The EU Somalia Unit and DfID

Strengthening Civil Society in Somalia: Developing a Comprehensive Strategy

Final report

March 2012
Disclaimer:

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The consultants would like to thank all those who kindly facilitated and supported our visit, especially Jane Rama and Nancy Thuo for an excellent job with arrangements, and Alberto Fait and Marcelino Benet of the EU field offices for their knowledgeable guidance in Somalia. Thanks also to all EU and DFID staff and partners and others who afforded us their time for interviews and completing two short questionnaires.
**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>Annual Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWEPA</td>
<td>Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESVI – GAVO</td>
<td>CESVI Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIR</td>
<td>Catholic Institute of International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSPE</td>
<td>Co-operation for the Development of Emerging Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development, UK Government</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOPAG</td>
<td>Forum for Peace and Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>Great Britain Pounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoR</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>International Socialist Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Joint Needs Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAGAAD</td>
<td>NAGAAD (women’s rights network in Somaliland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-State Actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Puntland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNSAA</td>
<td>Puntland Non-state Actors Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP 3 PILLARS</td>
<td>Peace/governance, access to services, poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
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<tr>
<td>SONSAF</td>
<td>Somaliland Non-state Actors Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SONYO</td>
<td>Somaliland National Youth Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORADI</td>
<td>Social Research and Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOSCENSA</td>
<td>South Central Non-state Actors Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Somalia Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>Somali Women’s Agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAid</td>
<td>United States Aid</td>
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Executive summary

This report sets out analysis and findings of an assessment of the Non-State Actors (NSA) programme of the European Union (EU) in Somalia as well as recommendations for a comprehensive strategy for civil society in coming years. The findings of this process are also interesting to DFID, particularly in view of the identification of the new programme for supporting civil society, and in the perspective of joint strategies with EU and other member states.

Current EU strategy is primarily focused on building the capacities of civil society, for participating in development actions, and in policy dialogue for peace and for supporting local peace initiatives. DFID’s strategy mainly focuses on constructing areas of stability in Somalia. Despite differences, EU and DFID match in supporting programmes focusing on NSA platforms and on strengthening local ‘indigenous’ or traditional peace initiatives. EU and DFID strategies, and the actions they support, are relevant in the Somali context and have been producing important effects and impact on civil society organisations capacity to deliver services and to engage in policy dialogue and peacebuilding in some key areas. Relevance has, however, been sometime lowered by a lack of process to base programmes on local contexts, and adherence to a requirement that agenda and priority setting involve strong partnerships where Somali organisations are able to meaningfully participate in identifying local needs.

Based on consultation with local and international actors involved in development initiatives in Somaliland, Puntland and South/Central Somalia; EU action impacts were observed regarding: CSOs capacities and legitimacy at community level; CSOs coalitions and NSA platforms; the capacity to build a common voice of NSA in front of political actors; CSOs participation in peace processes at grassroots and sub-national level; generation and dissemination of knowledge (although primarily directed at an international audience); representation of marginalised groups in policy change and the emergency of new organised actors supporting the interests of under-represented social groups.

However, project quality, efficiency, coordination and innovation were not always satisfactory. Further improvements can be facilitated by fostering - within the project selection and project formulation processes – the adoption of measures for improving partnerships, for increasing the application internationally recognised best practices (such as those proposed by OECD for support in fragile states) and for increasing alignment with the EU strategy for supporting civil society development. Lessons drawn from practices identified in the EU NSA programme highlight opportunities for:

i. use of local studies, conflict analysis methods and tools;
ii. improved partnership;
iii. application of good practices and standards;
iv. alignment of programmes and strategies;
v. use of independent evaluation;
vi. coherence with other EU programmes;
vii. new more inclusive approach to local peacebuilding;
viii. clarification of relationships between NSA and civil society organisations;
ix. support to legitimacy of civil society actors; and
x. support to new and emerging civil society actors.

The dynamics characterising Somali civil society organisations at different levels have been analysed, and based on the consideration of the specific drivers and dynamics of conflict in the different parts of Somalia and Somaliland, the specific roles for civil society organisations in current peace/state-building processes
have been identified. On this basis, specific needs for capacity building are set out and formulated into the framework for a new strategy.

Potential roles of civil society organisations were found to include:

- State-building; by grounding the constitutional process and fostering the setting of legitimate state and government, by grounding the peace processes in the policy issues related to people’s life and to conflict factors, by fostering the active participation of local actors to international and local led peace processes, and by advocating for international policies concerning external conflict factors.
- Local governance; focusing on making local institutions more accountable, improving the quality of services, improving the accessibility of public services, and by engaging in grassroots peace initiatives.
- New social actors; the emergence of new social actors, such as women, professionals, young people and people with disabilities, that are seldom recognised in the framework of peace and government building processes;
- The reduction of social exclusion and the construction of inclusive mechanisms for the representation of underprivileged groups in local and national governance processes;
- The fostering of a new role for Diaspora, as a set of collective actors to be engaged in local development initiatives.

On this basis a new strategy is outlined and attached as Annex 2, which aims at informing the implementation of the current EU 2010 NSA programme actions – and at informing DFID strategy and actions, not by changing the proposed theory of change, but by addressing a set of social and political dynamics that risk undermining the relevance of this theory, jeopardising peacebuilding both at local and national level. The strategy has the following main focuses:

a) Recognising Somali civil society organisations - hear them and support their involvement in political and policy processes.

b) Enable civil society to address or mitigate entity level, regional and international factors which contribute to conflict.

c) Supporting innovation and emergence of new actors.

d) Improving CSO actions impact on conflict factors and drivers, through analysis, methods and tools.

Coherent with the ‘variable geometry approach’ adopted by EU Somalia Unit, geographically specific focuses have been identified for Somaliland (the clarification of the respective role of public authorities and civil society and services), for Puntland (the re-opening the space for civil society and the emergence of new actors), and for South Central Somalia (the supporting of civil society movement in the framework of the transition and constitution making processes). The strategy was further developed by defining specific objectives, suggested outcomes, a set of monitoring indicators and a set of pre-conditions for effectiveness. Finally, a menu of options for concrete actions is proposed.
How this document can be used

This report is the outcome of an analytical work and of a consultation carried out in several phases, from September 2011 to March 2012. Following up the discussion that involved the many stakeholders of EU and DFID programmes for supporting civil society organisations in Somalia, rather than as a blueprint for the identification, formulation and implementation of the actions to be included in the EU programmes for supporting civil society organisations in Somalia, this document has to be used as a background paper for reflecting about the changing roles of CSOs, as a basis for improving the management of the programmes supporting CSOs and more in general non state actors, and as a starting point for launching structural dialogue in view of the next cycle of the EU programming activities. The document drafting has been finalised in March 2012, however the reflection on CSOs in Somalia that was activated through the consultation activities carried out is expected to continue, so to inform both EU Somalia Unit and DFID action as well as the action of its Somali and International partners.

The proposals provided through the report can be operationalised in some main ways:

- as a menu for possible actions and a map of emerging problems and issues, to be considered when defining programmes and projects;
- as background for a consultation, aimed at producing a common vision of issues and possible perspectives, among the donors, international NGOs and Somali CSOs;
- as a tool for informing the Somalia Unit and DFID programmes for supporting NSAs;
- as a tool for supporting the pro-active participation of Somali CSO and their international partners to the EU calls for proposals, both under the “thematic programmes” and the special programmes for Somalia.
1. Institutional framework and objectives

This report sets out the analysis and findings of an assessment of the Non-State Actors (NSA) programme of the European Union (EU) in Somalia as well as recommendations for a comprehensive strategy with civil society in coming years. The assignment was commissioned by the EU Somalia Unit and DfID Somalia and was undertaken in Sept 2011 by Mr. Rob Watson and Mr. Gianfrancesco Costantini: two independent consultants working under the auspices of ECO3. The team was supported by Ms. Anneke Meerkotter who provided technical support for the research and analysis.

Based on a consultation carried out by the EU Somalia Unit in January 2012 and on further meetings held in March 2012, a revision work on the report was carried out by Mr. Gianfrancesco Costantini in March 2012.

1.1. Objectives

The assignment was commissioned to assess the current programme and support the development of a new strategy for the EU. The findings of this process are interesting to DfID as they can facilitate a better integration of strategies and actions with EU and other member states.

The specific objectives of the assignment were set in the Terms of Reference (Annex 1) as:

- To develop a common analysis and evidence base for the EU and the UK on the role and potential impact of civil society on peace and governance in Somalia.

- To provide a common strategy to guide development assistance for the EU Somalia Unit and DfID in support of Somali civil society, as a revision of the EC strategy for NSAs support crafted in 2000;

- To develop common objectives and monitoring indicators (at least four) to be employed across civil society programming (and inform wider monitoring and evaluation initiatives), to strengthen the evidence base and impact of support to civil society in Somalia. The indicators should be gender sensitive.

1.2. Methodology

A participatory methodology was used in the assessment to involve a broad range of stakeholders, including the EU and – to a lesser extent - DfID, as well as international and Somali partners, entity government representatives, as well as other development actors in discussion around the key issues facing this work. Semi-structured interviews were set with a selection of the EU partners and entity governments. Visits were made to NGO and project offices in Nairobi, Hargeisa and Garowe. Questionnaires on partner’s programme details and their views on best practices were completed by 15 EU partners (summary attached as Annex 3). Focus group discussions were held with development actors in Nairobi, and NSA platforms in Somaliland, Puntland and South/Central Somalia. Moreover a focus group was held in Mogadishu, involving a variety of NGOs, Think thanks and Umbrella organisations.

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The term entity government used in this report refers to the autonomous and semi-autonomous emerging governments developing in the different sub-regions of Somalia, namely Somaliland, Puntland and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
wide set of documents were analysed, including research reports, academic papers, policy documents and a selection of project proposals (including logical frameworks and budgets).

Rather than relying on opinions and judgements, the findings in this report are mainly based on the identification and analysis of events, tangible and intangible ‘factual elements’ (such as representations, perceptions and attitudes) and phenomena (such as dynamics, actions and their features). These were either directly observed and gathered through visits to organisations and meetings or indirectly observed through the consultation of key informants and the analysis of documents.

Observation and analysis of the consultants has been shared and discussed with stakeholders both in individual meetings and in the collective interviews and focus groups that have been carried out in Nairobi, in Hargeisa and in Garowe.

The findings and analysis of the draft report were presented to a Validation Meeting in Nairobi at the end of the field visits. The event was attended by 44 representatives from partners and other interested embassies and donors.

Discussion of observations and analysis resulted in a consensus on the strategies and main findings (for example regarding the need of a greater recognition of Somali actors in partnerships). However, discussion did remain open on certain issues, such as:

- the definition of civil society organisations;
- the roles of elders, of traditional leaders and religious leaders;
- the distinction among CSOs and NSAs (and the relationships among different umbrella organisations);
- the focus on activities rather than on outcomes in certain projects;
- the sustainability of field activities without a full support from international NGOs.

Moreover, on some issues the meeting allowed the launching of a reflection process (e.g. on partnership and monitoring and evaluation) and in some cases, the discussions led to a clarification of issues (such the importance of promoting competitive tendering and competition among organisations and their relationships with donors).

1.3. Limitations

Main limitations in the assignment concern the difficult local conditions hindering the possibility to carry out field work in Somalia. Security allowed for visits only to Somaliland and Puntland, and the lack of possibility to visit South Central Somalia meant that the team was not able to carry out a survey on local CSOs that would have provided stronger evidence, both on impacts and on the dynamics characterising Somali civil society. – but to mainly use key informants and documents. Such a situation increased the weight of indirect observation and resulted in the need of a greater and deeper consultation of key informants in Nairobi, in Hargeisa and in Garowe.

As stressed in the previous paragraph, despite this limitation, findings were verified through an iterative process, based mainly on the cross-checking of information from different sources, including key informants, documents and responses to the questionnaires.

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3 On this issues a consensus was not achieved in the meeting, and different positions can be registered both among CSOs and between the consultants and certain NGOs.
2. Review of EU and DfID activities

2.1. EU and DFID support to Somali Civil Society

Current EU strategy is mainly focused on building the capacities of civil society, for participating in development actions and in policy dialogue, and for supporting local peace initiatives. DfID’s strategy mainly focuses on constructing areas of stability in Somalia. Despite differences, EU and DfID match by supporting programmes focusing on NSA platforms and on strengthening local ‘indigenous’ or traditional peace initiatives.

2.1.1. EU strategies and actions

Since the collapse of Somali State in 1991 the EU has been, and still is the major donor in Somalia. Funds have been mainly provided through the following channels:

- The European Development Fund (EDF) (mainly for supporting development initiatives identified and managed by the EU);
- thematic programmes – such as the EIDHR, NSA–LA, and Food Security - supporting international NGO initiatives for peace and development;
- co-funding to the projects of United Nations (UN) and other international organisations (including the support to the re-establishment and strengthening of public institutions in Somalia);
- ECHO activities, supporting humanitarian aid for the management of emergencies and for improving community resilience.

EU support to civil society in Somalia is currently mainly channelled through a comprehensive programme set up in 2010 (Annual Action Plan 2010), under the title Support to the effective participation of Somali Non-State Actors in peacebuilding for an all inclusive state-building in Somalia and Support to the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment in Somalia finalised in 2009 (Annual Action Plan 2009). The programmes are based on matching the EDF funds, with EU thematic programmes funds, and the contribution of other donors - the main one being DfID.

The programmes are built on the strategy for NSA drafted in 2000, revised in 2003 and are broadly based on the Joint Needs Assessment, the Reconstruction and Development Programme, and the related Joint Strategy paper for Somalia 2008 - 2013, and seek to involve Somali civil society, in particular women and marginalised communities, in the promotion of state-building in a consensual way and in applying the Somali rhythm. This would of course promote the building of a long lasting peace.

Synergies and complementarities are expected to be seen with the projects carried out in the framework of thematic programmes, namely, NSA and Local authorities and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), with the EU led Democratisation programme, including the support to the Legislative sector in Somalia and with some UNDP led programmes, namely: the Joint Programme on Local Governance (JPLG), the Rule of Law and Security Project (ROEs), the institutional support package, the Constitution programme and the related civic education/public consultation components.

Under the overall objective to contribute to the alleviation of poverty in Somalia and to promote a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society⁴, the programme focuses on the specific objective to deepen peace and establish good governance through the involvement of Somali NSAs in key questions for state reconstruction. The following results are expected:

⁴ This objective was set in the RDP/Joint Strategy Paper.
a) Somali NSAs capacities in peacebuilding are strengthened and the traditional Somali mechanisms for conflict resolution restored.

b) Somali NSAs are capacitated and enabled to translate peacebuilding strategies into specific state-building interventions.

c) The role of women, youth, diaspora and marginalised communities in peacebuilding is enhanced and their continued strategic engagement in state-building ensured.

d) Women economic empowerment is promoted.

These programmes represent an update of the previous strategy, set up in 2003, which focused on a set of outputs identified in order to integrate peacebuilding and good governance practices, while recognising the civil society as a key tool, based on the increasing credibility of CSOs and the possibility to enable organisations to play an increased role of advocacy so to give – when coupled with a strengthened role of traditional elders – opportunities to the voice of communities to be heard and their shared interest to be protected.

Three main activities have been identified in the 2010 programme which follow up activities currently being implemented under the SISAS (Strategy on the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia – 9th EDF) and that will be completed at the end of 2011. Particularly, the below listed projects will be implemented from 2012 in the framework of the Annual Plan 2011 under the 10th EDF.

a) The second phase of the programme Pillars of Peace: beyond Dialogue, which is implemented by the international NGO Interpeace with three main Somali partners, consisting of the promotion of dialogue around sensitive national and sub-national issues, engaging key stakeholders mainly through the Somali traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, and of the strengthening of NSA capacities in facilitating peace processes. The EC contribution to this programme is currently 3.2 Million and for the next programming period it is 2.15 Million Euro.

b) The programme Strengthening the participation of Somali Non-State Actors in decision-making on peace, security and development, which is implemented by the international NGO Saferworld and consists of the strengthening of three NSA Platforms in engaging and empowering a critical mass of the Somali public, including civic and community leaders, in key issues of reconciliation and reconstruction. The EC contribution to this programme is currently 2.2 and in the next programming period it will be 2.15 Million Euro.

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5 The output identified in the 2003 strategy were: improved respect for the rule of law; improved managerial and technical capacities of CSOs, enhanced mechanisms of dialogue for conflict resolution; improved dialogue among civil society, the private sector, administration and the international community; non violent resolution of disputes.

6 The launching of these activities is expected for the end of 2011. Contracts will be signed with Interpeace and Saferworld and a call for proposals will be launched in early 2012 for other activities.

7 The international NGOs Interpeace and Saferworld have been identified for direct awards of contracts on the basis of the art. 168.1(c) of the Implementation Rules also applicable to the 10th EDF (de facto monopoly). Both NGOs are currently implementing two ongoing programmes which will be ending in 2011 and have commenced actions in support of peacebuilding and civil society engagement in 2003 and 2005 respectively.

8 The Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Somaliland, the Centre for Research and Development (CRD) in Central South Somalia, and the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) are three think tanks which collaborate with Interpeace in carrying out research activities, in supporting “local peacebuilding processes” and in implementing capacity building activities since the 1990s.

9 This project aims “To create contributions to peacebuilding and state-building, To transfer peacebuilding capacity (institutions), To transfer peacebuilding capacity (Civic leadership), To transfer peacebuilding capacity (Women, Youth, Diaspora)”

10 SaferWorld has been involved since 2005 in mobilising three Somali NSA platforms: SONSADF in Somaliland, PUNSAA in Puntland, and SOSCENSA in South Central Somalia. These platforms include networks and individual...
c) The programme Somali Women Agenda II, implemented by the NGO COSPE in partnership with the Somali NGO IIDA, which consists of strengthening the largest women platform in Puntland and South-Central in their advocacy and lobbying for gender equality and women empowerment in Somalia. The project focuses on advocacy at national and international levels, as well as capacity building of women’s organisation and public awareness in Somalia. The EC contribution to this programme is currently 2.2 and in the next programming period it will be 1.8 Million Euro.

d) Call for proposals aimed at providing grants and capacity building activities to women, youth groups, the diaspora, and marginalised communities (IDPs, minorities) for their involvement in national or sub-national peace agreement processes and in laying the foundations of the state will be published. The EC contribution to this programme under the annual action plan in 2011 is 1.3 Million Euro, notwithstanding the yearly NSAs thematic line budget of 2.5 Million Euro and the European Instrument for Democracy and HR.

Other donors are involved in funding the NSA Programmes. The programme “Pillars of Peace: beyond Dialogue” is co-funded by DFID, USAid, Switzerland, Sweden Norway and DANIDA. The programme "Strengthening the participation of Somali Non-State Actors in decision-making on peace, security and development" is co-funded by DFID and CIDA Canada.

Globally, current EU contributions to civil society development in Somalia amount at about 20 Million Euro and is delivered through the below listed projects. As mentioned above, these projects have been selected following Calls for Proposals under the Non State Actors (NSAs) and European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) thematic programmes. Not all the projects mentioned below are managed by the Somalia Unit governance section but also by the other section dealing with food security, rural development and social sectors. This shows the extent of the NSAs work in Somalia as service delivers.

**Programme summary of EU support for NSA in Somalia**

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<th>Project</th>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
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<tr>
<td>Support to Media Independence and Education</td>
<td>Relief International UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening Somali civil society capacities to promote environmental protection and sustainable development and to contribute to good local governance system</td>
<td>CESVI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved protection of human rights in Somalia/land through strengthening the Role and Capacity of Somali civil society organisation</td>
<td>Stitching OXFAM NOVIB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhancing the Role of Civics and Intellectuals in Peace-Building and Reconciliation in Somalia</td>
<td>H. Boll Stiftung</td>
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organisations based in the three considered areas and function as dialogue mechanisms on issues and agendas related to democratization, peacebuilding and the re-construction of the Somali state.

11 IIDA is a large women’s organisation which that was created in Mogadishu in 1991, in the aftermath of the fall of the Siad Barre regime bringing together individuals and women’s groups from all over Somalia. The Somali Women Agenda (SWA) was created as a national women’s movement including Somali women both within Somalia and in the Diaspora, mainly focusing on women participation to decision-making process. The formation of the SWA started in 2004. The platform was officially launched in 2007 with the participation of 22 organisations.

