The Carana Scenario

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What is the Carana Training Scenario?

Carana is a fictitious country, located on a fictitious island, Kisiwa, off the eastern coast of Africa. The story of Carana and its people was originally developed in 2002-2003 by experts at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). It was meant to serve as the foundation for scenario-based training exercises by African peacekeeping forces.

Today, the European Union supports the evolution of the Carana scenario as part of its contribution to helping Africa resolve conflicts and keep the peace. The main beneficiaries are participant organisations within the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is an international, continental multidimensional African force, with military, police and civilian components, under the direction of the African Union.

The Carana training scenario has evolved over the years, with input from a number of contributors, including various peacekeeping and training institutions in both Africa and in Europe. The most recent version includes exercise-specific documents such as treaties, technical surveys and Security Council Resolutions.

The depth and complexity of the Carana story – beginning with the first settlements, through to growth, early internal conflicts, colonisation, the effect of the World Wars, independence, and up to the present day – allows trainers to present a range of potential issues that might contribute to national or regional crises, all within a realistic and coherent context.

Currently, training for African Union military and police peacekeeping forces under the Carana Scenario is supported by the EU-funded AMANI AFRICA II Cycle. The ultimate aim is to help Africans in the field of peace and security.
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REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Historical Overview

The First Settlements

Human life on Kisiwa is estimated to have begun over 35,000 years ago. At this time, ancient descendents of the Pleioni people settled in what would become the south east portion of the island. The Mahidi, a traditionally nomadic tribe, and Nakunda peoples are thought to have also sailed over from the African continent and settled on Kisiwa tens of thousands of years ago. These ancient peoples lived as hunter-gatherers before the development of agriculture and pastoral farming.

Around 350 B.C., the Nzedda people (sharing common ethno-linguistic roots) began arriving by boat from mainland Africa. The Nzedda who immigrated consisted primarily of people from the Falin tribes and the Tatsi tribes. These populations mostly settled in the southern part of the island, on what became Mosana and Rimosa. Other groups of people arrived in the following decades and centuries; Damangi populations made the voyage to the island and eventually settled in the north of the island, and people of the Mosanja tribe immigrated and settled in the western portion of the island. Migration from mainland Africa to the island slowed down after this, and only smaller groups of immigrants subsequently arrived in the region.

It is not known whether there would have been other ancient peoples that pre-dated the arrival of the immigrant populations to the island of Kisiwa. Archaeologists believe that while contact between this population and the Nakunda probably happened first, it would be centuries before the Tatsi would come in contact with the Pleioni, who were mostly located in the south east of the island. The discovery of the Mahidi nomadic tribes who roamed the north of the island would happen even later. The Mahidi mostly existed on the other side of the mountains and would not be discovered before the Damangi had successfully crossed the harsh terrain.
Around 300 AD, the Kori tribe, descendants of the Tondoi people, came to the island from the mainland. Scientists believe that the Kori would have arrived on Kisiwa in large numbers with more property, including cattle, than when others arrived. It is thought that with the arrival of the Kori people, the indigenous populations (Pleioni, Nakunda and Mahidi) probably became less numerous, and thus more vulnerable, than the immigrant populations. The equity of space between the different groups that had lasted for centuries was interrupted, especially since the Kori arrived with more resources than the other ethnic groups. Diseases, foreign to the indigenous populations, brought over by the Falin, Tatsi, Kori and others, also severely impacted the indigenous communities.

The Domination of the Kori Kingdom

The various settlements throughout the island engaged in farming, and by 500 AD, were cultivating groundnut, beans, corn and cotton. Communities also domesticated animals such as cattle and goats. Populations on the coast performed vital fishing activities. The cultivation of cotton especially flourished under the Kori who had settled in a part of the island where there was thick soil and good rainfalls. The Kori were able to capitalize on this cultivation, and an expanding production resulted in enormous wealth for the Kori tribes. For centuries, the cultivation thrived and the relative wealth of the Kori grew significantly, as did their power and influence over other ethnicities in the interior of the island. Wars for power and resources led to the Kori conquering the Damangi that were settled in the north-interior lands in 650 AD and 740 AD.

From the conquering of some of the Damangi tribes came the birth of the Grand Kori Kingdom that ruled the island for centuries. Having overcome their most immediate adversary for land in the interior of the island, the Kori were easily able to rid the centre of Kisiwa of other populations, specifically the indigenous people that had settled there. The Mahidi peoples in their midst were nearly all eliminated, and the Nakunda and Pleioni (who were more numerous than the Mahidi) were chased out of the interior. By the 800s, the Kori had established themselves as the dominant military force on Kisiwa.
Around 980 AD, with the death of King Yamongo Aso, Yamongo Asabo, the predecessor’s nephew, became the new king of the Kori people of Kisiwa. This most important position in Kori society, and most affluent position on the entire island, was transferred by inheritance via maternal uncles. Upon his accession, Yamongo Asabo proved to be a fierce warrior and shrewd leader. During his reign, he established a taxation system that brought huge revenues to the royal Kori court, and continued to assert his people's military fortitude. Before long, King Yamongo Asabo inspired awe and fear from other chiefs in other parts of the island. It was under his twenty-five year rule that the Kori kingdom flourished and took firm control of the central part of Kisiwa.

The kingdom continuously tried to conquer land from other groups, including the Falin. Since their arrival, the Falin had always been the most numerous ethnic grouping in Kisiwa, and they mostly settled along the eastern coast, especially in the area that has become Carana. After their initial arrival, several tribes also established villages and communities closer to the interior of the island in the chain of mountains between Carana and Katasi. For centuries, these inhabitants in the mountains served in defending the Falin tribes against the threat of the Kori, who constantly sought to expand their kingdom. Despite many Kori attempts in the early 1100s, however, the Kori military superiority did not triumph against the Falin’s better knowledge of their own terrain.

However, the Kori’s discovery of gold in the early 1300s served to further strengthen the kingdom on the island. This resource enabled the Kori royalty to coerce neighbouring chiefdom’s armies to swear allegiance to its reign. This allowed the Kori to push their control east and into the mountainous lands that they had failed to conquer against the Falin a few centuries earlier. The Falin tribes fled further eastwards, allowing the Kori tribes to access vital river systems, where they began fishing.

With the Falin’s exodus to the eastern coast of the island, the Kori kingdom’s further expansion was focused on the Tatsi tribes in the southern lands of Kisiwa. Two incursions by the Kori resulted in the Tatsi tribes falling under the domination of the Kori. Hundreds of Tatsi were
forced to work in the King’s court, and hundreds of others were ordered to work in the households of other affluent Kori families. In the wake of this victory, a sizable portion of the Kori population moved southwards and settled in the previously Tatsi-owned lands, which later became part of the country of Rimosa.

**The Arab Immigration to Kisiwa**

In the 1070s, the Berber Almoravid Dynasty of North Africa started establishing itself on the northern portion of the island, interacting with the Damangi and smaller ethno-linguistic communities there, eventually converting the great majority of these populations to Islam. While Islam spread throughout the northern portion of the island, it was contained to this area due to the heavy mountain range that separates the northern and central parts of Kisiwa. While the Damangi soon became part of the Dynasty, attempts at capturing the faiths and loyalties of the Kori and Mosanja were unsuccessful, and the great majority continued to follow their ancestral religions.

By the mid-1100, the Dynasty was steadily declining. The Damangi converts retained Islam and consequently, successfully thwarted attempts by Christian missionaries to convert them in the centuries that would later follow.

**The Mosanja Opposition**

The west of Kisiwa, settled by the Mosanja was conducive to profitable cotton cultivation. This, along with the profits of the Mosanja items of artisanship including copperware, pottery and ivory, allowed this group to accumulate significant wealth. The Mosanja not only traded with their neighbours, but established lucrative trading relationships with spice merchants en route to India from the Aksumite Empire of north-eastern Africa starting from 3 BC until well into the first century AD. With their growing prosperity, the Mosanja were the only people who could contend with the Kori.

For the most part, this tribe did not suffer the threat of the Kori who were content with dominating groups with weaker leadership. In fact, the strong chiefdom of the Mosanja enjoyed the utmost respect from the Kori kingdom, who needed access to the vibrant Mosanja ports. It was only around 1450 that King Akusa sent warriors to expel the Mosanja from the mouth of the Hudi River. The Kori attack failed, and the Mosanja blocked off access to their ports. While the kingdom had access to seaports by means of their dominance of the Tatsi, these ports were less frequented by traders and merchants. Thus, in 1457, King Akusa presented part of the Kori land to the Mosanja in exchange for access to the ports.
The Disintegration of the Kori Kingdom

The Kori kingdom’s failed attempt at conquering Mosanja land and the allocation of some of its territory to the Mosanja under King Akusa marked the beginning of the deterioration of the Kori kingdom. During his reign, it became apparent that the King and his court lacked the military astuteness and ruling strength of their predecessors. Before long, court revenues began to decline as traders evaded taxes, and poor discipline devastated the ranks of the Kori army. The kingdom was thrown into turmoil as successive rulers struggled to re-establish order. Eventually, groups that had been subordinated to the kingdom revolted and sought to re-establish their self-rule.

