HANDBOOK ON CSDP
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

First reprint of the second edition with amendments

edited by
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with forewords of
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Disclaimer:

Any views or opinions presented in this handbook are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the European Union or the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports.
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<th>A</th>
<th>CTBTO</th>
<th>Comprehensive Nuclear Text Ban Treaty Organisation</th>
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<td>DCI</td>
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<td>Development Co-operation Instrument</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
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<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DG</td>
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<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>DGEUMS</td>
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<td>Director General of the EU Military Staff</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
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<td>Department for Peace-Keeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<td>DSACEUR</td>
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<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (NATO)</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
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<td>European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument</td>
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<td>European Defence and Defence College</td>
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<td>European Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>EU MS</td>
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<td>European Member State(s)</td>
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EUSC  EU Satellite Centre  
EU SITCEN EU Situation Centre  
EU SSR EU Security Sector Reform (Mission)  
EUBAM European Border Assistance Mission  
EUFOR European Force (Mission)  
EUJUST European Justice Mission  
EUMC EU Military Committee  
EUMCWG EUMC Working Group  
EUMS EU Military Staff  
EUPOL European Police (Mission)  

F  
FAC Foreign Affairs Council  
FPI Foreign Policy Instruments  

G  
GAC General Affairs Council  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GNI Gross National Income  

H  
HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  
HR Human Rights  
HCoC Hague Code of Conduct (against Ballistic Missile Proliferation)  
H.E. His/Her Excellency  

I  
ICC International Criminal Court  
IDL Internet-based Distance Learning (EU) INTCEN Intelligence Analysis Centre  
IFS Instrument for Stability  
IIA Inter-Institutional Agreement  
INTEL Intelligence  
IPA Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance  
ISSAT International Security Sector Advisory Team  

L  
LOG Logistics  

M  
MS Member State  

N  
NAC North Atlantic Council  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  

O  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe  

P  
PESCO Permanent Structured Co-operation  
PMG Politico-Military Group  
pMS Participating Member States  
PPI Press and Public Information  
PSC Political and Security Committee  

R  
RCA Central African Republic  
R&T Research and Technology  
RELEX Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors  

S  
SC Special Committee (Athena)  
SEDE Sub-Committee on Security Defence  
SSR Security Sector Reform  

T  
TEU Treaty of the European Union  
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  

U  
UN(O) United Nations (Organisation)  
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution  

V  
VP Vice President
FOREWORD

For more than 10 years, the Common Security and Defence Policy has been one of the crucial topics within the European Union, in particular because this policy reflects the ambitions of the Union and its Member States to be more active, more consistent and more capable.

The Union launched its first crisis management mission in 2003. Since then the Union has deployed over 25 civilian and military missions and operations on three continents. From the start of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its comprehensive approach to crisis management.

Training in general is an important aspect of such successful operational engagement and following its comprehensive approach, training in civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is a special requirement for the EU which needs to be met through special training and combined civilian and military participation.

The European Security and Defence College is providing such training at the strategic level with a mixed civil-military participation in all its courses and is so playing a significant role in the implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.

This Handbook on CSDP, made available under the ESDC, mirrors this approach and thus provides a sound documentation for trainers and trainees of the European Security and Defence College and beyond. It is my hope that it will also help to promote a better and comprehensive understanding of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Catherine Ashton
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU set itself new levels of ambition. New structures and procedures will make it easier for the Union to be more active and to be more coherent. The newly-created post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is at the same time Vice-President of the European Commission, will also facilitate European external action.

The new structures will also give rise to a need to familiarise and train more personnel to enable them to work more efficiently in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy. In my post as Minister of Defence and Sports, I know from personal experience that training and education is of the utmost importance, sometimes even a *sine qua non*, for accomplishing missions successfully. Therefore Austria supported from the beginning the development of the European Security and Defence College in addition to other efforts aimed at enhancing the operability of CFSP/CSDP.

I would like to thank the Secretariat of the European Security and Defence College for the work done so far. I firmly believe that this present handbook will support the Common Security and Defence Policy and the relevant training and will contribute to the further development of a common and shared European security culture.

Norbert Darabos
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports
of the Republic of Austria
In 2003, the Greek Presidency initiative on “Common Training” was introduced, with the goal of creating a common European security culture. In support of this objective, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was established in 2005 as a network bringing together existing training institutes dealing with aspects of CFSP/CSDP, including diplomatic academies, police colleges, other civilian institutes, higher defence institutes and universities.

Since then, the College has trained more than 4,500 civilian and military staff from all Member States, relevant EU institutions and agencies, third states and international organisations.

Apart from the conduct of training activities, the development of CSDP-related training material is a specific task given to the ESDC. This handbook was the first training material designed under the umbrella of the ESDC for CSDP training purposes and presented to the public in the Press Briefing room of the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels on 19 April 2010. Austria, a strong supporter of the ESDC, volunteered to draw up this handbook in close cooperation with the ESDC Secretariat.

We, the editors, tried to offer our students a brief overview of CFSP/CSDP, specifically the state of affairs, structures and policies. To do so we relied on numerous contributions by many experts from relevant EU institutions and agencies and from national-level bodies.

The publication of the first edition can be considered a success, both within the EU and beyond. Officials from third states and international organisations participating in our training activities benefit greatly from this handbook. Shortly after the presentation, the first edition “sold out”, and it was reprinted several times for courses, seminars and conferences thanks to the services of the Council Secretariat. In addition, the online version of the handbook has been downloaded innumerable times by students, CSDP newcomers, practitioners and professors. It is still available on the webpage of the ESDC (esdc.mil-edu.be).

Nevertheless, the evolution of CFSP/CSDP, especially the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, made it necessary to review and adapt the contents of the handbook. CFSP/CSDP is a constantly developing policy area and therefore remains a “moving target” in this regard. The present handbook reflects as far as possible the latest developments in the field of CFSP/CSDP after Lisbon and takes into account the structural changes within the new legal framework.

Furthermore, we have also reorganised the chapters of the book, leaving some topics out and taking others on board or giving them a more prominent place. We have essentially maintained the Annexes, still including all CFSP/CSDP-related articles of the Lisbon Treaty as well as the European Security Strategy and its Implementation Report. However, we have added the report on the relationship between international security and climate change as this is a subject of growing importance. And last but not least, we have added an annex on the internal security strategy of the EU.

We are very grateful for the extensive support we have received from colleagues and friends of the College, in particular those involved in presenting our courses on a regular basis. They are in fact once again the cornerstone of this project. To make their tremen-
dous contribution more visible in this second edition, the authors are listed in Annex 6 with a brief CV for each of them.

We would like to thank:

- all the academic, civilian and military contributors for bringing in and sharing their practical experience in the field of CFSP/CSDP;
- the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports, which has been devoted to this project since its start in October 2009;
- the relevant services of the European institutions for providing us with expertise, pictures and graphs;
- the linguistic service of the Council General Secretariat for advising us and carrying out a last linguistic check of the articles;
- Mr Gert-Jan van Hegelsom from the Legal Service for his specific advice;
- the staff of the ESDC Secretariat, Mr Dirk Dubois, Ms Pavlina Gorenc and Ms Valentina Reynoso.

MajGen Johann Pucher, Defence Policy Director of Austria, deserves special thanks as one of the driving factors for this project.

We hope that the new edition of the Handbook will function again as a suitable reference book for our course participants after they attended the ESDC courses. Furthermore, we will again make it available on the webpage of the ESDC and so accessible for a worldwide audience interested in the development of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

Jochen Rehrl has worked for the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports and is currently seconded to the European External Action Service/European Security and Defence College in Brussels.

Hans-Bernhard Weisserth is a member of the European External Action Service of the European Union/Crisis Management and Planning Directorate and acting Head of the European Security and Defence College.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CFSP AND CSDP
The origins of the security and defence architecture of Europe can be found in the post-World War II situation. Starting in the late 1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for increased cooperation across Europe. Examples include the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) – sowing the seeds for a Western European Union – and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 1951 which placed strategic resources under a supranational authority.

In the late 1960s, the European Community (EC) began to explore ways in which to harmonise members’ foreign policies. At the Hague Summit held in December 1969, European leaders instructed their respective foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain. In response, foreign ministers introduced the idea of European Political Co-operation (EPC) in the Davignon Report from October 1970. The report defined its objectives (harmonization of positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions) and its procedures (six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, quarterly meetings of the Political Directors forming the Political Committee). Overall, EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC Member States.

European Political Co-operation served as the foundation for the Common Foreign and Security Policy introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. With its entry into force on 1 November 1993, it created a single institutional framework (the European Union) based on three pillars – the second of which was labelled Common Foreign and Security Policy. CFSP is more far-reaching than European Political Co-operation. For example, it breaks new ground via its Article J.4 which states CFSP includes “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”

While the European Union identified ambitious objectives in the area of external security and defence through the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be until the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans, that concrete provisions were introduced to endow the EU with tangible crisis management capabilities. Following the St. Malo Declaration in 1998, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking). Examples include the Cologne European Council Meeting (1999) which laid the foundations for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999), which introduced the Headline Goal 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (2000) which identified four civilian priority areas. In 2003, ESDP became operational through the initiation of the first ESDP missions. Since 2003, the EU has initiated over twenty crisis management operations and missions. In addition, the EU presented its first ever European Security Strategy in December 2003, outlining key threats and challenges facing Europe.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, ESDP was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In
addition, the Lisbon Treaty established the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The post merges the two positions of High Representative for CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between 1999-2009) and of Commissioner for External Relations (held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner between 2004 and early 2010) and symbolizes the disappearance of the pillar structure.

The Lisbon Treaty formally endorses the extension of the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, that now include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation’ (art.28B/Article 43 (1) TEU). These tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by ‘supporting third states in combating terrorism in their territories’. Finally, political and military solidarity among EU Member States is in the Treaty via the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause (art.28A7/Article 42 (7) TEU), and a ‘solidarity clause’ (Title VII, art.188R1/Article 222 TFEU).

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<td>Failure of the European Defence Community Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaties of Rome</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Co-operation</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (St. Malo)</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for ESDP</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Santa Maria da Feira European Council</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>Adoption of the European Security Strategy Adoption of the Berlin-Plus Arrangements</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – ESDP becomes CSDP</td>
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THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY (ESS)
2.1 BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESS IN 2003

by Sven Biscop

STRATEGIC DIVISIONS

When ESDP (now CSDP) was created in the wake of the 1998 Franco-British meeting in St-Malo, there was strong agreement on the need to tackle the military means, but there consensus ended. Member States differed widely on the political-strategic dimension, a debate which goes far beyond CSDP, beyond the CFSP even, but which concerns the whole of EU external action, across the pillars. What should be the scope of the EU’s foreign and security policy ambitions? What degree of autonomy should the EU have? And what then should be the precise role of the military instrument in EU external action? In order not to lose the momentum, it was decided to push through with those elements on which an agreement existed, i.e. the means and institutions of CSDP, assuming that once these were in place the strategic debate would inevitably have to follow. Accordingly, following the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, where the ‘Headline Goal’ was defined, the EU started building military and civilian capabilities for crisis management, without possessing an overall strategic framework for its external action.

That is not to say that EU external action has been completely ad hoc. Over the years, a distinctive European approach to security has emerged, which can be characterised as integrated, multidimensional or comprehensive. Yet the implicit assumptions on which it was based needed to be substantiated and policy areas needed to be integrated in order to arrive at a framework for maximally consistent, coherent and effective external action. For when the EU is confronted with acute crises, such as the one in Iraq in 2003, these implicit assumptions have proved to be insufficient to arrive at a common policy. More often than not, the EU has failed to achieve consensus on how to respond to such crises, even when the instruments and means to do so were at hand. A clear-cut strategy should be able to avoid internal divides and ensure the EU’s participation in international decision-making.

2003: A FAVOURABLE CONTEXT

It seems as if the intra-European crisis over Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a breakthrough possible. On the one hand, the Member States supporting the invasion wanted to demonstrate that the EU does care about the security threats perceived by the US and that the transatlantic alliance is viable still. Hence the similarity between the threat assessment in the ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS), which must be seen as a political message to Washington, and the strong emphasis in the ESS on transatlantic partnership. On the other hand, the Member States opposing the invasion were equally eager to show that even though the threat assessment is to a large degree shared with the US – if not perhaps the perception of the intensity of the threat – there are other options available to deal with these threats. The context of mid-2003 partially also favoured the adoption of the ESS: the successful conclusion of the European Convention and the grand and – then still – promising undertaking to draw up a Constitutional Treaty created a climate in which the preparation of a strategy seemed more feasible than before. The summer of 2003 also witnessed the first EU military operation without the use of NATO assets and outside Europe: Operation Artemis in the DRC (12 June – 1 September).
THE DRAFTING PROCESS

At the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on 2 and 3 May 2003, High Representative Javier Solana was thus – rather unexpectedly – tasked with producing a draft strategic document. At its meeting in Thessaloniki (19-20 June), the European Council welcomed the document submitted by Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, and charged him with taking the work forward with a view to completing a strategy by its next meeting. The EU then organised three seminars, in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 October) and Stockholm (20 October), bringing together officials from the Member States, the future Member States and the European institutions, as well as experts from the academic world, NGOs and the media. This innovative process allowed the High Representative to collect comments and suggestions from a wide variety of actors and observers, a number of which found their way into the final European Security Strategy, which was duly adopted by the European Council meeting on 12 December 2003. At the same time, drafting by a select group of high-level collaborators of Solana, rather than by committee and involving Member States’ delegations, ensured a concise and very readable document.

The main reason why these partly contradictory motivations led to results is that the EU was able to build on an extensive foreign policy acquis. Many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS were already evident as emerging strategic orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq crisis would suggest a deep division between Member States, the ESS actually builds on a strong consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Indeed, the real intra-European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued e.g. that all Member States agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. As in 1999, the real issue at stake was still the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the US reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet, what then has priority for the EU: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? Besides, it should not be forgotten that on a number of foreign policy issues the EU had already unanimously taken positions contrary to those of the US, e.g. on the ICC, on the Kyoto Protocol and on various trade issues.

Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It can only build on consensus in areas where it existed. On a number of issues it remains particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than that: no real choices are made particularly on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an international actor. This divide remains a fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP. Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of clear choices and thus has certainly strengthened the strategic framework for EU foreign policy.
2.2 MAIN THEMES OF THE ESS AND KEY MESSAGE FOR CSDP

by Sven Biscop

PRINCIPLES OF EU FOREIGN POLICY

From the ESS three main principles can be deduced on which all EU external action is based.

The first is prevention: “This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early”. A permanent strategy of prevention and stabilisation, addressing the root causes of threats and challenges, aims to prevent conflict so that, ideally, coercion and the use of force will not be necessary. Addressing the root causes means to close the gap, both within and between countries, between the haves and the have-nots in terms of access to the core public goods to which the EU feels everybody is entitled: security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social well-being. For this gap generates feelings of frustration and marginalisation on the part of those who are excluded economically or politically, radicalisation and extremism of various kinds, social and economic instability, massive migration flows, and tension and conflicts within and between States. Effective prevention is an enormous challenge, for it means addressing a much wider range of issues, at a much earlier stage, across the globe, because as the ESS says “the first line of defence will often be abroad”.

Closing the gap between haves and have-nots of necessity demands a holistic approach, the second principle, for the range of public goods is comprehensive as such. The security, economic, political and social dimensions are inextricably related – an individual cannot enjoy any one core public good unless he has access to them all – and all are present, in differing degrees, in all threats and challenges. In the ESS: “none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments”. Therefore every foreign policy must simultaneously address all dimensions, making use in an integrated way of all available instruments: “Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda”. This is perhaps the core phrase in the ESS: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”.

Such a holistic approach is best implemented via multilateralism, the third principle: “We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors”. Only in cooperation with others can our objectives be achieved peacefully, only in cooperation with all global actors can global challenges be successfully addressed, and only in cooperation with a wide range of actors can complex issues be comprehensively tackled. “The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective”, declares the ESS under the heading of “effective multilateralism”. Multilateralism is “effective” to the extent that the ensemble of regimes, mechanisms and institutions manages to provide access to the core public goods to citizens worldwide.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CSDP

The ESS constitutes an important strategic choice, but it mostly tells us how to do things – it is much vaguer on what to do, it is incomplete in terms of objectives. Of course, a strategy must be translated into sub-strategies and policies for it to be put into action. With regard to CSDP however, such a “sub-strategy” is missing, hence there is a missing link between the ambition in the ESS – “to share in the responsibility for global security” – and the practice of CSDP operations and capability development. As the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World states, “We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources”. Three dimensions must be covered.

First of all, there is not even consensus about which tasks or types of operations the EU can undertake. Legally, the EU’s Petersberg tasks include operations at the high end of the violence spectrum, including combat operations, yet politically the Member States are still extremely divided over the use of force under the EU flag.

Secondly, priority regions and scenarios must be defined in relation to Europe’s vital interests: where and why should the EU deploy troops and perhaps even go to war? Because of its proximity, “the neighbourhood” logically appears as a clear priority where the EU should not only be active, but take the lead. It could be debated whether the “broader neighbourhood”, including Central Asia and the Gulf, is a priority as well. Next to the neighbourhood, the ESS singles out Iran as a priority. Other conflicts are mentioned in the ESS – Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean Peninsula – but whether the EU should actively contribute to their resolution is not clear at all. Sub-Saharan Africa has been an important area of focus for CSDP, though the strategy behind it has not always been clear. For example, given that the EU twice intervened in the DRC at the request of the UN, in 2003 and 2006, why was the third request, in 2008, refused? This demonstrates that without a strategy, it is impossible to define what the success of an operation means. A perfect example of a European priority is the operation against piracy off the coast of Somalia, securing Europe’s lines of communication with the world. Importantly, the collective security system of the UN, and therefore of the EU as its main supporter and with two permanent members on the Security Council among its ranks, can only be legitimate if it addresses the threats to everyone’s security – too much selectivity undermines the system. The EU must therefore also shoulder its share of the responsibility by playing an active role in the Security Council and by contributing capabilities to UN(-mandated) crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

Finally, the EU must decide what scale of effort to devote to these priorities. CSDP is based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, i.e. 60,000 troops, but this has been overshadowed by the much more limited battle groups. The availability of the forces declared cannot be assessed, because Member States declare numbers that in theory they are willing to deploy for CSDP operation, but no pre-identified units, and have often declared similar numbers to NATO as well. If all ongoing CSDP, NATO, UN and national operations in which EU Member States participate are counted, Europe deploys more than 80,000 troops, but they obviously cannot mobilise 60,000 additional troops for expeditionary operations. The combined armed forces of the EU-27 total 2 million troops. There is no vision about how many of those troops Europe really needs.

These questions should be answered in a military or civil-military sub-strategy, or “white book,” specifically for CSDP. As Member States have but a single set of forces, the question is not what the CSDP level of ambition is and what is that of NATO; the question is what the EU, as the political expression of Europe and as a comprehensive foreign policy actor, wants to contribute as a global security provider, regardless of whether a specific operation is undertaken under CSDP or NATO (or UN) command.
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY – A SUMMARY OVERVIEW

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Global Challenges
Poverty and bad governance is often at the heart of the problem. Global warming! Competition for natural resources! Energy dependence! Security is a precondition of development!

Key Threats
Terrorism – willing to use unlimited violence and cause massive casualties – linkage to violent religious fundamentalism. Europe is both target and a base for such terrorists.

Proliferation of WMD is the single most important threat to peace and security. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire WMD.

Regional Conflicts threaten regional stability. Weakened or failed states in many parts of the world – are often exploited by criminal elements and are the basis for organised crime.

Taking these different elements together, we would be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Countering the threats
The EU already actively tackles threats presented by terrorism, proliferation, failed states, organised crime (most recently the proliferation of WMD). With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. There is a need to act before a crisis occurs – conflict and threat prevention cannot start too early!

None of the new threats can be tackled by military means alone. Each requires a mixture of instruments.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood
Promotion of a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean – close and co-operative relations.

The credibility of our foreign policy depends on consolidation of our achievements in the Western Balkans.

Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe but extending the benefits of economic and political co-operation to our future neighbours in the East – stronger interest in the Southern Caucasus is necessary. Resolution of Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. Continued engagement with our Mediterranean partners through more effective economic, security and cultural co-operation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. And a broader engagement with the Arab world.

International Order based on Effective Multilateralism
Our security/prosperity depends on an effective multilateral system. Stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

The fundamental framework for international relations is the UN Charter. Strengthening the United Nations is a European priority. We should be ready to act when rules are broken. One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship – NATO is an expression of this relationship.

Strengthening global governance – regional organisations are significant! Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reforms!

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

To be more active
Development of a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, if necessary, robust intervention. Ability to sustain several operations simultaneously. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.

To be more capable
More resources for defence and better use through pooled and shared assets avoid duplication. Stronger civilian resources and capabilities (combine resources of Member States and EU Institutions). EU-NATO arrangements! Wider spectrum of missions including inter alia disarmament operations.

To be more coherent
We are stronger when we act together! Key: create synergy of EU’s and Member States’ instruments! All our policies should follow the same agenda (see Western Balkan!)

Working with Partners
Key: International Co-operation! Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable! Closer relations with Russia/strategic partnership! Develop strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India!
European foreign policy has entered a new phase. The Lisbon Treaty, which created the single post of High Representative and Vice President, held by Cathy Ashton, and a unique new organisation – the European External Action Service – represents a landmark in the long development of CFSP.

Lisbon is all about effectiveness: making the EU more joined-up and better able to engage on the complex, multi-dimensional issues that define the international agenda today. Back in 2003, the European Security Strategy, followed by the Implementation Report in 2008, set out the case for Europe to pursue a more active, coherent foreign policy, addressing potential threats at source, and promoting international law and an effective multilateral system. Lisbon provides the institutional and political framework with which to deliver that.

The job now is to put it to work, and quickly. As the EES emphasised, the world around us is changing fast. The rapid growth of China, India and other emerging economies is the defining trend of our age. If we wish to see a global environment which supports our common interests and values, then we cannot afford to be bystanders. We play a full part in shaping events.

So what are we doing? In answering that question, Cathy Ashton has identified three strands:

The first is to raise our game with our strategic partners – the United States, Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa and others. This was, of course, a message from the ESS and the Implementation Report. But the context has been transformed, even in the period since 2008. China, as the second largest global economy, is now indispensable to our economic stability, and increasingly to global security as well. And, within Europe, the Lisbon Treaty has given us the means to engage more coherently, bringing together our economic and political agenda, and with President Van Rompuy, President Barroso and High Representative Cathy Ashton to represent us.

The European Council launched a process of reflection, led by Cathy Ashton, to see how we can use these partnerships better. Indeed, if we wish to exercise influence with others, we must first be clear among ourselves what we want to achieve. At the same time, we hosted a series of summits – with China, India and the United States – which were an opportunity to see the new Lisbon format in operation. The result is both a better level of engagement, between leaders, but also more scope for tangible results. With India, for instance, we were able to agree a Joint Declaration on International Terrorism, which provides the means to deepen our security relationship, and with the United States we agreed to take forward work together in the field of cyber security.

This is an ongoing process. The results will tell over time. As Cathy Ashton has emphasised, we cannot slip into a “one size fits all” approach. With each country, our agenda is different, and so is theirs. But in each case the challenge is similar: to bring together the various strands – trade policy, human rights
or security issues – so that we can better identify our interests, and how to use our leverage. This is the way that nation states have always operated. It is a lesson that the European Union is still learning. But it is indispensable, if we are to exercise influence in the world.

The second strand is a stable neighbourhood. The ESS set out a vision of nurturing a ring of well-governed countries around the EU. The EEAS, and the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy that is currently taking place, provide us with an opportunity to renew that task. So far, there have been both successes and disappointments. The Eastern Partnership, launched in 2009, has brought greater cohesion to our efforts. We have worked to support democratic transition, rule of law and market reform. Developments in the Republic of Moldova have been encouraging. But the aftermath of presidential elections in Belarus left the EU with no alternative but to take a tough response. And, after five confused but democratic years in Ukraine, we now see stability but also worrying signs of the decline in the open society.

Conflict also remains a lurking threat. The EU remains closely engaged in Georgia, including through the EU Monitoring Mission, and as co-chairs in the Geneva talks on the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But substantive progress to resolving that conflict remains elusive. On Transnistria, on the other hand, there are more encouraging signs. Our role has grown steadily within the 5 + 2 settlement format.

Our role in the South has been no less important. This builds on a long tradition, including launch of the Union for the Mediterranean. Events in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have opened another chapter. We need to embrace the prospect of democratic development, and draw on our experience elsewhere to build the institutions that will underpin lasting change.
The third strand is about addressing conflict and crisis around the world. During the first ten years of our Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union established an impressive track record, through our civilian and military missions, as a provider of greater stability in the aftermath of conflict. Many of these missions – in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Bosnia, for instance – represent a long-term commitment on our part to the stabilisation of these countries.

With these, comes a growing diplomatic punch. The European Union is now established as a serious interlocutor on key international issues, including the Iranian nuclear programme, in the Middle East Peace Process, or the Corfu Process on Euro-Atlantic security, within the OSCE. The External Action Service enables us to take this to another level, with a team of senior diplomats based at headquarters in Brussels, and a worldwide network of delegations. Moreover, it brings into one organisation areas of expertise – military, humanitarian, election observation – which in traditional government structures are spread across different ministries, and difficult to coordinate.

As an example, one area where this approach comes together is in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU, as a member of the Quartet, has brought a new vigour to the role of this group and is at the heart of providing international support to bring the two sides into meaningful negotiations. Cathy Ashton herself has twice visited Gaza, highlighting the plight of that territory and its people. This year, with a backdrop of wider change in the Middle East, is a crucial opportunity to make progress. But the EU is also engaged in delivering change on the ground, through our budgetary support and policing mission to the Palestinian Authority, which are creating the framework for a viable future Palestinian state. And Cathy Ashton has made clear that we stand ready to increase that presence, if the parties can reach a compromise agreement.

In conclusion, there is much to be done. We must be ambitious, but also realistic. Foreign policy is always work in progress. It is easy to spot failures, but much harder to define success. As Ziebnow Brzezinski, the former US National Security Advisor, has commented, we tend to overestimate our ability to influence events in the short term, but underestimate it in the longer term. To fulfil the ambitions set out by the European Security Strategy, we need to be able to operate in both: responding to the world around us as it is today, but shaping the way that we want it to look tomorrow. The External Action Service has provided us with the means to do so, by bringing together our collective economic and political weight. Now is the time to put that to work.

**Participation of Catherine Ashton, Vice-President of the EC, in the Quartet meeting and the meeting of the G8 Foreign Affairs Ministers in April 2012. Hillary Clinton, Catherine Ashton and Helga Maria Schmid, Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (from right to left)**
EXTERNAL ACTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Council was created in 1974 with the intention of establishing an informal forum for discussion between Heads of State or Government. It rapidly developed into the body which fixed goals for the Union and set the course for achieving them, in all fields of EU activity. It acquired a formal status in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which defined its function as providing the impetus and general political guidelines for the Union’s development.

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, it has become one of the seven institutions of the Union. Its President is Herman Van Rompuy, who has been re-elected for a second term.

The European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union.

It provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defines its general political directions and priorities. The European Council does not exercise legislative functions.

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part in its work.

The European Council elects its President by qualified majority. The President’s term of office is two and a half years, renewable once. According to Article 15 (6) of the Treaty on the European Union, the President of the European Council:
The new “EUROPA” building for the European Council still under construction

- chairs it and drives forward its work;
- ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in co-operation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;
- endeavours to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;
- presents a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council.

He also, at his level and in that capacity, ensures the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The European Council meets twice every six months, usually in Brussels in the Justus Lipsius building, assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council. When the situation so requires, the President will convene a special meeting of the European Council.

Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European Council are taken by consensus.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Webpage European Council/President: http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-president

More information on the Union’s decision making procedures can be found among others on the following webpage: http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/doublemajority_en.htm
3.2 HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

At the informal meeting in Brussels on 19 November 2009, ahead of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December, EU Heads of State or Government agreed on the appointment of Catherine Ashton as the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

DUTIES OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE

The High Representative exercises, in foreign affairs, the functions which were previously performed by the six-monthly rotating Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. In accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty on the European Union, the High Representative:

- conducts the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
- contributes by her proposals to the development of that policy, which she will carry out as mandated by the Council, and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted in this field;
- presides over the Foreign Affairs Council;
- is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. She ensures the consistency of the Union’s external action. She is responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action.

- represents the Union in matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and expresses the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences.
- exercises authority over the European External Action Service (EEAS) and over the Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations.

SUPPORTING ARRANGEMENTS

In fulfilling her mandate, the HR is assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS). She also benefits from support from the Council and Commission services as appropriate.
OTHER TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The HR has also responsibilities as regards the three EU Agencies established in the field of CFSP/CSDP. The HR is Head of the European Defence Agency and chairs its Ministerial Steering Board Meetings. The HR (or a representative) also chairs the EU Satellite Centre Board and the Board of the EU Institute for Security Studies.

In accordance with the Council Joint Action establishing the European Security and Defence College from 23 June 2008, the HR also plays a role vis-à-vis the College. The letters of appointment of the Member States’ representatives in the ESDC Steering Committee, duly authorised by the Member State, are directed to the HR. The course certificate of all ESDC courses are signed by the HR certifying among others that the courses conducted under the ESDC provide a clear EU perspective.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Webpage of the EEAS/High Representative: http://eeas.europa.eu/ashton

Press conference of HR/VP Catherine Ashton and Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of the National League for Democracy of Burma/Myanmar and 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate in April 2012
3.3 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN COUNCIL BODIES

compiled by Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

The Council of the European Union is a single body but for reasons relating to the organisation of work, it meets – according to the subject being discussed – in different “configurations” which are attended by the Ministers from the Member States and the Commissioners responsible for the areas concerned. In the 1990s there were 22 configurations; this was reduced to 16 in June 2000 and then to 9 in June 2002.


Council decisions are prepared by a structure of more than 150 working parties and committees.

The Foreign Affairs Council deals with the whole of the Union’s external action, including common foreign/security/defence policy as well as foreign trade and development cooperation. A priority is to ensure coherence in the EU’s external action across the range of instruments at the Union’s disposal in cooperation with the Commission. Defence Ministers meet within this Council configuration twice a year in addition to their informal meetings. The Foreign Affairs Council is chaired by the High Representative. Roughly 20 working parties (e.g. PSC, PMG, CIVCOM, thematic groups such as COHOM, CONUN, CONOP and COARM, as well as regional groups such as COEST, COASI, COLAT) in the foreign affairs field also have a permanent chairman appointed by the High Representative. The other Working Parties are chaired by the rotating six-months Presidency.

The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) prepares the work of the Council.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) was set up by the Council in January 2001 as the linchpin of CFSP and CSDP. It meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its mandate under Article 38 of the Lisbon Treaty includes keeping track of the international situation in the areas falling within CFSP, helping to define policies and to monitor the implementation of agreed policies. It deals with crisis situations, examines all the options that might be considered as the Union’s response to the crisis, makes recommendations to Council and,
when authorised, exercises “political control and strategic direction” of the civilian/military response to crisis under the authority of Council and the HR. Within this mandate it prepares discussions and conclusions of the Council. The work of the PSC is prepared by the Nicolaidis group.

The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is responsible for the politico-military aspects of the CSDP. It formulates recommendations and advice for the PSC on the politico-military aspects of crisis management.

The European Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States. In this configuration, the EUMC meets at least twice a year. Regular meetings take place with the permanent Military Representatives from all EU Member States. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. The EUMC’s work is prepared by a Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG). The Committee as well as its Working Group are chaired by a permanent Chairperson and supported by the EU Military Staff.

In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee provides information, recommendations, and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.

Another group, not mentioned in the diagram, is the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (Relex Group). This group deals with all horizontal aspects, in particular the institutional, legal and budgetary issues. It prepares e.g. the Council Decisions required for the launching of the EU’s crisis management missions and operations.
3.4 ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

by Juha Auvinen

When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force the European Commission lost its right of initiative in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nonetheless, its role in the Union’s external action is perhaps stronger than ever.

From the legal point of view, it ensures, together with the Council, the requirement of consistency of Union action. In the external relations field, the High Representative provides this consistency in her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Strategically and operationally the Commission is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crises and its external action more generally. The Commission manages a number of Union instruments that may be, and are, deployed in parallel with CSDP missions. The EEAS, the Commission and the Council aim at increased complementarity in EU interventions by using the right mix of instruments. A number of Commission services are involved: the Development and Co-operation DG (DEVCO/EuropeAid), the Enlargement DG (ELARG) and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI).

“The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the HR/VP, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect” (Article 21 (3) TEU).
The three major Union instruments are the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). The Instrument for Stability (IFS) finances measures with the aim of establishing conditions on the ground for longer-term development. The IFS, which has been rapidly growing in importance over the past years, funds exceptional assistance measures in crisis situations and longer-term structural programmes. The deployment of exceptional assistance measures is preceded by political consultation of Member States in the Political and Security Committee.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) supports measures aimed at enhancing human rights, democracy and rule of law as well as the monitoring of elections. Development co-operation measures in the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries are financed from the European Development Fund (EDF). Although not part of the Union budget, the EDF is also managed by the Commission. One of the components of the EDF is the Africa Peace Facility, which may contribute to peace operations of the African Union and regional organisations.

The Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection DG (ECHO) is able to mobilise resources quickly and flexibly in response to humanitarian needs in natural or man-made catastrophes.

CFSP operations are not based on a generic instrument established by a Council Regulation. Each CFSP operation requires a separate ad hoc legal basis decided by the Council, which gives considerable flexibility for the Council in defining the content of the operations.

The Commission has a specific role in the implementation of the CFSP budget, which is part of the Union budget. The budget is implemented by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) under the authority of the High Representative acting as Vice-President of the Commission.

The CFSP budget may not be used to finance military operations. Civilian crisis management missions are the major activity, consuming as much as 80-85 % of the budget annually. Other activities are projects in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament (5-10% of the budget) and EU Special Representatives (EUSR; 5-10% of budget), who are appointed by the Council in relation to specific policy issues. The size of the budget in 2012 is €362 million.

The Commission ensures day-to-day financial management of CSDP missions and undertakes on-the-spot monitoring and advisory missions to verify that the operations respect the principles of sound financial management as defined in the EC Financial Regulation. The Commission also contributes to the development of civilian capabilities by establishing and managing framework contracts for the procurement of essential equipment and services for CSDP missions, which is important in particular in rapid deployment situations. There are currently 10 framework contracts, ranging from armoured cars and security equipment to high-risk insurance. The Commission is also preparing a contract for warehousing services for CSDP missions. For these tasks, it cooperates closely with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) of the EEAS.

The Commission also ensures direct financial management of preparatory missions in order to facilitate the deployment of CSDP missions; it gives daily advice and training to mission staff in financial and procurement questions; and it hires external procurement and financial expertise to provide temporary expertise to missions.

In sum, the Commission continues to have an important role in CFSP/CSDP, by ensuring consistency of EU action, by being part of the Union’s comprehensive approach to crises, by managing the CFSP budget and by contributing to capacity-building in civilian CSDP.
3.5 ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

by Gerrard Quille

“HENRI SPAAK” and “ALTIERO SPINELLI”, the buildings of the European Parliament in Brussels

GENERAL

The European Parliament has developed a strong consensus in support of the European Security and Defence Policy (as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) during the 6th Legislature (2004 to 2009). This consensus can be seen in the adoption of several Resolutions on CFSP and in Resolutions approving specific CSDP Operations (incl. EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, and EUFOR Chad). Already at the start of the 7th Legislature (2009 to 2014), the European Parliament has shown its determination to use its new Lisbon Treaty powers to assert its parliamentary prerogative over the development of both CFSP and the new Common Security and Defence Policy.1 This is particularly evident in the role of the European Parliament in holding a hearing for the Vice President who is also the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) and in giving its approval of the HR/VP in a vote on the whole of the Commission. Furthermore, in the negotiations with the HR/VP and the Council of Ministers on the establishment of the European External Action Service, the European Parliament has placed considerable emphasis on the need to improve transparency and increase the democratic accountability of decisions in the area of CFSP/CSDP. As a result the HR/VP has adopted a declaration on political accountability which grants the European Parliament the opportunity to engage with the Council and the HR/VP on the launching of new missions or the adoption of new mandates and strategies.

1 This is clearly stated in the report by the then Chair of AFET, Mr Albertini, “on the Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2008, presented to the European Parliament in application of Part II, Section G, paragraph 43 of the Inter-institutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 (2009/2057(INI))”. See also the Report by the Chair of SEDE, Mr Danjean on “the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and the CSDP (2009/2198(INI))”.

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THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE AREA OF CFSP/ CSDP – POLICY-SHAPING AND BUDGETARY CONTROL

The formal role of the European Parliament in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (and, as an integral part of that policy, the Common Security and Defence Policy) stems from its two main roles as stipulated in the treaties i.e. that of political scrutiny and budgetary authority.

From the moment the European Parliament endorsed the High Representative as Vice President of the Commission, the development of a close working relationship between the HR/VP and the European Parliament has become the focus of attention. Initially this centred on the setting up of the EEAS which was established by a Council Decision following consultation with the EP and the consent of the Commission (Article 27 (3)) but which also involved Parliament’s co-decision on relating legislative and budgetary decisions, necessary for the operation of the Service. This working relationship, however, goes beyond the EEAS. The HR/VP has a central role (reaching across the EU institutions and to the Member States) in ensuring coherent and effective policy formulation of EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. In this respect the Lisbon Treaty tasks her to work with the European Parliament (Article 36 of the Lisbon Treaty), whereby:

*The European Parliament in Luxembourg*

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. She shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration ... The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.”

Therefore the HR/VP Catherine Ashton is the new linchpin of EU external action and importantly her role in relation to the EP is clearly spelt out as one of informing, consulting and of ensuring the views of the EP are duly taken into consideration. The declaration on political accountability issued at the time of the adoption of the EEAS decision confirms this mandate.
REINFORCING PARLIAMENT’S PREROGATIVE: THE POWER OF THE PURSE

Although these consultative rights do not give the European Parliament a decision-making role in the CFSP/CSDP, they are supplemented by the European Parliament role as a budgetary authority.

Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union clearly states that operating expenditure resulting from CSDP operations which do not have military or defence implications (military missions are funded by Member States outside the EU budget) are charged to the Union’s budget. As the number of civilian CSDP missions grew (growing from approx. 35 million euros prior to 2004 to approx 280 million in 2010) this put a greater demand on the Union’s CFSP budget. The Presidency therefore had to approach the European Parliament as a budgetary authority and regularly request increases in the CFSP budget. As part of the negotiations on the EU multiannual financial framework (i.e. the multiannual budget for all Union policy areas) an “Inter-Institutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management” was adopted on 17 May 2006. This agreement specified that for the CFSP budget (predominantly used for contributing to civilian CSDP missions) the Presidency, represented by the Chair of the Political and Security Committee, should consult the European Parliament (represented by the bureaux of the Foreign Affairs and Budget Committees) at least five times a year in order to prepare for the adoption of the annual CFSP budget. These “Joint Consultation Meetings” have been an important focus for the Committee on Foreign Affairs to express its views on CSDP missions alongside the Budget Committee’s control of CFSP spending. The meetings symbolise the coming together of Parliament’s consultation/scrutiny role and budgetary authority in the area of CFSP. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and specifically the replacement of the rotating Presidency by a representative of the HR/VP this IIA will need to be amended to reflect the new role of the HR/VP in relation to the European Parliament. At the time of writing this contribution the Inter-Institutional Agreement is still under revision but the Permanent representative of the HR/VP Chaired the Political and Security Committee has been announced as Ambassador Olof Skoog.

In addition, in order to ensure more flexible use of the CFSP budget the Lisbon Treaty (Article 41 (3) TEU) includes the provision for a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the area of CFSP. The article states that this Decision will be taken “after consulting the European Parliament”.

STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY LEGITIMACY OF CFSP/CSDP: COOPERATION WITH NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

Another important innovation in the Lisbon Treaty can be found in the role of National Parliaments and in particular in protocol Number 1 (in particular Articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty which specifies that:

“The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall determine the organisation and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union.” [This could include] “… the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees. … inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of the common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy.”
The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament already invites representatives from the EU national Parliaments for an annual exchange on the CFSP (including CSDP). This is important in bridging what is referred to as the double democratic deficit whereby the European Parliament has weak decision-making powers but very good insight (and increasingly a policy-shaping role) on CSDP but where national Parliaments have stronger formal powers but struggle to cope with the complexities of EU decision making on CFSP (and CSDP). Working together the European Parliament and national Parliaments can play an important role in providing democratic legitimacy to CSDP.

CONCLUSION

The innovations in the Lisbon Treaty provide an opportunity to improve political coherence in the EU’s external representation and action. The key role of the HR/VP, supported by the EEAS, is central in achieving the objectives of the Union. The political framework for consultation and dialogue with the European Parliament continues to improve, enabling it to contribute to the development of CFSP/CSDP. As a partner in the development of the Union’s external relations, the Lisbon Treaty enables the European Parliament to play its role, together with its EU national counterparts, in helping to address the challenge clearly set out in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” which states that:

“Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.”

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

For more and updated information you can consult the webpage of the European Parliament http://www.europarl.europa.eu/


- Born, Anghell et al “Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions. the European and National Levels, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armand Forces (DCAF), Geneva, see: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail/?id=55091&lng=en


- See also Mission Analysis Partnership http://www.csdpmap.eu
3.6 EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

compiled by Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

Article 27 (3) TEU constitutes the legal basis for the Council decision on the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

“In fulfilling his mandate, the HR shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States …”

MAIN TASK OF THE EEAS

The EEAS assists the HR in her roles as HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council and as Vice President of the Commission. It prepares proposals and contributes to their implementation after their approval by Council. It also assists the President of the European Council and the President as well as the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations and ensures close cooperation with the Member States.

POLICY GOALS

Neighbourhood policy is a top priority for the EEAS. This policy is directed towards our close neighbours to the East and South, tailor-made for each country. The overall aim is to increase prosperity, security and stability of the EU and its neighbours. This is done on the basis of common values: democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development.

ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS

The EEAS is a service sui generis separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It has the legal capacity necessary to achieve its objectives and enjoys autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff. EEAS staff is appointed by the HR and is drawn from three sources: relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council, of personnel of the Commission and – for one third – of national diplomatic services of the Member States. In order

EEAS KEY POLICY GOALS

- A secure, stable and prosperous European Neighbourhood
- Closer relationship with Strategic Partners
- Universal respect for human rights
- Spread of democracy and rule of law
- Sustainable development policy
- Crisis management and conflict prevention
to enable the High Representative to conduct the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Staff (EUMS) became an integral part of the EEAS, whilst maintaining their specificities in terms of function, recruitment and staff.

The EEAS is composed of geographical (covering all regions and countries) and thematic Managing Directorates, in addition to a Managing Directorate responsible for Crisis Response and one responsible for resources and administration. The 137 former Commission’s delegations and offices around the world became Union delegations under the authority of the HR and are now part of the EEAS structure. They work in close cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States.

In order to support the HR in her regular consultations with the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP/CSDP, the EEAS maintains close relations and contacts with the European Parliament.

Trade, development policy and humanitarian aid as defined by the Treaty remain the responsibility of the relevant Commissioners. For more details including the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) Commission Service see chapter 3.4 “Role of the European Commission”.

The EEAS has been established in several stages. Finally, when the EEAS has been functioning for some time at full speed, there should be a review of the functioning and organisation of the EEAS followed, if necessary, by a revision of the Council decision. This review should also cover the scope of the EEAS, including delegations’ role in consular affairs. Such a review should take place in 2014.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Website European External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu
3.7 CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

compiled by Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

From the start of CSDP, the EU quickly developed its crisis management structures to present its ability to deploy civilian and military crisis management instruments as its specific strength. The relevant internal services supporting crisis management include in particular the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, the Intelligence Analysis Centre and the Military Staff. They are an integral part of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The EU is a living organisation and CSDP a process developed step by step. The EU’s crisis management structures mirror this process and will therefore further evolve in the future.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION**

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING DIRECTORATE (CMPD)

The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) is part of the European External Action Service and at the core of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy as part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. It was created in 2009, following European Council conclusions encouraging the establishment of a new, single civilian-military strategic planning structure for CSDP operations and missions.

The CMPD works under the political control and strategic direction of the Member States in the Political and Security Committee, acting under the responsibility of the Council of the EU and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The CMPD provides also assistance and advice to the High Representative and the relevant EU Council bodies.

Its core activities and products include:

- Strategic Planning of CSDP missions and operations;
- Strategic Reviews of existing CSDP missions and operations;
- Develop CSDP partnerships;
- Coordinate the development of civilian and military capabilities;
- Develop CSDP policy and concepts;
- Conduct exercises and develop CSDP training.

The objective of the political-strategic planning is to develop possible options for EU action and prepare a decision by EU Ministers on “what to do, why, where and with whom” with regard to a international security crisis situation. These options are put together in a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) which is proposed to EU Ministers for approval. This strategic planning is conducted in an integrated way, involving both civilian and military planners and in consultation with other services within the EEAS. It forms the basis for the further operational planning and the conduct of a mission or an operation.

Crisis Management Concepts developed by the CMPD and approved by the Foreign Affairs Council include e.g. those for the mission for the Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia, the Sahel mission and the mission for the security of the airport in Juba (South Sudan).
CIVILIAN PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY (CPCC)

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was established in August 2007. Its mandate is:

- to plan and conduct civilian CSDP missions under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee;
- to provide assistance and advice in particular to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the relevant EU Council bodies.
- to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian CSDP operations.
CPCC works in close cooperation with the other crisis management structures within the European External Action Service and the European Commission.

The CPCC’s Director, as EU Civilian Operations Commander, exercises command and control at strategic level for the conduct of all civilian crisis management missions, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton.

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF (EUMS)

The EU Military Staff (EUMS) was established by a Council Decision in January 2001. Its mission is defined in the EUMS Terms of Reference and is to:
- perform early warning,
- situation assessment and
- strategic planning
for missions and tasks referred to in Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Lisbon, including those identified in the European Security Strategy. This also encompasses the identification of European national and multinational forces and to develop and implement policies and decisions as directed by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC).

The EUMS is the only permanent military structure of the European Union. The EUMS works in close cooperation with the other EU crisis management bodies, notably the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

The role and tasks of the EUMS have some unique characteristics. On one hand, the EUMS is an integral part of the EU crisis management structures and provides in-house military expertise for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). On the other hand, it assists the EU Military Committee and operates under its military direction.

The EUMS’s structure and organisation is fully multinational and comprises around 200 military personnel seconded by Member States, acting in an international capacity, as well as civilian staff. It is headed by a Director General (a three-star general officer) who is assisted by the Deputy Director General and Chief of Staff (a two-star general officer).

The Concepts and Capabilities Directorate’s mission is “to be responsible for EUMS concepts, doctrine, force planning and capability development including crisis management exercises, training, analysis and lessons learned, and for cooperation with the European Defence Agency. As regards EUMS planning, it ensures coherence between the EU military concepts and the crisis management procedures”.

The Intelligence Directorate’s mission is “to provide intelligence input to early warning and situation assessment. To contribute to the EUMS planning through the provision of intelligence and intelligence planning expertise. To provide the intelligence input to crisis response planning and assessment for operations and exercises”.

The Operations Directorate’s mission is “to assist in planning EU-led military crisis management operations, including post-launch strate-
Strategic crisis response planning, develop strategic advance and crisis response planning, including early military assessment and planning in support of informed decision making; to monitor all CSDP operations and to generate the capacity to plan and run an autonomous operation”. It is responsible for the maintenance of a fit for purpose Operation Centre which may be activated upon Council Decision.

The logistics directorate’s mission is “to serve as a focal point for all matters in the functional areas of logistics, to contribute to the EUMS planning through the provision of logistic planning expertise, to be responsible for logistic concepts and doctrine, to provide the logistic element of crisis response planning and assessment for operations and exercises and to provide administrative support to the EUMS”.

The Communications and Information Systems Directorate’s mission is “to develop, for the EUMS, policies and guidance for implementation, operation and maintenance of Communication and Information Systems, in support of CSDP activities. To contribute to EUMS planning through the provision of CIS planning expertise at the strategic and operational level, to provide the CIS element of crisis response planning and assessment for operations and exercises”.

The Executive Office’s mission is “to assist the Chief of Staff in the coordination of the EUMS internal processes and information flow and to act as the EUMS primary interface for, and to coordinate the military interaction with, all external institutions, international organisations and strategic partners”.

The Chairman Military Committee Support’s mission is “to serve as the focal point for supporting the Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) and the Chairman of the EUMC Working Group (CEUMC WG) in the preparation, execution and evaluation of the EUMC/EUMC WG meetings and acts as the interface/liaison between CEUMC office and the EUMS. In this context, it looks after all the secretariat’s tasks for the benefit of the EUMC and EUMC WG”.

Illustration of the Structure as at May 2012
The EU Cell at SHAPE Unit’s mission is “to prepare for EU operations having recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities under Berlin Plus arrangements and to support DSACEUR in his role as a potential operational commander for an EU-led operation. It contributes to full transparency between NATO and the EU embodying their strategic partnership in crisis management”.

The EUMS hosts the NATO Planning and Liaison Team.

In addition, a EUMS military liaison officer to the United Nations is established in New York to further enhance co-operation between the military parts of the EU and the UN.

EU INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CENTRE (EU INTCEN)

In 2002, the EU Joint Situation Centre (EU SITCEN) was established as a directorate of the Council General Secretariat, directly attached to the office of the High Representative. In 2011, the Centre was transferred to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and is now renamed the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN).

The EU INTCEN is the exclusive civilian intelligence function of the EU, providing in-depth analysis for EU decision-makers. Its analytical products are based on intelligence provided by EU Member States’ intelligence and security services, open sources (media, websites, blogs etc.), diplomatic reporting, international organisations, NGOs, CSDP missions and operations, EU Satellite Centre, visits and fact-finding missions. It co-operates closely with the Intelligence Division of the EUMS.

The Centre’s main mission is to provide intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative Catherine Ashton and to the European External Action Service (EEAS). It also offers its services to the various EU decision making bodies in the fields of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Counter Terrorism (CT), as well as to the Member States.

EU INTCEN does this by monitoring and assessing international events, focusing particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats.
3.8 AGENCIES IN THE FIELD OF CSDP

compiled by Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

There are currently three EU Agencies established in the support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): The European Defence Agency, The EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS).

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004, “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future.”

With the entry into force of the revised Treaty on European Union, the Agency now is a Treaty based agency (Articles 42 (3) and 45 TEU).

Functions

The European Defence Agency, within the overall mission set out in the Joint Action, is allocated four tasks, covering:

- development of defence capabilities;
- promotion of Defence Research and Technology (R&T);
- promotion of armaments co-operation;
- creation of a competitive European Defence Equipment Market and the strengthening of the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base.

All these tasks relate to improving Europe’s defence performance by promoting consistency. A more integrated approach to capability development will contribute to better defined future requirements on which cooperation – in
armaments or R&T or the operational domain – can be built. More cooperation will, in turn, provide opportunities for industrial restructuring and progress towards a continental-wide demand and market, which industry needs.

The EDA is an agency of the European Union and it is therefore under the direction and authority of the Council, which issues guidelines to and receives reports from the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as Head of the Agency. Detailed control and guidance, however, is the job of the Steering Board.

The HR chairs the Steering Board, the principal decision-making body of the Agency, made up of Defence Ministers from 26 participating Member States (all EU members except Denmark) and a member of the European Commission.

In addition to ministerial meetings at least twice a year, the Steering Board also meets at the level of national armaments directors, national research directors, national capability planners and policy directors.

The Chief Executive, his Deputies and the Directors together form the Agency Management Board (AMB), supported by the Planning & Policy Unit.

**Strategies**

The Agency conducts its activities within a strategic framework. It consists of four strategies, endorsed by EDA Steering Board.

- The Capability Development Plan (CDP) provides to Member States an auditable picture and assessment of capability trends and requirements, over the short, medium and long term, in order to inform national decisions on defence investments; this includes the identification of areas for cooperation for capability improvement, and the proposal concerning options for collective solutions. The CDP is the overall strategic tool, the ‘driver’ for R&T investment, for armaments cooperation and for the defence industries.

- The European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT) strategy aims at enhancing more effective R&T in support of military capabilities. The EDRT strategy defines the ‘Ends’ (in which key technologies to invest), the ‘Means’ (how to do this) and the ‘Ways’
to implement the ends and means through roadmaps and action plans.

- The European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) strategy is focussed on promoting and enhancing more effective European armaments co-operation in support of CSDP capability needs. The EAC strategy defines how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of European armaments programmes by a series of actions, applying lessons learned from past experiences through a ‘Guide to Armaments Co-operation Best Practice’.

- The European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy describes the future European defence industrial landscape, based on the three Cs: Capability-driven, Competent and Competitive. The future EDTIB has to be more integrated, less duplicative and more interdependent, with increased specialisation, for example by establishing industrial centres of excellence. It refers to action fields for which Governments will be responsible, such as consolidating demand and investment. Logically, the strategy links the work on realising the future EDTIB to the Agency’s activities on the European Defence Equipment Market. Special attention is paid to the importance of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises with their typical flexibility and capacity to innovate.

These strategies provide for the destinations of EDA’s activities in the four functional areas and for the course to be followed. But they don’t produce capabilities by themselves. These have to be generated through concrete projects and activities.

**EU SATELLITE CENTRE (EUSC)**

The Centre was founded within the Western European Union in 1992 and incorporated as an agency into the European Union on 1 January 2002. It is located in Torrejón de Ardoz, in the vicinity of Madrid, Spain.

**Mission and Staff**

In line with the European Security Strategy, the Satellite Centre supports decision-making in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), including European Union crisis management operations, by providing products resulting from the analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data, including aerial imagery and related services.

Furthermore, the Centre ensures close cooperation with Community space-related services, such as the Joint Research Centre. It also maintains contacts with other national and international institutions in the same field.

The staff of the Centre consists of experienced imagery analysts, geospatial specialists and supporting personnel, recruited from EU Member States. The Centre also hosts seconded experts from Member States and Third States.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION**

Further details are set out in the Joint Action establishing the European Defence Agency. This and more up-to-date information can be found on the EDA’s website: [www.eda.europa.eu](http://www.eda.europa.eu)
Supervision

The EUSC operates under the political supervision of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The PSC issues guidance to the High Representative (HR) on the Centre’s priorities. The HR gives operational direction to the Centre and reports to the PSC.

The EUSC Board, consisting of representatives from Member States and the European Commission, appoints the Director and approves the annual budget as well as the work programme of the Centre. Furthermore, the Board serves as a forum for discussion on issues related to the Centre’s functioning, staff and equipment. It meets at least twice per year but in practice more often, and is chaired by the High Representative or a representative.

Tasking and Priorities

Subject to the assent of the HR, the EU Satellite Centre may be tasked by the European Commission, the Member States and Third States. If the request is relevant in the field of CFSP, in particular the CSDP, international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may also file their requests to the Centre.

The Satellite Centre’s areas of priority reflect the key security concerns as defined by the European Security Strategy, such as monitoring regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For example, the EUSC gives support to EU operational deployments (such as EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUNAVFOR Atalanta) and humanitarian aid missions and peacekeeping missions. The Centre is also an important early warning tool, facilitating information for early detection and possible prevention of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.

The Centre carries out tasks in support of the following activities:

- general security surveillance of areas of interest
- support for humanitarian and rescue tasks,
- support for peacekeeping tasks,
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,
- treaty verification,
- contingency planning,
- arms and proliferation control (including Weapons of Mass Destruction),
- support for exercises,
- other activities, such as judicial investigations.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

More information on the tasks of the different divisions and on the work and the projects of the EUSC can be found on its website: www.eusc.europa.eu.
EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (EU ISS)

The EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) was established by the Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 (revised by Council Joint Action of 21 December 2006) as a replacement for the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies (established in July 1990). It was inaugurated on 1 January 2002.

