

Annex to the 2025 Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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1. COUNCIL DECISIONS

Overview of EU Council Decisions in the field of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament that were in force in 2025:

1.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

1.1.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1187 of 19 June 2023 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Objectives:

- a) Increase the number of States initiating processes to become party to ICSANT and heighten awareness and knowledge of ICSANT among beneficiaries, such as national policy- and decision-makers, and in international fora.
- b) Improve national legislation and the capacity of criminal justice officials and other relevant national stakeholders in beneficiary countries to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases in which ICSANT is of relevance.
- c) Enhance policies, practices and procedures to prevent, detect and respond to the threat of non-State actors, including terrorists, acquiring, possessing and/or using nuclear or other radioactive material.
- d) Improve knowledge and understanding of the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism and other criminal conduct involving such materials.
- e) Enhance national and international cooperation, including information exchange, within and among State Parties, in devising and adopting effective and practical measures to effectively implement the Convention.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

Budget: EUR 4,000,000.82

Official Journal: L 157/35 20.06.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.1.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1306 of 26 June 2023 in support of a project on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (ME WMDFZ) in an evolving regional security environment

Objectives:

- a) Assist in mitigating regional WMD proliferation trends.
- b) Encourage regional security arrangements and arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament norms and processes.
- c) Develop a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between the ME WMDFZ and current regional international developments.

d) Promote an effective, verifiable, inclusive, and sustainable ME WMDFZ.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: EUR 2,099,969

Official Journal: L 161/70 27.6.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.1.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2064 of 25 September 2023 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities

Objectives:

- a) Strengthen the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system.
- b) Strengthen the capabilities of the States Signatories to the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT and to enable them to benefit fully from their participation in the CTBT regime.
- c) Raise awareness of the CTBT and promote its universalisation and entry into force.

Implementing Agency: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

Budget: EUR 6,285,929

Official Journal: L 238/122 27.09.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.1.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/656 of 19 February 2024 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear security

Objectives:

- a) Promote adherence to relevant legally and non-legally binding international instruments to enhance nuclear security globally.
- b) Assist States in establishing, maintaining and sustaining national nuclear security regimes for nuclear and other radioactive materials, including during transport, and associated facilities used for peaceful purposes.
- c) Support the IAEA in playing the central role of facilitating and enhancing international cooperation and increasing visibility and awareness through communication on nuclear security.

Implementing Agency: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Budget: EUR 7,200,000

Official Journal: L 2024/656 20.2.2024

Duration: 36 months

1.1.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/646 of 27 March 2025 in support of facilitating a successful outcome of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Objective: Support activities aimed at facilitating a successful outcome of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2026 Review Conference through promoting greater inclusivity and the consolidation of the regional approach in the current review cycle, while upholding and preserving the integrity of the NPT through a balanced focus on its three equally important and mutually-reinforcing pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These activities include, among others, the organisation of four regional consultations of the President-Designate of the Review Conference with NPT States Parties in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 988,941.12

Official Journal: L 2025/646 28.03.2025

Duration: 18 months

1.2. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1.2.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344 of 26 June 2023 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Objectives:

- a) Verify the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production facilities subject to the verification measures provided for in the CWC.
- b) Prevent the re-emergence and reduce the threat of chemical weapons use.
- c) Respond effectively and credibly to chemical weapons use and allegations thereof.
- d) Ensure preparedness through the provision of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, their use, or threat of use in accordance with the provisions of Article X of the CWC.
- e) Promote peaceful uses of chemistry in economic and technological development through international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the CWC.
- f) Work towards universal adherence to the CWC.
- g) Ensure that the OPCW remains fit for purpose to face the challenges and opportunities generated by progress in science and technology.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 5,350,000

Official Journal: L 168/27 3.7.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.2.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery

Objectives: Support the project of the OPCW to enhance its operational effectiveness through satellite imagery and imagery analysis provided by SatCen, with the following objectives:

- a) expanding the OPCW's capacity to support OPCW-mandated activities (the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), etc.) through imagery analysis as a source of evidentiary substantiation or corroboration of findings; and
- b) utilising targeted imagery analysis for areas of interest (sites, routes, etc.) in planning for OPCW-mandated missions (incidents of alleged use (IAUs), challenge inspections (CIs), technical assistance visits (TAVs), etc.) in order to increase security and confidence in verification accuracy.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 1,593,353.22

Official Journal: L 421/65 26.11.2021

Duration: 48 months

1.2.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1984 of 15 July 2024 in support of the Institutional Transitional Planning for Non-Routine Missions and Investigative Capacities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Objective: To help the OPCW Technical Secretariat to transfer and integrate the expertise and knowledge acquired through the OPCW non-routine investigations, notably by its Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), into a permanent capacity embedded within the Technical Secretariat.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 1,605,447.56

Official Journal: L 2024/1984, 16.7.2024

Duration: 24 months

1.2.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2354 of 20 November 2025 in support of enhancing the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission activities related to Syria and Ukraine and enhancing OPCW operational effectiveness through satellite imagery

Objectives:

- a) contributing to the full internationally verified elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and establishing the facts and identifying the perpetrators related to the use of chemical weapons, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the policy-making organs of the OPCW;
- b) providing assistance consistent with the CWC to enable Ukraine to have the civil technical capabilities necessary to ensure that it can respond effectively to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals, including on the battlefield in Ukraine; and
- c) expanding the OPCW's operational capacities through imagery analysis, in support of OPCW-mandated activities, particularly with regard to Syria and Ukraine.

Implementing Agency: Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: EUR 4,447,748.18

Official Journal: L 2025/2354 21.11.2025

Duration: 24 months

1.3. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

1.3.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/349 of 16 January 2024 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Objective: Enhancing national and international security against the threat posed by biological weapons by increasing the global membership of the BTWC, strengthening the capacity of its States Parties to effectively implement the Convention and raising awareness about the importance of the Convention amongst NGOs, civil society and the science and technology communities, by

- a) promoting universal adherence to the BTWC by encouraging States not party to better understand the benefits of joining the BTWC and getting more involved in BTWC meetings and other activities;
- b) developing national capacities for BTWC implementation in developing countries to ensure their effective implementation of the Convention, while also establishing active cooperation networks with national counterparts, experts and national institutions able to provide high-quality and relevant assistance;
- c) providing capacity-development opportunities for young policymakers, scientists and academics from the Global South engaged in fields related to the BTWC, encouraging the development of young professionals' networks and capitalising on training materials developed by the European Union;
- d) supporting the intersessional programme from 2024 to 2026;
- e) enabling tools for awareness-raising, education and engagement.

Implementing Agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 2,760,292.43

Official Journal: L 2024/349 17.1.2024

Duration: 36 months

1.3.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons

Objectives: Support the full operationalisation of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism (UNSGM) for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in view of growing apprehensions regarding the possibility of the use of biological weapons. More specifically, the following activities are supported:

- a) training of experts on the roster of the UNSGM;
- b) participation of laboratories in activities to develop a network capable of supporting an UNSGM investigation into an allegation of the use of biological weapons;
- c) outreach activities to ensure nominations of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
- d) a full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);

- e) regular coordination activities/workshops with relevant organisational partners; and
- f) implementation of the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1,418,042

Official Journal: L 172I 03.06.2020

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2787 of 8 December 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 until 14 January 2025

Official Journal: L 2023/2787 11.12.2023

1.3.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/645 of 19 February 2024 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objectives: strengthen biological safety and security practices in 11 countries of Latin America, in line with resolution 1540 (2004), including the establishment and enforcement of effective measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. Key objectives are:

- a) strengthening existing national normative frameworks related to biological safety and security in beneficiary States;
- b) fostering greater compliance with international regimes by promoting collaboration and cooperation between participating States through innovative exercises such as 'peer review exercises' and also by helping participating countries with their submissions and declarations related to relevant biological weapons instruments;
- c) strengthening public and private sector capacity to secure biological weapons through training activities;
- d) creating a regional community or network of private and public sector actors engaged in biological safety and security.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 2,686,427

Official Journal: L 2024/645 20.2.2024

Duration: 36 months

1.3.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/494 of 11 March 2025 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, its inter-sessional programme and the preparations for its Tenth Review Conference

Objectives:

- a) support the BTWC inter-sessional programme by facilitating the discussions taking place within the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BTWC as well as the preparations for the Tenth Review Conference in 2027;
- b) strengthen implementation of the Convention by building on the achievements of previous Council Decisions (CFSP).

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1,474,753.82

Official Journal: L 2025/494 12.03.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.4. BALLISTIC MISSILES

1.4.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/124 of 17 January 2023 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objectives:

- a) Promote universal subscription to the Hague Code of Conduct.
- b) Promote the full implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct by subscribing states.
- c) Contribute to better inserting the Hague Code of Conduct into efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Implementing Agency: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Budget: EUR 1,042,614.72

Official Journal: L 16/36 18.01.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.4.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2598 of 15 December 2025 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objectives:

- a) promote universal subscription to the Hague Code of Conduct;
- b) promote the full implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct by subscribing states; and
- c) contribute to better integrating the Hague Code of Conduct into efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Implementing Agency: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Budget: EUR 1,099,446.40

Official Journal: L 2025/2598 16.12.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.5. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540

1.5.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/654 of 20 March 2023 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objectives: the following activities are supported:

- a) Thematic capacity-building workshops and trainings for up to five assistance requests from States.
- b) Regional Points of Contact Training.
- c) Support the development of National Action Plans and provide tailored support.
- d) Virtual Regional Assistance Conference on UNSCR 1540 (2004) implementation.
- e) Regional Outreach Conferences.
- f) Knowledge Generation and Dissemination.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 2,368,769.46

Official Journal: L 81/29 21.3.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

1.6.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with the OSCE

Objectives:

- a) Enhance capabilities of the State Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Fiscal Service/State Customs Service of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.
- b) Enhance supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with respect to their control of the manufacture, marking and record-keeping of weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.
- c) Enhance operational capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the National Police of Ukraine, which reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with respect to forensics, analysis, detection, tracing, and investigation of illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.
- d) Enhance capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the improvement of legislative mechanisms for regulating and controlling the circulation and use of weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as raising public awareness on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.
- e) Enhance inter-agency coordination and cooperation resulting in developing strategic approach, data-collection and analysis in preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in Ukraine corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 5,151,579

Official Journal: L 312/42 3.12.2019

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, the Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2276 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 23 January 2024

Official Journal: L 300/42 21.11.2022

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1805 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 21 January 2025

Official Journal: L 2024/1805 25.6.2024

1.6.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3003 of 2 December 2024 in support of strengthening the capacities of the Ukrainian authorities to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

Objective: To assist Ukrainian authorities in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition, and explosives in all its aspects.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: EUR 5,000,000

Official Journal: L 2024/3003 03.12.2024

Duration: 36 months

1.6.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3006 of 2 December 2024 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition

Objective: To further contribute to improved security in the SEE region and in the EU by combatting the threat posed by illicit SALW and their ammunition in and from South-East Europe, and Ukraine.

Budget: EUR 3,999,920.60

Official Journal: L 2024/3006 03.12.2024

Duration: 36 months

1.6.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/387 of 20 February 2023 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace V')

Objectives:

- a) Continued maintenance of a user-friendly global information management system on diverted or trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition ('iTrace') documented in conflict-affected areas in order to provide policy-makers, conventional arms control experts, and conventional arms export control officers with relevant information to develop effective, evidence-based strategies and projects against the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition.
- b) Training and mentoring of national authorities in conflict-affected states to develop sustainable national illicit conventional arms identification and tracing capacity, encourage sustained cooperation with the iTrace project, better identify physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) priorities, more effectively articulate national arms control and law enforcement assistance requirements, notably Union-funded initiatives, such as Interpol's Illicit Arms Records and tracing

Management System (iARMS), and the activities of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and strengthen dialogue with EU missions and initiatives.

- c) Enhanced frequency and duration of in-field research into conventional arms and their ammunition, illegally circulating in conflict-affected areas to generate iTrace data, in response to clear demands made by Member States and Union Delegations.
- d) Tailored support to Member State arms export control authorities and arms control policy makers, including repeat consultative visits by iTrace project staff to capitals of the Member States, a 24-hour help desk to provide instant advice on risk assessment and counter-diversion strategies, the maintenance of secure desktop and mobile dashboard applications to provide instant notification of post-export diversion, and the provision to Member States, on request, of post-shipment verification by iTrace project staff.
- e) Increasing awareness through outreach on the findings of the project, promoting the purpose and available functions of iTrace to international and national policy makers, conventional arms control experts and arms export licensing authorities, and enhancing international capacity to monitor the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition and related materiel, as well as to assist policy makers in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation and to reduce the risk of diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition.
- f) Providing key policy issue reports, drawn from the data generated by field investigations and presented on the iTrace system, about specific areas deserving international attention, including major patterns in the trafficking of conventional arms and their ammunition, and the regional distribution of trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition, and related materiel.
- g) The continued tracing of conventional arms and their ammunition, with the cooperation of Member States and non-EU States, as the most effective means to establish and verify, to the fullest extent possible, the mechanisms behind the diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition to unauthorised users; tracing will be supplemented by follow-up investigations focused on identifying the human, financial, and logistics networks behind illicit conventional arms transfers.

Implementing Actor: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)

Budget: EUR 6,200,000

Official Journal: L 53/19 21.02.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.6.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Objective: Contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Oslo Action Plan 2020-2024 adopted by the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, by:

- a) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the survey and clearance and mine risk education and reduction aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- b) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- c) promoting the universalisation of the Convention and promote norms against any use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction;
- d) supporting the efforts of States Parties that retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes to increase reporting capabilities, ensure that the number of such mines retained does not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, and explore alternatives to live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible; and
- e) demonstrating the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States Parties that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention.

Implementing Agency: The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

Budget: EUR 2,658,139

Official Journal: L 58 / 41 19.2.2021

Duration: 48 months

1.6.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/781 of 14 April 2025 in support of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Objectives: To support

- a) greater implementation of Article 5 of the Convention;
- b) greater implementation of a rights-based approach to 'victim assistance' (Article 6.3 of the Convention);
- c) fostering promotion of and adherence to the Convention and its norm;
- d) compliance with Article 3 of the Convention including through the fostering of cooperation and assistance;
- e) promoting implementation of National legislation under Article 9 of the Convention; and
- f) demonstrating the commitment of the Union and Member States to the Convention

Implementing Agency: The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

Budget: EUR 2,700,000

Official Journal: L 2025/781 15.04.2025

Duration: 48 months

1.6.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2500 of 23 September 2024 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase III

Objectives: follow the same long-term objectives as in its previous incarnations to enable LAS member states to sustainably strengthen the effectiveness of their national small arms control and counter-proliferation frameworks, in line with the practices and standards set by the UNPOA, ITI, and GFA, according to their priorities and needs. This strengthening will be done through policy and practice, combining the use of data, evidence-based knowledge, authoritative resources and tools, tailored expert advice and training, and the convening of practitioners and policy makers in the LAS region. Engaging with key agencies and partners responsible for curbing the threat of small arms and light weapons proliferation in the LAS region will allow the project to meet a three-pronged objective:

- a) strengthen the capacities of customs and other border agencies to detect, intercept, and report on matters of illicit firearms trafficking in the LAS region;
- b) strengthen the capacities of law enforcement agencies to effectively investigate and co-operate on matters of illicit firearm proliferation and trafficking in the LAS region; and
- c) strengthen the capacities of security and military agencies to design and implement safe and secure stockpile management systems for small arms and light weapons and their ammunition in the LAS region.

