



European Union
Election Observation Mission

BOLIVIA 2025
Final Report

General Elections
17 August 2025
and
Presidential Run-Off
19 October 2025

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The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily
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ACRONYMS

ANPB – Bolivian National Association of Journalists

ATT – Telecommunications Regulation Agency

CIDOB – *Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia*

CNEP – National Code of Journalistic Ethics

CONNIOB – *Confederación Nacional de Naciones Indígenas Originarios de Bolivia*

CONSAQ-Bolivia – *Consejo Nacional de Suyus Aymaras y Quechuas del Qullasuyu*

COPPPAL – Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean

CRPD – Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

ECES – European Centre for Electoral Support

EEM – Election Expert Mission

EOM – Election Observation Mission

EU – European Union

EUR – Euros

ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

MAS-IPSP – *Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos*

OAS – Organisation of American States

OCD – *Observación Ciudadana de la Democracia*

OEP – Plurinational Electoral Body

PDC – *Partido Demócrata Cristiano*

RSF – Reporters Without Borders

SCORC – System for Consolidation of Official Results

SERECÍ – Civil Registry Service

SIREPRE – Preliminary Results System

TED – Departmental Electoral Tribunal

TNEP – National Tribunal of Journalistic Ethics

TSE – Supreme Electoral Tribunal

UNCAC – United Nations Convention against Corruption

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNIORE – Inter-American Union of Electoral Bodies

USD – United States Dollars

UTF – Technical Oversight Unit

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the 2025 general elections, the Bolivians determined who would serve as the country's president and vice-president, members of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, and representatives to supra-national parliaments for the next five years. In a competitive but peaceful political environment, the electoral process was overall credible and transparent, concluding successfully with the decisive verdict of Bolivian voters, who ended the two-decade-long dominance of the *Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (MAS-IPSP).

The elections took place amid long-standing political rivalries between the two main camps: one socially progressive and state-oriented, rooted in the MAS-IPSP legacy, and the other more liberal with varying degrees of social conservatism. The pre-election atmosphere was hardened by a prolonged political standoff which paralysed the legislature and exacerbated a socio-economic crisis characterised by acute scarcity of foreign exchange, widespread petrol shortages, rampant inflation, and steadily rising food prices. Some figures central to Bolivian politics did not contest the elections: outgoing President Luis Arce withdrew following internal divisions within the MAS-IPSP, while former President Evo Morales urged supporters to cast invalid ballots.

In this context, the general elections were contested by eight political organisations and the same number of presidential tickets. The competition culminated in a presidential run-off, in which voters chose Senator Rodrigo Paz Pereira and former police officer and anti-corruption champion Edmand Lara (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*, PDC), over former President Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga and entrepreneur Juan Pablo Velasco (*Alianza Libre*). The Paz–Lara ticket won by a comfortable margin, securing 55 per cent of the votes, and their opponents were quick to congratulate them. In the legislative elections, the PDC won a relative majority of seats in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, but will need to cooperate with other parties to pass legislative initiatives.

The campaign demonstrated genuine competition among contestants, with the freedoms of expression, assembly and association being upheld. However, participants had significant disparities in financial resources, which, combined with the absence of public funding for contestants and limited oversight of campaign finance, resulted in an uneven playing field. EU observers described campaigning for the first round as subdued. In contrast, the run-off saw a shift towards negative messaging and vice-presidential controversies involving inflammatory rhetoric, especially on media and on social platforms. While economic issues, including inflation and fuel shortages, remained central, the run-off campaign also brought social inclusion into focus, with candidates prioritising visits to rural and peri-urban communities.

The legal framework provides sufficient guarantees for inclusive and transparent electoral processes that respect fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, regulatory gaps, inconsistencies, and implementation challenges persist, including in campaign finance, candidate registration procedures, the prevention of political violence against women, as well as candidate withdrawals before run-offs. Moreover, the frequent use of petitions for protection by the Constitutional Court in electoral matters, although intended by law as an exceptional measure, has fuelled perceptions of politicisation and potentially challenged the independence of the election administration.

The law allows for an overly flexible and extended timeframe for replacing disqualified candidates. Combined with some rigid candidate registration requirements, this led to a significant number of replacements and disqualifications until shortly before the first round election day. The final list of candidates was published only one day before the elections, after the ballots had been printed. The late withdrawal of individual candidacies, or even entire lists – as occurred with two political parties – undermined voters' ability to make a fully informed choice.

Voter registration is active. There were some eight million registered voters for these elections, including out-of-country voting. Public confidence in the register was generally adequate. While

some political parties questioned its accuracy, alleging the inclusion of deceased persons and citizens residing abroad, these claims were not substantiated. At the same time, several EU EOM interlocutors reported persistent under-registration, especially in rural areas and within certain disadvantaged groups, with the authorities attributing this either to communities not being reached by registration efforts or to low engagement by these communities with the registration process.

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) demonstrated a commitment to efficiently organise the elections, in the face of operational challenges due to fuel shortages, inflation, underbudgeting, and understaffing across several of its units. Electoral authorities held inter-institutional dialogues, bringing together the four branches of government and competing political organisations to reaffirm their commitment to the democratic electoral process. Following the successful implementation of the preliminary results system in the first round, stakeholders' confidence in the TSE was substantially bolstered. Yet, publication of all plenary decisions and improved public communication could further enhance transparency in TSE decision-making.

Legal provisions for freedom of expression and freedom of the press were broadly respected. During the media campaigns, candidates and political organisations had unequitable access to public and private media, including for paid electoral ads, and free airtime for candidates was not consistently applied on public media. The mission also noted a significant amount of state advertising despite existing restrictions, as well as the uneven distribution of state ads among media outlets, which could be perceived as unethical government influence on the media. Bolivia still lacks a law on access to public information, which impedes transparency and investigative journalism. Despite government statements on protecting freedom of expression, media representatives deplored the lack of public prosecution when violations against the press occurred.

Digital platforms had an unprecedented reach during the elections, but weak regulation, covert advertising and rising disinformation exposed vulnerabilities in the online political landscape. TikTok was the most widely used social network in the country, strongly impacting campaigning and political discourse. Artificial intelligence also had an impact on the online sphere, with numerous fake videos and audio recordings attributing crimes to politicians or simply parodying them. MAS-IPSP representatives and government officials engaged in the questionable practice of using state social media accounts almost daily to publicise President Arce's achievements.

As required by law, women comprised half of the candidates on proportional lists, yet no gender parity provisions applied to presidential nominations. Following the elections, women's representation in the legislative assembly reached a historic high of over 50 per cent. Nevertheless, women candidates continued to face political harassment and violence, in some cases leading to their withdrawal.

Both election days had a high voter turnout and took place in a calm and orderly environment. Polling and counting procedures were generally well administered, with only minor inconsistencies that did not affect the overall integrity of the process. The preliminary results system functioned effectively, and the manual processing of official results was conducted in an orderly manner, with all legal deadlines met. A strong participation of party representatives and citizen observers constituted a positive transparency measure. Civil society organisations were active, operated without restrictions, and issued numerous qualitative reports throughout the electoral process and on the election days.

The EU EOM identified shortcomings which merit attention to improve future electoral processes in Bolivia. The following priority recommendations are offered for consideration and action to the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, Government, TSE, political parties, and civil society. A detailed table of recommendations can be found in the final chapter of this report.

- 1. Reinforce transparency and accountability by ensuring that the TSE promptly adopts and publishes its decisions, regulations, and other relevant documentation, including*

on the preliminary results system, while guaranteeing public access to information on its plenary sessions, in line with the law.

- 2. Establish and enforce a clear and reasonable deadline for candidate withdrawals, disqualifications, and substitutions to ensure that the registration process is completed in time for ballot production and for voters to make an informed choice.*
- 3. Level the playing field and strengthen political organisations by reintroducing direct annual public funding for political organisations and apply and expand upon existing public funding for electoral campaigns to cover activities beyond electoral propaganda.*
- 4. Introduce a law on public media clearly setting out principles of pluralism, impartiality and independence from the executive.*
- 5. Adopt a digital rights law to guarantee access to public information and protect citizens privacy and freedom of expression online.*

2. INTRODUCTION

At the invitation of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) of Bolivia, the European Union deployed an Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to monitor the 17 August general elections and the 19 October presidential run-off. The mandate of the EU EOM was to assess the conduct of the electoral process in accordance with Bolivia's regional and international commitments for democratic elections, as well as its national legislation.

The mission was led by Chief Observer Davor Stier, a Member of the European Parliament, and was composed of 11 election experts, 32 Long-Term Observers, and 50 Short-Term Observers (43 in the second round). On both election days, the mission was supported with the election-day participation of Locally-Recruited Short-Term Observers from EU Member States' diplomatic missions and the Delegation of the European Union to Bolivia. A delegation of seven members of the European Parliament also joined the mission for both the first round and the run-off. Altogether, the EU EOM deployed 144 accredited observers from 25 Member States as well as Canada, Norway, and Switzerland over both rounds; 41 per cent of the mission members were women.

The EU deployed election observation activities to Bolivia in 2006, 2009, 2014, 2019, and 2020.

3. POLITICAL CONTEXT

An initially tense political environment was followed by a peaceful democratic alternance of power, marking the end of 20 years of MAS-IPSP dominance

The 2025 general elections took place amidst divisions in the ruling *Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (MAS-IPSP), and a political standoff that has stalled the legislative process. This limited the government's ability to tackle a severe economic crisis causing food and petrol shortages, rampant inflation, and a shortage of foreign currency. The government held the Plurinational Legislative Assembly responsible for blocking key initiatives, noting that the Assembly was unable on several occasions to secure a *quorum* to approve crucial international loans.

In this context, outgoing President Luis Arce, who had initially intended to seek re-election, withdrew from the race before the campaign had begun. Former President Evo Morales, after losing an internal power struggle within the party he founded and from which he was subsequently expelled, sought to advance his candidacy, despite a legal ban to compete. He attempted to do so through a party that was later disqualified for not meeting the threshold requirement in the previous elections. Morales reacted by initiating calls to obstruct the electoral process, resulting in roadblocks and violence in pockets

across the country. However, he then pivoted to promote a protest vote during the first-round campaign, urging his supporters to cast an invalid vote on 17 August.

Five alliances (*Alianza Fuerza del Pueblo*, *Alianza Libertad y Progreso*, *Alianza Libre*, *Alianza Popular*, *Alianza Unidad*) and three political parties: *Autonomía Para Bolivia* (APB)-*Súmate*, MAS-IPSP, and *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) competed in the elections. The political landscape featured a pluralistic environment, with a diversity of options, from social progressivism to conservatism and from statism to free-market economy. Prior to the elections, a new generation of progressive leaders under 40 emerged, including Senate President Andrónico Rodríguez, former Government Minister Eduardo del Castillo, and El Alto Mayor Eva Copa, rooted in the MAS-IPSP legacy but adopting more moderate positions than their predecessors. Reflecting its internal fragmentation, the MAS-IPSP camp contested the elections without a single unified candidacy for the first time in two decades.

After an early failed attempt at unification behind a common candidate, the opposition went to the polls with three leading figures: businessman Samuel Doria Medina, engineer Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga, both perennial presidential contenders, and Manfred Reyes Villa, Mayor of Cochabamba, who were, to varying degrees, seen as the old guard attempting political renewal. Tarija’s Senator and former Mayor Rodrigo Paz Pereira sought to position himself as an alternative to the traditional opposition. Despite the presence of broader political options, polarisation persisted, often along a west and east divide that masked more complex underlying dynamics.

In the lead-up to the polls, EU EOM political interlocutors repeatedly pointed to an erosion of public trust in state institutions, including in the election administration. Concerns over the perceived fragility and instability of the electoral process were tempered by the fact that many viewed the elections as the only path out of the prevailing political, institutional, and economic crises.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF 2020 EU RECOMMENDATIONS

Some past EU recommendations were implemented, while key recommendations regarding candidate withdrawals and substitutions and disproportionate sanctions remained unaddressed

The 2020 EU EEM for the general elections issued 18 recommendations to improve future elections. Of these, three were fully implemented: In line with election transparency principles, the TSE has now successfully introduced a preliminary results system (*recommendation No. 16*). The 2025 TSE instructions established more detailed procedures for addressing errors in results protocols, which meant that the TSE did not need to revise results protocols, as these were dealt with at the departmental level (*recommendation No. 18*). The 2025 TSE regulations removed the pre-authorisation requirement before publication of an opinion poll; no authorisation was needed on the part of the TSE, control was *a posteriori* (*recommendation No. 3*).

A further five recommendations were partially implemented. The TSE conducted civic education activities and reminded voters that their vote is an individual choice. While the practice of community voting was less prevalent, further efforts in voter education are recommended (*recommendation No. 4*). The TSE sought to curb discriminatory and intolerant campaign messages through a 2025 regulation; however, stronger enforcement is still needed (*recommendation No. 5*). The TSE has now conducted a systematic social media monitoring; yet, this could benefit from cooperation with social media platforms (*recommendation No. 10*). The TSE has bolstered efforts to improve digital literacy of voters and has established agreements with the organisations *Bolivia Verifica* and *Chequea Bolivia*, but targeted measures are required to address disinformation online (*recommendation No. 12*). TSE regulations in 2025 reinforced gender parity by detailing how candidate lists should be presented, although enforcement of provisions against harassment and political violence against women remains weak (*recommendation No. 14*).

Some key recommendations remained unaddressed, including the removal of disproportionate sanctions for not passing the three per cent threshold to retain a party's legal status (*recommendation No. 1*), the need to harmonise legal deadlines for candidate withdrawals and substitutions with the deadline for printing ballot papers (*recommendation No. 6*), as well as strengthening the legal framework and enhancing the TSE's oversight of campaign finance (*recommendation No. 7*). In addition, recommendations on clarifying what constitutes government publicity (*recommendation No. 2*), regulating the use of public funds for media advertising (*recommendation No. 8*), prosecuting violence and pressure against journalists (*recommendation No. 9*), ensuring the independence of public service media (*recommendation No. 11*), and adopting a data-protection law (*recommendation No. 13*) also remained unaddressed. Most of these issues are reflected in the current set of recommendations at the end of this report.

5. ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Adequate legal electoral framework challenged by persistent regulatory gaps, implementation challenges and perceptions of a politicised justice system

5.1 Electoral system

The general elections determined the president and vice-president, 130 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 36 senators, and nine representatives to supra-national parliaments, all for a five-year term. Presidential and vice-presidential candidates run on joint tickets; if no candidate obtains more than 50 per cent of the valid votes, or more than 40 per cent with a margin of at least 10 percentage points over the runner-up, a second round is held within 60 days between the two leading candidates. Several EU EOM interlocutors from political parties and civil society considered the 60-day period unduly long, arguing that it prolongs political uncertainty and may lead to voter fatigue.

Of the 130 deputies, 63 are elected through first-past-the-post contests in single-member constituencies, 60 are elected from closed party lists in a single national constituency in proportion to the presidential vote, and seven seats are reserved for indigenous peoples with minority population status, elected by majority vote (see *Participation of National Minorities*). Senate and supra-national seats are assigned in departmental constituencies in proportion to the votes cast for presidential candidates.¹

To qualify for seat distribution, a political organisation must obtain at least three per cent of the valid votes in the respective department. Seats in the proportional contests are allocated using the D'Hondt method, with a compensatory adjustment, under which seats won in the majoritarian races are deducted from the proportional allocation. This electoral design may provide a disincentive for political alliances in the presidential race.

5.2 Constituency boundary delimitation

By law, in the Chamber of Deputies, the distribution of plurinominal and uninominal seats among departments is linked to population size and must be revised after each census to reflect demographic changes.² In addition, the Constitution grants less populated and less developed departments a higher number of seats with the aim to ensure equitable representation.

¹ The law does not specify the supra-national parliaments for which the nine deputies are elected, as these are determined after election day. Prior to the elections, Bolivia had representatives in the Latin American and Caribbean Parliament (Parlatino), the Andean Parliament (ParlAndes), the Amazonian Parliament, the Indigenous and Afro-descendant Parliament of the Americas, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur).

² In the Senate, each department is represented by four seats.

Based on population changes recorded in the 2024 census, the Legislative Assembly adjusted the distribution of seats among departments in January 2025.³ The revision granted Santa Cruz one additional plurinominal seat and reduced Chuquisaca's allocation by one. In May, the TSE redefined the boundaries of single-member constituencies to reflect the updated population data. While the amendments complied with legal requirements, some EU EOM interlocutors argued that some of the new boundaries did not accurately reflect population patterns and fragmented historically cohesive communities.⁴ Moreover, some stakeholders noted that redrawing constituencies only three months before the elections limited their ability to adapt to the new electoral map.⁵

The intention to promote the development of less populated and less developed departments constitutes a legitimate constitutional objective. However, the current framework for seat distribution affects the overall balance of representation.⁶ For example, in Pando, one deputy represents on average 39,000 registered voters, compared to 160,000 in Cochabamba, a disparity that may challenge the principle of equal voting power (see *Annex A*). A constitutional action against this framework, submitted by a citizen in April 2025, was admitted by the Constitutional Court but remained pending without a decision at the time of the elections.

6. Legal framework

Bolivia is state party to key international and regional human rights instruments related to democratic elections. When these treaties recognise rights that are more favourable than those provided in the Constitution, they take precedence and must be applied preferentially. The Constitution guarantees the right to participate in the exercise of political power, directly or through representatives, individually and collectively. Fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, access to information, peaceful assembly, and freedom of association, are constitutionally guaranteed.

The electoral legal framework is primarily composed of the 2010 Electoral Regime Law No. 026 (Electoral Law), which regulates the electoral process; the 2010 Plurinational Electoral Body Law No. 018, which defines the structure and responsibilities of the Plurinational Electoral Body (OEP); and the 2018 Political Organisations Law No. 1096, which governs the registration, functioning, and financing of political parties and alliances. Election administration regulations further shape the legal framework, notably on candidate and alliance registration, electoral advertising and campaigning, opinion polling, and the preliminary results system (SIREPRE).

Overall, the legal framework provides adequate guarantees for the conduct of democratic elections, and reflects a strong legal commitment to inclusiveness. Nonetheless, certain regulatory gaps and implementation challenges remain, many of which had been identified by previous EU electoral missions. These include the need to strengthen regulations on political and campaign finance to enhance pluralism, equal opportunities and transparency; to introduce specific transparency requirements for electoral advertising in traditional and social media; to reinforce mechanisms to address harassment and political violence against women; and to align candidate registration deadlines and procedures for disqualifications, substitutions and withdrawals with ballot printing.

³ Law No. 1614 adopted in January 2025.

⁴ Several EU EOM interlocutors in Santa Cruz and other major cities expressed concern that the census data may have underrepresented the demographic weight of large urban areas. Political party representatives in Santa Cruz and La Paz also raised concerns that some of the newly drawn constituency boundaries divided socially integrated communities.

⁵ International good practice suggest that constituency boundaries do not change within one year before elections. See II.2.B of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)'s 2002 [Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters](#) (Code of Good Practice).