The EU ISS is an autonomous agency with full intellectual independence operating in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its core goals are to help develop and project the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to provide research and recommendations that can contribute to the formulation of CFSP, and to enrich Europe’s strategic debate. It also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels and provides analysis and forecasting to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) is located in Paris. It is funded by EU Member States, according to a GNP-based cost-sharing formula and it is governed by two administrative bodies:
- the Political and Security Committee exercises political supervision;
- the Board lays down budgetary and administrative rules and is chaired by the High Representative or his representative.

Research
The EU ISS covers all areas related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and it approaches its research from both geographic and thematic perspectives. Its research fellows are complemented by an extensive network of external researchers who contribute to the Institute’s research activities on an ad hoc basis.

Publications
The Institute’s flagship publication is its monograph series of Chaillot Papers. The Institute also publishes occasional papers, books, reports, and shorter policy briefs and analyses, as well as a quarterly newsletter.
Seminars and conferences

The Institute organises its Annual Conference, the EU Washington Forum and other regular seminars and conferences. They bring together academics, EU officials, national experts, decision-makers and NGO representatives from the 27 Member States but also from the rest of the world.

Co-operation

The Institute co-operates with numerous counterpart institutions in Europe, the United States and beyond, and plays an essential role in the development of CFSP concepts. The EU ISS is also a permanent network member of the European Security and Defence College.

SOURCES FOR MORE AND UPDATED INFORMATION

For more information on the EU ISS and its publications you can consult its website www.iss.europa.eu. You can also subscribe to be kept up to date on the latest EU ISS publications and analysis with email alerts.

“THE CAPITAL” (also known as the Triangle), main building of the European External Action Service

Jochen Rehrl
THE EU AS AN ACTIVE PLAYER
**4.1. CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM – FROM PETERSBERG TO LISBON**

by Jochen Rehrl

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**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in February 1992 and establishing the European Union, was a milestone in the development of the EU’s involvement in the field of Foreign and Security Policy. At that time the EU had no operational capacities but a clear political will to evolve into a global actor. Therefore the operational tasks were given to another organisation, the Western European Union (WEU), which was reactivated during the disintegration process of the Yugoslav Republic.

In June 1992 at a Council of Ministers of the Western European Union in Petersberg, a conference location near Bonn/Germany, the WEU gave itself their new tasks:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

These tasks, called “Petersberg Tasks”, were incorporated in the legal framework of the European Union by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. With the creation of the (Common) European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU established its own operational...
capabilities in the military and civilian field. In 2003 the EU launched its first CSDP activities, in January a civilian police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) and in March the military operation in FYROM (Concordia) after having concluded a strategic framework arrangement with NATO (“Berlin Plus Arrangement”).

In the context of the Intergovernmental Conference for a “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, the so-called “Petersberg tasks” were revisited and extended. Besides this task catalogue, some other missions were included which will have an impact on the capability development of the CSDP instruments, in particular the solidarity clause and a mutual assistance clause.

CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM

Although the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” was only signed but not ratified, the task catalogue was transferred unchanged to the Treaty of Lisbon. After the end of the ratification process and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, from 1 December 2009 the mission spectrum is as follows:

Art. 42 TEU: “1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”

Art. 43 TEU: “1. The tasks referred to in Article 42 (1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

Some argue that the scope of the CSDP task catalogue did not expand compared to the Petersberg tasks from 1992. Taking into account the fact that the Petersberg tasks made a reference to a framework including missions from search and rescue to peace-making, everything which is now stated in Art. 42 TEU was already within this framework.

Others argue that the scope expanded because new capabilities are addressed. For example disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks could require tools other than those which were planned to execute the Petersberg tasks.

Regardless whether the original Petersberg tasks were enlarged compared to the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, the new horizontal task “terrorism” was introduced, which is new and will have an impact on the fight against terrorism.

Besides this CSDP task catalogue, another challenge for the CSDP is the newly introduced mutual assistance clause in Art. 42 (7) TEU:
7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Nevertheless the various types of Member States are respected: those which are neutral, non-allied and members of NATO.

TERRORISM

Terrorism can be found within the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, implicitly in the mutual assistance clause of Art. 42 (7) TEU and explicitly in the solidarity clause of Art. 222 TFEU. Taking these rules all together, the European Union will face the phenomenon “terrorism” within and outside the EU, preventively or in the form of consequence management. There are no clear indications whether one rule will be preferred in practice. One could argue that the CSDP task catalogue and the mutual assistance clause are designed for the fight against terrorism outside the territory of the EU, whereas the solidarity clause will be the rule for the EU territory itself. The fight against terrorism in the sense of preventive engagement remains an open question.

By including the task “fight against terrorism” in all relevant paragraphs of the Treaty which will influence capability development in the EU, the Union made a clear and promising statement that it will be ready and prepared to face the challenge and protect its citizens worldwide against any kind of terrorist threat.

GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF THE MISSION SPECTRUM

The CSDP task catalogue was created for missions abroad, whereas the mutual assistance clause prioritises operations to fight armed aggression inside and preventively also outside the EU. The geographical scope for EU’s missions and operations is not limited.
The first step is the drawing up of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC). This document describes the EU’s political interests in the conflict and proposes the aims and objectives that the CSDP engagement would pursue. The CMC also links those aims and objectives to the different policy tools that are available to act and respond. It therefore embodies the strategic vision of how the EU’s comprehensive approach can be brought to bear in any given crisis environment. Once the CMC has been agreed to by the PSC it is formally adopted by the Council, endowing it with the highest level of political approval.

Second comes the consideration of strategic options – if at all required – and the Coun-
Decision to act. Depending on the various policy tools proposed by the CMC, the PSC may ask for different Military Strategic Options (MSO), Police Strategic Options (PSO) or other Civilian Strategic Options (CSO) to be elaborated by the EU Military Staff and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. These will typically reflect different ways of achieving the same aim or different levels of ambition with which that aim can be pursued. Once the PSC agrees on which option to pursue, the Council can take the decision to act. For this the Foreign Relations Counsellors (RelEx Group) draw up a Council Decision. This is the legal act by means of which the Council formally establishes the operation, appoints the Head of Mission or Operations Commander(s) and decides on the financial arrangements for distributing the costs resulting from the engagement.

The third step is the elaboration of the increasingly detailed planning documents, namely the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN). The CONOPS is the Commander’s concise outline of how the operation is intended to fulfil its objectives. It is accompanied by guidelines on the use of force as well as a statement of requirements. This is a list of all the human and material resources necessary to conduct the operation. The subsequent OPLAN is a highly detailed script of the entire operation in all its practical aspects. Both the CONOPS and the OPLAN need to be approved by the PSC and the Council.

At this point, it is worth emphasising that these procedures are not set in stone but rather serve as flexible guidelines for structur-
ing a decision-making cycle that is bound to be influenced by a crisis environment that is often chaotic. As a result, some steps may be added or others deleted, as the situation requires. It is not uncommon to see extra documents surface in the course of the debate (e.g. policy option papers preceding the CMC). Some steps may be skipped altogether under the influence of time pressure. Furthermore, the process of drafting documents is typically iterative in nature. Different versions of the same draft may be sent back and forth multiple times between the EEAS and the Member States. Throughout the process, different committees and working groups may offer input (EUMC, CIVCOM and PMG to name the most important ones). The more extensive the consultations, the longer the process takes. What counts the most, however, is the collective political will to drive the process forward.

The corollary of this procedural flexibility is that Member States at all times retain political control and exercise oversight over all CSDP action. To this end, the PSC is tasked with providing strategic direction to all missions and operations. This is done through the provision of input into the production of the various planning documents, the generation of whatever resources the mission requires and ultimately the decision to launch, prolong or end the CSDP engagement. In order to inform these decisions, the chain of command regularly reports to the PSC. This is done with a view to keeping the Member States up-to-date on how the situation is evolving, and so as to receive further instructions as a function of such changes. As a result, the planning and conduct of missions and operations not only displays an iterative but also a dialectic character. What is politically desirable must be weighed against what is practically feasible within the given constraints of time and resources. For this very reason, the crisis management procedures not only deal with formal decision-making but also presuppose a creative design process.
In the absence of a permanent military command and control structure, the EU has three strategic options for commanding and controlling military operations.

**Firstly**, it can have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities using the Berlin-Plus arrangements. In this case, the preferred option is to establish the EU Operation Headquarters at SHAPE.

**Secondly**, the EU can have recourse to the Member States’ assets and capabilities. In this case the OHQ will be provided by one of the Member States able to provide this headquarters capacity (France, Germany, Greece, Italy and UK).

**Thirdly**, the EU can activate its Operations Centre in the EU Military Staff to plan and conduct an autonomous EU operation when the Council decides to draw on the collective capacity of the EU Military Staff for an operation which requires a civilian as well as a military response and when no national Operation Headquarters has been identified.

The following diagram illustrates the different command and control structures which need to be identified for civilian missions and military operations.
4.4 CIVILIAN MISSIONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Following the development and establishment of its structures and procedures, the EU started its operational engagement in 2003 with the first civilian mission (EU Police Missions in BiH) and military operation (Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM). Since then, it has conducted about 30 missions and operations. This handbook will not elaborate on the details.

The attached world map provides a general overview of all past and current civilian missions and military operations.

OVERVIEW OF THE MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

September 2013

For each operational activity, detailed and updated information, including video presentations, can be found on the website of the European External Action Service:
4.5 FINANCING OF CSDP ACTIONS

by Ernst Schmid

INTRODUCTION

External actions of the European Union are – thematically and financially – much broader than the crisis management operations under CSDP. They comprise, inter alia, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Stability and Humanitarian Aid. In total the multiannual financial framework provides for a maximum expenditure of 55.935 million euros for the „EU as a world player“ in the period 2007-2013. This chapter will, however, focus specifically on the principles of financing crisis management operations stricto sensu, i.e., civilian missions and military operations.

GENERAL RULES

The TEU lays down the basic rules on the financing of crisis management operations. Under Article 41 (1) TEU administrative expenditure of the institutions arising from the implementation of the CSDP, both for civilian missions and military operations, will be charged to the budget of the European Union. The same applies, as a general rule, to operating expenditure under Article 41 (2) TEU, except for cases (a) where the Council – acting unanimously – decides otherwise and (b) for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications.

If expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it is generally charged to the Member States in accordance with their gross national product (unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise). If, on a decision to embark on an operation having military or defence implications, a Member States abstains in a vote and makes a formal declaration (constructive abstention), it is not obliged to contribute to the financing of the respective expenditure.

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

Civilian missions are funded from the general budget of the European Union which is decided upon by the Council and the European Parliament. Title 19 of the budget covers „External Relations“, and its Chapter 3 is specifically dedicated to Common Foreign and Security Policy (the „CFSP budget“, as it is called). It is implemented by the European Commission.

The CFSP budget amounts to just over 362 million Euros in 2010. The relevant subdivisions (articles) are „Monitoring and implementation of peace and security processes“ (commitments of 3 million Euros), „Conflict resolution and other stabilisation measures“ (137 million Euros), and „Police missions“ (approx. 61 million Euros). In order to be able to respond flexibly and finance urgent needs 5 million Euros are provided for under the heading „Emergency measures“.

LEGAL BASIS

Articles 31 and 41 TEU, Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December 2008 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena), Articles 313 ff TFEU.
MILITARY OPERATIONS

After temporary financing mechanisms for operations CONCORDIA and ARTEMIS, the Council, in February 2004, established a permanent “mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena)”. ATHENA, in capital letters, as it is usually referred to, has a permanent structure and functional legal capacity. It acts on behalf of the participating Member States (all Member States of the EU, except Denmark), and third States, if the latter contribute to the financing of the common costs of a specific operation.

Given that the contributions are provided by the Member States based on a GNI scale (ranging currently from less than 0.5 % to more than 20 % per Member State) it is logical that ATHENA is managed under the authority of a Special Committee (SC) which is composed of a representative of each participating Member State and takes decisions by unanimity.

ATHENA covers, basically, the incremental costs for headquarters, certain infrastructure works, medical services, and satellite images during the active phase of an operation. Further expenditure may be authorised by the SC upon request by the Operation Commander who bears the overall financial responsibility. When the Council so decides, also transport to and from the theatre of operations for deployment, support and recovery of the forces are considered as operational common costs. In addition, certain measures in the preparatory and winding-up phases of an operation are borne by ATHENA, as well as specific general costs and joint costs of EU exercises.

The 2010 ATHENA budget provides for (in commitment appropriations) around 23.1 million euros for EUFOR ALTHEA and 9.95 million for ATALANTA out of a total of 34.6 million euros. It will, however, be adjusted if new operations are started. Overall, one has to bear in mind that the costs financed jointly account for less than 10 % of the total costs for an operation, the rest follows the principle “costs lie where they fall”.

CONCLUSION

The ATHENA mechanism is a very flexible instrument for the financing of military operations. This also holds true of periodical revisions of the mechanism as such. The EU budget, in some respects, lacks this flexibility. Its advantage, however, lies in the democratic control at European level which is exercised by the European Parliament as co-legislator of the budget.

Above all, the political will to provide sufficient funding, both for civilian and military operations, in order to fulfil the respective tasks is of paramount importance.
5 CIVIL-MILITARY CO-ORDINATION (CMCO)
5.1 CIVIL-MILITARY CO-ORDINATION – A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF THE EU

by Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

One of the three strategic objectives defined in the European Security Strategy is to tackle the key threats identified, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The strategy further concludes that none of these threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and combated through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, with humanitarian means used to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase.

Hence, the new strategic environment calls for the deployment of a mixture of instruments, of civilian and military capabilities together. Experiences with crisis management operations in the recent past showed that an operation requires a combination of civilian and military tools from the outset. In many cases military security is established quickly but organised crime and other factors continue to thwart a return to normality.

EU IN A UNIQUE SITUATION

In recent years the EU has created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The EU is in such a unique position to have at its disposal all the means and tools necessary for effective international crisis management. This is considered to be the comparative advantage of the EU. The challenge now is to bring together these different instruments and capabilities and to ensure that they all follow the same agenda.

From the start of its operational engagement in international crisis management in 2003, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments together as its particular strength. However, despite all co-ordination efforts, the civilian and military structures have remained to great extent different worlds and the civilian and military crisis management missions and operations are still separate.

PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

In recent years the Council has taken a number of decisions to lay down the conditions for better civil-military co-ordination and co-operation, aiming in particular to integrate the civilian and military planning structures and to launch activities relating to civil-military capability development.

A first attempt to create civil-military structures for the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations was made at the end of 2003. A Civil-Military Cell was estab-
lished within the EU Military Staff to enhance its capacity to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. The cell was led by a military director and a civilian deputy. All in all, it has proved to be a useful step forward towards a better linkage between civil and military strategic planning but its location within the EU Military Staff has raised doubts about its real civil-military character.

In the same context, an Operations Centre was established within the EU Military Staff which became operational in 2007. The aim was to provide for an additional command option in particular in cases where a joint civil-military response might be required and none of the national potential Operation Headquarters might be available.

In response to the lack of a planning and command structure for civilian missions, a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was created and became operational in 2008. As a matter of fact, it is an Operation Headquarters for civilian missions only, responsible for the operational planning and command of civilian missions at the strategic level. The Director of the CPCC acts as the Civilian Operation Commander for all civilian missions.

In 2009, a new decision was taken to further develop the relevant structures at the strategic level, namely to merge the relevant civilian and defence directorates in the Council Secretariat with the Civ-Mil Cell to form a new Crisis Management and Planning Department (CMPD). This department now operates as an integrated structure for strategic planning of CSDP operations and missions and is also dealing with CSDP policy and capability issues.

All in all, these are useful organisational and institutional steps taken so far at the strategic level which help to improve civil-military co-ordination. However, whether this will be the final solution is arguable. CSDP is and will remain an evolving process, at least in the coming decades. This process might cul-
minate in unified civil-military structures as underlined in 2009 by the former Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Henri Bentégeat. Referring to the progress made so far in civil-military integration, he underlined the importance of establishing an integrated Civil-Military Headquarters for CSDP missions which would, in his view, correspond to a specific requirement of the European Union.

CIVIL-MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Apart from the institutional and organisational aspects, consideration is now given to possible synergic effects in the field of European capability development. It is recognised that further co-ordination of military and civilian efforts is necessary, both at strategic level and in theatre, in order to enhance the capability of the EU to meet complex challenges in the future. Finding synergies between civilian and military efforts is also considered to be cost efficient for the Member States.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Following the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management, civil-military co-ordination is a recognised special training requirement for the EU and should be met through special training courses and through combined civilian and military participation whenever possible, in national and EU-level training. Aspects of civil-military co-ordination are also regularly addressed in EU exercises.

The European Security and Defence College is playing a significant and important role in support of the EU’s comprehensive approach by providing training at strategic level for civil and military personnel of the Member States and the EU Institutions. Training activities of the ESDC bring together diplomats, police, rule of law and civil administration staff and military personnel, thereby contributing to a better mutual understanding. Under the aegis of the college there are also training courses covering specifically civil-military co-ordination issues within the EU and in co-operation with international organisations and partners.
Security challenges are on the increase and getting more and more complex – in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Sahel, Iran and Northern Africa. Consequently, the demand for crisis management capacities to tackle these challenges is also growing. Budgets, however, are getting tighter. There is therefore a strong need to do better with existing means, to use them more wisely, in a better combination and coordinated better with the efforts of other organisations and actors in order to increase their impact.

An emphasis on synergy is particularly important given the increasingly common understanding that military means alone do not suffice to bring peace, security and stability to troubled areas. We also need civil instruments that can help rebuild state structures and democratic institutions and foster economic development. There can be no lasting peace, security and stability without respect for human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms, or without economic development.

Our approach, thus, should be a global and multidisciplinary one, which brings together military means and civilian instruments and looks beyond mere crisis management, by bringing together different policy tools – diplomacy, development and security/defence – in a single, sustainable approach with the correct mix and combination. This is the major task we are facing.

And it is precisely in the context of this challenge that the Lisbon Treaty can play its role. The Treaty aims to contribute to greater efficiency and coherence of the EU’s external action and security policy. It has given us the tools to develop a more comprehensive, integrated approach and make the EU more effective as a world player. It created the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who conducts the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. It gave birth to the European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist the High Representative in the preparation and conduct of her policy. Moreover, the High Representative is also Vice-President of the Commission. All this supports the development of a coherent EU strategy to prevent and tackle crises and make use of all the available tools, – diplomatic, economic, developmental, humanitarian and crisis management – in a coordinated manner, so that they complement and reinforce each other.

Of course, like Rome, neither the European External Action Service nor the comprehensive approach can be built “in a day”, however high the expectations for the EU to tackle crises and
assume its responsibility. Any change of this magnitude will take some time. We are building a new institutional framework and a new approach. But I clearly see progress and a real positive change in our approach, with a better response to developments, greater coherence and better cooperation with relevant services, including those of the Commission. It is important to fully exploit the wide variety of existing resources, maximise synergies and strengthen cooperation. Crisis management is an essential item in the EU toolbox.

Our current approach to Somalia is a good example. With EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, the EU is leading the international effort on combating piracy at sea. Our training mission in Uganda (EUTM) is providing training to Somali security forces as part of an effort to support the Somali Transitional Government in gaining control over Somali territory. In a broader perspective, the EU has committed substantial means to addressing the root causes of piracy on Somali lands and is helping build the capacities of countries in the region affected by piracy. Its action has political, diplomatic, development and humanitarian dimensions. It now includes the launch of a new CSDP mission to help countries in the region build up their maritime security capacities. A Special Representative for the Horn of Africa was appointed recently to ensure better coordination and integration of the different instruments via the Horn of Africa Strategy, which was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council at the end of last year.

A similar coordinated comprehensive approach, involving various EU instruments and possibly including a CSDP mission, is being developed for the Sahel region, where security threats are increasing very rapidly. The drugs trade, human trafficking, terrorism and the inflow of militia and weapons from the recent conflict in Libya are concocting a very dangerous mix.

Developments in the Sahel also clearly illustrate the need for better interaction...
between different EU policy areas, in particular between external and internal security policies. To that end, the EEAS has developed a policy paper and an action plan, approved by the Political and Security Committee, to strengthen ties between the Common Security and Defence Policy and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) and to address these issues in a more coordinated way. This is only the start, however. A lot more work needs to be done.

Developing a comprehensive approach does, of course, rely on effective cooperation across services. This is key to delivering results, as the High Representative has stated. For my department, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, it means improving links between the crisis management structures and actions and other EEAS/Commission departments and EU instruments.

Crisis management activities are not taking place in a vacuum: the missions and operations are instruments serving a more global policy and a common political objective. We have developed closer links and work together with the geographical desks and with relevant EU Commission services through reinforced coordination processes. The newly established Crisis Platform structure, at the management level, is a very useful tool in that respect as are the crisis management coordination meetings at the staff level. I’m a firm believer in such “triangular” cooperation between the “3Ds” – diplomacy, development and defence/security, i.e. the geographical desks, crisis management structures and the Commission. This approach should guide and shape our approach to planning and developing strategic options for crisis management as well as implementing our actions, learning lessons from them and evaluating their impact. We could call this doing crisis management “the European way”.

Shaping the comprehensive approach also involves our working more closely with partners such as the UN, NATO, the African Union and third countries, in order to pool our efforts better, combine our instruments and base our actions on a common understanding and strategy. That is why I am promoting an active partnership policy geared towards more intense cooperation in crisis management. In shaping the EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building mission for the Horn of Africa we opted for synergies with the UN and other programmes in order to increase the impact and achieve better results. The training of Somali security forces by the EUTM mission in Uganda is reinforcing efforts by the AMISOM force of the African Union to increase security in Somali. It is a joint effort with AMISOM, the United States and Uganda.

Developing a comprehensive, joined-up approach, which makes good use of different instruments of the EU combined in a good way and using partners, is not an easy task. Such work requires vision and a new mindset that builds bridges, not walls. It involves everyday working on a cross-service, sometimes in order to cope with “the winds of change”.

In fact, there is no alternative if we want to do more with less, do better with what we have, create greater efficiency and have a deeper and more lasting impact. This is the challenge that we all face. A comprehensive approach is the only solution and- this is both the main challenge and opportunity for the European External Action Service.
6 Capability Development
The European Union has played a central role over recent decades in the construction of an economic area. By contrast, Europe has yet to emerge as an equally powerful and credible player at the level of external policies. It is vital that the Europe of the future be more than a bit player on the world stage: Europe must be in a position to project and protect its core interests and shared values. That is the common political goal of all the Member States.

It follows that Europe must speak with one voice if its political aspirations are to be effectively articulated and clearly understood. For the European Union to emerge as a powerful political force at world level, however, it must think and act as a Union with respect to security and defence. And this is the basis of a Common Security and Defence Policy.

Full implementation of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy is a sine qua non if Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is to be accepted as a credible instrument of international policy at the sharp end of crisis management. Only then will the Common Foreign and Security Policy be perceived as a coherent and comprehensive political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, civil and military instrument. Articulation and implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy thus emerges as a key priority for the European Union.

If the European Union is to assert and sustain its political credibility and determination, it is imperative that it be able to act across the full spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks and the new additional tasks defined in the Lisbon Treaty. A credible capability for military intervention is indispensable to underpin the political aspirations of non-violent conflict prevention. Accordingly, the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 reached agreement on development of civilian and military assets required to take decisions across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis resolution.

As far as military capabilities are concerned, the European Headline Goal provides the quantitative and qualitative framework for armed intervention across the full range of the mission spectrum.

On the non-military side, the European Union has built up over recent decades an arsenal of political, diplomatic and civil instruments which are conducive to the attainment of its foreign policy objectives. The crisis in the Balkans demonstrated the need to reinforce and expand those instruments in order to improve their effectiveness. The Council has taken the view that a number of areas need to be addressed, including policing, promoting the rule of law, strengthening civil administrations, ensuring protection for civilian populations and monitoring.

**NEED FOR CIVIL-MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT**

Top-quality civil and military resources and assets are indispensable to effective European crisis management. The crises and conflicts that beset the international community today are, however, of an increasingly complex nature. As a general rule, they are less susceptible to traditional military intervention; moreover, questions of collective defence are increasingly less relevant to the majority of...
conflicts in today’s world. As a result, peacekeeping operations frequently extend beyond mere separation of the belligerent parties by military means: they are progressively multifunctional and are conducted in tandem with a series of civil initiatives, including the institution or reinforcement of civil administrations in a crisis region. What is more, military resources and capacities are often used in support of essentially civil missions, as in the case, for example, of humanitarian missions and rescue operations. Bundling and effective coordination of available assets thus make a vital contribution to overall efficiency and effectiveness.

This is particularly true of the European Union and its announced intention within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy to use the full gamut of instruments at its disposal in the best interests of conflict prevention and crisis management. In effect, the Common Security and Defence Policy has combined both civil and military resources into a single institutional framework. This, in theory, should enable the articulation of concepts and methodologies that allow for efficient coordination of resources at all times and at every level. While this is readily acceptable in theory, however, the fact remains that practical implementation represents one of the principal challenges facing the Union at the present time, inasmuch as the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military players are frequently highly disparate and, in some instances of civilian-military coordination, constitute entirely new territory.

Since 2009, on the basis of experiences gained in CSDP missions and operations, more concrete work is ongoing to explore potential synergies between the civilian and the military capability development processes in areas where an added value can be achieved.
6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

by Joël Schuyer

BACKGROUND

In June 1999, at the European Council Summit in Cologne, Germany, the European Union’s Heads of State and Government declared that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so.’ Half a year later, in Helsinki (December 1999), they emphasised – with explicit reference to developments in Kosovo earlier that year – the importance of also enhancing and better coordinating the EU’s and Member States’ non-military crisis response tools. The European Council in Feira in June 2000 followed suit by identifying four priority areas for EU civilian crisis management: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.¹

In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy, a strategic framework setting out global challenges and key threats for the EU.² This allowed the EU to pursue, under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the development of crisis management capabilities needed to face such challenges and threats.

THE CIVILIAN HEADLINE GOALS 2008 AND 2010

In order to bring the EU’s capability development in line with the ambitions set out in the European Security Strategy, the European Council endorsed, in June 2004, a Military Headline Goal with a 2010 horizon and an Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP.³ The Action Plan reaffirmed the level of EU ambition in the field of civilian crisis management. It defined ‘measures to be carried out in order to develop and operationalise civilian capabilities, including work on a consolidated Civilian Headline Goal.’ This led to the endorsement by the European Council, in December 2004, of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.⁴ Thus, the

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¹ See for the respective European Council Conclusions M. Rutten, ed., From St-Malo to Nice, European defence: core documents, Chaillot Paper No. 47 (Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies 2001), at 41 (Cologne), at 89 (Helsinki) and at 134 (Feira).
European Council put both military and civilian capability development on separate parallel tracks, where the civilian process was to take place over a shorter timeframe (2008) than the military process (2010). The CHG 2008 contained a summary of CSDP ambitions in the civilian realm, as well as the outline of a comprehensive process for the planning and development of the capabilities necessary to fulfil these ambitions. This process was based on virtual planning scenarios representing a selection of possible situations calling for EU action under CSDP. On the basis of these scenarios, a detailed list of personnel for possible civilian missions to be launched in those situations was established, and Member States were invited to indicate personnel that could potentially be made available. A comparison between the member States’ indications and the capabilities required provided a comprehensive picture of the actual state of EU preparedness for civilian CSDP missions.5

When, in November 2007, CHG 2008 was concluded, the Council stated that there was a continuous need to develop a body of crisis management capabilities in order to ensure that the EU could use all available means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks, and adopted a new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010).6 Where CHG 2008 strongly focused on human resources for CSDP civilian crisis management (such as, for example, police officers, judges, prosecutors, civilian administrators) and related issues such as training and civilian deployment mechanisms, CHG 2010 encompassed also civilian capability issues other than human resources (equipment, concepts and doctrine, supporting tools and instruments at EU and national level, and synergies

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4 The text constituting the CHG 2008 mandate in: ibid., at 359-363.
with the EU military, the European Commission and non-EU actors such as the United Nations. In December 2010, the Council decided to extend the implementation of CHG 2010 beyond 2010.  

