EU Statement – UN Security Council: Informal Interactive Dialogue on Sudan

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Mr President, Excellencies, colleagues,

When we met last December, I described a war escalating faster than diplomacy could respond. Nine months later, the picture is more complex. 

The military balance is shifting, but the logic of the war has not. The “fight-to-the-finish” mentality continues to shape the calculations of warring parties: drone warfare is expanding the geography of the conflict and fragmentation is accelerating.

At the same time, the peace efforts have transformed. We see more Sudanese political mobilisation and greater international convergence. With the Quad and the Quintet working in tandem, a new peace architecture has taken share. While progress is being made, more is needed. 

[As my colleagues have said] our visit to Khartoum last week was an important milestone in this respect. It confirmed two things: the demand for international engagement and the considerable distance that remains between Sudanese actors. Nonetheless, all agree that a conducive environment for dialogue is necessary.

I would draw four observations - we need to:

• to translate political convergence into practical steps, also using the Quintet to build effective bridges;

• to address the regional and external dynamics sustaining the war;

• and to make better use of this Council to support implementation.

1/. From political convergence to practical steps

As Quintet, we have made tangible progress since December: The Berlin Principles, successive Quintet consultations and engagement with Sudanese stakeholders as well as international partners supporting the Quintet – all these steps have created greater convergence around some fundamentals: 

• an inclusive Sudanese civilian owned political process - facilitated by the Quintet - will enhance coherence and impact. 

• A focus on substantive issues and in particular the transition phase is required;

• Greater synergies between the Quintet political track and the security track led by the Quad must be established; 

• and a bridge between the initiatives inside and outside Sudan. 

The core challenge now is to turn principle into practice. This requires establishing a political process which is genuinely inclusive enough to link stakeholders inside and outside Sudan, and particularly women, youth and civil society and creating a mechanism capable of connecting these diverse actors into a coherent whole. This is what the Quintet will focus on in the coming months. 

Our visit to Khartoum did not start this engagement; it built on months of preparatory work and sustained consultations with Sudanese political and civilian actors, from Berlin to Addis Ababa and through numerous engagements in between. The joint technical team set up between our five multilateral institutions is working around the clock to turn this ambition into reality. 

Our discussions in Khartoum reinforced the need to connect initiatives without prematurely endorsing any one of them. We should be open to synergies, while continuing the demands on inclusivity, credibility, Sudanese ownership and substance. 

The same applies internationally. The Quintet, Quad and other initiatives do not need identical mandates. But they need effective points of connection, so that progress in one track reinforces progress in another. The Council can support this complementarity. 

We should also already think about the “day after”. Monitoring, separation of forces, management of violations and humanitarian and economic access cannot be improvised once the guns fall silent. Some of these building blocks need to be prepared now: 

Our work with partners in The Netherlands [last June] highlighted a simple point: questions such as who monitors, what is monitored, how compliance is assessed and how incidents are managed need to be considered before an agreement is reached. We look forward to working with the Council and other key partners on the next steps.

Our work with the parties on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure [together with the ICRC] is another practical example. While trust remains extremely limited among both camps, discussions continue and progress is being made. As recent as last week, Generals Burhan and Hemedti have assured me personally their commitment to continue our work on the MoU were have been working on since exactly two years today. This confidence-building measure could contribute to the important work of the Quad on the security track.

2/. Address the external and regional dynamics sustaining the war

Preserving Sudan’s unity requires preserving national institutions, critical infrastructure, economic recovery, alongside a political framework capable of reconnecting constituencies separated by war.

At the same time, we need to be clear-eyes in our assessment: The conflict is regionalizing. Arms, financing and logistical support  connect the Sudanese battlefield to wider regional rivalries and security calculations. The longer this continues, the harder it will be to contain both the conflict and its eventual settlement within Sudan alone.

This is why external interference is not peripheral to mediation. The Council and partners are well positioned to address the calculations not only of the belligerents, but also of those enabling them.

3/. What this Council can do

Let me conclude with a few practical thoughts.

• First, we need to sustain political coherence. Continue to support the Quintet dialogue and its bridge-building role and encourage complementarity between the tracks.

• Second, support preparedness. A political opening could emerge. Monitoring options, Sudanese capacities, technology and institutional arrangements cannot be designed overnight. We should prepare credible options now, without prejudging negotiations.

• Finally, help create leverage. Diplomatic architecture matters only if it can influence behaviour. Council unity and sustained attention can help change the cost-benefit calculations of the parties and their external supporters.

When we met in December, the immediate challenge was coherence. Today, we need to move from coherence to operationalisation. The EU has been clear: we ask for progress on four parts in our last Council Conclusions: steps toward a ceasefire, a civilian transition, humanitarian access and, importantly, accountability. We look forward to working with you on these next steps together.

In closing, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my Quintet partners – the UN, AU, LAS and IGAD – for the trust and continued cooperation and the Council for putting Sudan on the agenda. 

Mr President, I thank you.