Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia^*, Montenegro*, Albania*, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Iceland⁺, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺ and San Marino.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2023/24, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 1 June 2023.

As a key security priority, the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to restore the implementation of the necessary restrictions to the Iranian nuclear programme in order to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region has further increased as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory. The EU remains committed to the JCPOA. We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions and not taken the necessary steps. On the contrary, it continues to significantly escalate its nuclear programme. This is despite political support by the EU member States and intense international diplomatic efforts to restore the full implementation of the JCPOA including those of the EU High Representative as Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission, whose good offices the EU fully supports. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

We regret that Iran has not accepted the compromise text submitted by the Coordinator on 8 August 2022 and that new developments have made it increasingly difficult to reach a diplomatic solution. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA is separate from Iran’s legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

The EU is deeply concerned by the successive IAEA reports documenting the alarming escalation of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has gravely departed from its JCPOA commitments, in particular with regard to the expansion of its nuclear enrichment capacity and production of highly enriched uranium. Iran’s actions, which have no credible civilian justification in Iran’s declared nuclear programme, carry very significant proliferation-related risks. These actions, which raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions, include continued and accelerated accumulation of enriched uranium, far beyond JCPOA thresholds for quantity and level of enrichment, including a sharp rise of material at 20%, as well as at 60% which is of particular proliferation concern. The stockpile of HEU enriched at up to 60 per cent has increased by almost 30% since the last quarterly report.

We remain extremely concerned by the presence of HEU particles containing up to 83.7% U-235 at the Fordow facility and the circumstances of its discovery through an unannounced inspection. We take note that the Agency has assessed that the information provided by Iran was not inconsistent with Iran’s explanations for the origin of these particles and the Agency has no further questions on the matter at this stage.  We also note that the absence of diversion of nuclear material at the facility remains to be confirmed by the Agency.

In light of past failure that the EU noted with concern, the EU strongly recalls Iran’s obligation under its Safeguards Agreement to provide pre-notification to the Agency of changes in the configuration and operation of its nuclear facilities. We also emphasize the importance of sustaining the increased frequency and intensity of the Agency’s verification activities at Fordow, as reported in GOV/2023/8. It is indispensable that the IAEA is able to detect and report in a timely manner any move from Iran to escalate its nuclear activities.

We recall our grave concern with the significant work on uranium metal previously reported, including with nuclear material enriched up to 20%, and associated irreversible knowledge gains. We reiterate our call on Iran not to commence any further work related to the conversion of UF6 to UF4 for the production of uranium metal and not to resume any activity related to the production of uranium metal.

We note with concern the absence of progress regarding the discrepancy between the amount of natural uranium declared by Iran from the Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) and the amount verified by the Agency. We expect Iran to clarify this matter without any further delay as requested by the Agency.

We remain deeply concerned that from 23 February 2021 onwards, the Agency’s verification and monitoring in relation to the JCPOA have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of JCPOA transparency measures and the Additional Protocol. Iran’s unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further exacerbated the situation. This has detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The continuity of knowledge has been lost and in the event that Iran resumes implementing its obligations under the JCPOA, a new baseline for verification would need to be established, that would involve a significant degree of uncertainty.

At the previous meeting of the Board, the EU took note of the 4 March 2023 Joint Statement by the IAEA Director General and the Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran. We expected Iran to restore confidence by promptly entering into full, substantial and constructive cooperation with the Agency. Since then, we note the installation of surveillance cameras at one location and of monitoring equipment at two declared enrichment facilities. The EU underlines the Agency’s assessment that installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment needs to be completed and that for these activities to be effective the Agency needs to re-establish a satisfactory understanding of Iran’s inventory and it is indispensable that the Agency and Iran should agree on an approach without delay that would provide the Agency with access to the data recorded by its cameras from February 2021 to June 2022, and to those since 2-3 May 2023. The EU firmly expects Iran to engage with the Agency, in a sustained and uninterrupted manner, in order that all of the commitments contained in the Joint Statement are fulfilled, without further delay.

We strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory, to return to its political commitments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation without further delay, and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures, as well as its Additional Protocol. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1, is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

To conclude, timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU expresses its strong support to and commends the Director General, the Secretariat, and in particular the IAEA inspectors, for their professional, objective and impartial work. The EU wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We welcome Member States’ extrabudgetary support to IAEA’s mission in Iran.

Chair,

The EU takes note of the Director General's report and requests that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.