EU Statement at IAEA Board of Governors on Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), as delivered on 10 September 2024
Chair,
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina[1], the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, align themselves with this statement.
The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report and DDG Aparo for the technical briefing. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, independent and impartial work.
It is a key security priority for the EU to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We call on all countries to support the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, to which the EU remains committed. Iran’s unabated nuclear advances over the last 5 years have made a return to the JCPOA increasingly challenging. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region is increasing as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory.
The EU remains deeply concerned by the continued alarming expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has gravely departed from its JCPOA commitments and has gained irreversible knowledge. The EU notes with particular concern Iran’s considerable accumulation of high enriched uranium and expansion of nuclear enrichment capability and operations, including through the installation of thousands of additional advanced centrifuges. The DG’s report documents a particularly sharp rise of material at 60%. Such actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions, since they have no credible civilian justification. In this context, the EU remains concerned by statements made by Iranian officials in the previous reporting period about Iran’s capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon.
Iran has informed the Agency it would not reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw the designations for any of the experienced Agency inspectors previously working in Iran. We urge Iran to reverse that extreme decision, which, directly and seriously impacts on the Agency´s work in Iran, without delay. This is essential to allow the Agency to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively and in full.
Chair,
Iran has stopped the implementation of its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA. For more than three and a half years, the Agency has been unable to carry out several key JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities. Iran’s subsequent decision to have all of the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment removed, has further exacerbated the situation. The Agency has lost continuity of knowledge on the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium concentrate. Therefore, the Agency is unable to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We reiterate our grave concerns in this regard.
Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State to systematically produce and accumulate highly enriched uranium. This adds not only to the Agency’s concerns, as stressed in the report, but also to ours. In light of these multiple and grave concerns, we strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory and return to its nuclear non-proliferation commitments without further delay. The EU expects Iran to complete the installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment and grant the Agency unhindered access to their data. We also urge Iran to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, to ratify it, and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1, is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We reiterate our support for the Director General’s efforts in the pursuit of a constructive engagement with Iran to enhance cooperation and address issues that need to be urgently resolved. We unequivocally call on Iran to engage effectively with the IAEA without any further delay.
With this, we take note of the Director General's report and request that it be made public.
Thank you, Chair.
[1] North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.