Thank you, Mr. President, 

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro^*, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina^* and Georgia, as well as San Marino, align themselves with this statement.

Mr. President, 

We are grateful for this meeting, which presents us with an opportunity to contrast legal and necessary sanctions, as lawful and legitimate tools of foreign policy, to the vague politically motivated narrative on so-called unilateral coercive measures. We recall in this regard our statement from the debate on the same agenda item that took place on 13 June 2024.

Mr. President, 

Sanctions are among the peaceful tools at the disposal of the UN Security Council to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, as provided in the UN Charter. Yet, we all know that the UN Security Council is often prevented by certain UNSC members from taking action to address serious violations of international law – including when a UNSC permanent member may be involved in such violations. The dire consequences of not taking action to uphold the UN Charter in such grave situations should be a central part of this discussion. Putting an end to acts of aggression, grave human rights violations or abuses, including the imprisonment or killing of human rights defenders and the suppression of democratic opposition and civil society organizations, as well as nuclear proliferation and the use of chemical weapons, are key priorities for both the UN and the EU. They should not be swept under the carpet by a simplistic and divisive “UCMs” rhetoric, which prevents UN Member States from engaging in a serious discussion on a very serious topic.

EU autonomous restrictive measures aim to target those – and only those – responsible for these transgressions. They contribute to filling the dangerous void in situations where the UNSC is unable to take action. They comply with international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law. They are carefully and systematically scrutinized by EU Courts, where listed persons can and do regularly exercise fully their due process rights and right to a fair trial. EU restrictive measures have no extra-territorial application. In other words, they do not create obligations for non-EU operators, unless their business has a link with the EU and only to that extent. They are based on clear listing criteria and robust and compelling evidence. Lastly, they are temporary in nature, as the latest lifting of a number of restrictive measures on Syria attests.

By stark contrast, we note that some countries that otherwise vehemently oppose so-called “UCMs,” regularly exert unilateral economic pressure on other countries or adopt sanctions – often without any transparency, due process guarantees, or any international legal justification – nakedly aimed at imposing on others their own narrow national political or economic interests. To add insult to this hypocrisy, some of them are at the same time also obstructing meaningful implementation of UN sanctions.

Having clarified the aim, legal nature and scope of application of EU restrictive measures, let us turn to their relation to humanitarian aid and development assistance, which tends to be systematically misrepresented. 

It should be recalled at the outset that the EU together with its Member States are the world’s largest donors of development assistance (42%) and the second largest donors of humanitarian aid (28%). We are committed to protecting people from the effects of economic destitution and war, as well as of natural disasters, and to supporting better lives and development conditions in all corners of the world, including in countries concerned by restrictive measures, be they UN sanctions or autonomous measures. Indicative specific examples can be drawn from the cases of Syria, Guatemala, and Myanmar. The EU imposed restrictive measures on the previous regime in Syria in response to its widespread and systematic violations of human rights and international law. At the same time, the EU together with its Member States continued to be the largest humanitarian donors to Syrians since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. The EU and its Member States have mobilised over EUR 35.3 billion to help Syria and its neighbouring countries to address the consequences of the war. Earlier this year, with the aim to support Syria’s recovery and a political transition that fulfils the aspirations of all Syrians, the EU lifted all restrictive measures on Syria with the exception of those based on security grounds. In the cases of Guatemala and Myanmar, the EU imposed targeted restrictive measures on specific individuals. This did not prevent the EU and its Member States from being the second largest donors of bilateral ODA to these countries. 

Furthermore, EU restrictive measures are carefully tailored not to target the civilian population and the delivery of humanitarian aid, but to affect only those responsible for the serious violations of international law and human rights. Food, medicines, and emergency supplies do not fall within their scope. We recall in this regard that the EU swiftly implemented UN Security Council Resolution 2664(2022) and went even further, by introducing equivalent (and at times broader) humanitarian exemptions into most of our autonomous restrictive measures regimes. 

We have always stressed that addressing potential unintended consequences of UN sanctions and autonomous measures is a serious concern that demands our collective attention. This is why the EU also constantly undertakes actions and spares no effort to prevent or address over-compliance and any unintended consequences of restrictive measures. 

Dear colleagues, 

Even though it should be clear from the above that the narrative on so-called UCMs does not apply to EU restrictive measures, it remains highly politically motivated, divisive, misleading - based on generic allegations and factual inaccuracies. 

It is also instrumentalised to divert attention from the reasons why sanctions are adopted in the first place. It is these reasons themselves, not UCMs, that are often at the root of grave challenges to sustainable development. They include conflicts, wars of aggression, war crimes and other atrocities, internal repression, but also severe governance and financing challenges and other universally recognized major inhibitors to sustainable development. In the end, the UCMs narrative distorts and politicizes a key UN priority -- sustainable development -- which requires global cooperation, not artificial polarization, to be effectively, urgently, and collectively addressed.

It is for all these as well as fundamental procedural reasons that we will explain in an explanation of vote why we cannot support the proposed resolution establishing an International Day against UCMs.

To conclude, Mr. President, sanctions are a means rather than an end in themselves. 

They are part of a wider, comprehensive policy approach involving political dialogue and complementary efforts, such as preventive diplomacy and other instruments aimed at preserving international peace and security and defending the Charter, the rule of law and human rights. 

I thank you.  

* North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.