EVALUATION OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA, 2002-2007

Russell Gasser | Geneva | August 2009

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The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) strives for a world free of anti-personnel mines and from the threat of other landmines and explosive remnants of war, and where the suffering and concerns of populations living in affected areas are addressed. The Centre is active in research, provides operational assistance and supports the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.


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ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRCNMS</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AICMA</td>
<td>Integrated Mine Action Programme (of the OAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APL</td>
<td>Anti-personnel Landmine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>Abandoned Explosive Ordinance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Community Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission, also European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuropeAid</td>
<td>The EuropeAid Cooperation Office of the European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Multi-Criteria Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAA</td>
<td>National Mine Action Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-State Actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation for American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PADCA</td>
<td>Program of Demining Assistance to Central America (of the OAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAICMA</td>
<td>Presidential Programme of Integrated Action against Anti-personnel landmines (of Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>External (Foreign) Relations Directorate General of the EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIM</td>
<td>Resilience-Impact Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Suspected Hazardous Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordinance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The EC Anti-Personnel Landmine Regulation of 2001\(^1\) mandated evaluations of EC Mine Action strategy every three years. The first report was a Global Evaluation published in 2005, this report forms one part of the 2008 evaluation by regions and covers Latin America, 2002-2007.

Total EC funding for mine action in Latin America in the period 2002-2007 was about 8 million euros, roughly 2% of the EC total worldwide budget for mine action. Sixty-eight percent of the eight million euros was from the dedicated thematic Anti-Personnel Landmine budget line and 31% was from the geographic budget for Colombia. There were also smaller contributions from the Human Rights and ECHO budgets.

The approach used for the evaluation was desk research, visits to mine-affected countries and further contact with EC delegations by phone and internet. Face-to-face discussions with RELEX staff in Brussels took place before and after the field visit to Peru and Colombia.

IMPACT OF MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin America has nine countries with contamination by mines and other Explosive Remnants of War. Five have no known casualties and little or no mine impact. Three countries have local impact near contaminated areas and some casualties, fewer than 30 civilians per year in total, killed and injured, for all three countries together. Mines account for about one third of the accidents. Colombia has massive, widespread contamination affecting 60% of municipalities and one of the highest mine/ERW accident rates in the world, affecting about 350 civilians per year. Mines are still being emplaced in some parts of Colombia due to an ongoing long-term conflict.

Mine clearance throughout Latin America is usually a monopoly of military and police special forces, there appears to be no NGO or commercial clearance. The Organization of American States’ mine action programme dominates mine action both in terms of scale, and also historically as it started in 1991, some six years before the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) was signed. The modus operandi is based on military-to-military training to build national clearance capacity based on national military (or special police forces) in each country.

The EC has funded mine clearance projects (which included training and equipping, and also small amounts of other activities) in Chile, on the Peru-Ecuador border and in Nicaragua. In Colombia funding was given for capacity building of the national mine action centre, Mine Risk Education, and other activities. The Chile and Peru-Ecuador projects were perhaps selected for their strategic political importance more than for the impact of the demining.

In 2006 a restructuring of EU foreign policy mechanisms led to the elimination of thematic budget lines and the introduction of four new Instruments. Funding for mine action, except in countries with crises or emerging crises, would henceforth all be from geographic budget lines and would thus depend on the prioritisation of mine action by the national government leading to


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EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA
FINAL VERSION | ii
its inclusion in the EC Country Strategy Paper. This is in line with the EC commitment to the Paris Declaration.

**KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The selection of countries to receive funding was appropriate and relevant. The allocation of funding was also generally relevant. More attention could have been given earlier to the mine contamination inside Peru blocking access to infrastructure.

Whilst the funding for mine clearance may indeed have been an entirely appropriate response to political goals, with two exceptions there is no longer an evident need for further mine action funding in Latin America. The most important exception is Colombia, a heavily mine impacted country with hundreds of mine casualties every year, and there may also be a case for some limited support for the special police demining teams clearing infrastructure in Peru.

The OAS mine action programme has offered the EC very poor value for money in terms of the cost of demining. There are also some serious issues regarding how the OAS way of working relates to a Project Cycle and developmental approach. Any future EC investment in mine action in Latin America must take more steps to conduct an appraisal to determine the appropriate program model and the value for money of the proposed intervention.

There are problems with fragmentation and isolation of the EC mine action efforts and the staff responsible for implementing them. These were noted in the 2005 Global report but have been exacerbated in some ways by deconcentration, the ending of the APL horizontal budget line and other impacts of the new Instruments. Latin America is particularly susceptible to this due to the small number of projects – one per selected country except Colombia.

There has not been enough communication between EC staff working on mine action throughout Latin America – due to the small number of mine action projects Project Officers do not usually have colleagues with mine action experience in the same delegation. Exchange of information and experience between delegations could have been of real value – especially in a region where many mined areas are on international borders and all the affected countries have a common language.

EC staff has only one, or a few, mine action projects as part of a large portfolio; they are not specialized in demining. This has led to poor project design and implementation.

There is a lack of information in a suitable format to support delegation staff by providing them the key information they need to successfully draw up and implement demining contracts and manage mine action projects. The lack of information is exacerbated by the apparent difficulty in contracting technical experts to assist in these tasks (a key point of the 2005 Global Assessment) and the absence of opportunities for specialist training.

Whilst there are some difficulties in coming to grips with the new Instruments, especially for rapid response actions, these are not specific to mine action. The mine action community was apparently unaware of the changes in advance, despite their publication from 2004 onwards.

In Colombia the ongoing conflict, and the military monopoly on demining, limit options. The EC funding for a rapid survey of landmine impact and victims (currently in planning) is welcomed. Until a peace process is underway there may be limited opportunities for further action. The work already supported in building institutional capacity in Colombia appears to be sustainable
beyond the end of the funding and further support in this area is not a priority. Mine action in support of the EC’s substantial commitment to peace-building and emergency relief to displaced people in Colombia should remain a priority within the CSP for Colombia so that funding from Geographical budget lines remains an option.

In November 2008, after this report was written, the EC published a set of guidelines on how to more effectively link mine action with development for future programming of EC mine action over the 2008-2013 period. This Commission Staff working document, “Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013” can be downloaded from the website.2

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2 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/anti_landmines/docs/index_en.htm
1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted a Regulation in two parts as the basis of the European Community response to the problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL). The Regulation laid the foundation of a Europe-wide integrated and focused policy.

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states: “The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.” The APL Regulation goes on to state: “Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions […]” (Article 14).

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007 further specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:
Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Caucasus-Central Asia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005, while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

The objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country and

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4 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

5 Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:
- provide a repository service for reports from evaluations and similar studies;
- train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
- support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

regional levels. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America to generate credible and useful lessons for the European Commission, to support the improved planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
1. To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
   - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
   - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
   - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Programmes for mine-affected countries in Latin America;
2. To analyse the allocation of funds among mine-affected states in Latin America, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
3. To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
   - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
   - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
   - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/programmes of the beneficiary countries;
4. To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
5. To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in;
6. To assess the potential impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and the implementation of the four new Instruments on future mine action support from the EC to Latin America;
7. To make recommendations to improve the identification, the definition, the implementation and the impact of EC-funded mine projects;
8. To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among mine action programmes in Latin America and globally.

METHODOLOGY
The evaluation entailed: (i) preliminary planning and research; (ii) initial contact with EC staff in Brussels (iii) missions to the focus countries (Colombia and Peru); and (iv) additional contact with EC delegation staff in two further countries (Nicaragua and Chile); (v) a second round of meetings in Brussels with EC staff to discuss the initial findings; (vi) analysis and reporting.

The Evaluation Team comprised Dr Russell Gasser, Director of Humanitarian Technology Consulting Limited and a former Fonctionnaire of the European Commission, supported in strategy and reporting by Dr Robert Keeley, Director of RK Consulting Ltd and a former Bomb Disposal Officer in the British Army. The country missions were organised as follows:
In addition, it was possible to meet with staff of the EC Delegation in Nicaragua on 28th December 2007.

Reporting included a country report on each of Colombia and Peru, and this overall strategic evaluation report.

**DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION CRITERIA**

The standard development evaluation criteria promoted by the OECD\(^7\) of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability will be used in this evaluation, in line with the ToR:

- **Relevance**: The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.
- **Effectiveness**: A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.
- **Efficiency**: Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.
- **Impact**: The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
- **Sustainability**: Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. This includes environmental as well as financial sustainability\(^8\).

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\(^7\) See OECD website for further information
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html

\(^8\) The full terms of reference are attached in Annex I
2. GENERAL FINDINGS

OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF ERW AND EC FUNDED MINE ACTION INITIATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM

Latin America has 14 countries with former or current mine and/or other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) problems. The 9 countries which still have contamination are indicated in bold type in the table below. Only one country, Colombia, is seriously affected by mines and ERW.9

Table 1 – Countries with former or current mine and/or ERW problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Argentina continues to claim the Falklands/Malvinas which are heavily contaminated, but no mines on the mainland. See note 1, below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Mostly border minefields, few casualties. Clearance in progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Widespread contamination due to an ongoing armed conflict. Continued new use of mines. By far the most severely affected country in Latin America, hundreds of civilian casualties each year at present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Border minefields with Nicaragua cleared, declared free of known minefields 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Minefields around USA Guantánamo Bay base. Some reports state these have now been cleared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Contamination in border area with Peru from 1995 war. Clearance under way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>El Salvador has claimed on several occasions since 1994 that it is totally or almost free from uncleared minefields. Small numbers of residual mines and ERW are still being found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>One minefield only, cleared in 2005. ERW also cleared. Guatemala now declared free from known mines and ERW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Border minefields cleared 2004. Honduras now declared free from known minefields, though a few residual mines still reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Clearance of border and remote minefields under way, about 130,000 people still affected. Completion probably 2008 or 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Technically, a part of the problem in Colombia consists of mines (many of which are improvised mines) as well as IEDs and other ERW: as the conflict is continuing there are also items of explosive ordnance which are not abandoned nor remnants of war but active stockpiles and ordnance in current use.
Peru

Two separate problems: the border with Ecuador and infrastructure in other parts of the country, especially electric line pylons. Clearance under way - slow on border

Panama

UXO in former USA army ranges in canal zone. No mines.

Suriname

Small number of mines finally cleared 2005. A WW2 ammunition dump remains to be cleared.

Venezuela

13 mined areas around naval bases. Clearance currently planned for 2011.

Note 1: The inclusion of Argentina and the Falkland Islands is solely based on a geographical interpretation of “Latin America.” Inclusion of Argentina does not represent any official position of the EC or its member states, nor of the GICHD, on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas; nor does it reflect any opinion regarding responsibility for the clearance of the islands. Similarly, the inclusion of Guantánamo indicates only a geographic interpretation.