⁶ The law further provides that the population of each uninominal constituency within a department may not deviate by more than 15 per cent from the departmental average. However, there is no similar requirement regulating population disparities between constituencies across different departments.

In addition, some gaps persist regarding the conduct of second rounds, particularly concerning the consequences of candidate withdrawal and replacement, and other situations not explicitly covered by law. In the absence of legal provisions, the TSE was required to take *ad hoc* decisions on matters such as the adjudication of vacant supranational seats, updates to the voter register, the extension of mandates within certain levels of election administration, and the procedures for accreditation for observers and party agents. These gaps should be addressed well in advance of future elections to enhance legal certainty and consistency in the administration of the process.

Recommendation: Conduct well in advance of the next elections a comprehensive review and reform of the electoral legislation to address existing gaps to ensure important aspects of the electoral process are clearly and consistently regulated, in line with the principle of legal certainty.

The Constitution establishes four branches of public power: the executive, legislative, judicial and electoral, with the TSE serving as the highest electoral authority. Elections are conducted under the principle of preclusion, whereby each stage has a fixed, non-extendable deadline that, once concluded, cannot be reopened or altered. Decisions by the TSE are final, and may only be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, whose rulings set binding jurisprudence.

While intended as exceptional legal remedy, petitions for constitutional protection have in recent years become frequent in electoral processes, fostering the perception that these mechanisms serve political purposes, particularly to the benefit of the incumbent party. In these elections, 16 such constitutional actions were filed.⁷ Concerns over the Constitutional Court's impartiality have also been compounded by inconsistent rulings on the two-mandate limit for presidents (one authorising re-election after having served two mandates and another prohibiting it), its interventions in TSE decisions, and the continued tenure of five of its nine magistrates, whose mandates expired but were self-extended, in contravention of the legal framework.

7. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

Technical preparations for the elections carried out effectively, with perceptions of institutional weakness eased after the first round

7.1 Structure and composition of the Electoral Administration

The general elections were administered by the Plurinational Electoral Body (OEP), comprising the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), nine Departmental Electoral Tribunals (TEDs), some 7,900 electoral notaries, and 35,253 polling station committees, including 1,227 abroad.

The TSE is responsible for regulating, supervising and administering elections nationwide. It is headed by a seven-member plenary; six members elected by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly and one directly appointed by the president. The mandate of TSE President Oscar Hassenteufel expired in April 2025. In the absence of an internal agreement on a successor, and given his reputation as a stabilising figure within the collegial body, he was confirmed as interim president for the general elections. The mandates of six TSE members are set to expire in December 2025, while the seventh member's term extends until 2030, subject to the incoming president's discretion. At the time of writing, a draft legal amendment regulating the selection of new TSE members was under consideration in the Chamber of Deputies.

TEDs, under the supervision of the TSE, conduct elections at the departmental level. Each TED has five members: four elected by the Chamber of Deputies upon nomination by the Departmental Assemblies, and one appointed by the president. Electoral notaries, appointed temporarily by TEDs

⁷ These cases were not publicly accessible and could only be reviewed once the Constitutional Court's decision had been published on its official website. UN General Assembly. Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council. Forty-eighth Session. Comment 28.

from among qualified applicants, oversee the work of polling stations on election day. Poll workers are randomly selected by lot from the pool of registered voters, six per polling station, separately for each election day, and their participation is mandatory.

The legislation provides for a minimum of three women and two indigenous representatives in the TSE, and two women and one indigenous representative in each TED. These requirements were generally complied with.⁸ While no gender composition requirements apply to other levels of the election administration, the TSE conducted the lottery for selecting polling staff in a manner to ensure equal representation of women and men among those selected.

7.2 Decision-making and public communication

In line with its mandate, the TSE adopted comprehensive regulations to complement the Electoral Law ahead of the first round but left several aspects of the run-off without formal decisions (see *Legal Framework*). Moreover, it did not consistently publish its regulations and instructions on time, with some, including those on constituency delimitation and the preliminary results system, released several weeks after adoption. Although the law requires its plenary sessions to be public, the TSE deliberated behind closed doors during most of the election period and did not release meeting minutes, reducing transparency and accountability.⁹

Recommendation: Reinforce transparency and accountability by ensuring that the TSE promptly adopts and publishes its decisions, regulations, and other relevant documentation, including on the preliminary results system, while guaranteeing public access to information on its plenary sessions, in line with the law.

The legal framework guarantees the institutional independence of the electoral administration. Nevertheless, before the first round, opposition parties and civil society representatives questioned its effective autonomy, citing past interventions by the Constitutional Court, the body's financial dependence on the government, and allegations of political pressure. The absence of specific legal safeguards protecting TSE members from prosecution in ordinary courts also raised concerns that they may be discouraged from taking politically sensitive decisions.¹⁰

Public confidence in the election administration improved markedly after the first round, due to the successful implementation of the preliminary results system. However, many stakeholders, including TEDs, political parties and civil society representatives, noted that information provided by the TSE to the public and its subordinate structures on key matters, such as candidate registration and certain election-day procedures, was often delayed or insufficient.

7.3 Administration of the elections

The election administration met all key deadlines, even in the face of significant logistical challenges, including fuel shortage, inflation, as well as underbudgeting, and understaffing across several units. It also introduced improvements to some operations, such as enhanced security features and transport protocols for sensitive electoral materials compared with previous elections. The TSE benefited from technical assistance implemented by the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with the support of the EU.

The election administration, complimented by civil society and community radios, ran an extensive multi-format civic education campaign, with targeted messaging to youth, women, and indigenous

⁸ During these elections, of the 41 sitting TED members, 15 were women (36.6 per cent) and 7 self-identified as indigenous (17.1 per cent). While most TEDs also complied with gender requirements, the TED in Cochabamba included only one woman.

⁹ Article 17 of the Law on the Plurinational Electoral Body. Also see section 3.1 of the [Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters](#), which recommends that sessions of higher-level election administration bodies be open to the public.

¹⁰ A draft law aiming to extend to them protections similar to those granted to other high-ranking officials (who may only be tried with the approval of two-thirds of the Legislative Assembly) remains pending in the Chamber of Deputies.

communities on, *inter alia*, voting and counting procedures and the SIREPRE. Despite extensive efforts and high-quality didactic materials, EU observers noted that outreach remained limited, particularly in rural areas, due to institutional capacity constraints and the absence of multilingual materials. As a result, many voters appeared to lack a clear understanding of key issues, such as the newly delimited electoral constituencies, the institutions and representatives to be elected, and the nature and purpose of preliminary results.

Recommendation: Strengthen voter education efforts, in cooperation with civil society, media, and other stakeholders, to ensure that rural and indigenous populations, have access to clear, accessible, and comprehensive information on voting rights, obligations, and the electoral system.

The training of poll workers was generally comprehensive and interactive, with a practical focus on election-day procedures and role-playing exercises. However, some sessions did not cover all aspects of the procedures in sufficient detail. In some cases, logistical challenges were also observed, such as inadequate venues and delays in remote areas due to fuel shortages and poor road conditions. While some sessions were conducted in indigenous languages, the availability of training materials in these languages remained limited. Positively, for the run-off, the curriculum was updated based on lessons learned from the first round. Nevertheless, on election day, EU observers reported occasional inconsistencies in the application of procedures, suggesting that the training did not fully ensure their uniform implementation (see *Polling, Counting, and Tabulation of Results*).

Between July 2024 and June 2025, the election administration held four inter-institutional dialogues, bringing together the four branches of government and competing political organisations to reaffirm their commitment to the democratic electoral process. In addition, despite initial financial and organisational difficulties, the TSE successfully implemented out-of-country voting in 22 countries for both rounds.

7.4 Election technologies

Various technologies were incorporated in the electoral process, most notably for the transmission of the preliminary results (SIREPRE) and for tabulation of the official results (SCORC). Both systems facilitated an efficient and swift processing and publishing of the results data, enhancing public trust in results tabulation.

Following a June 2025 legal amendment, the use of a preliminary results transmission system in all electoral processes was made mandatory. However, the regulation outlining its implementation was issued by the TSE only a month before election day. This belated adoption permitted only a limited preparation and adjustment time and left a lack of clarity in terms of responsibilities of the TSE units involved.

Some decisions related to the SIREPRE processing procedures were also adopted relatively late in the process, such as the instruction on how to process the results protocols containing procedural remarks related to the results data, to ensure that the broadest possible sample of protocols could be included in the system. Moreover, due to expiration of the security certificates, the last updated version of the SIREPRE mobile application for the first round was released only the day before election day, further straining the operational capacities of the TSE units to ensure its timely installation on operator's phones. Factoring in the first-round experience, the operational planning ahead of the second round allowed for well-timed finalisation of system adjustments as well as deployment of the operators.

Stakeholder confidence in the TSE's ability to deliver preliminary results via the new internally developed SIREPRE prior to the first round was tempered by poor past experience with similar systems in the country. While confidence was largely restored on the first election night following the successful implementation of the system, in the lead-up to the polls, the TSE missed the opportunity to alleviate public concerns through more proactive and thorough information sharing and broader involvement of stakeholders in the whole process.

Despite the law envisaging political parties to follow all phases of the SIREPRE implementation and establishing an expert commission to assess and monitor this process, neither parties nor the commission were systematically involved beyond a few isolated tests. Moreover, no similar transparency measures are stipulated for the implementation of the SCORC. Also, detailed technical information on the functionality of the results management systems and on adjustments made following internal tests was not shared with stakeholders. At the same time, political parties made limited use of the offered opportunities to participate in the testing events to which they had been invited, with some attributing this to the largely demonstrative nature of these events.

Due to budgetary and time constraints, as affirmed by the TSE technical personnel, neither the SIREPRE nor the SCORC was subject to an independent compliance audit. However, in cooperation with two external companies, the TSE performed an ethical hacking exercise on and continuous monitoring of the infrastructure, allowing to identify and address potential security risks. Internal testing and large-scale simulation tests further permitted the TSE to enhance system performance, implement adequate security measures, and address logistical and coordination deficiencies, ensuring smooth operations on both election days.

The SIREPRE included over 97 per cent of in-country result protocols in the first round and almost 99 per cent in the run-off, providing the public with reliable early projection on both election nights. Subsequent EU EOM analysis confirmed that SIREPRE results differed by only fractions of a per cent from official results (*see Annex B*), attesting to the system's reliability. While party representatives and observers at the SIREPRE operations centre could follow the data processing on-site from the outset, the public received aggregated preliminary results only after the official press conferences held by the TSE, without the possibility to display preliminary results data disaggregated per polling station or images of original results protocols. This delayed release of data limited real-time access to detailed information and precluded stakeholders from better tracing the results from polling stations to national results, potentially impacting confidence. As a good transparency measure, the tabulation of official results included both the disaggregated polling station results data and the scanned results protocols.

Following the run-off election day, allegations emerged of irregularities and a supposed suspension of the preliminary results system on election night. These claims were promptly refuted by the TSE and publicly dismissed as unsubstantiated by observation missions, including the EU EOM.

8. VOTER REGISTRATION

The voter register was adequate to conduct the elections, but some limitations hindered full inclusiveness and its planned audit

8.1 The right to vote

Bolivian citizens aged 18 years or older on election day are entitled to vote. Voting is compulsory for those residing in Bolivia under 70 years of age. Members of the armed forces and the national police are also entitled to vote, while both institutions are required to maintain political neutrality.

Citizens who fail to vote in two consecutive elections or refuse to serve as polling staff without justified cause are disenfranchised until they regularise their status.¹¹ Moreover, those who do not vote are not issued a voting certificate, which temporarily restricts access to certain public services. Political rights, including the right to vote, may be suspended for the duration of the sentence for certain crimes, such as misappropriation of public funds or treason.

¹¹ Disenfranchisement lasts until citizens request re-registration by paying a fine. For the general elections, the voter register contained 403,584 citizens declared ineligible for failing to vote in two consecutive elections or to serve as polling staff, who had not regularised their status before election day.

8.2 Voter registration

The permanent biometric voter register, maintained by the Civil Registry Service (SERECÍ), is based on active registration by citizens. By law, run-offs must be conducted using the same voter lists as in the first round.¹² Voters are assigned to polling stations according to their declared address, which does not need to be substantiated by documentation. As a result, the framework does not fully prevent misuse: EU observers received indications of some voters declaring residence in constituencies where they did not reside to support specific candidates in the legislative elections.

In recent years, SERECÍ has made consistent efforts to clean the voter register through software-based verification of records. From 25 March to 13 April, it conducted a nationwide voter registration campaign that resulted in 178,973 new registrations. This figure fell short of SERECÍ's own projection of 291,000, based on population growth estimates, which the institution attributed to low public engagement and its limited operational capacity. In February, the TSE, political parties, and civil society agreed to jointly conduct a sample-based audit of the voter register. However, the planned audit was not carried out due to time constraints and limited political party engagement.

The final voter register included 7,937,138 voters, of whom 369,931 were registered abroad. Public confidence in the register was generally adequate. While some political parties questioned its accuracy, alleging the continued inclusion of deceased persons and citizens residing abroad, these claims were not substantiated.¹³ At the same time, several EU EOM interlocutors reported persistent under-registration: SERECÍ estimated that up to almost half a million eligible citizens, mainly from rural areas and disadvantaged groups such as persons with disabilities, were not included in the register. The authorities attributed this either to communities not being reached by registration efforts or to low motivation among these communities to take part in the registration process. This shortfall potentially challenges Bolivia's international commitments to ensure universal suffrage.¹⁴

Recommendation: Undertake a comprehensive assessment to identify the extent of under-registration, especially among vulnerable social groups, and develop targeted measures to address the identified gaps to increase the inclusiveness of the voter register.

Voter registration continues to rely on outdated software and hardware, in use since 2009. While the system was suitable for these elections, SERECÍ stated that a comprehensive overhaul will be required shortly after the general elections.

9. REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES

A short candidate registration period and the overly extended timeframe for withdrawals and substitutions hindered voters' ability to make an informed choice

9.1 The right to stand

Although the Constitution embraces a broad notion of political representation, encompassing citizens groups, indigenous and peasant communities, only political organisations with legal status can directly nominate candidates for general elections. The legal framework allows for participation through political alliances but does not provide for independent candidacies. Participating political

¹² Although not specifically provided by the law, between the two rounds, the TSE, with a view to strengthen public confidence, removed from the register some 8,000 deceased citizens.

¹³ Political parties were provided in-site access to data in the register by the SERECÍ, but only two parties exercised this right and none filed complaints.

¹⁴ Art. 25 of the 1966 UN [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights](#) (ICCPR) states that "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...] to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections". Paragraph 11 of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' 1996 [General Comment 25](#) to the ICCPR further clarifies that "States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right. Where registration of voters is required, it should be facilitated and obstacles to such registration should not be imposed."

organisations may submit lists of up to 350 candidates, including reserve candidates for the presidential ticket, the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and supranational representation.

To obtain legal status, parties must demonstrate support from at least 1.5 per cent of the voter register.¹⁵ To retain it, a party must have secured at least three per cent of the valid votes cast in the most recent elections. By law, the TSE must revoke the legal status of political organisations that fail to meet this threshold, a sanction considered disproportionate under international good practice.¹⁶ Moreover, the term “preceding elections” is not clearly defined by the law, and as general and subnational elections are held separately, this ambiguity leaves room for differing or arbitrary interpretation. On this basis, the TSE cancelled the legal status of two political parties before the elections and is set to cancel that of two other parties that did not reach the threshold in these elections.¹⁷

Recommendation: Remove the provision that cancels political organisations’ legal status if they fail to reach the three per cent threshold.

By law, the TSE verifies compliance with eligibility criteria and registers candidates who meet requirements. While most eligibility requirements are inclusive, some provisions impose excessive formalism that may unduly restrict access to candidacy. These include the obligation to submit an original, up-to-date tax clearance certificate, a notarised proof of proficiency in at least two of the country’s 37 official languages, and a declaration of resignation at least three months prior to the elections from any managerial position in a company holding contracts with the state.

9.2 Candidate registration

Of the five political parties and five alliances that initially registered with the TSE, eight ultimately contested the elections. The candidate registration period was limited to a six-day window, from 14 to 19 May. Of the 3,290 initially submitted registration requests, the TSE approved only one third, rejecting 2,014 for failing to meet one or more requirements, with the abovementioned three grounds accounting for most disqualifications.¹⁸ The most emblematic case concerned aspiring presidential candidate Jaime Dunn, who had settled his debt with the state but was excluded from the race because the competent authority failed to update the record in time. As his tax-clearance certificate still indicated the debt, the TSE disqualified him based on a formalistic interpretation of the rules.

Recommendation: Revise candidate eligibility criteria to ensure they do not impose disproportionate procedural barriers to candidacy.

The high number of disqualifications cannot be attributed solely to complex procedural requirements. In addition to these procedural hurdles, the legal framework itself contributes to this outcome by establishing an overly extended timeframe for substituting disqualified candidates—an arrangement that most political parties have strategically used to register ‘placeholder’ candidates for later replacement. The law also allows candidates to withdraw without justification up to 45 days before election day, or up to three days before election day in cases of *force majeure*, an exception that, in practice, has become the norm in this and previous elections. Throughout the pre-election period, 44 per cent of the initially registered candidacies were substituted, while around 35 per cent were either

¹⁵ 1.5 per cent of the voter register represents at least 113,508 signatures.

¹⁶ International good practice on political party regulation recommends that once a party registration is approved, requirements for retaining it should be minimal, although stricter conditions may apply for receiving public funding or contesting elections. See Paragraph 99 of the 2023 Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR [Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#).

¹⁷ *Partido de Acción Nacional Boliviano* (PAN-BOL) and *Frente para la Victoria* (FPV) were cancelled on 7 May 2025 for not reaching the threshold in the 2020 general elections. *Alianza Libertad y Progreso* received 1.45 per cent of the votes, while *Alianza Fuerza del Pueblo* obtained 1.67 per cent in the current electoral process.

¹⁸ The most frequent grounds for disqualification included failure to resign from positions in companies holding contracts with the State (1,885 cases), failure to submit a language proficiency certificate (1,884), and failure to provide a valid tax clearance certificate (1,814).

disqualified or withdrew (*see Annex C*). This dynamic highlights both the fragility and improvisational nature of political parties and the misalignment of the candidate registration period with milestones of the electoral calendar.

The final list of candidates was published only one day before the elections, after the ballots had been printed, leaving voters without timely or reliable information about the final candidate options. The late withdrawal of individual candidacies or even entire lists, as occurred with *Nueva Generación Patriótica* (NGP) and *Movimiento Renovador Nacionalista* (Morena) further contributed to occasional voter confusion.¹⁹

The late cut-off dates for withdrawals, substitutions, and disqualifications left the TSE with insufficient time to properly review and validate the final list of candidates. As a result, following the first round, several PDC parliamentary and supranational seats were allocated despite the corresponding lists being vacant or including disqualified or withdrawn candidates. As the legal framework lacks clear procedures for filling such vacancies, the TSE plenary will need to address each case on an *ad hoc* basis, impacting legal certainty and consistency in the application of the law.

