EU Statement - Meeting of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group on developments in small arms and light weapons: Opportunities presented by developments in the manufacturing, technology and design

04.06.2026
New York

4 June 2026, New York – European Union Statement delivered by Michał Karczmarz, Chair of the COARM Working Party, EEAS, at the Meeting of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group on developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology and design at Panel 2) Opportunities presented by developments in the manufacturing, technology and design of small arms and light weapons to strengthen national implementation in line with relevant provisions of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument

 

Guiding question 5: What specific technological developments can enhance the means and methods for detection, identification, and tracing of illicit small arms and light weapons?

 

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro*, Serbia*, Albania*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina* and Georgia, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

Allow me first to congratulate you on your appointment as the Chair of OETEG, and to commend on behalf of the EU the inclusive and transparent preparatory process carried out over the course of the past months. 

The EU is convinced of the critical need to find new solutions to the evolving challenges of illicit small arms trafficking, and this must include leveraging new and emerging technologies. This panel and the OETEG itself are therefore most timely and welcome, and the briefers’ presentations have been rich and informative. 

The wide scope of the panel is appropriate as it will be important for the Chair’s report to reflect the range of applicable technologies to support effective implementation of the PoA and the ITI. 

In pursuit of the need to constantly reassess evolving technologies, the EU places great importance on supporting research and analysis on the applicability of specific new technologies to counter SALW trafficking.

In this regard, the EU has submitted a working paper drawing on research published this year on the automated detection of firearms and their parts and components in AI-enhanced X-ray scanner systems in airports and fast parcel post sorting centres. The research report was published under the project Automated Arms and Ammunition Mapping 2, an initiative of the EU’s Global Threats programme.

The underlying technology represents a potentially significant advancement in the detection of some forms of illicit firearm trafficking, and therefore in support of investigations of diversion, and it is already being deployed in airports in Europe. But it is not without its challenges and limitations, as the research shows. 

Allow me to summarize the main points of our working paper, which we have also submitted to the record and request to see reflected in the Chair’s summary.

 

These are as follows:

  1. The rapid evolution of illicit firearms trafficking, driven by the explosion of online commerce, the proliferation of privately manufactured firearms, and the evolution of 3D-printed weapons, threatens to outpace traditional law enforcement interdiction capabilities. 

  2. High-volume logistics hubs, particularly postal sorting centres and border crossings, are critical chokepoints where manual inspection of baggage and packages is no longer feasible, and where automation and machine-learning solutions are now necessary.

  3. Commercial artificial intelligence (AI) computer vision-enhanced X-ray scanners, known as Automated Prohibited Items Detection Systems (APIDS), are reaching high levels of technological readiness and are being deployed in aviation baggage and parcel screening, and thus represent a critical tool for firearm trafficking interdiction. 

  4. In the EU, these systems are subject to certification by aviation safety authorities, and performance testing is conducted by authorized national testing facilities. But very few systems have been certified to date. The applicability of approved systems, and in particular standards and performance metrics, for other border control and fast-parcel post settings, also needs exploration.

  5. While AI-enhanced APIDS continue to advance in sophistication, research has highlighted that their full potential remains constrained by the scarcity of diverse, high-quality training data for firearm parts, components and accessories that are subject to trafficking. In particular, the non-traditional shapes, designs and materiel properties of 3D-printed weapons and kits continue to evolve and may not be fully represented in training data. 

In light of these considerations, the EU submits that:

  1. AI-enhanced APIDS are growing in sophistication and will be an essential component in illicit SALW trafficking interdiction efforts, diversion detection and investigations.

  2. Given that effective deployment of these systems requires fit-for-purpose training data and algorithm certification standards, Member States have an interest in contributing to these prerequisites.

  3. Efforts to support improving AI-enhanced APIDS to keep up with the evolving SALW trafficking threat could include initiatives to coordinate, share and build a diversity of high-quality training data. Initiatives that bring together research and testing institutes, industry and commercial providers, should be closely aligned with regional SALW control policy roadmaps, national firearms focal points, and similar coordination bodies.

  4. In particular, it is critical that national and regional SALW trafficking experts are involved and consulted in the development of commercial APIDS detection capabilities and certification for the evolving illicit SALW trafficking threat. The sharing of anonymized, real-world seizure data among Member States and international bodies such as INTERPOL, UNODC and the World Customs Organization, also remains critical to this objective.

  5. These steps would not only contribute to tangibly enhancing the detection, identification, and tracing of illicit small arms and light weapons, but also chart an effective path for leveraging the positive opportunities of AI for the effective implementation of the PoA-ITI.

 

  1. North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.