12 The number of women in the Transitional institutions does not currently fulfil the quota of 12% foreseen in the Charter. Access to education for girls remains limited compared with boys, reflected in women’s literacy rate of 14% (compared with a literacy rate amongst men of 36%). The practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) has an estimated 98% prevalence, with negative impacts on girls and women’s health. Women are the primary ‘breadwinners’ and dominate petty trade but capital assets are typically owned by men.
| Strengthening the participation of Somali Non-State Actors in decision-making on peace, security and development | SaferWorld LBG |
| Enhancing Popular Participation in Governance and Sustainable Development in Somalia and Somaliland (Focus on Women and Youth) | H. Boll Stiftung |
| Promoting Somali NSA inclusion in policy making | Saferworld |
| Empowering the Somali Women’s Agenda; Empowering Somalia | COSPE |
| Strengthening Non State Actors in the sector of Non-Formal Education and Vocational Skills | Foundation Caritas Luxembourg |
| Support to youth and gender umbrella associations in Somaliland | Terre Solidali ONLUS |
| Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating political participation and representation | Saferworld |
| Protection of the rights of children affected by the armed conflict in Somaliland and Puntland | CESVI |
| Strengthening radio stations in Somalia to promote human rights, peace and governance | BBC WST |
| Enhancing the role of youth and rural communities in peacebuilding through film-based discussions on peace, democracy and security | Interpeace |
| Setting News Standards in Somalia | Stitching Press Now |
| Engaging Non-State Actors in the Promotion of Alternative Energy Activities in Somaliland | ADRA-Somalia |
| Empowerment of Somali Non-State Actors | OXFAM GB |
| Strengthening the capacity of CSOs on civic dialogue, human rights and active citizenship in Somaliland | Catholic Institute of International Relations - Progressio |
| Strengthening the civil society to promote human rights and to provide legal services for victims | Foundation Caritas Luxembourg |
| Strengthening the Role of Somalia Red Crescent Society SRCS as Non-State Actor to better integrate the Youth into the Society of Somaliland | Deutsches Rotes Kreutz |
| Institutionalizing Democracy in Somaliland: Strengthening Civil Society for Effective Democratic Participation | H. Boll Stiftung |
| Strengthening use of media in promotion of human rights, gender equity and peace in Somalia | BBC WST |
| Action against Conflict and for Tolerance (ACT) in Puntland | DRC |
| Action against Conflict and for Tolerance (ACT) in Somaliland | DRC |
| Dialogue programme | DRC |
| Enhancing Participation of Somalis with Disability for Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland and Puntland¹³ | Handicap International |

¹³ This project is based on networking among people with disabilities group and on advocating policy changes, at local and national level.
In addition to the projects in the above table, other projects and programmes are funded by the EU through joint management with the UN and are seen to work directly with Somali civil society in their peace and governance work locally. Particularly, these include projects in the programmes for Governance, Reconciliation and Security, with a total budget of about 46 Million Euro. Projects include:

- The support to the legislative sector in Somalia (managed by the international NGO AWEPA);
- the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance (involving 5 UN agencies)\(^{14}\);
- the Somali Institutional Development Project (UNDP) and its component of the Somalia Constitution Making;
- the Somalia Democratisation Process II and III;
- Rule of Law and Security Programme III (UNDP)\(^{15}\).

Furthermore, as mentioned above, Somali civil society is impacted by the EU funded projects under Health, Education, Agriculture and Environment, among others. In fact, most of these activities are carried out through the involvement – mainly as implementing partners – of Somali NGOs and many of them foresee the support to grassroots and self-help organisations (e.g. pastoralist groups and associations, parents and community-based development committees).

### 2.1.2. DFID strategies and actions

Within the general strategy of DFID, which aims to promote longer-term stability and to directly transform the lives of poor Somalis\(^{16}\), DFID’s programming looks at local level peacebuilding, local governance, regional and national governance and core state functions, deepening democracy, and reducing external stresses. As pertains civil society, DFID mainly support civil society engagement in national and regional level policy dialogue. Going forward, DFID will be designing a number of new programmes, including a voice and empowerment programme.

The intended impact of the Governance and Peacebuilding Programme is increased stability and improved governance in Somalia, while the expected outcome is less conflict and better access to services in target communities in Somalia. The total amount of resources allocated for achieving this result in the period 2012 – 2015 is £72 million.

DFID programme design will be comprised of four programmes:

1. Core governance functions;
2. Stability programme – including support to stability fund launched in February 2012 at London conference\(^{17}\);
3. Voice and empowerment programme;

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\(^{14}\) This programme while aimed at constructing the capacity of public authorities also include actions aimed at involving citizens in monitoring public actions and in setting priorities for local development policies. These actions result in the mobilization of community and citizens committees at district and village level, assuming often a watchdog role in front of district and village councils, of elders groups and of service delivery agencies.

\(^{15}\) These projects focused in the past on formal justice, but are now looking at traditional justice and governance setting, and include actions aimed at improving citizens participation in the management of justice. An important basis for these project is the acknowledgement that not always local stability generate “local justice” and that therefore specific actions should be identified to this aim. Therefore, democracy and cultural change are assumed as issues to be considered in this framework. In this framework, practices to be considered as a reference for grassroots management of security and justice issues are the “District Safety Committees” set up in the UNDP ROLS Community Security experience.

\(^{16}\) DFID strategy is based on four pillars: a) governance and peace-building; b) wealth and job creation; c) health care, particularly for women and children, and d) humanitarian assistance.

(4) Monitoring and evaluation programme.

The new programme will scale up and build upon existing interventions. At present the DFID programming has been implemented to a large part through the UN and through a set of INGOs with a strong track-record of delivery in Somalia, including: CARE, Saferworld and Interpeace (matching the resources provided by the EU); PACT and the Danish Refugee Council. Moreover, funds have been given to Mercy Group and the Danish Demining Group. The activities of these organisations are to be considered as a reference in identifying specific measures that can be implemented for fostering peace building at local level.

DFID action on governance and peacebuilding is defined on the basis of a Theory of Change illustrated in the diagram below. According to this Theory, through a reduction of external stress and improvements in international coherence and community driven development initiatives as well as peacebuilding initiatives and community management and prevention of conflict – more peaceful societies would be produced. This would be seen first at community level, and then at the level of emerging (local) political entities, of political entities, regional states and at national level the development of legitimate public authorities and long term stability. Achieving this long term impact is related to the delivery of certain outcomes, including:

- at national level: a legitimate Somali-led process delivering peace in Mogadishu, Appropriate central functions that add value,
- at regional and local level: legitimate & accountable public authorities delivering core basic services; community engagement in development & economic activities strengthened,
- at community level: fewer conflict & more areas of peace; community engagement in development & economic activity strengthened; legitimate & sustainable political settlements.

In line with this Theory of Change, three sets of activities are funded:

- those carried out by UN organisations and some INGOs (Interpeace and Saferworld) dealing with the political dynamics at regional /national level (including the support to NSA platforms),
- those carried out by different organisations for fostering peacebuilding at local level, through the support to traditional or indigenous peacebuilding (i.e. elders led initiatives for solving conflicts on local resource management and clan-related disputes), through grassroots peace initiatives, such as the creation of local committees involving all stakeholders in local areas to promote local development initiatives showing the advantages of peace, and by training “peace facilitators” at local level,
- those aimed at fostering service delivery at community level based on local identification of needs (such as the activities carried out in the framework of UN Joint Programme for Local Governance, or some quick impact projects carried out in connection with grassroots peace initiatives).
2.2. Outcomes of the NSA Programme: relevance, effectiveness, impact

2.2.1. Relevance

EU and DfID strategies and actions regarding civil society and NSAs are relevant in the Somali context and on the whole, have been producing important effects and impact on civil society organisations capacity to primarily to deliver services and to a lesser extent to engage in policy dialogue and peacebuilding.

Relevance has however been sometimes lowered by a lack of process to base programmes on local contexts, and by the emerging of difficulties concerning the setting of strong partnerships where Somali organisations are able to meaningfully participate in identifying local needs. The consultation of Somali partners, and the support provided by the EU to the development of dialogue for agenda and priority setting, have not always impacted the setting of programme priorities. In some cases, these have been decided by donors and international organisations in a ‘top-down’ manner, reflecting the priorities of international actors (and sometimes the negotiation with Somali political parties, often only linked to Somali elites) more than local realities.
2.2.2. Effectiveness

Despite the difficult conditions for project implementation that are related to the persistent conflict in South and Central Somalia and to the political environment of Puntland and Somaliland, the programme has been generally effective: involvement of CSOs in peace processes increased; policy involvement of CSOs is growing—particularly on specific policy areas (i.e. education, health, gender, etc.); participation of CSOs to political processes is apparent (particularly in Somaliland); capacities of many CSOs greatly improved; service provision to disadvantaged people was often assured by CSOs; etc.

<table>
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<th>NSA Platforms</th>
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| In the framework of EU NSA Programme, a main action can be identified in the support to the development of three regional NSA platforms: SOSCENSA in South and Central Somalia, PUNSAA in Puntland and SONSIF in Somaliland. The origin of the platforms draws back to the claim for recognition of NSAs in the early years of this century and to the participation of NGOs, think tanks, traditional leaders and elders, religious leaders and businessmen in the peace processes at local and regional level. Based on these experiences a process was developed since 2004 – firstly supported by Interpeace, in partnership with APD, CRD and PCRC – and then transferred to SAFERWORLD – for building up platforms able to “strengthen non state actors to engage in domestic and international policy dialogue and decision making to bring about a secure and peaceful future for the people”.

Important basis for the constitution of the platforms were: on the one side, the recognition of NSAs by the Cotonou agreement, that provided a kind of legal framework for NSA to have a voice in policy dialogue; on the other side, a mapping exercise resulting in the acknowledgement of the existence of a wide fabric of organisations and networks, not only consisting of NGOs but also including many other actors in the different regions of Somalia.

In 2008, with the support of SAFERWORLD, assemblies for the constitution of the platforms were carried out and the three platforms created. Since then the three platforms developed in a different way, somehow reflecting the opportunities and difficulties emerging in the local context: SOSCENSA has engaged in generating policy positions with its member organisation and feeding these into policy dialogue processes, mainly working in trying to set a relationship with TFG institutions and to influence to constitutional process; SONSIF actively engaged in the preparation of elections and in the democratisation process in Somaliland (including the claim for larger space for the representation of youth and women, and including the participation to the debate on Diaspora role and the role of the civil society in the electoral process); PUNSAA actively engaged in the political dialogue in Puntland, mainly focusing on democratisation process and on awareness rising at local level on the key concepts related to the process.

The issues considered in their activities by SOSCENSA, SONSIF and PUNSAA reflect the main interest of the represented actors and to their agendas: the construction of an institutional space for dialogue and the construction of conditions for peace, security and governance. However these main interests are very general ones – peacebuilding and statebuilding, aid effectiveness and service delivery, democratisation - and are not necessarily leading to the identification and implementation of solutions concerning some of main factors in the conflict, such as those related to conflicting interests within the Somali society (i.e. access of different groups to resources; land ownership and management; management of financial resources and of public services, labour related conflicts, ethnic conflicts, etc.). Without a further effort for clarifying differences, interests and the constituencies that are linked to each of participating actors, it can be argued that it could be difficult to deal with these issues within the NSA platforms, while it is mainly in reference to the management of these conflicting interests and to the related governance processes that a special role can be identified for civil society organisations.

Moreover, while it is clear that the different issues considered by NSA are related to local processes and local priorities, they are to be recognised as concerning the political and institutional dimension rather than other local – and grassroots - priorities and needs, such as those more related to the management of resources, to the functioning of public services, to the identification of solutions to structural problems related to the interaction and to the conflicting interests of the different actors within Somali society.
These local priorities and needs are among those more considered by civil society organisations when they engage in service provision. However, service provision is not necessarily influencing governance, nor the management of inter-actor relationship, so to manage/reduce conflicts. Consequently, at this lower level, conflicts that are solved only at “institutional and political level” risk to re-emerge and perpetuate, particularly if spaces for dialogue and governance are not created. However it is mainly at this lower level that civil society actions can foster in the most effective way new governance initiatives, in coordination and cooperation with public authorities and with other NSA.

In this framework, while the support to NSA has been effective for facilitating the setting of dialogue spaces at higher institutional and political level, a further area remains to be explored in supporting NSA activity and organisation - also by promoting action research activities carried out by Somali CSOs and NSA platforms - namely that of local governance and local democracy, in which civil society organisations can play a key role.

In this generally satisfactory situation, however, it is possible to observe some critical issues that can be considered for improving programme effectiveness.

- The tendency, diffused among international NGOs (and thus also among local CSOs) to define project objectives in terms of “implemented activities” rather than in terms of results or outcomes. This is at least partially due to the need of NGOs to assume a “process based” approach. However the identification of activities and results can easily result in a lack of attention to the (positive and negative) processes and changes that are actually produced by project implementation, as well as in the involvement of local partners as simple “implementing bodies” rather than as actors really participating to project governance.

- The risk for public services to be recognised as the main space for CSOs action, undermining both the possibility of CSOs to assume a more active role in development policies and the process of creation of awareness of the importance and role of the public sector in Somalia, that can be one of driver for a change towards peace.

- The need for a more effective monitoring and evaluation system, at project level and at programme level: mainly monitoring and evaluation is carried out in an autonomous way by the NGOs managing projects\(^\text{18}\), through ROM missions\(^\text{19}\) and through the work of the EU field offices in Mogadishu, in Hargeisa and in Garowe. However, the difficult access to the areas in which projects are carried out and reduced personnel on the field hinder the effectiveness of monitoring in understanding effectiveness and impact at different levels. A further obstacle to monitoring and evaluation is the lack of results’ indicators.

- The difficult coordination among projects carried out by different organisations (particularly when international agencies or when different programs are involved), so that duplication of projects, competition among different organisations and projects running in parallel are – according to interviewed informants – a usual fact. Coordination meetings have been organised by the EU Somalia

\(^{18}\) According to the data gathered through questionnaires, only 1/3 of organisations involved in EU programme seem to have an effective M&E system. A result of inadequate monitoring is a lack of knowledge accumulation and transfer: little transfer exists of the knowledge and experiences developed in the field (many respondents talked about activities that are replicated without learning from experience). Moreover, the lack of coordination among partners around shared outcomes results in the fact that good practice mostly remains within each organisation. Looking at partners’ questionnaires not one partner was able to present and formalise specific good practices.

\(^{19}\) Results Orientated Monitoring (ROM) (rapid assessments) used by the EU did not always identify the weaknesses and the improvement of programme strategy and implementation. This is perhaps because of the focus on activities rather than on dynamics in local society and their information base is mainly consisting of data on activities carried out and of judgements by stakeholders. However in cases as that of Saferworld evaluation of 2008, despite resistances from involved organisations, the application of evaluation outcomes allowed for improving project relevance and impact.
Strengthening Civil Society in Somalia

Unit on certain focus areas for presenting new projects and coordinating them with those already in implementation stage. This effort needs therefore further support to be successful.

**Monitoring & Evaluation: the perspective of EU partners**

Evaluation and monitoring results can be somehow improved through the adoption of measures aiming at facilitating a self-evaluation attitude among partners and by adopting measures for promoting participation and ‘peer control’ in quality improvement processes. Mostly these measures can be based on the involvement of different organisations in shared monitoring and evaluation processes, that can, on the one side, increase the visibility of events and learning emerging from project implementation and on the other side let organisations improve projects not because of the opinion of external consultants (that are always seen with suspicion) but because of the emerging of a community of practice able to generate shared representation of reality and to put pressure on participating organisations. In the framework of the seminar held on September 29th for discussing the outline of the strategy for EU support to civil society development, a working group was held focusing on monitoring & evaluation. The following main points emerged from the consultation participants of EU international and Somali partners.

**What are the current shortcomings in the monitoring & evaluation of the projects/programmes aiming at peace-building and governance?**

- Problem analysis are often too general and do not include specific problems which the organisation intents to change in the period of the action.
- There is limited capacity among partners to define and assess outcomes and impact.
- There is a lack of understanding about what impact is and how to measure – and there are different views about what level to pitch outcomes.
- Focus on measurable “quantitative” impact. Lack of holistic participation hence partial impact. Targeted #s reached versus quality in terms of practice.
- There is little or no contact with other partners about what they are doing with M&E – this would be good.
- Different donors want different reports – should be harmonised.
- Many of the reports sent to donors do not represent reality: they are just done to keep the donor happy.

**How can evaluation be improved, while recognizing that the focus of programmes and projects are outcomes - rather than activities?**

- Agreement in the design phase about what is result, impact.
- Regularly update context analyses.
- Identify realistic and achievable problems.
- Coordination on different sectors, cluster monitoring – linking complementary sectors.
- Flexible approach in using M&E tools and review of applicability.
- “Strengthen” capacity of donor to follow upon processes. Donor should respond to reports – constructive/consistent engagement of donors with implementing partners.
- Keep it simple and appropriate to context.

**Are proposed indicators relevant for improving projects/programmes? Is it possible to set up common or joint M&E systems among the programmes/projects at a cluster level?**

- Proposed indicators are relevant but should be updated each year.
- In applying indicators, processes should be included as well as numbers if possible.
- Partners should also be able to report on progress towards meeting the outcome levels.

**In what ways concretely can the EU Somalia Unit influence and improve M&E in peacebuilding and governance initiatives?**

- Fund M&E person and M&E activities at partner level.
- Discussion and agreement on outcomes and M&E plans.
- Accompaniment on M&E e.g. trainings and resource persons.
- Harmonisation of reporting formats and donor reporting requirements.
2.2.3. Impact

Despite the limits of political representation in Somalia, as it will be analysed in the following paragraph, the programme impacted both policy making and on the political process, opening new spaces for dialogue between public authorities and NSAs and CSOs, creating space for peacebuilding at local level and increasing civil society capacities to intervene in the public arena. A growing involvement of civil society in local peace-making processes is apparent; particularly in supporting the local based traditional peace processes, while a few grassroots civil society based initiatives have been identified – mainly in border areas and with the direct support of international NGOs.

Great appreciation has generally been expressed by partners for the work of the Somalia Unit and more generally the role of the EU was highly valued by most actors. Partners said they appreciated the commitment and interest shown by staff at the EU for their work and the time they took to visit partners in the field (security permitting).

Based on consultation with local and international actors involved in development initiatives in Somaliland, Puntland and South/Central Somalia, the following impacts were observed:

a) **Capacity has been improved in a number of CSOs** through the many capacity building activities as well as the involvement of local organisations as (implementing) partners in international aid efforts. This has resulted in a large number of organisations with capacities and skills in project implementation and service delivery, and in a lesser measure in policy analysis and peace-building (for instance, over 900 organisations are known in South Central Somalia\(^{20}\), over 1200 organisations are registered in Somaliland, over 300 organisations were registered in Puntland – most of these organisations are probably not active, but have been involved in project implementation. CSOs run school, universities and other educational institutions, hospitals and health care centres, reconciliation activities and removal of militia checkpoints, reporting and advocacy for human rights, awareness-raising activities, and shelter provision for IDPs and other destitute persons, often without using resources from international aid\(^{21}\); paradoxically – according to many informants - these capacities and skills seems to be developed to a greater extent in the South and Central Somalia, where international NGOs have more difficulty to act directly. Even more paradoxically, capacities are often not recognised by international actors as a basis for trust: while Somali CSOs are considered as implementing agencies they are not considered by most donors as ‘actors’ capable to manage resources or to represent local interests.

b) **Coalitions of CSOs in local and sector platforms and networks emerged all over Somalia** (over 130 networks were censed by Saferworld in 2008, and currently more than 133 participate in NSA Platforms). Many local and sector networks have been created as a way to have an easier access to international resources and information, as a way to facilitate capacity building and transfer, and as a way to have a greater influence on local authorities and on policies at local and sub-national level, particularly concerning women and youth. The existence of these many networks was the basis for setting NSA platforms in the framework of the EU programme.

