



IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS REPORT

2025

EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
INTRODUCTION	5
NUCLEAR ISSUES.....	6
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.....	7
The International Atomic Energy Agency.....	8
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.....	11
Nuclear Security and Related Issues.....	12
Verification Regimes and Initiatives	14
Regional Issues and Aspects	15
<i>Iran / JCPOA</i>	15
<i>Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)</i>	16
<i>Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction...</i>	17
CHEMICAL WEAPONS	19
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	20
BALLISTIC MISSILES.....	22
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 / CBRN RISK MITIGATION	23
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.....	25
Small Arms and Light Weapons.....	25
Anti-personnel mines.....	28
EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES.....	29
Nuclear Suppliers Group	29
Australia Group	30
Missile Technology Control Regime	31
Wassenaar Arrangement.....	31
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES	33
COLLABORATION WITH THINK TANKS AND NGOs.....	35
DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES	38

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2025, the international non-proliferation and disarmament framework continued to be impacted by Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Multilateral fora were further polarised by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, escalating tensions in other regions, and growing concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Despite its continued isolation, Russia pursued further the prioritisation of its war effort against Ukraine over any other consideration in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Russia continued to contribute to the erosion of the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, through its provocative and irresponsible rhetoric, its obstructive tactics in multilateral fora, and its dissemination of disinformation. China further pursued the rapid, opaque build-up of its nuclear arsenal. The nuclear proliferation challenges posed by Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also continued to grow.

Confronted with an ever more complex and demanding geopolitical situation, the EU continued to follow the guidance provided by the applicable strategic documents:

- the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (doc. 10715/16),
- the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (doc. 15708/03),
- the New Lines for Action (doc. 17172/08) and
- the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (doc. 7371/22).

The guiding principles set in these strategic documents include the following:

- the promotion of effective multilateralism, by upholding, supporting and further advancing the universalisation of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, through diplomatic action and financial assistance to third countries and international organisations;
- close cooperation with countries to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime;
- addressing non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral political and non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue meetings, and in more informal contacts; and
- effective and complementary use of all available instruments and financial resources, in order to underpin EU foreign policy objectives.

With regard to weapons of mass destruction, the EU continued to participate at regular events, such as the third session of the Preparatory Committee to the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 28 April-9 May), and in all WMD-related multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament fora, including the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the meetings in the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as the multilateral export control regimes.

Regarding conventional weapons, the EU continued to participate in all the main multilateral fora aimed at preventing and curbing their illicit trafficking and to prevent human suffering (i.e., Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, United Nations Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, Arms Trade Treaty) and to pursue capacity building projects in this field. The EU continued to develop in 2025 its cooperation with Ukraine to prevent a potential future diversion and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

All across these strands of work, the EU maintained a constant dialogue with third countries, both in the G7 format and through bilateral formal dialogues and informal consultations, and cooperated closely with civil society. It also continued to promote cross-cutting priorities, such as supporting and advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women across the whole realm of non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the participation of the youth.

INTRODUCTION

This report focuses on the progress made in 2025 in the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, adopted by the European Council in December 2003 (doc. 15708/03), complemented by the *"New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems"*, as endorsed by the Council on 8-9 December 2008 (doc. 17172/08). For the sake of completeness, aspects regarding conventional weapons – including both small arms and light weapons and anti-personnel mines – are also touched upon.

This report is published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (article 27 of the Treaty on European Union). It is non-exhaustive and focuses on main developments.

Under the direction of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS contributes to the EU's joint efforts on non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, along with Member States and the European Commission. The EU Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and his team in the Division for Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control (SECDEFPOL.4) of the EEAS work with third countries, international organisations, and civil society, in order to reduce global weapons stockpiles, prevent their diversion to criminals and terrorists, and regulate the development of new weapons agents and technologies.

The Council Working Party on Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports, through both its non-proliferation and disarmament (CONOP) and conventional arms exports (COARM) subgroups, plays a central role in coordinating and establishing EU positions and policy, upholding international agreements, and advancing efforts in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control. The Delegations of the EU in Geneva, New York and Vienna, as well as the EU Liaison Officer to International Organisations in The Hague; represent the EU in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control fora, prepare and coordinate EU statements, and organise side-events to promote the EU's objectives, therefore also contributing to policy-making. Other EU entities, most notably the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and other services within the European Commission, also contribute to implementing the EU policy on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

Throughout 2025, the EU continued to work towards its long-standing objectives in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, that were reaffirmed at the highest level through the adoption by EU Foreign Ministers, on 15 December 2025, of [*Council Conclusions for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons \(NPT\)*](#). Among these long-standing objectives are the following:

- the universalisation and the full, complete and effective implementation of the NPT;
- the entry into force and universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
- the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and, pending its entry into force, that all States concerned not to have done so declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems in the Middle East; or
- supporting the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), recognising its safeguards system as a fundamental component of the NPT's non-proliferation regime, as well as its efforts in promoting nuclear safety and security, including in Ukraine due to Russia's illegal war of aggression.