Note 2: The clearance of all known minefields cannot guarantee that all mines have been cleared, especially in remote areas. Residual “forgotten” mines and ERW must be expected in the same way that parts of Europe have residual contamination from the first and second World Wars.

CASUALTIES AND CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS

Except for Colombia, the number of casualties due to ERW in Latin America is very small. This is summarised in the table below.

In the whole of Latin America except Colombia, in 2005 the reported civilian casualties, for both deaths and injuries together, was 25, of which 9 were due to mines and 16 due to other ERW. In 2006 the total was 28, with 5 reported mine casualties, and a further 23 casualties from other ERW. These figures may be lower than the actual number due to under-reporting. A larger number of UXO than mine casualties is usual in countries where there are not large displaced populations, for Latin America outside Colombia the ratio is very approximately three to five times as many UXO than mine casualties. About two thirds of the casualties in Colombia are military and police casualties from the continuing conflict. These have not been included in this table.

Table 2 – Casualties and clearance requirements in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Area remaining to be cleared (hectares)</th>
<th>Civilian 2005</th>
<th>Casualties 2006</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Falklands/Malvin as all fenced &amp; marked.</td>
<td>About 2000 ha</td>
<td>No casualties</td>
<td>No casualties</td>
<td>Low impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from Landmine Monitor and APMBC Article 5 reports.

11 Humanitarian deminers (but not military deminers) have also been included in these figures, the intention is to avoid confusing military combat casualties with civilian mine victims.
## Evaluation of EC-funded Mine Action Programmes in Latin America

### Country | Contamination | Area remaining to be cleared (hectares) | Civilian Casualties 2005 | Casualties 2006 | Impact |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
**Chile** | Mostly border minefields. Fenced and marked. | About 2000 ha | 1 mine - Peruvian citizen | 2 mine 6 UXO | Low impact |
**Colombia** | Large scale contamination. Details not known. Current conflict with continuing mine use. | Extensive, including 21 ha ready to be cleared around military bases. | 338 total mine, UXO, IED | 314 total mine, UXO, IED | High & very high rural impact |
**Cuba** | Border minefields (Guantánamo) | No casualties | No casualties | No casualties | No impact |
**Ecuador** | Border minefields (Peru border) | About 34 ha | No casualties | No casualties | Low impact |
**Nicaragua** | Border and remote minefields. | About 56 ha | 7 mine 8 UXO | 2 mine 5 UXO | Local impact |
**Peru** | (a) Minefields (Ecuador border) (b) Infrastructure | * 21 ha • less than 50 ha | 1 mine 8 UXO | 1 mine 12 UXO | Local impact |
**Panama** | UXO in former USA ranges in canal zone. No mines. | Not known. Cost estimate US$500M - 650M | No casualties | No casualties | Low impact |
**Venezuela** | 13 mined areas around naval bases. | 0.6 ha | No casualties | No casualties | No impact |

In **Colombia**, the defined mined area which can be cleared to international standards at present is also small (21 ha), and all other mined areas are in conflict zones. The contamination in conflict zones is extensive with 60% of municipalities and 30 of 31 mainland departments affected. The Colombian military undertakes operations called “Emergency humanitarian demining” however these are believed to be clearance in order to reduce humanitarian impact and not clearance according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), which would include quality management processes and reporting in the national mine action database.

**Argentina**, which maintains a claim to the Falkland Islands and is in complex negotiations with the UK about mine clearance there, has no mines on the South American mainland. The total area which will have to be cleared in the Falklands is about 2,000 hectares, all of which is fenced and marked. There have been no casualties and the local population are on record as requesting...
mine clearance should first be completed in other more urgent areas in other countries. Chile also has about 2,000 hectares to clear. This is all stated as being marked and fenced and is almost all in border areas. The casualty rates are low. The impact is low.

Many of the mine affected areas are in border zones (international frontiers) or around military installations. The exceptions are Colombia which has a widespread mine problem and Peru which has both a border problem and also a separate problem with mined infrastructure inside the country.

**EC support for Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) compliance**

Central America has four countries already declared free of known minefields and Nicaragua is likely to reach this position in 2009. The situation is not the same in South America where total clearance of remote border mines will be both expensive and time consuming. The evaluation team notes that full compliance with the APMBC in its present form includes achieving “clearance of all known minefields” status. However, the EC 2005 to 2007 mine action strategy has as its title “Towards zero victims,” and in most affected countries in Latin America victim rates are already low. Article 6 of the Convention places an expectation on rich countries to assist those with fewer resources in achieving clearance. Nevertheless this is not a full obligation and clearing all known minefields, especially within a short time limit, is prohibitively expensive in some countries. Use of scarce resources to do this where there is little or no socio-economic impact is difficult to justify unless there are overriding political considerations.

Without an end to the current conflict and extensive clearance activities, there is no prospect of Colombia reaching either full clearance of known mined areas or impact free status.

**AMOUNT OF SUPPORT**

In the years 2002 to 2007 an estimated 8 million euros of EC Mine Action funding was spent in Latin America, rather less than 3% of the total amount (final data are not yet available for 2007). Given the small number of countries and projects involved, it has been possible to compile what is considered to be a complete list of projects with co-financing from the EC\(^\text{12}\). This does not include projects bilaterally (or multilaterally) funded by Member State governments.

The full list is included in Annex 2.

**Table 3 – EC mine action funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total EC mine action funding</th>
<th>EC mine action funding for Latin America</th>
<th>% for Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002 – 04</td>
<td>145.2 million €</td>
<td>1.6 million €</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 - 06</td>
<td>107.8 million €</td>
<td>4.6 million €</td>
<td>4.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>253.0 million €</td>
<td>6.2 million €</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from Landmine monitor and EC project records.
This level of funding allocation by the EC is broadly similar to overall funding distribution which shows 3% of funding for Latin America.

\(^{12}\) The list was compiled by contacting EC delegations (EuropeAid and ECHO staff) in the countries concerned and double-checking by searching the EC “CRIS” database by arrangement with RELEX staff. The evaluation team wishes to thank the EC staff involved for their assistance and cooperation.
The division by year and EC budget line was as follows:

Table 4 – The division of EC funding by year and EC budget line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of allocation of funds</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Amount allocated for EC co-financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,550,000 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,059,799 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,529,114 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,000,000 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8,143,913 €</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EC Budget Line</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mine Action</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5,555,000 €</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59,799 €</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic (Colombia)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,500,000 €</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO (Emergency - Colombia)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29,114 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8,143,913 €</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ECHO Mine Action funding was in both cases a small amount of mine risk education (MRE) activities included in larger projects.

Countries supported
Since 2002 the EC has supported mine action in five countries of Latin America. In South America: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru. In Central America: Nicaragua. The work on the Peru/Ecuador border was a single project. There was also funding for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and Landmine Monitor, a total of 500,000€ worldwide and an estimate of 5,000€ of this (1%) has been included in the Latin America regional funding.

Table 5 – EC funding by country, project and total value of EC co-financing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Total value of EC co-financing</th>
<th>Percentage of total EC co-financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000,000 €</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,838,913 €</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,300,000 €</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru/Ecuador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000,000 €</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000 €</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8,143,913 €</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Type of organisation supported

Mine clearance in Latin America is a monopoly of national military, police and civil defence organisations, and with only a few exceptions funds to these organisations are channelled through the Organization of American States (OAS) Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA) programme which primarily uses USA military personnel as trainers. One exception was the EC support to Chile through the UNDP which principally supported training the Chilean military – the demining trainers in this case were also USA military personnel using the same train and equip model as the OAS.

Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), as well as the military, undertake Mine Risk Education programmes in most affected countries. Victim Assistance is supported by governments, NGOs and in some countries by the police and military for their own casualties. Money is either channelled through the OAS AICMA or directly contributed.

Support for national capacity building has been given directly to the National Government in Colombia, and one Departmental Government has had an integrated MRE and Victim Assistance programme funded.

Table 6 – Organisations supported by EC co-funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation supported</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Amount allocated for EC co-financing</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct to National Governments</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,500,000 €</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS - AICMA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,300,000 €</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to NGOs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,818,913 €</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000,000 €</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to Departmental Governments</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>525,000 €</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,143,913 €</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mine Action components supported

All components of mine action have been supported in Latin America. With only one project per country except for Colombia it is difficult to generalise, however there is a clear division between the “mine clearance” projects of the OAS AICMA in Peru/Ecuador and Nicaragua and the UNDP in Chile, which all follow the same model, and the MRE and national mine action capacity development projects in Colombia which are aimed at establishing and reinforcing the Colombian Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, the National Mine Action Authority and Centre.

The three “demining” projects based in Chile, Nicaragua and Peru/Ecuador, in fact used a very substantial part of their resources for training and equipping deminers. These were all nominally “integrated projects” which included limited amounts of MRE and Victim Assistance (VA), typically worth less than 10% of the total value of the project. The MRE was undertaken by military personnel in the areas being cleared and did not use Community Liaison approaches which are now widely regarded as best practice. The close linkage of MRE to demining activities is however a definite advantage. The VA parts of these programmes have been more based on individual support to a small number of victims than on wider advocacy or structural approaches. This has not been entirely successful – in Peru, rehabilitation in the form of prostheses and training was offered for up to 14 people but reports state that only eight came forward. In the
end, fewer than this number were actually helped (either three or five depending on the report). The victims’ association was cogently critical of the programme and continued to press for funding for an initial survey of victims to identify how many there are, and in which regions of the country, as this has not yet been done.

In Colombia there is more attention given to MRE and advocacy based VA, in part because demining is not open to the substantial NGO sector. Given the very widespread nature of the contamination, and the millions of displaced people, there is a very substantial demand for MRE which is being addressed through local government and NGOs co-funded by the EC, primarily using a Community Liaison (CL) type of approach. (UNICEF also has a substantial CL based programme in Colombia). Medical assistance to mine victims is available through the Colombian national health system, but the rural population who suffers mine accidents (over 97% of accidents are in rural areas) face substantial difficulties in accessing the available health and rehabilitation services. The barriers include physical remoteness making access extremely difficult at times, a lack of information and knowledge of health rights, and even possible risk to mine victims or their families from being perceived as having been injured either while laying mines (and hence sympathisers with the armed factions) or as having tried to clear mines (and hence opposing the armed factions).  

The largest single funding item by the EC has been the 2.5 million euros (31% of the total Latin America funding) for capacity building of the National Mine Action Authority in Colombia of which about 800,000 euros is planned to be used on a rapid survey of impact and victims starting in 2008 (within the constraints of an ongoing conflict).