Recommendation: Establish and enforce a clear and reasonable deadline for candidate withdrawals, disqualifications, and substitutions to ensure that the registration process is completed in time for ballot production and for voters to make an informed choice.

10. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

An overall subdued first-round campaign, characterised by a multidimensional crisis and unequal access to resources, was followed by a calm yet competitive run-off campaign that saw negative undertones

The legal framework establishes two distinct campaign periods: the public campaign and the media campaign. In the first round, the public campaign was much longer than the media campaign, whereas the run-off featured a single 50-day combined campaign period. Both campaigns concluded with a 72-hour campaign silence period before election day.

The electoral laws contain provisions aimed at ensuring equal rights to freedoms of assembly, expression, and movement for all candidates. The prohibition of the use of state resources for campaign purposes is stipulated in both the Constitution and the Electoral Law. Campaign regulations forbid incitement to violence through hate speech.

10.1 Electoral campaign – general elections, 17 August

The first-round public campaign began on 19 May, followed by the media campaign on 18 July, with both concluding on 13 August.

Overall, the campaign was subdued, due to party unpreparedness, economic hardship affecting both candidates and voters, and candidates' reluctance to appear ostentatious before an electorate impacted by ongoing political and financial crises. In general terms, the campaign was more dynamic on social media. EU observers estimated that most rallies observed drew less than 500 attendees until an uptick in activity in the final week, where most closing rallies drew over 1,000, and four exceeded 10,000. At the same time, some events showed signs of incentivised mobilisation through goods and lottery prizes (*See Annex D*).

Despite the campaign's relatively low profile, political debates became a distinctive feature, with an unprecedented number nationwide – both for presidential and parliamentary candidates. While the debates contributed positively to informing voters, some candidates refused to attend, and others complained that due to their low standing in polls, they were not invited to participate in

¹⁹ According to the final results for the first round, 6,365 (0.09%) voters cast their votes for withdrawn candidate lists.

the media-organised debates. Therefore, these became platforms for exchanges primarily between opposition candidates. While all presidential candidates participated in the widely-broadcast first TSE-organised debate, most frontrunners did not participate in the second debate.

Campaigns focused on the economic crisis, inflation, and lithium exploitation policy, with limited attention to social issues affecting under-represented groups. Many voters expressed disillusionment, feeling unrepresented by any political option. In this context, Evo Morales promoted a protest vote campaign which intensified in the final stretch leading up to the 17 August election day. This involved campaign offices across the country promoting this option and campaign closing events for the invalid ballot.

While candidates generally campaigned freely, most avoided pro-Morales strongholds such as El Trópico de Cochabamba (El Chapare, Cochabamba), and Caranavi and Achacachi (La Paz). The TSE and security forces engaged with local communities to ensure organisation of the polls in these areas. Notably, some opposition candidates reported improved access to rural zones that had been considered hostile to them in past elections, suggesting a slight easing of political polarisation. Mission interlocutors noted that there was also less inflammatory language than in previous electoral cycles, a shift that may be partly linked to the recent inclusion of anti-discrimination provisions in campaign regulations. Nevertheless, isolated incidents of electoral violence against three presidential candidates were reported in Yapacaní (Santa Cruz, 12 July), Cochabamba (14 July), Batallas and Caranavi (La Paz, 23 July), as well as Sacaba (Cochabamba, 13 August).

In the absence of public funding, structural disparities in access to financial resources continued to shape the dynamics of the race, particularly amid an ongoing economic crisis. Spending disparities were particularly evident in media and social media expenditures (*see Campaign Finance*).

EU observers received numerous reports of pressure on civil servants to engage in campaign activities, especially during the final stretch of the first-round campaign. There were also reports of office holders misusing state resources to support either their own campaigns or those of other candidates. They also received reports of unequal access to public spaces for candidates, depending on which political authority controlled the municipality.

10.2 Electoral campaign – presidential run-off 19 October

Bolivia's first ever presidential run-off pitted the Rodrigo Paz–Edmand Lara ticket (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*, PDC), which had secured 32 per cent of the first-round vote, against the Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga–Juan Pablo Velasco ticket (*Alianza Libre*), which had obtained 27 per cent.

Overall, the campaign remained subdued on the ground but shifted towards negative messaging, with vice-presidential controversies and instances of inflammatory rhetoric in both traditional and social media. While the limited focus on programmatic discussions may have restricted voters' access to substantive information, the TSE-organised debates – particularly the presidential one – helped promote informed choice by providing a clearer overview of the candidates' proposals.

Both tickets generally tried to broaden their electoral base toward the left, employing similar campaign strategies in content and activities. This entailed a focus on small-scale events, such as visits to local communities, offering food donations, health care services, and legal advice in rural and peri-urban areas. Although economic issues, including inflation and fuel shortages, remained central, the topic of social inclusion entered the discourse. Quiroga's earlier narrative portraying Paz as a leftist and *Masista* faded as the campaign progressed, while his communication strategy increasingly incorporated symbolic cultural references to attract the indigenous vote. In the final stretch of the race, larger campaign closing events were held across the country in a festive and peaceful atmosphere (*see Annex D*).

Overall, the campaign was competitive and took place in a calm environment in which fundamental freedoms were respected. Both camps reported improved access to areas previously dominated by

MAS-IPSP, particularly in the Chapare region of Cochabamba. Unlike in the first round, campaigning for invalid voting largely subsided after former president Evo Morales ceased to support it.

Although the Paz–Lara ticket ran its campaign with substantially greater resources than in the first round, the gap in financial capacity between the two presidential tickets was significant, with the Quiroga–Velasco ticket maintaining a clear advantage, especially in social media and paid ads in traditional media (*see Campaign Finance*).

10.3 Campaign finance

Legal and structural gaps undermined transparency, campaign equality, and effective oversight in campaign finance

Political and campaign finance is regulated by the 2018 Political Organisations Law and the 2019 Regulations on Oversight of Political Organisations. The framework primarily applies to political organisations, with candidates covered only indirectly through their parties' reporting obligations. To circumvent these reporting requirements, some well-resourced political organisations refrained from providing direct financial support to their candidates. Consequently, amid the ongoing economic crisis, many candidates had limited resources to campaign effectively. The absence of direct oversight of candidates' income and expenditures further reduced transparency in campaign financing, and was not in line with Bolivia's international commitments.

While political parties do not receive annual public funding or direct state contributions for campaign expenses, the law envisages limited public support for media advertising during election periods. However, for these elections, all political parties formally agreed to forgo this entitlement, which amounted to a total of approximately EUR 4.97 million (BOB 40,000,000), to be redirected toward the implementation of the preliminary results system.²⁰ This resulted in a framework marked by the near-total absence of public support, which did not contribute to a level playing field.

Consequently, campaigns were primarily financed through the private resources of parties and candidates. Permissible sources included personal funds, contributions from supporters, and external donations. The law prohibits anonymous donations as well as those originating from public entities, foreign organisations, religious groups, or individuals compelled by their employer to contribute. Each donation is limited to a maximum of 10 per cent of the party's annual budget or, during the campaign period, 10 per cent of the campaign's budget. The law contains no provisions restricting third parties, such as trade unions, from funding election-related expenditures, including campaign advertising and activities, although some were observed to be actively involved in electoral campaigns.

By law, political organisations' private expenditures on media advertising are capped at 35 per cent of the amount of public funding. However, with the suspension of public funding, no ceiling applied in these elections, leaving media advertising effectively unregulated and with no spending limits, except for time and space restrictions on paid electoral ads in public and private media. The lack of spending limits, combined with the absence of public funding, undermined the principle of equal campaign opportunities and advantaged better-resourced parties, which may be inconsistent with Bolivia's international obligations.

Recommendation: Level the playing field and strengthen political organisations by reintroducing direct annual public funding for political organisations and apply and expand upon existing public funding for electoral campaigns to cover activities beyond electoral propaganda.

Political organisations are required to submit annual budgets and financial statements to the TSE's Technical Oversight Unit (UTF). In election years, they must additionally submit a provisional campaign budget 60 days prior to the start of the campaign and a final campaign finance report within two months of the elections. The UTF is mandated to verify compliance with campaign finance

²⁰ Declaration of the Third Multi-Party and Interinstitutional Meeting for Democracy, La Paz, 17 February 2025.

regulations and reporting requirements, and to issue resolutions confirming their fulfilment. Non-compliance can result in official warnings, and may ultimately impede a party's operations.

There is no legal provision requiring any institution to publish financial reports. The Political Organisations Law only obliges political organisations to disclose them internally, thereby restricting transparency and public access to financial information, and not aligning with Bolivia's international commitments.

Recommendation: Introduce a legal requirement for prompt public disclosure of political organisations' financial reports to promote greater transparency in political and campaign finance.

Political parties have 60 days after election day to submit their financial reports – 16 October for the first round and 20 December for the second. Of the eight political organisations contesting the first round, the UTF timely received five financial reports, as two advanced to the run-off and one had lost its legal status. The preliminary evaluation of financial reports generated several requests for additional information, which the organisations were given 21 days to provide.

The UTF is a fully centralised body and staffed by only six auditors for the entire country. This results in significant human resource challenges in election years, and the absence of auditors at the departmental level further limited its ability to monitor compliance with campaign regulations. Moreover, the UTF does not have direct investigatory powers and must channel all information requests through the TSE plenary, including those to the tax authority, SERECÍ, or law enforcement agencies – a bureaucratic process that limits the efficiency of financial report oversight and points to the need for a faster, smoother process. Despite these constraints, the UTF conducted several training sessions for political parties to explain the oversight system.

Recommendation: Strengthen the TSE's Technical Oversight Unit (UTF) with greater resources and staffing, including at departmental levels, and amend the legal framework so that oversight applies to both political organisations and candidates, ensuring more effective and transparent political finance control.

Overall, a legal framework that applies only to political organisations and not to candidates, provides no mechanism for public disclosure of financial reports, is compounded by minimal public funding, and is further constrained by the UTF's limited institutional capacity, resulted in limited transparency, reduced campaign equality, and diminished the effectiveness of the oversight system.

11. MEDIA

Freedoms of expression and of the media were globally respected in a polarised media scene that provided substantive campaign coverage, but contenders did not enjoy a level playing field in terms of equitable access to the media or ability to place paid political ads

11.1 Legal framework

The Constitution and the 1925 Law of the Press protect freedoms of expression and of the media. The Electoral Law, the Plurinational Electoral Body Law, the Law on Political Organisations and the TSE's 2025 Regulations on Advertising and Electoral Campaign, and on Opinion Polls, mainly govern political actors' access to the media. Contrary to international standards which recommend avoiding prison sentences for journalists and media when offences are linked to professional practice, the 1997 Penal Code and the 2010 Law Against Racism and Any Form of Discrimination still criminalise media-related offences with prison sentences, although most cases do not reach court.²¹

The 2011 General Law on Telecommunications, Information Technology and Communication (Telecommunications Act) provides for sanctions, including fines, suspension and closure of radio

²¹ Penal Code: art. 283 (slander, up to three years in prison); art. 285 (spreading insults, up to three years). Law Against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination: it also contains prison sentences (up to 5 years) that apply to journalists.

stations and television channels by the Telecommunications Regulation Agency (ATT) on technical and administrative grounds only, although EU observers were informed that closures sometimes had a political bias.²² The National Code of Journalistic Ethics (CNEP) acts as a self-regulation mechanism, widely supported among journalists, with complaints submitted to the National Tribunal of Journalistic Ethics (TNEP) by persons who consider themselves affected by a publication in the media, or by journalists who feel they are the object of pressure or threats. The country still lacks a consistent law on access to public information, which impairs transparency and media investigation.

11.2 Media environment

The media landscape is vibrant, plural, and polarised. The digital news space, fuelled by lower costs and strong interest from youth, is rapidly expanding, with most major print and radio-television media running online versions.²³ According to the OEP list of accredited media published in July 2025, there are 348 national-level media outlets – 48 television channels, 26 radio stations, 28 printed dailies and periodicals, and 246 digital media. There are hundreds more at local level in the nine departments. Official data indicates there are 11,463 media workers and journalists in Bolivia. In terms of audience reach, Bolivians enjoy good access to a variety of media platforms: according to the 2024 census, 68 per cent of the population had access to mobile internet, 71 per cent to terrestrial television, 22 per cent to cable and satellite television, and 62 per cent to radio.

State-owned Bolivia TV, Radio Illimani-Red Patria Nueva, *Ahora El Pueblo* daily, and ABI press agency operate under the Vice-Ministry of Communication, and most coverage goes to the government and the president. Private media, like the highest-rated private television channels UNITEL and Red Uno, and the leading digital platform *El Deber*, are linked to private business interests and mostly reflect liberal political views. Catholic Church-linked Radio Fides and associative Radio Erbol, with their influential networks of local radios, mostly offer pluralistic coverage, as does leading private Radio Panamericana. Radio Kawsachun Coca only echoes the views of Evo Morales and his movement. Community radios, reaching out to the remote rural areas, mainly focus on indigenous priorities, broadcasting in Quechua, Aymara and Guaraní.

Bolivia ranks 93 out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index. On 18 June, the Bolivian National Association of Journalists (ANPB) submitted a report to the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression in which 95 violations against journalists and the media were listed from January to June 2025.²⁴ In spite of government statements on protecting freedom of expression, media representatives deplore the lack of public prosecution when violations against the press occur. For example, during the roads blockades last June, 51 incidents of journalists being assaulted and threatened by pro-Evo Morales activists were reported, but so far prosecution rates have been low.²⁵ Also, freedom of expression defenders decry that

²² In Cochabamba department, Radio Comunitaria Aiquile was shut down by the ATT in December 2024 on technical grounds, although local sources denounced a political decision, and other local radio stations were allegedly similarly closed. In La Paz department, the ATT revoked in February 2024 the licence of FM Bolivia, for broadcasting outside of its authorised area, although the decision was made on political grounds according to local sources. In early 2025, following payment of a fine, FM Bolivia regained its frequency and was mainly broadcasting electoral ads for *Alianza Unidad* during the campaign.

²³ Facebook pages followers: Red Uno (3.7 million) y UNITEL (3.6 million) television channels; *El Deber* daily (2.5 million), Radio Fides (520,000), Radio Kawsachun Coca (1 million).

²⁴ The human rights platform UNITAS numbered 153 violations of freedoms of expression and of the media from 1 January to 3 November 2025.

²⁵ During the road blockades that affected the country in June, the ANPB numbered 51 incidents involving journalists and media, among them 31 in Llalagua, where the peak of violence occurred with three policemen and a civilian killed.

the creation of an independent authority to support journalists at risks, including at judicial level, has not been advanced by the authorities.²⁶

Self-censorship generated by a mostly hostile media environment, as well as the difficult economic situation of the press and the precarious working conditions of journalists, further undermine freedom of expression, as assessed by EU observers both in urban and rural areas. Also, the non-equitable and opaque distribution of State advertising among the media, as assessed by EU monitoring, is described by independent experts as a source of unethical government influence on editorial content, affecting freedom of the media including political coverage during election periods.²⁷

11.3 Media and elections

During the campaign in the media periods for the first round (18 July-13 August) and the run-off (27 August-15 October), media coverage in news and other non-paid programmes of government and political parties was regulated by equity and pluralism principles without specific time limitation in the coverage of candidates and other political actors, whereas paid political ads were limited in volume, without spending ceilings.²⁸

During most of the first-round campaign, free airtime was offered from 26 July to 13 August by State-run Bolivia TV to the presidential candidates, providing three minutes per day in different time slots throughout the day. However, the broadcast rarely fell within peak hours, substantially limiting the audience, and spots were interrupted or postponed on several occasions in favour of presidential, bicentenary, and sports coverage. Only five candidates had their spots broadcast during the whole period of the first free airtime campaign, while two candidates joined at a later stage, and one never joined. Some candidates declared they struggled to cover production costs, and others submitted their spots too late. There is a legal provision for free airtime in public media for candidates throughout the campaign in the media period. However, during the seven-week-long run-off campaign, the TSE only implemented free airtime on Bolivia TV and on public radio during the last week, significantly restricting candidates' access to the media and voters' capacity to make an informed choice (*see Annex E, fig. 1.21 and 1.22*).

EU media monitoring detected a highly uneven distribution of paid electoral ads among presidential tickets on the major television channels and radio stations (*see Annex E, fig. 1.23 to 1.26*).²⁹ Updating the legal framework on paid electoral ads strengthening spending limits in favour of a better level the playing field appears necessary (*see Campaign Finance*).

Traditional and digital media offered a largely unequal and polarised coverage of the candidates. During the first-round campaign in the media, EU EOM monitoring mostly detected polarisation between pro-government and pro-opposition media content, and equity was not respected in terms of

²⁶ The recommendation was made in 2021 by the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) created body, in charge of investigating the serious violations of human rights that took place the 2019 general elections period, also reporting 58 assaults on journalists.

²⁷ According to data shared on 2 September with the EU EOM by the Fiscal Information Management Systems (DGSGIF) of the Ministry of Economy, from 1 January to 1 September 2025, the government, including the presidency, ministries, public agencies and public companies, spent a total of BOB 131.50 million (EUR 16.45 million) on State advertising in the media and other supports. National television channels were awarded the most valuable contracts (EUR 8.78 million in total): Bolivia TV (EUR 1.86 million), DTV (EUR 721,000), RTP (EUR 620,000), Red Uno (EUR 668,000), UNITEL (EUR 367,000).

²⁸ Paid electoral ads are limited to 10 minutes per day and per presidential candidate on each radio and television channel with national broadcast. Similar restrictions apply to digital media and local media. Spending limits on paid electoral advertisement only apply when there is public financing of political parties' electoral activities, which did not happen during the 2025 general elections.

²⁹ During the first-round campaign, Samuel Doria Medina and Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga placed the most ads on the major private television channels and radio stations, respectively 41 per cent and 38 per cent. During the run-off, Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga quasi monopolised paid electoral ads, with 92 per cent of the total ads broadcast from 8 September to 15 October, while Rodrigo Paz was scarcely visible, only appearing on Red Uno from 26 September on and ultimately on UNITEL from 12 to 15 October.

candidates' coverage in news and other election programmes in the public and private media (*see Annex E, fig. 1.1 to 1.5 and 1.11 to 1.15*). As for the run-off, while most major television channels and radio stations monitored by the EU EOM provided balanced coverage in terms of airtime to the competing tickets during the last two weeks of the campaign (*see Annex E, fig. 1.6 to 1.10 and 1.16 to 1.20*), the highest-rated private broadcasters, UNITEL and Red Uno, as well as the influential private digital platform *El Deber* qualitatively favoured the *Alianza Libre* over the whole campaign, with Church-linked Radio Fides and private Radio Panamericana being more neutral. Bolivia TV mostly favoured the president and the government, and although it offered little campaign coverage, it provided mostly equal and impartial treatment to the candidates, although criticism of Edmand Lara, and to a lesser extent of Juan Pablo Velasco, were frequent.