In 2025, the EU continued to condemn Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric and its threats to use nuclear force in its war of aggression against Ukraine, considering them irresponsible, provocative, dangerous and escalatory – including its disturbing shift of position on the DPRK's denuclearisation. The EU also continued to express its deep concern about Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus and to call on both to reverse the decision. In addition, the EU expressed its categorical opposition to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons and any other types of WMD in outer space, recalling that the deployment of such weapons would constitute a severe and wide-reaching breach of international law, including the Outer Space Treaty.

The EU also continued to convey, both bilaterally and in multilateral fora, its deep concern about China's rapid, opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. The EU encouraged China to engage in risk

reduction and arms control, including by enhancing transparency, establishing necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions, and clarifying its strategic objectives.

While reaffirming its unwavering commitment to advance nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, the EU reiterated its commitment to further reductions of nuclear arsenals. Underlining the special responsibility of the States with the largest nuclear arsenals, the EU continued to strongly encourage seeking further reductions to their nuclear arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, as well as deployed and non-deployed, nuclear weapons. The EU continued to condemn Russia's purported suspension of the New START Treaty, urged Russia to immediately return to compliance and fulfil all its obligations, and called for urgent work towards a successor agreement. The EU strongly encouraged nuclear-weapon States to pursue discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction and verification, laying the ground for the negotiation of robust future arms control agreements and reporting.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

In 2025, the EU continued to contribute constructively to discussions in the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT was held from 28 April to 9 May 2025 in New York. Like in 2024, the Chair managed to issue a factual summary on his own authority, but no consensus was reached among States Parties. A draft Review Conference decision on "strengthening the review process" gathered ample support among States Parties but failed to secure consensus due to the opposition of Russia and China.

At the Preparatory Committee session, the EU delivered six statements¹ and submitted three working papers: one on enhancing transparency and accountability in the implementation of NPT obligations and commitments ([NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.1](#)), one on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ([NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.3](#)) backed by sixteen other States Parties, and a third on a prospective fissile material cut-off treaty ([NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.6/Rev.1](#)) that gained endorsement from twenty-three other

¹ A general statement, one statement for each of the three clusters (disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy), a statement under cluster II on regional issues including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution, and a statement under cluster III on the special issue of improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

States Parties. The EU also organized three side events² and endorsed, along with its Member States, a joint statement on [“Addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge”](#).

Additionally, the EU adopted *Council Decision (CFSP) [2025/646](#) of 27 March 2025 in support of facilitating a successful outcome of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. This instrument provides funding for a series of regional consultations, organised by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), for the President-Designate to gain a better understanding of States Parties’ priorities and concerns ahead of the Review Conference. By the end of 2025, such NPT regional consultations had been held for Asia-Pacific (Hanoi, 28-29 October) and Africa (Addis Ababa, 20-21 November).

Finally, the Council adopted on 15 December [Council Conclusions](#) for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), setting the EU’s political priorities for the 2026 NPT Review Conference and the upcoming 5-year NPT cycle.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The EU highly values the technical expertise, independence and impartiality of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in fulfilling its mandate, which encompasses both nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Maintaining nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme remained the EU’s top priorities at the IAEA. The EU Delegation in Vienna coordinated dozens of EU statements on these and other topics on the IAEA agenda and contributed to the successful adoption of several resolutions. Considering the global challenging and volatile environment, the General Conference in September 2025 was quite challenging. However, it was a broadly successful General Conference for the EU. Similar to previous years, the EU and its Member States continued to sponsor the annual IAEA General Conference resolutions on nuclear security and on safeguards. While consensus was reached on the nuclear security

² The three EU side events were:

- “Non-proliferation, peaceful uses and nuclear technology: Clarifying the role and impact of export controls”, organised with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI);
- “Exploring the Role of Extra Regional States in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone”, organised with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR); and
- “Fostering Non-Proliferation of Cancer by Innovative Nuclear Medical Applications: The EU-Africa Synergy in Advancing Targeted Alpha Therapy”, co-hosted by the European Union (European Commission’s Joint Research Centre) and South Africa.

resolution, difficulties in the negotiations on the resolutions on technical cooperation and non-power applications ultimately led to the withdrawal of the safeguards resolution. This means that the resolution on safeguards adopted during the General Conference in September 2024 continues to apply.