Implementing Actor: Small Arms Survey (SAS), represented by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, with the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) and in close cooperation with the LAS Secretariat.

Budget: EUR 3,999,776.72

Official Journal: L 2024/2500 24.9.2024

Duration: 36 months

1.6.8. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2275 of 18 November 2022 in support of the development of an internationally recognised arms and ammunition management validation system (AAMVS) to prevent illicit proliferation

Objectives: The purpose is to support efforts to ensure the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition by improving the decision-making processes

of stakeholders working in export control and international cooperation and assistance. The objectives are:

- a) Create an operational AAMVS.
- b) Encourage the efforts of regional organisations and their Member States to develop their own AAMVS.

Implementing Agency: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT)

Budget: EUR 1,792,690.84

Official Journal: L 300/31 21.11.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.6.9. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3097 of 5 December 2024 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Conventional Ammunition in South-Eastern Europe

Objective: to reduce risks of illicit trafficking and uncontrolled spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in, to or from South-Eastern Europe that undermine safety and security by impeding sustainable peacebuilding and socioeconomic development as well as by contributing to a breakdown in order, fuelling terrorism and criminal violence or leading to a resumption of conflict. Actions in the following areas will be supported:

- a) assisting the national authorities of the Republic of Albania to decrease the risk of proliferation and misuse of SALW;
- b) addressing security and safety risks of illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- c) supporting the strengthening of the K-9 capacity of the Kosovo* police to detect and confiscate SALW, ammunition and explosives;
- d) assisting the national authorities of the Republic of North Macedonia to decrease the risk of proliferation and misuse of SALW;
- e) strengthening the capacities of the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro to more effectively reduce, prevent, and counter illicit trafficking and misuse of SALW, ammunition and explosives;
- f) addressing safety and security risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition in Serbia;
- g) strengthening OSCE action against the illicit proliferation of and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition – Phase 3.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Budget: EUR 3,763,170

Official Journal: L 2024/3097 06.12.2024

Duration: 36 months

This Council Decision has been amended by:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/344 of 18 February 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/3097 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Conventional Ammunition in South-Eastern Europe

Object: There was no Annex to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3097 at the time of its adoption; it was therefore necessary to amend the Decision.

Official Journal: L 2025/344 19.02.2025

1.6.10. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2321 of 25 November 2022 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans and in support of disarmament and arms control activities in South-East and East Europe

Objective: Support Western Balkans partners with the implementation of the 'Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW/firearms and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024'. The goals set out in the Roadmap are:

- a) By 2023, ensure that arms control legislation is in place, fully harmonised with the EU regulatory framework and other related international obligations and standardised across the region.
- b) By 2024, ensure that arms control policies and practices in the Western Balkans are evidence based and intelligence led.
- c) By 2024, significantly reduce illicit flows of firearms, ammunition and explosives (FAE) into, within and beyond the Western Balkans.
- d) By 2024, significantly reduce the supply, demand and misuse of firearms through increased awareness, education, outreach and advocacy.
- e) By 2024, substantially decrease the estimated number of firearms in illicit possession in the Western Balkans.
- f) Systematically decrease the surplus, and destroy seized small arms and light weapons and ammunition.
- g) Significantly decrease the risk of proliferation and diversion of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

In addition, support will be provided for countering illicit arms trafficking in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

Implementing Agency: South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme.

Budget: EUR 4,006,955.58

Official Journal: L 307/149 28.11.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2587 of 15 December 2025 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans and in support of disarmament and arms control activities in South-East and East Europe

Objectives: The focus is on four main areas, maintaining the holistic approach to tackling the threat posed by SALW in the region. Those main areas address the strategic and policy levels, as well as the operational aspects, thus directly assisting at all levels of SALW control, with an emphasis on:

- a) coordinating the regional approach and monitoring of the implementation of the Roadmap,
- b) strengthening of knowledge exchange and inter-regional cooperation on SALW control,
- c) strengthening the capacities of law enforcement services in Moldova and Ukraine to counter illegal possession, misuse and trafficking,
- d) strengthening the capacities of law enforcement and customs services in the Western Balkans for countering illicit trafficking.

The action's geographic scope shall be the Western Balkans. In addition, for certain goals, the action shall provide support to the Republic of Moldova and to Ukraine.

Implementing Agency: South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme

Budget: EUR 3,499,363.97

Official Journal: L 2025/2587 16.12.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas

Objectives: In order to address armed violence in the Americas:

- a) Strengthen the National Firearms Regulatory Framework, considering international normative and good practices.
- b) Improve the operational capacity of national authorities to mark, trace, store, and destroy firearms.

- c) Optimise small arms control through the use of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA).
- d) Strengthen community resilience to gun violence and reduce access to illicit/and or unwanted firearms.
- e) Develop a Central American Firearms Roadmap to equip the countries with a practical and management tool through a regional, coordinated, and evidence-based approach.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 4,240,906

Official Journal: L 148/40 31.5.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.6.13. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1451 of 15 July 2025 in support of efforts to prevent and combat the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas – Phase III

Objectives:

- a) to strengthen regulatory frameworks to address trafficking in firearms in the Americas;
- b) to increase the sharing of knowledge and information in respect of trafficking in firearms and the illicit proliferation of SALW in the Americas;
- c) to improve state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition, reducing the risk of diversion to the illicit market;
- d) to strengthen national systems for systematic tracing of illicit SALW;
- e) to reduce risk factors associated with armed violence at the community level; and
- f) to strengthen sub-regional cooperation through the development and implementation of the Sub-Regional Firearms Roadmap.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: EUR 4,055,956

Official Journal: L 2025/1451 16.07.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.6.14. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

Objective: Support the full and effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, enhance international, regional and

national security, contribute to the realisation of human security, and promote sustainable development through SALW control, by:

- a) supporting forward-looking global policy developments in the context of the fourth United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action in 2024;
- b) strengthening effective national and regional implementation of the Programme of Actions and the International Tracing Instrument; and
- c) supporting gender-responsive SALW control policies and programmes.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 4,524,465.05

Official Journal: L 270/67 18.10.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.6.15. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2565 of 15 December 2025 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects and the Global Framework on Ammunition

Objectives:

- a) to strengthen forward-looking and action-oriented policy outcomes under the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management, the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the ITI;
- b) to support the coordinated and strengthened implementation of the international instruments at the national,
- c) sub-regional and regional level; and
- d) to leverage SALW and ammunition control in broader peace and security efforts frameworks to more effectively prevent armed violence and promote peace and development.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 4,399,030.86

Official Journal: L 2025/2565 16.12.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.7. ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS[†]

1.7.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2539 of 13 November 2023 supporting a project on the promotion of effective arms export controls

Objectives:

- a) Promote effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT.
- b) Support third countries' efforts at national and regional level to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)

Budget: EUR 682,464.03

Official Journal: L 2023/2539 14.11.2023

Duration: 14 months

1.7.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/208 of 30 January 2025 in support of a project on the promotion of effective arms export controls

Objectives:

- a) to render international trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent;
- b) to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)

Budget: EUR 2,100,000

Official Journal: L 2025/208 31.01.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.7.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2296 of 23 October 2023 on Union support for activities of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Objective: Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by supporting the activities of the ATT Secretariat aimed at:

[†] Detailed information on the implementation in 2025 of the Council Decisions under this section will be made available in the *Twenty-Eighth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment*. The latest report available in this regard, pertaining to 2024, is available [here](#).

- a) supporting States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT; and
- b) strengthening the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.

Implementing Agency: ATT Secretariat

Budget: EUR 1,298,000

Official Journal: L 2023/2296 24.10.2023

Duration: 24 months

1.7.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2367 of 20 November 2025 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Objectives:

- a) to support States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT;
- b) to strengthen the institutional setup of the Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties in implementing the ATT.

Implementing Agency: ATT Secretariat

Budget: EUR 993,533

Official Journal: L 2025/2367 21.11.2025

Duration: 24 months

1.7.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)

Objective: Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by:

- a) reinforcing or developing arms transfer control capacities and expertise for ATT implementation in new and existing beneficiary countries, through instruments such as legal assistance and training of licensing and enforcement officials;
- b) outreach to other countries, including non-States Parties to the ATT, with a view to supporting universalisation of the ATT at national, regional and multilateral levels.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) and Expertise France.

Budget: EUR 3,499,892.39

Official Journal: L 461/78 27.12.2021

Duration: 36 months

1.7.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/442 of 28 February 2025 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Objectives:

- a) the reinforcement or development of arms transfer control capacities and expertise for ATT implementation in beneficiary countries;
- b) outreach to other countries, including non-States Parties to the ATT, with a view to supporting the universalisation of the ATT at national, regional and multilateral level

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) and Expertise France

Budget: EUR 3,100,000

Official Journal: L 2025/442 03.03.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.8. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

1.8.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security'

Objective: Support greater engagement of the civilian AI community in mitigating the risks that the diversion and misuse of civilian AI research and innovation by irresponsible actors may pose to international peace and security, by:

- a) generating greater understanding of how decisions in the development and diffusion of AI research and innovation can impact the risks of diversion and misuse, and in turn generate risk or opportunities for peace and security;
- b) promoting responsible innovation processes, methods and tools which can help ensure the peaceful application of civilian innovations and the responsible dissemination of AI knowledge. To that end, the project will support capacity-building, research and engagement activities that enhance the capacity within the global civilian AI community to include and address the peace and security risks presented by the diversion and misuse of civilian AI by irresponsible actors through responsible innovation processes; and strengthen the connection between risk mitigation efforts in responsible AI in the civilian sphere with those already ongoing in the disarmament, arms control and non- proliferation community at an intergovernmental level.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), supported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Budget: EUR 1,782,285.71

Official Journal: L 300/11 21.11.2022

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2539 of 11 December 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security.

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2539 by 3 months.

Official Journal: L 2025/2539 12.12.2025

1.8.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/529 of 17 March 2025 on Union support for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research project ‘Science and Technology Watchtower: Monitoring Innovation for Disarmament

Objectives:

- a) to provide evidence-based research and analysis to support and inform policy-making and decision-making by proactively monitoring science and technology innovation;
- b) to facilitate knowledge-building and transfer of knowledge on scientific and technological aspects of international security and disarmament;
- c) to bridge relevant communities to enable the transfer of knowledge from a geographically and disciplinarily diverse range of experts and Member States engaged in multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: EUR 1,671,615

Official Journal: L 2025/529 18.03.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.8.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2322 of 13 November 2025 in support of strengthening state capacities to enhance the protection of civilians and mitigate the impact of conventional and emerging weapons technologies

Objective: To strengthen states’ capacities for the protection of civilians and mitigate the impact of conventional and emerging weapons technologies.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: EUR 1,299,897.33

Official Journal: L 2025/2322 14.11.2025

Duration: 36 months

1.9. COLLABORATIONS WITH NGOS AND THINK TANKS

1.9.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

Objectives: Continue to promote and support the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, in order to:

- a) encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- b) provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control, and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the meetings of the Consortium;
- c) constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;
- d) contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
- e) contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries, including by strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament education, raising awareness of those issues among the younger generations and promoting the next generation of researchers and practitioners in this field, especially women, and in the natural and technical sciences.

Implementing Agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, consisting of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies Europe (IISS-Europe), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

Budget: EUR 4,700,000

Official Journal: L 114/75 12.4.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.9.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/889 of 12 May 2025 supporting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

Objectives:

- a) to encourage political and security-related research and debate within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics, on measures to prevent and combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, and the proliferation of conventional weapons, including on export control;
- b) to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks on issues referred to in point (a);
- c) to support reflection and decision making in the Council on issues referred to in point (a), in particular by providing reports, recommendations, or both, to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the 'High Representative') and the Member States;
- d) to contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and to promote the need to work to address those challenges in cooperation with the Union, including in the context of multilateral fora;
- e) to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity related to issues referred to in point (a) in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries, including by strengthening related education, raising awareness among the younger generations and promoting the next generation of researchers and practitioners, especially women.

Implementing Agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, consisting of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies Europe (IISS-Europe), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)

Budget: EUR 4,500,000

Official Journal: L 2025/889 13.05.2025

Duration: 36 months

2. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

2.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

2.1.1. Council Conclusions for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (15/12/2025)

1. As part of its firm commitment to effective multilateralism and the rules-based international order, the Council reiterates its unwavering support for safeguarding and strengthening the nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control architecture. The European Union (EU) will continue to work towards a **successful 2026 NPT Review Conference**, as it has done throughout this cycle.

2. The Council reaffirms its **unequivocal support to the NPT** as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament according to its Article VI, and an important element in developing nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes according to its Article IV. It is crucial to the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The Council recognises the **value of the NPT and its historic achievements**. For over five decades it has provided security benefits to all States Parties. The NPT contains a legally binding obligation towards nuclear disarmament and has enabled a significant reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles from Cold War highs, paved the way for certain States to renounce nuclear weapons, and curbed nuclear proliferation. The Treaty is the basis for the nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has played a central role in the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, facilitating international cooperation in this field.

4. The Treaty faces **notable challenges**, including increasingly high tensions and a resurgence of nuclear rhetoric, as witnessed by Russia's actions in its unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, with Moscow prioritising its war effort over its non-proliferation and disarmament obligations and commitments. Ongoing regional proliferation crises, China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and an uneven implementation of obligations and commitments, also contribute to this complex situation.

5. The Council notes the **very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use** and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening. In this regard, it recalls the Joint Statement of Leaders of Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, including the principle that **'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'**, to which the wider United Nations (UN) membership has committed through the Pact for the Future.

6. The Council reaffirms the importance of the **universalisation of the NPT** and calls on all States that have not yet done so, in particular India, Israel and Pakistan, to join it as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.

7. The Council reiterates its support for **all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT** and for a comprehensive, balanced and full **implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan**. The Council stresses the urgent need to implement **all obligations under the NPT**, as well as **commitments made during previous Review Conferences**,

including the need for concrete progress towards full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. The Council acknowledges the progress made in this cycle to identify measures to **strengthen the NPT review process**. The EU has engaged constructively[‡] and will work actively towards a decision in this regard at the Review Conference, as a central deliverable. In this regard, *Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/646 of 27 March 2025 in support of facilitating a successful outcome of 2026 NPT Review Conference* aims at improving inclusivity in the cycle.

9. The Council is committed to **enhancing transparency and accountability**. The EU supports establishing a process within the cycle for reviewing the implementation of NPT obligations and commitments by States Parties, especially by all nuclear-weapon States, across all three pillars, in particular with regard to article VI obligations. It also favours further qualitative improvements to reporting, encouraging the further development of previous proposals, including standardised templates, taking into account the 2013 model by nuclear-weapon States and best practices developed since, and acknowledging that developing a standardised template for national reports by non-nuclear-weapon States could stimulate an increase in submissions.[§]

10. The Council encourages NPT States Parties to work towards full, equal and meaningful participation of women in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It further underlines **gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls** as an important cross-cutting priority for the EU, and the importance of integrating a gender perspective into discussions across all pillars. The Council reiterates its commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, including by supporting and promoting the equal participation and leadership of women and men in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. The Council reiterates its support for **disarmament and non-proliferation education**, to which the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium contributes through its activities, and for the participation of young people in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

PILLAR I – DISARMAMENT

11. The Council reaffirms its unwavering commitment to **advance nuclear disarmament**, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, especially through the overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, and taking into account the **special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States** that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

12. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear-weapon States arising from Article VI of the NPT, the Council reiterates its commitment to **further reductions of nuclear arsenals** and, underlining the special responsibility of the States with the largest nuclear arsenals, strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their nuclear arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, as well as deployed and non-deployed, nuclear weapons. The Council welcomes the repeated offers of dialogue made in this regard by the United States, urges **Russia** to engage meaningfully, and calls on **China** to contribute and engage actively and constructively.