THE CIVILIAN CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The Civilian Headline Goals have certainly achieved encouraging results but also touched the limits of scenario-based capability planning. More needs to be done. Not only EU’s ambitions but also the lessons generated by the growing body of civilian CSDP mission experience (from one civilian CSDP mission in 2003 to 24 civilian missions in 2012) as well as dynamic political and geo-strategical factors need to be phased into the EU’s work on capabilities. And because most personnel in civilian crisis management missions under CSDP are seconded by Member States, the degree of involvement of a wide range of different ministries, services, judicial councils etc. responsible for the actual secondment process, directly impacts on the EU’s capacity to act. Therefore, account needs to be taken of national strategies and structures created by the Member States themselves to facilitate the recruitment, training and deployment of civilian personnel to international missions. Only in this way can the EU promote an equal preparation of Member States so that all may usefully contribute civilian resources to CSDP.

In order to provide further political impetus to this complex undertaking, the Council in December 2011 called for a multi-annual work programme for civilian capability development. This led to the adoption, in July 2012, of a Civilian Capability Development Plan with four interlinked drivers:

- EU Ambitions;
- Capability Trends;
- National strategies;
- Lessons Learned.

These four drivers represent the principal forces that drive CSDP civilian capability development. They replicate, in the civilian realm, the four strands of the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) managed by the European Defence Agency.

With this Plan we enter a new phase. It is to constitute the lasting framework for CSDP civilian capability development. Its structure should ensure that periodic modifications deriving from changes in ambitions, political-strategic context, operational feedback and other variables can be easily incorporated without upsetting the Plan or its stable, multi-annual conduct. A stable Civilian Capability Development Plan with a predictable cycle of reporting and guidance at political level should improve cooperation between Member States’ authorities and the European External Action Service in the field of civilian capability development for time to come. It also should allow better exploitation of possible synergies with the EU military, the capabilities available to the European Commission, non-EU States, International Organizations and non-State actors, and a more rational use in civilian capability development of important supporting tools that the EU developed over the years.

Furthermore, by drawing together existing and future lines of action in a coherent framework, the Civilian Capability Development Plan aims at maximizing efficient use of resources. This allows a more coherent, stable and hence cost-effective development of civilian capabilities than could otherwise be achieved if work streams were to be conducted in isolation - an important consideration, in particular in the context of current financial constraints.

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8 The four strands of the CDP are: A) Military Headline Goal 2010; B) Capability Trends; C) Member States’ defence plans and programmes; D) Lessons Identified. For further information on the CDP, see: http://www.eda.europa.eu/Strategies/Capabilities
6.3 DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

by Gabor Horvath

HELSINKI HEADLINE GOAL

To develop European military capabilities, Member States set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons.

These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.

Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.

They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.

In the context of the Headline Goal 2010, focussing in particular on the qualitative aspects of capability development, and the improvement in the areas of interoperability, deployability and sustainment, the EU Military Committee initiated the steps of the capability development process, with close cooperation of the Member States. First, the level of ambition had to be translated into military capability requirements. For this, illustrative (abstract) crisis scenarios were built up. Then a number of strategic planning assumptions (distances, reaction time, duration, rotation and concurrency options) were studied and presented to the Council for approval. The final formulation of military requirements were expressed in the Requirements Catalogue in 2005.

Then, the Member States made their bids against the requirements on what military capabilities they made available for the EU on a voluntary basis. This led, with scrutiny, to the compilation of the first Force Catalogue issued in 2006.

After evaluation and assessment of the Member States’ offers, the planning part of the capability development process ended by the identification of capability shortfalls, summarised in the Progress Catalogue in 2007.

The capability shortfalls identified in the Progress Catalogue were taken into account after prioritisation by the EU Military Committee in the initial Capability Development Plan, created by the European Defence Agency in 2008.

The Capability Development Plan (CDP) derives from four major inputs. One is the already mentioned prioritisation of the military capability shortfalls based on their calculated operational impact, provided by the EU Military Committee. Second is a long-term
and by the Member States themselves as well. Taking into account the short, medium and long term perspectives of the CDP, Member States selected 12 actions to address Capability shortfalls. In 2011 the CDP was updated and a new set of actions was decided.

As it can be seen, European Defence Agency, created in 2004, is playing a major role in military capability development. Its main areas of work are related to identifying possibilities for co-operation between Member States, encouraging harmonisation of national capability development and procurement efforts, and promoting synergies within the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Co-operation among the Member States in addressing the military capability shortfalls under the effects of the financial crisis became even more important during the recent years. New initiatives, as for example the pooling and sharing of military capabilities have been launched (“Ghent Initiative” and “Weimar Initiative”), in order to maintain existing capabilities or to commonly create new ones while under the pressure of shrinking national defence budgets. Also, an
important reflection process has started on promoting the synergies between civil and military capabilities to be used within the framework of CSDP. These initiatives may open new ways of fulfilling the objectives set forth in the respective Headline Goals.

The consistency between the EU’s capability development with that of NATO is ensured through Staff to Staff talks and a joint EU-NATO Capability Group. This group was established to ensure the transparent and coherent development of military capabilities and to provide a forum for addressing where relevant the overall consistency and complementarity of proposed specific goals, commitments and priorities. It is up to the EU, NATO and Member States of both organisations to draw conclusions from the group’s discussion in the future development of respective goals and capabilities.

In December 2010, Member States reaffirmed their level of ambition for the military and civilian operations to be conducted in the framework of CSDP. By this, in the framework of deploying 60,000 troops within 60 days for a major operation, to be able to plan and conduct simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope:

a. two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by up to 10,000 troops for at least two years;
b. two rapid-response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battle groups;
c. an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consular lead State concept;
d. a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission;
e. a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days;
f. around a dozen CSDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administra-

tion, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts) which could last several years. This formulation left untouched the objectives of Headline Goal 2010. At the time of writing this contribution, works were planned in order to analyse and – if needed – to reconfirm or to update the already existing capability development documents to better reflect the level of ambition of the EU in the field of military crisis management capabilities.
6.4 PERMANENT STRUCTURED CO-OPERATION – AN ACADEMIC VIEW

by Sven Biscop

THE OBJECTIVE: MORE DEPLOYED, MORE QUICKLY

The Protocol on Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO) (Article 1) sets out two objectives, one of which, i.e. to supply or contribute to a battle group, has already been achieved by most Member States (MS). This leaves a single major objective: to proceed more intensively to develop defence capacities, which must of course be available and deployable, as Article 2 (c) says. The main problem of Europe’s armed forces is fragmentation: limited defence budgets spent on a plethora of small-scale capabilities result in disproportionately high spending on “overheads” (and useless intra-European duplication) and, consequently, less spending on deployable capabilities and actual operations. To overcome this low cost-effectiveness, multinational cooperation is a must. Hence PESCO must be inclusive: the more ‘participating Member States’ (pMS), the more synergies and effects of scale can be created.

CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION: REALISTIC BUT REAL

The challenge is to reconcile inclusiveness and ambition, i.e. to define criteria that allow all Member States to participate but that do entail a real commitment. This has 3 implications. First, pMS cannot be expected to fulfil the criteria at the launching of PESCO: criteria must be fulfilled by an agreed deadline. Second, criteria that are unrealistic, e.g. spending 2% of GDP on defence, should be avoided. Third, PESCO must not just focus on the input, i.e. the level and manner of spending, but on the desired output, i.e. on specific deployable capabilities. PESCO is a way of achieving the HG2010 in a reasonable timeframe – that is the desired output.

The following criteria can be envisaged – to be seen as one set, to be pursued simultaneously:

1. To be able: The ultimate objective is to increase the deployability and sustainability of pMS’ armed forces by an agreed percentage within an agreed timeframe, until an agreed target is reached.

2. Solidarity in defence spending: pMS should harmonise their defence expenditure. At the very least, pMS spending less than the EU average (in 2008: 1.63% of GDP) should commit not to further decrease their defence expenditure, either in real terms or in % of GDP.

3. Solidarity in common programmes: pMS should contribute fully to the programmes of the EDA, which is to be used as the forum to mount collective projects, notably to address the commonly identified strategic shortfalls. Obviously pMS cannot take part in each and every EDA project; they will select specific programmes that fit with their expertise and force structure. But their share in the overall cost of all projects combined should reflect their respective GDP, in order to ensure fair burden-sharing between pMS.

4. Solidarity whenever CSDP operations are launched:

As an expression of the political solidarity that must underpin CSDP, pMS will participate in all CSDP operations requiring military assets (on the basis of unanimous Council decisions to launch, of which they will of course be a part) with significant contributions, i.e. with military forces deployed in theatre and listed in the Statement of Requirements; the size and type are left to
their own discretion. As a further option, in the context of PESCO the pMS could also strengthen financial solidarity between them by revising the existing Athena mechanism for the funding of EU operations. The aim of PESCO is not to punish or exclude Member States. For maximum effect, all Member States need to be encouraged to generate more deployable capabilities, by allowing as many as possible to participate at their own level of means, hence this proposal for realistic but real criteria.

PESCO AS A PERMANENT CAPABILITY GENERATION CONFERENCE

In order to make sure that, when making policy in function of the criteria above, pMS focus on the capabilities that at the European level have been commonly identified as vital, inspiration can be found in the method used to launch CSDP operations: a Force Generation Conference. Within PESCO the EDA can organise a “Capability Generation Conference” aimed at remedying each commonly identified shortfall within a reasonable timeframe. This implies that pMS are willing: to revisit their national defence planning, without any taboos; to do away with national capability initiatives proven to be redundant; to pool assets and capabilities in order to generate savings; to contribute to the programmes launched to fill the shortfalls in function of GDP; and to actively contribute to negotiations for as long as it takes to achieve success. This would indeed result in a permanent conference – but also in a permanently relevant EDA.

“END-TO-END” MULTINATIONAL CO-OPERATION: POOLING

The reality is that many Member States will not be able to meet the criteria and contribute significant capabilities if they maintain the same range of nationally organised capabilities that they possess today. Therefore identifying the opportunities for multinational cooperation is essential, in order to allow pMS to maintain relevant capabilities in a cost-effective way. The EDA will have a bird’s eye view: based on the information which, in the context of the CDP, pMS already provide (and must continually update) about their plans and programmes, and in combination with the progressive results of the Capability Generation Conference, it will be able to identify opportunities for cooperation.

Multinational cooperation does not imply that all pMS in PESCO cooperate in all capability areas. Rather a set of overlapping clusters will emerge, with e.g. pMS 1, 2 and 3 cooperating in area X and pMS 2, 3, 4 and 5 cooperating in area Y. This cooperation can take various forms, from joint procurement or development projects but with the aim of afterwards equipping national formations, to pooling, i.e. the creation of permanent multinational formations. The beauty of PESCO is its flexibility.

The model for pooling can be provided by EATC: deployable national assets, in this case transport aircraft, remain clearly identifiable and manned by national personnel, but are co-located on one base, where all support functions are multinationalised, as are the command & control arrangements. Thus pooling can still offer great flexibility: each pMS has to guarantee that its personnel in the support and command & control structures will be available whenever a pMS deploys its aircraft – but no pMS is obliged to deploy its own actual aircraft each and every time another pMS deploys its aircraft for a specific operation. The same model can be applied to fighter wings or army divisions. Obviously, pooling is easier when pMS use the same equipment, hence smaller pMS especially will inevitably take into account whom they want to cooperate with as a major factor in procurement decisions. For pooling to increase cost-effectiveness, national structures and bases must naturally be cut.
It has become a cliché to observe that Europe’s armies need many new military capabilities. But EU governments are still doing very little to remedy the problem. European armed forces struggled to fight alongside the US during the Kosovo war in 1999 because they lacked sophisticated equipment (and they needed US help again in Libya in 2011). As a result EU governments signed up to a number of “headline goals” to improve their military prowess. But it is hard to find much concrete evidence of real improvements in European military equipment over the last decade. Moreover, the budgetary challenge faced by European defence ministries is great. The cost of defence equipment is rising by six to eight per cent a year – whereas defence budgets are falling rapidly – and the growing number of operations is consuming money that had been set aside for buying new equipment.

Given that defence budgets are falling, and that the cost of new military technologies is soaring, governments will need to extract more value out of each euro they spend. It therefore follows that they need to pay more attention to improving European co-operation on armaments. Greater co-operation in armaments could lead to significant benefits, including better value-for-money for taxpayers; greater harmonisation of military requirements and technologies, which helps different European forces to work together more effectively; and a more competitive European defence industry.

THE CASE FOR OPENING UP EUROPE’S DEFENCE MARKETS

To achieve more effective armaments co-operation, European governments need to do a number of things such as pooling more resources, managing joint equipment programmes better, and in particular opening up their defence markets. The history of European armaments co-operation shows that none of these goals are easy to achieve. NATO, the WEU, and more recently the EU have tried to improve multinational armaments co-operation for decades, with depressingly little success. Defence remains the most ‘national’ of all policy areas, in the sense that the EU’s member-states are very reluctant to give up sovereignty to international organisations.

As a result of this protectionism, a number of EU countries do not buy their weapons from foreign defence companies, unless they do not have an indigenous defence industry, or their national companies do not make the product the government needs. Many still tend to favour their national suppliers irrespective of the price or quality of equipment they produce. They could do so legally because defence goods are exempt from the EU’s single market rules because of their sensitivity (see below for more on changes to market legislation). But the absence of cross-border competition makes European weapons expensive.
In theory, a more integrated European defence market would allow free movement of most defence goods amongst EU member-states. Greater cross-border co-operation would allow larger economies of scale, increased industrial competition, and thus lower prices, particularly for more advanced equipment. Defence ministries would be able to purchase equipment from the company that offered the best financial and technical package, regardless of its national origin. Keith Hartley of York University estimated that a single defence market could save EU governments up to 20 per cent of their procurement funds. EU governments spend roughly €30 billion annually on purchasing defence equipment (out of almost €200 billion in total on defence). Thus, a single defence market could save defence ministries up to €6 billion a year.

THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

Europe’s six main arms-producing states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK) recognised the logic of harmonising some defence market rules more than a decade ago. In 1998 they signed an agreement known as the ‘Letter of Intent’, which unfortunately did not have a major impact on cross-border armaments regulations, partly because it only aimed to help transnational companies to operate across borders, and did not establish a common market among the signatories.

In 2004 EU governments created the European Defence Agency (EDA), and one of its many tasks is to encourage the convergence of national procurement procedures. In July 2006 the EDA introduced a defence procurement ‘code of conduct’ to open up the European defence market. The basic idea behind the code was to ensure that defence companies from any country could compete for most defence contracts across Europe, excluding multinational equipment programmes and the most sensitive goods like encryption devices. The code works rather simply: countries that join the code vowed to open all non-essential defence contracts over €1 million to foreign bidders. And the EDA created a web site where those contracts are advertised to potential suppliers.

However, the EDA’s code is voluntary, and the member-states are not obliged to comply with it. In fact, they showed very little enthusiasm for awarding contracts to outside suppliers. Although within a year of the adoption of the code, some 15 member-states posted 227 tenders worth some €10 billion on the EDA’s web site, only two of the 26 contracts awarded were cross-border. One EU official, in conversation with the author at that time, perhaps unfairly compared the defence procurement code of conduct to a smoking ban in pubs and restaurants: “The code tells you when you can and cannot smoke, but it doesn’t mean you give up smoking”.

But the importance of the code lies as much in its principle as its practice. The idea of more open European defence markets has been around for decades, but with little or no progress until the code. Never before have so many European governments agreed that they should open up their defence markets to each other. And the EDA tried to continue to build on the growing member-state participation in the code. For instance, EU governments could encourage further industrial consolidation by extending the EDA’s code-of-conduct to future multinational programmes (they were exempt) within ten years. This would help increase the transparency of the tender procedure for multinational programmes and encourage more joint tenders and competition for contracts, which would have helped keep prices down.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The difficulty of adhering to a strictly intergovernmental approach was that it often proves inadequate, due to the limitations of agreements like the EDA’s code of conduct and competing national interests. A European institution should be involved in running a more open defence market. The European Commission has since taken on the task of regulating a European defence market to a large degree. Defence goods related to the ‘essential interests of security’ – as stipulated in Article 296 of the EU treaties – were one of the notable exclusions from the Commission’s regulation of European industry. Previously, the Commission’s role in the defence market was confined to ‘dual-use’ products that are components of both civilian and military equipment. But the defence market would clearly benefit from the Commission’s experience in policing the single market for commercial goods and services.

However, given the sensitive nature of the defence market, some arms-producing countries were reluctant to give much new regulatory power to the Commission. The main arms-producing countries in Europe traditionally adhered to a strict interpretation of Article 296. This prevented the Commission from having a meaningful involvement in the defence market, with the result that governments could protect their national companies from foreign competition.

But this has changed due to two factors: the defence budget crunch; and the Commission’s new approach to defence market rules. The Commission did not propose changing Article 296, as appeared to be the case with its past legislative initiatives. Instead the objective of Commission’s 2008 ‘defence package’ was to set up a new legal framework for security and defence related procurement and intra-EU trade of defence equipment. The legislative aspects of the ‘defence package’ contain two proposals for directives on procurement and trade. These texts were examined and passed into legislation by EU governments and the European Parliament during 2008 and 2009. They are currently in the transposition phase into national legislations.

The procurement directive has established four types of procedures to help streamline national procurement procedures. These are: restrictive calls for tender; negotiated procedures with publication; competitive dialogue; and negotiated procedure without publication.

The proposal seems both fair and sensible, because it strikes a balance between opening defence markets to allow more industrial competition and the sovereignty imperatives related to defence procurement that governments worry about. Moreover, the text includes not only defence but also security equipment tenders. This is important for two reasons: first, because the frontier between ‘defence’ and ‘security’ equipment is blurring. Second, because the EDA code of conduct did not cover security items. Like the code of conduct, in time the procurement directive should encourage the opening of European defence markets, but with a broader approach (including security products) and it will be legally binding.

The trade directive aims to liberalise the trade of defence goods within the EU (also known as intra-community transfers). Currently, intra-community transfers follow the same rules as those regulating exports of European defence goods to governments outside the EU. Each year, between 11-12,000 export licences are requested for defence transfers between EU governments, and almost all get clearance. However, this fragmented system causes extra costs and many delays, undermining European industrial competitiveness. More broadly, such practices constitute a barrier to creating a more integrated European defence equipment market, as they affect both large transnational defence companies and small and medium-size enterprises further down the supply chain.
Practically, the Commission proposed to replace the system of individual licences (whereby an individual licence is required for each transaction), by a system of general licences covering several different transactions for those intra-community transfers where the risks of undesired re-exportation to third countries are firmly controlled. Member-states agreed to this directive because, although it aims to harmonise the rules and procedures for intra-community transfers, it leaves governments room for manoeuvre. Governments would still have the responsibility to allocate licences, and in no way would it give the Commission the competence to regulate defence exports to countries outside the EU.

**CONCLUSION**

In different ways the European Defence Agency and the European Commission have tried to break up a highly protectionist European defence market, which should help improve many defence ministries’ bottom lines. If both the EDA and the European Commission manage to convince EU governments to truly open up their defence markets, those benefiting would include the defence industry, which would become more competitive; the armed forces, that would get badly needed military equipment at a better price; and the taxpayers, who would get better value for money.

This encompasses: purchases by armed forces of other EU member-states; transfers to certified companies of components in the context of industrial cooperation; transfers of products necessary for cooperative programmes between participating governments.
OTHER IMPORTANT CSDP-RELATED ASPECTS
7.1 CO-OPERATION WITH THIRD STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

by Helena Boguslawska

“There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International co-operation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-operation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.”

This quote from the European Security Strategy sets the scene for the EU’s co-operation with partner countries and international organisation in crisis management.

In line with this, the EU is developing an effective and balanced partnership with the United States on security issues, incl. in counter-terrorism, the fight against the proliferation of WMD and in crisis management. The United States participates in CSDP missions in Kosovo and Congo. In May 2011 the EU and US concluded a framework agreement facilitating US participation in EU-led crisis management operations. Similar agreements are in place also with Canada, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Special arrangements exists for the involvement of non-EU European allies in EU military operations, in compliance with the EU’s decision-making autonomy. Other candidate countries for accession to the EU are also closely involved.

Special frameworks for co-operation on CSDP are also in place for Canada, Russia and Ukraine.

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**THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION**

TEU Article 21 recalls that multilateralism is at the core of the EU’s external action. “The Union shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.”

**EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY**

identifies effective multilateralism as both a means and an end when it comes to meeting the challenges and threats faced by the European Union. It strongly emphasises the role of the United Nations as the fundamental framework for international relations and recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

So far, 25 partner countries contributed to 16 CSDP missions and operations. At the time of writing twelve countries (Albania, Canada, Chile, Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the US) participate in seven of the twelve ongoing CSDP missions and operations.

Excellent contacts with several partners have been developed in the context of counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia,
including with China, India and Japan, paving the way to wider dialogue on crisis management issues.

The EU also intends to further engage in CSDP co-operation with Eastern and Mediterranean partners on a case-by-case basis, thus contributing to enhancing regional security and stability.

In general, partners interested in making a contribution to an EU mission and operation are kept informed throughout the planning and decision-making process using the existing structures for political dialogue. At a certain stage, they are also invited to the relevant force-generation conferences. Following the decision by the Council to launch the operation, the Committee of Contributors starts its work as the body responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the operation. Contributing partners are represented in the Committee of Contributors with the same rights and obligations as the EU Member States.

The EU-UN co-operation in crisis management is highly important and beneficial to both organizations, since the EU benefits from the political legitimacy conferred by the United Nations Security Council mandate, while the UN benefits from the credibility and the operational capability brought in by the EU, especially when it comes to the EU leading complex operations.

Over the years, the European Union has provided operational, financial and political support to peacekeeping efforts of the UN. The launch of about twenty CSDP operations, military and civil, on several continents, bears testimony to such continued support.

EU-UN co-operation in crisis management was formalized in 2003 in a Joint Declaration, following operation Artemis. It was then complemented and reinforced by a further Joint Statement in June 2007.

A joint consultative mechanism, known as the “EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management” was created in 2003 as a follow-up to the Joint Declaration, bringing together EU and UN representatives at senior level involved in crisis management. It meets in principle twice a year, with possible additional ad hoc meetings in the event of a crisis.

At the beginning of 2011, the EU launched
a process aimed at enhancing EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping, in response to UN requests. In close co-operation with the UN DPKO and DFS, a list of actions has been defined and work is ongoing on an action plan to implement them.

The strategic partnership in crisis management between the EU and NATO rests on the so-called Berlin-Plus arrangements adopted in December 2002, which include:

- guaranteed access for the EU to NATO planning capabilities for planning its own operations;
- presumption of availability to the EU of NATO’s collective capabilities and assets;
- identification of European command options which recognise a special role for NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR).

These arrangements were first implemented in spring 2003 for the Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM and then for the current operation EUFOR ALTHEA in BiH.

To support close co-operation in crisis management, an EU cell has been established at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons/Belgium and a NATO liaison team is hosted in the premises of the EU Military Staff in Brussels.

Between the two organisations, a regular dialogue takes place, in particular between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and between the two Military Committees. To ensure consistency between commitments where military requirements overlap, the two organisations also meet in the EU-NATO Capability Group to exchange information on military capability development processes.

Apart from NATO, the EU has also developed close co-operation in the field of crisis management with the African Union (AU). The partnership with the AU has three particular aspects: strengthening the political dialogue, making the African peace and security architecture fully operational and providing predictable funding for the AU’s peacekeeping operations.

The EU also maintains an important dialogue on crisis management with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN).
The European Security Strategy defines the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as potentially the greatest threat to European and international security. Possible terrorist access to such weapons adds a critical dimension to this threat.

The risk of proliferation has grown in recent years, with new countries interested in nuclear energy. Sensitive technology and know-how can be used for nuclear power generation purposes, but also for nuclear weapons if no effective verification is in place. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons and bio-terrorism in the coming years. A large chemical industry could potentially be used to hide weapons-related activities. The development of a national space programme may go hand-in-hand with the development of ballistic missiles. Legitimate trade in dual-use goods, equipment and technology can easily become a source of proliferation if there are no effective export controls. The risk of radiological terrorism remains another concern given that radioactive sources, for example in hospitals, are not yet properly secured in all countries and could be used for radiological dispersal devices, i.e. for dirty bombs.

The EU has an effective framework in place to respond to these security challenges, namely the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This strategy was adopted in 2003 by the EU Heads of State and Government with the objective of preventing, deterring, halting and, where possible, eliminating WMD proliferation programmes of concern worldwide. It defines three main principles to guide EU policies: effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation.

The EU is convinced that the best way to prevent proliferation is through strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and in particular the multilateral Treaty system. The EU wants to convince all countries that it is in their best interest to join international treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The EU wants to make sure that all countries fully implement and comply with their international treaty and other obligations, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which inter alia requires all UN Member States to exercise effective export controls.

The EU supports the work of international organisations (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the Conference on Disarmament), international export control regimes (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime) and international initiatives (such as the G8 Global Partnership, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Nuclear Security Summit). The EU is one of the biggest donors helping third countries to prevent nuclear terrorism, illicit trafficking, biological and chemical hazards and so on. This
support is provided through the CFSP budget and other relevant instruments, such as the Instrument for Stability and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety. Dozens of countries around the world benefit from the EU’s assistance.

Since the adoption of the EU WMD Strategy, the EU has become a key player in international fora dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament. The EU increasingly speaks with one voice and makes an active contribution to the strengthening of relevant policies, whether at the NPT Review Conference, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), or in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), to mention just a few. EU positions are coordinated in Brussels-based working groups (CONOP, CODUN, COARM, the Dual-Use Working Party) and in UN capitals (Geneva, The Hague, New York, Vienna).

The EU maintains a close political dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament issues with many partners and countries, including the US, Russia and China. A challenge remains to mainstream non-proliferation issues in the EU’s relations with all relevant countries, including those that do not share the EU’s policy goals. Since 2003, a WMD clause has been inserted in the EU’s contractual relations with nearly 100 countries.

Regional proliferation crises remain a grave concern and the EU continues to address them in a resolute way. Since 2004, the EU has been actively involved in efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Based on the double-track approach, combining incentives with pressure, the EU High Representative has since 2006 been leading efforts aimed at bringing Iran back to meaningful negotiations.

With regard to the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the EU continues to support the Six-Party Talks process with the objective of promoting peace and security and denuclearising the Korean Peninsula. The EU has contributed in the past to the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) and to IAEA monitoring activities in the DPRK, and remains ready to provide further support once an appropriate solution has been found.

There is a growing awareness that EU action must be stepped up and broadened to other policy fields, if we want to combat proliferation in an effective way. Non-proliferation will continue to be a central part of EU foreign and security policy, but it is also a cross-cutting issue which requires attention in the issuing of visas, in university and scientific co-operation, shipping and aviation, financial supervision, criminal legislation and so on.

This is why, in December 2008, the Council of the EU adopted a new plan entitled New lines for action by the EU in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (17172/08). This action plan sets out a concrete list of measures that the Council, the European Commission and the EU Member States should implement across policy fields. One of the recommendations deals with the establishment of a High Level Training Course on non-proliferation, which is currently being set up under the auspices of the ESDC.

In December 2010, the Council adopted conclusions calling on the competent actors to take further initiatives to achieve the complete implementation of the New lines for action by the end of 2012. The EU CBRN Action Plan, adopted by the Council in November 2009, should also significantly contribute to the strengthening of the EU’s own capacity to prevent and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats within the EU.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION**

7.3 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

by Michaela Friberg-Storey

Security today is commonly viewed as a public good and security institutions are the service providers. This duty is a challenge in all contexts, but especially so in post-conflict or fragile societies where security institutions may lack the necessary human and material resources or even constitute sources of insecurity themselves. The objective of SSR is to enable security institutions to take on effective, affordable, accountable and transparent roles in providing security for the societies they serve. SSR builds on the principles that sustainable reform comes from within societies, with the engagement of the people at all levels. Thus, SSR initiatives need to be locally owned, tailored to the specific needs in each context and gender sensitive. As security problems often reflect wider structural changes in a society, SSR must be viewed and implemented in a holistic manner. Paramount is also the recognition that, while SSR often involves technical aspects, it is always of a political nature, as it touches on the very foundations of power. In essence, SSR is a concept that frames technical reforms in a political process.