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\(^{20}\) SOCSNSA Magazine, N.1, Issue 1, 2011

c) **Aggregation of NSAs for having a common voice in front of political actors are in a development stage:** particularly through the just mentioned NSA platforms and through the setting of Somali Women Agenda local actors autonomous from political parties and from clan affiliation have started to interact with political authorities and international organisations; NSA platforms and their associated networks have been able to influence the electoral laws in Somaliland and Puntland; the South Central Somalia NSA Platform and the SWA are actively participating in the civil society action on the Somali Constitution process\(^22\).

d) **Peace processes at grassroots and sub-national level have been implemented**, and facilitated through the provision of funding and technical expertise by NGOs and think tanks. With civil society support a number of local peace initiatives have been launched, involving local actors – particularly the elders and the representatives of clans and local authorities – both in Somaliland, Puntland and South /Central Somalia (91 local initiatives were counted by Interpeace; which often received support by CSOs).

e) **Knowledge has been generated**, both through research activities carried out by think tanks and through collaboration with civil society organisations and universities (APD, PDRC, CRD, SORADI, are among local NGOs permanently involved in research activities) and an important amount of knowledge was produced and made available on pertinent subjects such as peace processes, customary law and Islam and women’s rights. It is important to note that perhaps most of this knowledge had a larger effect at an international level than in Somalia as the documents are mostly only published in English\(^23\)).

f) **Institutional and policy change has resulted in some significant improvements in the representation of marginalised groups**, in Somaliland for instance where a Human Rights Commission has been established with a female chair, and an amendment of the Electoral Law lowers the age of elected representatives and provides for the inclusion of women in political bodies (including a 25% quota in Parliament) and the formulation of the Child Protection and People with Disabilities Acts.

g) **Development of new actors within civil society** can be seen as an outcome has been the development and emergence of new organised actors, such the formation of groups of women, youth, IDPs and people with disabilities. In some cases local organisations were created as a way to benefit from international aid (it is the case for instance of community committees that often are created for identifying local priorities or for assuring maintenance of projects – JPLG supported the development of over 300 committees). Often these organisations have been assuming a kind of autonomous dimension related to the possibility to represent local (or social group) interests in front of external actors such as local or entity level emerging government.

\(^{22}\) Based on a set of meetings with a large number of civil society organisation, public declarations have been issued by a group of South Central Somalia civil society organisation networks – including SOSCENSA and the SWA – claiming for a more meaningful participation of civil society to the formulation and implementation of the “Somalia End of the Transition Roadmap” and of the “transitional period”. Cfr. SOSCENSA, *Citizens’ dialogue. The role of citizens and civil society in the transitional period*, Mogadishu, August 2011 and the declaration on the lack of representation of civil society in the “Consultative meeting on ending the transition in Somalia” (6 September 2011). However, both declaration also show the relative weakness of the support to civil society organisation participation, that proved unable to foster their participation in the process for setting the “roadmap”, which only involved political parties and representatives of the Transitional Federal Government and of the Governments of Puntland and of the Galmudug state.

\(^{23}\) Many documents are available only in English, but some actors seem to be particularly careful of having documents also published in Somali language. It is for instance the case of Somali Women Agenda having most documents also published in Somali.
h) **The legitimacy of CBOs and support they enjoy from their communities has been enhanced.** The delivery of goods and services by local NGOs (through the support they receive from international NGOs that nearly always involve local NGOs or local CBOs in their activities has resulted in a greater legitimacy of local organisations in front of communities, and in their capacity to gain their support.

Often community support and social legitimacy of civil society are perceived as a threat by local political authorities that in most cases access fewer resources than NGOs and are less able to provide services (the threat of mobilising people at grassroots level has been referred by some informants as an important tool used by women organisations for influencing politicians).

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**The dialogue trap**

A **major outcome** of EU supported programmes on NSA and civil society organisations involvement in peacebuilding has been the creation of 'neutral' spaces for debate and for peace dialogue. Substantial effort and resources have been spent on supporting meetings and dialogue initiatives involving elders and clan leaders (Diyah groups) to meet in order to discuss and solve conflicts at local level.

Many local based peace initiatives become “case of school” for further initiatives. A key elements of the dialogue and peace building initiatives supported in the framework of the NSA Programme has been the involvement of actors that were not represented in most peace consultation activities at higher institutional level, such as elders, religious leaders, intellectuals and often also the leaders of civil society organisations. This allowed a better representations of both stakeholders in conflicts related to resource management and the intervention of third actors, with a mediating role. Carrying out these initiatives required often an injection of resources from outside, for supporting local processes.

As it has been observed, peace dialogue initiatives mainly provide solutions on local conflicts related to the management of resources, but are in most cases unable to remove structural causes for conflicts or to reduce structural unbalances and injustice:

> in most cases vulnerable and excluded social groups are not participating in peace dialogue. However, exclusion of groups from social and political participation was recognized as a main factor in conflict so that the adoption of peace dialogue as a main tool for peacebuilding can be a trap, leading to the maintenance of the status quo, rather than facilitating social change.

Emerging from the trap may require a greater involvement of excluded groups (such as – on the one side - those related to minorities or women's organisations and – on the other side – those related to political groups not represented in governments/entities) as well as the fostering of initiatives dealing with structural issues in Somali society (including land and water management). These initiatives can assume not only the traditional approaches such as dialogue, but also new forms, such as that of local committees for management of services or for planning purposes, that of multi-actors working groups involved in action-research. Sometimes, different institutional formations can be integrated so to be able to involve different kinds of actors.

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2.3. Resources and management in NSA Programme: efficiency and sustainability

2.3.1. Efficiency

A difficult context

Efficiency and sustainability of programmes and projects in Somalia appear to be influenced by the conflict situation. Costs tend to be higher on the whole, and high insecurity conditions often lead to changes in planned activities or to the need to carry out activities abroad, with an important increase in costs. The EU Somalia Unit attempts to control costs and budget structure, but it is frequent that project costs do not comply with required standards or that actual costs in project implementation are not fully reflecting those in formal budget. However, the co-financing of initiatives by EU and DFID is to be seen as a best practice, both for reducing administration cost of programmes and for increasing the leverage capacity of invested resources.

As in most international aid settings, different standards are often applied both by international NGOs and the UN agencies – whose funds are also provided by EU or DFID - in their relationship with local implementing agencies. Among the consequences of such a situation there is growing informal competition among organisations and a general trend towards the increase in costs and fees. Among the phenomena observed, a particularly important one for its effect on civil society organisations is the use of a wide range of different fees by different organisations for local and international staff which results in a high turn-over of professionals in organisations.

This situation not only influences the efficiency of single projects but appears to generate mistrust both among international organisations working in Somalia, and among Somali civil society organisations and public authorities (as observed in several meetings, in Nairobi as well in Hargeisa and in Garowe).

A growing specialisation of involved actors

Under the EU NSA programmes most projects and programmes are selected through Calls for Proposals (about 25 projects, selected through to 3 calls per year) while a set of 5 projects are carried out under direct agreements. Despite the fact calls for proposals are open, only a relatively small number of organisations submit proposals due to:

- the complexity of Somali environment, that keeps away organisations that are not already well positioned in the country;
- the need of being an organisation registered in a European or in ACP countries, that exclude organisations established in Somalia;
- the need to have a good financial records, and in some cases the need to present bank warranties, that exclude small organisations and often also well established Somali organisations that would be able to set up a foreign branch for fundraising purposes;
- the fact that most capable Somali organisations are operating in somewhat of a ‘comfort zone’ as partners of international NGOs or international agencies, so that often for them funding is assured through good relations with international partners;

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26 However – according to consulted informants - costs are lower in the activities carried out in Somalia than in those carried out in other complex conflict situations (such as Afghanistan).
27 for instance by adopting a standard practice allowing in project budgeting an allocation of 35-40 % for administrative costs and salaries and an allocation of 60/65 % in operation of activities – including consultancies and studies), on top of which there is the regular 7% overhead applied in the EU
28 Following to this, EU Somalia Unit is often exercising a further effort for applying corrective actions.
- the complexity of procedures – and the fact that they are often seen as too expensive, that lead NGOs having other possible simpler sources of funding, deciding not to compete for EU funds.

As a consequence of that, some phenomena emerge, that can be considered relevant for project and programme efficiency. Namely: a) a growing specialisation of the NGOs working in Somalia, that in principle can be seen as a positive process, allowing for a better use of resources; but since it also produces a “quasi-monopolistic” situation it can easily result also in a tendency to a less efficient use of resources; b) a tendency of many international and even Member States’ aid agencies to set up direct agreements for project support, ‘drawing from a small pond’ instead of practicing competitive selection of projects; therefore a twofold situation emerge: experience and specialisation facilitate a better use of resources, but lack of competition can result in the tendency to not care about efficiency.

Even more important than the impact on the use of resources, is in this context the risks to jeopardise innovation: specialised organisations tend to replicate actions (particularly when there are practices that proved to be working). This is particularly true in a setting like that of Somalia, in which there is little monitoring and evaluation of the inter-action among projects and the local environment and where many other factors influence the final project outcomes and results.

Uncertainties in management and a sometime a difficult relationship among actors

In 2008, EU NSA Programme in Somalia was considered as a good practice in “channelling aid through Civil Society Organisations”. This was mainly related to the development of a “wide range of engagement strategies with CSOs for addressing state and peace building challenges …. As well as facilitating and empowering CSOs to participate meaningfully in multiple cooperation/coordination mechanisms and forums” and through a “strategic consideration and specification of the roles to be played by CSOs in different sectors of intervention” 29.

Nevertheless, some problems have been observed during the mission. These are not concerning the strategic orientation of the cooperation with CSOs, but mainly regard the relationships between local CSOs and international NGOs and the setting and management of partnerships:

- often unbalanced relationships exist between International NGOs and Somali CSOs, in which the International NGO plays a leading role and keeps the control over resources;
- despite increased capacities, often Somali CSOs are considered “unreliable” or unaccountable, by European partners (accounting procedures are considered as a main fragility of local CSOs, while their main strengths are identified with the capacity to carry out actions and to respond to community demands);
- information on available resources and on resource management is normally not equally distributed among all partners, and this often generates mistrust within partnerships;
- official information and communication on projects (including the EU documents and calls) is in English, and this is often considered an obstacle by local organisations for accessing information.

These problems have been matter of debate also in the seminar held in Nairobi with EU partners on September 29th, 2011 and are reported in the box below.

Partnerships: the perspective of EU partners

During the validation meeting held in Nairobi on September 29th 2011 a workshop was carried out for discussing partnerships. The main issues emerged from the discussion are reported below.

Main partnership weaknesses:

- No analysis from local partners.
- Overemphasis on financial aspects of accountability.
- Poor studies.
- No real direct accountability – uneven relationship.
- Differentiated expectations from various donors. – UN should follow the rules as other implementers.
- Remote control mechanism of monitoring.
- Security issues.
- Difficulty in responsiveness. Late responses.
- Overreliance of INGOs and donors on the same local organisations.
- Patience to mentoring by the INGOs.
- Sustainability.
- INGOs imposing on local NGOs in some operations.

Possible improvement in partnership setting and management:

- Accountability should be couched to the local NGOs and transparency. Don’t take them as partners if not willing to be accountable.
- Capacity building & training.
- Hiring independent monitors and evaluators.
- INGOs should be innovative in their expectations of the local NGOs.
- INGOs and donors should walk with the local partners – horizontal relationship.
- Local partnership validation workshops should be held.
- Create a blog for local partners to give their contributions.
- Empowerment of the local partners.
- Clearly defined roles of each.
- Inclusiveness of the local NGOs from the onset of the implementation (PCM).

What the EU can do to improve partnerships:

- Social media - Create a blog for feedback from the local partners and gathering information.
- In reporting one page to be dedicated to the partners for comments.
- Information sharing through workshops on the ground in Somalia e.g. to explain the strategy or call for proposals to the civil society.
- EU to have intra-regional meetings to clarify expectations, problems etc.

2.3.2. Sustainability

Both according the International NGOs and local partners, the sustainability of initiatives initiated through the NSA Programme appears to be in most cases still low. This is due to different reasons, such as:

- the lack of a recognized juridical status of Somali CSOs (particularly NGOs) that involves the impossibility for them to directly access UE resources\(^\text{30}\);

\(^{30}\) According to many key informants, efficiency and sustainability would be well improved through fostering the funding of Somali civil society with international organisations partnering to provide ‘accompaniment’ and support as they take on new roles and responsibilities. However, as further discussed later, such an option finds an important obstacle in lack of legal recognition of Somali CSO.
- the fact that – despite the consultation activities promoted by EU in recent years - **projects are sometimes identified and designed according to donors priorities and programmes**, so that in many cases local demands and priorities are only partially considered;
- the **lack of defined local agendas** independent from international lead conferences, plans and agendas (till the actions concerning the setting of local agendas for constitution setting and for elections appear very much linked to international pressures);
- the **(economic) dependency of Somali CSOs** and of their initiatives for peace and governance – from international resources, and particularly from the resources of EU - and the lack of exploration of new sources of funding, particularly for supporting peace and governance initiatives: private resources and resources provided by “un-conventional” sources – such as international Islamic aid agencies – are mainly if not exclusively addressing humanitarian support and the provision of basic services;
- the fact that - since 1992 - NGOs often adopted **practices that tend to increase the dependency of local actors**, such as paying “participation fee” for the attendance to meetings; organisation of meetings abroad and the payment of “per diem” for those attending to these meetings; organisation of meetings abroad and the payment of “per diem” for those attending to these meetings; provision of financial support covering all costs of activities on the field; payment of very high salaries to qualified people (so that it is often impossible for local CSOs to find qualified local resources, and producing a competition based on the possibility to pay high salaries that tend to increase project costs for international NGOs; support to the setting of field offices for local CSOs that are far from being “affordable” for them without external support (but that set local references as for the creation of an office).

**The $10 participation fee – eroding the per diem culture**

In many cases the assessment found per diems are paid as an incentive to support participation in local peace-making, training or capacity building activities. This practice is usually reported as “$ 10 participation fee”.

No standards currently exist between different organisations and donors so that per diem can vary greatly (sometimes amounting to hundreds of US$ per day) and often are a matter of discussion between the actors involved. Although the UN is often cited as the biggest problem and payer of high per diems, the practice appears widespread. Despite a written request to the contrary, the EU is often considered by partners as a main contributor to this practice (perhaps because it is the largest of funders). Clearly this is having a negative influence on motivation for attendance which should be because of the RELEVANCE of activities to the participant, not material gain. Costs of course can be covered, but the EU and DfID partners should ensure that per diem is not paid as an incentive, either in the implementation of activities or to supplement salaries. Coordination is required with the UN and others to ensure this practice is addressed.

EU and partners can better improve the relevance of their activities and explore the non-material incentives that can be used to incentivise and reward participation in activities, as well as liaise with the UN and other donors to ensure standards for the use of per diems are broadly established.

In the Validation Meeting of partners, the concern was expressed by participating INGOs and Somali CSOs regarding the consequences of the use of per diems: as they are often seen as a need, but also seen to negatively impact on the local environment and create dependency on donor funding. The difficulty was also raised in spotting and defining local interests where people participate because of per diem and because of the possible competition among activities of different organisations over different amounts of per diem paid for similar activities.

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31 Organising meetings abroad is often a need due to unsafe conditions within Somalia or to the lack of opportunities to travel within Somalia even for Somali people coming from different regions. However organising meetings abroad is to be considered as a last resort solution. As a fact in addition to produce an higher increase of activities’ cost, it often generates mistrust and conflicts among local actors.

32 In meetings with NGOs and through documents, it was observed that some NGOs tend to pay salaries that are well above of those normally practiced by International NGOs, while others are not able to recruit qualified personnel because of the low salaries.
2.4. Lessons learnt from the NSA support programmes

Lessons can be drawn from good practices identified in the EU NSA programme as it follows.

- Use of local studies, conflict analysis methods and tools can be practiced in an extensive way by the EU and partners to better understand and respond to the local contexts and conflict actors and dynamics.
- Better partnership could improve local ownership, relevance and sustainability: examples in the EU programming show the possibility to adopt approaches building incremental and more sustainable peace through supporting and mentoring local research-based institutions, using a participatory approach designed to empower civil society and non-state groups, rather than, dominating and instructing local institutions. For promoting the actually adoption of such and approach specific resources should be earmarked within projects and programmes.
- Standards can be applied for improving project and programme efficiency and sustainability, particularly regarding: a) the competitive tendering process, b) the partnership agreements (which allow for all project details, including budgets to be shared and agreed before applications are made) c) the EU taking up its role as an active development partner beyond the funding of projects
- Better definition of programme and project results and outcomes can improve effectiveness.
- Better use of independent evaluation could produce better results and value for money. This would involve larger and better use of indicators. Indeed, it is important to note that indicators should not be used rigidly: numbers alone do not tell the story. Progressive and incremental change demonstrated merely by the existence of certain participatory approached are in themselves achievements in a climate where many never before have participate in any form of governance or public outreach.
- Coherence with other EU programmes is key to ensuring effectiveness.
- New more inclusive approaches to local peacebuilding need to be explored to involve emerging civil society actors.
- The relationships between different NSAs and the civil society may be further improved fostering clarification of actors’ roles and interests: NSAs include different actors sometimes with different and opposing interests, to increase effectiveness of their participation and consultation, the specific roles of the different actors as well as the relationships existing among them should be clear, as shown by the experiences of NSA platforms.
- Legitimacy of actors should be built and supported by political action, not just funding (funding may in many cases risks to generate dependency, while political support can increase impact of CSO actions): in this framework the importance of ensuring the space for civil society organisations to continue to work and provide direct advocacy, policy development and direct programming with and on behalf of Somalis is to be highlighted.
- Emerging local civil society actors need to be supported, while avoiding only restricting access to resources to main big actors.

3. Unpacking Civil Society in Somalia: agreeing on a concept

In Somalia as elsewhere, civil society organisations are often identified with NGOs or with other “formal organisations” and are mainly seen as implementers of initiatives designed by international organisations, involved with delivering programmes rather than enabled to act as change makers, or catalysts for improvements in policy and practice. Instead, by making reference to civil society organisations – in this report – we consider a great variety of organised actors, ranging from informal community based groups
to the organisations based on formal structures (such as NGOs) and to the platforms and networks composed by groups of organisations.

This wider approach to CSO is relevant with the approach already adopted by the EC Somalia Unit. As it has been observed in the already mentioned “Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations” (2008): “In the absence of a legal framework for CSOs in Somalia, the EC has to work for contractual reasons through European CSOs. However, in its support to local CSOs (always through INGOs), the EC explicitly covers a broad range of Somali CSOs, ranging from the well-established Somali NGOs to usually weaker community based organisations, professional associations, traditional and religious leaders, and also including the private sector. Under impulse and with support from the EC, all these actors have also been federated into local NSA forums”.

3.1. Applying the concept of civil society in the Somali setting

The application of the concept of civil society was often contested in Somalia (in fact it was often seen as in contradiction with the idea of clan as the most pervasive and only recognised structure in Somali society). Instead, the use of the concept of Non State Actors proved to be easier and was adopted as a reference in the Somalia Union Programme and as a basis for important actions such as the strengthening of Non State Actors Platforms, which were defined in the 2000 EU Strategy as all actors that are out of the state and are un-armed.

This definition however is not fully coherent with the definition of the concept Non State Actors (NSA) as it is used in EU policy documents. In these documents in fact the term Non State Actors is used as a synonym of civil society and it is somehow integrating some of the main features that are normally attributed to civil society. By EU definition NSAs are in fact expected to be structures that are created voluntarily by citizens, their aim being to promote an issue or an interest, either general or specific. They are independent from the state and can be profit or non-profit making organisations.

A main risk in using the concept of NSA without making reference to specific features is to include all actors existing in a society – very often with different and conflicting interests - and therefore to risk to have a concept which is synonymous to that of “society”, difficult to use for setting a common purpose or strategy.

33 By considering as “civil society organisations” not only NGOs but a wider set of groups and collective actors, an issue emerge about the difference between the State and public actors and civil society actors. As a fact, the concept of civil society – as well as of NSA – has been originally defined to identify actors, that are out of the political institutions, that play a different role from that of the State and of the actors in political institutions and that have a different social nature. Considering that, governance would be defined as a space in which the different actors interact with different roles and functions, so that supporting NSA and CS would also require to continue to engage on State and its relations with citizens.

34 The term “civil society” was used in 2002 by Oxfam-Novib for mapping actors that are out of the state, also including those related with traditional institutions such as “elders committees” and “religious leaders”. The mapping in fact was considering: Community-based organisations, comprising traditional elders (oday dhaqameedaya), religious leaders (Hogaamiye diineedaya), social and community groups (Kooxaha Bulshada); Local non-governmental organisations (Hayadaha aan dawliga ahayn ee deegaanka gudaha); Professional associations (Xirfadleyda) such as for teachers, medical personnel, lawyers, journalists, performing artists/composers.