[‡] [A stronger review process for a stronger NPT – European Union proposals for the Working Group on strengthening the NPT review process and ahead of the First Preparatory Committee of the 11th NPT Review Conference](#), working paper submitted by the EU ahead of the working group on further strengthening the review process (Vienna, 24-28 July 2023).

[§] The latest EU contribution in this regard is [A path towards enhanced transparency and accountability within the NPT review process](#), working paper submitted by the EU ahead of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 28 April-9 May 2025).

The Council condemns Russia's purported suspension of the **New START Treaty**, urges Russia to immediately return to compliance and fulfil all its obligations, and calls for urgent work towards a **successor agreement**. If the New START Treaty expires before such a successor agreement can be concluded, the EU encourages the United States and Russia to maintain the agreed limits on their nuclear arsenals.

13. The Council condemns in the strongest possible way **Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric and its threats to use nuclear force** in its war of aggression against Ukraine, which are irresponsible, provocative, dangerous and escalatory. The latest update of Russia's nuclear doctrine, aimed mostly at coercing and deterring further support to Ukraine, no longer includes "compliance with international arms control obligations" among the principles of Russia's deterrence policy. The Council is deeply concerned about Russia's announced **deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus**. It recalls Belarus' commitment under the Budapest Memorandum 'to eliminate all nuclear weapons from [its] territory' and calls on both countries to reverse this decision. The Council categorically opposes the development and deployment of nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction in **outer space**. The deployment of such weapons would constitute a severe and wide-reaching breach of international law, including the Outer Space Treaty.

14. The Council is deeply concerned about **China's rapid, opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal**, which is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. Its lack of transparency about its doctrine, policies and expanding arsenal raises serious doubts about the credibility of its '**No First Use**' policy, and fuels mistrust. We encourage China, holder of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, to engage in risk reduction and arms control, including by enhancing transparency, establishing necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions, and clarifying its strategic objectives.

15. The Council strongly encourages nuclear-weapon States to pursue discussions on **confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction and verification**, laying the ground for the negotiation of robust future arms control agreements and reporting. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction contributes to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts. Concrete risk reduction measures, including measures to **reduce the risk of nuclear conflict**, should therefore be pursued.

16. The Council stresses the need to promote **universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**, and urges all States that have not yet done so, in particular those in Annex 2, to sign and ratify it without precondition or delay. The Council reaffirms its commitment to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing. It calls on all States to abide by the existing **moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions** or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty. Any explosive nuclear weapon test by any State would be harmful and destabilising for global non-proliferation efforts and for international peace and security. It calls on **Russia to reverse its unprecedented decision to revoke its ratification** of the CTBT and, in the meantime, respect the CTBT's object and purpose.

17. The Council commends the early deployment and operation of the **International Monitoring System (IMS)** and of the **International Data Centre (IDC)** that are at the core of the robust verification regime of the **Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)**. This deployment ahead of the CTBT's entry into force has provided the international community with reliable and neutral scientific and technical information on nuclear test explosions carried out since 1997 and constituted a strong preventive measure against testing. The financial support provided by the EU through

nine consecutive Council Decisions since 2006,** as well as by EU Member States, has proved instrumental in this regard.

18. The Council reiterates its call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations of a **treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)**. Pending the entry into force of such an FMCT, the Council calls on China, the only nuclear-weapon State not to have done so, and any other States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate **moratorium on the production of fissile material** for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

PILLAR II – NON-PROLIFERATION

22. The Council stresses the urgent need to **address decisively the multiple existing nuclear proliferation challenges**, in order to preserve and strengthen the NPT's positive record in this regard. The Council highlights the **safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** as a fundamental component of the NPT, as well as the great importance it attaches to the IAEA's mandate and its impartial, independent and objective role.

23. The Council recalls the severe implications of Russia's unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression for **safeguards in Ukraine**, especially the illegal seizure and militarisation of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). It calls on Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Ukraine's ZNPP and comply with all relevant UN General Assembly and IAEA resolutions. The EU and its Member States will continue to uphold international law and full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Military activities continue to challenge the implementation of IAEA safeguards under Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. The Council welcomes that the IAEA has continued to implement safeguards and undertake in-field verification activities in Ukraine, and stresses the importance that it continues to be able to do so, in accordance with Article III of the NPT and Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol. The Council is grateful to the IAEA for all its work to contribute to mitigating nuclear safety and security risks and reiterates its call that the IAEA is granted full, timely and unrestricted access for its experts to all requested locations, information and personnel at Ukraine's ZNPP.

24. The EU has always been clear that **Iran** must never be allowed to seek, acquire or develop a nuclear weapon. The UN Security Council Resolutions reinstated after completion of the snapback process create obligations for all UN Member States and decide that Iran shall suspend several proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. The EU is gravely concerned by Iran's serious curtailing of its cooperation with the IAEA and calls on Iran to urgently comply with its legally binding nuclear safeguards obligations under the NPT, and to resume full cooperation with the IAEA without any further delay. The EU and its Member States remain committed to diplomacy and negotiations as the only way to achieve a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The Council invites the High Representative to continue to support political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution in line with the provisions of the reinstated UN Security Council resolutions.

25. The Council reiterates its call on the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)** to abandon all its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as required by UN Security

** Currently, through [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/2064 of 25 September 2023 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization \(CTBTO\) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities](#).

Council Resolution 2397 (2017). It insists that the DPRK return to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bring into force the Additional Protocol, refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches and nuclear tests, and sign and ratify the CTBT. The DPRK will never be accepted as a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT or have any other special status in that regard. The Council urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

26. The Council expresses its deep concern about **Russia's disturbing shift of position on the DPRK's denuclearisation since 2024**, which undermines decades-long non-proliferation efforts in exchange for support for its war of aggression against Ukraine. All UN sanctions established pursuant to relevant UN Security Council resolutions remain fully in place. The Council welcomes the establishment of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, until the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), whose mandate renewal Russia vetoed, can be reconstituted. The Council resolutely condemns Russia's continuing illegal military cooperation with the DPRK, in particular the DPRK's deployment of troops and arms transfers to Russia, including ballistic missiles, in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and calls on both countries to cease immediately these activities, and on all States to implement fully the relevant UN resolutions.

27. The Council supports the IAEA's engagement with **Syria** and the ongoing process to clarify outstanding safeguards issues, welcomes efforts so far and calls on transitional Syrian authorities to continue to engage constructively. It strongly encourages Syria to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol to rebuild confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

28. The Council acknowledges the importance of existing **Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones** (NWFZs) for international peace and security and reiterates its commitment to implementing the Resolution on Middle East of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. It welcomes the six sessions of the UN Conference on the Establishment of a **Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction** and their outcomes. The Council recalls that NWFZs can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned. The EU strongly urges all stakeholders to engage urgently in meaningful consultations to build an inclusive and consensus-based process to implement the 1995 Resolution on Middle East.

29. IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the NPT and help create an environment conducive to peaceful nuclear cooperation. **Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements**, together with the **Additional Protocol**, constitute the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT. The Council reiterates its call for their universalisation without delay. It urgently calls on concerned States, especially those who apply the original version or are engaged in building nuclear power plants or research reactors, to immediately amend or rescind their **Small Quantities Protocols**.

30. Effective **export controls** are fundamental to comply with non-proliferation obligations under Article III of the NPT and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Council invites all States to adhere to the guidelines of relevant multilateral export control regimes, including the **Zangger Committee** and the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**. These regimes provide impartial guidelines to ensure proliferation concerns are addressed. They build trust that contributes to facilitating legitimate transfers of nuclear technology and scientific knowledge for peaceful uses, to maintaining a predictable, transparent framework and a well-defined

level-playing field for international nuclear trade, and to improving overall trade and growth, not least in developing countries.

31. The Council reiterates its serious concern about the **proliferation of WMD-capable delivery systems** such as **ballistic missiles** and related technology, recalls its strong support for the **Missile Technology Control Regime**, and calls on all States that have not yet done so to subscribe to **The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation**.

PILLAR III – PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

32. The Council reaffirms its support for the inalienable **right of NPT States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes** without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty, as reflected in its article IV, including in the framework of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme, in accordance with its Statute.

33. The Council recognises the **possible contribution of nuclear science and technology in areas like human health, agriculture, food security and safety, water management, climate change, environmental protection, or preservation of cultural and natural heritage**. All these areas are directly linked to the 2030 Agenda and the IAEA has an important role to play therein. The Council appreciates the IAEA's activities in this regard, including the important initiatives launched by its Director General, such as Rays of Hope, ZODIAC, NUTEC Plastics and Atoms4Food. It also highlights the successful holding in 2024 of the *IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme*, and acknowledges the Ministerial Declaration adopted therein as a demonstration of growing interest in the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

34. The Council underscores that the EU and its Member States continue to support activities to facilitate cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and provide technical expertise and know-how. EU Member States are among the largest donors to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. The European Commission also contributes, including through in-kind support provided by its Joint Research Centre, both to the IAEA and through bilateral projects.

35. The Council acknowledges the need to ensure energy security and respect the right of States to decide on their energy mix and choose the most appropriate technologies to collectively achieve the 2030 climate target and potentially mitigate the consequences of **global warming**. The Council acknowledges the unique value of the scientific data accumulated by the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat since 1996 and made available for scientific studies and purposes, which contribute to the understanding and mitigation of climate change. The Council also underscores the crucial contribution of relevant IMS stations to the International Tsunami Information Center established in the framework of UNESCO.

36. The Council reiterates its commitment to the **highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards**, essential to a responsible, safe and secure development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The European Commission through Euratom has guaranteed for decades nuclear materials controls in Europe and acted as a reliable partner to the IAEA in the domain of nuclear safeguards. It remains an essential supporting pillar, contributing substantially to global non-proliferation efforts. The Council stresses the IAEA's central role in this regard and the EU's significant contribution, including through the European Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and *Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/656 of 19*

February 2024 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear security.

37. The Council encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to **international nuclear safety and security conventions**, including the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and other instruments such as the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The Council stresses the need to improve continuously nuclear safety and security for the development and deployment of new technology for the entire fuel cycle, including related to concepts of **small modular reactors**. Given that some partner countries opt for nuclear energy, the Council reiterates the necessity to continue to promote and support the highest nuclear safety, environmental and transparency standards, regionally, in the immediate vicinity of EU borders, and globally.

38. The Council is concerned over the potential implications of **armed attacks against nuclear facilities** devoted to peaceful purposes, recalls the importance of upholding the IAEA's seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in armed conflicts, and calls upon States to refrain from such actions, in accordance with international law. The Council highlights the difficulty of implementing nuclear safeguards and verification of diversion of nuclear materials under armed conflict situations and the consequent risks to nuclear proliferation. We note the relevant IAEA General Conference resolutions regarding armed attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols thereto.

39. The Council reiterates its grave concern over the **nuclear safety and security risks caused by Russia's unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine**. It recalls the importance of upholding the IAEA's seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in armed conflicts and five principles for ensuring nuclear safety and security at Ukraine's ZNPP. Any future potential restart of the reactors at this plant can only be considered once the safety and security conditions have been met and the facility has been returned to the legitimate control and oversight of Ukraine's competent regulatory authority. Any attempt to connect this plant with Russia's energy grid is unacceptable and would further exacerbate the already serious nuclear safety risks. The Council confirms its strong support to the IAEA's missions at all of Ukraine's nuclear facilities, as well as its monitoring at electrical substations. The EU urges Russia to refrain from carrying attacks on such infrastructure, which constitute a serious threat to nuclear safety and security.

3. STATEMENTS

3.1. GENERAL STATEMENTS

3.1.1. EU statement at the High-Level Segment of the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 24/02/2025)

Madam President, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

We are today facing unprecedented challenges to global security. The erosive pressure on arms control frameworks, and rising geopolitical tensions underscore the need to reduce risks of miscalculation and misunderstandings.

At this critical time, rapid and collective action is needed to reinforce and advance disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, uphold international security commitments, and prevent a further deterioration of the global security environment as a matter of urgency. We must renew our commitment to multilateralism as a fundamental pillar of global peace and security, rooted in the rules and principles of the UN Charter.

Trust and confidence are the foundation of any security-building process. Our collective responsibility is to reinforce dialogue, rebuild trust, and work together toward concrete progress on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Greater transparency on nuclear doctrines, policies, and strategies, can contribute to confidence-building and risk reduction, which is important to us all.

Madam President,

Today marks three years since Russia launched its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal aggression against Ukraine, blatantly violating the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law. The EU reiterates its resolute condemnation of Russia's war of aggression. We strongly condemn support by third countries, and actors and entities therein, which enable Russia to sustain its war, including arms transfers and deepening military cooperation with the DPRK and Iran. The EU reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence. We reaffirm our support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, in line with Ukraine's Peace Formula. It is essential that no initiative regarding Ukraine be taken without Ukraine.

The EU condemns in the strongest possible way Russia's actions, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force in its illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which are provocative, dangerous, and escalatory. This further demonstrates how Russia's actions repeatedly undermine international peace and security and erode arms control mechanisms, security assurances and underscore the urgent need to strengthen our defence in order to protect our societies. At the same time, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation contributes to European and global security, and we will advance our efforts towards progress in this area.

The EU warmly welcomes the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, which will allow the phased release of the hostages - ending their terrible ordeal that has lasted for more than 15 months – an end to hostilities, and easing of the humanitarian suffering in Gaza. It is vital that the deal is fully implemented to allow all the hostages to be released, and to ensure a permanent end to hostilities. The EU deeply deplores the unacceptable number of civilians, especially children, who have lost their lives. We call for full and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid to the Gaza strip and that aid can be effectively distributed to those in need, including by UN agencies and notably UNRWA. Displaced Gazans should be ensured a safe and dignified return to their homes. The EU is committed to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-State solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security.

At a time when the international security landscape is deteriorating, the role of the Conference on Disarmament is more important than ever and its continued deadlock remains of deep concern. We welcome the re-establishment of five subsidiary bodies and are committed to leveraging this opportunity to bring the CD back on track, towards fulfilling its negotiation mandate.

Madam President,

Less than a year from now, the New START Treaty will expire. The world could be for the first time in decades exposed to the absence of an agreed framework for nuclear arms control between the US and Russia. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear weapon States arising from Article VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU strongly encourage seeking further reductions to their arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and to pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, and verification activities, laying the ground for even more robust and ambitious future arms control agreements and reporting. We call on China to actively contribute to these processes. The EU also deplores the unprecedented decision of Russia to revoke its ratification of the CTBT. Promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the CTBT, as well as supporting CTBTO and the full implementation of its international monitoring system remains a key priority for the EU.