**EVALUATION OF THE EC STRATEGY**

**SELECTION OF WHERE TO ACT**

**Country Strategy Papers CSP**

The inclusion of mine action in the national (or regional) Country Strategy Paper (CSP), in itself based on national government priorities has in recent years assumed increasing importance, due to (a) the commitment of the EC to the Declaration of Paris and (b) the ending of thematic budget lines and start of the four new Instruments as the basis for funding development cooperation by the EC.

Table 7 – Inclusion of Mine Action in the National Country Strategy Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>No – 1 project funded</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Yes – 5 projects funded</td>
<td>Yes – 3 projects funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Yes – 1 project funded jointly with Peru</td>
<td>No (ongoing project listed once without comment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>No (one mention of existence of budget line but no other</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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13 Further information is included in the country report.

14 There is no CSP for Cuba as it is not an ACP signatory.
The very limited inclusion of mine action in the Country Strategy Papers of Latin American countries with ERW contamination suggests that the problem is not a critical issue for many countries. Only Colombia and Peru have included mine action in both 2002-6 and 2007-13 CSPs. This reflects the reality of mine contamination in the region, only these two countries have a significant problem due to mines and other ERW, though it should be emphasised that the Colombian problem is far more widespread and severe than in Peru.

The ratio of mine action horizontal budget line to geographic budget line funding (roughly two-thirds horizontal and one-third geographic) is the reverse of the world-wide ratio. There has been only one mine action project funded from a geographic budget line in Latin America, in Colombia. This raises questions about the relevance of some of the funding allocated from the thematic Mine Action budget as the actions are not matched by similar commitments from the geographic budget lines.

Country selection criteria

In the 2005 Global review of EC Mine Action the criteria and mechanism for selecting countries to receive support to mine action were discussed in some detail. In selecting which countries to focus on, and also the actions to be supported in each country, the use of the Resiliance-Impact Matrix (RIM) was proposed; other similar assessment tools might also be suitable. “Resiliance” is the term used in risk and disaster management for the property of ability to recover from a disabling event, this attribute is very much the same as that usually described by the term “Capacity” for development potential, and either resilience or capacity could be used in developing this visual approach. There is a clear need to set objective and verifiable selection criteria in terms of relevance – i.e. select which actions in which places will most contribute to realising the overall strategic goals. The basic RIM diagram described in the 2005 Global review proposed the uses of a previous stage of Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) as part of the overall process. The RIM diagram schematic and a proposed analysis for the countries in this evaluation are as follows:

The RIM diagram is based on the concept of “Resiliance” as applied to a country contaminated with ERW – a typical dictionary definition of resiliance is Merriam-Webster’s “an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change”. In mine action an example is the name of the “Cranfield Resilience Centre”, a part of Cranfield University. See the 2005 Global Evaluation for further details. The RIM diagram was first presented in the 2005 report, and later refined by Keeley in his PhD thesis. The concept was included in the 2007 Evaluation of Netherland Government funding for Mine Action by TNO for the Netherlands foreign ministry.
The nine mine/ERW affected countries in the region can be placed on a RIM diagram as follows:

Note: Ecuador and Peru are linked as they have a border minefield whose removal is considered to be important in terms of the consolidation of the peace process between the two countries. Without this, the impact on Ecuador would be very low, like Chile. Peru has further impact from mined areas around internal infrastructure.
Colombia

Use of the resilience-impact analysis suggests that the optimum regional strategy would be to focus resources on Colombia, which has medium to high resilience in terms of Latin America and a very severe mine problem. With Colombia receiving 59% of the total funding this was largely the case, and this allocation can be seen as relevant. There are external limiting factors (Log Frame assumptions) which have a negative impact on this relevance. The most important are the ongoing conflict which limits both access and the possibility of marking, mapping and demining as the mined areas are still active, and secondly the monopoly on demining by the military which leaves to NGOs and other actors (including the national mine action structures) only the roles of Mine Risk Education, Advocacy and Victim Assistance. This may in practice limit the amount of funding that can usefully be spent – an effectiveness issue. The RIM analysis suggests that the most appropriate type of actions to support in Colombia would be Management training, local capacity building and train and equip programmes. Given the limitation that mine clearance cannot be funded, these priorities are otherwise fully reflected in the funding allocated which can thus be seen as relevant, given the assumptions. There are a number of strategic effectiveness and efficiency issues which will be discussed in the section on the role of the OAS, below.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua has very low resilience (it is the second poorest country in the hemisphere, has a weak economy, has suffered political turmoil for decades and suffers frequent natural disasters). Nicaragua also has low total contamination and low mine impact overall; the CSP does not mention mine action. This suggests that either no action or a modest non-sustainable clearance operation might be the most suitable linked to the development of a small permanent capacity to take care of residual contamination. In practice, the EC funding was channelled through the OAS AICMA programme which does not share these goals leading to poor relevance.

Ecuador/Peru border

Ecuador/Peru border clearance has low to moderate resilience (again, in terms of Latin America) but only minor contamination in a mostly remote border region. There is some impact on cross-border transit and trade, and possibly on future mineral exploitation, but the most important reason for demining is to reinforce and consolidate the peace process between the two countries. The mines were placed during a bitter border conflict (the last of a long series) as recently as 1995. The RIM analysis suggests that in terms of mine clearance the best approach would be quick clearance and limited long term capacity building. However, the goal of mine clearance was secondary to the strategic goal of consolidation of a peace process so limitations in effectiveness and efficiency could be tolerated in order to have a greater impact on the political outcome. Introducing a specialist third-party demining organisation might have been optimal in terms of clearance, but would have raised concerns about security and perhaps bred mistrust. Working with the established military of both countries was more useful in bringing about rapprochement and building confidence. The EC funding was channelled through the OAS AICMA programme which does not share these goals leading to poor relevance.
Peru

In addition to mines on the Ecuador border, Peru has also a mine problem inside the country, with areas around electric pylons (transmission line towers), and some prisons and police bases being contaminated as a result of protective mining by special police units during the internal armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. This contamination appears to have caused more casualties than the mines on the border with Ecuador, but has received far less attention; it is not mentioned in the CSP 2002-6. Clearance of these mined areas is novel in several aspects. First, it is paid for by the privatised electric companies, which brings about pressure to do the clearance quickly and cheaply. Despite the waste of resources in repeating unsatisfactory clearance, this demining appears to be considerably cheaper than any other mine clearance in Latin America. Secondly, it has been done by an initially poorly equipped and poorly trained police force, which suffered about 80 deminer casualties in the process. Almost all other clearance in Latin America appears to have been done by military personnel, trained and equipped through the OAS AICMA and USA military “Train the Trainers” programmes. This high number of casualties led to the first victims’ association in Peru being started by ex-deminers from the police force. Quality management has been so poor that some areas have had to be cleared three times over as there were further civilian casualties after the first and second clearance. A third novel aspect is that Quality Control is now provided by ex-deminers from the victim’ association observing demining activities, an arrangement that appears to be working well. Further information is included in the country report on Peru.

There appears to have been a clear opportunity for international support to training and equipping this police unit, especially in the context of developing a long-term capacity in the country to deal with residual contamination. This was met, at least in part, by the OAS. Support may have been limited due to three factors:

- There is a much lower political profile for this internal demining that the international border.
- The funding for the demining of the pylons comes from the privatised electric companies. This may make some donors cautious about involvement – though there would appear to be no clear reason why supporting training and equipping police units working on a commercial contract should be any less acceptable than training and equipping military units from a humanitarian budget.
- The police unit does not entirely fit in to the military-to-military model of training usually employed by the OAS and USA programmes.

Use of RIM analysis suggests that one of the appropriate actions would be funding a non-sustainable clearance programme to remove the mines as quickly as possible backed up with a small long-term capacity. This is essentially what the police demining unit is attempting. Introducing elements of “train and equip” (group C in the RIM diagram) can also be justified. Peru is located near the centre of the RIM diagram so a variety of options should be considered. The needs of internal mine clearance in Peru were not identified in the CSP 2002-6. Given the possibilities of a modest amount of financing having a significant impact on this work there may have been a missed opportunity to intervene at an early stage to ensure an improved quality of clearance and fewer deminer casualties.

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17 Peru’s request for an extension to the time period for clearance under Article V of the APMBC states that the police have 80 deminers and the army 160. The cost estimates are that police re-clearance of over 1,000 pylons, plus clearance of about 18,000 mines around three prisons and two police bases will have a total cost of 650,000 US dollars. The police have already cleared about 60,000 mines. The cost of army clearance (in the remote and difficult) border region, is estimated at 20 million dollars for about 31,000 mines in 210,000 sq m of hazardous areas. The army has so far cleared about 1,600 mines. There are currently more casualties from the internal mines than the border mines.
The appropriate inclusion of mine action in the CSP for 2007 to 2013 corrected this earlier omission.

Chile

The selection of Chile as a recipient of funding from the Mine Action budget line, for one project, appears to be based on strategic importance, linked to Chile’s support of the APMBC and having in place national mine action structures. In terms of the RIM analysis, Chile is an upper-middle income country with a modest problem having low impact and causing few casualties. This suggests that either no external intervention, or at most the provision of management training should be considered. The overall relevance of the funding for Chile is based on larger strategic considerations of the EC and not on the mine problem as such.

The Chilean minefield on the border with Peru is of concern to Peru where it has some impact. Peru formally protested to the OAS about the two border minefields in April 2007 and insisted that they should be cleared. The EC funding for Chile was originally designated for “high impact” border mine clearance. In the end it was used for other purposes (see text box for further details) leaving the border contaminated. The Peruvian position suggests that the change of purpose of the funding (from border clearance to capacity building) was a clear and significant reduction in the relevance of the project and the end result had poor relevance.

Other countries

Cuba, Panama and Venezuela have contamination which has little or no impact and no casualties. Argentina, in its claim to the Falklands, has a mine problem which has no casualties and modest impact. All these countries have sufficient resilience to deal with the problems. There is no case for external assistance either in terms of RIM analysis or based on the EC strategy of “Towards a Zero Victim Target.” Future political considerations may over-rule this.

SUSTAINABILITY

Mine clearance projects in Chile, Peru/Ecuador and Nicaragua

These projects all had a very strong emphasis on training and equipping deminers, so might be expected to have strong sustainability. However, they all resulted in high cost clearance (per square metre) and inefficient working methods (such as two and three person drills) that they are generally not affordable by in the long term by the countries concerned. They all fell significantly short of the clearance targets in the proposals. The project in Nicaragua, for example, funded in 2003 and completed in 2006, is described as bringing mine clearance to and end in the country which would then be free from known minefields. However, clearance in Nicaragua is now scheduled to end in 2009 after substantial further funding. Given the definition the “Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn” all of these projects had poor to medium sustainability. The limited contamination and the absence of mine clearance from the CSPs for Chile and Nicaragua strongly suggest that the national governments do not consider mine action to be a high priority.

