Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and the EFTA countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Canada align themselves with this statement.

I am taking the floor to explain our vote on the proposals contained in documents A/C.1/77/L.70 regarding “Further Practical Measures on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” and A/C.1/77/L.67 regarding "No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space".

Mr. Chairman,

We will vote against these two resolutions and call on other MSs to do the same.

The EU and its Member States are actively engaged in promoting the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis for all, for present and future generations. The EU and its Member States remain strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is essential for strengthening international security and stability and for safeguarding the free exploration and long-term use of the space environment for peaceful purposes. Therefore, all EU Member States supported UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/76/L22 regarding the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).

We share the view that we need further practical measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. However, definitional ambiguity regarding the question of what constitutes a weapon in space will affect all objects placed in space or possessing capability to affect objects in outer space that could in one way or another be considered a weapon if used in an aggressive manner.

With regard to draft Resolution [L.67] on “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (NFP), we remain concerned that this initiative still does not adequately respond to the objective of strengthening trust and confidence between States to concretely strengthen space security. We reiterate that the NFP initiative does not address the difficult issue of defining what a weapon in outer space is, which continue to make this resolution ineffective and does not address threats and security risk emanating from the capability of space systems to interfere with other space systems. Ambiguities, regarding the capabilities of certain objects and regarding intentions of their use, could lead to misinterpretations, misunderstandings and miscalculations, and could consequently increase the risk of conflict in space.

Furthermore, with space being increasingly contested and congested, we remain concerned about the continued development and testing of anti-satellites weapons and the repeated threats by the Russian Federation to target commercial satellites.

We underline the importance of addressing such dangerous and highly destabilizing developments promptly, comprehensively and as part of international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space, something that this resolution does not do sufficiently.

In this regard, the EU and its Member States welcome and support the new US resolution on “Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-satellite (ASAT) Missile Testing” as a pragmatic, concrete and measurable step forward.

Without excluding the possibility of new legally binding instruments in the future, the EU and its Member States believe that an approach based on behaviours is the most pragmatic and immediate way forward to improve space security today. The EU and its Member States underline that future legally binding frameworks in the scope of space security should be effective and verifiable and should aim to cover all relevant threats.

We believe that such discussions are best further elaborated within the existing work of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on reducing space threats. Within this OEWG, efforts are discussed to set up norms of responsible behaviour in space as a first step on the way towards a legally binding instrument. Starting up a new parallel process such as the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.70 would undermine the ongoing work within the OEWG. It is [therefore] too soon to decide on new working formats on PAROS as the work of the OEWG is only halfway.

The EU and its Member States continue to be fully committed to engage actively and constructively in advancing space security and space governance.

* North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.