Madam President,

We remain deeply concerned by the rapid and opaque expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, which raises serious questions about its strategic objectives and is not in line with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. China's lack of transparency over its nuclear doctrine, policies, and expanding arsenal raises questions about its declared 'No First Use' policy, fuelling mistrust. Doctrinal statements alone are insufficient; concrete actions and meaningful engagement are needed to build confidence. We therefore urge for clarity and meaningful engagement from China regarding its nuclear capabilities, and the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its doctrines and policies, including in relation to its stated No-First Use policy and nuclear posture. As the world's third-largest nuclear-weapon state, China must enhance transparency, establish communication lines with the U.S. and Russia to prevent misperceptions, and clarify its strategic objectives. We urge China to engage in arms control dialogue, improve information-sharing, and halt further build-up.

Madam President,

We consider that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and all States possessing nuclear weapons, have a responsibility to engage in meaningful dialogue, take concrete steps to reduce risks, and must uphold their respective commitments to arms control and disarmament. In this context, progress toward a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is a

necessary and logical step. Pending a future agreement on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT), we call on China to immediately declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Given the increasing number of new space actors and users of space services, as well as the worsening international security situation, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in all its aspects is more relevant than ever. It is therefore crucial to enhance outer space security through a pragmatic approach, recognizing that “political commitments on responsible behaviours can be developed in support of, and without prejudice to, the pursuit of legally binding measures and instruments”.

Madam President,

Lastly, let me stress that inclusivity and transparency remain fundamental to the EU’s approach in multilateral settings. We support the participation of observers in CD deliberations, as their perspectives enrich discussions and enhance the legitimacy of our outcomes. Attempts to silence critics or exclude observer States and international organisations interested in the work of the CD undermine the very principles on which multilateral diplomacy and this very forum are based.

The EU also supports the long overdue enlargement of the CD to reflect the realities of today’s global landscape and enable broader participation as a matter of urgency. We call for the urgent appointment of a special coordinator who could lead substantive consultations on the expansion of membership and lay out concrete scenarios for the consideration of CD members.

In summing up, let us seize the opportunity to reinvigorate the Conference on Disarmament and deliver on the international community’s shared goals. The time to act is now.

I thank you, Madam President.

3.1.2. EU general statement – UN General Assembly First Committee (New York, 08/10/2025)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

Maintaining international peace and security is a primary purpose of the UN, to which all its members have committed. Yet today, conflicts are being waged across almost all continents, marked by violations and abuses of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. The EU condemns Russia’s illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and calls upon Russia to end this war which violates fundamental principles of international law and has global negative consequences. The EU deplores the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties and the levels of starvation. The European Union remains firmly committed to a lasting and sustainable peace based on the two-State solution. We are ready to contribute to all efforts towards this solution and call on all parties to refrain from actions that undermine its viability. We are also deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Sahel and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the war in Sudan, terrorism and violent extremism, the climate emergency, cyber threats, as well as the erosion of democracy and increasing threats to human rights. All these

developments risk undermining our longer-term development goals. The SDGs are intrinsically linked to peace, security and human rights. Without peace, none of these goals can be achieved. It is abhorrent and totally unacceptable that civilians and civilian objects, humanitarian workers, and journalists are targeted and increasingly so; that women, girls and children continue to suffer disproportionately; and that safe, rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access is increasingly challenged or used as a bargaining chip.

These challenges cannot be addressed by any country alone; they must be resolved collectively. The EU and its Member States will continue to advocate for such collective solutions, while upholding international law, the rule of law and multilateralism founded on the UN Charter, and while continuing to defend, promote and further strengthen the global architecture for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, including export control regimes.

The EU deplores the obstructive posture of Russia, including the misuse of consensus in multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and export control fora. The continued noncompliance by some States with their international obligations should be a matter of grave concern for all UN Member States. The viability and effectiveness of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation agreements require that those agreements be fully implemented, complied with and enforced. Ensuring accountability and ending impunity is crucial to preserving the integrity of the established norms and a major priority for the EU.

Implementation of the Pact for the Future provides a unique opportunity to reinvigorate multilateralism, to ensure it can tackle current and future global challenges, and to help reduce the trust gap towards institutions at all levels and among UN members.

Now after more than three years, Russia's unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine continues to inflict a devastating toll primarily on the Ukrainian people, with spillover effects felt in the wider region and across the globe. We condemn Russia's actions to destabilise the global architecture for the maintenance of peace and security, including UN Security Council instruments. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and its repercussions for European and global security in a changing environment constitute an existential challenge for the European Union. We strongly condemn Russia's aggressive actions, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force in its war of aggression against Ukraine, which are provocative, dangerous and escalatory, and which further demonstrate how Russia's repeated actions undermine international commitments, peace and security. Russia continues to blatantly violate international law and the UN Charter, as well as the "Helsinki Decalogue" and its commitments under the Budapest Memorandum. The EU and its Member States will continue to uphold the principles of the UN Charter and international law and full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, support Ukraine, and work to ensure full accountability for crimes. A comprehensive, just and lasting peace, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, remains our priority. The EU will continue to contribute to all peace efforts, in accordance with its aim to promote just and lasting peace, including by intensifying global outreach. The EU is also seriously concerned about the growing number of reports highlighting the use of riot control agents as well as the alleged use of the choking agent chloropicrin by Russia against Ukrainian soldiers. The results of the three the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reports point to a pattern of riot control use as a method of warfare at the frontlines in Ukraine. We call on Russia to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The EU also condemns the Belarusian regime's complicity in Russia's war against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of international law and the UN Charter, as well as Russia's deepening military cooperation with

the DPRK and Iran. The EU condemns the announced deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus.

Mr. Chair,

The EU remains strongly committed to peace, security and stability in the Middle East. The EU calls for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and the unconditional release of all hostages, leading to a permanent end to hostilities. It profoundly deplores the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties and the levels of starvation. Israel must allow immediate, unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale into and throughout Gaza and fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law.

The EU has always been clear that Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon and that it must comply with its legally binding nuclear safeguards obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call on Iran to resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to allow IAEA inspectors to regain access to all Iranian nuclear sites. The EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution and will continue to contribute to all diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and to bring about a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, which can only be achieved through negotiations.

The EU will continue to support a peaceful and inclusive transition in Syria, away from foreign interference, which guarantees the rights of all Syrians without distinction. In May, the EU lifted all its remaining economic sanctions, to support the country's economic recovery and stabilisation, maintaining only sanctions related to the Assad regime in line with its call for accountability, and those sanctions based on security grounds. The EU welcomes the cooperation of Syria's transitional authorities with the OPCW, and the IAEA, in view of the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme, as well as a full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's safeguards. From the issue of landmines and remnants of war to that of the diversion of small arms and light weapons, the situation in Syria presents a number of challenges: tackling those will be crucial for achieving lasting peace, and the EU calls on the international community to step up and coordinate efforts. Syria's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure borders should be fully respected, in accordance with international law.

Mr. Chair,

Ahead of the 2026 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the EU remains fully committed to its full implementation along with universalisation of this treaty, which remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments from previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The EU will continue to pursue the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, reiterates its full support for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and highlights its continuing support for the work of the IAEA.

The EU will continue to promote and further strengthen multilateral instruments against chemical and biological weapons in order to uphold the international legal prohibition of such weapons, and to ensure there can be no impunity for their use. We underline the importance of the UN Secretary General's Mechanism in this regard. We remain committed to achieving concrete results within the Working Group on the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention.

The EU supports conventional arms control instruments, with emphasis on preventing the diversion of small arms and light weapons, and ammunition. The EU supports the implementation of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029 of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, as well as preparations for the Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 2026. We welcome as an important achievement of the international community, the creation of the Global framework on through-life conventional ammunition management, with its aim to prevent diversion and unintended explosion, and its first preparatory meeting held successfully in June last year. With the Costa Rica Conference approaching, the EU recalls the importance of the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA) with its aim to reduce harm and strengthen the protection of civilians.

The EU appreciates the role of the ATT to address the diversion, proliferation and misuse of SALW. The EU will continue to support and defend multilateral export control regimes as key elements of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, against malign actions of those who want to exploit international trade and scientific peaceful cooperation for their own military build-up for aggressive or terrorist purposes.

The EU will further address the impact of new and emerging technologies including in the area of international peace and security. In particular, we emphasise the need to make urgent progress on the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems. To that end, the EU will support efforts under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and is fully committed to deliver and fulfil the mandate of the GGE on LAWS as soon as possible. The EU supports the so called “two-tier” approach to such weapons systems and will remain committed to promote it in the framework of the GGE on LAWS. The EU further supports discussions on developing principles for the responsible military use of artificial intelligence (AI).

For a secure, safe, stable and sustainable outer space environment, the EU reiterates the necessity of compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, applicable to outer space. The EU and its Member States support the universalisation of and full compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and promote the adoption of norms of responsible behaviour to make progress on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The EU supports strengthening the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs and recognises the role of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as the principal UN body dealing with international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The EU will continue to place the prevention and elimination of all forms of sexual and gender-based violence at the centre of its efforts. The EU supports full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women and emphasises its commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda as a whole. It reaffirms its full commitment to the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda. The EU will continue to support disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the European network of independent think tanks, is contributing with various activities. The EU also encourages the meaningful inclusion and participation of youth delegates in national and EU representations.

The EU and its Member States will continue to advance responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The EU welcomes the adoption of the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs. The EU is determined to continue to implement the UN framework, to enhance global cyber resilience, to invest in cyber capacity building and to work with civil society, academia and the private sector in view of strengthening international security and stability in cyberspace.

Finally, the EU stands ready to engage with partners in driving forward UN reform through the “UN80 initiative”, towards a more effective, cost-efficient and responsive UN, to ensure that the UN system is able to address today’s challenges, including in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.2. NUCLEAR ISSUES

3.2.1. Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the bombings on Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945) (06/08/2025)

Eighty years on, the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still stands as a chilling testament to the power and consequences of nuclear weapons. The world must never forget – and must never repeat – those tragedies.

Yet today, we face a deeply worrying trend: irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, the opaque expansions of nuclear arsenals, and new actors seeking nuclear capabilities. These developments endanger international peace and security – and blatantly undermine the fundamental truth we all affirmed: a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

In the face of these challenges, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The EU is unwavering in its support for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and for preserving and reaffirming the existing moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions. We call on renewed strategic dialogue and concrete steps toward further reductions to nuclear arsenals as the last remaining nuclear arms control instrument – the New START Treaty – nears its expiration in February 2026.

We bear a shared duty to pass on to future generations the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We owe it to the victims to ensure that this legacy serves as a foundation for peace.

Disarmament and non-proliferation are not optional—they are a collective responsibility. The EU will continue to lead, together with our partners, in advancing diplomacy and defending the multilateral order, and ensuring that such tragedies never happen again.

3.2.2. EU statement at the General Debate of the 3rd Preparatory Committee Session of the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 28/04/2025)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Rest assured of the EU's full support in ensuring that this PrepCom paves the way for a successful outcome, including ways to strengthen the review process, next year.

The EU remains united in its unequivocal support to uphold and strengthen the Treaty, which remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI, and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. The NPT has enduring value and its universalisation and full implementation is needed now

more than ever, particularly in view of the ongoing destructive and destabilising actions by Russia, and continuing proliferation crises. We call upon the remaining States to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.

We are committed to constructively and meaningfully engage in a comprehensive manner on all thematic priorities under the Treaty. In particular, we are convinced that improving transparency and accountability in the implementation of NPT obligations and all commitments of the 2010 Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties to the NPT.

Risk reduction measures are not a replacement for concrete measures on nuclear disarmament. We support work on risk reduction, call for the entry into force of the CTBT, and the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Any return to nuclear testing would constitute a grave threat to international peace and security and to the global efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The norm against testing must be upheld. Pending a future FMCT in force, the EU calls on all States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU recognizes that negative security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and emphasises the importance of existing nuclear weapons free zones.

Mr. Chair,

The EU reiterates its resolute condemnation of Russia's brutal and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, with Belarus' complicity, and support by other third countries, actors and entities therein – including arms transfers, and ballistic missiles – and deepening military cooperation with the DPRK and Iran. The EU reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence. We reaffirm our support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, in line with Ukraine's Peace Formula. It is essential that no initiative regarding Ukraine be taken without Ukraine.

We urge Russia, a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council with the responsibility to uphold the UN Charter, to reverse its destabilizing actions that undermine international law, including its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Russia must immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations. We call on Russia to revert its decision to withdraw its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and, in the meantime, respect the object and purpose of the CTBT. In order to reconstitute trust in negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, we call on Russia to cease violating its commitments under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, particularly its commitment to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine. By not respecting its agreed obligations and commitments, Russia undermines the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as well as international peace and security.

Mr. Chair,

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of

nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

We remain deeply concerned by the rapid and opaque expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, which raises serious questions about its strategic objectives and is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. China's lack of transparency over its nuclear doctrine, policies, and expanding arsenal casts doubt on the credibility of its declared 'No First Use' policy, fuelling mistrust. Doctrinal statements alone are insufficient; concrete actions and meaningful engagement are needed to build confidence. We therefore urge for clarity and meaningful engagement from China regarding its nuclear capabilities, and the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its doctrines and policies, including in relation to its stated No-First Use policy and nuclear posture. As the holder of the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal and a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, China must enhance transparency, establish necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions and clarify its strategic objectives. We urge China to engage in arms control dialogue as a first step, improve information-sharing, and halt further expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

The EU remains seriously concerned in the face of persistent proliferation crises and challenges, which represent a threat to international peace and security, and underlines its resolve to increase non-proliferation efforts and to strengthen, universalise and render more effective the nuclear non- proliferation architecture.

It is a key security priority for the EU to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, the EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We call on all countries to support the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). The EU is gravely concerned by the continued alarming expansion of Iran's nuclear programme and that, due to Iran's lack of cooperation, the IAEA has lost the continuity of knowledge and is still not in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. The EU urges Iran to work with the Agency swiftly and substantially towards full compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement obligations. It remains essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran delivers on the actions specified in the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors since 2020.

The EU reiterates that the DPRK must immediately fulfil its obligations under all relevant UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, while ceasing all related activities. The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT or any other special status in that regard. The EU urges the DPRK to immediately return to full compliance with the NPT. The EU is ready to work with all relevant partners and promote any meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. We strongly condemn the arms transfers, including of ballistic missiles, deployment of combatant troops and military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, which violate UN Security Council Resolutions, and call on the DPRK and Russia to immediately cease these activities.

Mr. Chair,

We recognise the important work and central role of the IAEA and are resolved to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The EU urges all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the international nuclear safety and security conventions without delay. The EU emphasises that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, constitute the current verification standard

under the NPT and calls for their universalisation without delay. We also appreciate the IAEA's support to make the most of nuclear science and technologies, mindful of the contributions to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Agreement.

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls are top cross-cutting priorities and believes it is essential to integrate a gender perspective into discussions across the three pillars of the NPT. Improving gender equality in participation in the NPT review process is highly desirable and necessary to enhance the effectiveness of Treaty processes and their outcomes. To this end, we welcome initiatives such as the "Young Women Next Generation Initiative" established by the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. The EU is also the largest donor to the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme and supports the meaningful and inclusive participation of young people.

In conclusion, we reiterate our commitment to further contribute to the work of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee, as well as throughout the whole NPT review cycle, with the aim of making concrete progress towards the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.2.3. EU Statement at the General Debate of the 69th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna, 15/09/2025)

President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of 26 European Union Member States. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

We congratulate you, President, on your election and assure you of our full support and cooperation.

The EU attaches great importance to the technical and independent mandate of the IAEA which is captured in the motto "Atoms for Peace and Development".

We are meeting at a time of multiple crises and serious challenges. We can only overcome them together, by upholding and protecting the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core, and by respecting our obligations and commitments.