The EU provides strong support to the IAEA and its Member States both politically and through substantial financial contributions. The EU and its Member States are among the largest donors to the Agency, in particular its Technical Cooperation Fund, as well as in the area of research and development. In addition, the EU remains among the largest donors to the IAEA in the field of nuclear security, through contributions from both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget and from Member States.

Since 2003, the EU has provided EUR 67 million in support of the IAEA's nuclear security activities, through nine consecutive actions under the EU's CFSP. Throughout 2025, this support was channelled through [*Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/656*](#), of 19 February 2024, on *Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security* ('IAEA IX'). This action allocates a total of EUR 7.2 million for a 36-month period, including EUR 1.12 million for IAEA assistance to Ukraine. The following three specific objectives are targeted: a) building capacity in IAEA Member States and assisting them to strengthen nuclear security; b) providing nuclear security assistance to Ukraine, including by supporting the continued presence of IAEA staff at all nuclear sites in Ukraine; and c) strengthening the participation of women in careers related to nuclear security, in particular through the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme.

IAEA safeguards are a crucial element of the international security framework. The NPT serves as the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its article III requires that all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, in order to prevent the diversion or misuse of nuclear energy for non-peaceful uses. The EU supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and remains of the view that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in combination with the Additional Protocol, remains the current verification standard. While a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement enables the IAEA to verify that declared nuclear material is not used for undeclared purposes, the Additional Protocol gives the IAEA further possibilities to verify that there are no undeclared nuclear material or activities. The EU continues to call for universal adherence to them.

The safeguards agreement between the IAEA, Euratom and Euratom's non-nuclear-weapon Member States, signed in 1973 in Brussels, represents the first multilateral NPT safeguards agreement. It includes a Protocol that amplifies the cooperation arrangements which are

necessary because of the existence of the Euratom safeguards system. Under this Agreement, Euratom Member States accepted safeguards pursuant to the NPT on all nuclear material in all their peaceful activities, allowing for the implementation of effective and efficient safeguards in all EU Member States. Euratom is also party to the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and France, which is complemented by its respective Additional Protocol, which came into force in 2004. Nowadays, Euratom Safeguards are regarded as an integral part of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation.

The EU actively supports the IAEA safeguards system, including financial support for the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories, as well as the promotion of State Systems for Accountancy and Control of nuclear materials (SSAC) in partner countries. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), operated by the European Commission, also continues its international outreach through its Memorandums of Understanding with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCON) and the Asian Pacific Safeguards Network, in close collaboration with the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management.

In 2025, the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (EC-SP) to the IAEA continued to provide vital technical expertise and support in the field of nuclear safeguards. Operated by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) in close collaboration with the Directorate General for Energy-Directorate Nuclear Safeguards (DG ENER), the programme remained a cornerstone of the IAEA's efforts to deter the spread of nuclear weapons. Through its ongoing tasks, the EC-SP enabled the effective implementation of safeguards verification measures, including the detection of undeclared materials, activities, and facilities. With over 40 active tasks, the programme's contributions are regularly reviewed and emphasized through biannual meetings, highlighting the importance of this collaborative work. The IAEA acknowledged the unique expert support provided by the JRC and DG ENER, recognizing the crucial role the EC-SP plays in ensuring that States honour their legal obligations to use nuclear material solely for peaceful purposes.

Euratom has allocated EUR 300 million under the Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation over the period 2021-2027 to promote nuclear safety, responsible radioactive waste management, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards in third countries. The Instrument supports, among others, a large training and education project in the area of nuclear safeguards with the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN), including – in cooperation with the IAEA – the first-ever academic postgraduate programme on nuclear safeguards.

The EU and its Member States continued to be strong supporters of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through substantial contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund and the Peaceful Uses Initiative, which are important tools to enable the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology and to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The EU and the IAEA regularly hold annual Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) to review and plan their broad-range cooperation. The 11th EU-IAEA SOM meeting was held on 31 October 2025 in Luxembourg, bringing together senior officials of the IAEA and the EU to reaffirm their cooperation on nuclear activities and to further explore areas of cooperation, such as nuclear safety, security and safeguards, with a major focus on the nuclear safety and security of the operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine, as well as on electrical substations critical for nuclear safety and security in that country.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as pursuing its objectives for a world free of nuclear testing, remain key EU priorities in the framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. All EU Member States have demonstrated their strong commitment to the Treaty by ratifying it and, pending its entry into force, by actively adhering to its objectives. As a key confidence- and security-building measure, the EU advocates for the CTBT's contributions to peace, security, disarmament, and non-proliferation, while also highlighting its civil and scientific applications such as tsunami warnings, nuclear emergency response, civil aviation and scientific research.