When capacity which had been built through a similar process was handed over to national control in Costa Rica the programme came to a halt until further donor funding could be found. It appears likely that the same would have happened in Nicaragua and Peru/Ecuador if clearance had been fully handed over. A similar problem in Bosnia was reported in the 2005 Global Assessment.
Support to national capacity, and MRE in Colombia

While the substantial funding to the national mine action centre in Colombia has not delivered the anticipated results, it has made a real difference to the national structures. The Government of Colombia has also contributed a significant part of the costs of the “Observatorio de Minas” and the subsequent Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal.

Support for Mine Risk Education by NGOs, and also local government in the most affected department is unlikely to be entirely sustainable once funding ends, but is likely to have a long term impact and leave a significant number of local staff trained in Community Liaison techniques of MRE.

The sustainability is therefore evaluated as being medium to good.

FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF PROJECTS WITH POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

As has been noted above, some mine action projects are selected because of the relevance of their political context – one example is the mine clearance on the Peru/Ecuador border in support of consolidating the peace process. To evaluate these projects adequately requires some analysis of the criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact) in terms of both the overall strategic objective and also the mine action. There appears to be no easy way at present of conducting such a dual evaluation and the focus appears to be more on technical goals than strategic goals. It is important to note that the overall aim should be not one or the other, but for the project design and implementation to have positive impact and strong sustainability in both areas.
Textbox 1- Improving relevance requires basing future strategy on current experience

The EC Mine Action Strategy (MAS) 2005-7 states: “In response to a request by the Chilean government this programming will support mine clearance in high impact areas, namely cross-border mine clearance between Chile and its neighbors (Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina) where mine fields still pose security problems.”

The MAS includes six criteria for selection of geographic areas for action, as follows:
- Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty,
- High Humanitarian and Developmental Need,
- Strategic Importance for the European Union,
- Sustainability and Coherence with Wider Assistance,
- Proven Commitment of Non-States Parties to Mine Action and the Principles of the MBT,
- Efficiency and Effectiveness of Local/National Mine Action Planning and Programmes.

Chile has few mine casualties and mine action is not mentioned in the Country Strategy Paper. Chile is not a poor country. However, after a period of broken relations, the EU and Chile concluded an Association Agreement in 2002. The subsequent political rapprochement and further negotiations qualified Chile as being of “Strategic Importance for the European Union,” Chile is actively implementing the APMBC and has effective national mine action planning. Thus responding to the request was entirely in line with the EC Mine Action Strategy.

The project documents reflect this political strategy as the highest level goal was defined as improving both regional stability and the relationships between Chile and its neighbors.

The project spent most of the funding on capacity building of the national armed forces by USA army trainers, and worked on clearance of just two mined areas important for the tourist industry and for international relations with neighboring countries. The project evaluations noted that the amount of clearance was far lower than originally planned in the project documents, just 3% of the original goal, but considered this as acceptable given the circumstances. In the end, over 40 dollars was spent for each square meter of land actually demined.

Capacity development may well have been appropriate, but it is clear that there was a shift away from the originally stated strategic goal of the EC to support "high impact" border demining. For Peru, the mines in Chile that cause Peruvian victims are an important issue and in April 2007 Peru formally protested to the OAS about border minefields in Chilean territory. However, these minefields were not the ones cleared by the programme.

The change in purpose of this 1M€ funding raises questions about the relationship between the planned strategy and project implementation. There was no clearance in the original strategic border areas defined in the original report, and just 3% of the stated target clearance in the new zone was actually cleared. Several causes can be identified for not achieving the technical goals as stated in the proposal– three are discussed in this evaluation: fragmentation and isolation of EC mine action personnel resources, limited communications among EC delegations on the topic of mine action, and non-specialist EC staff having to conclude a contract involving highly experienced demining specialists.

Despite the strategic goal of international rapprochement between Chile and its neighbors being largely achieved, this goal was not well reported and the successful outcome was not publicized.
THE ROLE OF THE OAS AICMA AND ITS IMPACT ON MINE ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE USE OF THE EC FUNDING

The Mine Action programme of the Organization of American States (OAS) dominates mine action in Latin America both in terms of its long historical record and also the number of projects, two of which have received a total of 2.3M€ from the EC, 28% of the total spent by the EC in Latin America. Some discussion of the AICMA programme is necessary to illuminate the very substantial difference in the way mine clearance operations are conducted in Latin America compared with much of the rest of the world.

The OAS\textsuperscript{19} itself dates from 1948 and all 35 independent countries of the Americas belong to the Organization\textsuperscript{20}. “Taking action against landmines” is listed as one of 16 “Key OAS issues” on its website. In 1991, the OAS created the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA)\textsuperscript{21}. This program began as an exclusively technical demining operation composed of programs to strengthen national capacity by training and equipping national military personnel to locate and clear minefields. Because demining activities were – and still are - generally considered a military responsibility by national authorities in Latin America, the military was the sole entity involved in most of the early demining activities.\textsuperscript{22} PADCA evolved into the current Program for Comprehensive Action Against Anti-personnel Mines (AICMA) which also includes national armed forces carrying out mine risk education (MRE) campaigns in areas of demining operations and some smaller scale support for victim assistance, survey and advocacy.\textsuperscript{23}

The OAS programmes thus predate the Ottawa process of 1996, and the signing of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in Ottawa in December 1997. They also provide a demining model that is a \textit{de facto} monopoly by military, special police or government civil defence. By far the most usual approach remains the training of serving military personnel as humanitarian deminers through direct military-to-military programmes. The evaluation team has not found any reports of NGO or commercial mine clearance in Latin America.

The AICMA programme is an agent, or channel, for funding, and runs single donor and multi-donor projects. Its role can be compared with that of the UNDP which acts in a similar capacity in many countries. In Chile, the project funded by the EC used UNDP as the funding channel, but in other respects used the “standard” Latin America model, developed by the OAS, of national military personnel being trained as humanitarian deminers and undertaking mine and UXO clearance. This UNDP programme received 1M€ support from the EC.

\textsuperscript{19} Further information can be found on the website http://www.oas.org
\textsuperscript{20} Cuba remains a member, but its government has been excluded from participation in the OAS since 1962
\textsuperscript{21} Further information can be found in the “Journal of Mine Action” on-line at http://maic.jmu.edu/JOURNAL/9.1/Focus/ruan/ruan.htm
\textsuperscript{22} See OAS website for further information on this point.
\textsuperscript{23} The program has provided physical and psychological rehabilitation services to 884 landmine victims since 1997 and some MRE which is always done as an adjunct to clearance, there are no separate MRE programmes.
Despite what might appear to be a number of advantages in terms of recruitment and overheads, the AICMA programmes, and the UNDP programme in Chile, appear to have a number of very serious disadvantages in terms of their integration into the humanitarian aid context of EC mine action funding.

- There appears to be no clear interface to the working methods of EuropeAid, such as Project Cycle Management25 and Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), thus making integration with larger development goals and established management practice, harder to achieve and document.

- The effectiveness and efficiency of many of the programmes appears to be very significantly less than mine clearance by NGOs and commercial companies in other parts of the world. This is shown both in terms of overall figures for, inter alia, clearance and victim support, and also by such details as the continued use of two or three person clearance drills (instead of single person drills) and in some countries military style protective equipment instead of the newer personal protective equipment (PPE) designed to facilitate humanitarian operations. The value of serving military personnel in uniform undertaking MRE has been widely questioned elsewhere. Given that AICMA is acting as an agent on behalf of the donors it should have a clear role in managing efficiency and effectiveness for the donors.

- There has been a strong emphasis on national capacity building, and little difference in the programme from one country to the next – essentially a “one size fits all”

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24 From [http://www.aicma.oas.org](http://www.aicma.oas.org). The only ERW contaminated countries not included in the AICMA actions are Cuba, Panama and Venezuela, none of which suffers significant impact and none has any casualties.

25 For example, the Chilean project did not make use of a Log Frame despite this being a standard requirement of EuropeAid.
approach. The very different circumstances of different nations in Latin America, both in terms of mine impact and resilience/capacity, suggests that considerable flexibility is needed. Capacity building is not guaranteed to give the best results where – as is common in Latin America – the scale of contamination is limited and clearance of all known minefields, or risk-free status, is likely to be achieved in a few years. Having a single modus operandi of always working with national military or civil defence staff, and not using international NGOs or commercial companies, has as a consequence the need for every country to start from the beginning and develop its own national capacity based on national personnel, usually trained by other military personnel. The aim is for hand-over of mine clearance to full national control, though in practice it has been found to be very difficult to fund the resulting capacity from national resources and the hand-over may take place only shortly before finishing clearance, as happened in the case of Costa Rica. A project oriented approach where one or more NGO or commercial organisations cleared all the hazardous area would probably have been significantly more cost-effective.

Since the OAS program predates both the Ottawa process and the EC APL Regulation it is understandable that EC interventions in mine action in Latin America generally took the form of an investment in these existing structures. However, the evaluation team considers that the structure of the OAS program has some important questions to answer in terms of value for money and the proportion of resources spent on capacity development as compared to actual clearance. The OAS programs also tend to conduct MRE in what is generally considered an outdated manner using military instructors (who tend to describe mines) rather than deliver a public health/behavior change model as adopted by the most of the rest of the global mine action community.

The potential advantages of a regional approach to mine action by the EC in Latin America are clear. Reduction in the fragmentation of resources and isolation of Individual project officers would be welcome. However, it is clear that the OAS – despite its leading role in mine action in the region – is not at present working in a way that is either (a) compatible with the EC’s development based approach or (b) offers a realistic level of efficiency.

The recommendations of this report (see page 45) include the need for any future EC investment in mine action in Latin America to take more steps to conduct an appraisal to determine the appropriate program model and to ensure value for money of the proposed intervention. In some cases there may be a case for a new intervention mechanism: for example the OAS could manage a clearance contract on behalf of the EC where the implementer was chosen by a competitive bidding process. The relationship between the EC and the OAS could potentially be managed in a similar process to the FAFA (Framework Agreement on Finance and Administration) that regulates the relationship between the EC and the United Nations.

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26 Such an appraisal obviously requires specialist technical expertise. In practice it seems that finding a way to contract such expertise within EC structures may be a substantial obstacle to such an approach.
Textbox 2 - Note on mine clearance costs and efficiency in Latin America

The main thrust of the OAS AICMA programme is mine clearance and in particular training national military personnel to be humanitarian deminers. While an exact figure for the donor funds channelled through the OAS for demining is difficult to obtain, it appears to be well over 40 million dollars in direct contributions and perhaps a further 12 million in contributions in kind. The total area cleared, 336 hectares, is very modest for this level of funding, giving a cost of over US$15 per square metre cleared. This compares unfavourably with the clearance costs in many NGO and commercial programmes world-wide, but it is consistent with high costs elsewhere when demining is done by serving military personnel.