It is now more than three and a half years since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the illegal seizure of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). These are not only violations of the UN Charter and international law, but also violate the very principles of the IAEA Statute. The EU continues to condemn Russia's war of aggression in the strongest possible terms.

We are grateful to the IAEA for providing crucial assistance to Ukraine, which we strongly support. We commend the courage and professionalism of the IAEA staff operating under unprecedented challenges, providing valuable the first-hand impartial information on the situation regarding all Ukraine's nuclear facilities. The EU welcomes the recent Memorandum of Understanding signed by the IAEA and Ukraine at the Recovery Conference in Rome. This establishes an important framework for cooperation to support the reconstruction of the country's energy sector, which has been severely affected by Russia's aggression.

The EU condemns Russia's continued military strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Russia's military activities endanger nuclear safety and security. The Agency's recent mission to electrical substations in August provided evidence of vulnerabilities in Ukraine's electricity grid and damage caused by Russia's attacks. These military activities raise the risk of a complete loss of off-site power to all NPPs. The seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security for nuclear facilities during armed conflict are not fulfilled and are compromised. The EU reiterates that they must be respected.

The EU remains deeply concerned by the precarious nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP, as repeatedly highlighted by the IAEA Director General. Six of the seven pillars continue to be compromised fully or partially. We insist that under such circumstances all ZNPP reactors remain in cold shutdown. The IAEA must be granted unrestricted and timely access to all requested locations, information and personnel at the ZNPP.

Once again, the EU urges Russia to immediately, unconditionally and completely withdraw all its military and other forces, equipment and other unauthorised personnel from the ZNPP and the entire territory of Ukraine, and return full control to Ukraine's competent sovereign authorities. Russia's plan to connect the ZNPP to the Russian grid is another unlawful attempt to alter internationally recognised status of the ZNPP as Ukraine's facility. Russia must comply with international law and heed the IAEA General Conference and Board of Governors resolutions. The EU will continue to support Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The EU supports a full and unconditional ceasefire and remains steadfast in supporting a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

We are concerned over the potential implications of armed attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes and note the relevant IAEA General Conference resolutions in that regard, in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter.

We take note of the announcement that an agreement has been reached in Cairo between Iran and the IAEA on the technical measures to resume inspections of the Iranian nuclear sites and thank Egypt's facilitation. The EU also takes positive note of the Director General's statement that this is a step in the right direction, and that this agreement will neither amend nor modify Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement. We look forward to further reporting and call for the immediate implementation of the agreement through practical actions.

The EU remains strongly committed to peace, security and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf. We have always been clear that Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon and that it must comply with its legally binding nuclear safeguards obligations under the NPT. The EU is gravely concerned by Iran's serious curtailing of its cooperation with the IAEA since June 2025. On 2 July 2025, an Iranian law suspending IAEA inspector access was brought into force. Since 13 June 2025, the Agency has had no access to any of the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, except for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, nor has it received any of the legally required reports from Iran on its nuclear programme. The Director General has reported that the IAEA has now lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the current inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including highly enriched uranium. Iran must urgently allow the Agency to restart its safeguards activities in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. As the Director General clearly states in his report, Iran's implementation of its Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances. As the Director General also stressed, while national law may create obligations domestically, it cannot do so for the IAEA.

We call on Iran to remedy its non-compliance by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency and the Board, and we fully support the Director General's ongoing efforts in this

regard. Without the full implementation of safeguards in Iran being resumed, the Agency will not be in a position to provide any conclusion or assurance regarding Iran's nuclear programme.

The EU and its Member States remain committed to finding a lasting diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. As our diplomatic efforts continue, we call on Iran to urgently return to the negotiating table and to refrain from any initiative that may hinder a negotiated solution. We also call on Iran to immediately return to the full implementation of its CSA obligations and full cooperation with the Agency.

We are at a critical juncture. It has been almost two weeks since the notification to the Security Council triggering snapback, which initiated a 30-day window before the re-imposition of previously suspended resolutions. The EU has been clear to Iran and the International Community that we remain committed to diplomacy. Iran should take concrete steps to demonstrate it is serious about finding a diplomatic solution and to engage meaningfully with the E3's resolution 2231 extension offer.

The EU condemns the DPRK's unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security. Our concerns are amplified by the DPRK's ongoing nuclear activities, including indications related to expanding plutonium production and uranium enrichment capacities, as well as the DPRK's repeated ballistic missile launches, conducted in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to return to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and to bring into force an Additional Protocol. The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We remain alarmed about the statements made by Russian officials considering the DPRK's denuclearisation as a "closed issue", which is inconsistent with Russia's NPT obligations as well as UN Security Council resolutions that Russia itself voted for. The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful dialogue with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. This includes the Agency's return to the DPRK. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the expanding military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia.

We support the Director General's engagement with Syria. We welcome the process of clarification of the outstanding safeguards issues, through Agency visits and access to the sites related to the Deir Ezzor site. The recent contacts between Syria and the IAEA are further steps in the right direction. We agree with the Director General on the importance of continuing and reinforcing cooperation between Syria and the Agency to address unresolved safeguards issues.

President,

The EU remains a strong supporter of the IAEA's work across its full range of responsibilities, in strengthening the international nuclear safety and security frameworks, and implementing nuclear safeguards. We welcome the IAEA's efforts to respond to Member States' requests and address the challenges raised by the nuclear safety and security interface. We call on the Agency to continue fostering complementarity between safety and security in relevant areas, such as transport and training.

Ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the EU reiterates its firm support for the full, complete, and effective implementation of the NPT across its three pillars and continues to call for its universalisation.

The EU strongly supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with Additional Protocols, represent the current verification standard under Article III of the NPT. We call for their universalisation without delay. The EU also urges all remaining States, which have yet to do so, to amend or rescind their original standard Small Quantities Protocol and apply the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in full. In that regard, we note with concern that the Agency could no longer draw any safeguards conclusions for those States due to the limitations therein.

We attach utmost importance to nuclear safety and its continuous improvement during the entire fuel cycle, and call on all States to work in close partnership with the IAEA on this matter. IAEA peer review services are instrumental for the implementation of EURATOM's legally binding and enforceable safety framework. The EU will also continue to provide significant support to the IAEA's crucial work to support nuclear safety in other countries. We strive for the highest possible levels of nuclear and radiation safety, mindful of the IAEA safety standards.

We encourage all IAEA Member States to promote a strong nuclear safety culture. We strongly support the international nuclear safety instruments (conventions and code of conducts) and their universalisation and effective implementation. We call on Member States Parties to the conventions to fully engage in the review processes. We appreciate the Agency's continued commitment to maintaining fully applicable and up-to-date Safety Standards and the recently adopted systematic approach to their development.

Given the development of new technologies, such as Small Modular Reactors (SMR), the EU remains committed to strive for the highest level of nuclear safety. The European Commission established in 2024 the "European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors (SMR)", which has recently endorsed its Strategic Action Plan with Horizon 2030.

The EU and its Member States reiterate their highest commitment to maintaining and strengthening effective and comprehensive nuclear security. We underline the importance of universalisation of relevant international instruments, in particular the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment (A/CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), to which we encourage all States that have not done so to accede. We encourage all MS to promote strong security culture and support Agency's commitment to maintain up-to-date Security Guidance. The IAEA requires timely, reliable, and adequate resources to carry out its nuclear security activities, including from the Nuclear Security Fund and the regular budget. The EU and its Member States are major contributors to the Nuclear Security Fund and encourage all IAEA Member States to support it.

President,

The EU and its Member States support the Agency's activities in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology to implement the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Agreements whose historic 10th Anniversary is taking place this year. We acknowledge the need to ensure energy security and respect the right of Member States to decide on their energy mix and chose the most appropriate technologies to collectively achieve our climate target. We recognise that nuclear technologies can be of great help to mitigate the consequences of global warming and monitor its impact.

In line with the objectives of the Summit of the Future, we welcome the IAEA's contributions to improving human health and nutrition, agriculture, food safety and security as well as water management; to combating climate change and its effects; and to preserving natural and cultural heritage through the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. We welcome the Director General's continued work on flagship initiatives, namely Rays of Hope, ZODIAC,

Atoms4Food and NUTEC Plastics, and look forward to this year's Scientific Forum on "Atoms4Water".

The EU and its Member States reaffirm their longstanding commitment to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and its need-based, result-driven, and non-discriminatory nature. We attach great importance to international cooperation between Member States and thank the IAEA for the framework it provides in this area.

We appreciate the IAEA's strong commitment to gender equality. We were delighted to hear from the Director General that the Agency has reached gender parity in professional categories and higher levels early this year and encourage the Secretariat to continue its efforts to mainstream a gender perspective in programmes and projects. The EU commends the success of the Lise Meitner Programme and is proud to be the largest donor to the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme, supporting an inclusive workforce of both men and women who contribute to and drive global scientific and technological innovation.

In conclusion, let me express our appreciation for the work of Director General Grossi and all staff at the IAEA. Your mission is more essential than ever. You can count on our full support.

Thank you, President.

3.2.4. EU Statement on Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine at the 69th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna, 18/09/2025)

President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 26 European Union Member States. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

More than three and a half years have passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an act that constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the very principles of the IAEA Statute.

We commend Director General Grossi and the Agency's experts for their determination and courage in maintaining presence at Ukraine's Nuclear Power Plants, despite challenging and dangerous conditions. Their monitoring work remains essential to keeping the international community informed about nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in Ukraine, as well as delivering necessary assistance. We also thank the Agency for continuing to implement safeguards under Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol in these circumstances. We welcome the recent signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the IAEA and Ukraine in Rome, which aims to support Ukraine's energy reconstruction efforts.

The EU and its Member States call for the respect of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during armed conflict.

Russia's continuing attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure pose grave risks to nuclear safety and security. The EU is deeply concerned by the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which, since May, has depended on a single off-site power line out of ten. Military activity continues to prevent the repair and reconnection of a backup line, further weakening an already fragile safety and security environment. We urge Russia to allow essential repairs to take place. The lack of proper maintenance, licensed staff and of cooling water do not allow normal operating conditions. The five concrete principles to help ensure

nuclear safety and security at Ukraine's ZNPP, as presented by the Director General, should be fulfilled in full extent.

We are also concerned by significant intensification of Russian drone strikes, which further jeopardize the nuclear safety and security of all of Ukraine's NPPs. Of particular concern are the IAEA's reports of multiple drones flying near other Ukrainian NPPs, posing direct threats to nuclear safety and security. In February, a drone strike seriously damaged the New Safe Confinement at Chernobyl, undermining years of international effort and nearly EUR 1.5 billion of investment. The EU alone has contributed EUR 432 million to this project. Earlier this year, the EU pledged an additional EUR 37 million for nuclear safety in Ukraine, part of which will support repairs to the New Safe Confinement.

The damage from Russian drone strikes to the critical substations, as observed and documented by the IAEA's teams, also pose risks to the safety of Ukraine's nuclear facilities. Furthermore, this increases the risk of a complete loss of off-site power, placing nuclear safety in even greater peril.

We also take note of the challenges that Ukraine is facing in maintaining effective and continuous regulatory control, as well as in recovering high-activity radioactive sources during an armed conflict.

In this context, we ask the Agency to brief Member States on its findings concerning the application of its safety standards and nuclear security guidance during armed conflicts.

President,

The EU unequivocally condemns Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. We reiterate our call on Russia to comply with the IAEA General Conferences and Board of Governors resolutions. Russia must immediately and unconditionally withdraw its military and other unauthorized personnel and equipment from the ZNPP and from the entire territory of Ukraine, and return full control to Ukraine's competent sovereign authorities.

We also call upon all States and international organisations to refrain from any action that would recognise any alteration by Russia of the status of any of the Ukrainian regions and the ownership of the ZNPP.

A lasting and resilient energy system can only be achievable through a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine including a full and unconditional ceasefire. The EU reiterates its unwavering support for such a peace, in line with the principles of the UN Charter, based on full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. We remain committed to offer robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression.

In closing, the EU calls on all delegations to support the work of the IAEA in Ukraine and to vote in favour of the draft Resolution before us.

Thank you, President.

3.2.5. EU Statement – 14th Article XIV Conference in support of the Entry-into-Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (New York, 27/09/2025)

Distinguished Co-Presidents,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

I thank the Secretary General for convening this Conference and thank all distinguished high representatives of State Signatories for their engagement and support.

Let me start by congratulating Sweden and the Philippines on assuming the Presidency of the Article XIV Conference, and express our appreciation to Norway and Panama for their work as previous Coordinators. I assure you of the European Union's full support and cooperation in our collective efforts to promote the CTBT's entry into force.

Distinguished Co-Presidents, Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have gathered here today at a time marked by Russia's continued illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, increased global and regional tensions and continuing proliferation crises.

During these challenging times, when multilateralism is under increasing pressure, we must redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, promote the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and advance towards its entry into force.

Distinguished Co-Presidents, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The CTBT is a key pillar of our collective security and an indispensable multilateral instrument to advance towards nuclear disarmament and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent a serious danger to international peace and security, and undermine the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Halting all nuclear-weapon and other nuclear explosions limits the development of new or improved nuclear arms and thus serves as an effective support for disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The EU stresses that all States Signatories are obliged to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, pending the Treaty's entry into force.

Promoting the entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT remains a top priority of the European Union. All 27 EU Member States have ratified the Treaty, and we remain strongly committed to it. The CTBT would codify the global norm against nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and reinforce international peace and security.

Since our last meeting, Papua New Guinea has ratified the Treaty bringing us one-step closer to its universalization. It is regrettable that no further progress was made among Annex 2 States that still need to sign or ratify the Treaty. The EU deeply deplores the unprecedented decision by the Russian Federation, contrary to its NPT and other commitments, to revoke its ratification of the CTBT.

The EU calls on all States, which have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty, without any preconditions or delay. It is crucial for international peace and security that all States fully abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, we call on all States to continue to honour their engagements and reaffirm their commitments.

No state should conduct nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The EU strongly condemns the nuclear tests carried out by DPRK and urges the DPRK to comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions to refrain from testing nuclear devices and ballistic missiles, reaffirm the moratorium on long-range ballistic missile and nuclear tests, and sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay.

While the goal of bringing the Treaty into force has not been achieved yet, the CTBT has established itself as a strong, fully verifiable instrument, signed by 187 States and ratified by 178.

Its International Monitoring System has already demonstrated its value in providing independent and reliable data that will help deter non-compliance and strengthen transparency. Following the DPRK's nuclear tests, reliable and independent data was quickly available for decision-makers, enabling the international community to respond appropriately and swiftly. The fact that all States Signatories already adhere to its objectives further demonstrate the CTBT's strength and value. Its entry into force will outlaw nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions in a verifiable way, for good. This is what we must continue to strive for.

Distinguished Co-Presidents,

The EU is a strong supporter of the CTBTO. Since 2006, the EU has provided extra budgetary contributions of more than EUR 29.5 million for the strengthening of the CTBTO's monitoring and verification capabilities. The EU considers that IMS data should be exploited also for civil and scientific purposes, following the precedent of its use for tsunami warning that was approved by consensus, and supports capacity building in this regard. We call upon all States to honour their financial obligations and step up their political support for the CTBTO. At the same time, ensuring the sustainability and effectiveness of the verification regime, through adequate funding, remains crucial.

On its part, the EU will continue to use every opportunity to advocate the Treaty's prompt entry into force and universalization in international fora and with third countries that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty.