35 “Communication of the Commission on the “Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy”.

36 Even if the many different actors composing a society can have common goals at a certain time, as – according to some informants is in Somalia, where different actors are claiming for peace – these actors would in a further time develop different and opposed interests. The presence of a plurality of actors and a plurality of interests within a society cannot be denied by considering that they “have a common culture”. In the fact, Somali society has been torn by conflict and has been involved in so many change processes – from different colonization processes, to migration, to the development of contemporary political Islam, to the emergence of different kinds of professional groups, and
We chose therefore to propose a more specific operational concept that includes civil society organisations only, defined as:

**Collective actors (thus groups, not individuals), created voluntarily, with a membership that participate freely to the association, that are relatively independent from other institutions and that find their legitimacy in the fact they act and mobilise themselves to achieve a goal and to represent general or specific – but not private – interests.**

Therefore, we do not consider elders, other traditional governance institutions and religious leaders as civil society organisations to be included in this definition.

The value in including elders among civil society organisations was also discussed during the workshop held in Nairobi on the findings of the study and while it is clear that elders play a key role in Somali society, it is also clear that elders are mainly not organised as a permanent group and that they are “organically” linked with clan structures. Moreover, that of being an “elder” is a role that all Somali adult men assume when requested by his clan (or sub-clan). It was therefore confirmed that while often elders participate to CSOs, they cannot be considered as a CSO.

Looking at Somali society – we will include in civil society also the many Somali organisations that have been created and exist out of the Somali territory (i.e. Somali diaspora). A key distinction for identifying CSOs is the basis of legitimacy of the actor – if the actors draw legitimacy from a clear constituency with the representation of interests from that constituency it fits with this definition.

so on – that it seems not possible to talk about a common and unified “Somali culture”. It seems more relevant in a framework like that of Somalia to talk about a complex process of cultural change that needs to be recognized.

37 An issue that is often raised when discussing about Civil Society in Somalia – concerning the possibility to have “autonomous” organisations – is the fact that CSO leaders are normally playing different roles: normally they are involved in elders’ meetings, sometimes they participate to governments and political activity/institutions, they are involved in business, etc.. However, looking carefully, this situation is not unique to Somalia: in most societies, individuals are playing several, overlapping roles. This minds that when looking at the autonomy of organisations an “ideal condition” is posed, that in practice has to be measured with real situations. What make an organisation autonomous is not the fact that members are not influenced by others, but that decision making mechanisms exist within the organisations. This is also an additional reason to include only collective bodies and not individuals within the proposed framework. A further reason can be identified in the need to “escape” to the tendency to identify Somali society with “clan structure”. While clan structure exists and is very influent, a main feature of CSO is to be not directly dependent from clans (as claimed by almost all CSOs, opposing to the use of the 4.5 model in the management of CSOs/NSA participation to policy dialogue initiatives with TFG and UN).

38 Not considering these actors as civil society organisations does not mean that they do not play an important role in local governance and in peacebuilding. Nor the fact that they should be not listed among “NSA”. On the contrary, we recognize that, as others (i.e. private sector, etc.) these actors play a specific role in governance and peacebuilding often, currently, greater that the one played by civil society actors. Considering them within civil society would somehow jeopardize this role, while at the same time would not allow to recognize the further role that civil society actors can play in representing interests that sometime can challenge established social, cultural and religious traditions. This is a crucial issue when looking at the role of actors in peacebuilding, particularly in Somalia: as observed in the Interpeace “Peace Mapping” traditional governance systems are very effective in managing conflicts and in fostering temporary solutions, but “per se” are unable to influence the structural factors that deal to conflict.
Somali Civil Society – A diachronic view

Civil society organizations have a relatively short history in Somalia and Somaliland. The Siad Barre regime in fact banned all organizations out of those directly linked to the state. The “mass organization” set up by the regime – according to the socialist model that was formally the reference – never did develop themselves into autonomous organizations as happened in many former “socialist” countries, not at central nor at peripheral level. They simply collapsed with the regime.

The main environment for the development of civil society organizations in Somalia and Somaliland has been therefore that of the chaos that followed the fall of the regime. All over Somalia and also abroad Somali created a very large number of organizations, of very different kinds: from self-help groups at village level involved in managing the environmental resources and the agricultural or pastoral work – often created in the framework of “traditional” institutions and so embedded in them that is sometime difficult to distinguish the boundary between “traditional groups” and “civil society” organizations – to urban based NGOs, think tanks and research institutes, created through the mobilization of Somali elites, both within Somalia and outside, sometime with a vision on the future of Somalia, often with the aim to support disadvantaged people, as well as with the aim of generating access to professional and financial opportunities. In many cases, these organizations were maintaining direct linkages with clans and family groups, while in others they were created so to not respond to clan interests and to cross clan boundaries.

After 1991 most of these many organisations have been nurtured by international aid, mainly as implementing or supporting agencies, for facilitating the delivery of aid (often food aid) and the implementation of development activities at local level. Two main models to approach local organizations emerged in this period: the identification and contracting of local NGOs as implementing organizations – often leaving them little autonomy also in the management of field activities; the direct intervention of international NGOs at grassroots level, identifying or creating community based organizations, as a way to organize the beneficiaries of their activities.

Despite that, it is in this same period that some Somali organizations – often based on professional groups or on interest groups, such as that of women – start to mobilize themselves to find resources at the international level on agendas and development initiatives autonomously defined.

The proposed concept does not pretend to be applied to all kinds of studies and analysis of Somali society and to fully comprehend the complexity of Somali culture, but is proposed as a conventional tool to the purpose of the analysis carried out in this report. Adopting the concept defined above allows the identification of a large number of collective actors that can be roughly articulated along a continuum from grassroots level to national and an international level. Such a continuum can be represented, by making reference to a model that was applied in civil society organisations mapping in the framework of EU initiatives and that is simplified in the graphic on the below.

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4. A differential analysis of civil society organisations in Somalia

Using the conceptual scheme shortly described above, a differential analysis is possible, aimed at identifying both the specific issues related to different groups of organisations and to the identification of main capacity building needs that are featured by each group.

**service providing and advocacy organisations**

An important issue to be raised in this framework is the choice to not differentiate between “service providing” organisation and “advocacy” organisations. As a fact:

a) all civil society organisations are in principle both “service providers” (even if the provided services consist of research and advocacy or right defence activities) and “advocacy organisations” (actually, when civil society organisations stop to carry out initiatives aimed at making visible the interests of local actors, their needs as well as the issues emerging in local reality they tend to loss their “capacity” and “nature”).

b) a formal distinction between “service provision” and “policy” or “advocacy” organisations is sometime emerging in second level organisations (NGOs, research institutions, etc.), while both in first degree organisations (informal groups, CBOs, etc.) and in third and fourth degree organisations this distinction is very tricky: very often CBOs policy related activity is embedded in service provision, as well as in many cases the policy activity of third and fourth level organisations needs to include service provision to be effective.
Based on the lessons learned from the 9th EDF, a model for identifying the institutional capacity building needs of CSOs has been developed. This model considers capacities not just as the application of knowledge and skills, but as the ability to show action and outcomes from organisational processes from both within the organisation and in their environments. To deal with these different dimensions it seems necessary to identify three main capacity areas:

- the **individual skills**, where the questions are linked to professional capacities and to strategic leadership; and where training and traditional capacity building activities can produce the desired outcomes;
- the **organisational internal dynamics**, that include the presence of organisational conditions allowing making the most of individual skills and available resources, with specific attention paid to the aspects of identity, as well as to the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness; in this case, rather that training and capacity building activities, institutional development dynamics should be activated within the concerned organisations;
- the **organisation's interactions with other actors and the context**, in which the capacities to interact with the environment and to manage available opportunities and possibilities are the focus of the process; this would not require capacity building activities but rather initiatives addressing the social, political and legal environment in which organisations participate.

**geographical differences**

Differences exist among organisations in Somaliland, Puntland and South and Central Somalia. However, due to the fact that most of them have been involved since the fall of Siad Barre regime in common processes (such as those linked to international aid) many features of the civil society organisations are common in the different regions, while sometime a greater distance exists among the organisations that are based in urban and rural settings. Urban organisations (as most NGOs) have often similar features despite the fact of being based in different regions, and often a common features are shared by these organisations because of their linkages with international communities and with Somali diaspora. In the analysis, however, some differences emerging at regional level are highlighted.

**The legal framework**

No legal framework for civil society exists in the whole Somalia, so most Somali civil society organisations do not have any defined legal status, although few organisation – mainly created by Somali diaspora groups – are registered abroad, particularly in Kenya, the USA, Canada, the UK and Italy. The lack of a recognised legal status prevents Somali civil society organisations from directly accessing EU funds.

Policies in Somaliland and in Puntland have recently been established to provide legislative frameworks for regulating both international and national civil society organisation and are formally aimed at ensuring that NGOs activities are in line with the government’s development priorities and at improving accountability and transparency. Both NGO Acts provide for implementing projects and require local civil society organisation and internationals to be registered by national authorities.

In both cases little consultation was involved and the Acts were strongly contested by Somali civil society organisations and by International NGOs. In fact the laws were perceived as an attempt of government to increase

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its control over civil society organisations’ resources and activities. The entity governments, on their side, claim there is an important need for better coordination of the many actors and resources being used in their areas.

Based on the NGO Act in Somaliland, that requires a formal constitution, an address and internal bylaws, about 1200 organisations have been registered - many of them not being active. In Puntland, based on the NGO Act an NGO Desk was created in the Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation that launched a database of Local Active NGOs (LNGOs). A fee of 500 US$ is required for registration, as well as the presentation of progress reports to the Minister on a regular basis. After launching of the database the number of registered organisation was reduced. The registration certificate was revoked for about 273 organisations and only few dozen civil society organisations are now recognised by the Puntland authorities. In Somaliland, SONSAF has been involved in discussions on the NGO Act and is a member of the “NGO Consultative Committee” set up by the Somaliland Ministry of Planning. In Puntland, PUNSAA has been working with the Puntland Ministry of Planning for the planning of the mapping of CSOs and held civil society consultation meetings related to the process.

Supporting the development of a relevant civil society legal framework by EU and DfID can include political support to CSO and NSA platforms in claiming for a reform of regulative framework and provision of expertise, both to governments and to CSOs platforms, for drafting regulation based on international best practices. Moreover, an action is needed to foster the inclusion of an appropriate CSO legal framework in the end of transition process. An appropriate legal framework can be based on the registration principle instead of the principle of approval by government on which are based current frameworks.

Moreover, the donors can facilitate the setting of new more inclusive legal framework, by promoting the engagement of NSA and CSO platforms and umbrella organisations – including those of International NGO – in setting a system for registering Somali and international NGOs and for maintaining a record of their activities (such a system can be set as a roster updated annually, providing both to donors, governments and civil society organisations information on active organisations, engaged both in service delivery and in policy/advocacy activities. The roster can provide information facilitating the assessment of organisational capacities, based on the clarity and coherence between organisation’s mission, vision, constituency, organisational features, partners, resources and action.

4.1. First level organisations

First level includes community based organisation, self-help groups and other informal and formal grassroots organisations. Numbering these organisations is impossible since they are likely to exist in each community. This group is therefore characterised by a great variety from:

- semi-traditional groups (such as those created for maintaining irrigation and water infrastructure),
- to the associations set up by international NGOs as a way to organise beneficiaries, to the community management committees recently set in many villages and districts of Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia or
- the local leadership consortia in Mogadishu, supported by the UN – Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery, or
- the many groups created by women and youth at village level all over Somalia.

The main features of this wide range of organisations are:

- very localised constituency and action with strong linkages to communities and capacity to mobilise local resources;

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42 Ministry of National Planning and Development. The Law Governing International NGOs in Somaliland
43 http://mopicplgov.net/ngo-desk
44 Declaration of Ahmed Harir Gas, Head of LNGO/CSO Desk UCU, at Puntlandi.com, August 18th, 2011
- needs-based approaches – often focusing on single issues – without a permanent presence;
- capacity to interlink with local traditional institutions (such as elders and religious leaders);
- vulnerability to lack of resources and to local emerging conflicts (often these organisations are clan based);
- lack of formal structures or the adoption of formal structure as a way to access resources, rather than as a tool for assuring internal democracy and accountability;
- capacity to deliver services and to implement actions, under the guidance of NGOs.

In the considered framework, dealing with peace and state-building processes, a main issue emerging for most organisations at a grassroots level is the lack of capacity to produce a vision of local interests and needs in terms of rights or citizenship.

Emerging institutional capacity building needs include the following ones\textsuperscript{45}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First level organisations: CBOs, self-help and other grassroots organizations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual skills building</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis of local needs and demands in terms of rights</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational capacity building</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanisms for producing a vision of local interests and needs</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Context related capacity building</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Recognition as “actor” in local development policies, by NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recognition as “actor” in local development policies, by public and political authorities</td>
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</table>

\textbf{4.2. Second level organisations}

Second level organisations include NGOs, research and training institutes, think tanks, intermediary organisations and other groups supporting a beneficiary population. Based on documents reviewed and from analysing network membership, more than 2000 organisations of this level can be estimated to exist all over Somalia, the majority of them being active only when opportunities arise. Despite the many differences it is possible to identify some main features, such as:

- often an urban based and professionalised constituency;
- dependency on donors and international NGOs – often a kind of symbiotic relationship with long term international partners (INGOs depend on local organisations for accessing territory and for delivering actions, local NGOs depend on INGOS for accessing resources)
- presence of formal structures, but often hidden actual structures of power and authority (leaders are often the owners of organisations) exist, while the culture, agendas and organisational shapes reflect those required by donors
- prevalent focus on projects, both when working in service delivery and when working on policy issues, and lack of a defined positioning in front of social and political dynamics;
- capacity to deliver that has been developed through time (un-capable organisation mostly disappeared) but that is matched with an intermittent vitality due to dependency on external funding for activities;

\textsuperscript{45} These priorities do not substitute the necessary assessment of capacity building needs. However, assessments have been produced by many actors, including UNICEF and UNDP (for their partners organisations), the NSA platforms, Oxfam GB, Terre Solidali, etc.
- limited transparency and financial accountability;
- the reference to local grassroots organisations as “beneficiaries”.

Some trends can be seen in the Somali context and are important to be highlighted about second level organisations:

a) The emergency of a new group of organisations, mainly linked to youth and women groups, with a “second generation” leadership, consisting of young professionals - sometimes returning from abroad.

b) The risk of the establishment of a kind of closed system, that create obstacles to the emergence and development of new organisations. The well established organisations existing in Somalia – often having a long period of very effective relationship with donors and international NGOs and highly qualified and well trusted leaders – risk to play a gatekeeper role, not only in the capitation and distribution of resources, but also in the setting of agendas and in defining policies. This can result in conflicts with organisations – and leaders – promoting innovation in agendas and policies.

c) The development and diffusion of Islamic NGOs and charities. These organisations, that developed in the last ten years have a great capacity for delivering services and mainly rely on funds coming from the Islamic countries and institutions (e.g. Arab Development Bank), are in many cases characterised by a rather “secular” culture. However they are rarely involved in the NGO community and communication networks and even more rarely engage themselves in policy dialogue and in policy related activities.

d) The fact that second level organisations often can be seen to be able to overcome clan and ethnic confines and are able to bridge traditional interests with new ones, as those of women and youth. Overcoming clan confines is done by networking or by including people from different clans.

Main needs for second level organisations are:

- a shift from project based activity to institutional development processes that allow them to define long term programmes, to develop consistent organisational cultures and agendas; to positioning themselves in front of emerging dynamics at local and national level;  
- development of mechanisms assuring greater openness to second generation leaders and internal democracy and accountability;  
- improvement of capacities for analysing local reality and defining agendas, in an autonomous way from international partners, and recognising the local CBOs as actors in development and the peace process;  
- exiting from locked in symbiotic relations and opening the space for cooperation with new emerging organisations, also considering the possibilities of new kinds of partnership among Somali organisations and diaspora organisations.

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46 Often, some Somali NGOs have been questioned because they function as “firms”, depending from a small group of owners and having a small constituency. This is not necessarily a problem, if the mission and vision of the organisation are focusing on providing “professional” service or to produce knowledge or relevant advise – as in the case of a research center or of a think tank. However defining how the constituency is coherent with mission requires the clarity of the mission and of the identity of an organisation.
Specific priorities for institutional capacity building emerge as it follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Individual skills building</th>
<th>Organisational capacity building</th>
<th>Context related capacity building</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting of organisational identity, including the definition of mission, vision, constituency</td>
<td>Mechanisms for avoiding symbiotic relationships with donors and international NGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Capacity for analysing local reality and defining agendas – including regarding the setting of objectives</td>
<td>Mechanisms for establishing new kinds of partnerships with diaspora organisations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mechanisms for internal democracy and accountability to constituents</td>
<td>Mechanisms for opening the space to new Somali organisations</td>
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<td>Leadership renewal mechanisms and for recognition of new leadership</td>
<td>Recognition of local CBOs as “actors”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mechanisms for launching long-term institutional development processes</td>
<td>Mechanisms for improving legitimacy in front of public and political authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanisms for positioning of CSOs in front of social, political and economic dynamics – and for clarifying what CS is and what are the roles that can play</td>
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4.3. Third level organisations

The third level comprises the aggregations of CSOs focusing on a sector or a geographical area, such as networks and forums. Third level organisations seem to be much more diffused in Somalia than in other countries: hundreds of them have been mapped in the preliminary phase of Saferworld activity on setting NSA platforms. In many cases networks gather CBOs (first level organisations) and assume a kind of representative function, coordinating them and transmitting agendas from above.

Some main features were observed regarding third level organisations:

- territory based networks are diffused, but they don’t represent or define local agendas;
- sector based networks and coordination exist, but most of them are created because of external inputs, such as the claim for coordination among local actors coming from local public authorities or of international agencies;
- more than representation or coordination mechanisms, in many cases these organisations work as funding mechanisms, mediating the relations with international donors;
- leadership is not always clear: in many cases networks seem to depend on a single organisation rather than on their constituency;
- in few cases third level organisations have knowledge management and capacity building functions for their member organisations.

Some of the **main needs** identified regarding third level organisations concern the clarification of their role and of their relationships with their constituencies. Based on these specific needs would therefore emerge concerning the capacity to mobilise themselves and to participate in policy making and that of providing services to member organisations, without becoming a entity in itself or without becoming a dominant organisation which competes with its members.

Institutional capacity building of third level organisations should therefore prioritise:

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<th>Individual skills building</th>
<th>Organisational capacity building</th>
<th>Context related capacity building</th>
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<td>Clarification of the role of networks and platforms</td>
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<td>Clarification of the relationships among networks/platforms and member organisations</td>
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<td>Mechanisms for mobilisation and participation in policy making</td>
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<td>Mechanisms for providing services to member organisations</td>
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### 4.4. Fourth level organisations

The **fourth level** organisations consist of the general gathering of the CSOs, such as the national civil society platforms or the federations that adopt the main role of advocacy on general issues in front of the national government. In Somalia, some of these main organisations can be identified as:

- the Somali Women Agenda;
- the three regional NSA platforms;
- some large regional civil society platforms (such as the Somali civil society forum).

While the Somali Women Agenda and some regional civil society platforms have been created by local organisations as a tool for advocacy and for developing a wider movement on specific agendas (i.e. women’s issues), the NSA platforms have been created through a specific action carried out by an international NGO (SaferWorld) in the framework of an international programme (supported by the EU and DfID) with the aim to provide Somali NSAs a space for debate and for participating in policy dialogue and to international agencies a mechanism for dialogue and consultation with local actors. Even if the the

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47 For instance, PUNSAA website defines in the following way the PUNSAA mandate “PUNSAA is mandated to strengthen-non state actors in Puntland to engage in international policy dialogue and decision making.” (www.punsaa.org/about/faqs/index.php); SOSCENSA mandate is defined as “SOSCENSA is mandated to become a tool
creation of the NSA platforms was based on a process starting with the claim to be recognized by the NSA themselves and involving the main Somali think tanks (APD, PDRC and CRD)\(^{48}\), it is important to observe that an important difference remains in the nature, foundation, resources and functioning of the different networks and platforms.

