EU Explanation of Vote: UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, Georgia, as well as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom align themselves with this statement.

I am taking the floor to explain our vote on the draft resolution L.69 entitled “United Nations Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons".

We have taken note with concern of the Russian Federation’s proposal for a resolution requesting notably that the Secretary General seek the views of Member States on the possible need to review the Guidelines and Procedures of the Secretary General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (SGM). This is the third consecutive year that the Russian Federation submits a proposal for a resolution on the SGM. The two previous ones were not adopted by a wide margin of votes from all regions at UNGA. While the text of the draft resolution has been slightly modified, the aim and the purpose of this initiative remains unchanged and it risks undermining the mechanism. This is why, just as in the two previous years, we are not in a position to support this draft resolution and call upon others to vote against this text.

The EU Member States fully support the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), as key pillars of the international rules-based system, as well as the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism as a key component of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. In the same vein, the EU stands fully behind the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The EU is a staunch and long-standing supporter of the SGM as an independent international instrument to carry out investigations in response to possible use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law. A crucial aspect of the SGM Guidelines and Procedures is that they authorise the Secretary-General to decide autonomously whether to launch an investigation into alleged use or other cases of violation of customary international law. Prior approval from the UNSC is not needed. This independence of the SGM instrument is a vital guarantee to any UN Member State that  the launch of an investigation by the Secretary-General cannot be blocked by any other Member State for any reason, for instance political motives.

The EU does not at this time see a specific need to update the SGM Guidelines and Procedures, or for the Secretary General to take a first step in this direction for the following reasons:

First, the resolution proposal suggests that certain provisions of the SGM Guidelines and Procedures, that Russia has never identified specifically, may need to be adapted in light of scientific and technological developments and the evolution that has taken place in the field of chemical and biological disarmament since the endorsement of the Guidelines and Procedures by the General Assembly in 1990. 

We note that the draft resolution neglects to mention the fact that the SGM Guidelines and Procedures were actually reviewed in 2007 and that its technical appendices were updated the same year. Furthermore, the Guidelines and Procedures worked adequately in a real-world situation in 2013, when the SGM was launched for the purpose of investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria, where the Syrian regime resorted to the use of chemical weapons under the international political protection of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the Capstone Simulation Exercise investigating the suspected use of biological weapons, conducted in Germany under the auspices of UNODA from 19 until 28 September 2022, demonstrated the operational readiness of the mechanism. It is therefore unclear why there would be a pressing need at this time to start a process possibly leading to a review of the SGM Guidelines and Procedures.

Secondly, we question the motives behind this proposal: 

The numerous occasions in the past when the Russian Federation voiced criticism of the SGM show that the objective is not to strengthen the SGM, but to undermine its independence. For instance, at the Meeting of States Parties of the BTWC in December 2019, Russia strongly criticized any further development and strengthening of the SGM. In 2020, Russia carried out demarches opposing the work done by UNODA with the help of several UN Member States to strengthen the SGM.

At the BTWC Meeting of Experts in 2021 altogether three working papers proposing the establishment of new mechanisms or instruments for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons were submitted in view of the Ninth Review Conference. Incidentally, two of these proposals were tabled by the Russian Federation. We consider it key to make sure that the results of the BTWC Review Conference are consistent with the way the only currently existing instrument for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons works.

The fact that this year’s proposal for a resolution submitted by the Russian Federation employs the conditional (“possible need to update” SGM Guidelines and Procedures) does not change the ulterior motive behind this resolution, which is to start a process that could ultimately lead to modifying the Guidelines and Procedures by subordinating the SGM, and more specifically the Secretary General’s decisional power as to whether to launch an investigation into alleged use of chemical or biological weapons, to the UN Security Council. 

 For these reasons, we do not support this proposal for a resolution which raises serious concerns in both form and content and will vote against this draft. We call on all States not to support this proposal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

* North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.