In 2025, the EU continued to engage in diplomatic activities in support of the CTBT, in both multilateral and bilateral frameworks, consistently encouraging States who have not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty, and in particular Annex 2 States, to do so without preconditions and further delay, including at the article XIV Conference held in New York on 26 September 2025 in support of the universalisation of the Treaty. Following the Russian revocation of its ratification of the CTBT, the EU continues to call on Russia to uphold its commitment to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Since 2006, the EU has provided through nine actions over EUR 29.5 million in extra-budgetary contributions to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), demonstrating the strong commitment of the EU and its Member States to the Treaty and its implementation. These funds are currently being utilized

to support the CTBT verification regime and to enhance capacity-building for developing countries across all geographic regions.

In 2025, the implementation of [*Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/2064*](#), of 23 September 2023, on Union support for the activities of the CTBTO in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities, continued reinforcing the EU support for the CTBTO's activities. Through this action, the EU has allocated EUR 6.3 million for 36 months for the CTBT monitoring and verification system, strengthening the capabilities of States Signatories to fulfil their verification responsibilities, and promoting the Treaty's universalization and entry into force.

Pending the CTBT's entry into force, the EU continued to call on all States to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Nuclear Security and Related Issues

The EU is committed to upholding the highest international standards in nuclear security. While EU Member States bear the primary responsibility for ensuring nuclear security, an increasing number of related issues fall within areas where common EU rules and institutions also play a crucial role. This underscores the need for close collaboration and highlights the IAEA's essential role in supporting and enabling these efforts.

The EU stresses the need to continue strengthening nuclear security worldwide, considering that nuclear security goes beyond just preventing nuclear terrorism and facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear technology – it plays a vital role in delivering clean energy, advanced medical treatments, and improved food security.

The EU condemned in the strongest possible terms, in multiple statements at the IAEA General Conference and the Board of Governors, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which is causing unprecedented nuclear safety and security risks, with daily breaches of the IAEA seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security in armed conflict and potentially serious consequences. The EU reiterated its concern for the potential risks related to the physical integrity of Ukraine's nuclear facilities, radioactive sources out of regulatory control, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and technologies, as well as acts of sabotage at nuclear sites that stem from Russia's full-scale invasion against Ukraine.

The EU considers it important that all States accede to key nuclear security instruments, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its

Amendment (A/CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), as fundamental elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture. The EU continued to support States in their efforts to fully implement these conventions. Furthermore, as these conventions only address violations of international legal framework by non-state actors, the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), called on the international community to start a reflection on how to improve existing international instruments to protect nuclear sites in the context of war.

The EU continued the implementation of the [*Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/1187*](#) of 19 June 2023 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism* (ICSANT). The technical implementation was entrusted to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). It aims to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, improve national capacities to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases in which ICSANT is of relevance, improve knowledge and understanding of the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism and other criminal conduct involving such materials, enhance policies, practices and procedures to prevent, detect and respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism, and enhance international cooperation on the matter.

A Practical Arrangement between the European Commission, represented by the JRC, and the IAEA has been in place since 2013 and is successfully on-going, enabling close cooperation on nuclear security technical issues and fostering a strong partnership between the two organizations. This arrangement allows the European Commission, through the JRC, to work closely with the IAEA to increase coordination of training and capacity-building activities, promoting and implementing sustainable Nuclear Security Culture practices and enhancing the global nuclear security landscape. The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) has been fully operational since 2013, providing a unique platform for EU Member States and partner countries to enhance their nuclear security capabilities. The EUSECTRA offers a comprehensive range of training opportunities, covering the entire scope of nuclear security, including nuclear detection, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) radiological support, radiological crime scene management, and nuclear forensics. Utilizing radioactive and nuclear materials, cutting-edge technologies, and up-to-date knowledge, the EUSECTRA ensures that participants receive hands-on experience and training that reflects the latest developments in the field.

The European Commission continues to play a major role in international nuclear security efforts, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening global nuclear security. Notably, the JRC co-chairs the International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Forensics (ITWG), providing leadership and expertise in the development of guidelines and best practices for nuclear forensics. Additionally, the European Commission is an active participant in the Border Monitoring Working Group (BMWG), serving as part of the rotating Chairs (between the IAEA, the United States Department of Energy and the JRC) and contributing to the work of its two sub-groups on Detection Technologies and Capacity Building. Through these engagements, the JRC reinforces its position as a key player in the global nuclear security community, working collaboratively with international partners to address the complex challenges of nuclear security.