Despite collaboration on specific initiatives (i.e. the declarations on the constitution process in South and Central Somalia) and the participation of certain members to different networks and platforms\(^{49}\), in some interviews with platforms leaders and with the experts providing to networks technical assistance it was observed that a competitive relationship risks sometimes to emerge among the different platforms, that mainly find a common space of action or a common agenda when the need to respond to external input emerges\(^{50}\).

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**Voice and representation in civil society**

Often donors and governments look for one only representative of civil society and NSA. Such a representative is then charged of taking the voice into consultative initiatives. This has been also practiced in Somalia, sometime in the attempt of fostering a cooptation of CSOs. However, this can be a tricky exercise. In fact, often civil society is an arena in which different interests are at play, and differently from the representation process in democratic political institutions - that pretend to represent the interest of every citizens and than is based on elections – CSOs, because of their voluntary nature, cannot pretend to represent all citizens, but just those who mobilise for defending their rights or to support community, and can represent communities only in an indirect way – by making visible the emerging dynamics, issues and needs. The consequence of “naming” a representative of Civil Society normally results in conflicts among CSOs, particularly among platforms and umbrella organisations.

To facilitate a real dialogue with civil society and an effective participation of civil society to policy making, implementation and monitoring, government and donors should recognise internal differences within civil society community, and the fact that often these differences result in the fact that more than one “general” platforms exist. Therefore, while no any NSA / CSO platform can pretend to be the only representative of civil society and non state actors, space should be secured to all to participate in policy dialogue. This can be particularly important when policy dialogue concerns the setting of political institutions – as for the Somali constitutional process. Political bodies – and their technical appendixes – should focus on enlarging representation, engaging in dialogue the different categories of non state and civil society actors rather than few ones pretending to represent the others. At the same time, when funding CSOs initiatives within this framework attention should be devoted to avoiding influence CSOs by imposing agenda and timing.

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\(^{48}\) This process – at least partially related to the “Pillars of Peace” programme and to the mapping of local peacebuilding initiatives – was further developed by the mapping of NSA platforms and organisations and by the calling of conferences.

\(^{49}\) The same persons play sometimes a leading role in different platforms and networks (i.e. the chaipersons of SWA are members in SOSCENSA), but this is not necessarily reducing the distance among platforms, particularly when strategies and actions are implied.

\(^{50}\) As it becomes apparent when looking at membership and at leadership, also in the case of SWA a great difference exist between the central body and the founders of the network and the many participating organisations, also in this case therefore an issue is likely to emerge as concerning constituency active participation.
Moreover, while some platforms are finding a common agenda for gathering different kinds of actors – such is the case of SOSCENSA on the “road map” and the Constitution process and the case of SONSAF on an electoral law - in other cases, as in Puntland, such a common agenda has been in the past more difficult to identify. In many cases - as also it is pointed in the NSA platform websites – platforms are more a vehicle to disseminate information and to sensitise civil society organisations, citizens and even the political parties on certain issues (such as democracy, gender relations, the “transition process”, etc.) than a vehicle for collecting and making visible the interests of actors within civil society and the other “Non state” sectors.

The lack of an agenda that is relevant for (all) members can result in some cases in a lack of commitment and active participation by the platform members. In the interviews with the boards of the three main platforms as well as in the interviews with the organisations providing them support and technical assistance, difficulties were identified concerning the collection of fees and the possibility to function in the short term without external assistance. A further consequence of the setting of agendas that are not always relevant for most members of the platforms risks to be the emergence of a gap between the platform constituencies and their leaderships, tending to be accountable mainly to international bodies and international partners.

Differences exist also as concerning membership: in some cases the networks and platforms only include other networks, in some other cases they also include individual organisations (and even “individual persons”). Necessarily, the fact members are of different kinds can generate problems as for the representation of interests within the networks and platforms.

Therefore, in the case of fourth level organisations a need emerges to develop mechanisms to better identify and represent constituencies and to establish processes to meaningfully develop agenda which are relevant locally (a concrete way for fostering such a process is to focus on the dynamics that directly impact involved actors, rather than only on the large processes involving the country). Moreover, mechanisms are needed to generate a “common voice” maintaining the diversities within the CSO communities, which are to be seen as a strength rather than as a weakness. Without dealing with these challenges efforts to achieve sustainability and capacity building initiatives risk being carried out in vain.

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<th>Fourth level organisations: platforms</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual skills building</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification and development of mechanisms for effective representation of constituency</td>
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<td>Agenda setting mechanisms</td>
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<td>creation of a common space for interaction among different agendas and different NSAs</td>
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5. The main social and political dynamics involving Somali Civil Society

The actual and potential roles of Somali civil society organisations can be identified by making reference to the main social and political dynamics involving Somali Civil Society. Somali civil society does not exist in a vacuum yet some of the projects carried out by EU and DfID partners – as well as by UN and other international aid agencies - aim to build capacity or engage in state-building or service provision in the absence of reference to other actors or the local conflict dynamics. This practice has the danger of at best being ineffective, and at worst having negative impacts on the very peace and governance it is trying to support. It is not only state and peace that the EU and DfID is trying to build, but governance which is representative, responsive, transparent and accountable, and a peace which is inclusive and lasting. Civil society organisations and movement should be positioned within these dynamics to understand the role they can play.

The role of CSOs in the peace building process

Generally, conflicts result in the fragmentation of social fabric, in the decrease of human rights respect and enforcement, and in the crisis of the democratic governance system, at local and at national levels. Since the last decade of XX century a special role is recognized to CSOs in peace building and conflict resolution. In EU supported initiatives particularly, CSOs have been seen as relevant actors for:

- Mediation, negotiation and fostering of agreements among the conflicting parties;
- Building up peaceful communities, at grassroots level;
- Reconstruction of social fabric and social trust at local level;
- Creating a culture of peace, particularly gathering together different groups and overcoming cultural, social and political barriers;
- Peace monitoring and establishment of early warning systems.

Moreover, and perhaps most often, CSOs have been involved in conflict areas as service providers and in some cases in the establishment of formal and informal local “peace committees” that assume a variety of roles such as the administration of “proximity justice” and the facilitation of conciliation among litigants, or the management of local resources. As a matter of fact, based on international experiences, it is possible to identify different situations and positions:

- many organizations have as main focus the ethnic, national and religious identity and defending the interests of their constituent group: very often these civil society organizations do not facilitate peace building and reconciliation at community level; in many cases, however, involving this group of organisations may be crucial for understanding and for removing some factors in the conflicts situations; moreover in some countries it is particularly in the framework of this group of organisations that new and innovative actors are emerging in the local civil societies;
- a second group of organisations involved in conflict situation includes “rights defenders” and advocacy organizations: those belonging to this group can be found at community level, as well as at national and regional level. Very often these organizations are considered “confrontational” by national governments, by local authorities and sometimes also by other CSOs. However, these organizations play a key role in re-establishing and monitoring the rule of law. A key group in this context is that of women organisations;
- a third group of organisations that play a relevant role in this context includes the NGOs and intermediary organisations carrying out service delivery activities in conflict areas. In some cases these organisations are just

51 While often traditional NGOs – established following up the model of International NGOs – are an expression of social and professional elites (English speaking, having access to international community, “adopting a social responsibility” towards the communities, etc.), often the organisations representing ethnic and socially excluded groups are an expression of these communities. This implies that the capacities of these organisations are weaker.
52 The role of these organisations is in most often recognized by International agencies and NGOs, so that very often they are targeted by international aid initiatives for the reinforcement of civil society. Moreover, these organisations are often the most active in the promotion of coalitions and platforms, both at national level and international level.
“implementing bodies”, and are totally dependent from international NGOs and donors, or by the national and local authorities; in other cases they are more autonomous; their role can be very delicate: targeting and implementation of humanitarian and support activities may involve in a differentiated way the conflict parties and it may therefore produce a tightening of the conflicts;

- a fourth group is that of “Community based organisations”; this is a rather diversified group that may often include organisations created or stimulated by public authorities for managing and maintaining infrastructures and social services; “peace committees”; organisations having “de facto” a traditional base or a religious foundation; organisations established to manage community resources and infrastructures and to mediate the relations among competing users; not always they have these organizations a formal statute and nature; on the contrary, they are very often informal aggregations;

- a role in peace building is not only played by CSOs at local and community level; in several cases an important role is played by Civil Society platforms, coalitions and movements at national level, advocating for peace or democracy and putting pressure on governments and international actors.

5.1. Facing drivers and dynamics of conflict

As there are several existing studies on the dynamics of conflict in Somalia (often supported by the EU and DfID, as in the case of Life & Peace and Interpeace) we summarise some of the main drivers as identified in the literature reviewed.

The actors and dynamics will need to be identified in each local and entity level intervention, but generally they can be described as:

- **Lack of inclusion of actors in political decision making**, and control over the benefits from resources and economy, national, sub-national and locally is often cited as the main driver for conflict and fractionalisation in Somalia.

- **Resource-based conflicts**, including competition over land, water points and (potential) natural resources; intra-pastoralist and pastoralists versus agriculturalists, environmental degradation, water systems, lack of regulatory mechanisms, forcible occupation and re-acquisition of property.

- **Militarisation**, including small weapons proliferation; clan/power influence on public institutions and police, demobilisation processes, human rights violations and lack of access to justice, impunity.

- **Internal sub-national conflicts on contested areas**: Lower Juba, Mudug, Sool and Eastern Sanaag and Somaliland/Puntland border region; based both on national/ethnic claims and on the efforts to control natural resources.

- **Regional and international actors**: the opposing military and proxy influence of states in the region, the war on terror actors and politicisation of aid and aid effectiveness.

Civil society can play an important role at all these levels and is well positioned to do so as it is, more than other governmental actors, and seen as more neutral. Currently the focus is on local peacemaking on resource based conflicts and in facilitating demilitarisation processes (including the defence of human rights). However, a major role is to be played for de-escalating internal regional conflicts and for

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normalising regional and international conflicts drivers: in both situations civil society can assume both an advocacy role and a mediating role (through accessing European or British actors in support)\textsuperscript{54}.

5.2. State building

Peace and state-building have been, for many years, the focus of international organisations with several peace processes launched, mostly failing to achieve stability in the long term. A common feature in most processes has been the lack of involvement of civil society organisations both at the national as well at the local levels (which predominantly involved clan/traditional leaders). The main way to involve civil society at national level peace processes has been the cooptation of individuals coming from civil society within a process mainly aimed at producing an agreement among faction’s and party’s leaders (this has been a practice UNPOS has often been accused of). Only recently, in the Djibouti and Kampala processes some kinds of involvement of civil society have been more thoroughly considered. However, these processes failed to achieve a strong involvement, probably because of the emerging competition among political actors (that involve the fact that politicians see civil society organisation as a potential competitor or as a possible basis for the mobilisation of new political parties) and because of the mechanisms chosen for assuring representation of local actors, focusing mainly on the Clan system (the so called 4.5 model)\textsuperscript{55}.

A further common feature of most peace processes held at national level has been to look for establishing new – temporary or transitory – authorities, without looking to set up a process in which conflict factors are progressively addressed and solved in order to arrive at final agreement.

Nonetheless, and despite the presence of several external factors fuelling conflict – relative peace and stability have been established in the north of the country. Somaliland and Puntland are the larger and more stable areas in which peace has been achieved, but also a relative peace and stability has been set in many areas of South and Central Somalia. Invariably NSA have played important roles: elders negotiating clan based interests, the business community trying to achieve the possibility to carry out productive and commercial activities and even civil society organisations representing important groups in Somali society (as – among others – women).

Some different roles can be assumed by civil society organisations in such a framework, namely:

- grounding the constitutional process and fostering the setting of legitimate state and government, by assuming a mediation role and by allowing the people at grassroots level to understand and to be informed about the political dynamics and by feeding the political actors with knowledge and information on the needs and issues emerging in Somali society (e.g. the roadmap);

- grounding the peace processes in the policy issues related to people’s life and to conflict factors, by mapping conflict factors and advocating for the setting of a political and peace agenda that, more than searching for peace agreements based on the distribution of power among political actors, is based on the provision of solutions to existing problems, both regarding access to resources (land, water, etc.) and the representation of actors;

\textsuperscript{54} Also see the Saferworld debriefings to UN and donors conferences.
\textsuperscript{55} Even recently, in Entebbe I and Garowe I meetings concerning the “road map” of transition towards a Somali National government, the TFG and the regional governments requested to select CSOs representatives according to the 4.5 model. Selecting CSOs according to such a model reduce the main contribution that they can provide: that of creating bridges among communities, without respect to clan and political setting. Especially in South and Central Somalia, where clan presence is more diversified this issue can reduce the effectiveness of CSOs involvement in political dialogue.
- increase the participation of local actors to international led peace processes, by fostering an active participation to the peace processes initiatives (meetings, conferences, etc.) based on the representation of interest groups, platforms and networks rather than on the participation of single individuals selected on the basis of their individual features (as it has been done also recently, choosing civil society representatives on the basis of the 4.5 scheme), by fostering the representation of socially and political excluded groups (i.e. internally displaced people, ethnic minorities, disabled people, youths, women, etc.) and by fostering the citizens active participation in monitoring the implementation of peace agreements.

- advocate for international policies concerning external conflict factors, by assuming an active direct role in mapping external conflict factors (i.e. international and transnational political & economic interests) and making them the subject of advocacy activities addressing the international community (i.e. not only the international organisations and agencies but also the general public), without passing through the inter-mediation of international NGOs.

Recently, a greater participation of civil society and NSAs to the so called “Road map” process has been encouraged, also promoting “Civil Society Conferences”. However, some main issues emerge in these initiatives: the first one is that of agenda setting (de facto agendas are often following up the needs of the “political process”), the second one concern timing (the time of political negotiations is faster than that of civil society processes: calling a civil society conference is not simply to invite civil society representative to take part in a meeting, but involves a long term consultation and a progressive construction of agendas and representation); the third one is the transparency of the process itself: transparency is in fact a main legitimating factor for CSOs.

Civil society organisations role in state-building: the partners’ perspective

Civil society organisations role in state-building was the subject of a working group including several international and Somali EU partners, carried out in the framework of the strategy outline validation workshop of September 29th, 2011. The following points emerged.

a) The main role of CSO is that of rebuilding the trust between state and citizens, considering that Somali citizens never had the experience of an inclusive, accountable and responsive government and state.

b) State-building cannot be seen out of peacebuilding perspective: for Somali citizens, peace and stability emerge as a basic need. Rather than institution-building therefore, the focus should be on building reliable and sustainable governance systems allowing for the representation of all social actors. From experience we can see often interventions for state-building have tend to generate conflict among parties often defending vested interests and positions and have no linkages with people and with local needs and processes.

The role of CSOs may therefore be seen as that of supporting the building of local agendas and their implementation. The shift of governance and state-building from an almost exclusive focus on “government positions” to a focus on setting and implementing policies to solve problems and conflict structural factors can result in an increased pace in peacebuilding. In such a framework CSOs can participate as legitimate actors both in nurturing political institution with knowledge and capacities related to the identification of local needs and the formulation of problem-solving policies and in giving a voice to local actors that are not represented.

c) Inclusive consultation processes for allowing local and different agendas merge and influence the construction of institutional mechanisms can be a crucial element in the state-building process.

A relevant example to be considered is to this regard the processes that led to the constitution of SOSCENSA, SONSAF and PUNTLAND, that still is in process also because of the need to facilitate a reflection that have the local actors as the main subjects.
d) **Awareness building** is, in this framework, another crucial process: however awareness building cannot be seen as a ‘top-down’ educational process, but should be recognised as a two-way communication. Grassroots level organisations and actors need to inter-act and communicate with actors that are at a higher level, for building mutual recognition and understanding and for allowing - on the one hand – the understanding of political processes (including those linked to constitution making and elections) and – on the other hand – the recognition of local needs and dynamics by political actors and governments at all levels.

e) Since democratisation is not an irreversible process, and since in state and political institution consolidation often negative trends emerge, CSOs should play a specific role in **reducing and controlling such negative trends**, both through information and advocacy (at local – national - international level) and through the active participation in local governance. Some spaces for local governance have been created, sometimes thanks to international aid, both in Somaliland and in Puntland, but very often citizens organisations have been not identified as an actor to be involved. In this framework, action is needed to increase public recognition of CSO as legitimate actors and not just as service providers. In South and Central Somalia public spaces, in which citizens organisations can safely play their role are currently lacking, despite the fact that CSOs are widely recognised and are often active in influencing political power also in the areas in which conflict is more acute.

f) For being functional and legitimate, Somali state must achieve a sufficient degree of **inclusiveness and responsiveness to citizens**. With this aim, CSOs should foster the active participation to decision making of certain actors which are traditionally excluded (even if in some cases they can have a strong influence). Among these are: women, youth, pastoralists, IDPs and externally displaced people without linkages with their clan, people effected by stigma – such as people living with HIV or other ‘minority’ groups. The setting of coalitions among CSOs can reinforce the possibility of most excluded groups to be heard.

g) Representativeness and inclusivity of CSOs is often jeopardised by internal organisation dynamics, such as the lack of transparency, the presence of unaccountable leaders, the lack of spaces for constituency participation to decision making. The possibility to support state-building is therefore strongly conditioned by the possibility to **remove internal obstacle to CSOs representativeness and openness**. Resources should be devoted to support CSOs related more effectively with their constituencies – and their platforms - more accountable, representative and inclusive.

### 5.3. Local governance

While peace and stability can be often found at local level all-over Somalia and Somaliland, local governance remains fragile in most areas. As well as nation-level institutions often local authorities are not accountable; corruption remains a diffuse phenomenon as well as the presence of vested interest; public services are often inadequate in front of communities needs; access to services is often unequal among different actors; citizens are considered as client or as beneficiaries both by local public authorities and by the agencies involved in service delivery (including national and international NGOs); traditional institutional authorities play an important governance role, but are normally unable to produce structural changes when these are requested for solving problems in a permanent way; local actors out of main interest groups are often not represented or under-represented (this is for instance the case of IDP).

Roles that can be played by CSOs are in this framework the following ones:

- **making local institutions more accountable**, by monitoring the work of public authorities and the activities of political parties, at local level, by conveying to them information on local realities, by participating in the setting, implementation and monitoring of local policies, and by advocating needs and demands from the local actors;

- **improving the quality of services**, by promoting a better adaptation to local needs and demands, through: monitoring and evaluation of public services capacity to satisfy existing demands and needs, identification, testing and dissemination of good practices; launching of local coalitions for the management of emerging issues, promoting the collaboration between public, private and other NSA (including traditional authorities);
improving the accessibility of public services, through the shift from an approach mainly focused on “service delivery” (or to the achievement of minimal levels of access to services, such as those declared in MDGs) to a rights-based approach, focusing on the recognition, exercise and enforcement of citizenship rights; such a shift requires to not consider basic services only from the technical point of view (thus looking at the offer side) but to assume the “political” viewpoint of involved citizens and particularly of those that risk social exclusion;

grassroots peace initiative constitute another engagement area for civil society organisations: the engagement of civil society organisations can in this framework support the initiatives carried out by traditional leaders and public administration aiming at the appeasement of territory and at the reduction of violence, by: a) mapping conflict factors and identifying permanent solutions based on the recognition of involved actors and their interests; b) providing to local NSA and public actors evidences on the possible solution to local conflicts, so producing a space for the integration among different interests; c) mobilising local public opinion in the framework of decision making processes, that would otherwise be based only on the interests of main involved actors.

5.4. Emergence of new social actors

As most internationally based peace initiatives shows, the conflict in Somalia has somehow reduced the visibility of social change processes, and particularly of the emergence of new social actors. While traditional actors – such as the clans, the elders and the business community – have often been considered the only actors able to influence the national and local reality, many further actors emerged and assumed an important role in Somali recovery, rehabilitation and development processes.

The most apparent ones are women, professionals, young people and people with disabilities. All these categories have been creating in recent years groups and organisations, sometime just at local level – for delivering services or for advocating in front of NGOs and of the existing local authorities – in some other cases arriving to have a wider visibility, creating networks and obtaining the support of other actors (such as the Somaliland NSA forum for young people).

In many places these actors have been the ones that promoted locally based peace processes, by mobilising and making pressure on traditional and religious leaders.