During the campaign for the first round, the TSE organised two presidential debates: one on 1 August with all eight running candidates, aired by major television channels except Bolivia TV, and another on 12 August with three presidential candidates, which received limited coverage. For the second round, the TSE organised two debates: one on 5 October for the vice-presidential candidates, and another on 12 October for the presidential candidates, with extensive public and private media live coverage. In the absence of a specific law, candidates' participation to TSE debates was not mandatory and confirmations of participation came late. Also, the format of the debates varied greatly and was subject to criticisms regarding the role of the moderators.

Although operated on a legal basis by leading pollsters registered with the TSE, disputable opinion polls published by major media generated controversy during both campaign periods. The TSE assessed the most controversial voting intention polls, exit polls and quick counts published during the campaign; yet, by the time of writing of this report, had offered no negative conclusions. Also, the regulatory framework that allows media to broadcast exit polls and quick counts by private pollsters from 20h00 onwards on election night raises questions, since these might contradict the TSE's preliminary results published on election night. The latter could generate a negative impact on the acceptance of the results.

Smear content and significant disinformation were hardly detected in major media outlets during the first-round campaign.³⁰ What existed mostly involved reciprocal accusations between presidential tickets during debates and other media coverage. Unlike in the first round, when they were more limited to social media, smear campaigns, disinformation, defamatory accusations and insults spread to traditional media outlets in the run-off, casting a negative shadow over campaign coverage.³¹

The TSE, acting as State media regulator during the election period, notified five political organisations and a dozen media outlets of sometimes heavy financial sanctions for violations of campaign regulations during the first-round campaign.³² Violations related to the campaign silence period, surpassing time limitations, and not labelling paid electoral ads and content as such. No such violations were detected by the TSE or the TEDs during the run-off. Details about the violations were not available on the OEP website or social media, impairing transparency. Also, the way the fines were calculated, based on the minimum salary standard for all media outlets, whatever their size, and

³⁰ Among the most controversial stories was the leaked audio recording attributed to businessman Marcelo Claure, a close supporter of a frontrunner, in which he discussed the capacity for a presidential candidate to buy the media in order to be elected.

³¹ During the run-off, the alleged racist tweets attributed to Juan Pablo Velasco overshadowed part of the campaign of *Alianza Libre*, while Edmand Lara controversial statements, including against journalists, dominated PDC coverage in the media. The TSE debate on 5 October between the vice-presidential candidates was often described as a confrontation with defamatory accusations and insults rather than a discussion based on programmes.

³² On 28 August, the TSE was in the process of imposing a fine of BOB 1.54 million (EUR 190,000) on *Alianza Libre* (Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga), and fines of BOB 1.21 million (EUR 149,000) on *Alianza Unidad* (Samuel Doria Medina), BOB 220,000 (EUR 27,000) on *APB-Súmate* (Manfred Reyes Villa) and BOB 55,000 (EUR 7,000) each on MAS-IPSP (Eduardo Del Castillo) and *Alianza Fuerza del Pueblo* (Jhonny Fernandez). As for media: Radio Santa Cruz-Red Amazónica, BOB 935,000 (EUR 115,000); Radio Erbol, BOB 770,000 (EUR 95,000); Radio PIO XII, BOB 605,000 (EUR 75,000).

on the highest advertising rates for all media outlets, was heavily criticised by media and journalists' organisations, who considered the fines disproportionate.

Recommendation: Enhance the TSE/TEDs media monitoring capacities to better identify offline and online media campaign violations and shorten the reaction time for TSE sanctioning of media and political organisations to ensure a meaningful deterrent effect during the media campaign period, while ensuring fines are not disproportionate.

Despite a ban on government advertising during most of the media campaigns, EU EOM media monitoring detected a significant volume of ads promoting the outgoing president and government's achievements (see Annex E, fig. 1.27 to 1.30). While exceptions linked to specific public information announcements are permitted,³³ the government's efforts at self-promotion throughout the campaign period, including numerous public works inaugurations, is questionable.

Recommendation: Update the legal framework on government advertising authorised in the media during campaign period to further restrict and clarify the types of ads, extend the period of restriction to cover the long run-off campaign, and establish fair criteria for the allocation of government advertising in public and private media.

During the two campaign periods in the media, coverage of TSE and TEDs activities and broadcasting of TSE voter information campaigns were consistent across most media monitored. The TSE's total budget for voter education campaigns in the media amounted to BOB 24.25 million (EUR 3 million), according to the TSE's Intercultural Service for Democratic Strengthening (SIFDE). EU observers noted that national media and local media outlets frequently complained of being sidelined in the allocation of TSE voter information ads, which represented a loss of income for them.

Freedoms of expression and of the media were globally respected throughout the two media campaign periods, with a few notable exceptions.³⁴ On 25 October, major journalists' associations urged the next administration and legislature to undertake significant media reforms, including a law on journalists' protection. Independent fact-checking organisations *Chequea Bolivia* and *Bolivia Verifica* also complained to the EU EOM of being submitted to harassment after verifying, on 26 and 27 September, the authenticity of the racist tweets allegedly posted by *Alianza Libre* vice-presidential candidate Juan Pablo Velasco in 2010.

11.4 EU EOM media monitoring – general elections, 17 August

The EU EOM media monitoring unit assessed both media campaign periods,³⁵ plus silence periods, elections days and post-election periods. Quantitative and qualitative monitoring included a selection of major television channels and radio stations.³⁶

The public television channel mostly favoured the government and the president while providing unequitable coverage of the candidates. On state-run Bolivia TV, from 18 July to 13 August, in news and electoral programmes (see Annex E, fig. 1.1 and 1.11), the government and the president attracted

³³ Exemptions include information campaigns related to civil protection, health, education, public services, sports and tourism (see TSE media campaign regulation, April 2025, art. 25-26).

³⁴ On 17 August in Cochabamba department, two journalists were injured by pro-Evo Morales activists while covering the vote of presidential candidate Andrónico Rodríguez. On 20 August in Chuquisaca department, the antenna of a local radio station was purposely damaged following the coverage by the radio of the celebration, with local MAS supporters' presence, of the PDC victory. On 16 September in Santa Cruz, journalists were assaulted by Edmand Lara's team. On 26 September in Trinidad, journalists were prevented from accessing Rodrigo Paz. On 19 October, several journalists were pushed around while covering *Alianza Libre*-linked anti-fraud protest in Santa Cruz during election night.

³⁵ First round: EU monitoring assessed quantitatively the whole media campaign (18 July – 13 August); run-off: EU monitoring assessed quantitatively the last part (30 September – 15 October) of the media campaign (27 August – 15 October), except for the paid electoral ads which were monitored during the whole campaign.

³⁶ Television channels (monitored from 18 to 24 hours): Bolivia TV (State-run); UNITEL, Red Uno (private). Radio stations (from 9 to 14 hours): Radio Panamericana (private); Radio Fides (Catholic Church-linked).

the bulk of the coverage (46 per cent in total) mainly with a positive or neutral tone,³⁷ followed by presidential candidates Andrónico Rodríguez (9.5 per cent) significantly with a negative tone, Samuel Doria Medina (9 per cent) significantly with a negative tone, Eduardo Del Castillo (8 per cent) mainly with a positive or neutral tone, Rodrigo Paz and Manfred Reyes Villa (5.5 per cent each), partly with a negative tone, Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga (5 per cent), partly with a negative tone, Pavel Aracena (4.5 per cent), partly with a negative tone, Jhonny Fernandez (3.5 per cent), significantly with a negative tone, and Eva Copa (3.5 per cent), partly with a negative tone.³⁸

Recommendation: Introduce a law on public media clearly setting out principles of pluralism, impartiality and independence from the executive.

The major private television channels and radio stations coverage of the candidates was more equitable, although favouring the candidates leading in the polls (*see Annex E, fig. 1.2 to 1.5 and 1.12 to 1.15*). In comparison, on the private television channels UNITEL and Red Uno, the combined coverage of the government and the president was lower (13 and 18 per cent, respectively) than on State television and was partly negative. Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga received 18.5 and 15 per cent of coverage, mainly neutral in tone, and Samuel Doria Medina 17 and 18 per cent, also mainly neutral. Other candidates, including Eduardo Del Castillo (6 and 7.5 per cent, mainly neutral) and Rodrigo Paz (7 and 4.5 per cent, mainly neutral), received comparatively less coverage.

The campaign silence period (14 to 17 August) was mainly respected with a few notable exceptions.³⁹

11.5 EU EOM media monitoring – presidential run-off, 19 October

According to EU monitoring,⁴⁰ on public Bolivia TV, from 30 September to 15 October, the government and the president attracted the bulk of the coverage (43 per cent) mainly with a neutral tone, followed by Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga (30 per cent) mainly with a neutral tone, and Rodrigo Paz (27 per cent) mainly with a neutral tone (*see Annex E, fig. 1.6 and 1.16*).

On private television channels UNITEL and Red Uno, coverage given to the government and president together was significantly lower (6 and 9 per cent, respectively) than on state television, mainly with a neutral tone, while Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga attracted slightly more coverage (49 and 46 per cent), mostly with a neutral tone, than Rodrigo Paz (45 and 45 per cent), mostly with a neutral tone (*see Annex E, fig. 1.7 to 1.8 and 1.17 to 1.18*).

The campaign silence period (16 to 19 October) was mainly respected, while EU monitoring detected a few exceptions.⁴¹

12. SOCIAL MEDIA

A weak regulatory framework failed to curb hateful content, covert advertising, and AI-driven disinformation in an election marked by ‘guerra sucia’ (dirty campaigning)

³⁷ During the first round campaign in the media period, as monitored by EU EOM, Bolivia TV broadcast extensive coverage of the bicentenary celebrations (27 per cent of total monitored content in the news and other election programmes) mostly with presence of the president and government, and significant coverage of public works inauguration mostly with presence of the president and government (11 per cent of total monitored content in the news and other election programmes).

³⁸ Eva Copa, the only female presidential candidate, announced her withdrawal from the race on 21 July.

³⁹ On 17 August, Eduardo Del Castillo called for the vote on Bolivia TV, Red Uno and DTV.

⁴⁰ EU quantitative monitoring covered part (30 September – 15 October) of the run-off media campaign period (27 August – 15 October), except for the paid electoral ads which were monitored during the whole media campaign period on Bolivia TV, UNITEL and Red Uno.

⁴¹ On 17 October, DTV broadcast repeatedly negative campaigning against PDC. On 19 October shortly before 19h00, Radio Fides published early TSE preliminary results (PDC: 54 per cent, Alianza Libre: 46 per cent).

12.1 Legal framework

The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and laws prohibit the dissemination of hate speech through any means of communication. The TSE regulation on the 2025 elections introduced explicit definitions of hate speech, disinformation, and smear campaigning in elections.⁴² The publication of content that engages in any of these practices is punishable by removal of the content, rectification, and referral to the Public Prosecutor's Office for possible legal action.

Campaign regulations require that media outlets serving as advertising platforms register with the TSE and label advertisements as *espacio solicitado* (requested space). The Electoral Law prohibits the use of public resources for campaigning. It also prohibits all branches of government, except the TSE, from contracting advertising during the 30 days prior to the election. In addition, all public officials are prohibited from campaigning during working hours.

Bolivian legislation on digital rights is still in its infancy, with no comprehensive framework to regulate the online environment. There are regulations that address only partial aspects, such as the Telecommunications Act and the Law of the Press, designed for print media but applied, in a limited way, to the digital sphere. In recent years, bills related to cybersecurity and the fight against disinformation have been promoted, generating controversy due to the risk of restricting freedom of expression and access to information. This lack of a clear and balanced framework leaves gaps in the protection of personal data, digital privacy and the guarantee of citizens' rights on the internet, which is particularly critical in electoral contexts.

Recommendation: Adopt a digital rights law to guarantee access to public information and protect citizens privacy and freedom of expression online.

12.2 Social media environment

Bolivia's digital landscape has developed significantly over the last five years. The accelerated digitalisation imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and some government infrastructure and digital literacy plans have expanded internet use. Some 70 per cent of citizens have internet access and over 90 per cent use mobile phones. However, the country has not yet managed to reach the average access rates for Latin America. The main problem is the digital divide between rural and urban areas and, within the latter, the socio-economic inequality that prevents large segments of the population from being able to afford internet access.

Social media has been widely used in recent electoral processes, especially since 2019, but in these elections, candidates claimed that it was already an integral part of their campaign strategies. For the first time, TikTok was the most widely used social network in the country, followed by Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and X. The leading position of TikTok had a strong impact on campaigning and political discourse. Televised debates between candidates were fragmented and posted in short videos with clearly visible headlines and opinions; political proposals were presented in *meme* format, and candidates often appeared dancing or rapping. In short, politics has adapted to the short, fast audiovisual message to capture the attention of a young electorate (44 per cent are between 18 and 35 years of age).

12.3 Social media and elections

The two words most often used by stakeholders to describe the elections on social media have been *guerra sucia* (dirty warfare). Throughout the campaign, the online platforms have been the scene of a bitter and anonymous confrontation, with frequent personal attacks and low blows in multimedia format. The use of artificial intelligence made an impact on this conflict with numerous fake videos and audio recordings attributing crimes to politicians or simply parodying them. The ease with which

⁴² [Reglamento de Propaganda y Campaña Electoral para las Elecciones Generales 2025.](#)

this content can be created (especially audio recordings that mimic the voices of candidates) led to its proliferation as never before (*see Annex F*).

Although LGBTIQ+ and indigenous associations reported that hate speech decreased compared to previous elections, the EU EOM Monitoring Unit and EU observers detected several instances of sexist harassment of women candidates, particularly on TikTok and Facebook, where posts by candidates such as Eva Copa (Morena) were met with waves of sexist and derogatory comments (*see Annex G*).

Bolivia has two well-established fact-checking organisations operating over the past two election cycles: *Bolivia Verifica* and *Chequea Bolivia*. Moreover, the TSE has a small monitoring unit responsible for supervising social media and analysing complaints relating to online campaigning. This unit is composed of one official and two contracted consultants, as well as two other members who provide technical and legal support. All performed their duties appropriately but with few resources to carry out their work. During both rounds, the unit opened 204 cases in relation to disinformation, hate speech, and campaign irregularities on social media. None of these cases resulted in sanctions, revealing the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism and raising questions about the TSE's capacity to address online violations while safeguarding fundamental rights, in line with international standards.

Recommendation: Strengthen the institutional capacity of election administration's social media monitoring unit with more staff and resources and ensure that sanctions for infractions are promptly enforced, objective, and proportionate.

Throughout both first and second round campaigning, the government used social media profiles of ministries, public television and other state agencies to showcase the inauguration of dozens of public works and to promote its administration (*see Annex F*). This practice amounted to covert and unregulated political advertising, compromising the level playing field and challenging the national legislation that prohibits the use of public resources for electoral purposes.

Recommendation: Establish clear regulations and sanctions to prevent and deter the use of state resources and institutional communication channels for partisan purposes and empower the TSE to monitor and address such violations effectively.

12.4 EU EOM social media monitoring – general elections, 17 August

The campaign on social media began with an intense smear campaign between the three candidates leading in the polls, calls from Evo Morales' supporters to cast invalid votes, and some attempts to derail the process with disinformation. The main narratives pointed to a conspiracy to force the acting president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Óscar Hassenteufel, to step down; deliberate failures in the preliminary results system (SIREPRE) that would provoke acts of violence; or possible fraud orchestrated from within the TSE itself, which was allegedly receiving shipments of dynamite to boycott the elections with acts of terrorism. An election day of orderly and peaceful voting dispelled all the fears that were circulating on social media.

Advertising investment on Meta's social platforms (Facebook and Instagram)⁴³ was led by the three main opposition candidates, who accounted for more than 85 per cent of advertising (*see Annex F*). This advertising was contracted in three ways: directly, through the official accounts of the parties or candidates; indirectly, through intermediary profiles; and covertly, by paying influencers to appear in their videos and receive positive publicity. These influencers were not registered as media outlets with the TSE and did not declare this political content as requested space, in contravention of the electoral regulations. Indirect contracting allowed candidates to remain anonymous in the dissemination of videos for smear campaigning. At least six anonymous Facebook pages

⁴³ Advertising expenditure on TikTok, X, and YouTube remains largely opaque to external scrutiny in Bolivia.

published and promoted dozens of defamatory and, in many cases, offensive videos, mainly targeting candidates Samuel Doria Medina and Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga.

The campaign silence period was not respected on social media, where most politicians continued to campaign despite a TSE resolution prohibiting campaigning “by any means” from 72 hours before election day. The EU EOM Monitoring Unit detected at least two dozen violations during this period. During the first-round election day, even though the TSE had prohibited access to polling stations with mobile phones equipped with cameras during voting, the EU EOM detected several pictures showing invalid votes and several dozen live broadcasts of the count.

12.5 EU EOM social media monitoring – presidential run-off, 19 October

The run-off campaign was marked by scandals involving both vice-presidential candidates, particularly Juan Pablo Velasco, who was accused of posting racist tweets 15 years ago. The incident dominated much of the campaign and the vice-presidential debate. This and other incidents fuelled the resurgence of hateful content, including racist, sexist and homophobic material, despite the absence of women, LGBTIQ+ or indigenous candidates.

Online political advertising campaigns maintained notable inequalities in terms of resources and transparency during the second round. *Alianza Libre* spent more than USD 45,000 on Meta platforms, while the PDC made no investment (*see Annex F*). Violations of electoral silence continued in the run-off, as did photos of votes and live broadcasts of the count, but on this occasion, the TSE had not prohibited voters from bringing mobile phones into polling stations.

Allegations of fraud on social media during the second round shifted away from the SIREPRE to focus on the manoeuvres carried out by some members of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly to suspend the electoral process, such as setting up a commission to investigate possible fraud in the first round. However, on election day, voting proceeded calmly, with no major problems reported on digital platforms. When the polls closed and the counting began, the first messages claiming fraud appeared on social media. These accusations were based on four events: 1) an alleged temporary interruption to the SIREPRE, which could have allowed the results to be manipulated and which was reminiscent of the 2019 election; 2) out-of-context statements by the press; 3) allegations of fraud made by an alleged TSE official; and 4) a human error by a TSE official who misread the provisional results. These narratives circulated throughout the night, fuelling calls for protests in several cities and demanding an audit of the SIREPRE, which, however, did not gain significant traction, and the related false claims on social media soon disappeared (*see Annex F*).

13. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

Despite an advanced legal framework and the highest ever representation of women in Plurinational Legislative Assembly, harassment and political violence against women continue largely unpunished

Bolivia has ratified key international instruments on women’s rights and is recognised for its strong legal commitment to gender equality in politics. Bolivia has one of the highest proportion of women worldwide in the legislative branch: women held 49 per cent of the seats in the outgoing Plurinational Legislative Assembly, and their representation rose to 52.4 per cent in the newly elected body, with 86 of 166 seats (21 in the Senate and 65 in the Chamber of Deputies).⁴⁴ However, women’s presence in the special indigenous constituencies remains minimal, with only one woman among the seven elected members.

⁴⁴ At the time of writing, two seats remained unallocated. As such, the final number of women may change.