THE EU AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

With increasingly multifaceted Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations aimed at conflict management, prevention and stabilisation of post-conflict situations, there is an ever increasing demand for concepts and methodologies that can help practitioners on the ground. Since the adoption in 2003 of the EU’s Security Strategy, which recognised that “security is a precondition for development”, much work has been done to that end.

The EU conceptual framework for Security Sector Reform¹ (SSR) provides useful guidance for a multidimensional process consisting of complex political change with a variety of actors. Recognising that the nature of conflict has changed in recent decades, that states often fail to fulfil their security obligations or even actively compromise the security of their own people, SSR not only addresses the core security actors and the justice and

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law enforcement institutions. The concept also includes security management and oversight bodies, both within and outside the state structure, and it addresses the influence of non-statutory security actors on security and stability in a particular situation. Most importantly, however, SSR encompasses the understanding that sustainable peace, democracy and development come from within societies and with the engagement of the people at all levels. Thus, SSR focuses on human security, placing the security of citizens at the centre.

Security problems often reflect the wider structural changes in a society and can no longer be seen in isolation from its political, economic and social context. This is why SSR must be viewed and implemented in a holistic manner. The EU aims to contribute to SSR and the transformation of security institutions, by facilitating processes whereby these institutions take on more efficient, legitimate and accountable roles in society. Access to both security and justice is an overarching goal of SSR, not least concerning coming to terms with informal security and justice providers. Therefore, the inter-linkages between security and justice must be recognised. Human rights principles and gender equality are fundamentally important in the implementation of SSR commitments.

SSR builds on the recognition that there are no blueprints for reform processes – each country is unique and SSR assistance programmes need to be tailored to the specific needs in each context. As a donor, it is important to understand that SSR cannot be implemented solely as an external initiative but has to be anchored within the society. As such, local ownership and commitment are sine qua non for sustainable SSR.

FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE

Much work has been done to transform the established EU policy frameworks and principles into a unified and comprehensive practical approach to SSR. With the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the appointment of the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU has an opportunity to make use of its vast policy toolbox, from high-level diplomacy, to crisis management and development co-operation, in addressing the security and safety of individuals through SSR.

In November 2008, the Council of the European Union approved a document on European Expert Teams which could inter alia be deployed to reinforce CSDP missions and operations, conduct analyses and diagnostics of the security sector in potential partner countries and provide support for planning of SSR initiatives. The Council Secretariat was mandated to compile a pool of deployable SSR experts based on certain required profiles. Since then, additional work has been done to ensure the provision of proper training for these experts and enhance collaboration between the EU and other international actors.

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2 Council of the European Union 14576/1/08
At its meeting in November 2009 the Council of the European Union welcomed the considerable progress made in the implementation of the conceptual framework for SSR. It further encouraged the EU institutions to continue develop the methodological framework for SSR needs assessments as a means to strengthen a common and comprehensive approach to SSR. Such a framework allows the EU to undertake more systematic and consistent analysis of the SSR environment, covering all necessary aspects of the security sector, as well as each specific SSR sub-sector and the inter-connections between them. A correct understanding of the environment in which EU actors are engaged improves their ability to deliver effective SSR support.

With the establishment of the Pool of SSR Experts in December 2010, the EU has acquired a concrete identification tool for providing a wide range of SSR experts for complex SSR missions. The (expertise provided by the) pool has the potential to further strengthen and accumulate the institutional knowledge through the promotion of shared experience within EU institutions and the development of SSR theory within the EU, as expressed in the Council Document.

Expert rosters at the level of the Member State are not automatically made available to the European Commission. With the establishment of the EU Pool of SSR Experts, there is also an opportunity for the Commission to find relevant expertise for its SSR commitments. Several funding mechanisms exist and can be used in a flexible manner. Joint initiatives, such as needs assessments and fact-finding missions, are facilitated and have the potential to improve the coordination and coherence of EU SSR initiatives.

In making use of the resources (expertise) provided by the Pool, it is important to draw lessons from previous experiences, not least from the CRT mechanism.

BUILDING EU SSR CAPACITIES

In order for the EU to enhance its capacities to deliver coherent SSR assistance through CSDP missions and operations and Commission initiatives, it is essential that the members of the Pool of Experts share and understand the EU’s concepts and procedures, its approaches to SSR and methodological tools such as the Guiding Framework for EU SSR Assessments, which provides the EU with a concrete tool that allows for a more systematic and consistent analysis of the SSR environment and thus strengthens its ability to effectively deliver SSR support.

The European Security and Defence College plays a key role in facilitating the establishment of relevant training and exposure to existing EU tools and procedures. Most recently, under the auspices of the ESDC, curricula for two courses on SSR have been developed and will be implemented for the ESDC by qualified national training institutes of the EU Member States. The curricula are designed for a basic SSR course (3 days) and a core SSR course (7 days), in particular to support the Pool of EU SSR Experts. To further strengthen Member States’ SSR training initiatives, the ESDC Steering Committee established an Executive Academic Board on SSR (EAB SSR) in December 2010. The main mission of the EAB SSR is to optimise the co-ordination and coherence of SSR activities aimed at training the EU’s or Member States’ SSR personnel and in particular the members of the Pool of EU SSR Experts.

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4 Council of the European Union 14916/09
5 Council of the European Union 14576/1/08 REV1
6 Security Sector Reform - Guiding Framework for EU SSR Assessments 14916/09
Since the Treaty of Rome established the European Communities in 1957, human rights have been one of the defining principles of European integration, and with the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union of 1992, human rights became an objective of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Treaty is unambiguous in this respect, and states in its current Article 3 (5) that (...) in its relations with the wider world, the Union (...) shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The EU has since 2005 drawn up specific human rights and gender equality related policies for CSDP. Four main strands have emerged: human rights in general, children’s rights (particularly children and armed conflict), gender equality and women’s rights (particularly implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace and security) as well as protection of civilians. Furthermore, specific guidance on international humanitarian law has been drawn up.

While paying attention to human rights and gender aspects when planning or conducting a CSDP mission or operation is a legal obligation of the EU and a political objective set at the highest level, systematic consideration of human rights and gender aspects brings about operational advantages and can increase a mission’s efficiency and effectiveness. While in different missions, depending on their focus and nature, different kinds of approaches to these issues are called for, these aspects are relevant for all missions, whether civilian or military.

For further information
To download the strategy, please follow the link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/hr/news144.pdf
### SOME EXAMPLES OF RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER ASPECTS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF MISSIONS

| Police reform (e.g. EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPOL RD Congo): | • Improving local police capacity to respond to violence against women and children  
• Access for both men and women to employment in police forces  
• Codes of conduct and policies on discrimination, harassment and violence  
• Vetting police officers  
• Community policing |
| --- | --- |
| Justice reform and rule of law (e.g. EUJUST LEX Iraq, EULEX Kosovo): | • Ensuring that states meet their human rights responsibilities under international law  
• Securing access to justice for both men and women  
• Access for both men and women to employment in the justice system  
• Juvenile justice  
• Complementarity between national, regional and international courts (particularly ICC)  
• Drafting of new legislation in a way that corresponds to the international obligations of the state  
• Harnessing possibilities for new legislation promoting more equal participation of men and women in decision making |
| Maritime security/fighting against piracy (e.g. EUNAVFOR Atalanta): | • Respect of the relevant international human rights norms during detention on board  
• Treatment of suspected pirates under 18 years of age  
• Dealing with people in distress, asylum seekers and trafficked persons  
• Respect of the relevant international human rights norms in the conduct of judicial proceedings |
| Monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement (e.g. EUMM/Georgia): | • Identifying and reporting human rights violations by parties to the peace agreement  
• Gender-disaggregated monitoring  
• Missing persons  
• Human rights issues deemed to be in direct relation to the conflict dynamics such as minority rights, freedom of movement  
• Access to both local men and women and to the information they submit. |
| Securing and stabilising a region (e.g. EUFOR Tchad/RCA): | • Protection of civilians, particularly the most vulnerable  
• International Humanitarian Law  
• Access to both local men and women as sources of information (getting the entire security picture) |
| All missions | • Intentional or unintentional human rights violations by staff, misconduct, sexual exploitation and abuse, etc.  
• Staff’s understanding of human rights and gender and the mission’s role  
• Including human rights and gender aspects in reporting. |
MAIN PRINCIPLES

To summarise, the EU policy on human rights and gender aspects in crisis management is constructed around the following six main principles:

1. Human rights and gender should be considered throughout the mission ‘cycle’, starting from the fact-finding phase to the planning and conduct of activities and the subsequent lessons identified exercises. Relevant planning and the related mission/operation documents need to reflect this approach.

2. Relevant expertise, i.e. advisers or focal points, needs to be included in planning teams and missions/operations. The document ‘Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP’ specifies that the human rights adviser needs to be close to the Operation or Force Commander or Head of Mission (this was the case i.a. for the Aceh Monitoring Mission, EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR TCHAD RCA). The ‘Checklist on Children Affected by Armed Conflict’ calls for the designation of an expert in child protection and CAAC issues for ESDP(CSDP) missions operating in environments where the risk of grave violations of children’s rights is particularly high.

3. All CSDP staff should receive training on human rights and gender aspects, preferably prior to their deployment (note that CSDP pre-deployment training is a prerogative of the EU Member State, which thus bears responsibility for implementing this provision).

4. Mission reporting should cover human rights and gender aspects. The operational document ‘Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP’ calls for the inclusion of gender-related aspects, including information on sexual and gender-based violence as well as local women’s role as actors, in the regular and frequent reports by the European Union Special Representatives (EUSR), ESDP/CSDP Heads of Missions or Commanders. The ‘Checklist on Children Affected by Armed Conflict’ makes a specific reference to monitoring and reporting in ‘full knowledge of, and coordination with, the reporting and monitoring system of the UN established through UNSC resolutions 1539 and 1612’.

5. CSDP missions/operations should coordinate their action with other EU initiatives and the broader international community. The Comprehensive Approach on Resolutions 1325 and 1820 notably calls for a coordinated approach including CSDP missions/operations, political dialogue, development co-operation, multilateral co-operation and humanitarian aid.

6. In addition, the document ‘Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP’ calls for contacts with local and international civil society organisations and the ‘Checklist on Children Affected by Armed Conflict’ mentions the need to collaborate with child protection partners (for example UNICEF).

LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES IDENTIFIED

Since the EU launched its first crisis management operation in 2003, a number of lessons and best practices have been identified on how the effective consideration of human rights and gender aspects in the planning and conduct of missions and operations can contribute to their success and improve their operational effectiveness. Some of the recommendations, as contained in the report

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1 This list is non-exhaustive, but seeks to capture the common main principles present in the relevant policy documents.
2 11936/4/06
3 11936/4/06
‘Lessons and best practices of mainstreaming human rights and gender into CSDP military operations and civilian missions’4, endorsed by the Council in December 2010, are as follows:

• Include reporting on, assess and learn from the mainstreaming of human rights and gender in future lessons reports and 6-monthly progress reports of operations and missions. Consider carrying out specific evaluations of mainstreaming human rights and gender in CSDP operations and missions.

• Ensure human rights and gender issues are reflected in operation and mission benchmarks, planning and evaluation. The implementation of the host country commitments should be closely followed in the monitoring and evaluation of the operation or mission at political as well as operational level.

• Continue, on a regular basis, to discuss gender and human rights and CSDP in the relevant Council working groups.

• Emphasise the overall responsibility of senior operation and mission management staff at headquarters and field level for human rights and gender mainstreaming.

• Position the human rights and gender adviser/focal point strategically in the organisation chart, close to the operation or mission management and taking part in strategic meetings so as to have access to the necessary information that mainstreaming inside the operation or mission requires, and the backing to carry out the mainstreaming across different operation or mission components.

• Consider devising, if appropriate, accountability mechanisms on possible breaches of the Code of Conduct by operation or mission staff.

• Consider devising a standard ‘welcome package’ for all operation and mission staff as they take up their duties.

• Explore synergies between CSDP and other EU foreign policy instruments, and identify means to increase combined effectiveness, including between lessons processes in CSDP and development co-operation and by a wider sharing of respective best practices.

• Increase communication with the public in order, on the one hand, to enhance prevention of human rights violations and, on the other hand, to build public support for and knowledge of the CSDP both within and outside the EU. In this respect CSDP operations and missions should regularly meet with local women’s groups and wider civil society.

• In order to strengthen outreach to the public and especially women and children, create a contact point for the local population.

FURTHER RECENT ACTIONS TAKEN

Adoption of EU indicators on women, peace and security: In July 2010 the Council adopted 17 indicators on the implementation of the two key EU documents concerning Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security: ‘EU Comprehensive Approach on UNSCR 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security’ and ‘Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP’. Several of these indicators are directly relevant to the CSDP, namely:

• Proportion of men and women trained specifically in gender equality among diplomatic staff, civilian and military staff employed by the Member States and Community institutions and military and police staff participating in UN peacekeeping operations and CSDP operations and missions;

• Number and percentage of CSDP missions and operations with mandates and planning documents that include clear references to gender/women, peace and security issues and that actually report on this;

• Number and percentage of CSDP missions and operations with gender advisers or focal points;

4 For the full list, see 17138/1/10 REV 1
5 15671/1/08 REV 1
6 15782/3/08 REV 3
• Number of cases of sexual abuse or exploitation by CSDP staff reported on and acted upon;
• Percentage of EUSRs’ activity reports that include specific information on women, peace and security.

Regular reports on the basis of responses received by EU Delegations, EU member States and CSDP missions/operations are supposed to provide an overview on the state of affairs.

Drafting of standard training elements on human rights, child protection and gender: As a follow-up to the Council document ‘Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 in the context of training for the ESDP missions and operations – recommendations on the way forward’ 13899/09, the Council adopted the outlines for EU standard human rights and gender training elements in December 2010. The fully-fledged modules will be drawn up during the first semester of 2011.

Facilitating networking between human rights and gender advisers and focal points: The Council Secretariat started, in 2009, to facilitate regular meetings between gender advisers and focal points deployed in CSDP operations and missions. Such meetings are now conducted by the EEAS on a regular basis.

Specific Website on Women, Peace and Security: A specific section on Women, Peace and Security exists on the EEAS website, under human rights.

Finland prepared a ‘Human Rights and Crisis Management handbook for members of CSDP missions’ as a practical tool for mission and operation personnel.

Most recently, the Council appointed an EU Special Representative for Human Rights in order to enhance the Union’s effectiveness, presence and visibility in protecting and promoting human rights, notably by deepening EU co-operation and police dialogue with third states and other relevant partners.

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**REFERENCE DOCUMENTS**

A. Lessons and best practices of mainstreaming human rights and gender into CSDP military operations and civilian missions (17138/1/10 REV 1)
B. Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into European Security and Defence Policy, compilation of relevant documents (2008)
C. Mainstreaming human rights into ESDP (11936/4/06)
D. Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and other EU policies (10076/06)
E. Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security (15671/1/08)
F. Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP (15782/3/08)
G. Checklist for transitional justice (contained in 10674/06)
H. Draft general review of the implementation of the Checklist for the Integration of the Protection of Children affected by Armed Conflict into ESDP Operations (9822/08)
I. Update of the EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict (10019/08)
J. EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them (16173/08)
K. Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 in the context of training for the ESDP missions and operations – recommendations on the way forward (13899/09)
L. Checklist for working with civil society (10056/1/04)
M. Revised Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in CSDP Missions and Operations (15091/10)

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8 TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN THE FIELD OF CSDP
When CSDP development started under the auspices of the EU, it became obvious that the different aspects of crisis management would require appropriate training, not only offered at national level but complemented by training at EU level, the latter focusing in particular on the promotion of a European security culture.

To that end, in 2003 and 2004, the Council adopted an EU Training Policy and an EU Training Concept in the field of CSDP. The key objective defined is the adoption of a holistic and co-ordinated approach on training matters which should aim at establishing links and strengthening synergies between the different training initiatives at EU level, with a particular focus on the interface between military and civilian areas. Such a holistic and co-ordinated training policy would contribute to the overall goal of improving civil-military as well as civil-civil-co-ordination.”

Based on the Training Policy and Concept, an annual training management cycle has been established including four phases:
1. an analysis of training needs and requirements in the field of CSDP,
2. based on that, the design of an EU Training Programme listing all training activities offered at EU level,
3. the conduct of these training activities by the various training actors at EU and at national level,
4. an annual evaluation in the form of a “Comprehensive Annual Report on Training Activities in the field of CSDP / CART”.

The outer circle of the overview depicts the external dimension. CSDP is an open and transparent process. Close co-operation with third states and international organisations is a basic principle for the EU as regards the conduct of crisis management operations.

Following the EU’s comprehensive approach, training actors are encouraged to combine civilian and military participation whenever possible.

**THE EU TRAINING PROGRAMME AND THE “SCHOOLMASTER” APPLICATION**

The EU Training Programme lists CSDP-related training activities offered by training actors at EU level such as the ESDC and by the Member States’ national and multinational institutes which they open to participation by other nationals. Since 2009, the EU Training Programme has been run via the internet – the “Schoolmaster” application which can be found at [https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu](https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu).

Schoolmaster is owned by the EU and was created in the framework of the Goalkeeper software environment. The linkage between Schoolmaster and other elements of the Goalkeeper software environment (EU recruitment system; rosters of available personnel in EU Member States) is aiming at a better link between training and deployment. It should ensure that available training opportunities are better directed at those individuals requiring training with a view to their (possible) future deployment.
All courses contained in Schoolmaster are accessible to potential participants from EU Member States. Accessibility of courses in Schoolmaster to non-EU participants is at the discretion of the individual course providers.

Training Institutions authorized at national level to contribute to Schoolmaster may feed course data into the system at any given time. In order to ensure national control over the Schoolmaster content, Member States have been invited to designate a national central body (National Coordinator) responsible for the selection of those national Training Providers authorized to upload their course information directly. Uploaded course information is centralized and can be consulted by the public at the Schoolmaster website.

The opening of Schoolmaster to information on courses offered by other actors (IOs, non-EU States, NGOs etc.) is technically feasible but subject to a political decision.

Schoolmaster sends out automatic e-mail alerts whenever new course information is uploaded to the system. All those interested in receiving e-mail alerts on new courses registered in the system are invited to subscribe directly by going to the Schoolmaster application (https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu) and following the instructions.
8.2 ROLE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE

by Dirk Dubois

At EU level, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), established in 2005, plays a major role in the implementation of the yearly training cycle relevant to CSDP. Not only does the College contribute significantly to the implementation of the training programme through the delivery of its courses, its Secretariat contributes to the analysis of the training requirements, the development of the EU training programme relevant to CSDP and the evaluation of the training.

The main objective of the ESDC is to provide Member States and EU institutions with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on CSDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the College makes a major contribution to a better understanding of CSDP in the overall context of CFSP and to promoting a common European security culture. Helping to build professional relations and contacts at European level, the College activities promote a co-operative spirit and co-operative methods at all levels.

The ESDC is a network college. A large number of national universities, academies, colleges and institutes contribute to the success of the ESDC. The network members are well-known national civilian and military educational and research institutions in Europe. It also includes the EU Institute for Security Studies located in Paris.

A three-tier governance structure has been established for the college comprising a Steering Committee, an Executive Academic Board and a Permanent Secretariat. The Secretariat is located in Brussels and closely linked to the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The College established its own training concept addressing personnel at all levels in the CSDP field up to decision-makers. In line with this concept, and, as shown in the overview, it offers a growing number and variety of training activities initiated by Member States in support of CSDP in general, leadership, specific

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**ESDC THREE-TIER STRUCTURE**

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<tr>
<th>STEERING COMMITTEE</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE ACADEMIC BOARD</th>
<th>PERMANENT SECRETARIAT</th>
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<td>• representatives of the Member States</td>
<td>• representatives of the Network Institutes</td>
<td>• assists the Steering Committee and the Executive Academic Board</td>
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<td>• responsible for the overall co-ordination and guidance of the college’s activities</td>
<td>• implements, ensures quality and coherence of the training</td>
<td>• supports conceptual and academic work</td>
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<td>• convenes in Brussels</td>
<td>• can meet in different project-orientated configurations</td>
<td>• supports the training activities in particular those talking place in Brussels</td>
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policy fields, specialised staff und specific EU tools/programmes.

ESDC courses are based on “standardised curricula” and are thus recognised by the Member States and the EU institutions. A certificate signed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is awarded to all participants who completed an ESDC course.

The College also develops and produces training material for CSDP training such as the CSDP Handbook. In the same context, all ESDC training courses are supported by an Internet-based distance learning system (IDL) including a CSDP Knowledge Base containing CSDP-related information material which can be accessed for free through the ESDC web page.

Since its establishment in 2005, the College has provided training for about 6000 diplomats, civilians and police and military personnel from Member States and EU Institutions. Since 2006, more than 400 civilian and military staff from third states and international organisations have attended the college’s CSDP courses.

The success of the ESDC courses lies in a mixture of making the best use of the academic expertise, contacts and experience of our network members and bringing to the courses the practical knowledge of the specialists from the European institutions working on a day-to-day basis on the important dossiers in the field of CSDP. Applying the basic principle of mixed civilian and military audiences in almost all ESDC courses, the College makes a significant effort in support of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
Website: http://esdc.mil-edu.be
ESDC Video on: www.youtube.com/watch?v=gR0BXZzOlhM

ESDC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF ...

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<th>CSDP in general</th>
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<th>Policy Fields</th>
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<th>Concepts/Tools/Programmes</th>
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<td>CSDP High Level Course</td>
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<td>CSDP Common Modules</td>
<td>LEGAD Courses</td>
<td>European Armaments</td>
<td>Capability Development</td>
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<td>other events</td>
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<td>»Erasmus militaire«</td>
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Participation of diplomats, police, other civilians and military from Member States and relevant EU Institutions in almost all courses contributes to an efficient implementation of EU’s comprehensive approach.
HIERARCHY OF TRAINING AUDIENCES AND RELATED ESDC TRAINING ACTIVITIES

TRAINING AUDIENCES

High-Ranking Staff/Decision-Makers
(Ambassadors, Generals/Admirals, Directors)

Senior Staff Level
(diplomats, civil servants in capitals, civilian including police, and military personnel)

Expert Level
(diplomats, civilian, including police, and military personnel with a minimum practical experience)

Specialist Level

General (mid rank)
Working Level
(diplomats, civilian, including police, and military personnel)

ESDC TRAINING ACTIVITIES

CSDP High-Level Seminar (2 Days)

Senior Mission Leaders Course

CSDP High-Level Course

CSDP Advanced Course

CSDP Courses for Specialised Staff

CSDP Orientation Courses
including also International Audiences

OC-type course with focus on thematic, regional or horizontal issues

CSDP training at national level (Member States)
- CSDP training activities for nationals only
- CSDP training activities open to participation of other nationals and listed in the EU Training Programme in the field of CSDP (Schoolmaster)

Training material/IDL system support for all training levels, organised and co-ordinated through the ESDC

ESDC Regular Alumni Training Conference

CSDP Orientation Courses
PPI Staff

CSDP Orientation Courses
LEGAD Staff

CSDP Orientation Courses
POLAD Staff

CSDP Orientation Courses/OC-type courses/seminars/ can also be conducted focussing on a specific audience and specific theme

IDL Support
8.3 THE ESDC EXECUTIVE ACADEMIC BOARD
THE CENTRAL PLATFORM FOR CO-OPERATION AND NETWORKING IN CSDP RELATED TRAINING

by Cesare Ciocca

In the wide community of universities, academies, colleges and other civilian and military training institutes dealing with international security and defence matters, there is a common understanding that the quality and effectiveness of their activities is directly linked to the level and intensity of interaction they have with other relevant stakeholders. Interaction in practical terms means networking and co-operation which allows the exchange of experiences, good practices/standards, better adaptation of training programmes and creates capacities for a better delivery: what can be difficult for a single institute to do can become much more feasible for a group of training actors when working together.

These broadly recognised findings were also key factors in the definition of the EU’s training policy and concept in 2003/2004. In this context, networking, close co-ordination and co-operation between relevant training institutes are considered to be a “conditio sine qua non” to meet the objective of creating a common European security culture.

Accordingly, these were also the guiding principles in establishing the European Security and Defence College in the form of a network between national civilian and military institutes, including the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS).

In order to create a common CSDP culture within the EU, and to ensure a common high standard of education for all concerned personnel, a wide coordination between all training actors in Member States at EU level is required.

Contacts, exchanges of information, co-operation and co-ordination between all actors, through the development of a concept of “Networking, taking into account the already existing networks”, should be fostered.

A specific network could be established, bringing together all relevant civilian and military actors involved in this type of training. It should help to:

- define and harmonise academic programmes on CSDP matters,
- avoid unnecessary duplication in courses offered through coordination between actors,
- share academic resources and material,
- take stock of the relevant developments at EU level.

Distance learning could be envisaged at a further stage.

Accordingly, in 2005 the Council adopted a Joint Action establishing the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) as a network between civilian and military institutes, colleges, academies, universities and institutions within the EU dealing with CSDP issues, including the EU Institutes for Security Studies.
In practical terms, networking and co-operation within the ESDC basically happens through the Executive Academic Board (EAB) which is composed of senior staff and experts from the national civilian and military institutes concerned and which meets on a regular basis. Through the EAB, national civilian and military institutes implement together the ESDC training concept and programme. The Board can also meet in project-orientated configurations according to specific requirements or it can rely on specific expertise. This happens currently in support of three specific projects:

• An Implementation Group convenes representatives from the respective military academies, including policy makers from the Ministries of Defence supporting the implementation of the European initiative to enhance the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus.

• As a consequence of an initiative taken by the Member States to establish an EU Pool of SSR Experts, a new task-orientated configuration has been set up that brings together SSR experts in support of EU training in the field of security sector reform.

• A Project Group convenes technical as well as subject matter experts supporting the development of the IDL System.

So far, there have been about 50 different civilian and military institutes and other training actors actively engaged in ESDC activities. Networking and co-operation in the ESDC network thus creates currently a capacity at EU level to train about 1200 civilian and military staff on about 30 different courses each year.

This is obviously of mutual benefit. At EU level it creates and makes available training capacities and opportunities, an advantage in particular for smaller Member States who do not have all CSDP-relevant training capacities.
at their own disposal. Member States and their national institutes profit from being connected with the EU institutions and gain a unique opportunity to develop their CSDP-related training with a clear EU perspective.

The latter is ensured in particular through the annual working cycle of the Board, including evaluation, review and revision of curricula and finally programming:

(1) In autumn each year, the Board focuses on the evaluation of the activities of the previous academic year and on recent developments in concepts and doctrines at EU level. The assessment is done in close co-operation with the experts coming from the EU’s crisis management structures. (2) Based on the outcome of this evaluation, the Board then concentrates on a review and revision of the course curricula which is also done in very close co-operation with the experts working in the crisis management structures. (3) Towards the end of the academic year, the Board then focuses on the programming for the next academic year.

Member States and their national civilian and military institutes should feel particularly encouraged to engage as much as possible in the activities of the ESDC. As a security and defence policy network it also triggers networking and co-operation between civilian and military training actors and thus makes a significant contribution to an effective implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.

All in all, the ESDC network is working well and is already a good example of pooling and sharing between Member States, in this case in the field of training.

In the context of the ESDC, networking and co-operation goes beyond the national institutes. The ESDC co-operates with and draws on the expertise of international organisations and other relevant actors, such as national training institutes of third states. Closer co-operation exists and continues to evolve in particular with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Geneva in the context of the IDL System and in the conduct of specific courses. Co-operation has also started with the NATO Defence College (NDC) in the context of the ESDC IDL System.
Finally, when it comes to training and education in the field of security and defence policy, it goes without saying that the ESDC network is not operating alone but in the context of a range of other networks, in particular within the EU and including inter alia the European New Training Initiative (ENTRI) which brings together civilian training institutes and the European Police College (CEPT) as a network of the national police colleges. In line with the EU training policy and concept, these networks form part of the whole training system. Co-operation between the existing EU networks is therefore important.

