Board of Governors International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - EU Statement on Agenda item 5(c): Safeguards Implementation Report for 2025

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

We recall that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and help create an environment conducive to peaceful nuclear cooperation. The EU attaches utmost importance to the integrity of the IAEA safeguards system and strongly supports the Agency's efforts to strengthen its effectiveness and improve its efficiency.

For the EU, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), together with Additional Protocols (AP), represent the current verification standard under the NPT. We encourage the Director General and all IAEA Member States to actively promote the universalisation of these instruments, as outlined in the Joint Working Paper entitled “Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards” presented to the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Additional Protocols are indispensable for the IAEA to fulfil its mandate and provide credible assurance not only about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities.

We congratulate Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for the entry into force of its Additional Protocol last year and Guinea and Somalia for bringing into force their CSA and AP in 2026. We call upon all remaining States to conclude and bring into force Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols without further delay.

We note that the IAEA has drawn a broader conclusion for 75 States and that for 63 States with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol in force, the evaluation process for drawing this conclusion is still ongoing. 

The EU supports the implementation of integrated safeguards and the State-level Concept as a way to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards application. We look forward to additional information on these approaches as they continue to be further developed and implemented.

More than 20 years ago the IAEA Board of Governors decided to revise the standard text for Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs). We compliment those States that took action by amending their SQPs in 2025 in line with this decision. However, we note with concern that the Agency cannot draw any safeguards conclusions for those States that continue to have the outdated protocol. The EU urgently calls on those remaining States which have yet to do so, to update their protocols to the current standard, or to rescind them.

Chair,

As stressed in the report, the Agency’s inability, due to Iran’s persistent lack of cooperation, to verify the previously declared highly enriched uranium is a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance by Iran with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force and cannot be suspended by Iran under any circumstances. We note with grave concern that the Agency was unable to draw any safeguards conclusion in 2025 in respect of nuclear material previously declared at several of Iran’s nuclear facilities and that outstanding safeguards issues remained unresolved despite the Agency’s best efforts to make progress. We call on Iran to engage constructively with the Agency in order to return to full compliance with its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and implement the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board of Governors resolutions.

The EU applauds the IAEA for its active role in implementing safeguards in Ukraine despite Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and commends the continued cooperation with Ukrainian authorities. We regret that the Agency was again not able to draw the broader conclusion for Ukraine, due to conditions outside Ukrainian control that prevent the Agency from verifying certain nuclear material previously declared by Ukraine. However, the much-valued work of Agency inspectors helped the IAEA to draw the safeguards conclusion for 2025. We note that the Agency did not find indications that would give rise to a proliferation concern.

Chair,

The EU provides considerable support to the Agency's safeguards system through the Support Programmes of the European Commission and of EU Member States, and other financial and in-kind contributions. The EU remains committed to further strengthening the IAEA safeguards system and building the necessary capacities to meet the expected challenges and needs worldwide.

The EU welcomes the continued implementation of COMPASS whose growing network of partners includes the European Commission and eight EU Member States. We note that consultations continued between the Agency and States planning to develop naval nuclear propulsion programmes, on the arrangements required under their respective safeguards agreements.

We are pleased to see the increase in the number of women in the Safeguards Department and encourage the Secretariat to continue its efforts towards achieving gender equality, including at senior management level.

With these comments, the EU supports the recommended Board action set forth in the Safeguards Implementation Report 2025. 

Thank you, Chair.