Thank you.

3.2.6. Press release of the Council of the EU – “Iran sanctions snapback: Council reimposes restrictive measures” (29/09/2025)

Today, the Council agreed to reimpose a number of restrictive measures in relation to Iran's nuclear proliferation activities, that had then been suspended with the entry into force of the Joint Plan of Action (JCPoA or Iran nuclear deal) in 2015.

The decision was taken after the reintroduction of the UN sanctions, following of the UN Security Council's decision not to extend the lifting of sanctions on Iran. This occurred after the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) invoked the “snapback” mechanism foreseen in the JCPoA.

The measures reintroduced today include both those adopted by the UN Security Council since 2006 with successive UNSC resolutions and automatically transposed into EU law, and EU autonomous measures. They concern:

1. travel bans for individuals, asset freezes for individuals and entities and, in line with this, the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to those listed
2. economic and financial sanctions, covering the trade, financial and transport sectors.

Trade

In addition to the arms export ban to Iran and the ban on transfer of any items, materials, good and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes, the measures also include bans on:

- imports, purchase and transport of crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical and petroleum products and related services
- the sale or supply of key equipment used in the energy sector
- the sale or supply of gold, other precious metals and diamonds
- certain naval equipment
- certain software

Financial sector

The EU is reimposing the freezing of assets of the Central Bank of Iran and of major Iranian commercial banks.

Transport sector

Lastly the EU is reinstating measures to prevent access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights, and to prohibit the maintenance and service of Iranian cargo aircraft or vessels carrying prohibited materials or goods.

Background

On 14 July 2015, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) plus Germany, supported by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, reached an agreement with Iran on a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The plan set out a series of successive steps to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme would exist exclusively for civilian and peaceful purposes.

The UNSC consequently adopted resolution 2231(2015) endorsing the JCPoA in July 2015. The resolution also defined the schedule and commitments to be undertaken by all parties to lead to the termination of sanction against Iran on 16 January 2016 (implementation day).

In October 2015 the Council adopted declaration 2015/C 345/01 lifting all EU nuclear-related sanctions in accordance with the JCPoA and stressing that the EU would reintroduce sanctions in case of significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments under the agreement, upon joint recommendation to the Council by the High Representative and the E3.

On 28 August 2025, the E3 notified to the UN Security Council their assessment that Iran was in significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPoA, therefore triggering the “snapback” process providing for the re-introduction of UN sanctions, after a 30-day period. On August 29, the High Representative, France and Germany sent a joint recommendation to the Council calling for the reintroduction of all EU nuclear-related sanctions that had been suspended or terminated (2015/C 345/01 of 18 October 2015). In absence of a new resolution from the UN Security Council regarding the prevention of the ‘snapback’ of UN sanctions on Iran on September 17, 2025, the sanctions regime is re-imposed.

3.3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

3.3.1. Statement of the European Union by H.E. Ulf Melgaard, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the OPCW, at the 109th Session of the Executive Council (The Hague, 08/07/2025)

Mr. Chairperson,
Director-General,
Distinguished guests,

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU).

Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, San Marino and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

The European Union commends H.E. Ambassador Andrés Terán Parral of Ecuador for his able stewardship of the Executive Council during his chairmanship. We extend a warm welcome to the new Chairperson, H.E. Ambassador Thomas Schieb of Germany, and assure him of our full support in steering the work of the Council. The European Union also wishes to express its full confidence OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, and the Secretariat.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Chemical Weapons Convention is one of the success stories and key pillars of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The European Union will continue to actively promote its full and effective implementation, as well as its universalisation. A concrete expression of this are the four on-going EU voluntary financial contributions totalling EUR 8.7 million in support of the OPCW activities for the period 2023-6. As a member of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, the EU is committed to ensuring full accountability for those responsible for these heinous crimes. Furthermore, the EU is currently renewing its chemical weapons sanctions. The restrictive measures against individuals and entities involved in the proliferation and use of chemical weapons currently apply until October 2025.

Mr. Chairperson,

Today, almost 3 and a half years since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, the European Union reiterates its resolute condemnation of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of international law including the UN Charter. We reaffirm our continued support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. We reconfirm the EU's unwavering commitment to providing continued political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes. Russia must not prevail.

The European Union is seriously concerned by the growing number of reported cases of uses of Riot Control Agents by Russia as a method of warfare, which is explicitly prohibited by the Convention, as well as by the alleged use of choking agent chloropicrin against Ukrainian soldiers. Ignoring legitimate international concerns, Russia still has not provided a credible explanation pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 2 and 3 of the Convention.

Instead, Russia continues to deflect its responsibilities and distort facts with disinformation, whereas the results of the three TAV reports point to a pattern of riot control use as a method of warfare in the frontlines in Ukraine. In light of the seriousness of the situation and to enhance

the global norm against the use of chemical weapons, the European Union continues to call for a timely attribution of the proven use of riot control agents as a method of warfare.

The international community also still awaits a credible response from Russia regarding the poisoning of Mr. Alexei Navalny in August 2020. The European Union hence calls on Russia to allow an independent and transparent international investigation into his sudden death on 16 February 2024, as well as the assassination attempt on his life with a nerve agent of the Novichok group.

Mr. Chairperson,

Following the fall of the Assad regime, the EU has consistently reiterated its support for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition. At the Ninth Brussels Conference on “Standing with Syria” on 17 March 2025 the EU announced a significant financial package—nearly €2.5 billion for 2025 and 2026—reflecting the EU’s broader commitment to supporting Syria’s transition, socio-economic recovery, and urgent humanitarian needs. On 28 May 2025 the EU lifted its economic sanctions on Syria, further confirming the EU’s support for Syria’s transition.

In parallel, the European Union is preparing a substantial voluntary financial contribution to support the OPCW’s activities in Syria to ensure clarification of the full extent of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons programme, the inventory and verified destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stocks, as well as accountability for the use of chemical weapons. We urge all States Parties to consider contributing to this effort.

In this context, the European Union commends the Syrian transitional authorities’ cooperation with the OPCW and encourages it to ensure Syria’s return to full compliance of the Convention as soon as possible. We have taken good note of the Secretariat’s briefings and in-country deployments and look forward to swift implementation of the next steps to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme for good, to counter proliferation risks and to hold the perpetrators to account.

Mr. Chairperson,

The European Union has taken note with concern of the information indicating possible use of chemical weapons in Sudan. Pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 4 of the Convention, the Executive Council has been seized to clarify the situation. The allegations of use of chemical weapons should be addressed in an expeditious, objective and transparent manner. In this context, we welcome the confirmation that the Secretariat is monitoring all relevant situations and any allegations of use of chemical weapons that could arise, and stands ready to assist, if requested, in accordance with the Convention.

Thank you.

3.3.2. Statement of the European Union by H.E. Ambassador Stephan Klement, EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, European External Action Service, at the 30th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 24/11/2025)

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU).

Andorra, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

The European Union pays tribute to H.E. Ambassador Almir Šahović of Bosnia and Herzegovina for his steering of the 29th Conference of States Parties. We welcome H.E. Ambassador Agustín Vásquez Gómez of El Salvador as the Chairperson of the 30th Conference of States Parties and assure him of our full support. The EU also expresses its appreciation to H.E. Ambassador Thomas Schieb of Germany for the effective and constructive conduct of the 110th Executive Council at which important decisions and recommendations were taken on Syria, the biannual Budget and Programme as well the new OPCW Director-General. The EU warmly congratulates H.E. Ambassador Sabrina Dallafior Matter for her appointment as the next Director-General.

Mr. Chairperson,

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, as well as 28 years since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, chemical weapons continue to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. The current global security landscape, re-emergence of chemical weapons use, emerging technologies and abandoned chemical weapons present major challenges for the implementation of the Convention.

The EU will continue to actively support and promote the full and effective implementation of the Convention, as well as its universalisation. The EU is consistently a top voluntary financial contributor to the OPCW's key activities. Today, I am pleased to inform of a new voluntary financial contribution approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 20 November 2025. The grant consists of EUR 4,450,000 in support the OPCW activities in Syria and Ukraine including the provision of satellite imagery for 2026-27.

Mr. Chairperson,

On 3 November 2025, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee overwhelmingly reaffirmed its strong support for the Convention and for upholding of the norm against the use of chemical weapons. The annual resolution tabled by Poland is an unequivocal expression of support for the OPCW and its activities from all regions.

The EU expresses its full confidence in the Secretariat and commends the effective leadership of OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias. We welcome the confirmations that the Secretariat is monitoring all relevant situations and any allegations of use of chemical weapons, and stands ready to assist if requested. The EU supports the revised draft Biennium Programme and Budget for 2026-27. We also continue to encourage OPCW's efforts to promote gender equality, geographic representation, tenure flexibility and civil society engagement. Embracing opportunities from emerging technologies is essential to keep the Organisation fit for purpose.

Mr. Chairperson,

The EU welcomes the Syrian transitional authorities' determination to cooperate with OPCW. We consider this commitment an essential and positive step toward rebuilding trust, transparency and accountability in a dossier that remains crucial for international peace and security. We would like to commend Qatar's efforts in facilitating this reset in an efficient and timely manner.

We welcome progress towards achieving the verified and irreversible elimination of any remnants of the Assad-era chemical weapons programme. This is a complex undertaking and as long as it is not finished, the risk of proliferation remains significant. It is crucial that this work begins without delay. In this context, we take note with satisfaction of the eight in-country deployments carried out by the Secretariat and the work to establish a permanent presence in Damascus. These missions are a clear demonstration of the Secretariat's engagement,

even under difficult and complex circumstances. The EU will continue to support the OPCW's Syria-related activities financially, and encourages others to pledge in-kind and financial resources to enable future operations, as called for by the Secretariat.

Mr. Chairperson,

Since more than three years now, Russia's unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine continues to inflict a devastating toll on the country and its people. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment and support - with all available means at our disposal – for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence.

The spillover effects of Russian aggression are felt in the wider region and across the globe, resulting in the deterioration of the global security environment, as well as the re-emergence of use of chemical weapons. The EU is seriously concerned by the ever-growing number of registered cases of use of Riot Control Agents (RCA) by Russia as a method of warfare, which is explicitly prohibited by the Convention, as well as by credible reports of the use of choking agent chloropicrin against Ukrainian soldiers.

Three OPCW Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) reports confirm the presence of riot control agents in samples collected from the frontlines in Ukraine. These reports were prepared following strict international protocols for investigation, sample analysis and chain of custody. The TAV reports, together with the cases registered by the Ukrainian authorities, point to a pattern of systematic riot control agent use by Russia as a method of warfare. Russia still has not provided a credible explanation pursuant to Article IX of the Convention. Instead, it continues to deflect its responsibilities and distort facts with disinformation campaigns.

In light of the seriousness of the situation, the EU continues to call for a timely attribution of responsibility for this proven breach of the Convention. It is our common responsibility to take action against violations of the Convention, and hold perpetrators of all and any confirmed chemical attacks to account.

Mr. Chairperson,

Russia has a long track record of violating international law, including the UN Charter. Its blatant disregard for multilateral agreements, as well as disarmament and non-proliferation architecture have led to its exclusion from various executive bodies of these conventions and organisations. Russia's breaches of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as its war against another member of the Eastern European Group, make it unfit for a leadership position also in our Organisation. An overwhelming majority of the EEG is not comfortable with the idea that Russia, an aggressor against another State Party of the same region, would represent them in the Executive Council. This is a question that is of concern to all States Parties alike. The EU encourages States Parties to respect the will of the EEG majority and support the candidacies of Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.

Thank you.

3.4. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

3.4.1. Statement by the Spokesperson on the 50th anniversary of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Today marks the 50th anniversary of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

The Biological Weapons Convention is a cornerstone of global security. It was the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, establishing stringent international norms against their development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use.

The Treaty now has 188 States Parties. All States not yet party to the Convention should join without delay – universal adherence is essential to addressing both traditional and emerging biological threats.

The European Union remains committed to ensuring that biological weapons are never developed, produced, or used.

We will continue to promote consistently and tirelessly the universalisation, confidence-building measures, and strengthening of the Convention.

Rapid scientific advancements demand heightened vigilance and decisive collective action. The EU is committed to strengthening the Convention. All States Parties must redouble their efforts and work together to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention against evolving global threats.

3.4.2. EU statement for cluster II (Other Weapons of Mass Destruction) – UN General Assembly First Committee (New York, 25/10/2025)

Mr Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a grave threat to international peace and security. The risk that non-state actors, including terrorists could access WMD or their means of delivery remains real. In line with the EU's Strategy against the proliferation of WMD, one of the central goals of the EU's Common and Foreign Policy is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate such programmes worldwide. Compliance with and enforcement of international obligations applicable to these weapons therefore remains a fundamental pillar of global efforts to uphold the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and to prevent its erosion.

The use of chemical weapons poses a significant threat to international peace and security. Such an act by anyone – be it a State or a non-state actor – anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances is a violation of international law and can amount to some of the most serious crimes – war crimes and crimes against humanity. The European Union stands united for the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, and continues to support the OPCW politically and financially. We also remain steadfast in defending the Organisation

against deliberate and baseless attacks on its integrity and credibility. We reiterate our call upon those States not yet party to the CWC to join the Convention without further delay.

The European Union is seriously concerned by the growing number of cases of uses of riot control agents by Russia as a method of warfare, which is explicitly prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as by the use of choking agent chloropicrin against Ukrainian soldiers. Russia has still not provided a credible response to these legitimate concerns pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 2 and 3 of the Convention. In light of the seriousness of the situation and to enhance the global norm against the use of chemical weapons, the European Union calls for a timely attribution of the proven use of riot control agents as a method of warfare.

The European Union welcomes the Syrian transitional authorities' cooperation with the OPCW and calls on the transitional government to ensure swift implementation of the next steps to fully eliminate Syria's chemical weapons programme and to counter proliferation risks. The EU is supporting this process through a substantive voluntary financial contribution to support the OPCW's activities in Syria with a view to verifying and eliminating the Assad era chemical weapons programme, as well as identifying the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks committed in the Syrian Arab Republic.

We reaffirm our unequivocal support for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired and used as weapons. We welcome the recent accessions of Comoros and Kiribati to the Convention, which contribute to strengthening the BTWC, the universal norm against biological and toxin weapons. We call on the remaining eight States outside the Convention to join at the earliest date. The EU is encouraged by the productive work undertaken by the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention to date. It should complete its work as soon as possible, preferably in 2025 as urged by the 9th Review Conference, in order to establish the Science and Technology Review mechanism and the International Cooperation and Assistance mechanism. It should also endorse clear recommendations on further strengthening the functioning of the Convention. Measures to improve, monitor, and verify compliance with the Convention are significant steps towards the strengthening of the Convention, and we support the creation of an OEWG on this topic at the earliest opportunity.

We condemn the deliberate use of disinformation, especially by Russia against Ukraine and its partners, that undermine international peace and security, erode trust among States Parties, and obstruct cooperation and assistance under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. Russia's false claims about legitimate capacity building programmes for biosafety and biosecurity, as well as detection and diagnostics are a striking example in this regard. Such practices not only politicise technical forums but also weaken collective efforts to uphold treaty obligations. Preserving integrity, transparency, and trust must remain at the heart of our common work.

The EU recognises that the only existing independent international instrument for investigating the alleged use of biological weapons is the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (UNSGM) and recalls its strong and long-standing support. We will continue to provide funding for the operationalisation of this independent mechanism.