Last but not least, in the NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) context there are also a number of networks, including in particular the Conference of Commandants, organised annually by the NATO Defence College, and the PfP Consortium. The ESDC is regularly invited to participate and it also contributes actively to these conferences.

“Better co-operation between relevant instruments and actors such as the European Security and Defence College, the European Police College and the Instrument for Stability should contribute to greater efficiency in training programmes, with better results in the field.”

High Representative Catherine Ashton in her Report on CSDP, July 2011
A specific task given to the ESDC is to provide support for exchange programmes of the national training institutes.

In the second half of 2008, the then French Presidency initiated a discussion on ways of allowing greater integration of initial academic and professional training of European young officers through mobility. The initiative began in November 2008 based on a Council declaration. The declaration proposed a series of measures which prepared the ground for enhanced interoperability, thereby paving the way for the emergence of a European culture of security and defence among those future CSDP actors:

- Measures aimed at increasing the number of exchanges, such as the generalisation of the Bologna process, the mutual recognition of the outcomes of exchanges in professional training, the greater use of Erasmus mobility for students and personnel, the opening up of national training to European young officers, etc.
- Measures aimed at teaching/learning about Europe and its defence, such as the creation of a common module on CSDP, promoting the learning of several foreign languages, etc.

An Implementation Group was created in February 2009 as a project-orientated structure.
of the ESDC’s Executive Academic Board, charged with implementing the initiative.

Relying on the contributions and support from the Member States and their institutes, the Implementation Group reached sustainable progress on various aspects of the initiative, including the conduct of a common module on CSDP based on the standard curriculum developed by the ESDC, which was organised for the first time in the Portuguese academies in 2009. After a year of existence, these modules had allowed more than 400 young officers to become familiar with the role they may be called to play in the future European defence.

In 2010 a detailed stocktaking of the European officers’ initial training was finalised. The stocktaking supports the institutes concerned in their identification of partners with whom they organise exchanges, and a dedicated forum to enable the institutes to communicate their demands and their offers of exchanges has been set up.

In 2011 a Compendium of European Military Officers Basic Education was published by the Polish Presidency. This Compendium was designed to compare the basic educational systems of equivalent branches/services in all Member States. It represents a further conceptual step towards stronger and closer co-operation between national academies and training centres.

Furthermore, a framework arrangement has been agreed by all 27 Member States, setting out the conditions under which the exchanges between Member States willing to participate take place. It also lays down recognition procedures for the outcomes of exchanges in professional military training.

Meanwhile, common curricula on issues common to European armed forces are being developed on a constant basis and are now offered to young officers.

Implementation of the initiative is driven by the key idea that working exchanges and interpersonal qualifications at initial training level are the cornerstones for the emergence, in the longer term, of interoperability and the common culture that is needed for European defence.

Sources for More and Updated Information

- index.php/networking-news
Many Member States while relying for training in particular on the ESDC, continue to conduct at national level numerous training activities related to CSDP and also enable other nationals to participate in some of these activities. These offers are normally made available to other nationalities through the “Schoolmaster” application. There are other actors and activities at EU level dealing with training in CFSP/CSDP and complementing the training efforts of the Member States.

The European Police College (CEPOL) was established in 2000 to provide specific police training. CEPOL essentially operates as a network college with its Secretariat located at Bramshill/UK. Its mission is to bring together senior police officers from police forces in Europe – essentially to support the development of a network – and to encourage cross-border co-operation in the fight against crime, public security and law and order by organising training activities and research findings. CEPOL organises between 80 and 100 courses, seminars and conferences a year on key topics relevant to all police forces in Europe. The activities are conducted at the national police colleges of the Member States. To some extent CEPOL also conducts crisis management training, partly in close co-operation with the European Security ad Defence College (ESDC).

In the field of civilian crisis management, the European Commission has supported training from an early stage. During 2009 the Commission completed the implementation of the ‘EC Project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management’ (European Group on Training/EGT), a project which since 2001 has complemented Member States’ training activities. An important achievement has been the establishment and maintenance of a European network of professional training institutes and organisations specialising in training for civilian crisis management.

Continuing on from this, the Commission launched a new initiative under the name “Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management” (ENTRi). This initiative aims to deliver a programme under the capacity-building component of the EU’s Instrument for Stability. ENTRi is a training programme which seeks to build up the capacities of personnel who are to work in civilian crisis management missions outside the EU, whether under the auspices of the EU, UN, OSCE, AU or other valid actors. ENTRi seeks to harmonise the approaches of its partners and to facilitate interoperability. Planned activities include more than 30 pre-deployment and specialisation courses, which should involve around 700 participants over a two-year timeframe. Financial support is provided through the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The lead body of a group of partners implementing this initiative is the Berlin-based “Centre for International Peace Operations” (ZIF).

Furthermore, the Commission provides support – also through the Instrument for Stability – to the “EU Police Forces Training” (EUPFT) project which is dedicated to the training of...
police officers who might take part in stabilisation missions in countries emerging from crisis.

As regards EU civilian missions, in general, Member States are responsible for pre-deployment training of their national personnel earmarked for deployment. However, besides these training efforts, authorities responsible for CSDP missions also conduct CSDP-related training which basically is mission-specific and targeted, but which also covers the overall CSDP picture.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) deals with a wide range of CFSP/CSDP-related training. The main target audience are the staff working or due to work in the EEAS structure, including the EU delegations worldwide. For the conduct of the training, the EEAS relies to a large extent on national and international training institutes.

Diplomatic training is also provided under the European Diplomatic Programme (EDP), a joint project between the EU Member States and EU institutions established in November 1999. The target audience are young diplomats from EU Member States. The programme tries to develop a European identity among diplomats, create a network and therefore participate in shaping a common European diplomatic culture. The EDP has a modular structure, and the curriculum also includes CSDP and EU crisis management. The main actors are the national diplomatic academies. With the creation of the External Action Service (EEAS), the EDP will most likely undergo changes in its structure.

There are also specific military training initiatives. The EU Military Staff (EUMS), being an integral part of the EEAS, regularly organises Induction Courses for their new staff and other EEAS staff (every 3 - 6 months).

It also provides training such as the CSDP Foundation Training for Operation Headquarters (OHQs) key nucleus personnel and other augmentees. Other training initiatives include, inter alia, Mobile Training Teams to be sent to OHQs in order to familiarise HQs personnel with EU military concepts and tools. Furthermore, the EUMS is keeping up to date an EU Sharing Training Facilities catalogue which is intended to support Member States in identifying possibilities in pooling and sharing with respect to training.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) identified training requirements as part of its work on capability development. In cooperation with EU Member States and other EU agencies (e.g. the EU Satellite Centre), the Agency initiated training courses to develop certain skills and capabilities within Member States and EU institutions.

Handling Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) or creating Cultural and Situational Awareness are two examples of topics that have been addressed by the EDA's Training initiatives. The EDA may help to bring EU Member States together to pursue such activities, but in the long term an appropriate training actor would need to ensure the continuity of such CSDP-related training programmes.

The development of a European Armaments Co-operation Course jointly by ESDC and EDA is a good step in the right direction.

**Sources for more and updated information**

For more information you should consult the respective web pages:

- for CEPOL and its activities see: http://www.cepol.europa.eu/
- for ENTRI and its activities see: http://www.entriforccm.eu/
- for EDP see: http://edp.consilium.europa.eu/
- for EDA and its activities see: http://www.eda.europa.eu/
INFORMATION POLICY IN THE FIELD OF CSDP
9.1 COMMUNICATING EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – AN OVERVIEW

by Céline Ruiz

2011/2012 marks the transition whereby communication activities concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) move from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU to the European External Action Service (EEAS). As the transition is still ongoing, the following information will need to be updated once the organisational aspects within the EEAS have been completed.

INFORMATION ON CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

Information on CSDP operations is the most visible output of the European Union’s CSDP. With 25 operations launched since 2003, on three continents, some of them complex missions in challenging, high-profile environments, CSDP has gained increasing recognition as a tangible dimension of the EU’s foreign policy. For each CSDP military operation or civilian mission, key aims include, on the one hand, ensuring the consistency of the message among the different EU stakeholders (definition of an information strategy, preparation of ‘master messages’) and, on the other, communicating information on operations to the press and the public. Communication activities include:

- press information, technical briefings and press conferences involving the main players;
- political, military or civilian – in an operation, on the occasion of main events (e.g. decision, launch, termination);
- press visits;
- press releases and High Representative statements on the occasion of these or other events;
- production and circulation of printed, Internet and audiovisual material on each operation (see below).

INFORMATION ON CSDP STRUCTURES AND CAPABILITIES

Information on CSDP structures and capabilities means active communication on developments regarding the CSDP’s civilian and military structures and the capability process (pooling and sharing), notably in relation to events such as meetings of EU Defence Ministers (informal or in the framework of the Foreign Affairs Council) or the launch of a given project: EU Battlegroups (on which the EU seeks to coordinate with Member States e.g. regarding media coverage of BG exercises); Operations Centre (e.g. press visit in connection with the activation of the OpsCentre during the MILEX 07 exercise). Steering Board meetings and other events in the European Defence Agency provide opportunities to conduct information activities regarding the EDA’s work.

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1 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009.
A WIDE RANGE OF PRODUCTS AND RESOURCES

Over the past few years, the CSDP press team in the Council Secretariat has developed a range of CSDP-related information and communication products, in cooperation with other stakeholders such as the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), the EU Institute for Security Studies and the European Defence Agency, as well as with the European Commission regarding the EU’s external action as a whole.

PRINTED MATERIAL

Institutional printed material on CSDP includes the following items:

- the CSDP newsletter (six-monthly, circulation around 40,000 copies): 11 issues published since December 2005. The next issue should be published in autumn 2012. The newsletter aims to present CSDP operations and other activities in a clear, illustrative way for both a specialised readership and the general public;
- a range of booklets (e.g. “the EU, an exporter of peace and security” since 2003, the European Security Strategy booklet, as well as thematic/regional strategies [e.g. EU–Africa]);
- a range of fact sheets and background documents produced for each CSDP operation and on specific topics (e.g. the EU Engagement in Afghanistan or in Somalia, the EU Battlegroups, military capabilities);
- the EU Military Staff’s bulletin, Impetus, aimed primarily at a military readership;
- in cooperation with the European Commission, material on “The EU in the world – working for peace, security and stability” – that was before the creation of the EEAS;
- material produced by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS Newsletter quarterly,
- material produced by the European Defence Agency (e.g. EDA bulletin quarterly, newsletter and specific leaflets).
During the transition period, the Council of the EU’s website hosts the CSDP homepage: www.consilium.europa.eu/csdp or www.consilium.europa.eu/psdc (in French), which contains information on:

- all CSDP operations and missions (including links to specific operation websites where applicable);
- a weekly e-newsletter, an electronic newsletter on CSDP activities;
- CSDP news;
- structures, notably the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the EU Operations Centre, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD); the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC);
- capabilities;
- the European Security Strategy (ESS)/the Internal Security Strategy.

Other institutional Internet resources include:

- www.eeas.europa.eu (External Action website);
- www.consilium.europa.eu/esdc
- http://esdc.mil-edu.be (European Security and Defence College);
- www.iss.europa.eu (EU Institute for Security Studies);
- www.eda.europa.eu (European Defence Agency);

**AUDIOVISUAL MATERIAL**

Development of the range of CSDP-related audiovisual material on offer has been a priority in recent years. A range of resources is now available.

- Video material (VNRs – Video News Releases – and stock shots) is produced and made available for television on specific occasions such as the launch of an operation; such material can be found and downloaded in broadcast quality on http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu;
- a YouTube CSDP page is available: www.youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence (182 videos as of September 2012);
- some of the audiovisual material is released in the form of DVDs for distribution to the general public (since 2003);
• cooperation on CSDP-related TV productions;
• a CSDP photo library; a selection is available online on the Council website;
• arrangements are being made with individual member states concerning the sharing of audiovisual resources, particularly in the context of operations.

PRESS TRIPS

Press visits to the theatre of CSDP operations and missions have been organised for European journalists since 2004. For instance, visits to the Balkans, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Aceh (Indonesia), Chad (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA), Afghanistan, on EUNAVFOR-Atalanta and EUTM Somalia (Uganda), have been organised in order to highlight the EU’s comprehensive activities on the ground (CSDP operation and EU Delegation). Other visits are organised on the basis of the resources of the operations themselves.

LOOKING FOR SYNERGIES AND OUTREACH: TOWARDS A ‘CSDP PUBLIC DIPLOMACY’

In the past few years, the Council Secretariat has been trying to develop synergies with and among Member States, including through the mutual provision information concerning products and initiatives.
• meetings of officials in charge of information and communication on CSDP have been organised since 2001 in the framework of the Council’s Working Party on Information. These meetings provided opportunities to exchange information, material and experience;
• regular information on communication activities is given to the Political and Security Committee (PSC - COPS in French) and the Military Committee. Increasingly, outreach and awareness-raising activities have been developed by the Council Secretariat and other stakeholders.
before the creation of the EEAS, the Council Secretariat and the Commission regularly co-organised seminars for journalists (2 or 3 × year), think-tanks (normally once a year) and NGOs (normally once a year) on the topic “The EU in the world”, including CFSP/CSDP;

- the CSDP press team in the Council Secretariat regularly received groups of visitors, journalists and students and contributed to a number of events dedicated to CSDP (publications, seminars, training, EU Open Day);

- the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) contributes to raising the awareness of CSDP in Member States and also beyond. An annual CSDP Press and Public Information Course (PPI Course) was established in 2006 in the framework of the ESDC. The course aims to provide press and information personnel from EU Member States, EU institutions and CSDP missions and operations with up-to-date knowledge of CSDP and to facilitate the sharing of experience;

- the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris is also a key player in outreach activities on CSDP. As a European body where leaders, the media, academics, industrialists and elected representatives rub shoulders on a day-to-day basis, it contributes to spreading the ideas and values on which the EU’s foreign and security policy is founded. Information and communication activities are part of its work, together with academic research and policy analysis and the organisation of seminars (including the Institute’s Annual Conference, at which the High Representative delivers an address on the state of the Common Foreign and Security Policy). The Institute’s work involves a network of exchanges with other research institutes and think-tanks both inside and outside the European Union. The Institute’s output is distributed widely.

Contact: presse.psd@eeas.europa.eu
10 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES OF THE CSDP
10.1 CHALLENGES AHEAD – IMPLEMENTING THE LISBON TREATY

by Jochen Rehrl

The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty can be described as a milestone for the development of the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) and specifically for the “Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP). But the main challenge is still ahead – an efficient implementation of the provisions made in the Treaty making the new structures and mechanisms functioning smoothly.

The following is a summary of the main aspects. For the related articles in the Treaty you can consult Annex 4.

PROVISIONS MADE IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) are the only Council formations which are laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, there is only one Council of the European Union, which can meet in ten different formations. The Council formations can be extended or limited in numbers by the Heads of State and Government.

The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) formulates policy regarding the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensures that the Union’s action is consistent. This Council formation convenes normally with Ministers of Foreign Affairs and twice a year with Ministers of Defence.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, contributes through her proposals towards the preparation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.

The impact on the European foreign policy is enhanced by the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) who assists the High Representative. The EEAS started its work officially on 1st December 2010. The staffs are recruited from the relevant departments of the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council as well as from the Diplomatic Services of EU Member States.

The dual function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is at the same time Vice-President of the Commission, shall ensure coherence and coordination of the EU’s external action.

PROVISIONS MADE IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

The CSDP task catalogue includes the Petersberg tasks, namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and crisis-management tasks of combat forces, including peacemaking. And additionally to the Petersberg tasks, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping as well as post-conflict stabilisation tasks. All these tasks should contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by sup-
porting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

The mutual assistance clause follows the EU principle of solidarity. It guarantees the EU Member States aid and assistance from all other partners in the event of armed aggression on the territory of a Member State. The assistance is not limited to civilian, military or diplomatic efforts, but must be read as meaning as comprehensive as is necessary (“by all the means in their power”). Nevertheless, the status of neutrals and of non-allied and NATO partners will be respected.

Permanent Structured Co-operation should help Member States to build up closer links among each other. The preconditions for joining such a Permanent Structured Co-operation are firstly the fulfilment of higher criteria for military capabilities and secondly the more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to undertaking the most demanding missions.

Tasking of a group of Member States. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States, which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task, in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agree among themselves on the management of the task. Nevertheless, Member States participating in the task will keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. They will inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions set for the task. The Council will then decide if further steps are necessary.

The principles of financing CSFP/CSDP missions remain unchanged. The administrative expenditure of the institutions arising from the implementation of the CSDP, both for civilian missions and military operations, is charged to the budget of the European Union. The same applies, as a general rule, to operating expenditure except for cases where the Council – acting unanimously – decides otherwise and for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications. If expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it will be generally charged to the Member States in accordance with their gross national product (unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise).

The new aspect, which was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, is the creation of a so-called start-up fund. Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42 (1) and Article 43 TEU which are not charged to the Union budget will be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States’ contributions. The Council will then authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The High Representative reports to the Council on the implementation of this remit.

THE SOLIDARITY CLAUSE (NOT DIRECTLY CSDP RELATED)

The Solidarity Clause is not part of the CSDP chapter of the Treaty on European Union, but is laid down in Art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Although there is no direct link with the CFSP/CSDP, the same capabilities are addressed and it is therefore worth mentioning.

This clause relates to the prevention of terrorist threats, the protection from any terrorist attack and consequence management if such an attack occurs. Additionally, the solidarity clause deals with events such as man-made or natural disasters. In all these above mentioned cases, the Union and its Member States will act jointly in a spirit of solidarity. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.
Europe’s defence effort is very fragmented. Even States that are members of the EU or NATO or both, decide on national defence planning with little or no reference to either. Their guidelines are usually trumped by considerations of prestige, industrial interests, and budget. The bilateral and multilateral cooperation that does exist rarely goes beyond the tactical level. The strategic enablers required for the transformation to expeditionary operations (transport, communications, intelligence) are being developed only very slowly, if at all. At the same time, in some areas massive redundancies are maintained in spite of their limited usefulness. As States insist on maintaining a wide range of capability areas, in spite of the decreasing size of their armed forces and defence budgets, a plethora of small-scale capabilities, of limited deployability and low cost-effectiveness, is scattered across Europe.

The current budget crisis threatens to aggravate this situation. Nations have already announced severe defence cuts. The worst that could now happen is that each government will decide unilaterally, without any coordination with fellow NATO or EU members, where the cuts will be made. The great risk is that States will scale down or axe altogether ongoing and future projects intended to generate the indispensable strategic enablers, while hanging on to capabilities that are cheaper to maintain but that are already redundant. In the end the sum-total of European capabilities will be even less coherent, and even less employable.

Since, at the same time, the Lisbon Treaty aims precisely to empower the EU as an international actor, this is a paradoxical situation. In other fields of external action, co-operation is being strengthened, witness the setting up of a new permanent structure for EU diplomacy: the External Action Service. Will Member States also turn to more structured co-operation in the military field, or will they continue to pretend that their armed forces can exist in splendid isolation?

At the heart of the current fragmentation lies the lack of systematic consultation and coordination between Member States. This is made worse by the unwillingness to adapt national defence planning in accordance with fellow members’ plans and overall EU and NATO objectives. As long as States cannot be sure that if they abandon a capability area, it will be reliably taken care of by a fellow EU or NATO member, they will continue to struggle, against better knowledge, to maintain a broad range of capabilities each on their own.

At an informal meeting in Ghent on 23 and 24 September, EU Defence Ministers did seem to opt for co-operation. The idea was raised at least to exchange information on governments’ intentions. At their first formal meeting, in Brussels on 9 December 2010, the Ministers of Defence took this idea further and agreed on the “Ghent Framework”, referring to their earlier meeting in that city. Each EU Member State will analyse its capabilities in order to identify: 1. those it will maintain on a national level; 2. those to which it will contribute through pooling with other Member States; and
3. those to which it will no longer contribute, relying on specialisation and role-sharing between Member States. If done in a permanent and structured manner, such a process will lead to true co-operation – as envisaged by Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO), the new defence mechanism in the Lisbon Treaty. The end result will benefit everybody: more effective forces, no matter how integrated, will be available for national as well as CSDP, NATO and UN operations.

There is reluctance to embrace PESCO, for fear that a costly layer of bureaucracy might be added, whereas the existing institutions of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) could achieve much more if Member States made better use of them. The point is though that they don’t. The aim of PESCO is not to create new institutions, but to generate the political stimulus that would incite Member States to make the most of the existing potential, notably the European Defence Agency.

PESCO would serve as a permanent capability conference, where participating Member States coordinate and revisit their defence planning by focusing on the commonly identified shortfalls. Here lies the real added value for governments. Rather than maintaining a wide range of small, unemployable and therefore irrelevant capabilities, through permanent and structured coordination they could safely focus on a smaller number of capability areas that are relevant to the overall targets of the EU as well as NATO, in which they can make a real effort, while doing away with redundancies. If they wish, participating Member States can opt for far-reaching forms of pooling or other forms of co-operation in the areas in which they do remain active, just as e.g. France and the UK announced in their recent bilateral agreement. Thus, PESCO would allow all governments, within their respective means, to contribute with militarily relevant capabilities to every EU or NATO operation. And thus they would be politically relevant.

PESCO would shift co-operation from the tactical to the strategic level, and would change its nature from a bottom-up to a top-down process. Project-by-project co-operation is useful, but its scope is too limited to solve Europe’s capability conundrum. That requires much broader coordination of national defence planning. Providing a flexible structure for top-down political steering, PESCO offers a pragmatic solution with potentially far-reaching consequences.

Member States will have to make choices though. Applying the “Ghent Framework” means that in the long term, not all Member States will have capability in all areas any longer. A “common defence”, as called for in the Treaty on European Union, will eventually emerge. Not in the sense that there will be a single, supranational “Euro-Army”, but in the sense that top-down coordination by the Defence Ministers Council will allow Member States to opt for far-reaching specialisation and role-sharing. In the end, everybody knows that an air force of 12 fighters or an armoured capacity of 36 tanks is a non-deployable and therefore irrelevant asset. Why not admit it, do away with such mini-units, focus on a reduced range of capability areas – and make a real effort in those?
10.3 THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEMBER-STATES

by Julian Lindley-French

The lessons from Afghanistan, Libya and the Euro-debt crisis are clear. We live in a hyper-competitive world. The world is getting smaller, friction greater and we Europeans have chosen (yes, chosen) to become weaker at a critical moment in power shift, with both the NATO’s Strategic Concept and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) designed to mask as much as confront dangerous change that is the essence of both. Thus, today we have weakness without strategy, i.e. risk; having convinced ourselves we are too weak to affect strategic change alone, and yet too powerful to hide from such change.

Therefore, my mission today is to try and put Europe’s future security and defence in the context of both strategic environment and strategic culture which is what the European Security Strategy set out to do.

That of course begs a very serious question. What exactly is a strategic culture – let alone one that could be applied to such a diverse and fractured entity/group of actors huddling together away from the strategic, economic chill under the rhetorical shelter that is ‘Europe’?

For the sake of argument I will define said strategic culture as the balance between and emphasis upon all forms of security engagement ranging from negotiation, international law, trade and commerce, aid and development, alliance and regime building, coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions and military power.

There is also an immediate difficulty in defining European – do we mean Europe as a place or Europe as an idea – the EU. I would suggest that in fact we on the cusp between intense co-operation (i.e. between states) and culture (which by its definition is more likely to be found as a function of institutional integration).

There is also an irony with which we must also confront: European Strategic Culture has tended to be defined by Americans as a contrast to American strategic culture. One thinks of Joe Nye v Robert Kagan, of Venus v Mars, of Soft v Hard. What they have done is define the issue of a strategic culture as either/or, which is of course wrong because these are but metaphors for weak v strong. All Europeans have exactly the same tools as Americans but have made investment choices which tend to reveal a markedly different view of what tools to apply to what point in the conflict spectrum. Indeed, much of the debate over strategic conflict is really a metaphor for the role of war in strategic concept.

So, what of European strategic culture? And such culture must itself require a shared strategic concept. At the very least both concept and culture need a shared appreciation of the environment, a shared imagination over values and interests to project and protect and shared application in so doing. Whilst most Europeans share a very high degree of shared culture for most security challenges – see the Greek and Irish bale-outs, solidarity tends to collapse on the point of kinetic danger.
Paradoxically, European strategic culture fails the test of European strategic credibility for in this world credible military power remains the foundation upon which all other elements stand.

Therefore, the key question then becomes one of strategy – by whom, for whom to what end? Strategic Culture is by definition the stuff of grand strategy; i.e. the organisation of large means in pursuit of large ends. What does that mean for Europeans and how best to do it? Certainly, the weaker the power, the more important strategy is and with a narrative to justify the effort.

Where are Europeans today? We do not know how ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ we are; we have little idea what needs changing or how (strategy is always about change) and thus we have no convincing story to tell a nervous public about the relationship between security investment and positive change.

On the face of it Europe a weak ‘power’ made of weakening powers. The figures speak for themselves:

- NATO Europe nations have a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of €12.5 tr compared with the US GDP of €10tr or some 124% of the U.S. total.
- The combined 2009 defence budgets of NATO Europe totalled €188 bn compared with the 2009 U.S. defence budget of €503 bn. NATO Europe thus spends some 37% of the U.S. expenditure on defence.
- Of that €188 bn France and the UK together represent 43% or €80.6 bn, whilst France, Germany and the UK represent 61% or €114.2 bn and the so-called ‘big three’ spend 88% of all defence research and development in NATO Europe.
- Sixteen of the twenty-six NATO Europe members spend less than €4bn per annum and much of it inefficiently with the ratios between personnel and equipment budgets particularly obverse, with too many bloated headquarters, top-heavy command chains and outdated formations.
- Between 2001 and 2008 NATO Europe spending on defence fell from €255 bn to €223 bn (not adjusted for defence cost inflation).
- Paradoxically, given the fall in troop numbers defence spending per soldier rose from €74,000 in 2001 to €92,000 in 2008, although the figures vary widely across the Alliance from state to state.
- Over roughly the same period the US has increased its defence expenditure by 109%, China by 247%, Russia by 67% and Australia by 56%.

Herein lies the dilemma – Europe is a changing constellation in a rapidly changing world in which there are many risks but no existential threats.

Strategy is thus about choices that balance what must be done, what can be afforded and what might be needed. The problem with strategy in Europe is that Europeans are uncomfortable with power and even less comfortable with coercion and thus ‘culture’ – common precepts and identity underpinning shared choices is hard to define. Indeed, it is the very discretionary nature of conflict that makes unity of purpose and effort so hard to achieve and thus with it a strategic culture.

To move on we must return to fundamentals. Most Europeans have never had it so good? Europe by and large whole and free, living standards are by and large OK, and Europe’s wars of choice are not breaking what is left of the bank. In other words, strategy for Europeans is not so much about changing too much, but rather about protecting what we have – that is hardly a battle-cry for a common culture of action around which to rally. One can hardly build culture on the defensive; unless that it is a culture of defeatism which is hardly what any of us would wish to define Europe’s place in the world.

Indeed, the only clear, present and existential danger it is that of a renewed financial crisis which must thus take precedence.
But here’s the rub – the world is full of friction. Contemporary risks could become threats very quickly. Strategic shock is all too possible: be it

Therefore, security strategy must emphasise the ability to reconstitute and augment rapidly to balance projection with protection, robustness and resiliency, capability and capacity and strategy and affordability across the civil-military spectrum.

Here Europeans (be they in one institution or another) can play to their strengths and begin the long road to a European strategic culture.

Equally, strategy implies role allocation built on the trust required to give up key elements of state security. To that end institutions are important enablers of what might be called a security culture; rather than the more implicitly assertive strategic culture (which can be said to exist). OSCE will continue to play the role of forum where extremes of state behaviour across the Continent are mitigated, NATO will continue to be the conduit for most Europeans to absolute defence afforded by Americans, and CSDP in the EU should become the locus of a European pillar of security and defence in which civil-military co-operation is totemic.

