EU Statement at IAEA Board of Governors on agenda item 9 on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine
Chair,
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Albania*, Ukraine*, the Republic of Moldova*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Georgia, Iceland+, Liechtenstein+, Norway+ and San Marino.
The EU stands in full solidarity with Ukraine and commends the people of Ukraine for their courage in defending their country against the unprovoked and unjustified aggression of the Russian Federation which the EU condemns in the strongest possible terms. The Russian Federation’s invasion of a sovereign country is a gross violation of international law, notably the UN Charter, and it severely undermines European and global security and stability. We also condemn Belarus for its involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Russia’s actions pose serious and direct threats to the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, and they have impeded the Agency from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities in Ukraine. The attacks of the Russian armed forces at and near Ukraine’s nuclear facilities have caused human suffering and damage to civilian infrastructure, and they significantly increase the risk of a nuclear incident or accident, with potentially severe adverse consequences for human health and the environment.
The EU therefore fully supports the work of the IAEA and its Director General to assist Ukraine in ensuring nuclear safety and security, and to maintain IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials and activities. We welcome the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and commend the Director General and his team for their courage and determination in accomplishing this important mission. We support efforts to establish a more permanent IAEA presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in order to support Ukraine and provide information to IAEA Member States, and stand ready to support the objectives of the IAEA mission, as needed.
Chair,
Having taken careful note of main findings of the mission as described in document GOV/2022/52, we are deeply concerned that each of the seven indispensable pillars, outlined by the IAEA Director General to ensure nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict, has been compromised following Russia’s attack at and occupation of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant. This unprecedented and unacceptable situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant negatively affects the physical integrity of the facilities, the functionality of nuclear safety and security systems, operating conditions for Ukrainian staff, the off-site power supply, logistical chains, radiation monitoring and emergency response, and reliable communications with the Ukrainian regulator. We welcome the Director General’s proposal to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the modalities of which would still need to be agreed. In this regard, we support his call that military vehicles currently present inside and around the buildings must be removed so they do not interfere with the operation of the safety and security systems.
However, there is only one sustainable solution: The Russian Federation must stop its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all its armed forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, including from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. Other Russian personnel must also leave the ZNPP. The ZNPP needs to be returned to full and exclusive control of Ukrainian authorities, including regulatory control of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), so that they can resume their sovereign responsibilities and that the legitimate operating staff can conduct their duties without outside pressure and interference. The ZNPP must remain an integral part of the Ukrainian energy system, including grid connections with the Ukrainian electricity transmission system.
We are grateful to the Ukrainian regulator, the operator and their staff for their critical work in the most stressful circumstances and reiterate our full support.
Chair,
Since Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, the EU and its Member States provide comprehensive support to Ukraine, including in the area of nuclear safety and radiation protection. As noted in the IAEA Director General’s report, effective coordination has been established between the European Commission and the IAEA in order to avoid duplications in the provision of material assistance to Ukraine.
The EU will continue to focus its assistance also on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and the Exclusion Zone where the estimated damage caused by the Russian troops, including to the laboratory originally provided and funded by the EU, amounts to €80 million. The EU provides both material assistance as well as support to the Ukrainian regulator.
Chair,
We recall that back in 2009, the IAEA General Conference adopted a consensus decision GC(53)/DEC/13 stating that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the UN Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”. We also recall IAEA General Conference Resolutions which recognize that an armed attack or a threat of armed attack on a nuclear facility devoted to peaceful purposes, in operation or under construction, would create a situation in which the UN Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.
We expect that the IAEA Board take action in response to the Russian Federation’s major violations of international law. We call on the Board and all IAEA members to support the draft Resolution entitled “The safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine” (GOV/2022/57) while regretting that the Russian Federation remains in non-compliance with the previous Board resolution adopted on 3 March 2022 (GOV/2022/17).
Furthermore, we expect the Director General to continue providing formal reporting to the Board, in a timely manner, on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implementation in Ukraine as well as on the implementation of the Board resolutions, and to include this item also on the future Board agendas for appropriate follow-up.
Finally, we reiterate the need to consider new legally binding international rules specifically prohibiting armed attacks against any nuclear installation devoted to peaceful purposes, as called for by IAEA General Conference resolutions, which refer to the UN Charter.
Thank you, Chair.
* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, , as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.