EU Statement – UN Security Council: the situation in Somalia

 - As delivered -

Thank you very much, Madam President, and let me extend our best wishes for the Russian Federation presiding over the Security Council in the month for February.

Thank you for inviting the EU to brief the Security Council on Somalia. This is a very timely discussion in view of the increasing challenges in Somalia and indeed in the Horn of Africa region.

1. General Assessment of the situation in the Somalia

• Somalia is key to the stability and security in the Horn of Africa, but despite progress notably on economic reforms, the overall situation in Somalia continues to be extremely fragile and volatile hampered by political instability, persistent security challenges, socio-economic vulnerability, climate induced shocks, and a lack of sustained government presence and basic services delivery. Against a rising trend towards violence and extremism and the evolving threat of al-Shabaab, the country continues to suffer from terrorism and transnational crime;
• These factors combined with the COVID-19 pandemic and an unprecedented devastating drought, are the main drivers of acute humanitarian needs, with 2.9 million people internally displaced and over 4.6 million people facing acute food insecurity and hunger from February to May 2022; half of Somalia’s population is assessed to be in immediate need of humanitarian aid and protection as we’ve heard. It is thus imperative to adopt a comprehensive nexus-based approach to create synergies between humanitarian engagements, development efforts and peacebuilding and reconciliation;
• Somalia itself is presently at a crossroads due to significant shifts in regional dynamics and the factors I have just described. The immediate priorities are: conclusion of parliamentary elections, a peaceful transition of power and the formation of a functioning government able to deliver to its population and engage, inter alia, with the international community;

2. Putting politics at the centre

• In Somalia, it is critical to put politics at the centre. For months now, Somalia’s partners and neighbours have continued to urge Somali leaders to work in a spirit of compromise to overcome the last political hurdles to finalise an inclusive electoral process as soon as possible and respecting the agreements they reached both on 17^th September 2020 and 27^th May 2021. We note the level of progress - less than 50% of the 275 seats needed - to finish the elections for the House of the People [Lower House], within the prescribed deadline of 25^th February. The people of Somalia deserve the full dedication of their leaders to their safety, wellbeing and progress;

• Together with international partners, the EU has given support to Somalia to conclude the overdue elections and conduct an orderly and peaceful transition of power. This will be key for stability but also for reinvigorating the overall reform dynamics, including state building efforts and previously agreed key milestones which have not been met, such as the review of the provisional constitution, agreeing on the federal model for Somalia;
• In spite of the highly volatile situation experienced in the past year, the EU’s cooperation programmes have continued to support state-building, security and socio-economic development. Since 2014, our support has amounted to almost €1 billion in development and humanitarian assistance;
• With regard to the electoral process, last year, an immediate package benefiting civil society of €3.5 million was released to kick-start the implementation of the electoral agreement; actions include civic and voter education, establishment of early conflict warning and response, conflict mediation as well as information sharing on the electoral process. These actions also support women’s participation across the country;

3. EU’s continued support to a continued international security presence in Somalia beyond 2021

• Moving on to the security situation in Somalia and the evolving threat of al-Shabaab, looking more specifically at the tools both needed and available to provide a full spectrum solution to degrade al-Shabaab both on land and at sea, let me emphasise the EU’s strong commitment to Somalia’s state building efforts. Apart from the contribution in development and humanitarian assistance, as referred to before, our investment in the security sector is the most substantial, with more than €2.3 billion to AMISOM since 2007. We have also deployed an executive CSDP maritime operation (Operation ATALANTA) and the two missions (EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia);
• Operation ATALANTA has successfully contributed to the suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia. With the objective to further enhance the EU’s role as maritime security provider, the mandate of Operation ATALANTA was recently extended to other secondary executive tasks to counter trafficking of weapons in support of the UN arms embargo, and to counter trafficking of narcotic drugs, as well as monitoring illicit activities at sea. These new tasks will contribute to the ongoing fight against al-Shabaab and its funding streams. Our CSDP missions in Somalia continue to support the build-up of Somali Security Forces and institutions for a gradual takeover of security responsibilities both on land and off shore, in line with the Somali Transition Plan;
• Since its inception, EUTM Somalia has trained over 7000 SNA soldiers, and has been supporting the development of the Somali-owned Training system, that provides the SNA with the policies, procedures and expertise to manage their own force generation; the mission also provides the strategic advice and targeted training on enabling functions, such as C-IED, which remains instrumental in decreasing the Somali National Army’s dependency on AMISOM;
• EUCAP Somalia has been supporting the development of Somali Police Force, in particular the Federal Darwish, and its interoperability with the Somali National Army.  Over 800 Federal Darwish officers have been now deployed to security transition operations. EUCAP Somalia has also supported reopening of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Mogadishu, which has now reached its initial operational capability;

