EU Statement at IAEA Board of Governors on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), as delivered on 22 November 2023

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia^*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, Iceland⁺, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺, and San Marino.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report and its new clear structure contained in document GOV/2023/57, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 17 November 2023.

As a key security priority, the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, the EU remains committed to the JCPOA. We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions and not taken the necessary steps to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region has further increased as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory. Concrete and sustained moves of nuclear de-escalation are needed to help restore trust. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The EU remains deeply concerned by the successive IAEA reports documenting the alarming acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments. Iran’s actions, which have no credible civilian justification, carry very significant proliferation-related risks and raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions. They include continued expansion of its nuclear enrichment infrastructure and accumulation of enriched uranium, far beyond JCPOA thresholds for quantity and level of enrichment. The report documents a substantial rise of the nuclear stockpile. It is of particular proliferation concern that the stockpile of material enriched to 60% has further grown.  

We join the DG in his strong condemnation of Iran’s sudden withdrawal of the designations of several experienced Agency inspectors. We urge Iran to reverse these regrettable unilateral and politically-driven measures, which affect in a direct and severe way the Agency’s ability to conduct effectively its verification activities in Iran, including the monitoring of the JCPOA. Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA as required to facilitate the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement as well as the JCPOA monitoring, and ensure the appropriate treatment of inspectors.

Since 23 February 2021, the Agency’s verification and monitoring in relation to the JCPOA have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of JCPOA transparency measures and the Additional Protocol. Iran’s unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further exacerbated the situation. This has detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The continuity of knowledge, acquired during the Agency’s verification and monitoring work, has been lost and in the event that Iran resumes implementing its commitments under the JCPOA, a new baseline would need to be established, that would involve major challenges. We reiterate our grave concerns in this regard.

We strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory and return to its political commitments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation without further delay. The EU firmly expects Iran to engage with the Agency, in a sustained and uninterrupted manner, so that installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment is completed and access to the data recorded is granted to the Agency. We also urge Iran to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and to seek its ratification, and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1, is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

To conclude, timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU expresses its strong support to and commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective and impartial work. We wholly support the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran.

Chair,

The EU takes note of the Director General's report and requests that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.