However, the kingdom continued to fight for their dominance. Around 1520, in an attempt to restore their military dominance, the Kori attacked the Damangi with the aim of capturing parts of the land that eventually became the country of Sumora. The Damangi, by now under the control of the Ottoman Empire, fought off the Kori army. Also during these same years, the Damangi expelled Kori that had settled in their midst, but had never integrated into Damangi society. As the Kori retreated, Damangi populations moved south, seizing kingdom land and settling around the interior of the country that has become Katasi. Even with this weakening of the Kori society on the island, the Kori leaders remained the most influential leadership on the island.

The Exploration and Colonization of the Island of Kisiwa

Around 1430, Azurian explorers began arriving on the island in search of vital resources and wealth. On their arrival, they first came into contact with Falin and Tatsi populations living along the central eastern coastline of the country that has become Carana. Along these shores, the Azurians established trading posts that would allow them to trade and ship out resources found on the island. Along with the Azurian traders on the island were Christian missions that converted local populations to Christianity.
By the 1440s, Azurians began enslaving the African populations on the island who were transported through ports on the Gulf of Carana. Azurian slavers were aided by the Falin who, in exchange for guns, gunpowder and other supplies, identified Tatsi communities for capturing and exploitation, including some who had already been captured by the Falin from the south of modern-day Carana and northern Rimosa. This betrayal of the Tatsi by the Falin established a deep hostility between the two populations. It also led to sporadic attacks and purging of Falin who lived among the Tatsi for the centuries that followed.

The Azurians also established trading posts on the western coast of the island, where they settled amongst the Mosanja population. They traded with the Mosanja, who were rich with the resources sought by the Azurians. Christian missionaries also accompanied the Azurian traders on this coast, and the Mosanja population was quick to embrace the teachings of the missionaries.

There were also battles between the indigenous populations of the island, especially between the Damangi and the Barini and Hanari Falin subgroups in the north of the island. While all of these populations were Muslim, ethnic conflict between the Damangi and Falin forced tens of thousands of Falin to flee to Carana in the 1860s. While people of the Falin tribes were already in the majority in Carana, these Falin were of the Christian faith. This flow of Muslim Falin into Carana was the first major introduction of Islam to the country of Carana, even though there were Arab Muslims settled within the country.

The Partition of the Island of Kisiwa

By the 1600s, foreign interests had proliferated in Kisiwa. Powerbrokers from not only the Azurian Empire, but also from the Carmine Empire and the Sabelian Empire had firmly established their presence on the island and controlled different parts of Kisiwa. Disputes and attacks arose between different nationalities over control of the island’s offerings, and wars between rivals elsewhere in the world were mirrored on the island. This lasted several centuries.
In 1882, colonial powers convened to demarcate the areas of control and to formally end self-rule on Kisiwa, with the signing of the Treaty of Salin, where the modern boundaries of the territories of Kisiwa were drawn. Carana, Katasi and North Namuna went to the Azurian Empire, Rimosa and South Namuna to the Carmine Empire, and Sumora to the Sabelian Empire.

Subsequent to the 1882 Treaty of Salin, the other colonial powers began enforcing the agreed upon boundaries, although they encountered great resistance in some of the countries by populations that had previously enjoyed relative freedom of movement across the demarcated borders. This was especially the case in Katasi, where the Kori had fiercely fought to avoid subjugation. Their most significant victories were in 1886 and 1887, when the Kori in Katasi defeated two Azurian contingents. The Kori were eventually suppressed partly due to the betrayal of the Tatsi who harboured great resentment for their use as slaves in prior centuries. So, while the Azurians fought to consolidate their power in Katasi, the Tatsi acted as spies, alerting the Azurians to areas where pockets of organized resistance by the Kori were planned.

The Azurian rule of its colonies aimed at establishing strong Azurian institutions, complete with mandatory use of Azurian language and currency. These actions came as a surprise to the indigenous populations of their colonies. The effects of the Azurian regime were difficult for the Kori in the colony of Carana. These Kori were the descendants of those who were first isolated from the Kori kingdom when the border was established between Katasi and Carana. Ever since the boundary was established, the Kori had resented colonial rule and had organized many revolts and riots against Azurian authorities who would not let them cross the border. The Kori had strong traditional ties and customs that were negatively impacted by the arbitrary establishment of the boundaries.
The World Wars

In the first decades of the 20th century, the world was engulfed by the First World War and the events leading up to it. Kisiwa was no exception. In 1914, the Entente Powers attacked the coastline of Sumora, since the Sabelian Empire was sympathetic to the Central Powers. The Azurians, who had authority over Carana, lent their support by allowing the Entente forces to use their radio signal towers and sea ports as necessary. In 1915, Azuria and Carmina (formerly of the Carmine Empire) joined the First World War on the side of the Entente Powers. The Entente Powers were never able to gain a strong foothold in Sumora, but fighting in the rest of the world led to the defeat of the Central Powers and its allies, including the Sabelian Empire. After this defeat of 1918, Sumora fell under a Class B League of Nations Mandate, under the administration of Carmine authorities, later becoming a United Nations Trust Territory in 1945.

Upon their arrival in Sumora, Carmina established good relations with some of its indigenous populations, specifically the Falin that largely composed the public service and administrative positions dating back to the Sabelian rule. Carmine relations with the Damangi people were much more frigid. While the Damangi family of tribes comprised the majority of the population, the Falin inhabited more of the areas where the foreign powers were established, mainly along the Eastern coastline. This resulted in the colonial powers giving responsibilities and allocating power in Sumora to the Falin and not the Damangi.

During the Second World War, Carmine and Azurian forces were able to rely on the support of tens of thousands of soldiers from their colonies in Kisiwa who fought in the Middle East, the Far East and in Eastern Africa. The families of these servicemen were provided family allowances that allowed them to survive while their family members were away. These allowances helped to invigorate the economy of the island, especially Rimosa, from where the biggest portion of the soldiers came. Meanwhile, a high demand for agricultural and livestock products also advantaged Rimosa’s economy. After the Second World War, having greatly benefited from the war-economy, the colonies’ economies continued to transform. In Rimosa, it became obvious that the return of troops from abroad meant a presence of skilled ex-service people that benefited the public service.

The Process of Decolonization

In the second half of the twentieth century, the territories of Kisiwa, along with much of the rest of Africa, began a period of decolonization. The pressure to decolonize came from growing opposition to colonial rule in Kisiwa, as well as from a decline in the power of the remaining global empires. Independence was achieved by a variety of means, from negotiation to revolt.

Decolonization in Rimosa was gradual and relatively tranquil. Ever since Carmine authorities colonized Rimosa in the 17th century, there had been only small-scale revolts against the authorities. The Carmine rule was never seriously threatened and the relationship between Carmina and the indigenous population had been largely without friction. Carmine rule had infringed relatively little on traditional social structures (in comparison to other regions in Kisiwa and mainland Africa). In fact, authorities greatly depended on traditional forms of leadership and structure to implement their rule. As early as the 1920s, responsibilities became increasingly decentralized, and little by little through constitutions and treaties, power was transferred to the hands of the indigenous populations. In the early 1950s, Carmine authorities and the people in Rimosa started preparing for self-governance. Independence Day, September 4, 1957, was marked by a grand parade down the streets of Yudifa where African leaders and Carmine leaders walked side by side. This drew wide media coverage and others from around Kisiwa that hoped to achieve independence.
Independence in Katasi was achieved through great struggle. Conditions on the ground had deteriorated such that in 1955, the principal Azurian colonial capital was transferred from Nanom in Katasi to Galasi in Carana. After years of fighting, in 1958 the colonial authorities held a referendum on self-government within the Azurian Community. Recognizing the need for greater self-rule, Azuria had created the Azurian Community of States in January 1958. The revolutionary leaders denounced this and urged the population to vote against it; the People’s Republic of Katasi was pronounced that same year on July 26, 1958. During the fight for independence, the revolutionary leaders had managed to convince the populace that the Kori royal family was outdated and that if they were allowed to continue to rule, they would impede the nation’s progress. These elements derided King Muta Dagbi IV as a weak and ineffective leader who would hinder Katasi's growth and development, and after independence, they swiftly moved to dissolve the monarchy. The Kori royal family fled into Namuna where they were welcomed by King Mambose Asana III. Deposed King Dagbi IV died in exile two years later in 1960. His family, however, remained in Namuna.