The Peru-Ecuador border clearance proposal by AICMA, for the year to follow on from the EC funding proposes clearance of 26,000 sq metres at an overall cost of $40 per square metre cleared. Despite the extremely difficult terrain this is very high indeed, as is the 36% of the budget for the item “Supervision and Administration,” a percentage that is not untypical in Latin America but is very high when compared to the rest of the world. It is extremely unlikely that the land is worth anything close to $40 per square metre after clearance. If it is not possible to use standard investment appraisal, project cycle management techniques and other efficiency measures to significantly reduce the costs, money spent demining at this high cost level is generally better spent in mapping and marking hazardous areas, and then providing health, education or other development services to local people instead of demining.

The Colombia mine clearance programme of AICMA provided similarly disappointing figures with a total of about 1 sq m cleared per deminer in the programme per day. This is also a very unfavourable rate; the GICHD “Study of Manual Mine Clearance” reported typical rates of 8 to 75 sq m per deminer per day. The cause of such low daily rates may not be the actual demining but due to limited deployment of deminers for other reasons. Excess demining capacity might also be a cause.

This brief analysis is provided as background to the conclusions drawn at the end of this report; the evaluation is clearly focused on the EC and not the AICMA programme, and had limited time and resources so the evaluator was not able to spend time visiting the projects in question. It is entirely possible that there are extenuating circumstances that go some way to explain these very high costs. Access by the non-specialists in the EC delegations to suitably qualified and independent technical advice at the earliest stages of the project planning process would help manage such risks, and reduce the impact of the experience and size of the AICMA programme resulting in distortion of EC project design and implementation, especially when the EC project officer may have only one mine action project in a large portfolio and little or no previous experience of mine action.
RECENT REFORMS TO EC FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IMPACT ON MINE ACTION

The response of the European Institutions to “the antipersonnel landmine problem” has had three principal dimensions:
- A political response, principally in support of the Mine Ban Treaty and its implementation and universalisation.
- An aid and development response to the impact of landmines (or suspected mines) on local people, and also on development activities, in mine affected countries. This includes MRE, demining, victim assistance and other activities. There is also emergency aid (humanitarian aid) administered by ECHO, principally emergency mine awareness training and emergency mine clearance.
- A security response, principally where the presence of mines or ERW could lead to instability in a country or region (typically by initiating or prolonging a conflict) or where the presence of stockpiles or dumps of abandoned munitions could create security problems.

An “APL regulation” in two parts was approved by the Parliament in 2001 and in accordance with the Regulation a Mine Action Strategy was developed by the Commission for 2002-2004 and subsequently 2005-2007. The Regulation established a thematic or “horizontal” budget line for mine action of roughly 15M€ per year 2002-4 rising to about 19M€ per year 2005-7, which is complemented the mine action funding available from geographic (national or regional) and other EC and EDF budget lines, and bilateral donations from EU member states. In the entire period 2002-7 the thematic budget line comprised about 40% of the EC contribution and about 10% of the total if Member States’ bilateral donations are included.

The horizontal budget line opened up two possibilities in addition to funding geographically based Mine Action:
- Funding non-geographic activities such as the global (world-wide) support for “universalisation of the Mine Ban Treaty,” and
- Creating a small core group of staff in Brussels who could provide a focus point of knowledge and information about mine action and would also provide the resources to generate the EC-wide mine action strategy and ensure the agreement of all relevant directorates general - in itself a significant task.

The process of enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25, then 27, members led to the need for a re-think of the entire Foreign Policy structures and instruments. The previous approach was no longer viable for a much larger community. Reorganisation led to a significant streamlining, with the creation in 1999 of the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy that is effectively “Foreign Minister” of the EU. This had significant impacts of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP and also the way that foreign development aid was to be addressed, including mine action.

To define the new approach to development aid, the Commission set out a strategy and framework in February and July 2004 and then wrote detailed proposals which were presented to the Parliament and Council in September 2004. Essentially, a multiplicity of old instruments and many small individual thematic budget lines were to be replaced by just four new instruments: an Instrument for Stability, a financial Instrument for Development Co-operation and for Economic Co-operation (DCECI), a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). Funding for mine action (except in countries with
crises or emerging crises) would all be from geographic budget lines and would thus depend on the prioritisation of mine action by the national government leading to its inclusion in the EC Country Strategy Paper. In the case of situations of crisis or emerging crisis Mine Action is covered by the new Instrument for Stability under Article 3. With the exception of this short-term response to crisis in the IFS, the new instruments share a large-scale, macro level and mid to long term approach.

The Commission paper of September 2004 demonstrates that the issue of non-geographic funding was already known about:

Page 11: In some cases, the pursuit of a given policy objective will require that funds are not programmed geographically, as they serve multilateral objectives, for example, to enable the European Union to promote its environmental aims in a multilateral context, independent of the priorities of individual beneficiaries.

After due process, the Instrument for Stability, Regulation (EC) 1717/2006, was adopted on 15 November 2006, following a vote in the Parliament and consensus approval by the Council.

DECONCENTRATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS DECLARATION

The process of "deconcentration" in EuropeAid, which moved programming and project management from Brussels to the EC delegations in the partner countries or regions, was both an essential early stage of the reforms to the instruments, and was also one step of several in moving to aid delivery based on partnership between the countries involved, rather than donor policy alone.

The strong commitment of the EU to the Paris Declaration of March 2005 is part of the overall reform of development aid and the move towards development cooperation. The Paris Declaration was itself part of a larger process which included the Rome Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2003 and the Marrakesh meeting on Managing for Development Results in 2004. Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Paris Declaration is perhaps the key:

Donors commit to: Base their overall support — country strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes — on partners’ national development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these strategies.

EC support for mine action is thus to be based on the established Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) written by the EC delegations in partner countries, in close coordination with national authorities and governments. The CSPs will reflect the development strategies of the national governments, including poverty reduction strategies and other plans. This is a significant change in some areas which had previously relied in part on funding through thematic budget lines, one of which is mine action. Latin America provides clear examples of other areas where the apparently unintended impact of the new Instruments is perhaps more severe than in Mine Action; post disaster reconstruction is a particularly good example. Given the large scale and the importance of the funding affected by the lack of a “rapid-response” mechanism in the instrument it appears possible that this will be addressed in the near future. This may provide an opportunity for mine action to benefit from synergies with other funding areas.

A further example of the problems arising, which will have to be resolved, was evident in Colombia. Mine Action is very much limited in Colombia by the active conflict in much of the
country. At present there is no peace process, the current President was re-elected on a platform of pursuing a military victory over the armed factions, without negotiation. However, the EC delegation would like to develop a strategy for supporting a peace process so that they would be able to respond quickly if a change in policy means that negotiations are started. Part of the EC response is likely to be mine action as a peace building and confidence building measure, as well as emergency mine action in support of the return of the millions of displaced persons. The delegation would like to have at least outline plans in place in order to be able to move swiftly in response to any opportunity to promote a resolution to the long running conflict. However, the Government of Colombia does not entertain this in its policy documents so there are difficulties about including the action in the CSP. It will take time for the new instruments based on the Paris declaration to have new mechanisms associated with them to resolve these issues.

LOCATION OF MINE ACTION STRATEGY WITHIN THE “THREE PILLARS” STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht which established the European Union, divided EU policies into three main areas, called pillars. The first or 'Community' pillar concerns economic, social and environmental policies. The second or 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters. The third or 'Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters' (PJCC) pillar concerns co-operation in the fight against crime.

The aid and development aspects of mine action are first pillar responsibilities, and the security aspects are second pillar. Generally, mine action has been considered as within the first pillar, so the procedures are that the Parliament would enact legislation, and the Commission would be responsible for development and implementation of mine action strategy. The APL horizontal budget lines provided a mechanism to fund some of the aspects of mine action not associated with geographic budget lines (see below). For the second pillar the relevant bodies are (usually) the Council Secretariat proposing projects which are implemented by joint action at an inter-governmental level by Member State ministries (possibly by a sub-group of member states) after agreement by consensus in the European Council. This may appear a small difference, but currently, since the reforms of 2006 which removed the thematic budget lines and introduced the four new Instruments, it is considered as having the potential for an impact on EC Mine Action.

First, it further increases already serious fragmentation by bringing in an entire new "pillar" with different procedures, and secondly it could possibly move the focus of mine action towards being regarded as a security issue instead of a development issue.

CONSEQUENCES FOR MINE ACTION OF THE REFORMS

The new EC instruments appear to have taken the mine action community by surprise in 2006, perhaps because there is no overall "policy watch" institute for mine action. Other development sectors had earlier made responses - such as the European Confederation of Development NGOs who report that they succeeded in influencing the content of the Instrument for Stability.

Similarly, inside the EC, staff who worked on the APL horizontal budget line do not appear to have issued an advance warning to the mine action community which was then acted on - perhaps they were constrained in their response by larger institutional considerations, or maybe were simply so busy with current work that the longer term implications were not addressed in time.

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27 The evaluation team thanks Antoine Gouzée de Harven and David Spence, both of the European Commission, for valuable discussions and encouragement in preparing this section

28 See http://www.concordeurope.org
The overall effect is that the new instruments have some negative consequences - apparently unintended - which were not addressed in good time and which now require attention if they are to be addressed in time for the review of the instruments in 2009. The changes could lead to a reduction of the funding for Mine Action by the EC in the short term as the move is made to funding all mine action from geographic budget lines. In countries where it has not been done this will require the inclusion of mine action in Country Strategy Papers at their next review. In practice the reduction is likely to be minor in Latin America; the only two countries with significant contamination by ERW which is causing an impact (Colombia and Peru) have both included mine action in their CSPs for 2002 to 2006 and also 2007 to 2013. The “rebound” to previous levels of funding, with the prioritisation process more fully in line with the Paris Declaration is likely to be swift. However, the changes will also create serious difficulties for the non-geographic funding from the APL budget line, which amounted to 3.9M€ in 2005-7; this is less than 7% of the APL budget line. Nonetheless, some of the actions supported were of some importance.

The key areas of mine action which it appears cannot easily be funded from Geographic (country or regional) budget lines as they have no clearly identifiable geographic component are:

- Support for universalisation of the MBT including linkage to ERW or cluster munitions, as well as its general geographical extension to countries that are not yet states parties. In 2005-7 “Monitoring of APL issues (Landmine Monitor) and Campaigning including Sponsorship programmes and monitoring of compliance and effectiveness of past efforts” received 1.4M€. The loss of actions to promote universalisation is unlikely to have an impact in Latin America apart from the case of Cuba which is still not a signatory of the MBT and is reported to be an APL mine producer and user. The loss of funding for Landmine Monitor will have a global impact, including in Latin America. This highly regarded reference source is a useful tool in support of mine action as well as supporting achievement of political goals.

