EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mr Chair.
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.
The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Albania*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina* and Georgia, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a grave threat to international peace and security. The risk that non-state actors, including terrorists could access WMD or their means of delivery remains real. In line with the EU’s Strategy against the proliferation of WMD, one of the central goals of the EU’s Common and Foreign Policy is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate such programmes worldwide. Compliance with and enforcement of international obligations applicable to these weapons therefore remains a fundamental pillar of global efforts to uphold the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and to prevent its erosion.
The use of chemical weapons poses a significant threat to international peace and security. Such an act by anyone – be it a State or a non‐state actor – anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances is a violation of international law and can amount to some of the most serious crimes – war crimes and crimes against humanity. The European Union stands united for the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, and continues to support the OPCW politically and financially. We also remain steadfast in defending the Organisation against deliberate and baseless attacks on its integrity and credibility. We reiterate our call upon those States not yet party to the CWC to join the Convention without further delay.
The European Union is seriously concerned by the growing number of cases of uses of riot control agents by Russia as a method of warfare, which is explicitly prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as by the use of choking agent chloropicrin against Ukrainian soldiers. Russia has still not provided a credible response to these legitimate concerns pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 2 and 3 of the Convention. In light of the seriousness of the situation and to enhance the global norm against the use of chemical weapons, the European Union calls for a timely attribution of the proven use of riot control agents as a method of warfare.
The European Union welcomes the Syrian transitional authorities’ cooperation with the OPCW and calls on the transitional government to ensure swift implementation of the next steps to fully eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme and to counter proliferation risks. The EU is supporting this process through a substantive voluntary financial contribution to support the OPCW’s activities in Syria with a view to verifying and eliminating the Assad era chemical weapons programme, as well as identifying the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks committed in the Syrian Arab Republic.
We reaffirm our unequivocal support for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired and used as weapons. We welcome the recent accessions of Comoros and Kiribati to the Convention, which contribute to strengthening the BTWC, the universal norm against biological and toxin weapons. We call on the remaining eight States outside the Convention to join at the earliest date. The EU is encouraged by the productive work undertaken by the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention to date. It should complete its work as soon as possible, preferably in 2025 as urged by the 9th Review Conference, in order to establish the Science and Technology Review mechanism and the International Cooperation and Assistance mechanism. It should also endorse clear recommendations on further strengthening the functioning of the Convention. Measures to improve, monitor, and verify compliance with the Convention are significant steps towards the strengthening of the Convention, and we support the creation of an OEWG on this topic at the earliest opportunity.
We condemn the deliberate use of disinformation, especially by Russia against Ukraine and its partners, that undermine international peace and security, erode trust among States Parties, and obstruct cooperation and assistance under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. Russia’s false claims about legitimate capacity building programmes for biosafety and biosecurity, as well as detection and diagnostics are a striking example in this regard. Such practices not only politicise technical forums but also weaken collective efforts to uphold treaty obligations. Preserving integrity, transparency, and trust must remain at the heart of our common work.
The EU recognises that the only existing independent international instrument for investigating the alleged use of biological weapons is the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (UNSGM) and recalls its strong and long-standing support. We will continue to provide funding for the operationalisation of this independent mechanism.
The EU continues to support the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We consider the 1995 NPT Resolution valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East.
The EU reaffirms the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which continues to be a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture and the EU supports to the implementation of resolution 1540 through its Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/574 and hopes to see its functioning further strengthened.
After two decades of existence, the HCoC has become an important transparency and confidence-building measure, increasingly vital to international security. It remains the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing confidence and transparency about ballistic missiles launches and space launches of the Subscribing States. The EU reaffirms its strong support for the HCoC, including its continuous development and calls on all remaining states to subscribe to the Code.
We recall that effective and transparent export controls are important for facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information. Multilateral export control regimes, as well as national export control systems, are essential for the prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. Therefore, the EU fully supports the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. It reiterates that all EU Member States aspire to join these regimes and will continue to work towards their full inclusion. The EU is fully committed to defending and further developing export controls as universal, effective and responsive non-proliferation tools.
I thank you, Mr. Chair.
* North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.