Throughout the 1950s the agitation for independence had dominated the agenda of the North Namuna elite. However, unlike in Katasi, these were not violent events. Rather, natives who had been educated in Azuria and had become versed in the Azurian governing system led the call for independence. Their leader, Mambose Asana III joined Joseph Uroma (of Carana) at the Azurian National Assembly in 1958. That same year, when given the opportunity in a referendum to become an autonomous republic within the framework of the Azurian Community, the north voted in favour of the proposal, its name changing to the Kingdom of Namuna, with Mambose Asana III becoming the first fully independent king. Full independence was attained two years later on May 28, 1960.
In South Namuna, even though the Mosanja did not engage Carmina in long battles, there were enough revolts against them that by 1958, Carmina was ready to hand over administration to the natives. The attainment of Independence by Rimosa and others stimulated events in both North and South Namuna. Sankwaduro Mosindiga, a brilliant lawyer from poor roots found widespread support both among the masses and the elite of South Namuna. As chair of the Free People’s Party, he pushed for two successive constitutions in 1954 and 1958 that increasingly granted more powers to the Mosanja. The 1954 Constitution laid the groundwork for complete self rule and led to the proclamation of independence on July 20, 1961 as the Republic of Mosana.

Inspired by events elsewhere on the island, both African and Arab populations in Sumora increased their call for independence. Having won the support of Sumorans, Baliru Amadi led a popular independence movement in the country, which he hoped could remain non-violent. But in September 1956, after protesters in Babani were assaulted by Carmine authorities during a rally against the colonial rule, Amadi urged his supporters to pick-up arms and seek justice and independence for Sumora. Riots and attacks against Carmine rule quickly ensued, and after seven years of fighting, independence was achieved on 25 June 1963, and the colony became the Islamic Republic of Sumora.

Carana became a member of the short-lived Azurian Community of States. Despite this status, internal political pressure and domestic political opposition continued to grow in the country. Public agitation and dissent sparked by various groups and associations in the urban areas increased demand for full independence from the Azurian Empire. These protests were led by the charismatic Joseph Uroma, their representative to the Azurian National Assembly. Ultimately on April 10, 1962, after calls for self-rule had continually grown louder, the Azurian Empire relented and granted full independence to the République démocratique de Carana, Uroma becoming the first indigenous head of state of the country.
Geographic Overview

The island of Kisiwa lies in the Indian Ocean, approximately 100km from the horn of Africa across the Gulf of Kisiwa to the northwest, and about 100km to the Seychelles archipelago to the southeast. It straddles the Equator (0° latitude), and is centred at approximately 55°E longitude. It measures approximately 1,600km from east to west, and 1,300km from north to south. It has a land area of approximately 1,404,941 km². It features a diversity of terrain, from desert to rainforest, and from rugged mountains to level coastal plains. The highest feature on the island is Mount Katasi (1,917m).

Geologically, Kisiwa sits on the north-eastern edge of the Horn of Africa subplate, southwest of the Carlsberg Ridge in the Indian Ocean. It forms one of the 12 distinct physiographic provinces of the South African Platform physiographic division. Kisiwa originated as part of the Gondwana supercontinent. Its west coast was formed when Africa broke off from Gondwana around 165 million years ago.
Kisiwa is rugged and mountainous, with three principal ranges separated by major rivers. The northern and southern halves of the island are separated by the Namu River flowing southwest through Lake Namuna into the Gulf of Kisiwa, and the Lonari River flowing northeast into the Indian Ocean. To the north, the Sumoran highlands rise gradually from the southwest towards the north-eastern coast, to an elevation of about 1,100m. To the south, the mountain range is divided by the Hudi River, running north to south. To the west, a long ridge covers central Mosana, reaching elevations of almost 1,500m; to the east, another ridge runs north of the Torongo River, reaching elevations of almost 2,000m in central Katasi. South of the Torongo River, a range of low hills covers most of Rimosa.

Because of rainfall patterns and elevation, almost all of the major river systems empty into the ocean along the southern and eastern coasts. Most of these rivers meander across broad flood plains, terminating in estuarine deltas. Most of the major rivers permit navigation part-way into the island's interior by riverine and small coastal craft. Lake Namuna is a large freshwater lake of 19,529 km².
Kisiwa consists of six independent states, which may be described geographically as follows:

**Carana** (108,417 km²) situated along the east coast, between the Torongo River and the Kalesi River, and including the Mogave River and Kodari River systems; diverse terrain includes coastal savannah, montane rainforest, and rocky desert uplands.

**Katasi** (81,205 km²): landlocked country in the interior, including moist lowland areas to either side of a relatively arid dividing mountain range.

**Mosana** (403,322 km²): situated along the south-western coast; a rugged montane jungle interior, with fertile land along the southern shores of Lake Namuna; bordered to the north by Lake Namuna and the Namu River, and to the east by the Hudi River; the Dila River and Kasapi River systems create extensive coastal wetlands to the south.

**Namuna** (267,770 km²): situated along the north-western coast, with a rugged and hilly coastline; fertile land along the northern shores of Lake Namuna; bordered to the south by Lake Namuna and the Namu River.

**Rimosa** (225,288 km²): situated along the south-eastern coast, consisting primarily of gentle hills with a mixture of grassland savannah and rainforest; bordered to the west by the Hudi River, and to the north by the Torongo River.

**Sumora** (315,939 km²): situated along the north-eastern coast, with a barren, rugged and hilly northern coastline; coastal highlands rise steeply from the northern littoral, dropping gradually to the Lonari River valley in the south; the hills of the Gasi peninsula rise steeply between the Lonari River and the Kalesi River which forms the southern border.

### Infrastructure Overview

Although relatively rich with natural resources, the states of Kisiwa reflect a level of economic development not significantly different from most of the rest of Africa. All six Kisiwa states have lacked the capital necessary to develop modern infrastructure for transport and delivery of services. The basic distribution of ports, rail lines and roads have changed little since colonial times, and in some cases reflect the pre-existing political divisions.

As the geography tends towards shallow coastal waters, shoaling, sedimentation and marshy river deltas, Kisiwa has relatively few natural harbours, which are located mostly along the southern coast. Some other locations, while geographically advantageous, are located away from population centres, or too close to historically volatile national borders.

The Mosana port of Kuku is the largest and busiest seaport on the island, followed by the Rimosa port of Yudifa. Kuku has a capacity to handle approximately 4.5 million tonnes of cargo. In 2008, the total volume handled at Kuku was approximately 2.45 million tonnes. Total cargo landed was 1.3 million tonnes, while that shipped was 0.7 million tonnes, with 450,000 tonnes accounting for transhipment. Yudifa’s handling capacity is approximately 3.45 million tonnes. In 2008, 1.65 million tonnes of cargo was handled. Out of this approximately 0.9 million tonnes was landed, while 0.5 million tonnes was shipped. Transhipment amounted to 250,000 tonnes.

There are numerous small ports along the coast of Kisiwa, visited by coastal vessels plying both internal and international trade. Coastal trade provides an alternative to often poorly-maintained road systems, and inadequate rail networks. The majority of coastal traffic consists of break-bulk cargo, loaded and unloaded by cranes, or occasionally by human muscle.

Water access to the interior is provided by a number of river systems, in particular the Torongo and northern Torongo rivers, emptying into the Gulf of Carana, the Namu River, emptying into Mosana Bay through Lake Namuna, and the Lonari River, flowing northeast into the Indian
Ocean. All inland waterways are limited by overhead obstructions and elevation features such as rapids and waterfalls which impacts the size and draught of vessels they can carry.

Road transport in Kisiwa is based on a series of national road networks of differing standards and with varying levels of connectivity. The best road on the island is known as the “Coastal Highway” connecting Kuku in Mosana with Yudifa in Rimosa; for most of its distance it is a modern paved two-lane highway, well-maintained and engineered for speeds of 100 km/h. Both countries have other paved roads connecting most of their major communities. Sumora, Carana, and Namuna have fewer paved roads, and Katasi has fewer still. The rugged northern coast of Sumora still lacks a single paved road connecting the small communities along its length.

Rail transport on the island connects Mosana with Namuna and Rimosa, Namuna with Sumora, and Rimosa with southern Carana. However, there is no single rail network connecting all states or their major communities and ports. In addition, the difference between the Carmine (1,067 mm) gauge used by Rimosa and Mosana, and the Azurian (1,000 mm) gauge used by Carana, Namuna, Katasi and Sumora imposes further problems. (Katasi’s rail system is effectively obsolete, and no longer connected to the 1,000mm network in Sumora and Namuna.)

Like many islands, Kisiwa ultimately depends on air traffic for the rapid movement of people and products. Each national capital has an international airport. Of these, Nanom can only be reached via Kuku, Yudifa or Galasi. National carriers fly regularly between the various capitals and the African mainland, with the Mosana capital Kuku being the island's principal hub. Kuku has regularly scheduled flights to Europe, North America, Asia and various African destinations.

