Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania and the potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina^[1] align themselves with this declaration.

We would like to congratulate you and your team for your excellent work in steering the work of this open-ended working group during its first substantial session, held in May. We also appreciate your efforts in preparing the Chair’s summary of that meeting and look forward to further substantive discussions this week.

The second session of the OEWG convenes during the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, which is causing a tragic loss of life and immense human suffering. Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine grossly violates international law and the UN Charter, and undermines international peace and security. The international community will hold Russia accountable for its actions. The EU and its MS’ express full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. The EU remains strongly committed to the fight against impunity for atrocities.

Mr. Chair,

Irresponsible behaviours can be threatening and may lead to escalation including through misunderstanding, misinterpretation or miscalculation. Therefore, threats and irresponsible behaviour in space could  have grave consequences for the security and safety of people and goods and impact present and future generations.

Given the dual-use nature of many space systems, the EU and its Member States believe that an approach based on behaviours, supported by relevant monitoring capabilities, is the most pragmatic and immediate way forward to improve space security today, as it will help to reduce the risks of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation, and therefore decrease the risks of conflicts and escalation in outer space. We also stress that this does not exclude the possibility of a legally binding instrument in the future.

This second session of the OEWG, dedicated to threats and threatening behaviours in outer space, is thus a unique opportunity for all States to share their concerns and priorities and to present to other States their views of which behaviours they consider irresponsible or threatening. It is an opportunity to engage in a dialogue and to collectively reflect on each other’s security concerns.  We believe that this dialogue and exchange could act as a confidence building measure.

Mr.  Chair,

As the space environment is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive, the number of risks and threats to space objects, systems and services is rising significantly and merits our full attention. The destruction of space objects, systems and infrastructure as well as any forced interruption of the services they provide significantly impacts our  societies which are increasingly dependent upon them. 

Threats and irresponsible behaviours can have a significant impact on civilians, leading to partial or complete service outage; they can result in reversible or irreversible damages to space systems, and in some cases create space debris, jeopardising the orbits of vital interest today and in the future.

The rapid technical, economic and political development of the space sector contributes to new and emerging threats while the inherent dual-use nature of many space applications and systems poses challenges when it comes to protecting space assets, identifying threats, and interpreting an actor’s intentions.

The number of threats to space systems is increasing. The persistent development and testing of a DA-ASAT capability demonstrates a State’s intent to acquire capabilities of targeting and destroying satellites of a potential adversary. The conduct of such tests may lead States to perceive their space assets, including satellites of crucial importance, such as command and control, navigation or communication satellites, to be at risk. Such activities are dangerous and highly destabilising; they may lead to deteriorating confidence between space actors, increase the perception of threats, and could trigger an escalation of violence and potentially could have catastrophic consequences. The testing of kinetic destructive anti-satellite systems (ASAT) has long-lasting consequences on the space environment through the generation of space debris.

More over, in-orbit rendez-vous operations and proximity operations and corresponding technolologies that affect another State’s space system can be perceived as a threat when the intention behind the manoeuvre is not properly communicated. Such operations, in particular in the case of rendez-vous operations, could be misused for irresponsible or threatening activities such as de-orbiting satellites without consent or destroying them. The omission to inform, notify or communicate about a proximity operation that affects another State’s space system is considered an irresponsible behaviour.

Non-kinetic threats to space systems and services such as cyberattacks, jamming and other electromagnetic interferences or direct energy weapons, should also be considered irresponsible when they jeopardise the security of people, goods and services, whether on Earth or in space.

In conclusion, the EU and its Member States have submitted a joint contribution detailing our position on what we consider as being irresponsible and threatening behaviour. We invite all UN Member States and other stakeholders to examine it carefully.

The EU and its Member States therefore continue to be fully committed to engage actively and constructively in this process. We look forward to the views of other States and to engage with them actively in the discussions in order to concretely advance space security.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[1] North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.