EU Statement on Nuclear Disarmament Verification - Conference on Disarmament

European Union

Statement on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, August 15, 2023

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Republic of Moldova[1] and the potential candidate country Georgia align themselves with this statement.

We commend you, Mr. President, for the selection of the important topic of nuclear disarmament verification, as this issue has recently been a focus of increased international attention and activity. We thank the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification for the presentation of the work of this group and the latest report. The EU welcomes the work of the Group which provided a multilateral platform for experts to exchange knowledge and views on the political and technical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification. We congratulate Norwegian chairmanship on successfully adopting of a consensus final report. Its conclusions and recommendations will serve as an important framework to guide future efforts and work on nuclear disarmament verification, as they offer for further consideration many elements that may be relevant and practical for verification arrangements in nuclear disarmament negotiations or agreements and their related verification provisions.

Nuclear disarmament verification is an area, where we have seen quite a lot of progress in recent years and it merits our full attention including during the new review cycle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The EU has contributed with a Working Paper on this topic to the Second Preparatory Committee session of the 10th NPT Review Conference and become together with France, Germany and Hungary in their national capacity, supporters of Action 8 of the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament to develop nuclear disarmament verification. In this as well as in other areas, we attach importance to the meaningful and equal participation and leadership of women.

The EU and its Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals. We believe that concrete steps to further developing multilateral verification of the disarmament process could contribute to the implementation of Article VI as effective verification measures could help pave the way to fulfilling this goal.

Effective verification goes hand in hand with increased transparency. Together, transparency and verification can lead to confidence. The EU reiterates its support for intensified dialogue, including on strategic stability, increased transparency and confidence building measures by the nuclear weapon States to promote further progress in disarmament. Given the rapid and extensive build-up of China’s nuclear arsenal, we call on China to join future arms control agreements and to respond positively to calls for an arms control dialogue as a first step. We urge China to immediately take measures to improve the transparency of its nuclear weapons, to refrain from further build-up, which is not in line with its commitments under the NPT, and pursue new risk reduction measures. 

The New START Treaty has illustrated the importance of robust and effective verification for meaningful arms control, non-proliferation and, ultimately, achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. The reduction of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals under the New START Treaty, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism, contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of deployed nuclear weapons. The EU is deeply concerned about Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty. We call on Russia to immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations,  including by facilitating New START inspections on Russian territory, and by returning to participation in the Treaty’s implementation body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Mr. President,

We welcome the work conducted by the previous Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on nuclear disarmament verification and thank Norway for facilitating consensus on its report. The EU and its Member States supported the establishment of the GGE at the UN General Assembly in 2016 as well as its continuation in 2021 and 2022 to pursue further work, taking into account the GGE’s report. The EU and its Member States have significant experience that can be useful to effectively advancing the disarmament verification agenda and developing well-elaborated, certified and robust technical procedures and technologies in order to ensure that the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their NPT obligations apply.

In addition to the work undertaken by EU Member States, significant R&D efforts are carried out by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission as well as EURATOM in the fields of nuclear safety and security, safeguards and non-proliferation. Furthermore, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) has added special sessions on disarmament verification to its symposia.

We support partnerships and cooperative verification arrangements, such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which the EU and several EU Member States participate. We welcome the Franco-German Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NuDive) exercise as a concrete step towards developing reliable and sound multilateral nuclear disarmament verification procedures. This practical exercise demonstrates that nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear    weapon States can work together to advance transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in a way which does not compromise proliferation-sensitive information, completeness and correctness of the declarations, access, or other safety and security considerations. In addition, we welcome Belgium’s exercise of plutonium measurement methods, as well as the research and demonstration on high explosive detection methods carried out by the Netherlands within the IPNDV format.

The EU reaffirms the value of multilateral cooperation advancing nuclear disarmament verification. We will continue to support the actions taken by a number of states, including EU member states, to consider the role of nuclear verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and support further efforts in all relevant fora, including the GGE, the Quad nuclear verification partnership, the international partnership for nuclear disarmament verification (IPNDV) format, and the NuDiVe initiative. While verification is not an end in itself, further development of the multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities would assist in the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. The EU emphasizes that all States can make important contributions to the field of nuclear disarmament verification.

I thank you, Mr. President.

[1] North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.