However, there is another rub; the EU in particular is still too focused on the constraint of our own power, rather than the effective organisation and projection of it – which is at the core of a debate over European strategic culture. All our states (all of which are small in global terms) remain jealous of giving up sovereignty – strategy is thus lost in a vacuum of bureaucratic self-justification. Too often the short-term tail wags the strategic dog in Europe.

Let me conclude this statement by considering the method of strategy in Europe. Look at the nature of dangerous change relevant to Europeans – terrorism, proliferation in our neighbourhood, cyber-vulnerability, state weakness on our borders, fundamentalism in our societies etc. etc.

Strategy has failed in Europe not because we have spent insufficiently (we have) but because we have lacked a proper mutual understanding of our environment, been too keen too often to hide from it and in the absence of a consistent strategic narrative we have been unable to make choices and thus justify investments – be they knowledge structures (intelligence), protective mechanisms (cyber-defence) or projective forces (interdiction).

This has partly been due to the fractured nature of the strategic environment but above all it has been driven by the apologist political correctness that has prevented us from dealing effectively with dangers within and from correctly diagnosing potential dangers without.

Rather we have wallowed between nostalgic hard-liners at one of the spectrum and integration dreamers at the other with a sea of public ignorance and indifference in between fed by irresolute leadership.

After all, strategy is a function of leadership and if Europeans cannot fashion strategy in anticipation of shock one thing is clear shock will at some point impose strategy upon us.

What to do? Start properly investing in our institutions so that strategy in Europe can balance the efficiency and effectiveness needed to be credibly strong in the new world, but underpin such efforts with credible military power that for the foreseeable future will be overwhelmingly state centric. A culture might emerge one day from such intense co-operation, and it is of course work in progress. But we have a long way to go.

First steps, the bigger states, like Britain and France must seek ever closer co-operation; the smaller states defence integration.

Only then are we likely to preserve the freedoms and well-being that we today enjoy. Fail and we will lose them!

Let me finish with a quote from Churchill writing of France at the end of the First World War he could have been talking of Europe today and the need for a strategic culture.
“Worn down, doubly decimated, but undisputed masters of the hour, the French nation peered into the future in thankful wonder and haunting dread. Where then was that SECURITY without which all that had been gained seemed valueless, and life itself, even amid the rejoicings of victory, was almost unendurable? The mortal need was Security”. In fact, the mortal need was for strategy which would have afforded security and for that we need a strategic culture worthy of the name.

That is where Europe is at today.
“CSDP is dead” – a headline very often used in 2011 in the press and in publications elaborating on the future prospects for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. And even in internal e-mail exchanges desk officers within the EU’s crisis management structures and national delegations shared this view, most probably owing to a certain frustration about the lack of progress in various CSDP fields.

Such a situation is not new. I have personally experienced similar situations since ESDP development started to take more concrete shape in June 1992, following the declaration of WEU Foreign Ministers at Petersberg/Germany. Since then the development of this policy has had its ups and downs, with many good initiatives which took it forward, but also with events and developments which put it on hold.

Throughout its integration process Europe has faced many crises which resulted in the end in a stronger Europe. EU crises lead in most cases to a greater readiness on the part of the Member States to take the next steps towards further integration. This can currently be seen in the crisis surrounding the common currency. Recognising the need to adapt, Member States are now ready to accept arrangements and approaches which would have been completely unacceptable a few years ago. CFSP/CSDP is a policy field with a lot of similarities. A common key aspect is that further steps towards integration touch on the same highly sensitive aspect: national sovereignty.

One must not forget how much progress has been achieved since European countries started to develop a more specifically European approach to their security and defence. Basically, I see here four different phases: the attempts made to promote a European approach to security and defence during the Cold War period, a second phase where the WEU was revitalised to develop this policy field, a third phase including 10 years of CSDP development in the EU under the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties and the current phase in which we are developing this policy under the Lisbon Treaty. Going through the details of this history of CFSP/CSDP development, the progress is clear to see.

I would like to quote here just one example, which in my view illustrates this progress best.

In the past, the EU was often perceived as a talking shop, able to issue ‘nice declarations’ but not able to take any practical action for the resolution of conflicts. In 1994, European countries in the WEU Council discussed how to deal with the crisis in the Great Lakes Region in Africa. In the end they failed to reach a consensus on possible WEU-led intervention. My impression then was that it would take at least two decades or more until European countries were able to reach a common understanding on any crisis management engagement elsewhere in Africa. However, only nine years later, at the request of the UN Secretary-General, the EU Member States agreed on Operation ARTEMIS, an operation which helped to deal with a deteriorating humanitarian situation in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is worth mentioning that operational engagement by the EU followed later, even in places far away from Europe, such as in Asia, with the ACEH Monitoring Mission. All this happened with the active participation of Member States who in the past were never ready to agree to any kind of active operational engagement outside Europe.

To date, the EU has now engaged in more than 20 missions and operations on three continents. This proves that there is a growing political will to take on responsibilities and take action in international crisis management if necessary, a situation which was unimaginable when the EU started to develop its crisis management structures and procedures in 2000.

Today it is still difficult to get consensus among 27 Member States on any potential operational engagement in many regions where some Member States consider that EU action is appropriate, others not, as was the case for Libya. CSDP development is still in a phase where Member States’ traditional historical links and specific national interests matter. One must not forget that national defence policies still exist and vary considerably among the 27, with some Member States putting their emphasis on force projection and others still focusing on potential invasion by their neighbours.

However, the EU’s Security and Defence Policy is developing in the larger context of an evolving Common Foreign Policy which is increasingly enabling Member States to speak more and more with one voice even as regards regional issues on which they were recently divided. Apart from this, there are other factors which will determine the way and the speed CSDP will develop, factors which are manifold and complex in nature. I would like to refer here to one which is quite obvious these days – the impact of the financial crisis.

After the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, armed forces were reduced in numbers and size, putting pressure on Member States to reorganise their armed forces in a meaningful way. This has already led to more and closer co-operation and to some extent already to more integration. Getting the Dutch and Belgian naval forces under one command is just one example of this. The current financial crisis and shrinking budgets will further increase this pressure on Member States to co-operate more closely and thus overcome Europe’s problems of capability development, which are basically caused by fragmentation and unnecessary duplication. I believe that the current financial crisis can be a real turning point for European capability development. The alternative Member States have is to implement cuts simply at national level, ending up with even bigger capability gaps, or to do so in a co-ordinated way, in support of the CSDP. I believe that in the end Member States will opt for the latter course as the challenges ahead will not allow them the luxury of doing anything else.

CSDP development is and remains a process. Within a foreseeable timeframe there will be no situation which you could call the “end state” of CSDP. But there is already a long-term objective defined in the Maastricht Treaty, which states that the Common Foreign and Security Policy includes “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.

Not all Member States subscribe to this long-term objective – at least not at this point in time - but there are more and more Member States who recognise the need and are ready to move in this direction. The meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg in Brussels in April 2003, at which a number of forward-looking proposals for European defence were made, was just one expression of this growing will. More recently, new initiatives have been taken to step up military co-operation in
Europe. The so-called “Ghent Initiative” and the proposals by the Weimar Triangle: France, Germany and Poland, are aimed in particular at improving interoperability, pooling capabilities and role- and task-sharing between European partners. Where these initiatives will end up remains to be seen as they still lack full support from all Member States.

On the other hand, we are no longer able to wait until everybody is ready to take the “integration train”. The different speed of those who are ready to go ahead with more and deeper integration is in my view important – and these Member States should start to move this train. Full inclusiveness is the argument of those who tend to favour the status quo. However, openness and transparency will be important to allow all the others to jump on this train whenever they are ready to do so.

Finally, these developments should no longer be perceived as being directed against NATO or against our American partners. Experience shows that European capability development in the NATO context also had and still has its limitations. In this regard, I very much share the views expressed by the former Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency, Nick Witney, in an article in Europe’s World in Autumn 2008, that for too long Europeans avoided taking real responsibility for their own security, and invoked the catechism of ‘NATO, the corner-stone of our security’ as a substitute for serious thought. The US should encourage the EU to grow into its global responsibilities. The more seriously the Americans show that they are willing to take the EU collectively, the more seriously the Europeans will take themselves. Finally, those who fear that a real CSDP will make the US turn its back on Europe forget that the US is already changing its strategic focus anyway.

Incidentally, such a “pro European defence” position by the US would not be new. In 1950, it very much supported the idea of a European Defence Community (as an integral part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), an attempt by Western European powers to counterbalance the overwhelming conventional military ascendency of the Soviet Union by the creation of a supranational European Army. The European Defence Community would have provided for centralised military procurement, and would have had a common budget, arms and institutions. Unfortunately, in 1954 it was rejected by the French National Assembly.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION**


For the transatlantic aspects, you could study the EU ISS report “What do Europeans want from NATO?” (November 2010) which can be downloaded on www.iss.europa.eu
ANNEXES
A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Brussels, 12 December 2003
Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.
I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

Global Challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world’s population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.
Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years.

The last use of WMD was by the Aum terrorist sect in the Tokyo underground in 1995, using sarin gas. 12 people were killed and several thousand injured. Two years earlier, Aum had sprayed anthrax spores on a Tokyo street.
years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

**Regional Conflicts:** Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

**State Failure:** Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

**Organised Crime:** Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come
to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.
II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the Threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.

- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or south-east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global
communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe.
Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.
The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - which Europe has long supported - is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.
AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.
It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.
**More Capable.** A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.
More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Working with partners There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.
We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

Conclusion

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.
- Providing Security in a Changing World -

Executive Summary

Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.

The EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better. Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, in places such as Afghanistan or Georgia.

Yet, twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges.

Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world remain unsolved, others have flared up even in our neighbourhood. State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy. Terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability in the region and for the whole non-proliferation system.

Globalisation has brought new opportunities. High growth in the developing world, led by China, has lifted millions out of poverty. But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society - such as information systems and energy supplies - are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.

Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past.
Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation.

Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support.

Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues - anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world. For Europe, the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.

The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.
Introduction

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It gives an opportunity to examine how we have fared in practice, and what can be done to improve implementation.

I. GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

The ESS identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation by both states and terrorists was identified in the ESS as ‘potentially the greatest threat to EU security’. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure. While Libya has dismantled its WMD programme, Iran, and also North Korea, have yet to gain the trust of the international community. A likely revival of civil nuclear power in coming decades also poses challenges to the non-proliferation system, if not accompanied by the right safeguards.

The EU has been very active in multilateral fora, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation.

We should continue this approach, with political and financial action. A successful outcome to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, with a view in particular to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, is critical. We will endeavour to ensure that, in a balanced, effective, and concrete manner, this conference examines means to step up international efforts against proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to do so.

More work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
**Terrorism and Organised Crime**

Terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat to our livelihoods. Attacks have taken place in Madrid and London, while others have been foiled, and home-grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent. Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering.

Since 2003, the EU has made progress in addressing both, with additional measures inside the Union, under the 2004 Hague Programme, and a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted in 2005. These have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, also from 2005, is based on respect for human rights and international law. It follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of an attack. While national action is central, appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator has been an important step forward at the European level.

Within the EU, we have done much to protect our societies against terrorism. We should tighten co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism materials, on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism. Further work on terrorist financing is required, along with an effective and comprehensive EU policy on information sharing, taking due account of protection of personal data.

We must also do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment, by addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination. Inter-cultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of Civilisations, has an important role.

On organised crime, existing partnerships within our neighbourhood and key partners, and within the UN, should be deepened, in addressing movement of people, police and judicial cooperation. Implementation of existing UN instruments on crime is essential. We should further strengthen our counter-terrorism partnership with the United States, including in the area of data sharing and protection. Also, we should strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood. The EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN.

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.
**Cyber security**

Modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the internet. The EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted in 2006 addresses internet-based crime. However, attacks against private or government IT systems in EU Member States have given this a new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon.

More work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international co-operation.

**Energy Security**

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in June 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as are good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

**Climate change**

In 2003, the ESS already identified the security implications of climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. In March 2008, the High Representative and Commission presented a report to the European Council which described climate change is a "threat multiplier". Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible.
ANNEX 2

We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope. International co-operation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential.

II. BUILDING STABILITY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND

Within our continent, enlargement continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform.

With Turkey, negotiations started in 2005, and a number of chapters have been opened since. Progress in the Western Balkans has been continuous, if slow. Accession negotiations with Croatia are well advanced. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has obtained candidate status. Stabilisation and Association agreements have been signed with the other Western Balkan countries. Serbia is close to fulfilling all conditions for moving towards deeper relations with the EU. The EU continues to play a leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, despite progress, more is required from local political leaders to overcome blockage of reforms.

We are deploying EULEX, our largest civilian ESDP mission to date, in Kosovo and will continue substantial economic support. Throughout the region, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations are indispensable.

It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, supports this process. In the east, all eligible countries participate except Belarus, with whom we are now taking steps in this direction.

With Ukraine, we have gone further, with a far-reaching association agreement which is close to being finalised. We will soon start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a similar agreement. The Black Sea Synergy has been launched to complement EU bilateral policies in this region of particular importance for Europe.

New concerns have arisen over the so-called “frozen conflicts” in our eastern neighbourhood. The situation in Georgia, concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has escalated, leading to an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response, through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support. Our engagement will continue, with the EU leading the Geneva Process. A possible settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus, through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format, and the EU Border Assistance Mission.
The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working towards deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.

The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, co-operation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners. The EU is fully engaged in the Annapolis Process towards a two-state solution, and is contributing sustained financial and budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, and capacity-building, including through the deployment of judicial, police and border management experts on the ground. In Lebanon, Member States provide the backbone of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. On Iraq, the EU has supported the political process, reconstruction, and rule of law, including through the EUJUST LEX mission.

Since 2003, Iran has been a growing source of concern. The Iranian nuclear programme has been subject to successive resolutions in the UNSC and IAEA. Development of a nuclear military capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted. The EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure, together with the US, China, and Russia. The High Representative has delivered a far-reaching offer for Iran to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community. If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows. At the same time, we need to work with regional countries including the Gulf States to build regional security.

The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a long-term commitment to bring stability. EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mission, and the EU is engaged on governance and development at all levels. The EU Police Mission is being expanded. These efforts will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries: in particular Pakistan, but also India, Central Asia and Iran. Indeed, improved prospects for good relations between India and Pakistan in recent years have been a positive element in the strategic balance sheet.


ANNEX 2

Security and development nexus

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation. In many conflict or post-conflict zones, we have to address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict is essential.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.

Ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of conflict. There are increasing tensions over water and raw materials which require multilateral solutions. The Kimberley Process and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer an innovative model to address this problem.

Piracy

The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organised crime. It is also a result of state failure. The world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade. Piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue more pressing in recent months, and affected delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The EU has responded, including with ATALANTA, our first maritime ESDP mission, to deter piracy off the Somali coast, alongside countries affected and other international actors, including NATO.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster Munitions and Landmines

In 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition. In the context of its implementation, the EU supports the UN Programme of Action in this field. The EU will continue to develop activities to combat threats posed by illicit SALW.
The EU has given strong support to the concept of an international Arms Trade Treaty and has decided to support the process leading towards its adoption. The EU is also a major donor to anti-mine action. It has actively supported and promoted the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines worldwide. The Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreed at Dublin in May 2008, represents an important step forward in responding to the humanitarian problems caused by this type of munitions, which constitute a major concern for all EU Member States. The adoption of a protocol on this type of munitions in the UN framework involving all major military powers would be an important further step.

III. EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD

To respond to the changing security environment we need to be more effective - among ourselves, within our neighbourhood and around the world.

A. A more effective and capable Europe

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners. Our election monitoring missions, led by members of the European Parliament, also make an important contribution.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is increasingly in demand. Our Georgia mission has demonstrated what can be achieved when we act collectively with the necessary political will. But the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. We are developing this aspect of ESDP by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.
ANNEX 2

We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context.

For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. We need full interoperability between national contingents. In support of this, Member States have committed to draw up national strategies to make experts available, complemented by more deployable staff for mission support, including budgeting and procurement. The ways in which equipment is made available and procured should be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions.

For military missions, we must continue to strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so.

B. Greater engagement with our neighbourhood

The ENP has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration.

The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part.

The Eastern Partnership foresees a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbours, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU. The proposals cover a wide range of bilateral and multilateral areas of co-operation including energy security and mobility of people.

Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE, the US and Russia. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.
We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the Arab states. Here, as elsewhere, full engagement with the US will be key. In each case, a durable settlement must bring together all the regional players. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played an increasingly important role in the region, whereas this has not been the case with Iran. There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations.

C. Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective. The key partner for Europe in this and other areas is the US. Where we have worked together, the EU and US have been a formidable force for good in the world.

The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. The EU works closely in key theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, and has improved institutional links, in line with our joint 2007 EU-UN Declaration. We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.

We have substantially expanded our relationship with China. Ties to Canada and Japan are close and longstanding. Russia remains an important partner on global issues. There is still room to do more in our relationship with India. Relations with other partners, including Brazil, South Africa and, within Europe, Norway and Switzerland, have grown in significance since 2003.

The EU is working more closely with regional organisations, and in particular the African Union. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning. We have deepened links with our Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Elsewhere, the EU has developed engagement with ASEAN, over regional issues such as Burma, with SAARC, and Latin America. Our experience gives the EU a particular role in fostering regional integration. Where others seek to emulate us, in line with their particular circumstances, we should support them.
The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.

Key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO. The EU is leading negotiations for a new international agreement on the former, and must use all its levers to achieve an ambitious outcome at Copenhagen in 2009. We should continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, and maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights. We need to mould the IMF and other financial institutions to reflect modern realities. The G8 should be transformed. And we must continue our collective efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

These issues cross boundaries, touching as much on domestic as foreign policy. Indeed, they demonstrate how in the twenty-first century, more than ever, sovereignty entails responsibility. With respect to core human rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

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Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.
NOTE
From: presidency
To: Delegations

INTRODUCTION

For fifty years the European Union, its institutions and Member States have promoted and provided freedom and security. Europe guarantees respect for human rights, the rule of law and solidarity. As Europeans, we enjoy the right to live, work and study in European countries other than our own. The removal of internal border controls in the Schengen area was an especially great step forward for Europe. In addition, technological advances have revolutionised the modes and speed of communications, with the result that not only our borders, but also our societies have opened up. Through unity in diversity, this free and prosperous Europe continues to facilitate and enrich peoples’ lives.

For citizens of the European Union, security is one of the main priorities. The EU multi-annual work programmes have already provided a good pragmatic basis for strengthening operational cooperation, but now a larger consensus on the vision, values and objectives which underpin EU internal security is required.
The main crime-related risks and threats facing Europe today, such as terrorism, serious and organised crime, drug trafficking, cyber-crime, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography, economic crime and corruption, trafficking in arms and cross-border crime, adapt extremely quickly to changes in science and technology, in their attempt to exploit illegally and undermine the values and prosperity of our open societies.

Whilst in itself not aimed at creating any new competences, but at integrating existing strategies and conceptual approaches, and acknowledging the framework of the Stockholm Programme, the EU Internal Security Strategy is responsive to this. It demonstrates a firm commitment to continuing to make progress in the area of justice, freedom and security through a European security model which faces the following challenges: protecting rights and freedoms; improving cooperation and solidarity between Member States; addressing the causes of insecurity and not just the effects; prioritising prevention and anticipation; involving all sectors with a role to play in public protection (political, economic, social, etc.); communicating security policies to the citizens; and, finally, recognising the interdependence between internal and external security in establishing a "global security" approach with third countries.

It is thus vital that the Internal Security Strategy itself be able to adapt, both to the needs of citizens, and to the challenges of the dynamic and global twenty-first century.

The concept of internal security must be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept which straddles multiple sectors in order to address these major threats and others which have a direct impact on the lives, safety, and well-being of citizens, including natural and man-made disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods and storms.

The cooperation of law-enforcement and border authorities, judicial authorities and other services in, for example, the health, social and civil protection sectors, is essential. Europe's Internal Security Strategy must exploit the potential synergies that exist in the areas of law-enforcement cooperation, integrated border management and criminal-justice systems. Indeed, these fields of activity in the European area of justice, freedom and security are inseparable: the Internal Security Strategy must ensure that they complement and reinforce one another.
Europe must consolidate a security model, based on the principles and values of the Union: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, democracy, dialogue, tolerance, transparency and solidarity.

The quality of our democracy and public confidence in the Union will depend to a large extent on our ability to guarantee security and stability in Europe and to work with our neighbours and partners to address the root causes of the internal security problems faced by the EU.

The Internal Security Strategy has been adopted in order to help drive Europe forward, bringing together existing activities and setting out the principles and guidelines for future action. It is designed to prevent crimes and increase the capacity to provide a timely and appropriate response to natural and man-made disasters through the effective development and management of adequate instruments.

1. PROTECTING PEOPLE IN EUROPE WITHIN A GLOBAL SOCIETY

The European Union (EU) in the twenty-first century consists of 500 million people across the twenty-seven countries which make up the Union. Economic growth, together with the opportunities provided by a free and democratic society based on the rule of law, generate prosperity amongst Europe's citizens – but with such opportunities also come risks, as terrorists and other types of criminals seek to abuse those freedoms in the pursuit of destructive and malicious ends. Furthermore, increased mobility of people in turn increases our common responsibility for protecting the freedoms which all citizens of the Union cherish.

Security has therefore become a key factor in ensuring a high quality of life in European society, and in protecting our critical infrastructures through preventing and tackling common threats.
There is no such thing as "zero risk" but, despite that, the Union must create a safe environment in which people in Europe feel protected. Furthermore, the necessary mechanisms must be put in place to maintain high security levels, not only within EU territory, but also as far as possible when citizens travel to third countries or find themselves in virtual environments such as the Internet.

In this context EU internal security means protecting people and the values of freedom and democracy, so that everyone can enjoy their daily lives without fear. It also reflects Europe's shared vision of today's challenges and our resolve to present a common front in dealing with those threats, where appropriate, with policies that harness the added value of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme enable the EU to take ambitious and concerted steps in developing Europe as an area of justice, freedom and security. Against that background, this strategy:

- sets out the common threats and challenges we face which make it more and more important for EU Member States and Institutions to work together in order to tackle new challenges which go beyond our national, bilateral or regional capability.

- sets out the EU’s common internal security policy – and the principles underpinning it – in a comprehensive and transparent way.

- defines a European Security Model, consisting of common tools and a commitment to: a mutually reinforced relationship between security, freedom and privacy; cooperation and solidarity between Member States; involvement of all the EU’s institutions; addressing the causes of insecurity, not just the effects; enhancing prevention and anticipation; involvement, as far as they are concerned, of all sectors which have a role to play in protection – political, economic and social; and a greater interdependence between internal and external security.
COMMON THREATS: The main challenges for the internal security of the EU

Crime takes advantage of the opportunities offered by a globalised society such as high-speed communications, high mobility and instant financial transactions. Likewise, there are phenomena which have a cross-border impact on security and safety within the EU. There are, therefore, a number of significant common threats which can be identified:

- **Terrorism, in any form**, has an absolute disregard for human life and democratic values. Its global reach, its devastating consequences, its ability to recruit through radicalisation and dissemination of propaganda over the Internet and the different means by which it is financed make terrorism a significant and ever-evolving threat to our security.

  - In February 2008, during Operation PIPAS (against an organisation carrying out credit card fraud), 100 people were arrested and forty-eight house searches conducted through a joint investigation between eleven countries, coordinated by Europol. Source: Europol Annual Report 2008, p. 24

- **In 2007, through Eurojust, twenty-six people across Italy, France, Romania, Portugal and the UK were arrested in an international anti-terrorist operation. The organisation was planning to carry out attacks in Italy, Afghanistan, Iraq and Arab countries.** Source: Eurojust Annual Report 2007, pp. 34-35

- **In 2008, through national, regional and EU efforts, 1009 people across thirteen countries were arrested on terrorism charges.** Source: Europol TE-SAT Report 2009, p. 6

- **serious and organised crime** is of increasing importance. In its various forms it tends to occur wherever it can reap the most financial benefit with the least risk, regardless of borders. Drug trafficking, economic crime, human trafficking, smuggling of persons, arms trafficking, sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography, violent crimes, money-laundering and document fraud are only some of the ways in which organised and serious crime manifests itself in the EU. In addition, corruption is a threat to the bases of the democratic system and the rule of law.
ANNEX 3

- **cyber-crime** represents a global, technical, cross-border, anonymous threat to our information systems and because of that, it poses many additional challenges for law-enforcement agencies.

- **cross-border crime**, such as petty or property crime, often carried out by gangs, when it has a significant impact on the daily lives of people in Europe.

- **violence itself**, such as youth violence or hooligan violence at sports events, increases the damage already caused by crimes and can significantly harm our society.

- **natural and man-made disasters**, such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods and storms, droughts, energy shortages and major Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) breakdowns, pose safety and security challenges. In this day and age, civil protection systems represent an essential element of any modern and advanced security system.

- there are a number of other common phenomena which cause concern and pose safety and security threats to people across Europe, for example **road traffic accidents**, which take the lives of tens of thousands of European citizens every year.
THE RESPONSE TO THESE CHALLENGES

In order to cope with these phenomena, EU Member States have their own national security policies and strategies, and in response to the movement of criminals between neighbouring countries, bilateral, multilateral and regional patterns of cooperation among Member States have also been developed. However, since those efforts are not enough to prevent and fight such criminal groups and their activities, which go far beyond our borders, an EU-wide approach is increasingly required.

Joint Police and Customs Centres, such as the Centre de Coopération Policière et Douanière in Luxembourg, which support effective operational cooperation between the police, gendarmerie and customs authorities of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and France.

The Salzburg Forum, composed of the Interior Ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania, who meet to discuss common security issues. The Baltic Sea Task Force, including non-EU members, which was set up to combat organised crime in the Baltic Sea Region.

In July 2009, a criminal organisation of seventeen people, responsible for the counterfeiting of euros with a face value of more than EUR 16 million distributed throughout the EU, was dismantled by the Bulgarian and Spanish prosecution and police authorities, with the help of a Joint Investigation Team that included Eurojust and Europol

Source: Eurojust Press Release 3 July 2009

The Member States must continuously strive to develop instruments so that national borders, differing legislation, different languages and ways of working do not impede progress in preventing cross-border crime.

The EU has made significant progress in this area in recent years. For example, increased law-enforcement and judicial cooperation has been essential since the abolition of internal-border controls, which allows for the free movement of people within the Schengen area.

Numerous instruments for facilitating cooperation have been developed. The most relevant include:

- **analysis of future situations and scenarios: threat anticipation.** Europol and other EU Agencies produce regular threat assessments.
• **adequate response: planning, programming and handling the consequences.** Work Programmes have been developed which enable us to address the dangers to and the concerns of citizens in a methodical way. Strategies and specific work plans have also been developed on counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, organised crime and civil protection. Furthermore, the Community Civil Protection Mechanism coordinates the response of Member States to natural and man-made disasters.

• **effectiveness in the field: the work of agencies, institutions and bodies.** A number of agencies specific to the EU have been created and these include **Europol**, whose main aims are to collect and exchange information and to facilitate cooperation between law-enforcement authorities in their fight against organised crime and terrorism, **Eurojust**, which drives coordination and increases the effectiveness of judicial authorities, and **Frontex**, which manages operational cooperation at the external borders. The EU has also created the role of the **Counter-Terrorism Coordinator**. Other bodies and networks have also been established in the fields of training, drugs, crime prevention, corruption and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

• **tools based on mutual recognition, for information sharing and to facilitate joint investigations and operations.** Instruments based on mutual recognition include the European Arrest Warrant and provision for the freezing of assets. Data bases such as the Schengen Information System and networks have also been established for the exchange of information on criminal records, on combating hooliganism, on missing persons or stolen vehicles and on visas which have been issued or refused. The use of DNA and fingerprint data helps put a name to anonymous traces left at crime scenes. EU legal instruments facilitate operational cooperation between Member States such as the setting up of joint investigation teams, the organising of joint operations and close cooperation to ensure the security of international events, including major sporting competitions.