- Support for the testing of demining equipment and development of European Standards for testing demining equipment, which in 2005-7 received 350,000 euros. Since the start of this funding there has been an alternative view that manufacturers of equipment should support the development of their own industry standards and it appears that EC funding for this purpose is unlikely to be continued. This is also unlikely to have a large impact in Latin America, though it should be noted that new technology may be important in Colombia, and Chile is one of the first countries to adopt electronic information gathering for minefield survey.

- Support for extending or revising IMAS, LIS priority setting and similar areas with application in many countries.

- Support for multi-country initiatives where there is either no regional mechanism available (e.g. the countries are from different regions) or the regional mechanism has not identified a role in mine action and hence has not included it in a regional strategy paper. This use of regional mechanisms in Latin America could have been advantageous.

At least one further area will face some difficulties, which – although potentially open to a solution in the mid term - could be important for Colombia:

- Support to organisations involving and committing non-state groups to abide by the
principles of the MBT, which in 2005-7 received 400,000 euros will now have to be geographically based. Given that many non-state actors (NSAs) who use mines are engaged in armed conflict with national governments, it is most unlikely that the respective governments would wish to see formal recognition of the NSAs in a CSP, which is now the route to funding. Alternative funding routes have still to be developed, and may require careful use of regional initiatives if funding for such organisations as Geneva Call is to continue. The horizontal budget line gave an opportunity to prioritise EC strategy over the Country Strategy. The fragmentation of EC mine action (discussed below) acts against a single solution to this issue.

FRAGMENTATION AND ISOLATION

Key issues already identified in the 2005 Global review of EC Mine Action, as having a negative impact, are: wide dispersion (fragmentation) of funding and isolation of personnel resources working on planning and implementing projects; the increase in isolation due to deconcentration; and the difficulty in accessing technical support for improved contracting and monitoring. With the possible exception of the dispersion of funding, these issues, at least in Latin America, are considered in this evaluation as having negative consequences for three of the standard five development evaluation criteria: efficacy, efficiency, and impact.

As these two issues were identified as key issues for all aspects of the evaluation, and not just for the impact of the change to the new Instruments, they are discussed in detail below.

Terminology

In development terminology fragmentation has been used to describe the effect of recipients of development aid obtaining support from numerous donors. The term proliferation has been used to describe the dispersion of aid by a donor to multiple recipients; the two concepts are in effect a mirror image of each other. The effect has been quantified by some researchers, and both fragmentation and proliferation have been found to have negative impacts. Actions to mitigate have included Sector Wide Approaches, coordination groups, and a variety of other measures, but these have not generally been successful.

In this report fragmentation will be used in preference to the more usual proliferation to describe the effect of spreading the limited mine action resources of the EC thinly, as it is considered to be a more usefully descriptive. Furthermore fragmentation in this report will be used to include all of the following:

- Spreading limited resources thinly, so that several countries received small amounts of support during the period under evaluation. In Latin America, although the overall level of support was proportional to the overall mine problem, this resulted in just one mine action project in any country, except Colombia
- The relative scale of mine action resources being very significantly smaller than other development aid budgets – for example, in Colombia mine action support formed less than 2% of the overall EuropeAid budget. This means that there can never be a strong focus on mine action which has to be integrated as a small part of a larger portfolio.

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30 Ibid.
• The possibility that funding will be entirely project based so that repeat funding may not be available before the end of a previous project, leading to a loss of efficiency.

A further concept will be used in this report, isolation. This is a corollary to fragmentation. Most project officers responsible for mine action projects, and similarly the country or regional desk officers in Brussels, cannot be expected to have specialist mines knowledge, nor a large number of projects in mine action. There are several aspects to isolation:

• The limited number of projects covered by one delegation means that there is little or no accumulated knowledge and know-how
• The small proportion of the workload means that staff cannot expend the significant time required to become proficient or expert in mine action.
• There are at present only very limited co-ordination mechanisms to permit staff from different delegations to share knowledge and experiences in mine action.
• The normal turnover of staff in Delegations means that it is likely that most projects will see a change of the project officer during the project duration, so the learning process will be repeated and know-how lost.

Apart from Colombia, no Latin American EC delegation has had more than one mine action project. So, any EC staff member dealing with mine action in Latin America had one project on the topic, or in Colombia, at most four projects at one time, which still comprise a small part of their responsibilities. There is no possibility of having mine action specialists in the delegations for this small workload. Indeed, there is no justification from the present overall budget for even a single person for Latin America with specialist mines knowledge. In Brussels limited technical support is available through RELEX; there are two technical specialists in Directorate E (Unit E4: Governance, Security, Human Rights and Gender) to cover the whole area of disarmament and security but neither is specifically expert in mine action and development. Technical support is thus limited.

This also exacerbates the already existing problem of the difficulty of making use of specialist technical support, leading to poor strategic outcomes as well as poor project outcomes. While both deconcentration and the introduction of the new instruments has had a negative impact on the isolation of staff, it can be argued that the impact of the new instruments on fragmentation is mixed. The loss of a focal point in Brussels has had a negative impact in terms of building a central knowledge base, and in areas of strategy development and support to non-geographic priorities. However, the horizontal mine action budget line led to the wide dispersion of a part of the overall budget for mine action; EC (geographic) and EU (bilateral and multilateral Member State) contributions to mine action have been considerably larger than the dedicated budget line. It can thus be argued that the budget line contributed to the proliferation of small amounts of funding and thus to overall fragmentation.
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ENDING OF THE APL BUDGET LINE AND THE FOUR NEW INSTRUMENTS

The scale of the negative financial consequences of the loss of the APL budget line is modest when compared to the whole of EU support to mine action, and mine action is a very small part of the overall EC aid budget. The "drastic simplification" (as stated in the proposal for the new instruments) that has been undertaken at EU level is a long term, large scale policy. The potential gains from the changes which led to the introduction of the new Instruments and the ending of dedicated budget lines, in terms of overall efficiency for the EC (and the other European Institutions), are significant and the process of reform has been under way for several years. The key issue now is to make the reforms work for Mine Action and to find ways of funding activities which are considered important but have been excluded. A return to the previous situation of multiple, small horizontal budget lines, one of which is for Mine Action, is clearly not a possibility. New ways of ensuring the future of mine action for example by using the mid-term revision of CSPs, to take place in about 18 months time, are the route forward.

There was a lack of information in the mine action community prior to the changes, and no dialogue with the EC delegations in Latin America to ensure a smooth transition. Even EC delegation staff appears to have been taken by surprise by the four new Instruments which had been published as a proposal some two years previously. Improved communication within the EC would appear to be necessary. If work with national governments and organisations had started earlier there would have been time to ensure that CSPs of some mine affected countries more adequately reflected the need for mine action. There is a need to initiate coordination of experiences and opinions in time for the mid-term review of the CSPs and the first review of the new Instruments.

However, there are serious concerns in a number of areas:

- The loss of a financial instrument to support key actions (which involve very modest amounts of funding) in implementation and universalisation of the MBT and the Geneva Call deed of commitment. There will potentially be a loss of visibility and influence for the EC well beyond the scale of the loss of funding.

- The loss of a mechanism to fund a rapid (but not emergency) response. However, this also affects sectors of considerably larger size and importance, such as post-natural-disaster reconstruction which will have to be addressed quickly in Peru and Nicaragua. However, without concerted action, once again mine action may miss the opportunity to influence the outcome to ensure that the needs of mine action are also fully considered.

- The fragmentation of EC mine action in Latin America, and the isolation of staff responsible for projects, are, together, a contributing factor to the extremely poor technical efficiency, and limited technical effectiveness and impact. Strategic goals of improving regional harmony were far better achieved than technical goals; for example only a small percentage of very modest mine clearance goals were achieved in the large programmes in Chile and Peru/Ecuador. Action needs to be taken to improve communication within the EC, to establish contact between the scattered mine action projects and the staff responsible for them in delegations, and to provide

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31 The four new instruments are: Instrument for Stability, a financial Instrument for Development Co-operation and for Economic Co-operation (DCECI), a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). See pages 31 and 32 of this report for further information.
improved training or support. Technical expertise is essential to improving strategic outcomes and a mechanism to introduce it needs to be found. This may not be easy within EC structures, but without it EC funding for mine action in Latin America risks being ineffective and poor value for money.

On potential solution is a *regional approach*. The most visible candidate for undertaking a regional role is the OAS AICMA programme, however, as has been discussed in detail in this report the non-developmental approach, the absence of a compatible management and planning structure, the exclusive inclusion of military and other government special police forces and above all the extremely poor value for money of the current programmes makes the OAS an unsuitable candidate. Given the dominance of Colombia in the need for mine action, an alternative might be an internal EC coordination effort based on supporting the development of a regional role for the mine action staff of the EC delegation to Colombia.

The Global evaluation in 2005 made a number of recommendations regarding the selection of countries, selection of projects, and selection of implementers which have not been implemented. These recommendations were - and still are - highly pertinent to the current situation in Latin America.

**ANALYSIS - KEY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE EVALUATION**

**FRAGMENTATION OF EC PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES**

**Strategy Development**

The ending of the thematic Anti-personnel Landmine budget line has removed a clear focal point for developing a multi-annual mine action strategy. It is understood that such a strategy will continue to be developed within RELEX. However, there are some communication issues regarding both identifying who is responsible for what within RELEX, and especially between RELEX in Brussels and the Delegations. Staff in EC delegations in Latin America, responsible for mine action projects, were not always well aware of who in Brussels would be able to provide further information on strategy or who was responsible for developing future strategy.

Mine action is an area of considerable political sensitivity, and has a significantly higher political profile than many other development activities. The European Parliament continues to show interest in the topic of mines and ERW: on 16 January 2006, reference was made to landmines in the European Parliament resolution on disability and development; on 23 May 2007 in the discussion on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy a reference to universalisation of the APMBC was proposed, and on 12 December 2007 passed a resolution calling for continued support for mine action, including the reinstatement of the horizontal budget line.

There is a real risk that the future strategy could be clear on the political aspects, including developmental approaches, to the detriment of a sound technical foundation. All three aspects

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32 This point was also made in some detail in the 2005 Global Evaluation.
(political, developmental, and technical) are important in an overall strategy and it is far from clear that there is an adequate focus on the technical, nor the resources to support this aspect. There is already evidence in Latin America that the priorities selected in some countries (a) did not reflect a developmental approach to mine action and (b) the lack of technical expertise on the side of the EC has given extremely poor value for money.

