Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia^*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, Iceland⁺, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺, and San Marino.

The European Union welcomes the Director General's update on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran contained in document GOV/2023/43 and thanks Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 6 September 2023. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective, independent and impartial work in verifying Iran's safeguards obligations. The EU encourages the IAEA to continue to use all safeguards-relevant information available to it as per standard practice.

On many occasions, the EU has called upon Iran to urgently fulfill its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement by providing technically credible explanations and grant necessary access. The Board of Governors adopted three resolutions, in June 2020, June 2022 and in November 2022, expressing its profound concern at the lack of substantive cooperation by Iran, and deciding on actions that Iran had to take, without any delay, to: provide technically credible explanations; inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or contaminated equipment; provide all necessary information, documentation and answers; and provide the necessary access to locations and materials, including for the taking of samples. 

The EU is gravely concerned that in this reporting period Iran has not made any progress in resolving remaining outstanding Safeguards issues and in the implementation of the March Joint Statement. Iran has missed yet another opportunity to finally meet its legal obligations, which would have contributed to confidence building and de-escalation. The EU is deeply concerned at the presence of nuclear material at undeclared locations in Iran and that the current location of this nuclear material and/or of equipment contaminated by nuclear material, which may still exist in Iran today, is not known to the Agency.

The EU notes with grave concern the de-designation of key experienced Agency inspectors and denials of visas for Agency officials dealing with Iran. Iran must maintain a smooth cooperation with the IAEA and ensure the appropriate treatment of inspectors.

The EU notes with great concern that no progress has been made towards resolving the outstanding safeguards issues in relation to two locations, namely Turquzabad and Varamin. We urge Iran to take the expected necessary actions without any further delay. This means that Iran must address the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin found by the Agency at these two locations. We expect that Iran act promptly to implement its safeguards obligations so as to restore confidence by entering into full, substantial and constructive cooperation with the Agency. All safeguards issues will remain under our close scrutiny, until the DG reports that they are no longer outstanding.

It is extremely concerning that the Agency still cannot confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Agency is therefore not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. The EU recalls that the current global verification standard is based on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement combined with an Additional Protocol. We call on Iran to resume implementation of the Additional Protocol to enable the Agency to provide credible assurances on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. We stress that the implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under its CSA, which cannot be modified or suspended unilaterally. The EU recalls that it is a legal obligation for Iran to provide preliminary design information for new nuclear facilities.

Substantial and swift action by Iran to deliver on its commitments and safeguards obligations, including taking the actions specified in the November 2022 resolution and implementing the set of activities in the March 2023 Joint Statement, as requested by the Agency is essential and urgent. The EU expects rapid and tangible progress to be achieved in the shortest timeframe and shall consider further action accordingly.

The EU strongly recalls Iran’s obligation under its Safeguards Agreement to provide pre-notification to the Agency of changes in the configuration and operation of its nuclear facilities. We take note that the Agency accepted Iran’s explanations for the origin of the HEU particles containing up to 83.7% U-235 at the Fordow facility reported previously. Nevertheless, we remain seriously concerned by the technical capability of Iran to reach such unprecedented levels of enrichment that bear grave proliferation risks. It is indispensable that the IAEA is able to detect and report in a timely manner any move by Iran to escalate its nuclear activities.

The EU urges Iran to work with the Agency in earnest and a sustained way, in the agreed spirit of collaboration, towards the fulfillment of the commitments contained in the March 2023 Joint Statement. We note with concern the Director General’s assessment that no further progress has been made in implementing the activities set out in the Joint Statement, including Iran’s refusal to agree to the Agency’s request to install additional cameras at another location. We also note his affirmation that, for Agency cameras to be effective, including those installed at Esfahan, the Agency needs access to the data they record.

The EU notes with concern the absence of progress regarding the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance evaluation. The Agency previously reported that corrections made by Iran are not based on scientific grounds and, therefore, are not acceptable. Following its exchanges with Iran since the last quarterly report, we note that the Agency still does not agree with Iran’s statement regarding how the discrepancy emerged. We urge Iran to resolve this discrepancy, which the Agency regards as “still requiring resolution”.

In light of the Agency’s assessment in GOV/2023/43, the EU expects Iran to address without further delay:

the outstanding safeguards issues in relation to Turquzabad and Varamin, including informing the Agency of the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment.

the discrepancy in the amount of nuclear material verified by the Agency at UCF originating from JHL compared to the amount declared by Iran.

the completion of the installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment, access to data recordings and the gaps in the recordings.

the legal obligation to implement modified Code 3.1.

the denial of visas and de-designation of experienced Agency inspectors.

The EU takes note of the report, looks forward to the Director General continuing to report to the Board of Governors, as appropriate, and requests that this report be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.