Kuku International Airport (Mosana) is also the largest airport on the island, and with Yudifa, is capable of handling most large commercial aircraft. The other national and international airports are limited to medium-sized aircraft (e.g. Boeing 737). Many major airports are dual-use facilities, sharing runways and other services with their national Air Forces. All countries have a number of more or less austere airstrips and other minor facilities suitable for light aircraft and some military tactical airlift (e.g. C-130).

Each country in Kisiwa has at least one commercial air carrier, often wholly or partially state-owned, and operating fleets of varying size, age and reliability. (Some are on the list of airlines banned within the European Union) There are also a number of charter services (both fixed and rotary wing), primarily serving the natural resource industries.

Island of Kisiwa Geopolitical Considerations

Post-independence relations among the six states of Kisiwa can be characterised as largely stable, if chilly, with rare outbursts of hostilities. All six countries have a shared history of colonialism and have confronted similar challenges in the post-colonial era and this set of common problems has led to cooperative efforts such as the creation of Economic Cooperation Organization of Kisiwa (ECOK) in 1991. The island’s qualified successes often appear to be fragile because of the numerous issues that simmer beneath the surface of island politics.

Potential for intra-Kisiwa tensions play out against a backdrop of historical factors that have shaped the politics and relations among states on the island in the post-independence era. These underlying realities have the potential to flare up, and cause instability and insecurity on the island. If this were to happen, the most likely flashpoint would likely be in Carana, where latent tension lay just beneath the surface.

Political issues

Potential for friction on Kisiwa is heavily influenced by both the similarities and differences in the political experiences of the island’s six states. During the colonial period, the relative
power structure on the island was forever altered as the Kori lost their dominant status in the central and eastern sections of Kisiwa and other tribes rose to power within the new political boundaries, such as the Falin in Sumora and Carana. Similarly, inter-tribal relationships were fundamentally altered such as the Falin’s history of enslaving and selling Tatsi to the colonizing forces from Azuria and elsewhere. This exploitative relationship scarred Falin-Tatsi relations and continues to be felt today in the form of deep rooted animosities between the two groups. In the past, this bitter relationship has spilled over to affect Carana-Katasi relations through localised ethnic disputes almost automatically drawing in tribal relations across the border. The potential to do so again is always great.

Second, these varying colonial experiences have led to differing approaches to maintaining and managing relations with former colonial powers. Despite the injustices and indignities of colonial rule, both Carana and Rimosa, for example, have maintained mostly cordial and cooperative relations with their former rulers (Azuria and Carmina, respectively), whereas Katasi and, to a lesser extent, Sumora have shunned close relations with Azuria (Katasi) and Carmina (Sumora). These histories have had profound consequences for each country. In the case of Carana and Rimosa, relatively close relations with Azuria and Carmina have meant some measure of protection in the UN Security Council, where the former colonial powers sit as permanent members. It has also meant access to slightly better military equipment and training, although both Azuria and Carmina have been very selective with the type and amount of military assistance offered to their respective former colonies.

Conversely, for example, Katasi and Sumora have greatly limited formal connections to their respective former rulers. In the case of Katasi, it is almost an isolationist policy based on a firm rejection of Azuria playing any substantive role in Katasi’s political life. This stems from its especially unhappy period of Azurian rule and the violent campaign for independence. Katasi has made few efforts to build supportive relationships with other governments, including its neighbours. This has often left Katasi with no chance of generous aid packages from Azuria or Azurian allies when it has suffered from the volatility of international commodity markets. During the Cold War, Katasi’s situation was sufficiently grim that it found itself briefly dependent on the eastern bloc for financial and military assistance. Sumora has likewise pursued a more aloof posture vis-à-vis Carmina but more for reasons associated with its theocratic governance model than its violent struggle for independence. Sumora has largely ignored Carmina as a source of guidance and support over the years in large part because its religious leaders made the decision to broaden and deepen Sumora’s relations with other Muslim states and other developing countries soon after independence in an act of solidarity and as a symbolic rejection of the Carmina’s development models and priorities. Both Azuria and Carmina have established diplomatic relations with Katasi and Sumora, but, in both cases, these are minimal and perfunctory, as relations are cool and lacking any substance on most issues.

Third, relations among the island’s six countries are also influenced by another legacy of differing colonial experiences: language. As is the case in other post-colonial settings, the Kisiwa states can be split between English and French language camps. While island tensions are not directly attributable to this divide, it is a subtle factor in inter-state relations and much more of a factor in influencing relations with other actors off the island. In the case of inter-state relations on Kisiwa, the English-French divide plays out much like it does between the sources of the divide: Azuria and Carmina. There are occasional differences about the language of correspondence, official language status at conferences and perceived language-based blocs on certain issues (usually minor in nature). Off the island, as noted above, the language divide manifests itself differing membership to post-colonial organizations that are de facto language based. This leads to different networks and commercial relations and different perspectives on issues. Also, this has an impact on how the governments on Kisiwa engage with larger international organizations that are composed of language-based caucuses.

The fourth political The idea of neighbours providing safe places of exile or sanctuary to political opponents or rebel groups is not unique to Kisiwa, but it has certainly poisoned relations in the past and remains an everyday irritant in inter-state relations.
Otherwise, there are two high profile cases amongst Kisiwa countries. In the first case, Katasi and Rimosa are at odds over a number of small islands in the upper Torongo River. Confusion over ownership of the islands is traced back to colonial times and the vague and conflicting agreements reached separately by the Azurian and Carmine regimes with local groups, exacerbated further by changes in the river channels caused by natural and man-made erosion. Today, this colonial legacy makes life difficult for the local populations as they struggle to exploit the river’s resources and boat traffic without clear lines of border demarcation and governmental authority. The second case involves competing claims by Katasi, Namuna and Mosana to access to the Namu River. This river forms part of the border between these three states and is one of the largest on the island, but it is not fully navigable and can only accommodate small to medium sized river craft. This has led to tremendous pressure from all users to have maximum access to the river’s few docking facilities, fishing and resource rights and freedom of movement through some of the river’s key bottleneck points. Given its landlocked status, Katasi is especially sensitive to these river access issues.

Religious and Ethnic Factors

Kisiwa is an ethnically and religiously diverse island that was arbitrarily split into six countries by former colonial powers which has domestic and regional implications. In recent history, there have been significant economic migrants, internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees changing the ethnic make-up of certain regions. While none of these ethno-religious tensions have led to full scale war in recent times or to the toppling of a sitting government, the potential for instability remains great.

Military Issues

Five of the six nations in Kisiwa possess militaries of similar size, suggesting a relative equilibrium between them. The exception to this belongs to the Kingdom of Namuna, at roughly 25,000 personnel in uniform, some 11,000 more than its closest rival, Mosana. But, most analysts conclude that Namuna’s military, like most others on the island, is poorly trained, equipped and motivated, thereby negating much of its numerical advantage. Its military, like those of Katasi, Sumora and Mosana, is a conscription-based force. The militaries of Carana and Rimos are similarly sized and all-volunteer forces that are largely equipped with slightly more modern Western equipment, courtesy of their former colonial rulers and other western allies. The Rimosan military is seen to be the best trained of the six militaries (a reflection of its continued ties with Carmina) but Mosana’s military is considered to be the most effective by virtue of its slightly larger numbers, better resources and sufficient training. This perceived overall advantage between these states is, however, slight and all of the governments recognise that an all-out conflict with any neighbour would be terribly costly, regardless of which country would “win”. The impact of war would be particularly damaging to civilian populations, given the poor standards of training and discipline of the armies involved and the ethnic and religious factors that would likely be at the centre of any conflict.

Beyond their national capacities, however, some of the countries on Kisiwa do have extra resources available to them that might tip the balance in the event of conflict. First, Carana and Rimos are exploring talks with Mosana about the possibility of conducting joint military exercises in the future. This is perceived as a means to signal to Katasi their collective resolve to contain Katasi’s inability or unwillingness to stem its territory being used as a source of much of the illegal smuggling and trafficking on the island. One should keep in mind, however, that Carana’s government must also confront domestic opposition to any crack down on smuggling from Katasi because many of the smuggled goods transit through Carana’s ports destined for points abroad. Any effort to reduce this flow of goods will run into opposition from both legitimate and illegitimate interests in Carana.

Also, both Carana and Rimos have standing military agreements with their former colonial powers. Since 2002, Carana has had a defence and military agreement in place with Azuria that gives Carana access to better equipment and training through a joint decision-making
process involving both countries. As part of the accord, Azurian troops can be deployed into Carana at the request of the Caranese government, but only in the face of external aggression that endangers Carana’s sovereignty. For its part, Rimosa has a similar arrangement with Carmina, but this arrangement is governed by a military assistance agreement involving the loose association of former Carmine colonies and Carmina itself. There are substantial numbers of Carmine military personnel assigned to Rimosan units as advisors and trainers and the Carmine military is a regular visitor to Rimosan ports, bases and airfields. While not a formal collective defence agreement, this arrangement is still controversial for many Rimosans because of the neo-colonial undertones. Neighbouring Katasi has repeatedly denounced the Caranese and Rimosan agreements on the same grounds and characterised them as potential threats to Katasi interests.