Parity and alternation constitute a binding principle under the Electoral Law and should apply to all elected positions.⁴⁵ Candidate lists for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are legally required to observe gender parity and alternation, and the TSE must reject any list that does not meet these requirements. Although the principle should also cover the presidential ticket, it has not been enforced in practice. In a recent ruling, the Constitutional Court established that gender parity will be mandatory for the presidential ticket starting with the 2030 general elections.⁴⁶ The only woman presidential candidate, Eva Copa, withdrew two weeks before the elections, citing gender-based political violence among other reasons. Two presidential tickets included a woman vice-presidential candidate, but none advanced to the second round.

Political organisations reflected varying levels of commitment to gender equality in their agendas. Of the 10 initially registered political organisations, eight included proposals addressing women's rights in various areas, but in five cases, these were limited or largely symbolic. Only *Alianza Unidad*, *Alianza Libre* and *Morena* incorporated a comprehensive and substantive set of gender-oriented measures within their programmes.⁴⁷ The EU EOM observed 69 campaign events in the first round and 37 in the second. Although women accounted for approximately half of the participants, messages specifically targeting women's issues were scarce.⁴⁸ Overall, gender equality remained more a formal requirement than a substantive element of political discourse and policy proposals.

Despite Bolivia's pioneering role in adopting the region's first law specifically addressing political harassment and violence against women, a wide gap remains between legal commitment and enforcement. Data from the General Prosecutor's Office indicates that, since the 2012 law was adopted, 977 cases have been reported – 538 involving harassment cases and 439 political violence.⁴⁹ However, only seven cases have led to convictions, highlighting the urgent need for stronger implementation and accountability.

During these elections, instances of gender-based harassment and violence were reported by civil society organisations and candidates. Reported cases involved presidential candidate Eva Copa, vice-presidential candidate Mariana Prado (*Alianza Popular*), Senate candidates Susana Bejarano (*Alianza Popular*) and Karla Robledo (*Alianza Unidad*) as well as Chamber of Deputies candidate Toribia Lero (*Unidad*). All endured sustained sexist attacks, while Toribia Lero additionally encountered racist attacks. These acts originated both within their own political parties and from external actors, most frequently through social media platforms (see Annex G). Provisions on harassment and political violence have not yet been integrated into the Rules of Ethics of the Legislative Assembly, further limiting the effective protection of women's political rights.

Recommendation: Strengthen the enforcement of the law on harassment and violence against women in politics by improving inter-institutional coordination and incorporating preventive measures, awareness-raising actions as well as ensuring that victims receive timely and effective remedy.

14. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

The law restricts what the Constitution permits for indigenous participation

Bolivia has ratified the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169, and has endorsed the American

⁴⁵ Art 2h) of Law 026.

⁴⁶ Constitutional Courts Ruling 0040/2025.

⁴⁷ See also the newsletter of *Observatorio de Género de la Coordinadora de la Mujer*. June 2025.

⁴⁸ While the first round featured references to support for single mothers, job creation and empowerment strategies, the second round shifted focus to women's economic participation and basic social needs. Nonetheless, both second-round presidential tickets gave limited attention to gender equality, prioritising economic and governance topics on their agendas.

⁴⁹ Report DGFSE/RIAG 0017/2025. Sucre 9 October 2025.

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Constitution laid the foundation for the political participation of indigenous peoples through the framework of community democracy.

Bolivia officially recognises 36 indigenous languages and 55 indigenous nations. According to the 2024 census, 39 per cent of the population identified as belonging to one of these groups.⁵⁰ This represents a decrease of three percentage points compared with the 2012 census and of 22 per cent compared with the 2001 census, reflecting a gradual decline in the share of the population self-identifying as indigenous.

Over the past two decades, Bolivia has made substantial progress in recognising and strengthening indigenous rights, marking an essential shift for communities historically affected by racism and marginalisation. These achievements are reflected both in the ratification of key international instruments and in the Constitution itself, which allocates seven special constituency seats in the Chamber of Deputies for indigenous communities in minority situation. These seats pertain to the seven departments where such minorities exist.

Nominations to special seats may be submitted through registered indigenous organisations, although this has rarely occurred in practice. EU EOM interlocutors attributed this to socio-economic disadvantage, geographic isolation, and structural constraints that hinder political participation. For these elections, only two indigenous organisations (the *Chiquitana Indigenous Organisation* and BIA-YUQUI) nominated candidates in one constituency each. This limited participation was also reflected in the outcome of the elections: of the seven special seats, only one was allocated to an indigenous organisation, BIA-YUQUI in Cochabamba, while two seats were won by PDC, two by *Alianza Libre*, one by MAS-IPSP, and one by *Alianza Popular*.

The Constitution guarantees indigenous organisations, political parties and citizens groups the right to nominate candidates on an equal basis.⁵¹ However, the Law on Political Organisations limits indigenous organisations' direct participation to the subnational level and in the general elections, they can put forward candidates solely through a political organisation. This limitation considerably curtails their ability to influence national politics and advocate for their communities' interests. In the current electoral process, three indigenous organisations: the *Consejo Nacional de Suyus Aymaras y Quechuas del Qullasuyu* (CONSAQ-Bolivia), the *Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia* (CIDOB), and the *Confederación Nacional de Naciones Indígenas Originarios de Bolivia* (CONNIQB) attempted to nominate candidates for the Legislative Assembly; in line with the legal provisions, these nominations were rejected by the TSE.

Among the parties that explicitly addressed indigenous communities, the MAS-IPSP stood out for its plurinational approach and its proposals to strengthen the rights, political participation, and socio-economic well-being of indigenous, original, and campesino peoples. *Alianza Popular*, led by Andrónico Rodríguez, also included direct references to these communities—particularly on territorial protection, the promotion of indigenous autonomies, and the defence of collective rights—although with less detail than the MAS-IPSP. In contrast, most other political forces did not address these issues as robustly.

15. PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

Policies and practices for the participation of persons with disabilities in public and political life are limited, undermining their equal participation and representation

Bolivia is a State Party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (CIEDPD). The Constitution prohibits discrimination, and mandates affirmative

⁵⁰ Self-identification in [National Census 2024](#).

⁵¹ Article 146 of the Constitution.

measures to ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities in political life. In line with these principles, the 2012 Law on Disability No. 223 establishes the framework for protecting and promoting their rights on the basis of equality and non-discrimination. However, its provisions focus mainly on facilitating the right to vote rather than recognising persons with disabilities as active political actors.

According to the 2024 census, 5.7 per cent of the population live with a disability.⁵² Nevertheless, policies and practices to promote their equal participation in public and political life remain limited. In the general elections, there were no candidates with disabilities in leading or visible positions, and campaign messages addressing disability issues were largely absent. According to EU observers, while most campaign venues were physically accessible to persons with mobility impairments, participation by persons with disabilities in campaign events was minimal. Moreover, only three political organisations included disability-related policy proposals in their government programmes.⁵³

The law requires each polling centre to provide an appropriate space within the premises for voters with mobility impairments to cast their ballots. It also mandates the provision of tactile ballot templates for voters with visual impairments and allows assisted voting upon request. While these measures were generally implemented, organisations representing persons with disabilities considered them largely insufficient, citing the absence of homebound voting and the limited physical accessibility of polling stations.

Disability does not exempt voters from the obligation to vote. However, persons with disabilities faced persistent challenges to participating on an equal basis due to the suspension of public transport on election day and restrictions on private vehicle circulation, which applied to all except for holders of special permits. These factors, combined with uneven accessibility arrangements and under-registration (see *Voter Registration*), continue to hinder equal participation and are not fully in line with Bolivia's international commitments.⁵⁴

Recommendation: Ensure the effective participation of persons with disabilities and adopt accessibility standards based on universal design that guarantee accessible polling stations and, at the same time, introduce transportation policies to allow voters with disabilities to reach polling centres independently.

16. PARTICIPATION OF YOUTH

Young voters and candidates play a growing role, yet institutional, financial, and cultural barriers constrain their full participation in politics

The 2024 census indicates that Bolivia has approximately 3.75 million people aged 18-35, accounting for 44 per cent of registered voters. Citizens aged 18 and above may stand for elective offices, except for the presidency and vice presidency, which require at least 30 years of age.

Bolivia has adopted several instruments to promote youth rights and political participation, including the Ibero-American Convention on the Rights of Youth. The 2013 Youth Law establishes principles of equality and non-discrimination. Despite this framework, youth engagement remains limited, as

⁵² According to the National Institute of Statistics (INE), the 2024 [census](#) recorded 588,231 citizens living with a disability, the majority of them women (58.8 per cent), with prevalence higher in rural than urban areas (6.1 *versus* 5.6 per cent).

⁵³ *Alianza Popular* [committed](#) to inclusive health and education policies, *Alianza Unidad* [pledged](#) universal access to education for children and youth with disabilities, and PDC [proposed](#) stronger social protection.

⁵⁴ Art. 29 of the 2006 UN [Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities](#) (CRPD) requires State Parties to “guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with others”, including by ensuring that voting procedures, facilities, and materials are appropriate, accessible, and easy to understand and use.

reflected in the Global Youth Participation Index, which ranks Bolivia 66/100 for opportunities and barriers to electoral participation and 55/100 for political engagement.⁵⁵

Within political parties, decision-making space for young members is limited, as veteran leadership predominates. Several parties have introduced youth secretariats; however, these rarely translate into meaningful influence. Sociocultural barriers include persistent stereotypes of inexperience, while further challenges stem from limited political training and scarce financial resources. Many young people engage more actively in civil society and social movements to advance their agendas related to employment, entrepreneurship, environment and democratic participation.

In both campaigns, young voters were strongly targeted, reflecting their electoral significance. In the first round, youth-targeted messages were noted in 21 of the 69 campaign events observed by EU observers, and in the run-off, in 10 of the 37 events (*see Annex H*). The focus on youth was further evidenced by both run-off candidates having selected young running mates to appeal to younger voters. However, young speakers were not given particular prominence in the campaign events, accounting for 60 of 243 speakers in the first round and only 7 of 94 in the run-off (*see Annex H*). Moreover, many young people perceived campaign strategies as superficial, focusing on social media visibility over meaningful engagement.

Many young candidates also faced financial and institutional barriers, including having to contribute financially to party campaigns, and competing for favourable positions on lists in alliances. Approximately 15 per cent of parliamentarians elected to the upcoming legislature are under 35 years old, including 18 per cent of deputies and 3 per cent of senators.

17. PARTICIPATION OF LGBTIQ+

Despite legal advances in gender identity and non-discrimination, persistent barriers continue to limit LGBTIQ+ individuals' full political participation

Bolivia has adopted laws on non-discrimination and the recognition of LGBTIQ+ rights, including the right to civil unions (though not marriage). The 2016 Gender Identity Law allows individuals to change their sex, name, and photograph in the civil register, ensuring that their self-defined gender identity is reflected in their birth certificate, identity card, and other official documents. In the electoral context, this change is also a prerequisite for transgender individuals who wish to run for office, as candidates must have their self-defined gender identity officially reflected in their civil register documents.

Since the law's adoption, at least 700 individuals have used it to update their official documents with SERECÍ. However, the civil register is not harmonised with the voter register, and polling station members often lack training on handling cases where a voter's appearance or name on their ID differs from the register, which discourages trans voters from exercising their right to vote. In line with recommendations from the EU Election Experts Missions in 2019 and 2020, the voter register could be automatically updated to reflect all details of a person's change of gender identity.

During the 2020–2025 period, the formal participation of openly LGBTIQ+ persons in parliamentary and political spheres was modest, with one openly gay senator. In the 2025 general elections, a trans woman and human rights activist, ran as a substitute candidate for first senator in La Paz with *APB-Súmate*, while an openly gay incumbent senator in Cochabamba ran for a deputy seat under *Alianza Unidad*. Moreover, sexual and gender diversity issues remained largely absent from campaign discourse, as candidates generally avoided these topics, with broader priorities, such as the economic crisis, dominating political agendas. Only one presidential candidate explicitly supported protecting LGBTIQ+ rights, a position that was subsequently used to discredit his campaign. After the first

⁵⁵ Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI), country analysis: <https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/bo>

round, a vice-presidential candidate publicly used homophobic language against a presidential contender.

Despite Bolivia's legal strides in protecting LGBTIQ+ rights, the community continues to face stigmatisation, discrimination from certain societal sectors and state institutions, and violence, particularly against trans persons. In 2023, the NGO IGUAL found that half of the LGBTIQ+ respondents faced discrimination and 40 per cent experienced physical or verbal violence, yet 80 per cent did not report the incidents to the authorities due to fear of re-victimisation and distrust of legal mechanisms. Also in 2023, a report by the Ombudsperson found that 64 per cent of transgender people in Bolivia experienced discrimination based on their gender identity or expression.⁵⁶ Limited implementation of protective policies, combined with legal and administrative barriers, scarce support networks, and insufficient resources, constrain their empowerment and full participation in political and public life.

18. CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

Active and unrestricted citizen and international observation throughout both rounds contributed to the transparency of the process

The legal framework provides for election observation by civil society, international organisations, and political parties. Accredited observers and party representatives may follow all stages of the process, access electoral documentation, and submit observations or complaints regarding irregularities.

Citizen and international observation efforts were active and unrestricted. The TSE accredited some 2,500 observers in the first round from three domestic groups and 15 international organisations. The main national initiatives were *Observa Bolivia*, coordinated by *Fundación Construir* and comprising 40 organisations, which deployed 1,319 observers, and *Fundación Jubileo*, which coordinated the initiative *Observación Ciudadana de la Democracia* (OCD), with 723 observers. The largest international missions were those of the European Union, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL), and the Inter-American Union of Electoral Bodies (UNIORE). In the second round, *Observa Bolivia*, OCD, and the same international organisations deployed missions, bringing the number of accredited observers to about 2,040. The Office of the Ombudsperson deployed 800 human rights monitors.

In their reports, observer organisations commended the high level of voter participation and the professional performance of the election administration, while noting limited voter information, inadequate accessibility for persons with disabilities, and isolated incidents of violence. Following the first round, the OAS highlighted the social tensions and institutional challenges that preceded the elections, whereas after the second round it commended the professionalism of the election administration and the prompt acceptance of results by the losing ticket. Other international missions focused primarily on election-day procedures and assessed them positively overall.

19. ELECTORAL DISPUTES

The TSE is responsible for adjudicating electoral disputes, and its decisions are binding, final, and not open to appeal, except when reviewed by the Constitutional Court. In addition to the Electoral Law, other legal instruments, such as the Penal Code, also regulate aspects of the electoral process by criminalising offences such as electoral fraud or vote buying.

⁵⁶ [Unequal before the Law](#). Ombudsperson for Human Rights. 2023.

Following the first round, several politically motivated criminal complaints were filed questioning the integrity of the electoral process, with the apparent aim of halting the organisation of the second round. These contributed to shaping public perceptions and fuelled narratives of possible electoral fraud ahead of the run-off. Allegations of manipulation of election results and unauthorised access to electoral information systems were investigated by the Office of the Attorney General and ultimately dismissed for lack of evidence.

In a separate case, a criminal complaint was filed by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice against the self-extended magistrates of the Constitutional Court for alleged abuse of authority and for issuing resolutions contrary to the Constitution and the law. The case was referred to the Legislative Assembly – the competent body to address matters involving constitutional immunity – thereby underscoring the prevailing institutional tensions. However, proceedings had not been initiated at the time of writing this report.

18.1 Complaints on candidate eligibility

According to the Electoral Law, any person may file a complaint before the TSE challenging a candidate's eligibility. Such complaints may be submitted up to 15 days before election day, or in exceptional circumstances, within three days, and must be resolved by the TSE within three days of filing. In addition to *ex officio* disqualifications, the TSE received 59 citizen petitions, which resulted in the disqualification of three candidates, two from *Alianza Popular* and one from *APB-Súmate*.

18.2 Complaints and appeals on election day and during the results process

Complaints during the voting process may be submitted by anyone to polling station staff, who decide by majority and record the decision in the results protocol. Challenges to polling-station results may only be lodged by party agents; they must be presented at the polling station and subsequently submitted within 48 hours to the TED for consideration. Appeals against TED decisions are handled by the TSE, whose rulings are final. Party agents therefore play a crucial role, as challenges not raised at the polling station level cannot be introduced at later stages of the results process under the principle of preclusion. Consequently, the legal framework provides limited avenues for redress when irregularities are detected after election day, reducing the scope for subsequent review or correction.

Of the 35,253 results protocols processed, around 30 per cent contained observations in the first round and 14.3 per cent in the second. Most first-round cases involved minor arithmetic errors or votes cast for withdrawn candidates, while second-round issues mainly concerned administrative omissions, followed by counting errors and correctable discrepancies.

The law does not explicitly provide for recounts upon stakeholders' request. However, where grounds for annulment of a results protocol arise, the TEDs may examine all electoral material prior to taking a decision. This mechanism allows the TEDs to prevent unjustified annulments and the consequent repeat voting at the affected polling station.⁵⁷ Such repeat voting may be conducted two weeks later, regardless of whether the affected result could alter the overall outcome. In these elections, no results protocols were annulled, and therefore, no repeat voting took place in either round.

20. POLLING, COUNTING AND TABULATION OF RESULTS

Peaceful and well-organised election days contributed to public trust in the electoral process

⁵⁷ The Electoral Law sets out grounds of annulment of results in Art. 177. These include the absence of signatures and fingerprints of at least three polling station staff, alteration of figures which is not noted in the observations, a number of votes greater than the number of registered voters, loss of the original form unless it is replaced by two original copies and the existence of elements which contradict the information in the form.

20.1 General elections, 17 August

Election day was peaceful and orderly, with only isolated incidents that did not affect the conduct of polling. The EU EOM observed the opening in 55 polling stations, assessing procedures as good or very good in 53 cases. Most polling stations opened on time, with minor delays due to difficulties in set-up or the late arrival of staff, and essential materials were present in all cases.

Voting was observed in 422 polling stations, some 60 per cent located in urban areas and 40 per cent in rural areas. In nearly all cases, EU observers assessed the process positively, noting smooth organisation and a steady flow of voters throughout the day. In over 97 per cent of observations, the layout of polling stations preserved the secrecy of the vote, with a few exceptions due to the absence of standardised ballot screens or their inadequate placement. Party agents were present in 72 per cent of observed polling stations, representing all contesting political forces to varying degrees, while citizen observers were noted in 20 per cent of observations, where they were generally able to follow the process without hindrance.

Some procedural shortcomings observed during voting included the inconsistent application of the TSE instruction prohibiting voters from entering polling stations with mobile phones, issued only two days before election day. Moreover, while the election administration took a positive step by providing voter lists to party delegates for verification, only one copy was available per polling station, which was often insufficient for all delegates present. Polling staff showed near gender parity overall; however, only about 33 per cent of chairpersons, selected by the polling staff, were women.

EU observers generally assessed the vote count as transparent and orderly, supported by the presence of electoral notaries. Nevertheless, at times, prescribed procedures were inconsistently applied: in 11 of 53 observations, unused ballot papers or voting certificates were not annulled as required; in 19 cases, the number of votes cast was not cross-checked against the signatures on the voter list; and in 10 cases, polling staff encountered difficulties completing the results protocol. EU observers attributed these shortcomings to insufficient training rather than an intention to manipulate the results.