Moreover, they often are taking new information and knowledge within the Somali society: because of their involvement in international networks and in an international debate (it is the case of the women), or because of the fact they have been developing themselves because of their linkages with processes in which the Somali society was inter-acting with external actors or with external dynamics (such those concerning youth and people with disabilities). People with disabilities have been experiencing a shift from being the recipients or beneficiaries of assistance to assuming an active role, concerning the claiming of citizenship rights, the identification of their own needs, the direct involvement in the implementation of activities and the launching of advocacy initiatives. Youths not only have been increasingly involved in the creation of local organisations but are also influencing the way Somali diaspora is involved in local development: not only elders and political leaders are returning back to involve in Somalia development or politics, but also many young people are coming back in Somalia, on a permanent or on a temporary basis to work in development initiatives, taking with them not only technical skills and professional capacities but also “social competences” that have been developed in the experience abroad.

57 Using such a word, reference is made both to groups that only recently defined a specific “social identity” and to groups that are still not fully recognised as collective actors in the society and in the political institutions.
A further group that is seeking for greater recognition and that is organising include “minorities” (this word is used in the Somali context both to refer to ethnic minorities and to castes mainly related to professional groups within Somali ethnic groups). Minorities are increasingly creating their own groups and organisations and increasingly participating in civil society fora (i.e. several minority networks are taking part to the NSA networks in Puntland and in Somaliland). While ethnic minorities have a greater importance in South and Central Somalia – according to the organisations more involved in supporting NSA platforms – there are not organisational networks representing them. Nevertheless Bantu based organisations exist in rural South and Central Somalia and are involved in the management or agricultural resources and work (often these organisations receive support within the framework of rural development and food security programmes).

Despite all that, “new actors” have seldom been recognised in the framework of peace and government building processes. Only recently NSA platforms have been supported by international aid agencies and have shown a great capacity to represent a wide range of actors across the whole country and across the various existing divides (clan based, religion based). If recognising and supporting new actors has often resulted in increased stability, the lack of recognition of new emerging social actors risks influencing instability in the country. For example, militias such as Al Shabaab can be seen by some as a way for developing an identity and fighting exclusion.

Gender mainstreaming and the roles of women in governance and peace

Gender mainstreaming is clearly a perspective that considers implications for both women and men of policies and programmes. When dealing with gender issues in the Somali context often this is understood as a foreign concept with a hidden agenda, and having as a main content a message as “women, get out of your homes”. The basis for gender mainstreaming in activities concerning Somali civil society should therefore be characterized by a progressive approach.

Actually when dealing with gender in Somalia it seems necessary to consider the change processes that involved Somali society. These included both changes in the roles of men (that somehow have seen their leading role defied by the conflict, that involved a crisis of elders authority, the increase of unemployment, the diffusion of internal displacement and the fragmentation of families, the increased autonomy of young people through their participation in militias, etc.) and changes in the role of women. However, the changes occurred in societal functioning were not reflected in changes in the legal framework nor in the change of social norms and legitimate behaviours, so - that much more than before - gender based conflict and gender based violence emerge.

However, being not this report focused on gender issues, considering that gender related process are deeply embedded in slow social change dynamics, and being gender mainstreaming mainly considered, within this context, as related to the emergence of new actors, the following analysis will be mainly devoted to women roles.

Women in the Somali conflict

Women have been and still are – together with children - among the most vulnerable groups in conflict. Despite this, women actively participated in the conflict as well as have they been actively involved in peacebuilding, in a variety of ways:
- Women groups have been among the first collective aggregations in delivering help in conflict and post-conflict situations58 and women groups constitute a big share of Somali civil society organisations59;

58 In many cases, women from “elite” – having a socially recognised position, higher education, urban and often “globalised” culture , a wide network of relations within and without Somalia – have been the ones that assumed the responsibility to support women at the grassroots level and to mobilize women groups and organisations. The fact that most women organisations have a double character of being at once linked to elites and to grassroots level allow women organisations to assume a position that facilitate the representation of local interests together with the fostering of rights recognition.

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- Women leaders and groups have often generated communication channels among the conflicting parties;
- Women have supported the implementation of peace processes through the provision of support (food, hospitality) to negotiators.

Recognition of the roles of women

The recognised roles that women play in traditional peacebuilding are often limited by the traditional position of women in Somali society – which is highly limited in the public and decision making arenas. Through marriage, women are often part of two clans so in inter-clan conflicts they are said to have dual interests. In a traditional setting, women will not be found seated among elders and other parties in the negotiation process, and they are seldom recognised beyond supporters of the process, either bringing tea/food or reciting poems. Women-led peace initiatives are often refused or treated with mistrust.

This lack of recognition of women’s active role is not only concerning traditional decision making and traditional settings, it is also apparent in modern institutions, in a variety of ways:

- while single women are recognised as being leaders or important resource persons because of their social position, education, personal history and linkages, women as a collective actor - bearing specific interests and rights - are not recognised;
- there is a general tendency to consider women access to services and to education in terms of needs to be satisfied, rather than in terms of rights to be promoted and to be enforced (this is also often reflected in international NGO attitude to measure “gender mainstreaming” by simply making reference to the number of women beneficiaries or participants in their activities, or by “talking about gender related issues”, without actually engaging in the identification and overcoming of obstacles to women’s rights recognition and enforcement) 60:
  - there is little participation of women in political institutions with women’s seats often remaining vacant);
  - few votes gained by women candidates in electoral processes;
  - while present in the Boards of NGOs and other civil society bodies, they often don’t hold key power positions, but supportive or formal roles.

Despite the presence of many women’s networks within the existing NSA platforms 61, and the fact that key positions are assumed by women within the NSA platforms boards, the possibility to foster the recognition of women’s rights in this framework appears mainly reduced to the fostering of the attribution of seats to women in the political

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59 According to the Somali Women Agenda – that aims at mobilizing a women movement in Somalia and that collect 65 organisations from Central and Southern Somalia – about 80 % of Somali civil society organisations are led by women ( SWA Progress Newsletter).

60 On the basis of the recognition of a new role of women in society also issues concerning access to education are to be re-evaluated, both identifying ways to promote access to primary education (where a competition actually exist concerning the use of family resources) and the making the most of capacities of skilled and educated girls: while a growing number of girls achieve graduation at university level; most of them are not working, but remain at home – access of women to profession thus is to be seen as a priority in both education and labour market policies. Economic empowerment of women has been identified as a further priority.

61 Women organisations are involved in the three NSA platforms that have been created in the framework of EU support to NSA in Somalia since 2008. SOCSA (in South – Central Somalia) includes the COGWO – Coalition for Grassroots Women Organisation (30 organisations), Benadir Women Teachers, Bay Women (18 organisations), the Jubba Women Welfare Society, Bakol Women Empowerment Centre, ISRAAC Women in Business Organisation, Horsed Women Development. PUNSA (Puntland) includes WAWA (100 organisations), Somali Female Development Organisation, ABYAN, Somali Women Association, Hanaqaa. SONS (Somaliland) includes Somaliland Midwifery and Nursing associations (6 chapters), NAAGAD (45 organisations), Women Journalist Association, National Association of Women’s Business Owners (35 chapters), Women’s Industrial Network (3 chapters), Women in Trade, Horn of Africa Somali Women’s Organisation. Despite the presence of many women organisations there is not a clear gender agenda in the networks, out of that of advocating for an increase in the number of seats for women in parliaments. Moreover, the NSA platforms include not only networks but also individual organisations, so that a risk exists to enter in competition with “gender focused” platforms or to weaken their capacity to aggregate individual organisations.
institutions (as in SOCSENA and SONSASF women empowerment agendas) and to the launching of campaigns against genital mutilation: when looking at more traditional issues (such as those concerning religion and tradition, i.e. family code, property and heritage rights, etc.) the presence of actors with conflicting interests emerge as a main feature of NSA platforms (as gender is – as already observed – considered a foreign concept with a hidden agenda). However, when looking at Somali civil society it is especially among women groups at the different level that the more vibrant actors can be seen. In this sense supporting women organisations and their recognition as a policy actor in local governance and in national governance can to be seen as a priority.

**Gender mainstreaming in civil society strengthening**

When attempting to main-stream gender it is important to consider the cultural and legal obstacles to the recognition of women as a relevant policy actors, i.e. an actor that represent specific interests and is bearing a specific point of view on policies and development actions. Moreover, it seems necessary to carry out activities aimed at building spaces in which political role of women can be reinforced, including:

- women’s committee for the management and monitoring in education and health projects funded by EU;
- request for women’s organisations participation in groups and committees created in the framework of the implementation of EU funded projects on governance and the rule of law (including those carried out through UN);
- specific women’s organisations consultation initiatives in the framework of consultation activities concerning EU policies and concerning the setting of the agendas in EU funded projects (including NSA platform and support to peacebuilding at local level).

A main issue to be considered in promoting the participation of women in political institutions and in peace negotiation (both at local level, through the involvement of traditional and religious leaders, and at national and international level, through the involvement of political parties, members of parliament, etc.) is the need for the recognition of women as collective actor: this was actually assumed as main focus by the Somali Women Agenda. The impact of SWA action will be greatly increased through the identification of specific targets to be achieved.

A tool for increasing visibility and recognition of women as a policy actor is the identification and dissemination of best practices and success stories, both within Somalia and outside.

Further possibility to be considered includes the adoption and dissemination of a right based approach to gender issues. This can be particularly related to using health and education sector activities as an “entrance point” for working on gender issue. As a fact, in Galgalud, Puntland and Somaliland, working on gender issue from the sectoral point of view already allowed for the introduction of “innovations” involving women rights, such as the setting of gender units within the Ministries of Education and the provision of services for increasing girl access to secondary education. As well the setting of professional associations in the health sector has been a way to address in a “viable” way sensible issues, such as female genital mutilation.

Another issue to be considered is the need to find cultural anchorages for dealing with women rights. Somali Women Agenda launched a set of activities concerning the Islam and women’s rights. Along with Islam scholars, important actors that can be involved in anchoring women rights discourse within Somali culture are women organisations in

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62 According to some informants the issue is not only the recognition of women a san actor by other actors, but also the development of a full awareness of the need to struggle for rights also assuming a critical position within the NSA platforms and in front of political actors.

63 Women’s organisations have a long history in Somalia. Under the Siad Barre regime a Somali Women Organisation existed having mainly a “decorative” aim – being visible and supporting power, without having the authority and power of a real partner. According to some informants such a decorative role for women’s organisations and for women in politics risk to re-emerge in the emerging new political settings.

64 Prevention of female genital mutilation, gender based violence, HIV/AIDS and reproductive health are among the priority issues that have been identified by Somali women groups and that are mainly the subject of care delivery activities and of awareness campaigns.
Somali diaspora: often these organisations developed new identities in which Somali culture and traditions match with global culture.\(^{65}\)

Within the activities carried out in EU governance and civil society programmes some focus on media and the capacity of civil society organisations to interact with media. Greater attention of these activities on the obstacles to political recognition of women – including the dynamics related to the functioning and biased communication in media – as well as a greater coordination with other gender focused programmes\(^{66}\) would probably increase their relevance and effectiveness.

5.5. Social Inclusion and Social exclusion dynamics

Historically, social, as well as economic and political exclusion by political elites, has been a major driver of conflict in Somalia and remains key to establishing peace and good governance today. People that are not fully integrated into societal traditional links – such as the clan structure – are the ones more prone to be victims in both conflicts and natural disasters that characterise the Somali situation. Vulnerable social groups differ from locality to locality – from entity to entity but can generally be summarised as women, youth, people with disability, ethnic and clan minorities, IDPs/refugees/destitute and prisoners and those in conflict with law.

For many of these social groups the access to political representation and the ability to participate in government and benefit from economic resources is limited, being often both the cause of local conflicts (for instance those related to charcoal production in pastoral and agricultural areas) as well as to national political processes.

In the case of small business owners, many of whom are women, the current unstable and unsecure situation is very hostile, since small entrepreneurs have no means to secure clan support and politicians favour.

Supporting social inclusion processes and more representative government is a key role for CSOs. Such a role is already often practiced by many organisations of all sizes, from the informal self-help groups to the formal, internationally renowned think tanks – mainly by delivering basic social services where the public authorities are not able to arrive (i.e in remote areas in Somaliland and in Puntland, and in most the territory in South and Central Somalia). A less practiced option – involving a smaller group of organisations – is focused on advocating for appropriate policies and by monitoring for their actual enforcement, both at national, entity and local level.

5.6. The changing roles of diaspora

Somali diaspora has been since the Siad Barre regime a major source of financial resource for Somali society within Somalia and through remittances. The economic contribution of diaspora for reducing the vulnerability of Somalia is widely recognised within and outside the country. As well, Somali diaspora played an important role in the many peace processes carried out since 1991. Both in international led and “local led” processes people, mainly individuals, have been involved, often known and picked up from international actors or called by clan elders. The role they played has not always been a positive one, as diaspora representatives are often seen to be representing political and economic interests that are different from those emerging within the country, and often have little knowledge of actual social emerging processes (including social change processes).

\(^{65}\) An interesting example is provided by the Italian Somali diaspora [www.migrare.eu](http://www.migrare.eu)

\(^{66}\) Women Journalists from various Somali media houses, such as Horn Relief, Radio Iqra and the Shabelle Network, are an important component of SWA constituency.
However, in recent years at least two new aspects of diaspora have emerged and need to be recognised.

The first, and more apparent one, is the professional component and the skills that Somali professional abroad can offer. The second, which is somehow less apparent, is the development of collective actors within Somali diaspora that are interested to support development initiatives within the country. An interesting example of this kind is the Somali Family Service: originally an US based Somali self-help organisation is now involved in the management of a centre for civil society organisation, offering space and resources to small local organisations in Garowe. Collective action of diaspora in fact is not only providing financial resources (that are seldom used for development initiatives), but is a powerful drive for social change (as the already mentioned example of IIDA shows) and for the development of civil society. Linkages between Somali diaspora organisations and local organisations can facilitate the access to international aid resources also in the absence of a recognised local legal framework, avoiding the dependency phenomenon that often emerges when local organisations are implementing partners of the international actors.

For the EU and DfID – the inclusion of both the skill sets and the linkages with local Somali CSOs and networks should become key and included both in each of the applications for funding, as well as being a focus for specific support (such as through the IOM managed MIDA Programme, or by supporting temporary return of Somali youths from abroad).

Finally, Somali diaspora is to be considered in the framework of structured dialogue initiatives, not as a representative of Somali civil society, but as a group of actors within Somali civil society.

6. Regional dynamics involving Somali Civil Society

In addition the dynamics mentioned above that are relevant for the whole Somalia, specific dynamics involve Somali civil society and CSOs in each of the regional areas. These are shortly presented below.

6.1. Somaliland

Despite the lack of formal recognition, Somaliland have now a well established working public administration and a functional political structure. A main implication of this situation the presence of a relatively peaceful situation at local level, and the presence of structures and policies for the management of emerging conflicts (from a functioning judiciary system, to the recently established “commissioner for human rights”).

The main process in which civil society organisations are involved is therefore concerning the strengthening of the state, not only regarding the setting of political institutions, but also concerning the development of all functions of public authorities, both centrally and at local level. In addition to the process of progressive structuration of the political framework, Somaliland public organisation is increasingly assuming an active role in the setting and management of policies concerning both the provision of services (in some cases establishing partnerships with private sector) and the management of territory.

However, authorities at both central and at local levels suffer lack of resources and capacities and are mainly depending from international donors for accessing resources. In this context NGOs and CSOs are

67 A further example is the recent launching of “mapping of crisis situation” with the involvement of migrants communities and the elders (Crisis mapping Somalia with the Diaspora, http://irevolution.net/2011/08/04/crisis-mapping-somalia/)
often seen as a competing actor in the access to resources. Therefore a greater control over CSOs, their activities and their resources is claimed by the state: attempts to increase such a control can be identified in the new law on civil society organisations and – in a more mediate and moderate way – also in the sector committees that have been set up at government level, involving local and international NGOs.

The progressive strengthening of the public authorities in Somaliland challenges the CSOs and the NSA platforms to further develop by assuming a partially new role:

a) from being the main channel for international aid to being much more involved in policy making and in policy advocacy (such a role has up to now characterised mainly few research institutions and the NSA platform (SONSAF), but now it should be a central one also for other organisations – particularly NGOs - that can provide public authorities with knowledge about local environment and demands, that can represent local interests and that can support grassroots actors in being heard by public authorities;

b) from being directly involved in service provision – often without any coordination with public authorities or with other NGOs and CSOs – to playing a subsidiary role in service provision, by supporting public authorities in the delivery of services to territorial areas and to social groups that cannot normally access to public resources or in which the direct intervention of public authorities can be unappropriate

\[68\] such a role that is to be seen much more linked to the setting of functioning governance systems, in which NGOs play an intermediation role and support the provision of qualified and appropriate services, than related to traditional service delivery role assumed by NGOs – just as “implementing agencies” of international agencies;

c) from being the main recipient of support from abroad (namely from international agencies and NGOs), to be a vehicle for facilitating the transfer of resources and capacities to public authorities; Somaliland CSOs – despite the obvious differences among large and small, professional and informal, urban and rural organisations – constitute the wider pull of human resources, professional capacities and development related skills existing in Somaliland; this pull of resources need to be progressively shared with public authorities in order to let them play their role in an effective way; for sharing their resources CSOs can promote and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the capacity of public authorities, including training, the coaching and tutoring of local authorities, the fostering of NSA/public authorities partnerships, etc.

6.2. Puntland

Puntland has been characterised in recent years by an instable situation, both concerning the political framework (democratic institutions exist, but the government is often assuming authoritarian attitudes, both concerning the political setting itself – i.e. reducing space for political opposition – and regarding other actors – such as NGOs and CSOs, that are seen or as a “tool” for governmental policy or as “political opposition”) and the security setting (piracy finds its main basis on the Puntland coasts and involves unsafe conditions also in the interior of the region, a permanent conflict exist in certain boundary areas with Somaliland; new political entities emerge along clan or territorial divides; conflicts often emerge at local level, for the control over resources; conflict situations also emerge on the Southern borders of Puntland with “Al-Shebab” militias, as well as with other militarized emerging actors).

\[68\] In fact, in some cases – particularly in post-conflict settings and in areas in which the public authorities are still in a consolidation phase - the direct intervention of public authorities at grassroots level risks to produce unexpected output, such as the establishing of patron-client relationships or the generation of conflict situations. Because of their own structural features, public authorities have a limited capacity to understand social processes at grassroots level and to manage them without the intervention of third actors (such as NGOs and CSOs).
Strengthening Civil Society in Somalia

Such an instable situation is hardened by the lack of adequate economic resources generated through industrial, service and agricultural activities. Voices about the existence of oil in Puntland territory create a further instability factor.

Nevertheless, and despite all that, Puntland has been interested by some interesting development processes, including:

- an increasing decentralization, through the creation (with EU and UN support) of local development councils at district level and further decentralised structures at village level;
- the re-opening of spaces for democracy (also thanks to the engagement and legitimacy of some civil society organisations, such as PDRC), particularly related to the formulation and launching of the new political constitution and to the recent openness to federalism within the transition process;
- the development of new civil society organisations and new civil society actors, at local and at central level, that not always find an appropriate space within the existing organisational spaces (PUNSAA – the Puntland NSA platform has been interested by a critical situation mainly due to the little capacity to represent constituent organisations).

Strengthening the representation of local interests within these processes and an active (and pro-active) participation to the management of the political instability phenomena and of emerging local conflicts seem to be the main challenges the Puntland civil society organisations have to face.

A key issue in this framework is represented by the possibility for CSOs to increase their autonomy from the State without entering in conflict with public authorities.

6.3. South Central Somalia

South and Central Somalia is characterised by far by the more complex and instable situation.

While certain areas are under the control of the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government or under local authorities that are linked with TFG, other areas are under the control of international militarized actors (such as the OAU forces and the Ethiopian and Kenyan armies) and another wide area is under the control of “Al Shebab” militias. Social legitimacy of all these ruling actors is low (not only foreign forces, but also “Al Shebab” militias are recognised to rule against the population of occupied areas, rather than having a local consensus; while the legitimacy of TFG is reduced by the fact it was created on the basis of a negotiation among Somali political parties rather than through an electoral process).