Verification Regimes and Initiatives

Throughout 2025, the EU and its Member States continued to support initiatives in the field of nuclear disarmament verification (NDV), based on the conviction that further development of multilateral capabilities in this regard can assist in the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

The EU and ten of its Member States³ continued in 2025 to support politically and participate in the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV).

In the framework of the United Nations, all EU Member States voted in favour of [General Assembly resolution 80/53](#), adopted on 1 December 2025, on Establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on NDV, that was promoted jointly by Brazil and Norway. Previously, the EU had contributed to the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/240 on a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on NDV,⁴ in favour of which all EU Member States had also voted the previous year.

Finally, the EU included among its priorities for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT the further development of NDV capabilities, underscoring the value of multilateral cooperation in advancing NDV, reiterating its support to the IPNDV and other similar formats,

³ Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden are partners of the IPNDV.

⁴ See pages 36 to 38 of the [Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/240 on a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification](#).

and advocating constructive engagement on establishing a UN Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on NDV.⁵

Regional Issues and Aspects

Iran / JCPOA

Between February and September 2025, the IAEA issued six reports documenting Iran's increasing non-compliance with its nuclear obligations under the NPT and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). IAEA reports highlighted a steady erosion of transparency and the loss of continuity of knowledge about key elements of Iran's nuclear programme, including a stockpile of approximately 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%. On 2 July 2025, following the June war with Israel and US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran formally enacted a law suspending cooperation with the IAEA and limiting inspectors' access. Iran's repeated denial of access to IAEA inspectors raised serious concerns.

On 28 August 2025, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the E3) notified the UN Security Council of Iran's significant non-compliance with the JCPOA and triggered the so-called "snapback mechanism" under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231. This initiated a 30-day period before the re-imposition of all previously lifted UN sanctions. Ahead and during this period, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, together with the E3 and international partners, engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts with Iran which unfortunately did not result in addressing the international community's concerns or creating the conditions for a possible extension of the UNSCR 2231.

On 28 September 2025, the UN Security Council reinstated all nuclear-related UN sanctions⁶ on Iran. The EU subsequently transposed UN sanctions into EU law and re-imposed previously lifted autonomous EU sanctions.⁷

On 9 September 2025, the IAEA and Iran agreed in Cairo to resume cooperation through a technical framework. The arrangement introduced new procedures requiring inspection requests to be approved by Iran's Supreme National Security Council.

⁵ See paragraph 20 of the [Council Conclusions](#) of 15 December 2025 for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

⁶ UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010).

⁷ In line with Council Declaration 345/01 of October 2015.

On 20 November 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution stressing Iran's responsibility to fully uphold its legal obligations under the NPT and its binding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), and expressing serious concern over its outstanding safeguards issues. In response, Iran announced the termination of the Cairo cooperation agreement with the IAEA.

At the UN Security Council meeting on 23 December 2025, Iran, supported by Russia and China, challenged the legal basis of the snapback mechanism. The EU reaffirmed the validity of reinstated UN Security Council resolutions and urged Iran to fully resume cooperation with IAEA.

The EU remains convinced that a sustainable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue can only be achieved through negotiations. The HRVP continues to engage with all parties, including Iran, to facilitate a diplomatic solution, in line with the reinstated UN Security Resolutions.⁸

The EU continues to urge Iran to fully resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency without delay, in line with its legal obligations under the NPT and its legally binding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

During 2025, the EU continued to stress that continued DPRK ballistic missile launches represented a blatant violation of UN Security Council resolutions and posed a serious threat to regional and international peace and security as well as to the global non-proliferation regime. The EU underlined that illegal DPRK ballistic missile launches, along with the continuing activity in the DPRK nuclear programme, would never be accepted as legitimate. The EU continued to insist that the only route to sustainable peace and security lay in the DPRK taking action to comply with its obligation to abandon all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities.

The EU and its Member States continued to encourage all members of the United Nations, especially members of the UN Security Council, to urge the DPRK to change course, emphasising that the most effective instrument to achieve this remained the full implementation of UN Security Council sanctions. The EU also further increased consultations with partners on other ways to restrict flows of finance, knowledge and components into the

⁸ UNSCR 1803, Para 16 and UNSCR 1929, Para 33.

DPRK that could be used to support its illegal weapons programmes. As of the end of 2025, in addition to the 80 individuals and 75 entities listed under UN Security Council sanctions, 77 individuals and 21 entities were listed under the EU autonomous sanctions regime for the DPRK.