**Delegation staff responsible for Project Selection and Implementation**

An initiative is urgently required to provide delegation staff with – at the very least - (a) a comprehensive set of briefing and reference documents so that they can retrieve essential information readily; (b) strategy guidance; (c) practical guidance on what can, and cannot be expected as an outcome of a mine action project. There is a clear need for EC co-financed mine action projects throughout the region (and preferably throughout the world) to be based on common standards and learn from each others’ experience. Furthermore, in Latin America where the majority of mine contamination outside Colombia is on international borders, there is a clear need for closer communication and collaboration between delegations. One example has been given in this report – the minefields on the Chilean side of the border with Peru that pose a problem for Peru but not Chile. Regular (though not necessarily frequent) contact between all staff working on mine action projects in EC delegations in Latin America is a clear requirement. Even if such contact is no more than a regular conference phone call the impact could be significant both in information exchange and reduction of fragmentation. All ERW contaminated countries in Latin America are Spanish-speaking (at least in the capital city), so there are no language barriers to improved communications.

**Contract issues – achieving impact and efficiency.**

EC delegation staff, who are development specialists with little or no experience of mine action and no specialist technical knowledge about demining, are negotiating project contracts with specialist staff of the OAS or UNDP who have detailed technical knowledge, considerable experience in the field and are representing (in the case of the OAS) a large and powerful organisation that has dominated mine action in Latin America for over ten years. Staff who are specialists in one area of development, and in implementing development strategy and projects for the EC, are potentially at a significant technical disadvantage, and need to find ways to achieve outcomes which are “better” in the sense that they more closely reflect EC development policy, including LRRD, and which offer significantly increased value for money.

EC staff does not have the time or supporting resources to be able to become fully informed about the technicalities of demining; increased access to core information would alleviate this. Identifying and using a mechanism to bring in even a small amount independent expert guidance at the contract preparation stage might offer significant benefits. Use of mechanisms, which should already exist as part of a Project Cycle approach, to base future formulation and implementation on the results of monitoring and evaluation could also make a decisive contribution.

The majority of projects in Latin America, which include mine clearance, have not reached the proposed targets of mines or square metres cleared – often by large margins. The clearance organisations usually have a monopoly in their own country and generally suffer no loss from failing to meet the targets, indeed a common response has been to request more funding and extensions to the time period for clearance. This creates a situation where there is little incentive

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35This might include such information as available approaches and costs, examples of best practice, a detailed glossary and guidance on contractual issues specific to mine action.
to succeed. A remedy required may not be easy to achieve within the EC system. The evaluation team understands that any recommendations have to be feasible within the context, and likely to succeed.

- As noted above, improved information resources, possibly specialist training, and improved communications are required.
- Improved contract drafting and enforcement are required. Payment for clearance done rather than clearance planned is a clear example of a possible improvement. As was noted in the 2005 Global Report, this will probably require input from technical specialists in the field to ensure that the contractual terms are optimal for the EC’s desired outcome. It may also require willingness on the part of EC delegation staff to stand firm and insist on full compliance with contracts, including payment based on delivery of results, in an area where they are not specialists. This is acknowledged to be a difficult situation to manage.
<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of project</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>Demining (including train &amp; equip)</td>
<td>1.0 M€</td>
<td>Political relevance</td>
<td>Political - not clear Demining - poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Poor for demining - Political not known</td>
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<td>No mine action justification for repeating</td>
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<td>2.5 M€</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Medium so far-rapid survey not yet started</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Geneva Call - universalisation of MBT with NSAs</td>
<td>250 k € (estimate)</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good - but no breakthrough achieved</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Potentially valuable to peace process, but not a priority for national government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>60 k €</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>MRE and VA</td>
<td>675 k €</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Victim Assistance</td>
<td>800 K €</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>MRE and VA</td>
<td>525 k €</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td>Not yet known - started 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador/Peru</td>
<td>Demining (including train &amp; equip)</td>
<td>1.0 M€</td>
<td>Political relevance</td>
<td>Peacebuilding - good Demining - poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Peacebuilding - good Demining - poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>No mine action justification but real value for peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Demining (including train &amp; equip)</td>
<td>1.3 M€</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Limited results - was intended to finish clearance in country which is still not achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World-wide</td>
<td>Support for universalisation of MBT</td>
<td>5 k € (estimate)</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>No mechanism to fund in new instruments - though worth more than small cost suggests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

With the exception of Colombia which has a very severe problem due to mines, other ERW and also active ordnance, and Peru which has some impact due to mined infrastructure within the country, the impact and the casualties caused by mines and other ERW in Latin America is very limited. Outside Colombia, mines have accounted for about one third of the casualties and other ERW about two thirds. Due to ongoing armed conflict, Colombia has a very high rate of casualties with about 350 civilian and twice as many police and army mine and ERW victims each year.

The allocation of 8 million euros, roughly 2% of the total of EC mine action funding, to Latin America in recent years is fully in line with the support from all donors who have allocated about 3% of all funding to Latin America.

The allocation to different countries of EC support for mine action in Latin America has generally been relevant and appropriate. Nearly 60% of funding was for Colombia, by far the most affected country. Political considerations as well as purely mine action criteria were included in (at least) the selection of Chile and the Peru/Ecuador border for clearance. The two countries with the most severe problems, Peru and Colombia, included mine action in their Country Strategy Papers for 2002-6 and also 2007-13. Ecuador, which was joint recipient of funding (with Peru) included mine action in its CSP for 2002-6.

Given the current constraints in Colombia, selection of project topics (MRE, support for national mine action structures, victim assistance) for the EC funding is also considered as appropriate and relevant.

Based on Resilience-Impact analysis there is little or no case for further funding for mine action in Latin America on the basis of the direct impact of the actions, with two exceptions: Colombia, which has a very severe problem, and Peru which has a limited problem inside the country with mined infrastructure. In Colombia the ongoing conflict, and the army monopoly on demining, limit options. The EC funding for a rapid survey of mine impact and victims (currently in planning) is welcomed. Until a peace process is underway there may be limited opportunities for further action.

It is understood that the EC may choose to support mine clearance or other mine actions as part of a larger political process (e.g. in support of consolidation of the peace agreement between Peru and Ecuador). The resulting projects should be designed to optimise the political impact first, and the mine action impact second.

Mine clearance throughout Latin America is a monopoly of military and police and civil protection special forces, there appears to be no NGO or commercial clearance. The Organization of American States’ mine action programme dominates mine action both in terms of scale of its operations, and also historically. The OAS modus operandi is based on military-to-military training to build national clearance capacity in each country. There is also some limited

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36 A year after this report was written the Colombian authorities announced their intention to work with international civilian demining organisations.
funding for MRE, victim assistance and other aspects. The result has been too much of a “one
size fits all” approach that has not given optimal results for donors such as the EC. The demining
activities have been characterised by an over-emphasis on training and equipping new demining
units in countries with only modest contamination, where a focus on clearance could have been
more appropriate. There are also some issues regarding how the humanitarian demining within
military structures relates to a Project Cycle and developmental approach.

The 2006 changes which, inter alia, ended the mine action thematic budget line and created the
four new Instruments for cooperation, may have an impact on EC mine action in Latin America.
They present both challenges and also some opportunities. There was poor communication
between those parts of the EC working on the new Instruments and (a) other EC staff, especially
in the delegations and (b) with the mine action community. There appears to have been little or
no concerted response by the mine action community to the draft proposals published in 2004.

The financial impact of the new instruments is likely to be modest and short to medium term in
for mine action in Latin America with only a few exceptions: (i) the lack of a “rapid response”
mechanism will have a negative impact, especially on having a mine action plan in place to
support any movement towards peace in Colombia. This lack of a rapid response provision will
also affect other, much larger, actions, notably natural disaster recovery in Peru and Nicaragua.
(ii) A regional mechanism, or other alternative, will have to be identified for support to the
Geneva Call process if they are to play a role in bringing non-state actors in Colombia to abandon
their continuing use of APLs.

Fragmentation of resources and activities and the associated isolation of staff, was identified as
the most important challenge to EC mine action in Latin America. This issue was previously
noted in the 2005 Global report, but does not appear to have received attention as a result of that
report. Given that there is little or no need to continue mine action projects in Latin America,
with the exception of Colombia, addressing this issue is unlikely to have an impact at regional
level. However, there may be a “lesson learned” with value for EC mine action projects and
programmes in other parts of the world.

The serious problems due to the overall fragmentation of EC mine action and isolation of EC
staff responsible for projects have been exacerbated by deconcentration, and the recent wide
ranging changes. In terms of the dispersion of funding the impact of ending the horizontal budget
line is likely to be small but positive.

EC staff cannot be experts in demining when they have only one, or a few, mine action projects
as part of a large portfolio. This has led to poor project design and implementation. EC staff
simply cannot afford the time needed to become expert so they are limited in their options.

There is a serious lack of information in a suitable format to support delegation staff by providing
them the key information they need to successfully draw up and implement demining contracts
and manage mine action projects. The lack of information is exacerbated by the apparent severe
difficulty in contracting technical experts to assist in these tasks (also a key point of the 2005
Global Assessment) and the absence of opportunities for specialist training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The issue of fragmentation of EC mine action, and the isolation of EC staff responsible for
projects, should be addressed.
(i) In the event that there is further funding for mine action in Latin America, contact and communication between EC staff in different delegations who are responsible for mine action projects or programmes, needs to be substantially improved as a matter of urgency. Sharing experience and best practice, and reducing isolation, are necessary to improve the impact of EC co-financed projects.

(ii) Information resources for EC staff in different delegations who are responsible for mine action projects or programmes, need to be very substantially improved as a matter of urgency. A comprehensive set of reference documents should be made available.

(iii) The difficulty of employing specialist technical expertise in support of EC staff continues to create a situation where proposals and contracts are not subjected to sufficient technical scrutiny. This is not a new issue but remains one that requires urgent action.

(iv) If further mine clearance projects are to be supported, a way to interface between the EC Project Cycle Management and Log Frames, and the military planning of the clearance organisations currently active in Latin America, must be found and implemented.

Future funding for mine action in Latin America should be based on a clear socio-economic benefit, or a clear political benefit such as peace-building, or both. A clear benefit on one area should not preclude the other and the optimum route is to achieve impact in both.

Any future EC investment in mine action in Latin America must take steps to conduct an appraisal to determine the appropriate program model and to ensure value for money of the proposed intervention. Such an appraisal obviously requires technical expertise as well as other specialist knowledge. In practice it seems that finding a way to contract such technical expertise within EC structures may be a substantial obstacle to such an approach. In some cases there may be a case for a new intervention mechanism: for example the OAS could manage a clearance contract on behalf of the EC where the implementer was chosen by a competitive bidding process. The long established presence and experience of the OAS AICMA programme should not be a barrier to the EC insisting on a development based approach, use of Project Cycle Management, and above all, value for money.