In such a context, CSOs find themselves in a twofold condition. On the one hand, their mobility and possibility of action are very limited, as well as their security and the possibility to set up dialogue with political authorities – that actually exists only with TFG (activists and leaders of civil society organisations…

In January 2011 an agreement was set for establishing a “Local Development Fund for Puntland” aimed at strengthening local development initiatives. In the agreement, while Village Development Committees or Village Councils are identified as a partners in the Local development planning process, and would functions as a basic state institution (village Councils functions include: participatory definition of district development priorities; participation in annual validation of annual priorities in the district and reporting fora, participate in monitoring of project implementation, generate a demand for downwards accountabilities from LGs), CSOs are identified just as providers of services, particularly focusing on “community mobilization, civic education and capacity development” and on “complementary service delivery”. Achieving the recognition for a wider and more active role of CSOs within this framework can be seen as a main challenge for Puntland civil society.
have been often victims of violence, and are often seen as “competitors” or as a threat by all parties involved in conflict). On the other hand, they developed an autonomous and proactive capacity and developed a social (and political) legitimacy that has not equal in the other areas of Somalia: as a fact, in many areas, local CSOs are the only actors able to deliver services and provide support and protection to people, and in other areas are the only actors able to face the “occupying” forces.

Moreover, action capacity and possibility of CSOs as governance actors is further hindered by the focusing of international aid on emergency, on high-level political processes and on security as a policing or military issue.

CSOs are therefore involved in different processes that can be considered as a main basis for identifying the roles they are playing, namely:

- the political transition process, including the dynamics related to the formulation and the discussion of the new Somali constitution and those related to the construction of a democratic governance system, in which the TFG activity is backed by citizens’ participation;
- the peacebuilding and conflict management, both in urban and in rural areas, through the direct engagement of CSOs in mediation activities and in the mitigation of conflict impact on the life of people (including the distribution of aid;the identification and implementation of local development initiatives and conflict management actions70);
- the emergence of new or unrecognized organised actors as a way to manage the social and economic crisis linked to the armed conflict, such as Islamic charities, faith based organisations, community or local groups engaging in philanthropic activities, that normally not participate to civil society or NSA fora, networks and platforms and that often maintain a little visibility in order to avoid being involved in the armed conflict, but that assure access to goods and services at community level and sometime assure the maintenance of inter-clan communication and networks at local level.

7. A comprehensive strategy to support civil society in Somalia

EU support to civil society engagement in policy, state and peacebuilding in Somalia has been mainly focusing on building organisations’ capacities – particularly for service delivery and project implementation – and on building NSA platforms to act as channels between political and public authorities. Moreover, efforts were made to support peace-making at a local level through the involvement of local traditional authorities.

Due to conflict and post-conflict influences the dynamics and the roles of actors in Somalia is fast changing and remains fluid. The emerging and consolidation of new state and regional political authorities, and the need to ensure the establishment of good governance systems nationally and locally require further development in EU support to civil society.

Such support needs to be focused on the recognition of civil society as a set of collective actors – as an emerging movement - including the many formal and informal organisations created by Somali citizens at local and national levels. The role of civil society in policy making which has a link and clear impact on vulnerable groups as well as their key mobilisation roles fostering the emergence of local representative

70 A recent Life&Peace research study in South and Central Somalia identified the following functions of CSOs in peace building: protection of civilians; facilitation and negotiation, monitoring of human right violations and of needs (including regarding the food crisis); advocacy; socialization and community participation; social cohesion across clan divide; service delivery. IDA member organisations in the Shebelle Valley and in the Jubas have been actively involved in the processes for removing road blocks and to defend women from violence.
groups. This requires a conception of civil society organisations - not as mere partners in project implementation and service delivery, but as legitimate actors for representing the many interests existing in Somali society. Of particular interest are those groups that are traditionally excluded by decision making and political life such as youth, women, people with disabilities, IDPs/refugees/desitute and ethnic/clan minorities.

To enable civil society to play an active role in governance - by representing citizens’ interests and demands, by providing information on social processes and on the functioning of public authorities and public policies, by participating in the policy implementation and facilitating citizens access to services, by fostering collaboration and communication among actors, and by promoting dialogue and consensus building - the EU and DfID need to support civil society organisations at different levels – both political as well as programme support. This ranges from building capacities through focusing on outcomes (to achieve specific goals), to supporting civil society inclusion in national and international forums.

The proposed strategy is aimed at informing the implementation of the current EU 2010 NSA programme actions – particularly by influencing the projects that under the programme are foreseen - and at informing the identification and formulation of the next programmes (also through specific structural dialogue initiatives). This will be mainly done by increasing the fitness between the programme and the dynamics involving Somali civil society.

*Particularly, this will imply:*

a) a **more focused involvement** of CSOs in projects and programmes;

b) an improvement of project management and structuring through a **more clear identification of targets** (not re-shifting from process based approach to a project based approach, but on the contrary focusing on processes and considering the changes that occur in the social and political settings in which the programs are inserted);

c) an **improved coordination** among the many actions, mainly through the establishment of meaningful partnerships among involved local and international actors;

d) an **improved efficiency** of actions, mainly based on the adoption focused on continuous innovation and adaptation, based on the identification of emerging problems, rather than on continuity of actions.

The strategy is also aimed at **informing Dfid action**, not by changing the proposed theory of change, but by addressing a set of social and political dynamics that risk undermining the relevance of this theory, jeopardising peacebuilding both at local and national level. As well the proposed strategy would not require a change in the EU programmes, but rather the further development of certain activities that have been already included in such programmes, as well as to focus on certain specific issues.

Within the proposed strategy, the following **specific problems** will be addressed:

- Need for improved recognition of existing and emerging civil society actors and their representative roles and trust between Somali and international actors.
- Need for meaningful context analysis of conflict actors and dynamics, as well as conflict and rights-based methods and tools.
- Need for political support from international actors for policy making role of civil society at local, entity, national and international levels.
- Need for innovation, linkages and support for emerging new actors - ‘Group-think’ among international actors which is based on established thinking rather than innovation with new actors and processes.
- Need for improved use of external evaluation and horizontal learning.
7.1. The context

The proposed strategy is situated within a context that can be defined by considering two main frameworks.

The first one is the Somali framework, that is currently characterized by the permanence of armed conflict in certain areas (having among its consequences also the humanitarian crisis that periodically emerge in Somalia) and by the slow and progressive construction of functioning governance system, both at national level (through the Federal Transition Government) and at regional level (through the consolidation of the Somaliland and Puntland administrations).

The second one is that of EU policies, and particularly of the progressive recognition of non state actors as actors and as partners in development policy and in the efforts to reduce poverty, support human rights, democracy and good governance and promote an inclusive and sustainable growth for human development, that became a main feature of European aid since the Cotonou Agreement (2000, art. 6). Such a progressive recognition lead in recent years to test and to assume as an element for European international aid a wide set of new aid modalities based on the engagement with Non State Actors and civil society, including the participation in formulation of PRSP and sector policies, the participation to performance budget monitoring and users consultation, the participation in policy dialogue, sector coordination, midterm and joint review, as well as the contribution to implementation and service delivery. This also has been the context for the testing of so-called “structured dialogue”, conceived as a confidence and consensus-building mechanism aimed at increasing the effectiveness of all stakeholders involved in EU development cooperation.

Within this context, the strategies defined below are to be considered as a tool for facilitating the engagement of Somali civil society organisations both in the implementation of EU aid to Somalia and in the setting of the new policy framework, namely in the formulation of the Country Strategy Paper for the next programming period, that will require the implementation of a structured dialogue involving Somali NSA (including both civil society organisations, business and private sector, the traditional leadership and elders, the religious leaders, etc.).

A third (but not least) context consists of the dynamics within Somali civil society: while few years ago, the existence of civil society was a disputable one, since most CSOs were “visible” mainly in service delivery and project implementation, now the fact that a vibrant civil society exist is apparent, because of the participation of local and decentralized NSA networks and umbrella organisations in the main NSA platforms (that increasingly intervene in the national and international arena), because of the over 90 peace processes that have been carried out at local and grassroots level thanks to the initiative of local actors (CSOs, elders and so on – but quite always in autonomy from political parties and international led negotiation activity), because of the impact of civil mobilization in the construction of democratic political institutions and so on.

72 Engaging Non-State Actors in New Aid Modalities, European Union, 2011
73 Structured Dialogue for efficient partnership in development, Concluding Paper, May 2011
7.2. Main strategies

Coherently with “variable geometry approach” adopted by EU Somalia Unit, in the following paragraphs are exposed some main strategic focuses to be adopted at national level, and some specific strategies to be adopted in each of the main political regions of Somalia.

Considering the uncertainty that characterises Somalia political environment – particularly concerning the future of TFG, the constitutional processes both at national level and in Puntland, the setting of borders between Puntland and Somaliland, the presence of international and foreign armed forces and the occupation of certain areas of South and Central Somalia by the “Al Shebab” militias – the strategies defined are mainly focusing on the strengthening of civil society organisations as an “autonomous” actor - or better, as a set of different actors, with different interests, and acting at different levels - able to meaningfully interact with other NSAs and with the State and political institutions, and are mainly focusing on processes that are likely to occur whatever would be the result of the different processes related to Somali political setting.

As a fact, civil society development and engagement in governance is much more related to “in depth” dynamics involving Somali citizens, than the political negotiations and the formal peace processes held at national and international level. Thus the proposed strategies appear to be relevant both if the consolidation of an internationally recognized government in the South-Central Somalia advances, and if the TFG would continue to exist for a longer time. Moreover, it is to be stressed that different scenarios in Somali politics would have a greater influence on the role of NSA as a whole, than on the role of civil society organisation as a specific group of actors.

What would change in the different scenarios regarding the transition towards the establishment of a new Somali state, is mainly the place in which the relationship between organised civil society and organised NSAs - on the one hand - the political institutions – on the other hand - should be localized:

- in a scenario in which TFG leaves the space to a new national government, CSOs will be called to work not only on peace, democracy, statebuilding and service delivery in each of the three areas of Somalia, but also to play a role in the discussion of the relationship between the Somali national government, the local administration of Puntland (that has already started a new constitutional process) and Somaliland: the positive solution of possible crisis related to the claim for unity and/or to the claim for independency would in fact repose on the capacity to create a nation-wide reflection and to create consensus on the peaceful resolution of disputes; nevertheless CSOs and other NSAs will need to continue to assume the role they are already playing with an increasing impact in making visible the society out of political institutions;
- in a scenario in which TFG continues to exist, the role of NSAs would mainly be that of fostering the establishment of political mechanisms able to reflect the will and needs of citizens and communities, and not only reflecting the expectations and interests of political groups/leaders and the interests of international communities.

7.2.1. Main strategic focuses at national level

In order to increase civil society organisations capacities to participate to governance and peacebuilding – as an active partner of other intervening actors - the following main strategic focuses may be identified.

A) Recognising Somali civil society - hear them and support their involvement, by recognising the existence of a genuine civil society which not only include those NGOs and platforms that are already partners of EU and other international bodies, but also the many other organisations that from the very local to the international level are starting to advocate for accountable public authorities and for a
participatory governance. Their inclusion is not in addition to state-building, it as an essential part. In such a sense civil society has to be recognised as a new emerging structure in Somali society, able to act across and above clan and faction divides.

- Towards this aim, the EU and international actors need to apply political as well as programme support to civil society to get ‘a place at the table’ of national and international policy formations (while at the same time supporting improved legitimacy, and linkages with their constituencies).

B) Enable civil society to address regional and international factors which contribute to conflict, not only focusing on local disputes and traditional peace-making but supporting the civil society organisations engagement in addressing the structural causes and relationships in the Somali conflict – the entity, regional and international level conditions through identifying possible solutions, and promoting better coherence and better application of policy towards the Somali region.

- Towards this aim, the EU and international actors need to support better analysis of the local, national and international context rather than focusing only on local peacebuilding. Processes aiming at improving the political participation of disadvantaged social groups in policy making and state-building can be strengthened. The external factors contribute to mistrust and a conflict supporting environment can better be identified and addressed. Here the EU and its civil society partners are well positioned to play an important role as they are often seen as more neutral than other actors.

C) Supporting innovation and emergence of new actors, by supporting the process of development of new civil society organisations and their possibility to fully participate in the civil society community, not just as beneficiaries or as implementing partners, but as actors that bear relevant perspectives, knowledge and interests in the setting of civil society agendas.

- Towards this aim, the EU and international actors need to support actions that open the space of civil society to new actors, fostering the change in leadership and an increased linkages and horizontal accountability of big civil society organisations and of large platforms to their constituents. Moreover the EU and international actors should support the growing and institutional development of smaller and weaker organisations (particularly un-funded CBOs), facilitating their access to resources and their engagement in setting agendas (e.g. adopting sub-grant and accompanying mechanisms for institutional development), as well as facilitating their recognition by stronger organisations.

D) Improving CSOs actions impact on conflict factors and drivers, through the upgrading of conflict analysis, methods and tools. Although the broader goals of many international actors such as the EU and DfID are often related to peace, out of activities specifically aimed at peacebuilding, there is little use of conflict analysis and methods to better understand and identify conflict actors and dynamics. All actors – whether they are working on state-building, or women’s rights, or education, health or security – they require a better identification and analysis of the conflict context and how their work contributes to both conflict as well as peace.

- Towards this aim, the EU and international actors need to support the introduction of conflict analysis studies among its actors to identify the Specific context and problems their programmes will address (currently the problem analysis is more of a general story about conflict in the past 20 years). All applications for funding should include an analysis of the actors and dynamics and the EU or DfID can also initiate its own studies on specific focus areas where it is working.

- Moreover the EU and international actors need to support local actors to engage in policy analysis and to influence policies, by adopting a Rights Based Approach as a main feature of all projects, not...
only in the governance and peacebuilding area, but also in Health, Education, Economic Development etc., by introducing in all projects specific goals and measures linking development action to policy making and governance, and by involving civil society organisations in the monitoring & evaluation of all funded initiatives.

7.2.2. Somaliland

The focus of EC support to civil society organisations in Somaliland could be that of contributing to the clarification of the respective roles of public authorities and civil society. Within this general strategy the following main specific focuses should be assumed:

- reinforcing civil society organisations action in participating to governance, monitoring the public action, and representing citizens interests and rights, including in front of public-private partnerships for service provision;

- supporting civil society organisations in assuming a subsidiary role, by delivering services where these cannot be provided by public actors;

- strengthening civil society organisations activity in improving public services and in the transfer of capacities to public authorities, by participating to and by supporting “capacity building actions” addressed to public officers and to public entities (including training activities, knowledge production and transfer, and the involvement in the joint management of services and public functions);

- increasing public authorities openness in front of civil society, by facilitating the recognition of CSO autonomy as a resource for the country, by fostering the increase of capacities for coordination with NSAs within the public authorities, by facilitating public authorities engagement in testing “political” and structural dialogue with NSA, and by promoting a shift in the formulation and enforcement of “NGO Law” towards a “registration regime”, instead of an “approval regime”.

7.2.3. Puntland

Considering the specific context of Puntland, in which CSOs are involved in a democratisation process that is still characterised by a great instability, in a still incipient (but important) decentralization process and in a general situation that is characterised by the uncertainty of security and by the need to identify and develop new processes for economic recovery and growth, the support to Puntland Civil Society should focus on the support to the creation or recovery of a wider space for civil society, so to increase civil society opportunity to actually contribute to the identification and implementation of solutions for local development, avoiding both the danger of “cooptation” by the government and the danger of assuming the features and roles of a political opposition or a counter-power opposed to government.

This can be done by:

- providing support to civil society organisations recognition as a legitimate actor by the public authorities, not depending from “concrete action” but by the engagement in the public arena at local, national and international level - this will mainly require an action of information dissemination, awareness raising and capacity building addressed to government officials for increasing their capacity to understand “civil society” as a set of actors that are not directly involved in politics, but that can/should

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74 Recently – as said – the registration of a large number of civil society organisations was revoked by public authorities because these organisations have been said to have not concrete actions. Legitimacy of civil society organisations however don’t derive from their actions (that are often related to external funds, especially in areas with a poor local economy as Puntland), but from their capacity to represent and mobilize a constituency.
influence policies; in this framework an action can be promoted to support changes within the existing legal framework on NGOs;

b) **backing civil society “political action”** for more democratic and accountable political and public authorities;

c) supporting the **participation of new emerging organisations** – such as those related to youth and women, and those created by young intellectuals coming from abroad – within the civil society arena, removing the existing blocks in the access to support, funding, and agenda setting;

d) increasing support for the participation of organisations and CSO platforms that can act across and above clan divides in local **peacebuilding initiatives** and increase **support to local CSOs for the identification of relevant actions aimed at improving local governance, security conditions at local level and the economic and social opportunities available at local level** (therefore avoiding the imposition to CSOs of initiatives more responding to international agendas than to local processes).

### 7.2.4. South Central Somalia

Within the context of South and Central Somalia, which is characterised by the diffusion of armed conflict, by the occupation of the territory by a plurality of armed actors, by the development of local partially autonomous governance systems and by a slow transition to the development of a central state through the international recognition and support to the TFG, strategies supporting the development of civil society and its participation to policy processes should focus on:

a) supporting civil society movement in the framework of the **“transition” and constitution making process**, particularly by making political pressure on international agencies (i.e. UNPOS) and Somali political actors (i.e. TFG) managing the processes; this will include supporting CSOs and NSA claims for a full involvement in the negotiations concerning Somalia and in the constitutional process; a main issue to focus on in this framework is that of supporting – through pressure both on the Somali political parties and the UNPOS - the shift from the “cooptation” of civil society representatives to the launching of **structural dialogue activities** in which CSOs are participating in their diversities (thus, through the different existing coalitions and platforms); according to their nature of “bridge” among social groups and clans (thus without making reference to the 4.5 principle) and respecting organisational autonomy and independence;

b) supporting civil society in **peacebuilding at local and national level**, by fostering a greater involvement in civil society platforms, in peace initiatives as well as in development and humanitarian support activities of those civil society actors that are most able to act above and across the territorial political and clan divides (Islamic charities and NGOs represent in this framework a particularly important group), by fostering a shift of emergency funds/projects towards a more local development/governance approach; in this framework a special attention should be given to those groups that are most vulnerable to social risks, but that as well are more involved in social mobilization processes – as youths, women, ethnic minorities (as the Bantu people) and IDPs (that can be supported to come back to their original areas for assuming an active role in governance, rehabilitation and development.

c) targeting CSOs – including NGOs and CBOs – as actors to be strengthened particularly in **sensitive areas**, such as the central region, the territories that were in the past under Al Shebab control and those areas are characterised by the presence of several clans (that can compete for access to resources) and by the absence of functioning local authorities.

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75 The SOSCENSA Platform is already engaged in such a process. Therefore the maintenance of support to SOSCENSA can be identified as a relevant action for this strategic focus.
7.3. Objectives, outcomes and indicators

Linked to the four main focuses identified above – and in order to deal with the problems related with each strategy – the following hierarchy of objectives can be built. These objectives and the related indicators for monitoring and evaluation should not be rigidly imposed to partners, but should be adopted as a framework for ensuring common understanding of expectations and goals, including on results and reporting, and would also be a useful way to ensure alignment between the EU and organisations it supports.

The proposed specific objective is:

To enable Somali civil society actors to engage in addressing the causes of conflict and improve inclusive, transparent and accountable governance.

Indeed, this include the strengthening of civil society organisation to recognise and represent their constituencies, as well as of their capacity to recognise the social processes in which they are involved and to identify, formulate and implement relevant policies and actions. In the following paragraphs a set of outcomes is proposed, for Somalia as a whole and for each of considered regional areas. For each outcomes one or more indicators are proposed in the boxes following the description of the outcomes.

Suggested outcomes and indicators for the whole Somalia

1) Policy changes that benefit the political representation, access of resources an position in front of public authorities and the recognised rights of disadvantaged groups

Policy change implemented, that benefit the political representation, the access to resources and services, the position in front of public authorities and the recognised rights of disadvantaged social groups, such as women, youth, social marginalised groups (i.e. castes and minority clans), people with disabilities, internally displaced groups and destitute (that do not access clan support) and people in conflict with law (including prisoners).