Recommendation: Strengthen the training of polling staff to ensure the uniform and consistent application of all election-day procedures, including the vote count and completion of results protocols, in line with the Electoral Law and election administration regulations.

The TSE began publishing preliminary results online through the SIREPRE system at 21:00, as scheduled, by which time more than 90 per cent of polling station results had been processed. Department-level tabulation was generally well-organised, although initial delays in receiving protocols caused occasional interruptions. In some departments, EU observers noted limited transparency for party representatives in the review of the handling of on disputed results protocols.

TEDs completed departmental tabulation three days before the legal deadline of 24 August. The TSE proclaimed the national results on 26 August, and, as no presidential candidate obtained the required majority, issued the call for the presidential run-off on 27 August.

20.2 Presidential run-off, 19 October

On the run-off election day, the EU EOM observed the opening of polls in 46 polling stations, assessing it in most cases as well organised. Nearly all stations opened on time or with minor delays, and essential materials were available everywhere despite logistical challenges caused by the continued nationwide fuel shortage and adverse weather conditions.

Voting was observed in 389 polling stations across all nine departments and was positively assessed in the vast majority of cases. The secrecy of the vote was ensured in 98 per cent of observations, with a few exceptions due to missing or improperly positioned voting booths. Citizen observers were present in 12 per cent of polling stations, while party agents from *Alianza Libre* and the PDC in 73 and 68 per cent, respectively, and were able to follow procedures without restriction.

Polling staff were generally familiar with voting procedures. Despite the absence of a formal ban in the run-off, 13 per cent of polling stations prohibited voters from entering with mobile phones, while the remainder allowed it, reflecting inconsistent guidance from the TSE. Around 40 per cent of polling stations were not fully accessible to persons with physical disabilities. As in the first round, women remained underrepresented as polling station chairpersons.

Counting was positively assessed in 43 of the 47 polling stations observed. While in a few instances, it was rushed, leading to incomplete ballot reconciliation and arithmetic verification of results, this did not affect the overall integrity of the process. The TSE began publishing preliminary results shortly before 20:00. The SCORC system, used for the manual processing of official results, was launched on election night. By 22 October, all polling station results had been consolidated at the departmental level. EU observers reported that the tabulation process was orderly. Voter turnout stood at 85.3 per cent, similar to the 87 per cent recorded in the first round.

21. RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

The elections produced a pluralistic legislature that will necessitate broader inter-party cooperation and marked the victory of Rodrigo Paz in the presidential run-off

According to the official first-round results (*see Annex I*), presidential candidate Rodrigo Paz obtained 32 per cent of the votes, followed by Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga with 26.7 per cent. Frontrunner in public opinion polls in the weeks preceding the elections, Samuel Doria Medina of *Alianza Unidad* failed to qualify for the run-off. In the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, the PDC secured a relative majority, necessitating consensus-based decision-making to ensure governability. The former ruling MAS-IPSP narrowly surpassed the three per cent threshold required to retain its legal status. In the Senate, for the first time in two decades, no MAS-IPSP candidates were elected. The proportion of invalid votes reached almost 20 per cent, influenced by Evo Morales’ campaign calling for protest voting.

In the second round, Rodrigo Paz and Edmand Lara won the presidency with 55 per cent of the vote, a ten-point lead over Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga and Juan Pablo Velasco. The share of invalid votes fell below five per cent, likely due to Morales discontinuing his protest-vote campaign (*see Annex I*). Some allegations of fraud circulated briefly after election night, sparking demonstrations in several cities that quickly subsided without major incident. The losing ticket swiftly conceded and publicly recognised the results. Both outgoing President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales congratulated the winners, with the latter attributing the victory to the “Evista” vote. In their post-election address, the elected candidates called for national reconciliation and unity in addressing the country’s economic challenges.

Following the announcement of the final official results, Quiroga publicly expressed his support for the incoming government, providing the PDC’s parliamentary group with political assurances of greater governability. Rodrigo Paz and Edmand Lara were inaugurated as president and vice president on 8 November, and the new Plurinational Legislative Assembly held its first session on 13 November.

22. RECOMMENDATIONS (priority recommendations in bold)

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/ NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM					
1	<p>In the absence of legal provisions, the TSE was required to take <i>ad hoc</i> decisions on matters such as adjudication of vacant seats, updates to the voter register, the extension of mandates within certain levels of election administration, and the procedures for accreditation for observers and party agents in the run-off. These gaps should be addressed well in advance of future elections to enhance legal certainty and consistency in the administration of the process.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 7)</p>	<p>Conduct well in advance of the next elections a comprehensive review and reform of the electoral legislation to address existing gaps to ensure important aspects of the electoral process are clearly and consistently regulated, in line with the principle of legal certainty.</p>	<p>Electoral Law and TSE regulations</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly</p>	<p>Rule of Law</p> <p>ICCPR, Article 2.2: “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes the necessary steps...to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the preset Covenant”.</p> <p>ICCPR GC 34, para.25: “A norm, to be characterized as a “law” must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public”.</p> <p>UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 19/36 of 2012 (A/HRC/RES/19/36), para.16: “Calls upon States to make continuous efforts to strengthen the rule of law and promote democracy by c) ensuring that a sufficient degree of legal certainty and predictability is provided in the application of the law, in order to avoid any arbitrariness”.</p> <p>Good Practice Revised Interpretative Declaration on the Stability of Electoral Law, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). CDL_AD (2004) 027.</p>

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ELECTION ADMINISTRATION					
2	The TSE's incomplete regulation of key aspects of the second round and its limited publication of decisions and deliberations reduced transparency and accountability, underscoring the need for clearer and more timely disclosure practices. (Final Report, page 8)	Reinforce transparency and accountability by ensuring that the TSE promptly adopts and publishes its decisions, regulations, and other relevant documentation, including on the preliminary results system, while guaranteeing public access to information on its plenary sessions, in line with the law.	Enforcement of existing provisions is needed	TSE	<p>Transparency and access to information</p> <p>ICCPR, Art. 19.: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”.</p> <p>International Good Practice</p> <p>Venice Commission Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters, section 3.1: “The meetings of the central electoral commission should be open to everyone, including the media”.</p>
3	Despite broad efforts, voter education did not reach many rural and indigenous communities, leaving significant gaps in voters' understanding of key electoral aspects such as newly delimited constituencies, the offices to be elected, and the purpose of the preliminary results. (Final Report, page 9)	Strengthen voter education efforts, in cooperation with civil society, media, and other stakeholders, to ensure that rural and indigenous populations, have access to clear, accessible, and comprehensive information on voting rights, obligations, and the electoral system.	Practical change by the election administration is to be implemented	TSE Civil society Local media outlets	<p>State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights</p> <p>General Comment No. 25 to the ICCPR:</p> <p>Paragraph 12: “Positive measures should be taken to overcome specific difficulties, such as illiteracy, language barriers, poverty, or impediments to freedom of movement which prevent persons entitled to vote from exercising their rights effectively. Information and materials about voting should be available in minority languages.”</p>

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VOTER REGISTRATION					
4	<p>The estimated exclusion of several hundred thousand of otherwise eligible citizens, mainly from rural and disadvantaged groups, either because they were not reached by registration efforts or had low motivation with the registration process, indicates persistent under-registration that potentially undermines the principle of universal suffrage.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 11)</p>	Undertake a comprehensive assessment to identify the extent of under-registration, especially among vulnerable social groups, and develop targeted measures to address the identified gaps to increase the inclusiveness of the voter register.	Practical change by the election administration	TSE	<p>Right and opportunity to vote</p> <p>ICCPR, Art. 25: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...] to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”.</p> <p>General Comment No. 25 to the ICCPR:</p> <p>Paragraph 11: “Where registration of voters is required, it should be facilitated and obstacles to such registration should not be imposed.”</p>
CANDIDATE REGISTRATION					
5	<p>To obtain legal status (...). To retain it, they must have secured at least 3 per cent of the valid votes cast in the most recent elections. By law, the TSE must revoke the legal status of political organisations that fail to meet the threshold, a sanction considered disproportionate under international good practice. Moreover, the law does not clearly define what is meant by “preceding elections”. Since general and subnational elections are held separately, this ambiguity leaves</p>	Remove the provision that cancels political organisations’ legal status if they fail to reach the three per cent threshold.	Amendment to the Law 1096 on Political Organisations, Article 58b)	Legislative Assembly	<p>Freedom of association</p> <p>ICCPR, Art.22(1):” Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,...2) No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (...).”</p> <p>ICCPR, Art. 25: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable</p>

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	<p>room for differing or arbitrary interpretation. On this basis, the TSE cancelled the legal status of two political parties before the elections and is set to cancel that of two other parties that did not reach the threshold.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 12)</p>				<p>restrictions to a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs (...)."</p> <p>CCPR, GC 27, p.13: "(...) Laws authorising the application of restrictions should use precise criteria and may not confer unfettered discretion on those charged with their execution".</p> <p>See Paragraph 99 of the 2023 Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Political Party Regulation</p>
6	<p>Some provisions impose excessive formalism that may unduly restrict access to candidacy. These include the obligation to submit an original, up-to date tax clearance certificate, the requirement to provide a notarised declaration and proof of proficiency in at least two of the country's 37 official languages, as well as the obligation to declare having resigned at least three months prior to the election from any managerial position in a company holding contracts with the state. Of the 3,290 initially submitted candidacies, the TSE approved only one third, rejecting 2,014 for failing to meet one or more requirements, with the abovementioned three grounds</p>	<p>Revise candidate eligibility criteria to ensure they do not impose disproportionate procedural barriers to candidacy.</p>	<p>Constitution, Election Law No.026, TSE regulations</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly</p>	<p>Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs and hold office</p> <p>ICCPR, article 25 "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...] to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections ... guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors."</p> <p>ICCPR, GC 25,4: "Any condition which apply to the exercise of the rights protected by art. 25 should be based on objective and reasonable criteria".</p> <p>ICCPR GC 25 para 16: "Conditions relating to nomination dates, fees or deposits should be reasonable and not discriminatory. If there are reasonable grounds for regarding certain elective offices as incompatible with tenure of specific positions, measures to avoid any conflict of interests should not unduly limit the rights protected by paragraph (b).</p>

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	accounting for most disqualifications. (Final Report, page 12)				
7	The law allows candidates to withdraw without justification up to 45 days before election day, or up to three days before election day in cases of <i>force majeure</i> . However, the <i>force majeure</i> provision has been abused, with substitutions being made up until three days before election day. The final list of candidates was published only one day before the elections, after the ballots had been printed, leaving voters without timely or reliable information about the final candidate options. (Final Report, page 13)	Establish and enforce a clear and reasonable deadline for candidate withdrawals, disqualifications, and substitutions to ensure that the registration process is completed in time for ballot production and for voters to make an informed choice.	Amendments to the Election Law No. 026.	Legislative Assembly	Right and opportunity to vote ICCPR, article 25: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...] to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections ... guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.” ICCPR GC 25 para 16: “Conditions relating to nomination dates (...) should be reasonable and not discriminatory.”

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CAMPAIGN FINANCE					
8	<p>Political parties do not receive any annual public funding, as it was removed from the legal framework during the MAS-IPSP regime. Moreover, there is no legal provision for direct state contributions to campaign expenses; the law only provides limited indirect public support for media advertising during election periods, which has been redirected to TSE's operational needs in the past two electoral processes in agreement with the political organisations. Consequently, the legal framework is characterised by a near-total absence of public funding, which undermines the principle of equal opportunity in campaigns.</p> <p>(Final report, page 15)</p>	<p>Level the playing field and strengthen political organisations by reintroducing direct annual public funding for political organisations and apply and expand upon existing public funding for electoral campaigns to cover activities beyond electoral propaganda.</p>	<p>Amendments to the Election Law No. 026, and Law No. 1096 on Political Organisations.</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly TSE Government (for the budget)</p>	<p>Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs; Fairness in the campaign</p> <p>ICCPR Art. 25: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...], without unreasonable restrictions: (b) to vote and to be elected [...].”</p> <p>ICCPR GC 25 para 9: “Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.”</p>
9	<p>The legal framework does not require political organisations or the TSE to publish financial reports. The Political Organisations Law only mandates political organisations to disclose them internally, thereby restricting</p>	<p>Introduce a legal requirement for prompt public disclosure of political organisations' financial reports to promote greater transparency in political and campaign finance.</p>	<p>Amendments to the Election Law No. 026, and Law No. 1096 on Political Organisations.</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly TSE</p>	<p>Transparency and access to information</p> <p>UNCAC Art.13(1): “Each State Party shall, take appropriate measures within its means and in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, [...] in the</p>

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	transparency and public access to information. (Final report, page 16)				prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by corruption. This participation should be strengthened by such measures as: (b) Ensuring that the public has effective access to information.” OAS: Inter-American, MODEL LAW 2.0on Access to Public Information, 2020. Article 2(1): “This Law establishes the broadest possible application of the right of access to Information that may be in the possession, custody or control of any Public Authority, Political Party, Union and Non-Profit Organization [...]. (2) This Law is also based on the principle of maximum disclosure, so that any Information held by subject entities shall be complete, timely and accessible, subject to a clear and narrow exceptions regime to be defined by law as well as legitimate and strictly necessary in a democratic society.”
10	The campaign finance oversight body (UTF) is fully centralised and staffed by only six auditors for the entire country. This creates major human resource constraints, especially during election years. The lack of auditors at the departmental (TED) level further hampers the UTF’s ability to effectively monitor compliance	Strengthen the TSE’s Technical Oversight Unit (UTF) with greater resources and staffing, including at departmental levels, and amend the legal framework so that oversight applies to both political organisations and candidates, ensuring more effective and transparent political finance control.	Amendments to the Election Law No. 026, and Law No. 1096 on Political Organisations.	Legislative Assembly TSE Government (for the budget)	Prevention of corruption; State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights UNCAC Art.5(1): “Each State Party shall, [...], develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.”

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	<p>with campaign finance regulations across the departments.</p> <p>The campaign finance regulations apply only to political organisations, not to individual candidates. As a result, there is limited oversight of candidates' individual campaign income and expenditures, which creates opacity in overall campaign financing.</p> <p>(Final report, page 16)</p>				<p>UNCAC Art.5(2): “Each State Party shall endeavour to establish and promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption.”</p> <p>UNCAC Art.7 (3): “Each State Parties shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures [...] to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties.”</p>
MEDIA					
11	<p>Although a significant number of suspected violations of the media campaign regulations were identified by the TSE during the first round, none led to effective sanctions against related media and political parties/alliances and no other similar breaches by the media were reported by the TSE during the run-off. Moreover, the calculation of fines was described as disproportionate and unequitable, possible affecting freedom of expression.</p> <p>(Final report, page 19)</p>	Enhance the TSE/TEDs media monitoring capacities to better identify offline and online media campaign violations and shorten the reaction time for TSE sanctioning of media and political organisations to ensure a meaningful deterrent effect during the media campaign period, while ensuring fines are not disproportionate.	Amend the legal framework for the media campaign, including the Electoral Law and TSE regulations.	Legislative Assembly TSE	<p>Freedom of expression and information; Fairness of the election campaign</p> <p>ICCPR art. 19.2 Freedom of expression and information “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.” Article 25 right to vote and be elected “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity (...) a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; b) To vote and to be elected at genuine period elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of electors.”</p>

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/ NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
12	<p>There is a ban on government advertising in the media one month prior to election day, while public information announcements are permitted. However, a large volume of government spots, promoting the president and the government, were broadcast on radio and television during the restriction periods for the two rounds. This could be either evaluated as prohibited or permitted because of the vague wording of the regulation.</p> <p>The run-off campaign lasted seven weeks, whereas the ban only applied to the last four weeks.</p> <p>There is an uneven and opaque distribution of government advertising throughout the year and also during election periods. Journalist organisations have described this as government attempts to politically influence the editorial lines of the media.</p> <p>(Final report, page 20)</p>	<p>Update the legal framework on government advertising authorised in the media during campaign period to further restrict and clarify the types of ads, extend the period of restriction to cover the long run-off campaign, and establish fair criteria for the allocation of government advertising in public and private media.</p>	<p>Specific law to be passed regarding calculation/distribution of State advertising in the media</p> <p>Amendment to TSE campaign regulation</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly</p> <p>TSE</p>	<p>Freedom of expression and information; fairness of the election campaign</p> <p>IACHR Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Principle 13: “The exercise of power and the use of public funds by the state, the arbitrary and discriminatory placement of official advertising threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited by law. The means of communication have the right to carry out their role in an independent manner. Direct or indirect pressures exerted upon journalists to stifle the dissemination of information are incompatible with freedom of expression.”</p> <p>ICCPR art. 19.2 Freedom of expression and information: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”</p>

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
13	<p>During the media campaign periods, the State-run television channel, Bolivia TV, as assessed by EU EOM monitoring, favoured the president and the government and provided unequitable and uncomprehensive coverage of the candidates and their campaigns.</p> <p>(Final report, page 21)</p>	<p>Introduce a law on public media clearly setting out principles of pluralism, impartiality and independence from the executive.</p>	<p>Passing a law on public media</p> <p>Incorporation of new clauses in the public media statutes.</p> <p>Update TSE regulations</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly</p> <p>Government</p> <p>Public media</p> <p>Journalists</p>	<p>Freedom of expression and of the media; fairness of the election campaign</p> <p>UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR 2017 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda Art. 3-c: “States should ensure presence of strong, independent and adequately resourced public service media, which operate under a clear mandate to serve the overall public interest and to set and maintain high standards of journalism.”</p> <p>IACHR Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (2000) Principle 5: “Prior censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information transmitted through any means must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of expression.”</p> <p>Principle 12: “The concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies should take into account democratic criteria that provide equal opportunity of access for all individuals.”</p> <p>Principle 13: “The exercise of power and the use of public funds by the state, the arbitrary and discriminatory placement of official advertising threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited by law. The means of communication have</p>

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/ NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
					the right to carry out their role in an independent manner. Direct or indirect pressures exerted upon journalists to stifle the dissemination of information are incompatible with freedom of expression."
ONLINE CAMPAIGN					
14	<p>Bolivia still lacks a consistent digital rights legislation. The absence of a clear and balanced regulatory framework creates gaps in access to information, privacy protection, and citizens' rights online, issues of particular concern in electoral contexts.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 22)</p> <p>The country still lacks a consistent law on access to public information, which impairs transparency and media investigation, including during election periods.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 17)</p>	<p>Adopt a digital rights law to guarantee access to public information and protect citizens privacy and freedom of expression online.</p>	<p>Introduce a digital rights law.</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly</p>	<p>Right to Privacy</p> <p>ICCPR, article 17: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy [...] Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC, GC 16, para. 10: "The gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law."</p> <p>Constitution, Article 21 (2): "Bolivians have the following rights: [...] 2. To privacy, intimacy, honor, their self image and dignity"</p> <p>Freedoms of expression and of the media</p> <p>IACHR Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (2000), Principle 4 "Access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to guarantee the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only exceptional limitations that must be previously established by law in case of a real and imminent</p>