Economic Issues

All of the countries on Kisiwa are poor and under-developed and share a history of colonial exploitation that has left all of the six economies at the mercy of continental and international commodity markets or dependent on foreign assistance. While there are a few positive indicators on the economic front, most of the countries on Kisiwa are under tremendous economic pressures which, in turn, can exacerbate if not cause political tensions to rise or conflicts to erupt. The small economic elite of all countries continue to widen their income gap with their fellow citizens and it is not lost on anyone that those wealthy few are closely connected to the ruling parties or families in each country. National foreign debt loads are also on the rise in most Kisiwa countries and this has only added to the pain of national treasuries.

The successes are Mosana, and to a lesser extent, Namuna, where GDP per capita figures are respectable and growth rates, are impressive (5 % and 3.5 % respectively). Both governments, Mosana in particular, continue to make infrastructure investments, modestly pay down debt and pursue international trading opportunities. Rimosa and Sumora are not doing as well as their western neighbours, but their respective economies are still growing at modest rates and the unemployment figures remain stable, though high. The real problem rests with Carana and Katasi. Both countries are facing economic challenges that put them at risk of total economic collapse with far-reaching consequences for their other Kisiwa neighbours.

Carana is struggling with the after-effects of disastrous structural adjustment policies that were imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and chronic mismanagement by the PDC, which has ruled Carana since independence in 1962. High unemployment (38%), corruption and successive failed policies have driven citizen frustration and anxiety levels to new highs in recent years and feed a growing underground economy that has deep ties to other illicit markets on Kisiwa and internationally. Most importantly, underground and criminal economic activity has become a regional reality with Katasi, Rimosa and Sumora. As noted above, Katasi is one of the principal sources of regional instability on Kisiwa and this is largely a result of the dire economic conditions within it. The economy is shrinking by almost 3.5% per year and the unemployment rate stands at an astonishing 45%. If these conditions persist, Carana and Katasi have the potential to infect their neighbours through growing and unchecked regional criminal activity, increasing societal stresses that draw in cross-border tribal relations and dampen international investors’ inclinations to move projects forward in other Kisiwa countries, let alone Katasi and Carana.

Any efforts by Carana or Katasi to reverse their untenable course will have to involve greater domestic stability for Carana and a crack-down on illegal activity by the Katasi government as a necessary first step to restoring the formal markets in both countries and to attracting potential foreign investors who will be critical to any plans to develop each country’s natural resources. But, both Carana and Katasi will have to play catch-up with their neighbours in terms of promoting and pursuing international trading opportunities, starting with their fellow Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa (ECOK) members. Both countries have failed to capitalise on the few international trading opportunities on offer since the end of the Cold War relative to their Kisiwa neighbours, and this, in part, explains their current economic plight.
Environmental and Geographical Issues

Kisiwa's tropical climate is not immune to the effects of global climate change. Specifically, recent data suggest a marked increase in the strength of storms that hit the island, especially the south and eastern coasts. This has resulted in increased rainfall that has cause floods in the agricultural regions and stronger than usual winds that have caused great damage to residential shelters and infrastructure. However, there is less rainfall between the storms and few of the storms reach the plains of Sumora. Drought in this country is a growing concern.

Geography has appeared as an issue already, in the context of Katasi’s landlocked status and this fact contributes to Katasi aggressively pursuing border and river access disputes with most of its neighbours. Geography, however, plays at least two more noteworthy roles in relations among Kisiwa’s six countries. First, the mountains in the eastern half of the island that straddle the borders of Carana, Rimosa, Katasi and Sumora provide the rough terrain favoured by rebel and criminal groups for sanctuary and smuggling routes. Second, the close proximity of Kisiwa to mainland Africa and the island's rugged and sparsely populated and rarely patrolled coastline has become a favoured secondary base of operations for mainland-based pirates and international smuggling operations (primarily, drugs but also weapons and people).

Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa (ECOK)

History of Cooperation and the Birth of ECOK

The person who first introduced the notion of inter-state cooperation on the island of Kisiwa was former President Johnson Robongo of Rimosa, who during his Presidency strongly advocated for an increase in economic cooperation amongst Rimosa and its neighbouring States (Mosana, Carana and Katasi). This President held that the vitality of the Rimosan economy was contingent with its ability to open its borders to neighbouring states. After his Presidency, Johnson Robongo decided to push for the creation of a sub-regional framework that would make possible the creation of economic agreements between States on the island.

For several years, meetings and conferences were organized to discuss and eventually plan the creation of an economic framework that would enable inter-state cooperation of states on the island.

In July 1984, leaders and Heads of States of the countries of Mosana, Sumora, Namuna, Rimosa and Carana met in Galasi (Carana) to establish the Kisiwa Cooperation Union (KCU). This new organisation had the mandate to make easier the economic cooperation between its Member States with the purpose of increasing growth and development on the island. Due to the political regime of the Government of Katasi, its representatives declined all invitations to participate in the discussions on the economic community.

While the Union was formally created, it never received the funding from its Member-States that would have allowed for its full institutionalization. Only a few meetings and Summits were organized under the banner of the KCU, and they never resulted in decisions or agreements between the Member States due to political differences.

After severe economic hardship in parts of Kisiwa during the 1970s and 1980s, and with the global order veering heavily towards open markets, the Kisiwa Heads of State, including Katasi, got together to create a new Regional Economic Community that would take the place of the KCU. On July 24, 1991, the Treaty for the Establishment of the Economic Community Organisation of Kisiwa (ECOK) was signed by all six States of Kisiwa during this first Kisiwa Summit.
Overview of ECOK

The ECOK Member States comprise Carana, Katasi, Mosana, Namuna, Rimosa and Sumora. The seat of ECOK is in Kuku, the capital of Mosana.

ECOK has become one of the Regional Economic Community (RECs) pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC), as it has met the prerequisites of the AEC Treaty. ECOK however is not a part of the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union; its role is purely economic in nature, and even in this it has achieved relatively little success.

The aim of ECOK is to increase the standard of living of the peoples of Kisiwa by facilitating economic cooperation and integration between Member States. During the Summit of Heads of State in 2001, the priorities of ECOK were articulated as follows:

- To increase economic ties and partnerships between Member States, and;
- To establish and promote common strategies for socio-economic development.

The main organs of ECOK are the Summit of the Heads of State and Leaders, the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, the Consultative Assembly and several Specialized Commissions.

The ECOK Summit is comprised of the Heads of States of all Member States to the Community. The Summit meets once a year, though extra-ordinary sessions can be held. The Summit establishes the overall policy directions of the Community, with the purpose of seeing the achievement of the Community's objectives. A Chairperson is elected from the Heads of State for a year-long term.

The current Chairperson of the ECOK Summit is President Baba Sulumani of Sumora. The current deputy Chairperson is King Awuda Baga of Namuna.

The ECOK Council of Ministers is comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (or of the Ministry responsible for ECOK affairs) of each Member State, as well as another Minister of the choice of each Member State. The Council of Ministers can create subordinate Working Groups to examine and propose policy implementation options or to consider further technical issues. The Council gives recommendations, regulations and directives related to ECOK policy implementation. The Council of Ministers meets twice a year.

The ECOK Secretariat implements the decisions of the Summit, and the regulations of the Council of Ministers. The Secretariat is led by a Secretary-General who is supported by three deputy secretaries-general responsible for the departments of Trade, Development and Agriculture, and of Administration, Human Resources and Finance, and of Specialized Commissions. The Secretary-General is elected for a term of four years, renewable once. The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Community, and monitors the implementation of policy decisions made by the Summit, and monitor the operations of the Specialized Commissions.

The Current Secretary Général of ECOK is Wawa Mansa, a Rimosan.

The ECOK Consultative Assembly consists of 12 representatives from each Member-State that advise the Summit of Heads of State, as well as the Council of Ministers, as required or requested.
The ECOK Specialized Commissions assist in the implementation of programmes of the Community, and are established by the Summit. Each Commission is comprised of three representatives of each Member-State. The current Commissions of ECOK are:

- Agriculture, Water-Management and the Environment;
- Trade, Customs and Economic Integration;
- Human Resources, Development and Technology;
- Transport, Infrastructure and Communications.

In 1999, ECOK established the Kisiwa Trade and Development Bank (KTDB).

Following the Maputo Declaration (July 2003) on infectious diseases by the AU’s Assembly, ECOK’s Council of Minister’s established, in November 2003, a standing working group to provide a coordinated approach for ECOK members in implementing their various unilateral and multilateral programmes. This would allow the organisation to benefit from newly available international sources of funding related to infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. AU and UN officials have been putting pressure on ECOK and its Member States to develop and implement common programmes aimed at the public health crises of the island.