The EU continues to support the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We consider the 1995 NPT Resolution valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East.

The EU reaffirms the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which continues to be a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture and the EU supports to the implementation of resolution 1540 through its Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/574 and hopes to see its functioning further strengthened.

After two decades of existence, the HCoC has become an important transparency and confidence-building measure, increasingly vital to international security. It remains the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing confidence and transparency about ballistic missiles launches and space launches of the Subscribing States. The EU reaffirms its strong support for the HCoC, including its continuous development and calls on all remaining states to subscribe to the Code.

We recall that effective and transparent export controls are important for facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information. Multilateral export control regimes, as well as national export control systems, are essential for the prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. Therefore, the EU fully supports the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. It reiterates that all EU Member States aspire to join these regimes and will continue to work towards their full inclusion. The EU is fully committed to defending and further developing export controls as universal, effective and responsive non-proliferation tools.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.4.3. Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States at the 2025 Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 15-17/12/2025)

Madam Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

Let me congratulate you, Ambassador Clare Walsh, on assuming the role of Chair of the 2025 Meeting of States Parties (MSP). We are looking forward to your stewardship and assure you of our full support and cooperation in achieving the objectives of this Convention.

This is an important year for the BWC as it marks its 50th anniversary, a remarkable achievement in multilateral disarmament. We reaffirm our unequivocal support for the BTWC as the legally-binding norm against biological weapons and cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents or toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired and used as weapons. While it is encouraging to see that the Convention is becoming nearly universal, we encourage the remaining eight States to follow suit and join the Convention without any further delay.

Madam Chair,

The EU welcomes the advancement of the work of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention and commends its Chair for his efforts.

The EU strongly supports the objective of strengthening the Convention through practical mechanisms, greater transparency and predictability, as well as enhanced international cooperation and assistance, in particular through:

- i. a Science and Technology Advisory Mechanism to review and assess scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention and to provide States Parties with advice;
- ii. a mechanism open to all State Parties to facilitate and support the implementation of international cooperation and assistance under Article X of the Convention;
- iii. and a structured Open-Ended Working Group to examine scientifically founded and technically feasible measures for compliance and verification in order to fulfil the purpose of the convention.

Madam Chair,

The EU will continue its unwavering support for the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, underscoring its commitment to the independent international instrument. The UNSGM is the only existing independent international instrument for investigating an alleged use of biological weapons.

We also would like to reaffirm that observers play a constructive and long-standing role in BWC meetings. Ensuring observer participation is not a mere procedural formality; it significantly enriches our deliberations by ensuring a comprehensive understanding of complex issues, bringing us the latest, up-to-date scientific information and understanding, and contributing to a more informed and inclusive debate.

For many years, the EU and its Member States have been providing assistance to and participating in cooperation projects with many BWC States Parties. Through its Council Decisions, the EU has provided more than EUR 14 million in assistance to BWC States Parties. In addition, through the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative, we enhance preparedness, improve laboratory and border security, and develop national CBRN action plans, including on biosafety, biosecurity, and bio-surveillance. This demand-driven initiative with a budget of over EUR 140 million for 2021–27 supports capacity building in 64 partner countries around the world. Furthermore, the EU also provides support through the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Madam Chair,

Biological threats - whether deliberate, accidental or emerging from natural outbreaks - pose profound risks to global stability. The misuse of scientific and technological advances, the proliferation of high-risk biological capabilities, and the spread of disinformation intended to undermine trust in international norms are challenges that demand our collective vigilance and action. Such attempts erode confidence in this Convention.

I thank you, Madam Chair.

3.5. BALLISTIC MISSILES

3.5.1. DPRK: Statement by the Spokesperson on the latest missile launch (Brussels, 07/01/2025)

The EU condemns the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, which Pyongyang claims was equipped with a hypersonic warhead.

This violates multiple UN Security Council resolutions and further raises tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

The EU expresses its full solidarity with its partners in the region, in particular the Republic of Korea and Japan. The EU urges the DPRK to cease such illegal and escalatory actions, and to take up offers of dialogue by the main parties. This is the only path to sustainable peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

3.5.2. EU Statement on the occasion of the 24th Annual Regular Meeting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Vienna, 04/06/2025)

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of 26 European Union Member States. The following countries align themselves with this statement: Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, San Marino and Ukraine.

Let me start by congratulating Uruguay on assuming the Chair of HCoC for 2025 to 2026 and expressing our appreciation to Ambassador Wetzig for his work, undertaken during Chile's HCoC chairmanship. We also thank Austria for its efficient support to the Code as the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) in Vienna.

Chair,

After over two decades of existence, the HCoC has become an important transparency and confidence-building measure and is all the more important to international security. It is the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing transparency about ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles of the Subscribing States.

The EU reaffirms its strong support for the Code and will continue to actively promote its universalisation, full implementation and efficient functioning. Since 2008, through five consecutive Decisions of the Council of the EU, we continue to provide political and financial support for the Code, including outreach events, regional seminars, expert missions, and research papers, in cooperation with the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS).

It remains in all our interests to ensure the effective functioning of and necessary support for the HCoC – the foremost practical step to address the issue of the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Chair,

We reiterate our resolute condemnation of Russia's brutal and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, with Belarus' complicity, and support by other third countries, actors and entities therein - including arms transfers, and ballistic missiles - and deepening military

cooperation with the DPRK and Iran. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence. We reaffirm our support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law.

Chair,

We remain gravely concerned by the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in particular the pursuit by several countries of concern of ballistic missile programmes in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We call for the immediate dismantlement of such programmes, which are a source of mistrust and contribute to regional instability.

The DPRK continues to launch various new and existing ballistic and cruise missiles while referencing possible use of nuclear weapons, in blatant violation of its obligations under multiple UN Security Council resolutions. These actions threaten regional and international peace and security. The international community must respond with unity to put a stop to the DPRK's unlawful development of ballistic missiles and missile launches.

We strongly condemn the transfer of ballistic missiles and other arms from the DPRK to Russia for use in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine – a flagrant violation of multiple UNSC resolutions, which Russia itself supported. Deepening DPRK-Russia military cooperation risks further emboldening the DPRK in its pursuit of dangerous and illegal ballistic missile and nuclear programmes. We urge the DPRK and Russia to abide by the relevant UNSCRs and to immediately cease all activities that violate them.

We reiterate our position that the DPRK must abandon its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as required under multiple UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to engage in meaningful dialogue with all relevant parties to start building a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

We condemn Iran's continued destabilising activities in and around the Middle East. These include Iran's activities with ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs, and transfers of such advanced weaponry to state and non-state actors. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and calls on all countries to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions and not taken the necessary steps to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

We strongly condemn the continued Iranian military support, including deliveries of unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles to Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. We strongly caution Iran against any new deliveries of weapons to Russia.

Chair,

We continuously call on all UN Member States that have not yet done so to subscribe to the Code. We also encourage all UN Member States to support and vote in favour of the next biennial HCoC Resolution in support of the Hague Code of Conduct, during the 81st Session of the UN General Assembly in 2026. In this regard, we regret the change of Russia's position on the HCoC resolution at the last UN General Assembly. A negative vote on this is detrimental to international peace, confidence and security building. We encourage Russia to use available communication channels through the Intermediate Central Contact of HCoC to

address any relevant issue. Subscribing States should continue to preserve the integrity of the Code and act according to its non-proliferation objectives.

Chair,

The Code was conceived as an instrument to be continuously developed in order to further its aims. That is why the Annual Regular Meeting was entrusted with a mandate to develop it through consensus decisions by the subscribing states present at Annual Regular Meetings. There are many areas in which development could be considered – from the ever-growing relevance of the HCoC to space to the practical implementation of the Code. Such decisions must of course be well prepared to ensure consensus can be achieved and we therefore welcome continuous work of chairs to consider potential areas for further development. Intersessional informal meetings could also be used again to consider this and we stand ready to support the Chair, also in this regard.

Let me conclude Chair, by assuring you of the European Union's full support and cooperation for the issuance of a Communiqué by this Annual Regular Meeting, which should help to increase awareness and mobilise further international support for the HCoC.

Thank you.

3.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

3.6.1. EU General Statement – 11th Conference of the States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (Geneva, 25/08/2025)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Republic of Moldova, as well as the EFTA countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

Eleven years after the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty, the EU reaffirms its unwavering support for the Treaty, as a key international instrument that aims to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating trade in conventional arms.

We recognize the complementary role of the Treaty to other international instruments, such as the UN Programme of Action on SALW, the International Tracing Instrument, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and the Global Framework on Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management. At the same time, the ATT is unique in being the only cross-regional legally binding source of standards to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade, as well as to prevent misuse and diversion of arms.

We are all bound to ensure and maintain the effectiveness of the ATT, supported and advised by the ATT community, bringing together States Parties and other stakeholders: international and regional organizations, industry and business, academia, and, above all, civil society.

The EU is aware of its Member States' global responsibilities in the arms trade, with over 33,700 licences issued in 2023 for a combined value of almost EUR 300 billion, and actual exports accounting for a quarter of the global arms trade.

We are proud to keep the ATT high on the political agenda, supporting it in international fora, funding support for its universalization and implementation, and keeping the Treaty as a centrepiece of the EU Common Position on arms export and the legal frameworks of Member States, thereby developing a collective approach to the implementation of the Treaty. The EU Common Position on arms exports was updated in April this year. One of the priorities of its review process was to embed more closely the ATT obligations in the day-to-day licensing practices of Member States. Core provisions, concepts and understandings from the ATT, such as the relation between conventional arms and gender-based violence (GBV), or the use of military equipment to commit or facilitate serious violations of human rights law and IHL, have become part of the denial criteria of the EU Common Position. These are also now applicable even beyond the scope of the Treaty, to cover the entire EU Common Military List, also applicable in certain cases to dual-use goods, by all EU Member States. The EU also continues to exercise and promote transparency in arms trade, publishing its own annual report in an accessible online form, in compliance with ATT reporting obligations.

Mr. President,

As regards the ATT implementation and adherence progresses, an impressive, rigorous effort has been made within the framework of CSP cycles to support it, but a significant amount of work remains to be done. All States Parties need to become capable of delivering on their legal obligations, including measures against diversion, reporting and financial contributions, and export assessment. To achieve this, a multi-year strategy would be a promising initiative

if goals are clear and measurable. We look forward to discussing it further during this Conference and hopefully beyond.

But, above all, we cannot stay silent about ongoing tragic developments linked to the ATT's subject matter and we must work to ensure the Treaty is fully and effectively implemented.

Now in its fourth year of unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia continues to blatantly violate international law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. In this light, the EU condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's use of various types of conventional weapons against civilians in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Military support to Ukraine as necessary for the exercise of its right to self-defence is consistent with the Treaty. On the contrary, contribution towards Russia's military effort by diversion or supply of parts and components, including items which are turned in Russia, on an industrial scale, into components of missiles and drones used for strikes against civilians and civilian objects of Ukraine, is a violation of Article 6 of the Treaty. No actor involved in such support for an aggressor State can call itself impartial and supportive of peace.

The EU calls for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and the unconditional release of all hostages, leading to a permanent end to hostilities. It deplores the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties and the levels of starvation. Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law.

Mr. President,

Let me conclude by underlining the EU's full support for the Argentinian Presidency, including on its focus topic of universalization, and our commitment to working together towards its successful outcome.

Thank you.

3.6.2. EU statement at the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Small Arms and Light Weapons (New York, 10/11/2025)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, as well as San Marino align themselves with this statement.

Mr. President,

I want to thank Sierra Leone for organizing this important debate, as well as the briefers for their insightful remarks.

In line with our Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, the EU remains fully committed to preventing and curbing the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition worldwide, also through support for the implementation of the Global Framework on Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA). We welcome the preparatory meeting held in June this year and look forward to the first Meeting of States of the GFA in 2027.

The EU expresses full commitment to the implementation of Action Plans until 2030 adopted by the Review Conference on the UN Program of Action on SALW. The Open-Ended Technical Working Group established by the Conference is a timely initiative to address new

developments in manufacturing, technology and design of SALW and we look forward to its first meeting in 2026.

The Secretary-General's report sets the stage for today's debate by rightly capturing the causes for diversion of SALW. However, all these causes for diversion indicate that states must do more to deliver on their duties.

First, as importers and end users: to curb organized crime and cooperate across borders to that end; to ensure the security of their stockpiles; and to effectively regulate and manage cross-border transfers of arms and ammunition. There are international instruments that offer structured response and support: the Arms Trade Treaty, the Global Framework on Ammunition, and the Firearms Protocol. The EU encourages all states to formally adopt such obligations and commitments and to implement them effectively, and it offers broad assistance in doing so.

The EU recognizes and strongly supports the Arms Trade Treaty as the only global source of standards for legitimate trade in arms. We promote the universalization of the Treaty and offer free-of-charge technical assistance in establishing and strengthening national arms export control systems in line with ATT requirements – currently in Africa, Latin America, and South-East Asia. In parallel, we promote the EU's own system of arms export controls among numerous states.

The EU has also funded the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System, a self-assessment tool for states to help them meet commitments of the Global Framework on Ammunition, which is now ready to use free of charge by all willing states.

Second, also the exporters bear a significant share of responsibility for international and regional peace and security. They need to manage risks by implementing pre-transfer assessments. The EU updated in April 2025 its arms export control framework to keep its arms transfers criteria relevant to security challenges. This also includes the duty of EU Member States to focus on a particular diversion risk associated with SALW before granting transfer licenses. The exporters should also strive to establish cooperation with end users of exported items, through post-shipment control and ensuring traceability of arms and ammunition. A prudent exporter state must make use of all those means where needed. The exporter's responsibility does not end with arms and ammunition leaving its borders.

EU Member States invest in individual and regional SALW-control projects: first in our own neighbourhood, to address inevitable consequences of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and by helping the states of the Western Balkans to overcome the dire legacy of the wars in the 1990s. We also work globally, to fund regional organisations through UNODA to support the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW and the International Tracing Instrument.

The EU's global iTrace program has set a new quality standard for tracing the origin of diverted firearms, which has attracted cooperation by many states and attained some noteworthy results. Its spinoff actions help address the circumvention of EU and UN arms embargoes, most notably related to the DPRK's involvement in support of Russia's war against Ukraine. The findings of iTrace have become a wakeup call for many governments and businesses regarding diversion, and help shape cooperation with manufacturers, intermediaries, and end users.

Mr. President,

The EU remains a responsible partner in arms control. We stand ready to cooperate with all stakeholders to prevent arms diversion.

Thank you once again to the Presidency for taking the initiative to convene today's debate.

3.6.3. EU Statement – 10th Annual Pledging Conference – Support to Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 12/03/2025)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries Türkiye, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

First, allow me to commend Japan's Presidency for supporting our collective efforts in building on the results of the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. We also seize this opportunity to thank again Cambodia for hosting and organizing the Summit. Rest reassured of the EU's continued and resolute engagement to implement the ambitious action plan adopted in Siem Reap-Angkor last November.

Anti-personnel landmines pose a long-lasting threat to civilians, impede socio-economic development and hinder humanitarian access. Their use anywhere, anytime, and by any actor remains completely unacceptable to the European Union and we are resolved to continue our intense efforts in achieving a mine-free world including through financial assistance.

The EU welcomes the Tenth Pledging Conference and continues to strongly encourage all States and donors to support the effective implementation of the Convention in all its aspects through the sustainable financing of humanitarian mine action, as well as all efforts leading to its universalisation. The European Union maintains its strong engagement in funding and supporting mine action worldwide and will continue to do so in the future.

