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Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Canada, Australia and  the UK, align themselves with this explanation of vote.

I am taking the floor to explain our vote on the proposal contained in document A/C.1/76/L.54 entitled “United Nations Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons".

We are not in a position to support draft resolution A/C.1/76/L.54. and call upon others to vote against this text.

The EU Member States fully support the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), as key pillars of the international rules-based system, as well as the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism (SGM), as a key component of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. In the same vein, the EU stands fully behind the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

We have taken note with concern of the Russian Federation’s proposal for a resolution requesting notably that the Secretary General seek the views of member States on the need to review the SGM Guidelines and Procedures, and submit to the 77^th General Assembly a substantive report presenting these views for further discussion.

The EU is a staunch and long-standing supporter of the SGM as an independent international instrument to carry out investigations in response to possible use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law. The EU does not at this time see a specific need to update the SGM Guidelines and Procedures, or for the Secretary General to take a first step in this direction for the following reasons:

First, the resolution proposal suggests that this process should be started because certain provisions of the SGM Guidelines and Procedures - that still remain to be identified - should be adapted in light of scientific and technological developments and since their endorsement by the General Assembly in 1990. We note that the draft resolution fails to mention the fact that the SGM Guidelines and Procedures were actually reviewed in 2007 and their technical appendices updated the same year. Furthermore, the Guidelines and Procedures worked adequately in a real-world situation in 2013, when the SGM was launched for the purpose of the OPCW investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is therefore unclear why there would be a pressing need at this time to start a process leading to a review the SGM Guidelines and Procedures. 

Secondly, we question the motives behind this proposal. 

One crucial aspect of the SGM Guidelines and Procedures is that they authorise the Secretary-General to decide autonomously whether to launch an investigation into alleged use or other cases of violation of customary international law, and a separate approval from the UNSC is not needed. This independence of the SGM instrument is a vital guarantee to UN Member States that if they request for an investigation into alleged use of chemical or biological weapons, the launch of the investigation cannot be blocked by another Member State due to political motives.

The ulterior motive behind this supposed need to review the SGM Guidelines and Procedures is to subordinate the SGM, and more specifically the Secretary General’s decisional power as to whether to launch an investigation into alleged use of biological weapons, to the UN Security Council.  That is also why Russian Federation’s resolution of last year that centred around the same proposal to review the SGM Guidelines and Procedures, was defeated by a very clear vote. Indicative of this  motive are the numerous occasions in the past when the Russian Federation voiced criticism of the SGM. For instance, at the Meeting of States Parties of the BTWC in December 2019, Russian Federation strongly criticized any further development and strengthening of the SGM. In 2020, Russian Federation carried out demarches opposing the work done by UNODA with the help of several UN Member States to strengthen the SGM.

 Finally, at this year’s BTWC Meeting of Experts altogether three working papers proposing the establishment of new mechanisms or instruments for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons were submitted in view of the Ninth Review Conference. Incidentally, two of these proposals were tabled by the Russian Federation. We consider it preferable to wait for the results of the BTWC Review Conference first before rushing to start a process leading to a possible review of the way the only currently existing instrument for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons works.

 For these reasons, the EU calls on all states not to support this proposal of resolution which raises serious concerns in both form and content.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.