Conference on Disarmament - EU Statement on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

European Union

 

Statement on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 6 August 2026

Mr President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, and Republic of Moldova, the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

As we meet today, we mark the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Even after eighty-one years, this tragic event remains a stark reminder of the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use. It also reminds us that every practical step that builds confidence, strengthens transparency and supports future disarmament efforts retains its value today.

The EU welcomes the opportunity to discuss nuclear disarmament verification today - an issue that has gained increasing attention in recent years and directly linked to the CD agenda as adopted annually. 

The EU strongly supports all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT and the comprehensive, balanced and full implementation of the 2010 Action Plan. We stress the urgent need to implement all obligations under the NPT, as well as commitments made during previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Verification is an indispensable part of this effort. Nuclear disarmament cannot be credible or sustainable without effective verification. Transparency builds confidence and verification supports transparency. Nuclear disarmament verification is a practical enabler for achieving irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

Mr President,

The successful conclusion of the GGE to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues has made an important contribution to international efforts on nuclear disarmament verification and provided a solid basis for further multilateral work. It reflects broad expert consensus on many of the political, technical and operational aspects and significantly advances our common understanding of the challenges and opportunities related to nuclear disarmament verification. The report demonstrates that progress has already been made in developing concepts, procedures and technologies that may support future nuclear disarmament agreements and their implementation.

The challenge before us is therefore no longer whether verification is feasible. Rather, it is how we preserve, expand and make practical use of this accumulated knowledge so that it is available when political conditions allow further progress on nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, the EU considers it important that verification work continues. Verification capabilities cannot be developed only once negotiations begin. They need to be built in advance. Technical cooperation, practice-oriented research and multilateral exchanges on nuclear disarmament verification help reduce uncertainty, strengthen confidence and prepare the ground for future disarmament agreements.

Therefore, the EU attaches great importance to practical verification initiatives. We continue to support the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We also welcome initiatives such as the Franco-German NuDiVe exercise, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and other practical activities, such as initiated most recently by the Vienna Center for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament that bring together nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as initiatives that build capacities among non-nuclear-weapon States. These initiatives demonstrate that critical verification challenges can be addressed through cooperation without compromising safety, security or proliferation-sensitive information. They also help broaden expertise and build confidence among future verification experts.

Following the consensus report of the Group of Governmental Experts, the establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts by UNGA resolution A/RES/80/53 offers an opportunity to preserve, deepen, and further develop technical expertise on nuclear disarmament verification within the UN framework.

The EU and its Member States will continue to contribute actively to these efforts. We also recognise the important work carried out by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, EURATOM and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association in advancing verification technologies and methodologies.

Mr President,

The Conference on Disarmament also has a role to play in this regard. While the Conference has not yet been able to agree on a programme of work leading to negotiations, it needs to remain ready to engage on relevant exchanges on issues that will be essential for future negotiations. Nuclear disarmament verification is one such issue.

Drawing on the work of the GGE and other relevant initiatives, would help preserve institutional knowledge, broaden participation and ensure that expertise continues to develop. Such discussions would not prejudge future negotiating mandates. They could, however, help ensure that the Conference remains prepared to fulfil its negotiating role when conditions permit.

Mr President,

The EU continues to underline the importance of transparency, dialogue and confidence-building measures. We call on all nuclear-weapon States to engage in meaningful dialogue on risk reduction, transparency and verification. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction contributes to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts. We also encourage nuclear-weapon states to continue direct engagement in voluntary transparency measures and practical, verification-related activities.

In the wake of China’s recent test of a submarine-launched long-range ballistic missile, we encourage China to subscribe to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing transparency about ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The HCoC has been an important confidence-building measure, through inter alia standardised pre-launch notifications to all subscribing States. 

The EU notes the potential repercussions of the expiry of the New START Treaty, whose robust verification regime has demonstrated the value of effective verification for strategic arms control and nuclear disarmament. The EU calls for urgent work towards a new agreement on a verifiable legally binding framework limiting the largest nuclear arsenals and encourages the United States and Russia to maintain in the meantime the agreed limits on their nuclear arsenals. We urge Russia to engage meaningfully, and call on China to contribute and engage actively and constructively. 

Mr President,

Verification is not an end in itself. Nor can verification replace the political decisions required to advance nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, political opportunities should not find us technically unprepared. For that reason, the EU believes that continued investment in nuclear disarmament verification is an investment in the future of multilateral disarmament itself. All States have something to contribute to this work. We therefore encourage continued cooperation across all relevant international initiatives.

I thank you, Mr President.