The new EU Space Threat Response Architecture explained

What is the Space Threat Response Architecture?

The EU operates a 24/7 Space Threat Response Architecture which  is a framework for assessing and collecting information which can be used to support collective responses to space-related incidents. It is based on Council Decision 2021/698.

Why does the EU need to strengthen its Space Threat Response Architecture?

The EU and its Member States are becoming increasingly dependent on space-based systems and services at a time when space itself is becoming more contested.

Space is essential to Europe's security, defence, economy and daily life. Navigation and timing, secure communications, Earth observation, meteorology and other space-enabled services support critical infrastructure, economic activity and military operations.

Space Threats range from anti-satellite strikes and interference with satellite signals to cyber-attacks against space infrastructure and other forms of hostile or irresponsible behaviour. 

At the recent informal meeting of Ministers of Defence in early September, one of the key topics looked at was how to preserve Europe as a global space powe in the current geopolitical context, given that Europe’s position in space can no longer be taken for granted. Other countries are investing in space technologies at speed and at scale. Access to orbital slots, spectrum, launch and critical technologies are under growing pressure. 

Meanwhile, space systems are increasingly embedded in wider digital infrastructures, making them both more strategically important and more vulnerable.

Therefore, for Europe to remain a global space power, the EU must be able not only to use space, but also to secure access to it, preserve freedom of action in times of crises – and to protect its assets and services. This requires proportionate and coherent ways to detect, characterise, attribute and respond to threats.

Which incidents and responses will involve making use of the Space Threat Response Architecture?

Hypothetical scenario 1

In the first hypothetical scenario, an Earth Observation satellite belonging to an EU Member States could be directly threatened by another third Country satellite. This Member State may use the Space Threat Response Architecture. Upon a proposal of  the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council of the EU may decide a set of response measures from the new space security toolbox starting with diplomatic responses, up to  restrictive measures with the possibility to involve EU CSDP missions and operations.

Hypothetical scenario 2

In the second hypothetical scenario, space threats might lead to the disruption of Galileo signals. Galileo,   the EU´s Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) provides daily positioning, navigating and timing data to services, companies and ordinary mobile phones. Such disruption would therefore be impacting the daily lives of millions of EU citizens. In such a situation, the EU Space Threat Response Architecture would be immediately activated. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would take provisional instructions to directly mitigate the technical threat to continue normal satellite services to EU citizens. Meanwhile, EU Member States, as the Council of the EU, would consider using the Space Security Toolbox to deliver the appropriate EU response.

What is Council Decision 2021/698 and why was it revised?

The aim of revising Council Decision 2021/698 is to strengthen the existing Space Threat Response Architecture mechanism so that the EU High Representative can respond more effectively to a wider range of space threats.

The existing Council Decision was designed primarily for threats related to systems and services deployed, operated and used under the EU Space Programme. That framework remains important, but the threat environment has evolved. A mechanism focused too narrowly on assets of the EU Space Programme does not fully reflect today’s broader threat landscape.

The new Council Decision therefore expands the scope of the EU's response space threats to the security of the EU, the security of Member States or both even if they are not directly linked to the EU space assets.

In short, it strengthens and adapts the existing architecture to the current space threat environment. This includes, for example, cyber-attacks and espionage, but also possible disruptions to supply chains, ground stations or the wider space-based infrastructure.

What is the "space security toolbox"?

The updated Council Decision 2021/698 establishes a dedicated space security toolbox, the purpose of which is to give the EU a more structured set of options for responding to different types and levels of space threats.

This is important because space threats are not uniform. A cyber-attack against a space-programme supplier, interference with satellite communications, a threatening manoeuvre in orbit and a destructive anti-satellite test may require different forms of response.

The toolbox complements existing EU instruments and approaches, including the cyber diplomacy toolbox and the hybrid toolbox, while recognising the specific characteristics of the space domain.

What is the role of the High Representative?

The High Representative plays a central role to propose the right response at the right time to deter our adversaries while preventing unintended escalation.

Responding to a serious incident may require diplomatic action, political signalling, restrictive measures or other responses under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The High Representative connects the technical assessment of the threats with the EU's foreign and security policy instruments.

Why is the possibility of urgent action important?

Space-related incidents can develop faster than the normal EU decision-making cycle and yet, a first urgent response is often needed.

To this end; the Council Decision already provides for the possibility of urgent provisional action by the High Representative in exceptional circumstances where immediate action is required . The Council can then decide to revoke modify or confirm the provisional instruction proposed by the High Representative.

How does this relate to the 2023 EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence?

The revision of Council Decision 2021/698 is a direct follow-up to the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence adopted in 2023.

The Strategy identified five interconnected pillars:

1.    increasing the EU's understanding of space threats;
2.    enhancing the resilience and protection of EU space systems and services;
3.    responding to space threats;
4.    enhancing the use of space for security and defence; and
5.    strengthening international partnerships and responsible behaviour in outer space. 
 

Strengthening the Space Threat Response Architecture is principally part of the Strategy's third pillar: responding to space threats.

European Union, 2022

Why does the proposal cover threats to individual EU Member States as well as threats to the European Union as a whole?

The security of the EU's space environment cannot be separated neatly into "EU" and "national" systems.

EU countries operate important national space capabilities, while European security and defence increasingly depend on a mixture of EU, national and commercial systems.

A threat to an EU Member State's critical space capability can therefore have wider implications for European security.

The new approach allows the EU to address space threats to the EU as a whole as well as to individual EU Member States, while preserving the respective responsibilities and competences of the EU Member States to decide whether to use the EU response tools.

Does the proposal replace national capabilities?

No.

The proposal is about a coordination and response mechanism at the EU level, not about replacing national mechanism related to space and security.

However, EU Member States are essential providers of information, Space Domain Awareness capabilities and national response measures. They also operate satellites of their own that support the whole EU.

The added value of the EU mechanism is to bring relevant information and instruments together, establish a common picture where possible and enable a coordinated political and diplomatic response when a threat has implications for the EU or its Member States. It also increases the possibility offered to Member States to respond to Space Threats with EU tools that complement those already at their disposal at national multilateral and NATO levels.

EUMS

Why is cooperation with NATO included?

Space security increasingly intersects with broader security and defence issues, including cyber, communications, intelligence and military operations.

The proposal therefore provides for the possibility to cooperate with international organisations, in particular NATO, for the implementation of the Decision.

This is consistent with the broader logic of the EU's Space Strategy for Security and Defence, which emphasises partnerships and cooperation with international partners to strengthen resilience and responsible behaviour in space. 

Why are exercises such as Space Threat Response Architecture (STRA-X) exercise important?

A response architecture must work in practice, not only on paper.

The proposal therefore maintains the requirement for a yearly Space Threat Response Architecture (STRA-X) exercise to test procedures, information flows, coordination mechanisms and decision-making under realistic scenarios. They also help identify gaps before an actual crisis occurs.

This is particularly important for space threats because incidents can involve highly technical information, limited warning time and multiple actors across national and EU levels.

Read the press release: Council strengthens EU space threat response architecture