In multilateral fora and other settings – including the UN Security Council and at the IAEA – the EU also continued to call on the DPRK to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bring into force the Additional Protocol, and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The EU insisted that the DPRK could not and would never have the status of a nuclear weapon State under the NPT or any other special status. The EU insisted that the situation could only be solved through peaceful means. The EU urged the DPRK to resume dialogue with the main parties and reiterated its readiness to support or facilitate any meaningful process of diplomacy aimed at the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The EU continued to strongly condemn the military cooperation and arms transfers between the DPRK and Russia, which flagrantly violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions, as well as Russia's shift of position on the DPRK's denuclearisation.

Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

In 2025, the EU maintained its longstanding political support to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, freely agreed to by all States in the region.

The EU kept its concrete support through the continued implementation of [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/1306](#), of 26 June 2023, in support of a project on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in an evolving regional security environment. The project, implemented by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), focuses on: 1) assisting in mitigating regional trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 2) encouraging regional security arrangements and arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament norms and processes; 3) developing a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between the Middle East WMD Free Zone and current regional and international developments; and 4) promoting an effective, verifiable, inclusive, and sustainable Middle East WMD Free Zone.

The EU also included the establishment of a Middle East WMD Free Zone among its political priorities ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference,⁹ reiterating its commitment to implementing the Resolution on Middle East of the 1995 NPT Review Conference and welcoming the six sessions of the UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (the latest one held in New York from 17 to 21 November 2025) and their outcomes. The EU recalled that nuclear-weapon-free zones can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned and strongly urged all stakeholders to engage urgently in meaningful consultations to build an inclusive and consensus-based process to implement the 1995 Resolution on Middle East.

⁹ See paragraph 28 of the [Council Conclusions](#) of 15 December 2025 for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The EU remained committed to countering the proliferation of chemical weapons by supporting the full implementation and universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The EU's strong support to the implementing body of the Convention, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), was expressed through EU statements, demarches and voluntary financial contributions benefitting the OPCW's core activities.

The EU-OPCW cooperation takes place under the EU-OPCW Cooperation Agreement (MoU) concluded in 2024. It constitutes a framework for strengthened coordination and collaboration, with a high-level consultation mechanism that provides strategic guidance on key areas of the implementation of the CWC. The EU and its Member States remained the biggest voluntary financial contributor in support of the OPCW.

The CWC is a successful and central element of the world's disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Its continued vitality and countering any threat of chemical weapons use is more important than ever in the current security environment with a growing number of allegations of use of prohibited chemicals and the proven use of riot control agents as chemical weapons in the front lines in Ukraine. The EU will continue its strong political and financial support to the OPCW with a focus on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons and fighting against impunity for their use, as well as on capacity-building. In this context, the EU Foreign Ministers approved a new voluntary financial contribution of EUR 4.45 million by adopting [*Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/2354*](#) of 20 November 2025 in support of enhancing the *Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission activities related to Syria and Ukraine and enhancing OPCW operational effectiveness through satellite imagery* for implementation throughout 2026 and 2027.

On 16 October 2025, the Council of the EU prolonged the application of EU restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. Previously, on 20 May 2025, it had decided to impose restrictive measures on three Russian entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons by Russian troops in Ukraine. As of 31 December 2025, these sanctions applied to 25 persons and 6 entities. Those designated are subject to an asset freeze, and EU persons and entities are forbidden from making funds, financial assets or economic resources available to them. In addition, a travel ban to the EU applies to the natural persons listed.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. It was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. All EU Member States are Parties to the BTWC. Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the BTWC on 26 March 2025, the EU recalled that the Convention represented a cornerstone of global security and that it remained committed to ensuring that biological weapons were never developed, produced, or used. The EU pledged to continue promoting the universalisation, confidence-building measures, and strengthening of the Convention. On this occasion, the EU also organised a side event to underline the importance of the BTWC, which presented an opportunity to highlight the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative and its significant contribution to address the threat posed by biological weapons.

The EU welcomed and supported the work of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention, established by the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2022 to identify and develop effective measures on, among other issues, compliance and verification, and to establish mechanisms for International Cooperation and Assistance and for Science and Technology Review. However, similarly as in 2023 and 2024, the BTWC meetings in 2025 of both the Working Group and the Meeting of States Parties faced disruptive attempts by Russia aiming at attacking any dissenting voice, undermining transparency and inclusivity, and slowing any progress on substance through deliberate textual overload, procedural arguments, and reinterpretations of selected articles of the Convention. Despite Russia's attacks, the EU and its Member States continued to play an active role in countering Russia's disinformation campaign and in supporting progress on substantive matters in the Working Group. This also included the EU's and EU Member States' push for a Special Conference to establish a mechanism to review and assess scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, and a mechanism to facilitate and support the full implementation of international cooperation and assistance under Article X.