The main organs of ECOK are as follows:

ECOK is important to the six Kisiwa states for its symbolic value of being a creation of the six states for the six states. In practical terms, however, its importance and relevance to the types of challenges facing its six members is highly questionable. This assertion is largely supported by a quick review of ECOK’s record of accomplishments since its creation in 1991. ECOK can claim a number of modest successes such as a slight increase in intra-Kisiwa trade between Mosana, Namuna and Rimosa. It also succeeded in coaxing Katasi to open itself to trading with its neighbours, or at least providing Katasi a platform for building new trading relationships as its traditional east bloc partners retreat from their preferential policies for Katasi. These achievements, however, pale in comparison with the magnitude of the need for greater intra-Kisiwa trade as a critical channel for speedier and durable economic development on Kisiwa. Moreover, the fact that Sumora, while an ECOK member, continues to focus on building trading relations with non-ECOK partners suggests that there remains deep seated problems in ECOK’s current structure or processes.
INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS

African Inter-Regional Geopolitical Dynamics

The Kisiwa States’ ties with mainland Africa are various, reaching across the cultural, economic and political spheres. Still, the six Kisiwa countries have had a restricted influence internationally and with the mainland, due to its remoteness and relative population size.

Kisiwa Countries and the African Union

All Kisiwa countries were Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, and are currently members of the African Union (AU); the government of the six States have signed the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) over the course of 2001 and have been to a more or lesser extent, active members of the AU since its establishment in 2002. All Kisiwa Heads of State (more often than the countries’ Heads of Government) meet with their counterparts at the Assembly, the Kisiwa Foreign Ministers sit on the Executive Council, and ambassadors to Addis Ababa sit on the Permanent Representatives Committee. Elected representatives of the six Kisiwa countries occupy seats at the Pan-African Parliament, along with the representatives of the other Member States. No Kisiwa national has yet to hold a high-rank position within the African Union’s main bodies. Kisiwa nationals are present in various AU projects, task forces and networks at the continental and sub-regional level.

The governments of the Kisiwa countries are State Parties to numerous OAU/AU treaties, and have occasionally played an active role in their development. The Government of Mosana has been particularly active in the drafting and lobbying relating to some agreements, most importantly 1999’s OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and 2002’s Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Kisiwa governments sometimes have similar signing patterns with regard to these agreements. For instance, none of the countries have signed 1995’s African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. But on other occasions, the subjects of these agreements are points of contention between the Kisiwa countries, especially since security and stability on parts of the island appear to be ever more elusive. For instance, the African Maritime Transport Charter (1994) has been a major point of division between the Kisiwa countries, with regards to articles on the cooperation between land-locked states (Katasi) and transit countries (the other Kisiwa states). Only Sumora is a State Party to this charter, otherwise, Carana is the only country who is a signatory to the instrument.

Kisiwa countries have been enthusiastic about the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). While no Kisiwa Head of State currently sits on the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) of NEPAD comprising of three states per AU sub-region, both Rimosa and Sumora have expressed an interest in representing the sub-region.

As part of the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), all Kisiwa countries are all participants to their sub-region’s coordinating mechanism and decision-making organs. This involvement ranges from Heads of State, to relevant Ministers and other representatives. Kisiwa countries all contribute to the sub-region’s Early Warning System as well as to the associated Continental Early Warning System, as per AU requirements. Since the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004, it has supported the capacity-building of the Kisiwa countries in coordinating and harmonizing their efforts with regards to these Early Warning Systems. The Kisiwa countries were also to a more or lesser extent involved in the conceptualisation and development of the sub-region’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, within the framework of the establishment of the sub-regions stand-by capacity.

Ever since the mandate of the sub-regional organization has included “peace and security”, activities related to these have sometimes been pressure points between governments of Kisiwa. Political, military, and security tensions between some of the Kisiwa countries,
especially Katasi, and the other countries in the sub-region have been seen as detrimental to the functioning and efficiency of the Community. Intergovernmental relations between some of the Member States have at times worsened following particularly challenging meetings on these issues. It was suspected that some of the governments were withholding mandatory payments to the organization due to the animosities created by the security and defence discussions. Strenuous government relations and lack of resources have carried over to the economic forums of the sub-region, where decisions and policies have been less frequent, and harder to monitor.

The governments of the countries on the island of Kisiwa are State Parties to the following OAU/AU treaties:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Carana</th>
<th>Katasi</th>
<th>Mosana</th>
<th>Namuna</th>
<th>Rimosa</th>
<th>Sumora</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abrogated &amp; replaced by the Constitutive Act</td>
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<td></td>
<td>OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa</td>
<td>13-Jul-82</td>
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<td>12-Aug-68</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources</td>
<td>25-Jun-88</td>
<td>(s) 15-Sep-68</td>
<td>(s) 15-Sep-68</td>
<td>7-Jun-70</td>
<td>4-Dec-73</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations</td>
<td>24-Oct-74</td>
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<td>(s) 12-Dec-04</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-Operation Programme</td>
<td>(s) 14-Apr-03</td>
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<td>(s) 17-Oct-04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
<td>Carana</td>
<td>Katasi</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa,</td>
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<td>6-Mar-81</td>
<td>(s) 2-Nov-78</td>
<td>14-Sep-77</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>Cultural Charter for Africa</td>
<td>24-Apr-90</td>
<td>6-Nov-81</td>
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<td>26-Aug-78</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI)</td>
<td>(s) 8-Apr-96</td>
<td>2-Jul-94</td>
<td></td>
<td>(s) 8-Nov-05</td>
<td>(s) 8-Apr-86</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Convention for the Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa</td>
<td>(s) 30-Jan-91</td>
<td>6-Sep-98</td>
<td>17-May-04</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>African Maritime Transport Charter</td>
<td>(s) 5-Jan-98</td>
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<td>9-May-05</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism</td>
<td>(s) 23-Mar-99</td>
<td>17-Apr-02</td>
<td>17-Apr-02</td>
<td>8-Dec-04</td>
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Regional economic/commercial relationships

The Kisiwa countries have not been very successful in developing significant trading relationships with mainland African countries. Only Mosana and Namuna count other African countries among their top exporting partners. Reasons for this vary by country but essentially Kisiwa countries have looked past African business opportunities, instead favouring long-standing colonial trading ties or, in the case of Sumora, leveraging religious ties into commercial relationships. This somewhat aloof posture towards mainland Africa is increasingly seen as out-of-date by Mosana, Namuna and, to a lesser extent, Rimosa, who are all now looking for ways to expand mainland contacts and build new trading relationships. The trouble, as is often the case, is that intra-African trade is often hindered by countries trying to sell the same commodities to one another. To avoid this obstacle, these more proactive ECOK countries are looking to industries such as ship repair, oil and services as their points of entry into mainland markets.
From the mainland’s point of view, Kisiwa states have had a limited profile internationally for years, in part due to their remoteness and relatively small populations. Also, the years of separation from the mainland dimmed any of the original ethnic connections between Kisiwa and the mainland, thus removing one of the main trans-border connections in African politics. Efforts to draw Kisiwa states into mainland African affairs have had some positive impacts on building stronger connections between Kisiwa and the mainland, but, as will be discussed below, it is widely viewed that more can be done on both sides.

Impact of Regional Criminal Activity

The rise of international criminal activity is becoming an increasing concern for Kisiwa states. Currently, regional governments are focusing on three key areas:

- The regional aspect of the global drug trade;
- Piracy;
- The regional aspect of global smuggling of people and weapons.

Due to the ever-shifting transit routes of drug smugglers and the limitations of governmental authority and law enforcement in the region, especially in international waters, Kisiwa has seen a dramatic increase in these three areas of organised criminal activity. The growth of piracy has reached the point that pirates now seize vessels well off the African coast. Finally, Kisiwa has become a major trans-shipment location for local and international criminals trafficking in people, money, black market commodities such as illegal weapons and mined resources. Some of these groups operate in conjunction with mainland groups or directly with their contacts outside of the region.

All of these activities are a grave menace to governments in the region and internationally. Numerous governments are concerned by the impact of the weapons and drugs smuggling on their streets and that portions of the proceeds from all of this illicit activity may be going to terrorist groups. Kisiwa governments such as Carana’s and Rimosa’s fear that the criminal gangs behind this activity are growing stronger at the expense of the island’s governments and are directly or indirectly supporting the various rebel and opposition movements within national borders through the system of informal taxes the smugglers pay to local groups for transiting through territory nominally outside of the central government’s control. Given the islands unemployment rates and myriad social, political and religious resentments, the role of criminal syndicates is now seen in many of Kisiwa’s capitals as a growing and serious security threat. Because of the deepening connections between groups on Kisiwa and the mainland, this issue is an obvious candidate for region-wide cooperation.