Proposed indicators

- number of civil society organisations locally able to improve governance policy and practice at an entity and local level which have a direct benefit to lives of target groups

(a) Somaliland: women, youth, disabled, destitute/homeless/IDPs/refugees, ethnic/clan excluded groups and small businesses;
(b) Puntland: women, youth, disabled, destitute/homeless/IDPs/refugees, ethnic/clan excluded groups and small businesses;
(c) South/Central: women, youth and homeless/IDPs/refugees.

2) Civil society actors engaged in peace based on local autonomous agendas

Local actors engaged for peace: that is engagement of civil society actors in peace initiatives based on agendas defined in an autonomous way and on the capacity to mobilize autonomously local, national and international resources.

Proposed indicators

- number of local actors enabled to engage with peace-making with their own resources;
- development of common agenda and goals by civil society organisations, particularly at sector level or in the framework of networks, platforms or temporary initiatives having a geographical basis.
3) Civil society engaged in addressing regional and international factors
Regional and international factors effectively influenced by civil society initiatives: that is engagement and participation in actions and initiatives addressing regional and international factors in the conflict, influencing the setting of agendas and mobilizing international and national public opinion for influencing political processes.

Proposed indicators

- number of CSOs engaged with peacemaking activities targeting regional and international factors at local level;
- number of CSOs engaged with peacemaking activities targeting regional and international factors at international level;
- definition of shared agendas, public declarations, “manifestos” by Somali CSOs targeting regional and international factors at international level.

4) Innovative actions based on inclusion of new emerging civil society organisations launched
Emergent civil society organisations included in design and implementation of governance and development initiatives: formulation and implementation of innovative actions for peace and governance based on the inclusion and participation of new and emerging civil society organisations, particularly focusing on CBOs and local and self-help groups, particularly these actions would focus on increasing accountability of local authorities and political parties in front of citizens.

Proposed indicators

- number of women groups and organisations formally recognised as active actors in peace, and in local and national governance initiatives.
- number of policies and practices changed at a entity, national, regional and international level that create a conducive environment for peace and good governance, removing factors generating conflicts or facilitating the adoption of agendas addressing social, economic and environmental problems.
- number of emerging civil society actors supported to represent community and specific interests through innovative means;
- involvement of local CSOs in programmes focusing on empowerment, including the progressive assumption of responsibilities on project formulation and on project management.

5) Methods based on civil society participation in peace processes and state-building applied
Methods based on civil society participation to peace processes identified, tested and applied to support political and public authorities (both as regarding accountability to citizens, and as concerning technical capacities) and to identify and implement relevant local agendas. Methods would particularly focus on conflict analysis, on recognition of social, economic and political dynamics and on the recognition of rights and interests of stakeholders.

- number of international and Somali actors showing good utilisation of local studies and conflict sensitive and rights based methodologies that improve their relevance and responsiveness to local conditions and needs;
- targeting of conflict drivers within proposed projects by international and local CSOs.
Suggested outcomes and indicators for Somaliland

6) CSOs actively participate in the governance and monitoring of public policies and of services, including those provided through public-private partnerships (e.g. water supply).

Proposed indicators

- number of CSOs /CSOs networks or umbrella organisations participating in the functioning of local governance structures, including with public-private partnerships;
- number of service or project related monitoring and management committees set up following up to the request of CSOs;
- identification of best practices in citizens’participation and monitoring of public services and local authorities.

7) CSOs engage with local authorities and governments in identifying the service areas in which their activity cannot be transferred to public actors.

Proposed indicators

- number of local development and service provision initiatives carried out by CSOs in coordination with public bodies in geographical areas that are not accessing to alternative public services or in support of social groups that are not served by public services.

8) CSOs are involved in activities aimed at transferring capacity, knowledge and skills to Ministries and local authorities.

Proposed indicators

- number of partnership initiatives based on the collaboration between CSOs and public authorities that include “capacity building actions” addressed to public officers;
- number of partnership initiatives in which CSOs play a coaching or tutoring role in support of public authorities (at central and local level).

9) the NGO act is applied according to the “registration and recognition” principle, rather than as a tool for controlling CSOs by authorising them to exist.

Proposed indicators

- public policy documents recognising CSOs as autonomous actors to be recognised;
- public debate on autonomy and recognition of CSOs;
- number of new NGOs and CSOs registered by the public authorities without questioning/discussing their mandate and activities.

Suggested outcomes and indicators for Puntland

10) Public authorities and government recognise CSOs as a legitimate actor, not depending from their engagement in concrete action and service delivery.

Proposed indicators

- public policy documents recognising CSOs as autonomous actors to be recognised;
11) Public authorities openness and accountability increased in front of civil society actors.

**Proposed indicators**

- number of CSOs initiatives aiming at monitoring public services and the government activity that are carried out with the support or the participation of the government;
- number of proposed changes in public policies or public services formulated by CSOs that are acknowledged by the government as legitimate initiatives (not necessarily accepting them);
- number of proposed changes in public policies or public services formulated by CSOs that are acknowledged by the government as legitimate initiatives (not necessarily accepting them);
- number of CSOs (non only NGOs) that are participating in committees related to priority setting and development planning at decentralised level (i.e. in Village and District Development Committees, in councils established for managing schools and health posts, in councils set for fostering peace/security at local level);
- number of CSOs (non only NGOs) that are participating in committees related to priority setting and development planning at ministry level.

12) Organisations set up by youths, women and other new emerging actors are involved within NSA networks and Civil Society community, actively participate to agenda setting and decision making, and access resources.

**Proposed indicators**

- number of new CSOs actively participating (through their umbrella organisations) in PUNSAA: proposals submitted to the platform; participation in discussing agendas; demands for support, etc.;
- number of people within NSA networks (particularly among those involved in PUNSAA – directly or through umbrella organisations and networks) elected for representing new member organisations;
- Agendas and priorities assumed by NSA networks based on needs, priorities and demands by youths, women and other emerging actors’ organisations.

13) CSO platforms and CSOs actively engage in local peace building initiatives, participating in the setting of local agendas and identifying and implementing actions that improve local governance and security at local level, including through service delivery and economic re-vitalisation.

**Proposed indicators**

- number of CSOs launching activities (including service provision, policy dialogue, local committees, etc.) which involves people from different clans and social groups;
- Formulation of agendas and programmes focusing on local peace/conflict drivers.

**Suggested outcomes and indicators for South Central Somalia**

14) CSOs participate as organisations in the debate over new constitution and institutional setting.

**Proposed indicators**

- number of CSOs (including SOSCENSA, SWA and other umbrella organisations) recognised and involved as collective bodies in the debate on Constitution, in the consultations about political transition, and in UNPOS led initiatives;
- recognition of CSOs as a specific actor, to be represented without reference to 4.5 principle, within the documents and programmes related to the implementation of the “roadmap”;
- actual participation of representatives chosen by the CSOs in the meetings, conferences, working groups, etc. concerning the preparation of the constitution and of the political institutions, without any selection process involving political parties, the TFG, traditional authorities, international organisations and “joint committees”;
- common positions and common policies are developed by the different CSO and NSA platforms in order to have a common more powerful voice in front of political actors and clan based actors.

15) A wider range CSOs receive support in fostering at local and national level activities that bridge across the territorial political and clan divides.

**Proposed indicators**

- number based peace initiatives supported at national level (Mogadishu) and regional level that involve new NGOs or NGOs that were not receiving international funding;
- number of new CSOs (including faith based organisations) participating in SOSCENSA and in other platforms based in South Central Somalia;
- number of development initiatives supporting youths, women and ethnic minorities – particularly focusing on education, economic empowerment, the access to qualified employment, the management of land and water resources.

16) CSOs are engaged in setting local governance structures and in delivering “conflict sensitive” services in sensitive geographical areas, such as the central region, the territories that were under Al Shebab control and where armed occupation exists, trans-boundaries areas and the areas characterised by the presence of several clans.

**Proposed indicators**

- number of new CSOs involved in the channelling of EU Aid, also through sub-grant schemes;
- agendas for the use of international aid is based on agendas defined by SOSCENSA, SWA, CSF and other local platforms/umbrella organisations;
- programmes formulated by local CSOs concerning the development in the sensitive areas;
- number of projects funded by EU and other donors (also through sub-granting) for the implementation of these programmes.

17) CSOs involved in service delivery and “emergency work” are engaged in local governance and policy dialogue, through the inclusion of policy related activities within all “emergency” and sector activities and through the integration and coordination of the projects managed as emergency and relief action, with those managed as “governance” support actions.

**Proposed indicators**

- availability of funding opportunities for targeting policy/development issues within the emergency projects;
- number of emergency and relief projects that involve policy and local governance actions
- agendas for the use of international aid is based on agendas defined by SOSCENSA, SWA and local platforms/umbrella organisations.

8. Operational options for supporting civil society development
The following is an illustrated list of options for the EU Somalia Unit and DfID Somalia to consider when supporting the emergence of a strong civil society in Somalia. To avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to stress that the actions identified below concern the strengthening of each segment within civil society. Obviously the options indicated in the following paragraphs are to be seen as a menu of option, and are not excluding other options that should be indentified on the field and through the involvement of local actors.

Moreover, a different set of actions concerning the whole civil society and its relationship with other actors is to be identified for the implementation of the strategies defined in the previous paragraphs, increasing the engagement of CSOs in peace-building and governance. These actions might include, among others:

- promoting confidence-building and interaction between state institutions and civil society organisations;
- fostering civil society efforts at peace-building and mediation;
- supporting civil society efforts at oversight and monitoring of international aid work and government actions;
- enabling civil society to take active part in democratisation efforts (from awareness raising to efforts aimed at fostering inclusion and downward accountability).

8.1. Support to first level organisations

Supporting first level organisations (CBOs, grassroots and self-help groups) should assume the main aim of allowing them to maintain their grassroots links and functions, while achieving greater capacities and sustainability for defining local development agenda, for linking with NGOs; for linking with local public and political authorities, for linking with Clan elders (while normally maintaining a strong linkage with clans, often – especially when involved in policy action – CSOs intervene in spheres that are without traditional clan sphere of influence).

Maintaining grassroots links and functions and is strongly connected with the possibility and capacity to play an active role in the management of local public services and development initiatives. This can be achieved, for instance, by:

- Supporting the creation of local funding schemes in which communities and their organised bodies are involved – without necessarily having pre-set agendas - in the identification and definition of priorities and in the selection of projects and activities to be funded (a reference for these activities can be provided by the practices tested by PACT, DRC and Oxfam GB);

- Creation of local (village or community level) Monitoring & Evaluation Committees for following up project activities carried out locally, both by local and international NGOs – particularly if funded by EU and DfID) or by public authorities (a reference for this activity is provided by some initiatives under development in the framework of the JPLG);

- Providing assistance to local authorities (village councils and district councils) in the setting-up and management of local committees for planning local development interventions - particularly within the JPLG by linking the UN with NGOs specialised with community and civil society building - so as to promote recognition of CBOs as policy actors to be involved in existing schemes and to avoid consideration that they are just implementing actors or beneficiaries (actions can include training and technical assistance, particularly on civil society consultation, on participatory budgeting, on strategic planning; such activities can be carried out in cooperation with the actions fostered by other donors for promoting NGO sector development);
Using thematic programmes (particularly NSA Programme) for launching partnership initiatives in which NGOs (both national and international) are engaged in long-term, programme based actions for reinforcing CBOs capacities. The village/district councils focusing on citizens involvement in monitoring public services and local resources including water, housing and the environment and for launching institutional and sector capacity building initiatives;

Using thematic programmes including NSA, PtP, gender, etc. and Health, Education and Economic Development projects for launching initiatives in which local first level CSOs are involved in the setting and monitoring of quality standards for service provision reflecting the needs and expectations of their constituencies; this can be conducted around services delivered both by public authorities and by private providers such as NGOs or the UN. Areas in which participatory standard-setting and monitoring can be implemented include urban services, child care, health services, education);

Particularly through thematic programmes, fostering the creation and development of local coalitions for solving local problems – including conflicts over local resources - in which first level CSOs are involved as full capacity actors together with NGOs and public authorities. The special areas in which such kinds of actions can promoted are those in which the effectiveness of solutions depends on the participation of the various involved actors, such as the management of environmental resources and of public space.

Promoting, both in the framework of thematic programmes and in the framework of geographic cooperation the improvement of knowledge and recognition of first level CSOs presence and roles by public authorities and by NGOs; to this aim research studies, e.g. local or sector mapping studies, as well as seminars, publications and the use of media such as the production of documentaries; a key function of these studies can be also that of clarifying differences, relations and roles of grassroots groups and of grassroots institutions (including elders).

8.2. Support to second level organisations

Support to second level organisations (particularly, NGOs and charitable societies) can aim to increase the policy advocacy roles of NGOs and the increase the attitude to recognise first level organisations as “policy actors.” This would mainly be focused on increasing impact for local peace building.

This can be achieved, for instance, by:

- Promoting a greater involvement and a stronger role of NGOs in sector coordination; already sector coordination committees exist in Somaliland and (based in Nairobi) at country level, but they involve mainly International NGOs. They could be made more relevant and outcome orientated and a greater participation of local NGOs can be fostered.

- Setting priorities in the calls for projects of thematic programmes aimed at selecting projects which include policy development actions, and long-term institutional development initiatives which means defining a plan of progressive independence of the involved local actor, including stages and targets, which are part of long-term programmes;

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76 In Somaliland also some local CSOs are involved in sector committees, particularly in the Health Sector and in the Education sector. Moreover, NSA sector committees have been set up with the facilitation of NSA platforms in the three regions.
Promoting the launching of **sub-granting and support schemes in which NGOs adopt the role of mentor of CBOs**, rather than simply using their implementation capacities. An International NGO provides grants that are addressed to a couple of local CSOs: the one working as mentor – coach of the other; sub-granting schemes have been used successfully in different NSA/CSO support programmes, from Burundi to Palestine; a model for sub-granting was developed by the EU delegation in occupied Palestinian territory and approved by the headquarters in Bruxelles.

Adopting two-step procedures for project selection and provision of **support and funding for participatory formulation and conflict analysis** for the projects that have been selected in the first step; in fact, project formulation is often based on previous studies and contacts with beneficiary communities, almost never on a real and effective consultation of local partners. A main obstacle for adopting such a modality of project formulation is the lack of time and financial resources specifically allocated for this.

Introducing criteria for verifying the **actual involvement of CBOs and local NGOs in project formulation** particularly in large programmes directly contracted;

Introducing criteria for verifying the fact that **long-term and peer-to-peer partnerships** are established e.g. fund distribution among partners, programme governance systems etc., particularly in large programmes directly contracted;

**Involving local NGOs** in the activities identified above for supporting first level organisations thus creating consortiums among resource providers – such as research or capacity building specialized NGOs – and local NGOs that can be involved in the management of activities and in the delivery of long-term coaching and technical assistance to CBOs;

Fostering medium and **long-term institutional capacity building programmes** for NGOs, by giving preference to projects that are integrated in longer programmes, this would imply the definition of indicators for selection looking at the existence of longer capacity building programmes; and through the coordination among donors for funding the different parts of only one long-term programmes.

Promoting an engagement of the **Somalia NGO Consortium** on substantial issues related to the development of local civil society and the opening of the consortium to local NGOs -in Puntland, already a number of local NGOs participate to the consortium.

### 8.3. Support to third and fourth level organisations

Third and fourth level CSOs (sector based platforms, coalitions, regional and local networks, general umbrella organisations, etc.) seem mainly to need support to achieve higher participation by member organisations, to define relevant agendas representing their constituencies, to be able to perform permanent and continuous activities and to have a greater influence on policy making, both at national and at local level.

A major issue in this framework is to avoid the building of new artificial or “funding based” networks, that are likely to disrupt the existing networks and to produce conflicts with the stronger ones. Instead, it would be possible to support already existing structures and processes by opening the space for a more active role for these organisations within the NSA platforms. It would be necessary as well to reinforce the participation of constituencies within existing civil society and NSA platforms, particularly through the recognition of the interests of each constituent group and the re-construction of the linkages among networks at lower levels.
In addition to the possibilities listed below – that concern the strengthening of civil society networks and platforms – it is opportune to remember that a wide set of actions are possible with the aim of reinforcing civil society participation.

Possible actions could include:

- **Maintaining current engagement in peacebuilding activities**, while identifying specific roles for the different actors involved in platforms, clarifying expectations, needs and interests related to the various actors and setting up mechanisms for the mediation and conciliation of emerging differences. In this framework, also processes aimed at building a “common voice” and a “common policy” – particularly for participating in the short term to the management of so called “Transition Roadmap” - while maintaining and respecting differences among actors and organisations.

- Promoting greater involvement and a stronger role of CSO networks in sector coordination activities, for instance, calling the representatives of sectoral platforms and network to assume an active role in the management of the existing sector coordination groups among development partners (assuming such a role can consist in taking the responsibility for the secretariat and for the setting of meeting agendas) – however networks would need to have funding for playing such a role;

- Supporting preparatory meetings among CSOs for sector coordination groups, with the aim of producing a common voice and proactive participation; networks and platforms can be asked to prepare these meetings;

- Active involvement of sector and geographic platforms and networks in the preparation and organisation of the structured consultation activities that are already held by EU this can allow for the organisation of local consultation in which local NGOs and CBOs participation can be facilitated;

- Provision of technical assistance and resources to platforms for the formalization of institutional development plans or for improving functioning and provision of network services: i.e. knowledge management, production and dissemination; information activities; coordination and agenda setting; representation of member organisations, producing sector or geographically focused CSOs mapping; this can be conducted by increasing within the thematic programmes the specific actions aimed at supporting networking and platform development;

- Opening space at national level and at local level in which CSOs networks can represent member organisations, including monitoring and evaluation committees for projects and development initiatives (note the ones indicated above) and the creation of committees for the discussion and following-up on EU geographic cooperation initiatives such as the activities under the Country Strategy Paper and main , including infrastructure;

- Supporting the assumption of a guiding role of networks and platforms in the activities supporting CSOs development; in this framework networks and platforms should be invited to act as a leading body and to leave implementation of activities to other specialised bodies; participation of networks and platforms should not be limited to the election of representatives in the boards leading the actions.

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77 In addition of being a factor of conflict among CSOs, the assumption of different voices (by elaborating different Civil Society Agendas) and the adoption of different policies concerning the participation to the “road map process” by the diverse NSA platforms and umbrella organisations, result in a weaker capacity of CSOs as a whole to influence policies and the political processes.
8.4. Increasing effectiveness and efficiency

Instead of promoting dramatic changes that could risk creating mistrust and conflict among partners, the improvement of effectiveness and efficiency in supporting CSO development may be approached by the EU and DfID in a way to increasing communication and promoting better partnerships. By establishing processes to improve communication, planning and partnership among partners of different kinds (i.e. Somali NGOs and international organisations) the EU and or DfID could both improve practice as well as relations which have been identified as key to success in Somalia. By supporting the development of communities of practice in which emerging issues are considered and analysed by the stakeholders, a form of peer review and evaluation could be developed.

This can be done by:

- organising informal groups, not necessarily with the direct participation of EU Somalia Unit, for discussion about standards of practice in Somalia, based on international best practices and on issues that have been observed by the EU Somalia Unit, such a case issue being that of per diems which was already raised by the EU Somalia Unit, but which is a matter for discussion among organisations, since this may influence their activities; another issue is that of better partnership with local CSOs;

- organising informal groups for programme monitoring meetings – also without the direct participation of EU Somalia Unit – for discussing in timely way the issues emerging on the field and influencing positively or negatively the activities and their impacts; a good location for these meetings would be the EU field offices in Hargeisa, Garowe and Mogadishu;

- **Requiring two or more partners develop joint plans to address one outcome** - which can be expected to interact on the field or on strategic issues – for carrying out joint monitoring activities and for setting joint actions;

- setting standards to be applied in project formulation and in budget formulation;

- introduce and provide support to all projects to develop a set of **common indicators concerning outcomes** on civil society development, to be used separately and to be used for a comparative analysis of projects, those proposed in the strategy outline can be used for mid term review, and potentially for promoting joint monitoring exercises involving different organisations;

- requiring projects/partners to carry out **an internal informal monitoring** based on a specific set of issues to be verified, for understanding the relationships between project actions and their environment: a possibility can be to focus on a) reactions and actions by local public authorities; b) reactions and actions by local NGOs involved in the project/programme; c) actions by other CSOs in the project territory; relations among the CSOs directly involved in the programme and those that are not involved; d) dynamics and impacts on local communities; e) obstacles in achieving expected targets.