Under Council Decision 2021/257 adopted in February 2021, EUR 2.6 million have been allocated to the implementation of the Oslo Action Plan to promote the universalisation of the Convention and help States Parties to meet their obligations, in particular to implement non-technical surveys, mine clearance and mine risk education, as well as to develop policies to best assist mine victims and affected communities in a non-discriminatory manner addressing their specific needs, including mental health and psychosocial support. The projects under this decision are coming to an end this month.

The EU is resolute in its commitment to supporting the implementation of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan. In the coming months, the EU will adopt a new dedicated fund for the projects to be carried out by the Implementation Support Unit. We are pleased to announce that EUR 2.7 million will be allocated in the next four years to continue promoting the universalisation of the Convention and its full and effective implementation through inclusive processes, in particular national stakeholder dialogues.

The EU seizes this opportunity to commend the engagement and hard work of the small ISU team, and its exemplary implementation of the EU projects. The EU aims to continue supporting the work of the ISU in the future and encourages all partners and States Parties to continue to do so as well.

The EU remains the world's second largest donor in mine action, having contributed over EUR 180 million to humanitarian mine action since 2023. The list of countries having received EU funding for mine action activities is very long, across all continents and regions of the world. Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan (risk education, victim assistance and mine clearance), Colombia (mine clearance and rehabilitation of former combatants), Croatia, Libya, Syria and

Ukraine are only a few to be mentioned. We sincerely hope that our collective European commitment for mine action in States not Party will bring these States closer to the Convention.

Ukraine continues to be one of the most mine-contaminated countries in the world with over 23 % of its territory at risk of landmines or other explosive ordnance. The fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates the cost for clearance of explosive ordnance at around USD 29.8 billion in the long-term. The sheer size of Ukraine requires an efficient mine action strategy, decisive action and continued international support to help Ukraine in tackling this challenge. Mine action remains key to ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access. The overall priority is clear: to ensure protection of civilians and safely return as much land, as fast as possible, back to civilian use. This is a crucial pre-condition to enable displaced people to return to their homes and for the economic recovery of the country.

The EU will continue to stand by the Ukrainian people to make their land safe again. We are fully committed to supporting mine action governance reform and enhancing demining efforts, while exploring additional resource allocations in line with Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy until 2033. Through sustained engagement and targeted support, the EU aims to contribute to the effective implementation of these efforts, ensuring comprehensive and lasting impact.

Together with its Member States, the EU is providing more than EUR 370 million to support humanitarian demining in Ukraine since 2022. This includes more than EUR 80 million financed through EU rapid response and humanitarian assistance, including support for the Ukrainian government and state operators in implementing the National Mine Action Strategy, assistance to humanitarian actors for mine clearance, non-technical surveys, and mine risk education, as well as the procurement of essential demining equipment and specialized training.

Moreover, an additional crisis response measure of approximately EUR 11 million is being adopted for 2025 to further enhance Mine Action efforts in Ukraine. This funding will further focus on key priorities in line with the Ukrainian National Mine Action Strategy, with the goal of ensuring a targeted and effective response to Ukraine's most urgent needs while simultaneously strengthening national capacities to implement long-term mine action.

To achieve the objective of a mine-free world, the European Union emphasizes the need to help all countries affected by mine contamination, whether heavily affected or not, as well as those suffering from mine contamination for a long time and being close to complete their demining activities. In this regard, we welcome the efforts to explore the feasibility of a Voluntary Trust Fund within the APMBC to assist countries that are close to finishing their mine clearance obligations under the Convention.

The EU is committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into its mine action work. We continue to support the work of stakeholders in mine action to advance gender equality and take into account the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into humanitarian mine action policies.

Madam President,

Today's Conference provides us with an opportunity to renew our collective commitment to the comprehensive prohibition of anti-personnel mines, towards the goal of a mine-free world, and to enhance cooperation and assistance for mine action, in particular in the current global context that brings so many new challenges to the Convention.

In conclusion, we would like to take this opportunity to encourage all States Parties to contribute to mine action, including to the work of the Implementation Support Unit, which is critical to the functioning of the Convention.

I thank you.

3.6.4. EU Statement on Victim Assistance – 22nd Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 03/12/2025)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its Member States.

The candidate countries Türkiye, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Republic of Moldova, as well as the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

At the outset, I would like to seize this opportunity, Madam President, to express the appreciation of the European Union for your personal engagement and command your leadership in guiding this meeting. You may be assured of the strongest engagement of the European Union in support of your efforts. We would like also to welcome the Marshall Islands and Tonga as new States Parties to the Convention, and to join others in wishing them all success.

The European Union would like also to thank the members of the Committee on Victim Assistance for your work, and for the update on your activities.

Madam President,

The EU has been resolutely engaged in supporting mine victims and persons with disabilities through its policies and assistance for decades.

As long as anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature and explosive remnants of war, continue to affect the lives of millions of civilians across the world, the EU will continue to engage and to support victims and survivors. We recognise the devastating humanitarian, social, economic and developmental impact of these weapons, and we will continue to work on victim assistance in our efforts towards achieving a mine-free world. In 2024, the EU remained a major donor to mine action across the globe, having contributed over EUR 110 million to humanitarian mine action, including EUR 13.2 million specifically for victim assistance.

On April 14th, 2025, the EU reaffirmed its continuous financial support to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention by adopting Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/781. This allocates EUR 2.7 million to the ISU for 2025-2029 to contribute to the full implementation of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, including victim assistance commitments under actions 30 to 39. The EU commends the ISU for its continued efforts in this regard.

Madam President,

The EU has been, and continues to be, engaged in support of mine victims, survivors and persons with disabilities through its policies and assistance.

We support full, equal, effective, and non-discriminatory participation of mine victims and survivors in society. Furthermore, we will continue to provide sustained and continuous assistance to victims to fulfil their rights in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and strengthen synergies with this important

instrument. In this regard, mainstreaming a gender perspective into mine action work, supporting the efforts of stakeholders, and taking into consideration the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities for humanitarian mine action policies remain a top priority for the EU.

We support States Parties in developing clear, measurable victim assistance plans and promoting international and regional cooperation with civil society to build sustainable capacities, while ensuring the meaningful participation of affected communities in all matters that affect them. In this matter, the EU will support regional and national stakeholder dialogues, as well as expert meetings to advance victim assistance in line with the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan. The EU intends to support the Committee on Victim Assistance and the Convention President in convening a Fourth Global Conference on Victim Assistance building on the successes of previous Conferences held in Colombia (2014), Jordan (2019), and Cambodia (2023).

Madam President,

The EU encourages the development of policies to best assist mine victims and survivors in a non-discriminatory manner, addressing the specific needs of all and leaving no one behind. We also encourage commitments by all States Parties to fully implement their obligations under the Convention, including by taking appropriate assistance measures beyond mine clearance, when they are in a position to do so, to ensure social and economic rehabilitation of mine victims and survivors.

We underline the necessity to provide context-specific emergency medical care and early rehabilitation services to new casualties that are both effective and efficient. We must continue to improve national capacities through training and risk education and ensure that mine and other explosive ordnance survivors, as well as affected families and communities, have access to psychological and psychosocial support services in line with the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.

Madam President,

Let me conclude that, as long as there are victims and survivors, the EU will provide them with sustained assistance to fulfil their rights. We encourage all international stakeholders to continue to provide funding to, and support, capacity-building in States Parties with reported mine victims. We call on all States Parties to intensify their efforts and to implement fully the actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.

Thank you, Madam President.

3.6.5. EU Statement on Mine Clearance – 22nd Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Geneva, 04/12/2025)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU).

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Republic of Moldova as well as the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

The European Union would like to thank the Committee for its work regarding the implementation of Article 5 and related mine clearance actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.

The European Union has taken note of the report addressed to all States Parties by the Article 5 Committee on 5 November 2025 and thanks its members for all the work accomplished. The EU notes the difficulties reported in the exchanges with the States submitting deadline extensions requests and renews its encouragements to all States to respect the obligation under the Convention. Repeated delays and difficulties may contribute to discouraging donors.

Additionally, the EU encourages States Parties whose territories are reported to be contaminated by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, to continue building awareness on the need to address this contamination within the framework of the Convention.

Madam President,

The EU have a long-standing history of supporting States Parties in their full and effective implementation of the Convention, particularly in mine clearance and stockpile destruction. The EU reaffirms its strong commitment to the implementation of Article 5 and to continue to assist mine-affected States Parties in meeting their obligations under Article 5.

On 14 April, 2025, the EU reaffirmed its continuous financial support to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention by adopting Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/781, allocating EUR 2.7 million to the ISU for the period 2025-2029 to contribute to the full implementation of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, including its actions 17 to 29 related to clearance of mined areas, survey and mine risk education. This is the fifth consecutive project undertaken by the EU since 2008.

Madam President,

In 2024, the EU has contributed EUR 110 million to mine action globally, including mine clearance.

Ukraine benefitted the largest part, with EUR 50 million dedicated to building survey capabilities, and innovative survey capabilities, purchase of clearance machines, direct support to mine clearance and mine clearance governance and training, and to early recovery mechanisms. Since 2022, Ukraine has received EUR 360 million for mine clearance and other mine clearance activities, including EUR 85 million through the rapid response mechanism.

Beyond Ukraine, the EU also maintains its engagement in other mine-affected countries. In 2024, Libya has benefitted EUR 1 million for the second phase of an action in support of stabilisation and human security through humanitarian demining. In Afghanistan, the EU has allocated EUR 3.4 million to a humanitarian demining project carried out by HALO Trust. Additionally, Croatia has received EUR 40 million in 2024 for the final phase of demining its forests. Croatia plans to be fully demined by 2026.

In 2024, DG ECHO (the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations) funded 13 actions under the sector of mine action, for a total contracted amount of EUR 13.2 million. Mine action interventions were implemented in 8 countries: Afghanistan, Ukraine, Yemen, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Myanmar and Sudan. Performed activities were in the sub-sectors of mine education and mine risk reduction, victim assistance, humanitarian demining. Among these projects, three were solely mine action interventions, while 10 were multi-sectoral projects combining mine action with other sectors.

The EU further encourages a collective approach and welcomes efforts from all States Parties to increase financial and technical support for mine clearance to help the remaining contaminated States to be declared mine-free.

Madam President,

The EU strongly condemns Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its massive use of anti-personnel mines and improvised anti-personnel mines, that makes Ukraine the most mine-contaminated country in the world. We are also deeply concerned about contaminations in countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, as well as in the Sahel, in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and also Ethiopia.

We remain fully committed to supporting the implementation of Article 5 by promoting national ownership and building the capacity of States Parties to respond to both known and newly discovered contamination. Our efforts focus not only on clearance and reporting, but also on ensuring sustainable national capacities, enhancing mine risk education, and encouraging the use of innovative technologies. Through national and regional dialogues, we aim to foster partnerships, increase transparency, and strengthen coordination among stakeholders, in line with the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.

The EU reminds all States that Article 5 deadline extension requests should be considered an exceptional measure and appeals to them to make every effort to complete their obligations under the Treaty in full and on time.

Madam President,

The EU will contribute constructively to collective progress under the Convention and recalls its support and readiness to engage in mine clearance activities, reaffirming its strong commitment to upholding the norm against anti-personnel mines.

I thank you, Madam President.

3.6.6. EU Statement – 13th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Geneva, 18/09/2025)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

We wish to congratulate you, Ambassador Carlos D. Sorreta, Permanent Representative of Philippines, on assuming the role of President of the Thirteen Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). We look forward to your stewardship and assure you of our full support and cooperation in advancing this Convention.

Mr. President,

First of all, we welcome Vanuatu as a new State Party to this Convention and look forward to working with its delegation.

This year marks the fifteenth anniversary of the Convention's entry into force – a significant milestone in our shared global commitment to realizing its noble objectives. The Convention has significantly contributed to alleviating human suffering and the humanitarian impact of these weapons, while advancing the cause of humanitarian disarmament. We commend the progress achieved by States Parties in its implementation. Our collective efforts and commitment to international humanitarian law, underscore the importance of effective measures to mitigate and ultimately prevent the harm caused by unexploded ordnance.

The European Union reaffirms its steadfast commitment to the humanitarian objectives pursued by the CCM and by other international disarmament instruments: to end the suffering

caused by the devastating impacts of explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions, protect civilians, and advance the Sustainable Development Goals.

In the current geopolitical context, it is crucial that humanitarian instruments remain strong with full compliance with all obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law. In light of recent developments, we are convinced that continued adherence to the CCM and its principles is vital for this important humanitarian instrument.

The humanitarian impact of cluster munitions continues to be felt. We are gravely concerned by reports, including those highlighted in the 2024 Cluster Munition Monitor, which confirm that the use of these weapons tragically persists in recent conflicts. The indiscriminate use of these weapons continues to cause unacceptable harm to civilians, including children, and creates long-term contamination that delays recovery and development.

In this regard, we reiterate our strong condemnation of Russia's ongoing unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine in blatant violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Credible reports show that cluster munitions have been used in Ukraine. Russian forces continued use of cluster munitions in densely populated urban areas is particularly alarming. The EU strongly condemns Russia's continued air and missile attacks against Ukraine's civilians and civilian infrastructure, including unacceptable targeting of the energy sector. Schools, medical facilities, and other civilian infrastructure have increasingly come under attack by Russian forces in Ukraine. We call on Russia to immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces, military equipment and proxies from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. Russia's war and its repercussions for European and global security constitute an existential challenge for the European Union. The EU reiterates its support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law.

Mr. President,

We are pleased to see that all of the 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 179 million sub-munitions. The full implementation of Article 3 obligations by all States Parties marked a significant milestone in the Convention's history. This achievement sends a strong signal: the international community can effectively eliminate these weapons when political will and cooperation converge.

The EU also welcomes progress being made in clearance of contaminated areas by cluster munition remnants, but much remains to be done. We call on States Parties with outstanding obligations to accelerate their efforts and to share best practices, including on resource mobilisation and risk reduction.

A particular priority remains Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), which is saving lives every day. We encourage all States Parties to mainstream EORE in their national action plans and to ensure that persons or communities in vulnerable situations are reached.

The EU and its Member States remain among the largest donors to mine action, providing sustained political, financial and technical support for clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance and risk education, including in particular in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and other affected regions.

We also recall that victim assistance is not only a legal obligation, but a moral imperative. We encourage States Parties to integrate these measures into national health, social and development policies in a gender-responsive and inclusive manner. Where possible, we support seeking synergies in the implementation of the CCM with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and other relevant disarmament instruments, such as the

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and CCW Protocol V, especially on victim assistance, clearance, and survey.

We also welcome the commitment to gender mainstreaming across the Convention as decided by States Parties at the Second Review Conference. An inclusive and gender-balanced approach in implementation activities at the national level and in the Convention's machinery, including its meetings, remains crucial and should be further advanced.

We are also concerned about the dire financial situation of the Convention. The payment of annual contributions in full and on time is part of the commitment of each State Party to the objectives of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The EU expresses our appreciation for partners from across the sector including United Nations entities, the ICRC, mine action operators and civil society who are in the front line in ensuring effective implementation of the Convention, through their efforts in clearance, stockpile destruction, risk education, victim assistance and advocacy. The EU and its Member States have a long history of support for mine action, including the Oslo Action Plan that benefits heavily mine-affected countries and regions of the world. We will continue to support States Parties as they revise or develop inclusive national action plans.

I thank you, Mr. President.