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
					danger that threatens national security in democratic societies.”
15	<p>The TSE’s media and social media monitoring unit, tasked with overseeing social media and investigating online campaign complaints, opened 204 cases during both rounds of the election concerning disinformation, hate speech, and other infractions on the internet. However, none led to sanctions, exposing the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism and raising doubts about the TSE’s ability to manage online violations while upholding fundamental rights. Moreover, while smear campaigns, disinformation, and defamatory content were mostly confined to social media in the first round, they expanded to traditional media during the run-off, negatively affecting campaign coverage (Final Report, page 23)... [While] the publication of content that engages in any of these practices is punishable by removal of the content, rectification, and referral to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for possible legal action (Final Report, page 21).</p>	<p>Strengthen the institutional capacity of election administration’s social media monitoring unit with more staff and resources and ensure that sanctions for infractions are promptly enforced, objective, and proportionate.</p>	<p>Amendments to the Electoral Law No. 026.</p>	<p>Legislative Assembly</p> <p>TSE</p>	<p>State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights</p> <p>ICCPR Art. 2(2): “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”</p> <p>Art. 2(3): “(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;”</p> <p>Art.20(2): “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”</p>

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/ NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
16	<p>During the campaign, Luis Arce’s government promoted its administration by publicising the inauguration of public works and other official achievements, and used official social media accounts of ministries, state media, and other public institutions to disseminate this content.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 23)</p>	Establish clear regulations and sanctions to prevent and deter the use of state resources and institutional communication channels for partisan purposes and empower the TSE to monitor and address such violations effectively.	Amendments to the Election Law No. 026.	Legislative Assembly TSE	<p>Prevention of corruption; Fairness of the electoral campaign</p> <p>ICCPR, article 25: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [...] to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections [...] guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”</p> <p>GC 25 para 19: “[...] to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.[...]“</p> <p>UN HRC Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, (2012), Georgia, p. 90: “(d) increase efforts to ensure that all political parties, including opposition parties, have genuine, equitable and adequate access to state resources for election campaigning. It is especially crucial that the line between the ruling party and the state be clearly defined in order to create a level playing field.”</p>
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN					
17	<p>Despite Bolivia’s pioneering role in adopting the region’s first law addressing harassment and political violence against women (Law No. 243), a wide gap exists between legal commitment and enforcement. Data from the General Prosecutor’s Office indicates that, since the law</p>	Strengthen the enforcement of the law on harassment and violence against women in politics by improving inter-institutional coordination and incorporating preventive measures, awareness-raising actions as well as ensuring that victims receive timely and effective remedy.	No legal change needed	Ministry of the Interior Ministry of Justice Security Forces Public	<p>Right to security of the person and right to effective remedy</p> <p>ICCPR, Art. 2(3): Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy.</p>

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
	<p>was adopted in 2012, 977 cases have been reported. Only seven cases have led to convictions, suggesting impunity for infractions. In the 2025 elections, there were five prominent cases.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 25)</p>			Prosecutors	<p>ICCPR, Art. 9.1: “Everyone has the liberty and security of person”.</p> <p>Belem do Pará, Art. 7: “The State parties condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delays, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such violence to b) apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence against women.</p> <p>Belem do Pará, Art. 8: “The State parties agree to undertake progressively specific measures, including programmes.</p>
PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES					
18	<p>Persons with disabilities continued to face structural and practical barriers to full political participation, including limited accessibility, lack of inclusive policies, and inadequate consideration in party platforms. Moreover, the suspension of all transport on election day significantly hinders the access of PWD to polling stations.</p> <p>(Final Report, page 27)</p>	<p>Ensure the effective participation of persons with disabilities and adopt accessibility standards based on universal design that guarantee accessible polling stations and, at the same time, introduce transportation policies to allow voters with disabilities to reach polling centres independently.</p>	<p>Electoral Law, practical change by TSE, political parties and CSOs</p>	<p>Plurinational Legislative Assembly TSE Political Parties Civil Society</p>	<p>Freedom from discrimination</p> <p>CRPD Art.29: State Parties must “guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with others [...] including by ensuring that voting procedures, facilities, and materials are appropriate, accessible, and easy to understand and use.”</p> <p>The Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, Article III, requires state parties to “adopt the legislative, social, educational, labor-related, or any other measures needed to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities and to promote their full integration into society, including [...] political and administrative activities”.</p>

N.	CONTEXT (Including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL PRINCIPLE/COMMITMENT/NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Including text quoted)
ELECTION DAY					
19	Procedural inconsistencies observed during the vote count indicated that polling staff required stronger training to ensure the uniform application of election-day procedures. (Final Report, page 31)	Strengthen the training of polling staff to ensure the uniform and consistent application of all election-day procedures, including the vote count and completion of results protocols, in line with the Electoral Law and election administration regulations.	Practical change by the election administration	TSE, TEDs	<p>State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights</p> <p>General Comment No. 25 to the ICCPR: Paragraph 20: “An independent electoral authority should [...] ensure that the election] is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.”</p> <p>Good practice</p> <p>Venice Commission Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters, Section 3.1: “Members of electoral commissions must receive standard training”.</p>

American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

The *United Nations Convention against Corruption* (UNCAC)

23. ANNEX A – VARIATIONS IN VOTING POWER AMONG DEPARTMENTS

Table 1: In the 2025 general elections, the weight of the vote across constituencies ranged from 39,306 voters per seat to 160,335 voters per seat, representing a nearly fourfold difference.





Table 2: The current provisions on seat distribution resulted in certain departments being overrepresented and others underrepresented. Overrepresentation was most pronounced in the allocation of plurinominal seats in Pando (69 per cent more than the average), while underrepresentation was most notable in the allocation of uninominal seats in Cochabamba (33 per cent less than the average).



24. ANNEX B – SIREPRE

COMPARISON OF RESULTS DATA PROCESSED IN SIREPRE AND SCORC SYSTEMS - FIRST ROUND

Administrative unit	No. of protocols SCORC	No. of protocols SIREPRE*	Percentage of protocols in SIREPRE
Chuquisaca	1 815	1 678	92.45%
Oruro	1 693	1 593	94.09%
Tarija	1 814	1 803	99.39%
Pando	394	391	99.24%
Potosí	2 377	2 302	96.84%
Santa Cruz	9 115	8 880	97.42%
Beni	1 373	1 267	92.28%
Cochabamba	6 346	6 274	98.87%
La Paz	9 099	8 902	97.83%
National	34 026	33 090	97.25%
National + out-of-country	35 253	--	93.86%

*Preliminary results were transmitted from 33,327 polling stations. All protocols received and processed in SIREPRE are indicated; of those 625 protocols were processed but excluded due to procedural errors, and 237 remained unprocessed in the system.

	Political entity	Valid votes				Difference*
		SCORC	Percentage	SIREPRE	Percentage	
National	AP	439 388	8.39%	415 611	8.22%	0.17
	LYP ADN	76 349	1.46%	73 550	1.45%	0.01
	APB-Súmate	347 574	6.46%	335 126	6.62%	0.16
	Alianza LIBRE	1 397 226	26.68%	1 356 370	26.81%	0.13
	FP	86 154	1.65%	82 170	1.62%	0.03
	MAS-IPSP	166 917	3.19%	159 769	3.16%	0.03
	Alianza UNIDAD	1 039 426	19.85%	1 004 846	19.86%	0.01
	PDC	1 683 891	32.15%	1 652 882	32.14%	0.01
National + out-of-country	AP	456 002	8.51%	--	--	0.29
	LYP ADN	77 576	1.45%	--	--	0.00
	APB-Súmate	361 640	6.75%	--	--	0.13
	Alianza LIBRE	1 430 176	26.70%	--	--	0.11
	FP	89 253	1.67%	--	--	0.05
	MAS-IPSP	169 887	3.17%	--	--	0.01
	Alianza UNIDAD	1 054 568	19.69%	--	--	0.17
	PDC	1 717 432	32.06%	--	--	0.08

*Difference in result percentages indicated by the systems expressed in percentage points

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COMPARISON OF RESULTS DATA PROCESSED IN SIREPRE AND SCORC SYSTEMS - SECOND ROUND


Administrative unit	No. of protocols SCORC	No. of protocols SIREPRE	Percentage of protocols in SIREPRE*	VALID VOTES		VOTES FOR PDC		VOTES FOR LIBRE		Difference**
				SCORC	SIREPRE	SCORC	SIREPRE	SCORC	SIREPRE	
Chuquisaca	1 815	1 790	98.62%	302 387	299 190	162 429 (53.72%)	160 137 (53.52%)	139 958 (46.28%)	139 053 (46.48%)	0.20
Oruro	1 693	1 624	95.92%	307 234	299 483	185 452 (60.36%)	179 324 (59.88%)	121 782 (39.64%)	120 159 (40.12%)	0.48
Tarija	1 814	1 803	99.39%	316 432	314 701	157 237 (49.69%)	156 204 (49.64%)	159 195 (50.31%)	158 497 (50.36%)	0.05
Pando	394	387	98.22%	61 532	60 462	33 736 (54.83%)	33 140 (54.81%)	27 796 (45.17%)	27 322 (45.19%)	0.02
Potosí	2 377	2 316	97.43%	393 524	385 628	249 402 (63.38%)	243 307 (63.09%)	144 122 (36.62%)	142 321 (36.91%)	0.29
Santa Cruz	9 115	8 901	97.65%	1 713 448	1 682 702	659 737 (38.50%)	643 628 (38.25%)	1 053 711 (61.50%)	1 039 074 (61.75%)	0.25
Beni	1 373	1 341	97.67%	234 269	231 541	107 685 (45.97%)	106 240 (45.88%)	126 584 (54.03%)	125 301 (54.12%)	0.09
Cochabamba	6 346	6 274	98.87%	1 177 650	1 164 431	721 754 (61.29%)	712 079 (61.15%)	455 896 (38.71%)	452 352 (38.85%)	0.14
La Paz	9 099	8 861	97.38%	1 746 134	1 709 163	1 153 026 (66.03%)	1 122 878 (65.70%)	593 108 (33.97%)	586 285 (34.30%)	0.33
National	34 026	33 297	97.86%	6 252 610	6 147 301	3 430 458 (54.86%)	3 356 937 (54.61%)	2 822 152 (45.14%)	2 790 364 (45.39%)	0.25
National + out-of-country	35 253	--	94.45%	6 404 195	--	3 519 534 (54.96%)	--	2 884 661 (45.04%)	--	0.34

*Preliminary results were transmitted from 33,660 polling stations. Only protocols which were accounted for in the preliminary results are indicated; 256 protocols were processed but excluded due to procedural errors, and 107 remained unprocessed in the system - reaching up to almost 99%.

**Difference in result percentages indicated by the systems expressed in percentage points

25. ANNEX C – CHRONOLOGY OF CANDIDATE REGISTRATION


Chronology of candidate registration



26. ANNEX D – CAMPAIGN REPORTS SUBMITTED BY EU OBSERVERS

Number of events and participants


Campaign Reports. Bolivia 2025. First round



Created with Datawrapper

Number of events and participants


Campaign Reports. Bolivia 2025. Run-off



Created with Datawrapper

Cost of the event


Campaign reports. Bolivia 2025. First round



Created with Datawrapper

Cost of the event


Campaign reports. Bolivia 2025. Run-off



Created with Datawrapper

Assessment of the events atmosphere

Campaign reports. Bolivia 2025. First Round



Created with Datawrapper

Assessment of the events atmosphere

Campaign reports. Bolivia 2025. Run-off


■ Calm ■ Festive ■ Tense



Created with Datawrapper

Incentives

Campaign reports. Bolivia 2025.



Created with Datawrapper

27. ANNEX E – EU EOM MEDIA MONITORING

The EU EOM monitored a sample of national broadcast media during the two media election campaign. The media monitoring team was composed of four media monitors, one media assistant and one media analyst. The media monitoring included quantitative and qualitative monitoring of three major television channels and two major radio stations, and qualitative monitoring of selected online media outlets to assess the media coverage of the campaign and other electoral/political topics, assessing the time and tone allocated to candidates/political parties/alliances, public officials, government ministers and other politically relevant subjects.

The monitoring sample for audio-visual media included:

- Television channels: Bolivia TV (State-run); Red Uno and UNITEL (private)
- Radio stations: Radio Fides (Catholic Church-linked) and Radio Panamericana (private).

Television channels were monitored from 18 to 24 hr during the first-round media campaign (18 July – 13 August) and part of the run-off (30 September – 15 October). Radio stations were monitored from 9 to 14 hr during the first-round media campaign (18 July – 13 August) and part of the run-off (30 September – 15 October).


The EU election media monitoring methodology is a mix of quantitative and qualitative assessments (see [Handbook for EU election observation](#), 2016 edition, p. 79).

HOW TO READ THE CHARTS

- The donut/pie charts show the distribution of airtime or space (in percentage) allotted to political parties by each media outlet.
- The bar/column charts show the tone of the coverage (negative, neutral, positive) and share of voice, both in total and per category.
- The time is monitored in seconds for the electronic media and space is measured in cm² for print media.

Fig.1.1: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Bolivia TV (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 33h 21m 54s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.2: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Red Uno (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 20h 46m 5s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.3: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on UNITEL (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 14h 38m 44s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.4: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Radio Panamericana (1st round)


18 July - 13 August 2025



Total airtime: 14h 38m 44s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.5: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Radio Fides (1st round)


18 July - 13 August 2025



Total airtime: 10h 43m 30s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.6: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Bolivia TV (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025




Total airtime: 7h 42m 34s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.7: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Red Uno (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025




Total airtime: 10h 2m 4s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.8: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on UNITEL (2nd round)


30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 9h 16m 36s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.9: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Radio Fides (2nd round)


30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 6h 4m 35s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig. 1.10: Time of coverage of the presidential candidates and the government on Radio Panamericana (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025




Total airtime: 6h 24m 59s - Government actor includes president and government. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.11: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Bolivia TV (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 33h 21m 54s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.12: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Red Uno (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 20h 46m 5s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.13: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on UNITEL (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 14h 38m 44s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.14: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Radio Fides (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 10h 10m 10s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.15: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Radio Panamericana (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025



Total airtime: 14h 30m 3s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.16: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Bolivia TV (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 7h 42m 34s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.17: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Red Uno (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 10h 2m 4s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.18: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on UNITEL (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 8h 48m 18s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.19: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Radio Fides (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 6h 4m 35s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.20: Tone of coverage of the candidates and the government on Radio Panamericana (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025




Total airtime: 6h 24m 59s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.21: Free airtime for presidential candidates on Bolivia TV (1st round)

26 July - 13 August 2025




Tiempo total: 5h 25m 30s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring of the entire programming schedule
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.22: Free airtime for presidential candidates on Bolivia TV (2nd round)

09 October - 15 October 2025

Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga Rodrigo Paz




Tiempo total: 0h 25m 30s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring of the entire programming schedule
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.23: Paid electoral ads per presidential candidates on television channels (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025

■ Eduardo Del Castillo ■ Jhonny Fernández ■ Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga ■ Manfred Reyes Villa ■ Samuel Doria Medina




Total airtime: 9h 42m 12s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.24: Paid electoral ads per presidential candidates on radio (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025

■ Andrónico Rodríguez ■ Eduardo Del Castillo ■ Jhonny Fernández ■ Jorge 'Tuto' Quiroga ■ Manfred Reyes Villa ■ Samuel Doria Medina




Total airtime: 6h 9m 5s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.25: Paid electoral ads per presidential candidates on television channels (2nd round)


08 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 3h 9m 22s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.26: Paid electoral ads per presidential candidates on radio (2nd round)


08 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 2h 30m 21s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.27: Government ads per type on television channels (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 3h 42m 12s. Based on size in number of seconds. Government advertising includes the presidency and the government. Monitoring slot (18:00–00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.28: Government ads per type on radio (1st round)

18 July - 13 August 2025




Total airtime: 1h 57m 12s. Based on size in number of seconds. Government advertising includes the presidency and the government. Monitoring slot (09:00–14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.29: Government ads per type on television channels (2nd round)

18 September - 15 October 2025




Total airtime: 4h 28m 26s. Based on size in number of seconds. Government advertising includes the presidency and the government. Monitoring slot (18:00–00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.30: Government ads per type on radio (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025




Total airtime: 1h 58m 9s. Based on size in number of seconds. Government advertising includes the presidency and the government. Monitoring slot (09:00–14:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.31: Type of government coverage in news and other electoral programmes on television channels (1st round)


18 July - 13 August 2025



Total airtime: 22h 9m 25s. Based on size in number of seconds. On Bolivia TV, Red Uno and UNITEL (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.32: Type of government coverage in news and other electoral programmes on radio (1st round)


18 July - 13 August 2025



Total airtime: 6h 48m 15s. Based on size in number of seconds. On Radio Fides and Radio Panamericana.
Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.33: Type of government coverage in news and other electoral programmes on television channels (2nd round)


30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 4h 40m 44s. Based on size in number of seconds. On Bolivia TV, Red Uno and UNITEL (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.34: Type of government coverage in news and other electoral programmes on radio (2nd round)


30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 2h 44m 4s. Based on size in number of seconds. On Radio Fides and Radio Panamericana.
Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.35: Time of coverage of the electoral observation missions on television channels (1st round)

18 July - 30 September 2025




Total airtime: 1h 41m 21s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).

Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.36: Time of coverage of the electoral observation missions on radio (1st round)

18 July - 30 September 2025




Total airtime: 2h 51m 15s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).

Fuente: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Creado con Datawrapper

Fig.1.37: Time of coverage of electoral observation missions on television channels (2nd round)


30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 0h 12m 50s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 00:00).
Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Fig.1.38: Time of coverage of electoral observation missions on radio (2nd round)

30 September - 15 October 2025



Total airtime: 0h 25m 7s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (09:00 - 14:00).
Fuente: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 Media Monitoring • Creado con Datawrapper

28. ANNEX F – EU EOM SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING

Social Media Environment

The Bolivian digital landscape shows a steadily growing online audience, with around 12.5 million inhabitants and more mobile connections (13.5 million) than people, indicating widespread access to digital technologies.⁵⁸ An estimated 8.77 million Bolivians use the internet, while 7.63 million are active on social media, representing roughly 61 per cent of the total population. TikTok is the most used platform, followed closely by Facebook and YouTube, reflecting a strong preference for audiovisual and mobile-first content, while X (previously known as Twitter) and Instagram account for smaller but active communities.

Internet and Social Media in Bolivia 2025




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Gender distribution among users shows that men represent a slightly higher share of social media users (54.3 per cent), though this balance varies by platform, which highlights differing engagement dynamics depending on the audience and communication style.

Social Media Users by Gender




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

⁵⁸ Datareportal. [Digital 2025: Bolivia](#).