Update on Regional Public Health Crises

Soon after its formation, the African Union declared its intent to combat infectious diseases, chief among them, HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, at its Assembly in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003. As part of their respective follow-up to the Assembly, Kisiwa’s governments through a special session of ECOK’s Council of Minister’s established in November 2003 a standing working group to provide a coordinated approach for ECOK members in implementing their various unilateral and multilateral programmes. This was seen as a critical step for the ECOK membership in light of the multiple new international sources of funding being made available over the past five years to tackle these diseases.

Given the variations in state capacities among ECOK members, and the less than ideal interface between ECOK and donors, the results of these efforts differ from country to country. In Mosana, Namuna and Sumora, infection rates of HIV/AIDS and TB have dropped over the last five years by 10-20% and malaria infection rates by 5-10%. In Katasi and Carana, the rates for all diseases appear to be flat or slightly down, while Rimosa is facing slight increases for all diseases, despite its better resourced health care system. These numbers are encouraging for Mosana, Namuna and Sumora but clearly the other three countries are at risk to fall behind
not only their neighbours on Kisiwa but also many other countries on the mainland. AU and UN leaders are aware of this mixed record on Kisiwa and there is a new effort in both Addis Ababa and Geneva to engage the Kisiwa governments more vigorously through ECOK to implement more effective delivery programmes.

**Relevant Global-Level Geopolitical Dynamics**

The diversity of political interests and ideologies amongst Kisiwa states, and the lack of security cooperation have rendered the region potentially unstable. Because of these internal divisions, the region has been unable to protect against threats and possible negative effects from outside the region. Insecurity in mainland Africa and elsewhere in the world continues to have the potential to destabilize the economy and politics of Kisiwa.

The potential for instability had been previously exemplified during the Cold War, when the East and West blocs vied for power over the newly independent states. Because the island of Kisiwa and the Horn of Africa sit at a major maritime crossroads between the West and the East, the region is of considerable strategic importance. Control of Kisiwa would enable better influence over the Arabian Peninsula from the south. A short war in 1976 between Namuna and Sumora, supported respectively by the East and the West, was an illustration of the superpower involvement on the island. The East gave military support to Katasi and Namuna, as well as many other forms of assistance, including education and training. The West assisted and influenced Sumora, Rimosa, Carana and Mosana, while (at the peak of the Cold War), halting much of the aid to Katasi and Namuna.

More recently, the international security situation post-September 11, 2001 has come to have implications for states on the island. Although all six nations have voiced an apparently unanimous condemnation of terrorist activities, they have had varying levels of success in addressing the threat of terrorism. Sumora and Namuna have been dealing with extremist elements with links to international terrorism, with varying degrees of success. The region is under some pressure to respond to possible terrorism threats, with linkages being made between their responses and current/future economic assistance.

**Political, Trade and Military Issues**

It was noted earlier that Carana has not shut itself off from the outside world. Politically and militarily, Carana has sought to strengthen its connections with Azuria in particular through a defence pact in the event of external aggression that endangers sovereignty of Carana. This agreement is seen as a hedge by Carana against provocations from Katasi. Rimosa has entered into a looser arrangement with Carmina through the association of former Carmine colonies, but its value to Rimosa appears to be very similar as that to Carana, i.e. as a backstop against foreign threats.

Being recognised as reliable and cooperative partners in the fight against terrorism is very helpful to Carana and Rimosa given the importance of counter-terrorism efforts for Azuria and Carmina. But, the focus and derived benefits of the war on terror are not entirely external for Carana. Carana’s own ongoing struggle with domestic, ethnically based opposition groups has evolved over the past 10 years; some of these groups have taken up arms and have pursued their causes through violence, including tactics that western analysts would consider terrorism. The three groups of greatest concern to Caranese officials are the Mouvement patriotique de Carana (MPC), the Combattants indépendants du sud Carana (CISC) and the True Islamist Movement (TIM) based in Sumora.

The MPC is a Kori tribe-based group that is largely driven by long-standing chauvinistic grievances stemming from being displaced by the Falin as the dominate tribe in the country. Separatist politics do not appear to be a prime motivator for the MPC currently, but many observers watch MPC actions and statements carefully for any signal that the group is giving up on regaining political influence within Carana in favour of forming a new independent state or separating from Carana to join Katasi.
The CISC is an even greater concern for the Caranese and Azurian governments. This group, formed in 1991 to protect and promote Tatsi rights and interests in Carana, is not only increasingly more violent and experiencing growing support in the Tatsi community within Carana and across the border in Rimosa but it is also seen to be growing closer to drug smuggling gangs operating within Carana and across its borders. This relationship has meant greater revenue for CISC through its protection services to the drug gangs and a concomitant rise in influence among Tatsi and greater capacity to challenge government authority in certain areas of the country. This dynamic has resulted in greater protection for the drug shipments, which means more arrive safely in their destination markets, which include Azuria and Carmina.

The TIM is a Sumoran group - with suspected ties to that country’s government - that is suspected by Caranese and Azurian officials as being the “hidden hand” behind periodic sectarian violence in the north of Carana, near the border with Sumora. This cross-border connection is troubling enough but Azurian officials also suspect that TIM is establishing and/or deepening relations with international extremist groups abroad. Caranese cooperation in tracking and confronting TIM is considered an urgent priority.

Finally, Carana’s relationship with Azuria has not provided a clear path out of its dire economic circumstances. While Rimosa has benefited from a bilateral trading relationship with Carmina that has contributed to its relative economic stability and prosperity, Carana remains in a highly one-sided trade relationship that foremost favours Azuria and other trading partners to a lesser degree. It is unlikely that trade initiatives can have a meaningful impact on Carana’s economy in the short-term given the country’s very limited international trading profile. But, this disadvantaged trading position, common in the developing world, has made it all but impossible for Carana to get its economy back on track after the disastrous re-centralization of the economy in the mid-1990s. Following this time, there was a brief period of recovery when Carana switched course once again towards a more liberalized economy. However, the economy began a descent into chaos again after President Ogavo unilaterally announced a suspension of the nation’s debt servicing. Instead of providing a brake on any further slippage, Carana’s current annual trade deficit (currently US$ 399 million) ensures that it will continue to lack the capital necessary for investments or reforms to the economy. Carana needs to work to re-establish its damaged relationship with the international economic community that followed the suspension of loan payments. The nation’s preparation to hold debt rescheduling meetings with its international partners is a step in the right direction. Carana will need significant international help in stemming the rampant smuggling across its borders and through its ports that is feeding the growth of the underground economy. Diminishing the underground economy is an enormous challenge for any country, and there are significant limitations on just how much any foreign government or international organization can help.

Growing Presence of Multi-National Corporations

As in many other parts of Africa, foreign corporations (public or government-owned enterprises) have arrived on Kisiwa in recent years looking for investment opportunities. The higher-profile cases concern oil companies striking exploitation partnerships with Rimosa, Sumora and Mosana. As Carana (along with Katasi and Namuna) does not have confirmed oil deposits on its territory or off-shore, this mini-boom of international investment has passed it by. There is, however, a growing suspicion in the energy industry that Kisiwa’s eastern coastal waters may also hold large natural gas deposits. Rumours abound that one Asian-based company has begun talks with Rimosa, which are denied by both parties. Caranese officials recognise both the potential for natural gas discoveries in their coastal waters and the fact that their country’s current political and security circumstances might limit their attraction for potential investors.

Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations

The six states of Kisiwa have all had reason to receive humanitarian relief and development assistance from external sources since their respective independence from colonial rule. Cross-border wars, violent up-risings against colonial powers, post-independence internal
conflicts and natural disasters have all ensured that Kisiwa was a frequent destination for international aid organizations. Similarly, in times of peace, various international actors sought to engage in a full range of economic development programmes and strategies that had an equally full range of results for the recipient countries.

Carana has a mixed record in dealing with these external aid actors over the past twenty years. The picture is somewhat clearer in terms of humanitarian aid. Carana’s relatively peaceful achievement of independence meant that humanitarian relief organizations did not appear in the country in large numbers until a string of cyclones hit Kisiwa’s east coast in the mid-1970s. Rimosa and Sumora were also hard hit and in need of assistance, while inland Katasi escaped much of the serious damage. In the aftermath of the last major storm in July 1975, a few large international relief NGOs remained in Carana, expanding their operations from relief to longer-term development, while other NGOs arrived on the scene to launch new community-based development projects. This proved fortunate, because within months of the storm’s passing (and with the clean-up still on-going) a minor humanitarian crisis flared following Colonel Tarakoni’s coup d’état late in 1975. While there were few deaths and injuries, even this small number of casualties over-burdened many hospitals, especially in the national capital.