• **evaluation mechanisms have been developed to assess the effectiveness of our actions.** For example, peer-to-peer evaluation exercises in the field of terrorism and organised crime which have contributed to the improvement of mutual trust.
2. TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SECURITY MODEL

The success to date demonstrates great progress in the fields of justice, freedom and security in the EU. However, we must continue to pool our efforts in order to guarantee even greater protection for our citizens. The Stockholm Programme and strategies such as the European Security Strategy, the Strategy on the external dimension in the area of justice, freedom and security and the Information Management Strategy have provided a good basis for doing that.

The time has come to harness and develop common tools and policies to tackle common threats and risks using a more integrated approach: that is the main aim of the Internal Security Strategy. To achieve that aim we have chosen a security model which integrates action on law enforcement and judicial cooperation, border management and civil protection.

The principles and guidelines for action using this model are set out below.

PRINCIPLES
People in Europe expect to live in security and to enjoy their freedoms: security is in itself a basic right. The values and principles established in the Treaties of the Union and set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights have inspired the EU’s Internal Security Strategy:

• justice, freedom and security policies which are mutually reinforcing whilst respecting fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of law and privacy.

• protection of all citizens, especially the most vulnerable, with the focus on victims of crimes such as trafficking in human beings or gender violence, including victims of terrorism who also need special attention, support and social recognition.
• **transparency and accountability** in security policies, so that they can be easily understood by citizens, and take account of their concerns and opinions.

• **dialogue** as the means of resolving differences in accordance with the principles of **tolerance, respect** and **freedom of expression**.

• **integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination** as key elements for EU internal security.

• **solidarity** between Member States in the face of challenges which cannot be met by Member States acting alone or where concerted action is to the benefit of the EU as a whole.

• **mutual trust** as a key principle for successful cooperation.

**STRATEGIC GUIDELINES FOR ACTION**

On the basis of these principles, ten guidelines for action are laid down in order to guarantee the EU’s internal security over the coming years.

**-I- A wide and comprehensive approach to internal security**

Internal security must be seen as encompassing a wide range of measures with both horizontal and vertical dimensions:

• **horizontal** dimension: to reach an adequate level of internal security in a complex global environment requires the involvement of law-enforcement and border-management authorities, with the support of judicial cooperation, civil protection agencies and also of the political, economic, financial, social and private sectors, including non-governmental organisations.
-II-  Ensuring the effective democratic and judicial supervision of security activities

Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the involvement of the European Parliament in the development of security policies has greatly increased, which means that effective consultation at all stages is essential. National parliaments also have a greater role to play in the work of the EU through their ability to monitor application of the subsidiarity principle and through their participation in evaluation of the implementation of justice, freedom and security policies.

The European Court of Justice becomes fully competent in this area (except as regards Member States' internal law and order and their security responsibilities). Finally, the EU's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights will also contribute to improved protection for the human rights of people in Europe.

-III-  Prevention and anticipation: a proactive, intelligence-led approach

Among the main objectives of the Internal Security Strategy for the EU are the prevention and anticipation of crime as well as of natural and man-made disasters, and the mitigation of their potential impact. Whilst effective prosecution of the perpetrators of a crime remains essential, a stronger focus on the prevention of criminal acts and terrorist attacks before they take place can help reduce the consequent human or psychological damage which is often irreparable.

Our strategy must therefore emphasise prevention and anticipation, which is based on a proactive and intelligence-led approach as well as procuring the evidence required for prosecution. It is only possible to bring successful legal action if all necessary information is available.
Furthermore, it is necessary to develop and improve prevention mechanisms such as analytical tools or early-warning systems. An applicable instrument of prevention should also be a European Passenger Names Record (PNR), that ensures a high level of data protection, for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime, based on an impact assessment. This allows us to deepen our understanding of the different types of threats and their probability and to anticipate what might happen, so that we are not only prepared for the outcomes of future threats but also able to establish mechanisms to detect them and prevent their happening in the first place. For this reason, a comprehensive approach must be taken that is geared to constant detection and prevention of the threats and risks facing the EU in the various areas of internal security, and the main issues of concern to the public. A strategy to prevent and tackle threats such as organised crime is needed.

Prevention of crime means addressing the root causes and not just the criminal acts and their consequences.

Security policies, especially those of prevention, must take a broad approach, involving not only law-enforcement agencies, but also institutions and professionals at both national and local levels. Cooperation should therefore be sought with other sectors like schools, universities and other educational institutions, in order to prevent young people from turning to crime. The private sector, especially when it is involved in financial activities, can contribute to the development and effective implementation of mechanisms to prevent fraudulent activities or money laundering. Civil society organisations can also play a role in running public awareness campaigns.

EU action in the field of civil protection must be guided by the objectives of reducing vulnerability to disasters through development of a strategic approach to disaster prevention and anticipation and by further improvements in preparedness and response while recognising national responsibility. Guidelines for hazard and risk-mapping methods, assessments and analyses should be developed as well as an overview of the natural and man-made risks that the EU may face in the future. This EU-wide risk analysis should be the basis for cooperation initiatives between risk-sharing Member States and the EU in the field of civil protection and capacity planning. New risks and threats are to be identified, such as energy shortage, ICT breakdown and pandemics. Resilience of citizens as well as public and private sector to the effects of disasters are to be included in prevention policies.
-IV- Development of a comprehensive model for information exchange
An internal security policy supported by information-exchange on a basis of mutual trust and culminating in the principle of information availability. If law-enforcement authorities are to be able to prevent and act early they must have timely access to as much data as possible concerning criminal acts and their perpetrators, modus operandi, details of victim(s), vehicles used, etc.

In order to increase substantially the current levels of information exchange, we must continue to strengthen the mechanisms which build mutual trust between the authorities responsible for ensuring internal security in the EU, in order to enhance existing mechanisms, and use the Information Management Strategy to develop a secure and structured European Information Exchange Model.

This model will include all the different EU databases relevant for ensuring security in the EU so that there can be interaction between them, as far as is needed and permitted, for the purpose of providing effective information exchange across the whole of the EU and maximising the opportunities presented by biometric and other technologies for improving our citizens' security within a clear framework that also protects their privacy.

This information exchange model must always fully respect the right to privacy and protection of personal data. If a higher level of security means an increase in data exchange, it is important that that increase be managed carefully, that it be proportionate and that it respect data protection laws.

-V- Operational cooperation
The Lisbon Treaty has created the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) to ensure effective coordination and cooperation between law-enforcement and border-management authorities, including the control and protection of external borders, and when appropriate judicial cooperation in criminal matters relevant to operational cooperation. The work of this Committee will be based, above all, on national and EU threat assessments and priorities.
Stringent cooperation between EU agencies and bodies involved in EU internal security (Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, Cepol and Sitcen) must be also ensured by COSI so as to encourage increasingly coordinated, integrated and effective operations. Such players must continue to improve the provision of effective support to specialist services in Member States. In particular, Europol's capacity to support Member States' operations should be improved.

Progress should be made on the development of a cooperation framework to improve security and safety at major and mass international events.

In the field of civil protection, the EU should promote an integrated approach to cover the different phases of a crisis – prevention, response, and recovery – through the implementation of European mutual assistance and solidarity.

**-VI- Judicial cooperation in criminal matters**

Closer cooperation between Member States' judicial authorities is essential, as is the need for EUROJUST to achieve its full potential within the framework of applicable law. At EU level, successful criminal operations and investigations must enable us to realise the potential synergies between law-enforcement and border agencies and judicial authorities in preventing cross-border crime.

**-VII- Integrated border management**

As well as tackling illegal immigration, integrated border management plays an important role in maintaining security. The integrated border-management mechanism must be reinforced in order, *inter alia*, to spread best practice among border guards. The feasibility of the creation of a European system of border guards must be explored on the basis of a prior analysis. Special emphasis will have to be given to the continued development of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).
The cooperation and coordination of Frontex with other EU agencies and Member States’ law-enforcement agencies is a key issue for the success of this Agency.

New technologies play a key role in border management. They may make it easier for citizens to cross quickly at external-border posts through automated systems, advance registration, frequent-traveller schemes, etc. They improve security by allowing for the necessary controls to be put in place so that borders are not crossed by people or goods which pose a risk to the Union. In that context, close cooperation between law-enforcement and border-control authorities is essential. Likewise, the law-enforcement authorities should facilitate provision of the information necessary for the implementation of security measures at borders.

The entry into force of the Visa Code, further development of the Schengen Information System as well as electronic border-control systems, such as an exit-entry system, will contribute to intelligence-led integrated border management. Dialogue and cooperation with third countries of origin and transit are also essential, for example to build up border-control capacity.

-VIII- A commitment to innovation and training

It is necessary to work together to promote and develop new technologies through a common approach as well as cutting costs and increasing efficiency. In the field of technology, it is also important for the public and private sectors to work together. Building upon the outcome of research and development projects conducted under the Joint Research and Development Programme, the EU should develop technological standards and platforms tailored to its security needs.

The interoperability of different technology systems used by any agency or service must be a strategic objective so that equipment does not pose a barrier to cooperation between Member States on the sharing of information or the carrying out of joint operations.
A strategic approach to professional training in Europe: this objective is essential in establishing law-enforcement, judicial and border-management authorities that have advanced technology and are at the forefront of their specialisation, and in enabling European law-enforcement training to take a major step forward and become a powerful vehicle for promoting a shared culture amongst European law-enforcement bodies and facilitating transnational cooperation. For that to be achieved, European elements should be included in national training, and exchange programmes should be developed on the basis of the Erasmus model. To that end, highly trained European professionals sharing a similar culture will add value in the context of competition in a globalised society, as well as in the field of security. The European agencies and bodies, especially CEPOL, should play an important role.

**-IX- External dimension of internal security/cooperation with third countries**

A concept of internal security cannot exist without an external dimension, since internal security increasingly depends to a large extent on external security. International cooperation by the EU and its Member States, both bilaterally and multilaterally, is essential in order to guarantee security and protect the rights of our citizens and to promote security and respect for rights abroad. The EU’s policies with regard to third countries need to consider security as a key factor and develop mechanisms for coordination between security and other related policies, such as foreign policy, where security issues must increasingly be taken into account in an integrated and proactive approach.

In terms of external security, the EU must not restrict itself just to cooperation between the law-enforcement agencies of Member States and other countries, especially EU neighbours. It is necessary to build relationships with other countries through a global approach to security, working closely with them and, when necessary, supporting their institutional, economic and social development. This system of working will mean establishing opportunities for dialogue through areas of mutual interest, concerns and the possibilities for cooperation that can be identified in each case. Cooperation and coordination with international organisations in the field of law enforcement, in particular with Interpol, should be enhanced. Bilateral, multilateral and regional approaches among Member States should be developed, where appropriate, to address specific threats.

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European countries have established successful platforms in the Caribbean, Lisbon, Toulon, Accra and Dakar in cooperation with third countries in the fight against drug trafficking.
The efforts to combat transnational crime outside the EU as well and to build up respect for the rule of law are of crucial importance. Cooperation with the Common European Security and Defence Policy, especially between the EU agencies and the respective missions, must therefore to be enhanced even further. It is also very important to strengthen the participation of law enforcement agencies and Justice Freedom and Security bodies at all stages of civilian crisis-management missions, so that they can play a part in resolving conflicts by working together with all other services involved on the ground (military, diplomatic, emergency services, etc.). Special attention will have to be paid to "weak and failed States" so that they do not become hubs of organised crime or terrorism.

In this context, the Internal Security Strategy serves as an indispensable complement to the EU Security Strategy, developed in 2003 under the EU’s Security and Defence Policy to address global risks and threats and to make a commitment to the social, political and economic development of global society as the most effective way of achieving effective and long-lasting security.

**-X-  Flexibility to adapt to future challenges**

A broad, pragmatic, flexible and realistic approach, continually adapting to reality, taking into account risks and threats which could impact on citizens in a wider perspective, not focusing only on criminal aspects but taking into account risks of any kind which might create a security problem in the broader sense, as well as being attentive to the detection of any need to adapt to these changing circumstances and guaranteeing the highest levels of security for the people of Europe.
3. **NEXT STEPS**

Following the Action Plan for the implementation of the Stockholm Programme, the Commission will adopt a Communication on the Internal Security Strategy which will include action oriented proposals. Further developing, monitoring and implementing the Internal Security Strategy must become one of the priority tasks of the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI). Furthermore, according to the Stockholm Programme, the Commission will consider the feasibility of setting up an Internal Security Fund to promote the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy.
CONSOLIDATED VERSION

OF

THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

SECTION 2

PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Article 42
(ex Article 17 TEU)

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as the European Defence Agency) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

**Article 43**

1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

**Article 44**

1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Article 45

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:

(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;

(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;

(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;

(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.

Article 46

1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.
3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.

The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.

The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.

6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only.
CONSOLIDATED VERSION

OF

THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
TITIE VII

SOLIDARITY CLAUSE

Article 222

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

   (a) — prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

   — protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;

   — assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.

3. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council shall act in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union where this decision has defence implications. The European Parliament shall be informed.

   For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article 240, the Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the structures developed in the context of the common security and defence policy and by the Committee referred to in Article 71; the two committees shall, if necessary, submit joint opinions.

4. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action.
PROTOCOL (No 10)  
ON PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION  
ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE 42 OF THE TREATY ON  
EUROPEAN UNION  

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,  

HAVING REGARD TO Article 42(6) and Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union,  

RECALLING that the Union is pursuing a common foreign and security policy based on the achievement of growing convergence of action by Member States,  

RECALLING that the common security and defence policy is an integral part of the common foreign and security policy; that it provides the Union with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets; that the Union may use such assets in the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; that the performance of these tasks is to be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States in accordance with the principle of a single set of forces,  

RECALLING that the common security and defence policy of the Union does not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States,  

RECALLING that the common security and defence policy of the Union respects the obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty of those Member States which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, and is compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework,  

CONVINCED that a more assertive Union role in security and defence matters will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance, in accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements,  

DETERMINED to ensure that the Union is capable of fully assuming its responsibilities within the international community,  

RECOGNISING that the United Nations Organisation may request the Union's assistance for the urgent implementation of missions undertaken under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter,  

RECOGNISING that the strengthening of the security and defence policy will require efforts by Member States in the area of capabilities,  

CONSCIOUS that embarking on a new stage in the development of the European security and defence policy involves a determined effort by the Member States concerned,  

RECALLING the importance of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy being fully involved in proceedings relating to permanent structured cooperation,
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

**Article 1**

The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to:

(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and

(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of five to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.

**Article 2**

To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to:

(a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of the Union’s international responsibilities;

(b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics;

(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures;

(d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’;
(e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency.

**Article 3**

The European Defence Agency shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating Member States’ contributions with regard to capabilities, in particular contributions made in accordance with the criteria to be established, *inter alia*, on the basis of Article 2, and shall report thereon at least once a year. The assessment may serve as a basis for Council recommendations and decisions adopted in accordance with Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council

1 INTRODUCTION

The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place. The UN estimates that all but one of its emergency appeals for humanitarian aid in 2007 were climate related. In 2007 the UN Security Council held its first debate on climate change and its implications for international security. The European Council has drawn attention to the impact of climate change on international security and in June 2007 invited the High Representative and the European Commission to present a joint report to the European Council in Spring 2008.

The science of climate change is now better understood. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change demonstrate that even if by 2050 emissions would be reduced to below half of 1990 levels, a temperature rise of up to 2°C above pre-industrial levels will be difficult to avoid. Such a temperature increase will pose serious security risks that would increase if warming continues. Unmitigated climate change beyond 2°C will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it is likely to trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible and largely unpredictable climate changes. Investment in mitigation to avoid such scenarios, as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive security policy.
Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. It is important to recognise that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests. Moreover, in line with the concept of human security, it is clear that many issues related to the impact of climate change on international security are interlinked requiring comprehensive policy responses. For example, the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals would be at considerable risk because climate change, if unmitigated, may well wipe out years of development efforts.

This report focuses on the impact of climate change on international security and considers the impact of these international security consequences for Europe’s own security, and how the EU should respond.

The EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in development, global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal. Moreover, the security challenge plays to Europe’s strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, and as a key proponent of effective multilateralism.

The European Security Strategy recognised the link between global warming and competition for natural resources while the Communication “Europe in the World” highlighted the effects of globalisation on external relations.

The report considers how the full range of EU instruments, including Community and CFSP/ESDP action, can be used alongside mitigation and adaptation policies to address the security risks. It also considers the implications for the intensification of political dialogue with third countries. A post-2012 agreement has to be developed by the end of 2009 and all levers of EU foreign relations must work towards this end.
The report concludes that it is in Europe's self interest to address the security implications of climate change with a series of measures: at the level of the EU, in bilateral relations and at the multilateral level, in mutually supportive ways.

Although this report addresses the impact of climate change on international security, the EU's response will be conditioned by the impact of climate change on Europe itself. Climate change will heavily affect Europe's natural environment and nearly all sections of society and the economy.

II. THREATS

The effects of climate change are being felt now: temperatures are rising, icecaps and glaciers are melting and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and more intense. The following section outlines some of the forms of conflicts driven by climate change which may occur in different regions of the world.

i) Conflict over resources
Reduction of arable land, widespread shortage of water, diminishing food and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged droughts are already happening in many parts of the world. Climate change will alter rainfall patterns and further reduce available freshwater by as much as 20 to 30% in certain regions. A drop in agricultural productivity will lead to, or worsen, food-insecurity in least developed countries and an unsustainable increase in food prices across the board. Water shortage in particular has the potential to cause civil unrest and to lead to significant economic losses, even in robust economies. The consequences will be even more intense in areas under strong demographic pressure. The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicised.
ii) Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure
It has been estimated that a business as usual scenario in dealing with climate change could cost the world economy up to 20% of global GDP per year, whereas the cost of effective concerted action can be limited to 1%. Coastal zones are the home of about one fifth of the world’s population, a number set to rise in the years ahead. Mega-cities, with their supporting infrastructure, such as port facilities and oil refineries, are often located by the sea or in river deltas. Sea-level rise and the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and their economic prospects. The East coasts of China and India as well as the Caribbean region and Central America would be particularly affected. An increase in disasters and humanitarian crises will lead to immense pressure on the resources of donor countries, including capacities for emergency relief operations.

iii) Loss of territory and border disputes
Scientists project major changes to the landmass during this century. Receding coastlines and submergence of large areas could result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states. More disputes over land and maritime borders and other territorial rights are likely. There might be a need to revisit existing rules of international law, particularly the Law of the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border disputes. A further dimension of competition for energy resources lies in potential conflict over resources in Polar regions which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming. Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts over territory and borders that threatens the political stability of countries and regions.

iv) Environmentally-induced migration
Those parts of the populations that already suffer from poor health conditions, unemployment or social exclusion are rendered more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, which could amplify or trigger migration within and between countries. The UN predicts that there will be millions of "environmental" migrants by 2020 with climate change as one of the major drivers of this phenomenon. Some countries that are extremely vulnerable to climate change are already calling for international recognition of such environmentally-induced migration. Such migration may increase conflicts in transit and destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure.
v) **Situations of fragility and radicalization**

Climate change may significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by over-stretching the already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face. The inability of a government to meet the needs of its population as a whole or to provide protection in the face of climate change-induced hardship could trigger frustration, lead to tensions between different ethnic and religious groups within countries and to political radicalisation. This could destabilise countries and even entire regions.

vi) **Tension over energy supply**

One of the most significant potential conflicts over resources arises from intensified competition over access to, and control over, energy resources. That in itself is, and will continue to be, a cause of instability. However, because much of the world's hydrocarbon reserves are in regions vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and because many oil and gas producing states already face significant social economic and demographic challenges, instability is likely to increase. This has the potential to feed back into greater energy insecurity and greater competition for resources. A possible wider use of nuclear energy for power generation might raise new concerns about proliferation, in the context of a non-proliferation regime that is already under pressure. As previously inaccessible regions open up due to the effects of climate change, the scramble for resources will intensify.

vii) **Pressure on international governance**

The multilateral system is at risk if the international community fails to address the threats outlined above. Climate change impacts will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it. Impacts of climate mitigation policies (or policy failures) will thus drive political tension nationally and internationally. The potential rift not only divides North and South but there will also be a South - South dimension particularly as the Chinese and Indian share of global emissions rises. The already burdened international security architecture will be put under increasing pressure.
III. GEOGRAPHICAL EXAMPLES

In many regions, climate change is fuelling one or more of the threats identified above. The following sections illustrate how climate change is multiplying existing pressures in various regions around the world. Since the EU’s neighbours include some of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, e.g. North Africa and the Middle East, migratory pressure at the European Union's borders and political instability and conflicts could increase in the future. This could also have a significant impact on Europe’s energy supply routes.

1. Africa:
Africa is one of the continents most vulnerable to climate change because of multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity. In North Africa and the Sahel, increasing drought, water scarcity and land overuse will degrade soils and could lead to a loss of 75% of arable, rain-fed land. The Nile Delta could be at risk from both sea-level rise and salinisation in agricultural areas while 12 to 15% of arable land could be lost through sea-level rise in this century with 5 million people affected by 2050. Already today, climate change is having a major impact on the conflict in and around Darfur. In the Horn of Africa reduced rainfall and increasing temperatures will have a significant negative impact on a region highly vulnerable to conflict. In southern Africa, droughts are contributing to poor harvests, leading to food insecurity in several areas with millions of people expected to face food shortages. Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions through Northern Africa to reach Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify. In Africa, and elsewhere, climate change is expected to have a negative effect on health, in particular due to the spread of vector-borne diseases further aggravating tensions.
2. **Middle East:**

Water systems in the Middle East are already under intense stress. Roughly two-thirds of the Arab world depends on sources outside their borders for water. The Jordan and Yarmuk rivers are expected to see considerable reduction in their flows affecting Israel, the Palestinian territories and Jordan. Existing tensions over access to water are almost certain to intensify in this region leading to further political instability with detrimental implications for Europe's energy security and other interests. Water supply in Israel might fall by 60% over this century. Consequently, a significant drop in crop yields is projected for an area that is already largely arid or semi-arid. Significant decreases are expected to hit Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia and thus affect stability in a vitally strategic region for Europe.

3. **South Asia:**

Sea-level rise may threaten the habitat of millions of people as 40% of Asia's population (almost 2 billion) lives within 60km from the coastline. Water stress and loss of agricultural productivity will make it difficult for Asia to feed its growing population who will additionally be exposed to an increase of infectious diseases. Changes in the monsoon rains and decrease of melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than 1 billion people. Conflicts over remaining resources and unmanaged migration will lead to instability in a region that is an important economic partner of Europe with factors of production and distribution concentrated along vulnerable coastlines.

4. **Central Asia:**

Central Asia is another region severely affected by climate change. An increasing shortage of water, which is both a key resource for agriculture and a strategic resource for electricity generation, is already noticeable. The glaciers in Tajikistan lost a third of their area in the second half of the 20th century alone, while Kyrgyzstan has lost over a 1000 glaciers in the last four decades. There is thus considerable additional potential for conflict in a region whose strategic, political and economic developments as well as increasing trans-regional challenges impact directly or indirectly on EU interests.
5. **Latin America and the Caribbean:**
In drier areas of Latin America climate change will lead to salinisation and desertification of agricultural land and to decreasing productivity of important crops and livestock. This will have adverse consequences for food security. Sea-level rise is projected to cause increased risk of flooding in low-lying areas. Increases in sea surface temperature due to climate change are projected to have adverse effects on coral reefs, and cause shifts in the location of fish stocks. Latin American and Caribbean countries are already subject to the detrimental effects, including many extreme events, associated with the El Niño cycle. Changes in rainfall patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect water availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation, for example in the Andes region. Countries in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico are already increasingly affected by major hurricanes. This will be further exacerbated by climate change and result in social and political tensions in a region with often weak governance structures.

6. **The Arctic:**
The rapid melting of the polar ice caps, in particular, the Arctic, is opening up new waterways and international trade routes. In addition, the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests. The resulting new strategic interests are illustrated by the recent planting of the Russian flag under the North Pole. There is an increasing need to address the growing debate over territorial claims and access to new trade routes by different countries which challenge Europe's ability to effectively secure its trade and resource interests in the region and may put pressure on its relations with key partners.

**IV. Conclusions and Recommendations**

The impact of climate change on international security is not a problem of the future but already of today and one which will stay with us. Even if progress is made in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases, weather patterns have already changed, global temperatures have already risen and, above all, climate change is already being felt around the globe.
The active role of the EU in the international climate change negotiations is vital and must continue. The EU has demonstrated leadership both in international negotiations, in particular by advocating the 2°C target, and with its far-reaching decisions on domestic climate and energy policies. Yet, the EU cannot act alone. In a changing international political landscape, major emitters and emerging economies will also have to be engaged and commit to an ambitious global climate agreement under the UN framework.

In the EU’s response, special consideration needs to be given to the US, China and India and what the implications mean for the EU’s long term relations with Russia. The recommendations below should be complemented by further studies and followed up by coherent EU action plans, aiming at addressing the different dimensions of the responses required to address the impact of climate change on international security in a comprehensive and effective manner. The upcoming examination of the implementation of the European Security Strategy, and as appropriate proposals to complement it, should take account of the security dimension of climate change.

**Enhancing capacities at the EU level**

A first step to address the impact of climate change on international security should be to build up knowledge and assess the EU's own capacities, followed by an improvement in the prevention of, and preparedness for early responses to, disasters and conflicts. Financial implications for such responses should be identified and also be considered in the EU’s budget review.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

- Intensify EU capacities for research, analysis, monitoring and early warning and Watch Lists including the Institute for Security Studies, the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the EU Network of Energy Correspondents (NEC), the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Joint Research Centres. Monitoring and early warning needs to include in particular situations of state fragility and political radicalisation, tensions over resources and energy supplies, environmental and socio-economic stresses, threats to critical infrastructures and economic assets, border disputes, impact on human rights and potential migratory movements.
• Further build up EU and Member State planning and capabilities including civil protection and the use of crisis management and disaster response instruments (civil and military) to contribute to the response to the security risks posed by climate change.

• Commission further work to look, region-by-region, in more detail at what the security implications are likely to be and how they will affect EU interests.

**EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security**

Climate change is a key element of international relations and will be increasingly so in the coming years, including its security dimension. If recognised, it can even become a positive driver for improving and reforming global governance. As it is a global problem, the EU is advocating a multilateral response. Building on the successful Bali conference in Dec 2007 the EU needs to continue and strengthen its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement in 2009, including both mitigation and adaptation action by all countries as a key contribution to addressing climate security.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

• Focus attention on the security risks related to climate change in the multilateral arena; in particular within the UN Security Council, the G8 as well as the UN specialised bodies (among others by addressing a possible need to strengthen certain rules of international law, including the Law of the Sea).

• Enhance international cooperation on the detection and monitoring of the security threats related to climate change, and on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response capacities. Promote the development of regional security scenarios for different levels of climate change and their implications for international security.

• Consider environmentally-triggered additional migratory stress in the further development of a comprehensive European migration policy, in liaison with all relevant international bodies.
Cooperation with third countries

Climate change calls for revisiting and reinforcing EU cooperation and political dialogue instruments, giving more attention to the impact of climate change on security. This could lead to greater prioritisation and enhanced support for climate change mitigation and adaptation, good governance, natural resource management, technology transfer, trans-boundary environmental cooperation (inter alia water and land), institutional strengthening and capacity building for crisis management.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

- Further integrate adaptation and resilience to climate change into EU regional strategies (for example Northern Dimension, European Neighbourhood Policy, EU-Africa Strategy, Barcelona Process, Black Sea Synergy, EU-Central Asia Strategy, Middle East action plan). Special attention should be given to the most vulnerable regions and potential climate security hot spots. The Global Climate Change Alliance between the EU and the most vulnerable developing countries should be built upon.
- Develop an EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into account i.a. access to resources and the opening of new trade routes.
- Examine the security implications of climate change in dialogue with third countries including through the sharing of analyses.
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