EU EOM Methodology

The EU EOM Social Media Monitoring Unit (SMMU) to Bolivia 2025 has systematically analysed Bolivian political discourse during the 2025 general elections. The SMMU was established to assess the digital information environment surrounding the electoral process. The Unit's work supports the mission's mandate to evaluate the overall conduct of the elections according to international standards, national legislation, and regional commitments, by analysing the role of online information flows in shaping voter perceptions and political discourse.

The SMMU's analytical framework is built upon the EU EOM Digital Observation Guidelines, combining quantitative monitoring and qualitative analysis. The methodological workflow included identification of the most relevant social media platforms in Bolivia. The EU EOM monitored public activity on four major social media platforms: Facebook, X, TikTok, and YouTube, from 17 August to 16 September and from 1 October to 24 October.

Monitoring covered contestant and non-contestant profiles, including media outlets and public institutions. In total, 1,429 accounts were monitored during the electoral campaign: 138 contestant and 64 non-contestant profiles on Facebook, 274 contestant and 220 non-contestant profiles on Twitter, and 434 contestant and 79 non-contestant profiles on TikTok.

Two more datasets of 39 electoral keywords and 79 divisive and polarizing keywords were monitored daily, allowing the Mission to identify both campaigning activity and narratives shaping public debate. A total of 60 official social media accounts belonging to ministries and public institutions were monitored across Facebook, X, and TikTok – three per institution.

A total of 58,331 posts were collected: 29,779 on Facebook, 15,047 on Twitter, 13,161 on TikTok, and 344 on YouTube.

Three tools were used for monitoring:

Sentione: To periodically extract posts from each of the platforms. These posts were prepared in an Excel form that the monitors then processed.

Gerulata: To analyse in detail the origin and structure of the narratives circulating on social media.

Who Targets Me: To facilitate the monitoring of political advertising contracted on Meta's social media.

The Unit identified and contextualized misleading, manipulative, or harmful content, particularly narratives targeting electoral institutions, candidates, or vulnerable groups. The monitoring was performed on online content in Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara, contributing essential insights into the cultural framing of online narratives.

Online Campaign

In a campaign marked by the use of TikTok and Facebook, video (56.2 per cent) was the format most used by candidates, followed by text with photos (21.49 per cent), links (10.67 per cent) and galleries (4.2 per cent). The streaming format (live) also played a prominent role due to its intensive use by the PDC vice-presidential candidate, Edmand Lara.

Type of Post




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Posts by Social Media Platform



Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Political Affiliation




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

The media has dominated most of the political conversation, and partisan media⁵⁹ outlets have played a particularly prominent role in polarizing the debate and spreading misinformation.

Type of Page



Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Bolivia TV, the state television channel, published a great deal of content during the campaign. Some of its posts included campaign irregularities, such as the promotion of public works and institutional events by President Luis Arce (see *Use of public resources*).

Type of Page: Subcategory




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

⁵⁹ Media outlets closely linked to a political option, such as *Kawsachun Coca*, *El Búnker*, *Novavox Noticias*, and *Cabildeo*.

In a political conversation marked by the media, unofficial election information has dominated the debate, followed by direct campaign messages and official information provided by the *Tribunal Superior Electoral*.

Topics of Posts by Round




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

In a country experiencing economic hardship, the main topics of debate have centered on proposed solutions to overcome the crisis, with serious concern about the social impact that adjustments to Bolivian state social subsidies could have.

Topics of Campaign by Round




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

The PDC, the winning party in the elections, was at the bottom of the polls when it managed to win the first round of the elections. Its social media strategy achieved high levels of engagement⁶⁰ by combining the offline campaign with content adapted to TikTok and live broadcasts via this platform.

Posts and Engagement per Party on the First Round




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Posts and Engagement per Party on the Second Round




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Posts and Engagement per Party on Both Rounds




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

⁶⁰ Engagement measures the level of audience interaction with a post, combining all visible reactions such as likes, comments, shares, and other platform-specific actions. It is calculated as the sum of all user interactions, averaged across posts to assess content resonance.

Negative Campaign




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Most of the negative content focused on discrediting candidates (1,543). Additional efforts targeted the electoral process (910) and political parties (719), aiming to undermine trust in institutions. Attacks on Electoral Management Bodies (81) appeared less frequently but reinforced the overall pattern of delegitimisation.


Harassment Content



Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Harassment online has been marked by derogatory speech (202), while hate speech (72) and threats (9) further reflected an aggressive climate. Targeted harassment against minorities (6) and women (3), though smaller in volume, highlighted the presence of identity-based attacks.

Information Manipulation Content



Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

The manipulation ecosystem relied primarily on misleading content (106) and manipulated media (52), revealing a preference for distorting real information rather than creating entirely false narratives.

Examples of posts created with artificial intelligence



- 1. Edmand Lara and his wife, Diana Romero, in public confrontation against each other. (AI)
- 2. Mariana Prado makes discomfort faces while eating with shoe shiners. (AI)
- 3. Eva Copa in her office, showing she is lazy (jaira) (AI)
- 4. Edmand Lara and Evo Morales are shown as allies. (AI)

Total Political Ad Spent in Meta

Political advertising on Meta’s social networks was skewed in favor of the three main opposition parties: more than 95 per cent of advertising investment was concentrated on *Alianza Unidad*, *Alianza Libre* and *APB-Súmate*. These parties contracted advertising through official accounts (Line A) and unofficial accounts (Line B), a strategy often used to circumvent advertising limits⁶¹ imposed by the electoral authority. But in this election, there were no such limits: why then did they advertise indirectly? Most of the ads published by these unofficial accounts contained dirty war messages.⁶²

Political Meta Ads Total Spent in USD




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

⁶¹ The shortage of circulating U.S. dollars in Bolivia has made international expenditures, such as Meta Ads purchases, particularly difficult. National banks have imposed strict limits on foreign currency transactions, as the official exchange rate remains 1 USD = 6.98 BOB, while the parallel (black) market trades the dollar at between 12 and 14 BOB at the time this report was drafted. Parties with bank accounts outside the country benefited from advertising contracts at nearly half the cost of local ones and with no contract limits.

⁶² The monitoring covered the period from July to August 2025. More than 2,300 active Meta Ads were analysed, of which 68 per cent corresponded to Line A and 32 per cent to Line B. In terms of spending, Alianza Unidad accounted for approximately 54 per cent of total investment, followed by Súmate (28 per cent) and Alianza Libre (6 per cent). The remaining 12 per cent was distributed among minor candidates with no sustained advertising activity.

Top Meta Spenders in Total in USD




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Alianza Unidad (Samuel Doria Medina):

- Line A: messages about management, anti-corruption, support for young people and entrepreneurship.
- Line B: network of pseudo-media and meme accounts promoting the anti-MAS ‘useful vote’ and attacking Tuto Quiroga, generating high levels of virality and regional segmentation.

Alianza Libre (Tuto Quiroga):


- Line A: reformist and modernizing discourse with a low budget in Meta Ads.
- Line B: use of ‘independent’ accounts that praise his achievements and attack Samuel Doria.

Súmate (Manfred Reyes Villa):

- Line A: emphasis on leadership, order and citizen mobilisation, with distrust of polls.
- Line B: smear campaign against rivals (Samuel, Tuto and Andrónico), accusing them of corruption and treason, with a strong emotional charge and narrative of social confrontation.


The common pattern is the parallel use of narrative lines: proactive institutional communication (A) and an aggressive informal network (B). This duality increases the reach and protects the reputation of the candidates but weakens transparency and electoral fairness by spreading anonymous or manipulative messages. Monitoring suggests that the Bolivian digital environment is entering a phase of hybrid campaigns, where economic investment and disinformation operate in a complementary manner.

First round: Official accounts spent from 2/15/2025 till 8/17/2025



Alianza Unidad spent USD 207,515 (39.90 per cent); Alianza Libre, USD 177,287 (34.09 per cent); Súmate, USD 110,308.166 (21.21 per cent); Alianza Popular, USD 16,260 (3.13 per cent).

First round: Non-official accounts spent from 2/15/2025 till 8/17/2025



Alianza Unidad, USD 132,999 (56.87 per cent); Súmate, USD 46,361 (19.82 per cent); MAS-IPSP, USD 25,855 (11.06 per cent); Alianza Popular, USD 21,918 (9.37 per cent); Alianza Libre, USD 6,719 (2.87 per cent).

Top Meta Spenders on First Round in USD





Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper


The imbalance remained in the run-off, in favor of *Alianza Libre*, which invested around USD 45,000. Meanwhile, the unofficial accounts invested barely a tenth of this amount.

Run-off: Official accounts spent from 9/1/2025 till 10/19/2025



Libre, USD 143,545 (99.92 per cent).

Run-off: Non-official accounts spent from 1/1/2025 till 8/17/2025



MAS-IPSP, USD 3,173 (65.24 per cent); Alianza Libre, USD 963 (19.81 per cent); PDC, USD 682 (14.03 per cent).

Top Meta Spenders on Second Round in USD




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

Case study: Null Vote Campaign Trends

Evo Morales was unable to run in the elections after the Plurinational Constitutional Court ruled that the two-time former president could not serve another term, either continuously or discontinuously. Morales called on his supporters to cast null votes in the elections, an issue that was widely promoted on social media.⁶³

Null Vote Campaign Posts



Created with Datawrapper

1. 29 Jul: President Luis Arce declares that null votes only serve the personal interests of Evo Morales and not the democratic will of the people.
2. 11 to 13 Aug: Evo Morales inaugurates several campaign offices for null votes, the most significant being the one set up in Villa Tunari (Chapare).
3. 17 Aug: First round of elections. A large number of voters sympathetic to Evo Morales publicly announce their null vote through photos or videos on social media.
4. 22 Aug: Evo es Pueblo Congress, where Morales supporters claim to be the second political force. (They obtained the third highest number of 'votes' in the elections).
5. 7 Sep: Evo Morales announces that there will be no campaign for null votes in the second round.
6. 19 Oct: Second round of elections, supporters of Evo Morales continue to show their null votes on social media.

⁶³ Sample of 2,100 results collected between 17 July and 26 October, from Facebook, X (Twitter), and TikTok containing the term “voto nulo” and its variants.

Case Study: Fraud Narratives Trends during Campaign

Analysis ⁶⁴ of trends in the use of the word '*fraude*' in social media posts and comments shows that this narrative was present throughout the electoral process, with peaks in conversation closely linked to political milestones. The data shows that interactions were organic, with no evidence of significant inauthentic behavior.

Fraud Narratives Trend




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper


The most significant peaks are:

1. 22 Jul: News about Óscar Hassenteufel's resignation generate the first peak in conversation, associated with institutional uncertainty and comments linking his departure to an alleged internal TSE's crisis.
2. 14 Aug: Three days before the elections, Luis Arce renewed the Military High Command, which generated comments on social media about a possible pre-election strategy.
3. 17 to 18 Aug (election day): The conversation mixed citizen reports, rumours about vote rigging and allegations of coercive voting. Mentions increased on the 18th, after the official results were announced.
4. 26 Aug: The next significant peak occurred after the meeting between President Luis Arce and candidate Rodrigo Paz (PDC), interpreted on social media as a possible political negotiation.
5. 16 Sep: Candidate Edmand Lara (PDC) declared that 'if Tuto wins, it will be because of fraud.'
6. 4 Oct: Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga made statements to the media, claiming that 'strange things are happening, manoeuvres are taking place, and now they are denouncing alleged electoral fraud by the PDC.'
7. The highest peak of the entire period was recorded on the day of the runoff and in the hours after the results were announced. This surge was not based on verifiable evidence, but on political reactions opposing the result and narratives of mistrust.

⁶⁴ More than 31,580 posts and comments on Facebook and Twitter were analysed, between 18 July and 23 October 2025, using the keyword "fraud" and terms related to it. A mixed approach was applied, combining quantitative analysis of the frequency of mentions and trends with qualitative analysis through thematic classification and cross-checking with national media.

Case study: Hate speech Trends

Hate Speech Comments Trends



Source: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

First Round

Sexism (red line)

1a. 23 Jul: Feminist activist María Galindo denounces Mariana Prado for the alleged use of assets linked to MAS-affiliated public officials.

2a. 29 Jul - 1 Aug: Eva Copa announces her withdrawal from the electoral race. The confirmation takes several days, and her decision remains a central topic in public discussion.

Racism (blue line)

1b. 24 Jul: The detention of political leader Ruth Nina, after her controversial statements against the electoral process (“They will not count votes, they will count the dead”).

2b. 30 Jul: Opposition leader Fernando Camacho endorses candidate Samuel Doria.

3b. 2 Aug: The Runasur event takes place in the Chapare, a political stronghold of Evo Morales, with the participation of indigenous leaders from across the region.

4b. 13 Aug: Final campaign events. Reyes Villa, candidate for *Súmate*, threatens Morales.

Homophobic (green line)

1c. 24 Jul: Online reactions about the detention of Ruth Nina portrays her as courageous, contrasted with claims that Evo Morales does not face his own legal accusations.

2c. 12–13 Aug: Coinciding with final campaign activities, online users engage in direct confrontations in comment sections across social media platforms.

ED1. 17 Aug: On national election day, all three lines show a marked increase, indicating strong polarisation among the electorate.

Second Round

Sexism Line (red line)

3a. 15 Sep: A video accusing Eva Copa of aligning with Tuto Quiroga and forcing municipal employees in El Alto to campaign for *Alianza Libre* goes viral.

4a. 1 Oct: A video manipulated with AI, ridiculing Eva Copa and calling for an audit of her administration as mayor of El Alto, circulates widely.

5a. 16 Oct: The Prosecutor's Office of Achocalla issues an arrest warrant against Eva Copa related to a landslide in 2024 that resulted in the deaths of a woman and her two children.

Racism Line (blue line)

5b. 21 Aug: Lara proposes a vice-presidential debate at the Abasto market in Santa Cruz, with questions posed directly by the public.

6b. 26 Aug: Lara announces he will be unable to attend a scheduled debate with Juan Pablo Velasco, leading to online accusations of cowardice and further polarisation.

7b. 29 Aug: Fernando Camacho is released from Chonchocoro prison and receives a massive welcome in Santa Cruz.

8b. 4 Sep: Former member of Jeanine Añez's Government, Arturo Murillo, previously imprisoned in the US, arrives to Bolivia to serve his sentence.

9b. 9 Sep: Chilean deputy María Luisa Cordero insults Bolivians in reaction to Rodrigo Paz's proposal to legalize '*chuto*' (undocumented) vehicles.

10b. 30 Sep: Racist tweets by Juan Pablo Velasco begin circulating widely.

11b. 8 Oct: Juan Carlos Velarde, elected deputy from *Alianza Libre*, publicly refers to indigenous people as "filthy coca-chewers".

12b. 15 Oct: Andrónico Rodríguez accuses candidates of seeking servility to the United States rather than economic stability.

13b. 23 Oct: The Andean cross (Chakana) is removed from official State accounts and replaced with the National Coat of Arms.

14b. 25 Oct: President-elect Paz announces he will facilitate the return of the DEA to Bolivia.

Homophobic (green line)

3c. 20 Aug: Lara refers to Tuto Quiroga as "*maricón*" (faggot) during his victory speech.

4c. 26 Aug: Following Lara's announcement that he will not attend the vice-presidential debate at the Abasto market, users call him a coward and use the term "kewa".

5c. 10 Sep: A meeting between is held to sign the "Pact Against Dirty Campaigning". Edmand Lara is the only candidate absent, prompting accusations of cowardice.

6c. 15 Sep: Tuto Quiroga challenges Rodrigo Paz to a debate in Tarija to discuss his relationship with Evo Morales and alleged corruption.

7c. 2 October – Radio Deseo and RTP propose a vice-presidential debate; Lara quickly accepts, prompting online users to again call him a coward. Previously, he had conditioned his participation on the official TSE-organized debate.


8c. 8 October – Polarisation increases following racist comments by a newly elected *Alianza Libre* elected Assembly member referring to indigenous people as "*mascacocas hediondos*".

ED2. 19 October – On the second national election day, all three lines reach peak levels, reflecting a highly polarised and conflict-prone public discourse.

Case Study: Use of Public Resources

The monitoring unit detected 1,055 posts showing the inauguration of works and other achievements of Luis Arce's administration. This content was published on the official social media accounts of the main ministries and state agencies. On average, one in four messages from these public entities (28 per cent) contained these irregular messages.⁶⁵

Total of State Entities and Irregularities



Created with Datawrapper

Irregularities by State Entity




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

⁶⁵ From a total of 4,648 posts in the period between 17 July and 19 October.

29. ANNEX G – POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMAN: EVA COPA CASE

The only female presidential candidate was subjected to political violence on social media. As a female candidate and an indigenous person, she experienced an increase in harassment as the election drew closer, which decreased radically when she withdrew her candidacy. (Neutral comments about Eva Copa in blue; negative comments in red.)⁶⁶

Sentiment and Frequency of Comments about Eva Copa




Chart: EU EOM Bolivia 2025 • Created with Datawrapper

1. **24 July** – Ponciano Santos, an activist aligned with the ‘evista’ faction, issued a public apology to Eva Copa after several offensive statements against her.
2. **30 July** – Copa announces her withdrawal from the electoral process, citing sustained political harassment as the primary reason for her decision.
3. **1 August** – The withdrawal of Copa and her party, Morena, is formally registered.
4. **6 August** – Copa reiterates that her resignation was the result of ongoing political harassment.

Examples:




1. False claim from Eva Copa against MAS. 2. AI picture with Tuto Quiroga making a deal. 3. False accusation of non-participation in voting? because she attended a folkloric parade. 4. False claim about her campaign budget.

⁶⁶ More than 18,500 comments collected from TikTok, Facebook and X, between 1 January and 17 August, using 93 terms combined with “Eva Copa”, including 27 terms in Aymara or Aymara-derived expressions.

30. ANNEX H – YOUTH PARTICIPATION

Messages targeting specific populations

Campaign reports. Bolivia 2025.



Created with Datawrapper

Speakers


Campaign reports. Bolivia 2025



Created with Datawrapper

31. ANNEX I – FINAL ELECTION RESULTS

Presidential Election Results – First Round, 17 August 2025



Legislative Election Results – Chamber of Deputies – 17 August 2025


Distribution of Elected Deputies by Type of Seat

Political Organisation	Single-Member seats	Multi-member seats (proportional representation)	Special Seats (Indigenous)	Total	Supranational Representatives
PDC	30	17	2	49	5
<i>Alianza Libre</i>	20	17	2	39	2
<i>Alianza Unidad</i>	11	15	1	27	2
<i>Alianza Popular</i>	2	5	1	8	
<i>APB-Súmate</i>	0	5	0	5	
MAS-IPSP	0	1	1	2	
BIA YUQUI	0	0	1	1	
Total	63	60	7	130	9

Legislative Election Results – Senate – 17 August 2025

Political Organisation	Number of Seats
PDC	15
<i>Alianza Libre</i>	12
<i>Alianza Unidad</i>	8
<i>APB-Súmate</i>	1
Total	36

Presidential Election Results – Run-Off, 19 October 2025



Results by Departments

Results by *Municipios*