NGO’s slowly proliferated across the country throughout the rest of the 1970s and 1980s to address humanitarian needs among various rural groups and displaced populations, especially those living along Carana’s borders. Since 1996, when a surge in communal violence in Rimosa sent the second wave of Pleioni refugees across the border into Carana, a number of NGO’s and UN agencies (with the financial backing of key donor governments) have established a group of camps in the border region to serve this population. (A previous wave of Pleioni refugees in the 1940s was largely settled, although their presence in southern Carana has been a source of friction with the Tatsi population.) There have been subsequent smaller movements of people since 1996, and the vast majority of refugees are reluctant to return to Rimosa. The camps are taking on an air of permanence, as the Caranese government is not willing to grant the refugees full residency or citizenship. The Rimosan government has expressed concern that the camps have become recruitment and training centres for rebel groups. NGO’s and donor governments continue with their humanitarian work but are aware that the existing situation cannot continue indefinitely.

International Legal Factors

An issue with Carana is the unilateral restrictions that some western countries have imposed on the travel of some Caranese private business people and government officials due to suspicions that these individuals are involved in the growing underworld economy, drug and weapons trans-shipments in particular. These legal actions target individuals not the government or country as a whole, but they are a major embarrassment for the PDC-ruled government because the individuals named are close to President Jacques Ogavo, so the kind of legal action that would satisfy foreign governments behind the sanctions is not expected any time soon.

In terms of the signing and ratification of international legal instruments, Kisiwa countries often adopt similar positions. With the exception of Katasi, all five other states have signed and ratified many of the important treaties to be opened for signature during the past fifty years. All countries signed the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and all countries except Katasi have ratified the follow-on conventions concerning political, social and economic rights; Katasi only being a signatory to the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and having not signed onto the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Other conventions and optional protocols of instruments of international law remain unsigned and/or non-ratified by some Kisiwa countries. Potentially significant, in the case of an outbreak of war on the island, is that the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000) on the involvement of children in armed conflict remains unsigned by Carana and Katasi, and non-ratified by Namuna and Sumora.
Still, as elsewhere, the biggest problem has been with the implementation of these agreements within each country’s borders. By and large, all countries on Kisiwa are falling well short of meeting their various human rights obligations (as noted by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and others) but, this track record does not stand out as a particular source of tension between countries on Kisiwa except in those cases where the alleged victims of official abuse appeal to allies across borders for support.

Tension on Kisiwa is more likely to be raised by the differing approaches taken in relation to recent agreements like the Treaty of Rome which established the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the case of the ICC, Carana, Mosana, Rimosa signed and ratified the founding treaty while Katasi has only signed the treaty, and Namuna has yet to sign the instrument. While not a problem in itself, this split reaction to the ICC has led to complications in planning for cooperative responses to common challenges. For instance, the plans for joint military exercises by some of the Kisiwa countries are stalled in part by officials’ concerns that any sort of international military exercises or operations could result in personnel being arrested, detained and tried by the ICC as the result of politically-charged accusations or accidents while serving abroad with countries who are parties to the Treaty of Rome.

The governments of the countries on the island of Kisiwa are State Parties to the following international treaties:

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### Kisiwa Countries and International Organizations

The Kisiwa states have a long involvement with international organizations dating back to their respective independence periods. While various international organizations (IOs) have tried to have an effect on the respective governments, the track record above demonstrates the mixed or poor results that can come from misguided and misinformed policies. Nowhere is this clearer than looking at the World Bank's record in many countries in the 1980s and early 1990s. Carana's history of receiving attention from international organizations has perhaps been a less than happy one, but these cases also illustrate the dangers of inconsistent implementation of agreed policies by national governments.

Yet, it would not be fair to characterise the record are entirely negative. Some large development projects had a positive impact. Also, it is fair to note that all of Kisiwa's governments (and their citizens) have benefited greatly from community-level development projects and humanitarian assistance.

The greatest positive impact of international organizations for Kisiwa will hopefully lie in the future. As this paper discussed, a number of international bodies are now paying serious attention to issues in Kisiwa. There appears to be enough overlap of “great power” interests on issues such as anti-terrorism and anti-piracy that the political differences that made proactive action through IOs impossible may become less relevant. Not only is cooperative action through key IOs possible, but the IOs themselves appear to have absorbed lessons from past mistakes, and new processes and strategies may be expected to be more relevant and effective.

However these high hopes can only be tested through practice and experience. It is possible, even likely, that political, humanitarian and development efforts in Kisiwa will all be tested over the next year, as tensions and pressures continue to build in eastern Kisiwa. There is little doubt that Carana may become a primary focus for attention from a number of IOs. All political actors, Caranese and foreign alike, would be well advised to leverage that attention and the resources and experience that come with it for Carana’s difficult years ahead.

#### Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

The OIC has traditionally played a very small role in the political life of Kisiwa, but since 2001 it has taken a greater interest in policies implemented by external players, such as Azuria and Carmina, in the context of the “war on terror” and how these policies impact on the lives of Muslims around the world. Given Sumora's membership in the OIC and the external and internal pressure it faces to combat extremism, the OIC pays particular attention to developments in that country.

#### La Francophonie

As a member of La Francophonie, and with strong support from Azuria, Carana enjoys a level of support from this group’s members in diplomatic circles. In spite of the diverse membership in La Francophonie, Carana (with Azuria’s help in recent years) has been able use this forum to influence other francophone states, who have gone on to provide support in other settings such as the AU, the EU and the UN. While not usually directly involved in political and security
capes, La Francophonie has provided Carana with a useful venue to exert influence against Katasi, who is also a member. By failing to support the peace and security initiatives of Katasi, it has alienated itself from the mainstream of La Francophonie.

**Association of Former Carmine Colonies**

In much the same way Carana approaches its membership in La Francophonie, Rimosa and Sumora try to mobilise support for their interests within the slightly larger Association of Former Carmine Colonies (AFCC). For Rimosa, this is relatively straightforward due to its active participation in the AFCC's limited security dimension. Sumora does not share Rimosa's close connection with Carmina and has been accused by governments on Kisiwa and elsewhere of being soft on extremist groups on its territory, such as TIM. It has also been accused of not making the necessary effort to stop the movement of people and resources across its border into Carana to support radical Muslim groups in that country. Thus, Sumora has manoeuvred defensively at AFCC conferences, defending its record of dealing with extremists and illegal border crossings. Both Rimosa and Sumora also hope to use AFCC membership as a means to push policy positions in other multilateral venues, such as the AU, the EU and the UN.

**United Nations**

A UN Country Team is present in Carana, with counterparts in Rimosa, Katasi and Sumora. The UNCTs comprise all UN agencies, programmes and departments operating in the countries with some participation by officials from the NGO community in a liaison role. Through these agencies, the UN system has already had a presence in some of the Kisiwa states for many years. The size and operations of each agency varies according to the needs of each host state. In the case of Carana, the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Emergency Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) are moderately active, while the UNCT chair, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the lead agency. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is managing the refugee camps along Carana’s southern border and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is working with the Caranese and Sumoran governments in an effort to mitigate tensions related to the nomadic movements of people across that border. IOM is also overseeing two initiatives concerning nomads on the Namunan and Sumoran border. The IOM is a non-UN system member but has a special status and is usually invited to join the UNCT.

**International Financial Institutions**

All countries on Kisiwa rely on International Financial Institution (IFIs) - some to a greater extent than others. Mosana and Katasi depend to a lesser extent on these institutions, but for very distinct reasons; Mosana because its own economy has fared comparatively well, and as such has had less of a need to borrow; Katasi because it has primarily looked to the East, and more recently to Asian countries for support. Rimosa, Sumora, Namuna and Carana all depend heavily on IFIs. Carana’s relationship with the IFIs has been particularly tumultuous. In the 1980s with the nation’s renewed commitment to economic restructuring and democracy, the IFIs supported Carana with massive injections of financial assistance. In the mid-1990s, with the nation’s decision to retreat from liberalization policies, these institutions curbed their financial support and it was not until Carana changed course at the beginning of the new millennium that relations were normalized. Carana’s recent attempt to unilaterally suspend its external debt has again challenged this relationship.

**Interpol**

As the smuggling problem has grown more serious, Carana, Rimosa and Mosana have reached out to Interpol for intelligence and technical support. While the resulting cooperative programme is only two years old, some successes can be claimed. Most of the interceptions of smuggling operations have occurred in Mosana, whose airport is the principal air gateway to Kisiwa, but the navies of these three countries, acting with the ships of other navies and on
intelligence provided by Interpol, have also made a few arrests in coastal waters and chased off two separate pirate attacks. These initial results have been sufficiently promising that the three states have begun talks with Sumora to expand the programme. However, given the human rights records of the countries involved, some Interpol members are insisting on limits to the programme, so that a fuller range of cooperation should be used as an incentive to desired domestic reforms in the HR and rule of law areas.