- CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY -

Mr. President,

1. It is an honour to have again the opportunity to address the Council in this session on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr Josep Borrell, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA). 

2. My first expression of gratitude goes to Secretary-General António Guterres and to the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of Resolution 2231 and in particular the report prepared for today’s discussion. I also want to thank Ireland as the Facilitator of Resolution 2231 and the work done to keep members informed of the current state of play.

3. I would like also to underscore the important role of the IAEA as the sole impartial and independent international organisation mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA.

4. Last June, we described the intense negotiations efforts to restore the JCPOA undertaken by all JCPOA participants, and the United States, since April 2021. Following this process and based on all the key positions of the participants in negotiations, the EU High Representative had been able to put forward in early August a compromise text that reflects his understanding of the most realistic equilibrium in view of a deal . The text lays down the necessary steps for the US to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of all its JCPOA commitments. However, since then, new developments have added significant new layers of complications that makes it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. Nevertheless, the coordinator remains in close contact with all JCPOA participants and the Unites States on this issue.

Mr. President,

5. Since the discussion on the previous report of the UN Secretariat on the implementation of the UNSCR 2231, the IAEA documented thoroughly the alarming further acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments. IAEA DG’s reports of the 10, 22 and 29 of November documented the expansion of Iran’s nuclear enrichment operations and capacity. This includes more enrichment of uranium at the level of 60% in two facilities and more cascades of advanced centrifuges going to operation while others are being installed.

6. Let me also recall that Iran’s unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further aggravated existing concerns related to the fact that from 23 February 2021 onwards, the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.

7. Furthermore, Iran, which conditioned a deal on the restoration of the JCPOA on the settlement of the ‘outstanding safeguards issues’, needs to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

8. We continue to recognise that Iran has faced and continues facing very serious negative economic consequences following the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of previously lifted US unilateral sanctions which we deeply regret. Since our last discussion in June, the US has imposed additional nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, including in the area of oil and petrochemicals. The restoration of the JCPOA remains the only way for Iran to reap the full benefits of the JCPOA and reach its full economic potential as it will result in a comprehensive sanctions’ lifting that will encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with Iran.

9. I recall in this context that the EU has lifted all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions since the JCPOA Implementation Day and this remains the case. But let me also clarify that EU measures relating to the unacceptable repression of protests in Iran over the past months and Iran’s military support to Russia are outside the JCPOA.

Mr. President,

10. In addition to the advancement of the nuclear programme of Iran, the European Union is indeed extremely worried about Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine including through deliveries of drones. The EU will continue to respond to this, as necessary, not least as this also affects the implementation of SCR 2231.

11. On 12 December last, the Council of the European Union recalled that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without prior permission by the UN Security Council is in violation of Resolution 2231. On this occasion, the EU reaffirmed its support to the ongoing work by the UN Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Resolution. The EU also recalled that Resolution 2231 calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology.

Mr. President,

12. The process to conclude a deal and bring the JCPOA back on track has been seriously challenged by the various developments over the last few months as described earlier.   

13. However, I shall be straightforward: the High Representative does not see any sustainable alternative.  To echo the statement made by the UN Secretary-General in his report, let me reaffirm here that diplomacy and restoring the JCPOA’s full implementation is still the best option for preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This is also instrumental to the security of the whole region and remains in our fundamental common interest.

14. For almost two years, the Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran’s activities on the entirety of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle. Let me recall that the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which substantially strengthened legal capacities of the IAEA in terms of verification, is only made applicable under a fully implemented JCPOA. Moreover, while the agreement is in the shadow, Iran’s programme runs quickly with irreversible proliferation implications in particular in the field of research and development. The combination of continued nuclear progress by Iran and decreasing visibility over its programme raises more concerns than ever.

15. The Procurement Channel, another benefit of the JCPOA, continues to be fully operational. It remains a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. It gives assurances to Member States and the private sector that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.

16. For all these reasons, on 12 December, the Council of the EU reaffirmed its commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. It called on all countries to support the implementation of Resolution 2231. The EU also underscored that the JCPOA is separate from Iran’s legally binding obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

17. Drawing on this unambiguous support from the Foreign Ministers from the 27 EU countries, the High Representative is determined to continue working with the international community towards a full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. He joins his voice to that of the UN Secretary-General to encourage all parties to intensify diplomatic efforts to this end.

Thank you, Mr. President.