• Turning to the immediate question of Somalia and the security transition from AMISOM, let me first underline that any progress made over the years in Somalia has been possible thanks to AMISOM, and I want to pay tribute here again to the sacrifices by Africa’s sons and daughters paying the ultimate price in their contribution to security in Somalia.
• In line with the required UNSC mandate [UNSCR 2568 (2021)] requesting a reconfigured AU mission, there is general agreement that continued support from an international mission on land is necessary, that more accountability from all stakeholders is needed, and that the AU is best placed to continue to provide this. Let us be clear, the EU is willing to support the continued security presence of a reconfigured AU mission in Somalia. But, there is no support for “more of the same”. This is precisely because the context has evolved which requires a fresh, holistic approach to address the challenge posed by the mutating threat which sees a number of actors working more closely to deliver such a comprehensive and integrated solution;
• Despite the delays of last year, it is nevertheless a positive sign that the parties are reengaged, that the QUARTET [FGS, AU, UN, EU] has reconvened and the work begun by the technical teams, first in Addis, then in Cairo and now Mogadishu. The Roadmap provided by the African Union anticipated this entirely in accordance with the timelines set by the Security Council. We welcome also the positive spirit fostered between the teams to conclude this process;
• In parallel to the reconfiguration, and plans for the eventual drawdown of ATMIS, it is essential that the Federal Government of Somalia plans how this drawdown process can be matched by a corresponding generation of the forces needed. We encourage full transparency on this going forward. As partners, we look forward also to discussing the resources needed to deliver the Somali Transition Plan. Together, these plans must be realistic, pragmatic and focused as well as conditions-based in order to ensure a measured transition between the phases foreseen;
• As regards the EU, while we continue to call on all partners for a more balanced donor structure, the EU’s commitment to supporting peace, stability and development in Somalia is long-term;

• Turning then to the maritime domain, since its inception in 2008, Operation ATALANTA has successfully reduced the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia, with 171 pirates having been transferred to competent authorities; The UNSG report of November 2021 concluded that piracy had indeed been suppressed but not eradicated as root causes remain, and only naval presences, such as Operation ATALANTA, could ensure the needed deterrent effect;  
• Operation ATALANTA also has a 100% success rate in the protection of World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to persons in need;  almost 1600 vessels have been protected with over 2.5 million tonnes of food/aid delivered to Somalia since 2008;
• We are willing to work hand in hand with the Somali authorities to support their efforts on maritime security, in full respect of course of the sovereignty of Somalia. We hope the Council will be able to agree on a revised resolution that better reflects Somali priorities, while also renewing the legal provisions necessary for the continuation of Operation ATALANTA for at least for the remainder of this year.
• We therefore count on Somalia/FGS to express its readiness to have a renewal of the UNSCR for at least another 9 months (until December 2022).
• If the UNSC Resolution is not extended beyond 3 March, ATALANTA will not have authorisation to fight piracy and to protect the WFP deliveries and other vulnerable vessels in the Somali territorial waters;

• On the EU’s part, once the Resolution is renewed and extended, we stand ready to start discussions with the FGS, to define the mutually agreed parameters of cooperation on maritime security, including on capacity building.
• The EU remains strongly committed to further enhancing the regional maritime security architecture, as well as supporting Somalia’s strategic priorities, notably the build-up of maritime capacity and capability, and the gradual take-over by Somalia of security responsibilities both off shore and on land;

Thank you, Madam President.