Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

The multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament framework remains under unprecedented pressure due to current geopolitical challenges, including Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and multiple crises in the Middle East. At this critical time, we must strengthen our collective efforts to uphold and preserve the NPT, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Chair,

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a gross violation of the UN Charter and international law and poses multiple grave threats to global security. Russia’s actions are a serious threat to the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities including through continued reckless attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The situation remains precarious at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), illegally seized and militarised by Russia. We support the ongoing efforts of the IAEA Director General and Secretariat to address the nuclear safety, security and safeguards implications of the current situation in Ukraine. We welcome that the IAEA was able to continue to implement safeguards and undertake in-field verification activities in Ukraine in accordance with Article III of the NPT and Ukraine’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. 

Under these unprecedented circumstances, the work of the IAEA and its continued presence at all of Ukraine’s nuclear sites is of utmost importance. We expect that the next rotation of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission at the ZNPP takes place through the usual route and insist that the IAEA has access to all requested locations, information and personnel. All ZNPP reactors must remain in cold shutdown, as ordered by the Ukrainian regulator. We urge Russia to withdraw from the ZNPP, to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and comply with all relevant UN General Assembly and IAEA resolutions.

Chair,

Ensuring Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon is a key security priority for the EU. We recall Iran’s legally binding obligations under the NPT, and its commitments, all of which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution to address the Iran nuclear issue. We call on all countries to ensure the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). 

The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region is increasing as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory. Iran’s unabated nuclear advances over the last five years are of utmost concern. Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State to systematically produce and accumulate highly enriched uranium. Iran has already accumulated more than 6 significant quantities of 60% enriched material [which the Agency defines as the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded]. Iran’s actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and have no credible civilian justification. In this context, we remain concerned by statements made by Iranian officials about Iran’s capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon. We urge Iran to return to the provisional implementation and work towards ratification of the Additional Protocol and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures.

The EU urges Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory, return to its nuclear non-proliferation commitments and co-operate with the Agency swiftly and substantially, towards full compliance with its obligations under the NPT-required Safeguards Agreement. We look forward to the distribution, as soon as possible, of the IAEA DG’s comprehensive and updated assessment. We also condemn Iran’s military support to Russia, including the delivery of ballistic missiles, which is a major threat to European and international peace and security.

Chair,

The DPRK must cease all unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security, and comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions.The DPRK must take concrete steps in dismantling its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The DPRK will never be accepted as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT or have any other special status in that regard. We are alarmed about the disturbing shift of Russia’s position on the denuclearisation of the DPRK. 

We urge the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to bring into force the Additional Protocol. We also urge the DPRK to refrain from testing nuclear weapons, to reaffirm the moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing and nuclear tests and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without further delay or preconditions. The EU is ready to work with all relevant parties in promoting a meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building the basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

We stress that UN sanctions remain fully in place, despite Russia’s veto that prevented the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 from continuing its work. Russia’s decision severely impacts all UN Member States’ ability to implement UN Security Council resolutions and address the DPRK’s destabilising actions. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the expanding military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including the DPRK’s deployment of troops and transfer of arms to Russia, in particular ballistic missiles, in flagrant violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. We call on the DPRK and Russia to immediately cease these activities and abide by relevant UN Security Council resolutions.  

The EU supports the IAEA Director General’s engagement with Syria. We welcome the process of clarification of the outstanding safeguards issues that was launched last year. The EU calls upon the transitional Syrian authorities to engage constructively with the IAEA on the outstanding issues related to the Assad regime’s nuclear activities, notably by providing it with the necessary information and cooperation. Moreover, we would strongly encourage Syria to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol without further delay, so as to rebuild confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. 

Chair, 

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with the Additional Protocol, represent the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT. The EU continues to promote their universalisation and calls upon States, which have not yet done so, to conclude and bring into force these indispensable instruments before the next NPT Review Conference. 

We call on concerned States to amend or rescind their Small Quantities Protocols without delay, especially those countries that are already in the process of building a nuclear power plant or research reactor. We note with concern that the Agency will no longer be able to draw safeguards conclusions for States with the outdated protocol.

Chair,

The IAEA safeguards system remains a fundamental component of the NPT. The EU attaches great importance to the IAEA’s mandate and its impartial, independent and objective role. The close cooperation between EURATOM and the IAEA contributes to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards in EURATOM Member States. 

The EU recalls the importance of effective export controls, in accordance with Article III of the NPT, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887 and 2325. We invite all States to adhere to the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. We reiterate that export control regimes provide impartial guidelines that allow States to ensure that proliferation concerns are addressed and thus contribute to facilitating transfers of nuclear technology and scientific knowledge for peaceful uses, and to maintaining a predictable and transparent framework for international nuclear trade. It is in this spirit that the EU has organised in this Preparatory Committee session a side event on the benefits of export controls. We support the participation of all EU Member States the abovementioned export control regimes.

The proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles and missile technology is a destabilising factor and remains a matter of grave concern to the EU. The EU calls on all States that have not yet done so, to subscribe to The Hague Code of Conduct, the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument aimed at bolstering efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation. The EU has been a tireless advocate for its universalisation and effective implementation.

Thank you, Chair.

* North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.