EU Statement at the IAEA Board of Governors on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), delivered on 4 March 2025

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report and DDG Aparo for the technical briefing. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, independent and impartial work.  

It is a key security priority for the EU to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. We call on all countries to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the JCPOA, which provides the basis for the IAEA's monitoring and reporting. We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Iran’s unabated nuclear advances over the last five years are of utmost concern. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region is increasing as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to address this issue. 

The EU remains deeply concerned by the continued alarming expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has gravely departed from its JCPOA commitments and has gained irreversible knowledge. The EU notes with particular concern Iran’s significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium and the expansion of its nuclear enrichment capability and operations. This includes the installation of thousands of additional advanced centrifuges. The DG’s report documents a sharp increase of material enriched at 60% which is now produced at an unprecedented rate, with a 50% increase in the reporting period. Iran already accumulated more than 6 significant quantities of 60% enriched material [which the Agency defines as the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded] and is currently producing one significant quantity of highly enriched uranium every month. All these actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions, since they have no credible civilian justification. In this context, the EU remains concerned by statements made by Iranian officials about Iran’s capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon.

Chair,

Iran has stopped the implementation of its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA. For four years, the Agency has been unable to carry out several key JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities. Iran’s subsequent decision to remove all of the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment has further exacerbated the situation. As a result of this, the Agency has lost and will not be able to restore continuity of knowledge and is unable to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We reiterate our grave concerns in this regard. 

We echo the DG’s deep regret that Iran, despite having initially accepted to consider it, has finally refused the designation of four additional experienced inspectors recently proposed by the Agency. It is deeply regretful that Iran has not reversed its previous decision to withdraw the designations of several experienced Agency inspectors, as requested by the Board and the DG. 

Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State to systematically produce and accumulate highly enriched uranium. This is of serious concern to the Director General, and also to us. In light of these multiple and grave concerns, we strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory and return to its nuclear non-proliferation commitments without further delay. We also urge Iran to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, to ratify it, and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1, is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. 

Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We reiterate our support for the Director General’s efforts in the pursuit of a constructive engagement with Iran to achieve the necessary cooperation and address issues that need to be urgently resolved. We unequivocally call on Iran to engage effectively with the IAEA without any further delay. 

With this, we take note of the Director General's report and request that it be made public. 

Thank you, Chair.