Attention should be given to supporting moves to persuade non-state actors in Colombia who continue to use anti-personnel landmines on a large scale, to change their position. This is one of very few countries with continued large scale use of AP mines. A pro-active approach to identifying new ways of funding such organisations as Geneva Call in this work should be undertaken, even though this raises difficult questions for the relationship with the government of Colombia. There are some practical difficulties as to how to fund such work within the new instruments.

Given the continuing conflict in Colombia, mine action in support of the EC’s substantial commitment to peace-building and emergency relief to displaced people in Colombia should remain a priority.
APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America 2002-2007

1. BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL). These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy.

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: *The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.*

The APL Regulation goes on to state: *Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions...* (Article 14)

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007 further specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Caucasus-Central Asia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005, while the agreement with

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38 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

39 Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:
   • provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and similar studies;
   • train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
   • support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

**Overall objective:**
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

**Specific objectives:**
- To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
  - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
  - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
  - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in Latin America 2002-2006;
  - EC strategy documents for Latin America or major sub-regions in Latin America.
- To analyse the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in Latin America, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
- To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
  - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
  - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
  - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/programmes of the beneficiary countries;
  - supporting local mine action organisations;
- To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (national; UN; OAS, donors; international NGOs; etc.);
- To assess the role & performance of multilateral agencies active in the national mine action programme (e.g. Inter-American Defence Board/OAS, UN agencies, etc.);
- To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in Latin America, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
- To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of implementation;
- To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance (including plans for sustainability);
- To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian assistance, development, and armed violence reduction

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To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC
to Latin America;
− To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-
funded mine projects;
− To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among
mine action programmes in Latin America and globally.

Expected results
The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to Latin America, and to
particular mine-affected countries in Latin America, since 2002. It shall incorporate more
detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to
illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim
in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to
mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other
donors, and UN agencies for the next years.

3. METHODOLOGY
The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:

− Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
− Desk Research
− Country Missions (to be confirmed)
  o Colombia
  o Peru/Ecuador41
− Analysis and Reporting

Country Missions
As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team
members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and
collect documents and data from:

- EC delegations
- national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
- UN agencies supporting mine action
- representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
- representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
- other key government officials
- representatives from key regional organisation (where present).

Additional data collection
Additional information will be obtained from:

41 Relating to the cross-border project Mine Action in the Condor Mountain Range of Peru/ Ecuador, approved in 2005.
− Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available;
− Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);
− Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC Delegations, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations’ headquarters and on the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.).
− EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.
− National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action Strategies from the focus countries
− Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine action) and the World Bank
− Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
− Other sources, as appropriate.

4. OUTPUTS
An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and data collection stage (late October 2007).

A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other stakeholders at the end of each country mission.

Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks.

A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels.

All reports will be in English, with the final Executive Summary translated into Spanish as well.

All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.42

42 http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm. The GICHD logo shall be provided by the GICHD.
**APPENDIX 2 LIST OF EC CO-FINANCED MINE ACTION PROJECTS IN LATIN AMERICA 2002-7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract number</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contract Title</th>
<th>Contractor’s signature date or start date of activities</th>
<th>End date of activities</th>
<th>Contracting Party</th>
<th>Amount of EC cofunding</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAP/2003/074-967 EC</td>
<td>Colombia and Middle East</td>
<td>Engaging armed non-state actors (NSAs) in a landmine ban: Colombia and the Middle East</td>
<td>02/12/2003</td>
<td>01/12/2005</td>
<td>Geneva Call</td>
<td>250.000 €</td>
<td>Total budget was 500.000 € - assumed 50% spent on each of Colombia and the Middle East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP/2004/088-125 DE</td>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines: activities proposal 1-9-04 to 30-9-05 including Landmine Monitor Initiative</td>
<td>01/09/2004</td>
<td>30/09/2005</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines Asbl</td>
<td>5.000 €</td>
<td>Total budget was 500.000 €. Very difficult to identify the small part relevant to Latin America, estimated at 10.000€ (2% of total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP/2004/091-146</td>
<td>Peru/Ecuador</td>
<td>Mine Action in the Condor Mountain Range of Peru/Ecuador</td>
<td>01/01/2005</td>
<td>01/04/2006</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>1.000.000 €</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDH/2004/097-944</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>MRE “Estrategia de Comunicación para la prevención de accidentes por minas antipersonales y artefactos explosivos abandonados con y para niños, niñas y jóvenes”</td>
<td>01/02/2005</td>
<td>01/02/2006</td>
<td>Fundacion Antonio Restrepo Barco</td>
<td>59.799 €</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract number</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Contract Title</td>
<td>Contractor’s signature date or start date of activities</td>
<td>End date of activities</td>
<td>Contracting Party</td>
<td>Amount of EC cofunding</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP/2005/108-985</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Mine Clearance “Desminado Humanitario en Chile”</td>
<td>02/01/2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>1,000,000 €</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/-SM/BUD/2006/01005</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Our future is today III: Re-integration in the educational system and increased protection against mines and UXO’s</td>
<td>01/03/2006</td>
<td>Feb 07</td>
<td>Diakonisches Werk der EKD - Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe Germany</td>
<td>28,113 €</td>
<td>Reported as 100,580 in EC “Mine Action in the World” report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/SM/BUD/2006/01016</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Access and Humanitarian Aid for populations putting up resistance, those that have returned and those displaced, in the municipalities most affected by the conflict and the displacement in the departments of Valle del Cauca and Nariño.</td>
<td>01/07/2006</td>
<td>Jun 07</td>
<td>Solidaridad Internacional</td>
<td>1,001 €</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract number</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Contract Title</td>
<td>Contractor's signature date or start date of activities</td>
<td>End date of activities</td>
<td>Contracting Party</td>
<td>Amount of EC cofunding</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP/2007/143-289</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>MRE “Educación en el riesgo (ERM) de la población vulnerable y Atención a las víctimas de minas antipersonal y municiones sin explotar en el sur de Colombia”</td>
<td>01/10/2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deutscher Caritasverband e.V. (Caritas Germany)</td>
<td>675.000 €</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP/2007/143-269</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>VA “Asistencia a víctimas civiles de accidentes de Minas Antipersonal y Municiones Sin Explotar (MAP y MUSE) en Colombia”</td>
<td>01/12/2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>HI Belgium</td>
<td>800.000 €</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP/2007/144-541</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>MRE in Antioquia “Institucionalización y sostenibilidad de la educación riesgo de minas y la atención biopsicosocial a víctimas de MAP y MUSE, a través de educadores y personal de salud en municipios prioritarios del Departamento de Antioquia”</td>
<td>01/12/2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antioquia Local Government</td>
<td>525.000 €</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total identified funding Latin America 2002-2007
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract number</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contract Title</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date of activities</th>
<th>Contracting Party</th>
<th>Amount of EC cofunding</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01006</td>
<td>Colombia (ECHO)</td>
<td>To provide protection, relief and assistance to people affected by the internal conflict in Colombia in the rural and urban areas located close to the border with Venezuela, in the Cesar departments.</td>
<td>Apr.07</td>
<td>Feb.08</td>
<td>Movimiento por la Paz el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL)</td>
<td>Multisectorial project with a mine risk education component (under R6): Workshops on antipersonnel mines and UXO for IDP families and trainings of communitarian Mine Risk Education multipliers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01007</td>
<td>Colombia (ECHO)</td>
<td>ICRC assistance and protection activities</td>
<td>Feb.07</td>
<td>Jan.08</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td>The component of economic support for residents (R3) contains provision of food assistance up to three months and EHI on a one-time basis for 100 families of the missing or affected by land mines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01011</td>
<td>Colombia (ECHO)</td>
<td>Amélioration de l’attention médicale portée aux populations vulnérables d’Arauquita, dont en particulier, celle du service de santé publique.</td>
<td>Jul.07</td>
<td>Jun.08</td>
<td>Croix-Rouge Française</td>
<td>The project focused at providing health assistance has also a component of mine risk education and awareness (R2): Formation de leaders communautaires dans chaque point d’attention sur la thématique des mines durant 3 jours, avec distribution du matériel didactique. Réalisation de 10 ateliers sur les mines pour les populations infantiles et adultes avec une distribution de matériel didactique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract number</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Contract Title</td>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>End date of activities</td>
<td>Contracting Party</td>
<td>Amount of EC cofunding</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/SM/BUD/2007/01013</td>
<td>Colombia (ECHO)</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance to isolated or blocked rural communities, populations at risk of displacement and other population directly affected by the armed conflict in the Municipalities of Remedios and Zaragoza, Department of Antioquia, Colombia.</td>
<td>Jul.07</td>
<td>Jun.08</td>
<td>Spanish Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td>This project focused on providing health assistance has also a component of mine risk education and awareness (R2): talks on antipersonnel mines for children and adult population in each of four focal communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/SM/BUD/2007/01014</td>
<td>Colombia (ECHO)</td>
<td>Access and humanitarian aid for populations putting up resistance, those that have returned and are displaced, in the territories of ethnic communities most affected by the armed conflict in Valle del Cauca and Nariño</td>
<td>Jul.07</td>
<td>Jun.08</td>
<td>Solidaridad Internacional</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multisectorial project with a component of institutional and community strengthening (R1 and R5) that will contain specific activities (to be defined by the indigenous communities in the next weeks) such as sensitation events regarding risk related with landmines and/or development of contingency plans in case of landmine accidents in Nariño department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/SM/BUD/2007/01001</td>
<td>Colombia (ECHO)</td>
<td>Our future is today: Protection of Indigenous Populations and Children</td>
<td>Mär.07</td>
<td>Feb.08</td>
<td>Diakonisches Werk der EKD - Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, Germany UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Among its coordination and information activities, OCHA also collects and disseminates information related to landmines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO/SM/BUD/2007/01020</td>
<td>Colombia (ECHO)</td>
<td>Provision of coordination services for humanitarian response in Colombia</td>
<td>Mär.07</td>
<td>Feb.08</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract number</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Contract Title</td>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>End date of activities</td>
<td>Contracting Party</td>
<td>Amount of EC cofunding</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/???</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Improving humanitarian protection of communities living in the midst of the conflict.</td>
<td>Okt.07</td>
<td>Jun.08</td>
<td>OXFAM GB</td>
<td>Multisectorial project with a capacity strengthening component that contains actions to improve the information and communication relating to the routes for treatment of populations affected by landmines, among others (R2)*.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>