Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia^*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine^*, the Republic of Moldova^*, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, Iceland⁺, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺ and San Marino.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2022/39, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 8 September 2022.

The EU reiterates its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and is determined to continue working with the international community to preserve this agreement of strategic importance for the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. The EU calls on all countries to support its implementation in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. Full and verified implementation of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments in this regard is indispensable.

The EU acknowledges the issues connected to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions by it. Alongside the verified full implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions is an essential part of the agreement. The EU has fully upheld its commitments, including sanctions lifting under the JCPOA.

The EU member states understand that a viable package was submitted by the Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission on 8 August in order to allow for Iran’s return to compliance with its JCPOA commitments and a US return to the deal. This is the outcome of more than 15 months of painstaking negotiations with Iran within the framework of the Joint Commission and in proximity talks with the United States and the best possible way to thoroughly accommodate the concerns of all parties in a balanced way. We regret that Iran has chosen not to seize this critical diplomatic opportunity and call on Iran to accept it so that the JCPOA would be fully restored. Iran continues to escalate its nuclear programme far beyond any plausible civilian justification. We fully support that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran’s legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

The EU is  seriously concerned that Iran, while negotiating the return to full implementation of the JCPOA, continues to undertake  a series of actions inconsistent with the JCPOA, with severe and, in certain cases, irreversible proliferation implications. These actions, which raise serious concern, include:

• continued and accelerated accumulation of enriched uranium, far beyond the JCPOA thresholds for quantity and level of enrichment, including alarming quantities of material at 20%, as well as at 60% which is of particular proliferation concern. IRN’s increased LEU production capacity has serious implications as an enabler for further HEU enrichment.
• continued expansion of uranium enrichment capacity, through the installation and testing of additional IR-1 and advanced centrifuges. Among them, three additional IR-6 cascades have been installed and put in operation at the underground Natanz site since the last Board with six more IR-2m declared, four of which are currently being installed.
• loss of monitoring and verification of the centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows manufacturing capacity due to Iran’s decision in early June to have all JCPOA related IAEA monitoring equipment removed.

We recall our grave concern with the significant work on uranium metal previously reported, including with nuclear material enriched up to 20%, and associated irreversible knowledge gains. We reiterate our call on Iran not to commence any further work related to the conversion of UF6 to UF4 for the production of uranium metal and not to resume any activity related to the production of uranium metal.

Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification in the context of Iran’s declared nuclear programme.

We remain deeply concerned that, from 23 February 2021 onwards, the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. For more than 18 months, the Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran’s activities on the entirety of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle. Iran’s decision in June 2022 that all Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation further aggravates existing concerns as it has detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

We urge Iran to implement all transparency measures, so that the Agency is in a position to resume the necessary verification and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA, which is indispensable. We take note that, for the Agency to address the resulting knowledge gaps, in the event of a full resumption of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, additional safeguards measures, including under the additional protocol, will need to be applied by the Agency and comprehensive and accurate records will need to be provided by Iran.

We strongly urge Iran to refrain from any further escalatory steps, to reverse all activities inconsistent with the JCPOA and return, without any further delay, to its full implementation, including of all transparency measures. This, together with full implementation of the CSA, including modified Code 3.1 to its subsidiary arrangements, and immediate provisional application pending earliest ratification of the Additional Protocol is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We stress that the implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under its CSA, which cannot be modified or suspended unilaterally and urge Iran to resolve this issue. Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial.

The EU expresses its strong support to and commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective and impartial work and wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We welcome Member States’ extra budgetary support to IAEA’s mission in Iran.

Chair,

The EU takes note of the Director General's report and requests that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.