In line with the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and as a long-term advocate of the BTWC, the EU continued the implementation of its Council Decision¹⁰ in 2025, funding activities of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) with a view to providing capacity building to strengthen BTWC national implementation, fostering biosecurity networks in the Global South, strengthening the preparedness of States Parties to

¹⁰ [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/349](#) of 16 January 2024 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

prevent and respond to attacks involving biological agents, and enabling tools for outreach, education and engagement. In 2025, the Council of the EU adopted [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/494](#) of 11 March 2025 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, its inter-sessional programme and the preparations for its Tenth Review Conference, funding UNODA's activities in this regard.

Thanks to these Council Decisions, the EU also funded dedicated training courses and a global meeting for newly appointed BTWC National Contact Points in 2025 to improve national reporting and Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), organised by the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU). The EU supported the *Science for Diplomats Series* initiative aimed to increase the understanding of policy makers regarding technological and scientific advances that impact the BTWC. Furthermore, the EU supported youth engagement in biosecurity and funded a *Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship* in 2025 through its dedicated Council Decision, which represents an investment in the next generation of experts, policymakers, and leaders who will safeguard the BTWC in the decades ahead. Through the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence, the EU continued the "*Enhanced Biosecurity in Southeast Asia*" and "*Strengthening biosecurity and biosafety in Eastern and Central Africa*" projects, providing legislative support and technical cooperation in 21 third countries belonging to these regions.

The EU celebrated and actively supported the accession of Comoros and Kiribati to the BTWC in 2025, which was facilitated by EU-funded universalisation projects. These accessions brought the total number of BTWC States Parties to 189.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is an important transparency and confidence-building instrument. It is the only multilateral instrument aiming at both preventing ballistic missile proliferation and increasing transparency about ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. States that subscribe to the HCoC voluntarily commit themselves to provide pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches, and to submit an annual declaration on their policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.

The EU is a long-standing supporter of the HCoC. All EU Member States have subscribed to it. The EU regularly reaches out to non-subscribing States in support of the further universalisation and effective implementation of the Code. With the last subscription of Qatar in 2024, a total of 145 UN Member States are now Subscribing States to the Code.

Through a number of consecutive projects under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has since 2008 financed HCoC outreach activities, side events, research papers, expert meetings and regional awareness seminars, implemented by the Paris-based *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*. In 2025, the EU renewed this support through the adoption of [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/2598](#) of 15 December 2025 in support of the *Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, that runs until 2028.

The 24th Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the Hague Code of Conduct took place in Vienna on 4-5 June 2025. At the meeting, the EU and its Member States reiterated their strong support for the HCoC, its universalisation, full implementation and efficient functioning and expressed ballistic missile- and UAV- related concerns with regard to activities of Russia, Iran and the DPRK.¹¹ As in the previous three years, there was no press release by the HCoC subscribing States from the meeting, in contrast with the practice of ARM meetings preceding 2022.

¹¹ [EU Statement](#) on the occasion of the 24th Annual Regular Meeting of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), Vienna, 4-5 June 2025.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 / CBRN RISK MITIGATION

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) is a fundamental pillar of the global framework for preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. It plays a crucial role in international efforts to curb proliferation, particularly to terrorist groups and other non-state actors.

Effective prevention of proliferation, including controlling materials and expertise, requires not only the adoption of national legislation but also consistent enforcement and oversight across borders and sectors. The EU works with partner countries to strengthen their capacity to adhere to the provisions of UNSCR 1540 and supports UN agencies in their work to promote understanding and compliance.

In 2025, the EU continued its active support for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by prioritising capacity-building, regional workshops, and financial support for UN efforts. Key activities and events in 2025 included:

- Through [*Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/654*](#) of 20 March 2023 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the EU continued to support in 2025 the implementation of UNSCR 1540. This action provides approximately EUR 2.3 million to UNODA for activities, building on previous Joint Actions, aiming for improved sustainability of projects, enhanced partnerships and strengthened national implementation of the Resolution. Work focuses on strengthening the capacity of regional points of contact and improving the involvement of stakeholders like civil society and industry.
- The EU maintained its significant financial backing of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities to ensure effective 1540 implementation, contributing to over EUR 6 million in support since 2006.
- The 1540 Committee, with EU-supported initiatives, organised a 1540 Points of Contact training course for Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Panama in December 2025.
- Promotion of Voluntary National Action Plans: Throughout 2025, EU-supported activities focused on assisting states in developing or updating their national implementation plans (NAPs). In this regard, among other initiatives, the EU supported thematic capacity-building workshops and training focusing on Asian, African and Latin American countries.

