EU Statement – UN General Assembly 1st Committee: Outer Space (Cluster III)
Chair,
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro*, Albania*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina* and Georgia, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.
The EU and its Member States are actively engaged in promoting the preservation of a safe, secure, stable and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space. We remain strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) in all its aspects.
Outer space has witnessed a surge in security challenges over recent years with threats and perceived threats multiplying, compromising not only the long-term sustainability of the space environment, but also the level of trust among space actors. This risks the safe and secure delivery of essential services, vital for the functioning of today’s societies and for progress on a number of crucial global issues. Therefore, improving space security and preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict is in the interest of and for the benefit of all States.
The EU reaffirms the applicability of international law, including international humanitarian law, to outer space, including the United Nations Charter and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and other relevant UN treaties on outer space as well as non-legally binding instruments developed in or endorsed by the UN, as well as consensual principles developed in the UN framework. The EU and its Member States recognise outer space as a global commons, to be used for the benefit of all humankind. All space activities must be conducted in accordance with existing international legal framework, including the Outer Space Treaty, the cornerstone of global governance in outer space. We encourage all States to ratify the Outer Space Treaty and fully implement its provisions.
We particularly emphasise Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which obliges the State Parties not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on celestial bodies, or station in outer space in any other manner any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Deployment of nuclear weapons and any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space would constitute a severe breach of international law. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that States do not develop such weapons specifically designed to be placed in outer space. The employment of such a weapon would have severe consequences for peace and security, civilian infrastructure, our societies and hugely impact the interests of all States. The EU therefore welcomed the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution called Weapons of mass destruction in outer space by a vast majority in 2024 and deeply regrets the use of the veto by Russia in the Security Council on a similar resolution.
The goal of PAROS is achievable through a combination of legally binding and non-legally binding measures. While reaffirming the importance of developing verifiable legally binding instruments, the EU and its Member States believe that developing norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours is the most pragmatic way forward to make progress on PAROS and improve space security. Norms of responsible behaviours within legal regimes governing other domains, such as maritime, cyber or telecommunication, constitute good examples, best practices and lessons learned and can serve as inspirations for our endeavours. The development of non-legally binding measures does not preclude future negotiations on legally binding instruments, where appropriate. Any legally binding frameworks for space security must be effective and verifiable and should aim to cover all relevant threats, be they Earth-to-space, Earth-to-Earth, space-to-space, or space-to-Earth.
The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on PAROS in all its aspects offers an opportunity to build a new common understanding on what the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects means in the 21st century and to address security threats in outer space. We welcome the active discussions during the Third session in July, contributing to better understanding of different positions as well as more convergence of views on some issues, including the protection of civilian and humanitarian space services and increased recognition of the contribution of non-legally binding measures, including norms of responsible behaviour. We consider it important to continue to discuss threat perceptions and further steps to enhance space security. For their part, the EU and its Member States will continue to participate actively and constructively in the OEWG process, and we call on all States to do so. We underline the importance of a comprehensive and inclusive approach, as required by the merger decision that established the OEWG. Civil society, industry, academia and international and intergovernmental organisations need to be part of discussions on space security. We therefore regret that following one State’s’ objection two organisations were denied observer status at the meeting. We call on all States not to prevent the participation of observers at upcoming OEWG sessions.
Chair,
Promoting trust among States is a prerequisite for the elaboration of any international non-legally or legally binding measures and instruments regarding space security. Transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) can serve as a tool for cultivating trust and forging common understandings among States involved in activities in outer space or utilizing space technology services, thus creating conducive atmosphere for further negotiations. The Hague Code of Conduct sets a good example of the use of TCBMs to avoid misunderstandings and increase trust. The EU and its Member States encourage all States to subscribe to the HCoC and to fully implement its provisions. We remain open to collecting good practices with a perspective to elaborate more detailed guidelines for notifications on space manoeuvres, recognising that these need to be practically feasible and take into account that different actors, including commercial entities, are involved in these.
We remain concerned about ambiguous, unfriendly or hostile activities in outer space and underline the importance of addressing such irresponsible and potentially escalatory developments promptly. Among the most urgent threats are destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests, the harmful effects of which can be the destruction of the targeted satellite, the generation of long-lasting space debris, and the risk of uncontrolled escalation. The EU strongly condemned the Russian Federation’s conduct of a destructive direct-ascent ASAT weapon test against its own satellite in 2021, as a clear act of irresponsible behaviour in outer space. We welcome the commitments, as a norm of responsible behaviour, made so far by 38 UN Member States, including all EU Member States, not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. We encourage all States to make such a commitment. We are open for the consideration of a more formal ban on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing. This was also expressed by a number of States in the July OEWG session.
The EU reiterates the importance of an inclusive format and a multi-stakeholder approach including international organisations, commercial actors, and civil society, when addressing space threats. The EU and its Member States will continue to engage actively and constructively in discussions that contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.
I thank you, Chair.
- North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.