- Support for Export Control and Border Security: The EU continued to support the "EU P2P" programme (Export Control Programme for Dual-use Goods) to strengthen national export controls, which are a central pillar of UNSCR 1540 compliance. In that spirit, the EU emphasised the crucial role of effective export controls at events like the Global Trade Conference in Singapore in August 2025.

The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, with a budget of almost EUR 147 million in 2021-27, continued providing significant assistance to mitigate risks from accidental, natural or criminal incidents in partner countries. This initiative managed by the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments strengthens all-hazards security governance, both at national and regional levels. In June 2025, partners from 63 countries gathered in Brussels to celebrate 15 years of the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence, marking a milestone for the world's largest initiative to build preparedness and response capacity to CBRN risks and threats, thus contributing to global non-proliferation efforts.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Small Arms and Light Weapons

In line with its 2018 Strategy on illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, “*Securing arms, protecting citizens*”, the EU in 2025 remained fully committed to preventing and curbing the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition and to promoting accountability and responsibility with regard to their legal trade.

Over the course of 2025, the EU continued pursuing several SALW-control projects with a focus on voluntary civilian disarmament campaigns, collection and destruction of surplus SALW and ammunition, physical security and stockpile management for SALW and ammunition, and capacity-building for making, record keeping and tracing SALW. They included support for the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2022/1965](#), which benefited Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific region, through activities undertaken by the three United Nations regional centres for disarmament. The EU renewed its support to the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, extending it to cover also the Global Framework on Ammunition, through the adoption of [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/2565](#), implemented by UNODA. Many of these projects have a regional scope and were implemented with the help of regional organisations. For instance, in Latin America and the Caribbean, EU collaboration with the Organization of American States (OAS) continued under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2022/847](#) and the newly adopted [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/1451](#). The Member States and the Secretariat of the League of Arab States continued to benefit from the EU’s support under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/2500](#).

Supporting Ukraine in defending its national sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russia’s illegal and unprovoked military aggression by providing military assistance to Ukraine through deliveries of equipment and training remained a political priority and a strategic necessity for the EU and its Member States all throughout 2025. The EU and its Member States underlined in international fora, such as the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and multilateral export control regimes, that the export of military equipment to Ukraine remains fully in line with the legal obligations stemming from the [Common Position 2008/944/CFSP](#) on arms exports and with obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as with the Wassenaar Arrangement Initial Elements. Given many grave breaches by Russia of the Geneva Conventions, including attacks directed against population and civilian objects, arms transfers to Russia would not be permitted under the ATT, hence the EU continuously urged all States Parties to the ATT to refrain from any transfers to Russia.

The EU committed to continuing to support Ukraine building up robust capacity to monitor the stocks, the acquisition and possession of firearms and SALW, investigate and prosecute their illegal possession and trafficking, support international cooperation and assistance in this area, and support the designation, development, training, and equipping of appropriate state agencies aiming at an effective control and disposal of firearms and SALW. The EU and Ukraine also remained committed to actively exposing and countering Russian information manipulation in this area. The longstanding cooperation between the EU and Ukraine continued in 2025, under the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine of June 2024, and the EU Action Plan on Firearms Trafficking 2020-2025, through the EU-funded projects under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/3003](#), with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as its main implementer, [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/2587](#) implemented by SEESAC, and [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/387](#) in support of iTrace V. Military equipment, weapons and ammunitions provided under the European Peace Facility by EU Member States to Ukraine continued to be recorded by the EEAS, based on the delivery verification certificates signed by the Ukrainian authorities and provided by EU Member States' implementing actors.

South-East Europe continued to receive substantial attention. [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/3006](#) supported SEESAC activities in the Western Balkans, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, while [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/3097](#) enabled efforts by the OSCE to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of small arms, light weapons and conventional ammunition. Under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2022/2321](#), the European Union backed efforts by SEESAC to assist in implementing the Roadmap for a Sustainable Solution to the Illegal Possession, Misuse and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Their Ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024. In December, the Union renewed support through SEESAC to the Roadmap, taking into account the extension of the Roadmap until 2030, through [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/2587](#).

The EU continued its longstanding (since 2013) support to iTrace, a global reporting mechanism on illicit SALW and other illicit conventional weapons and ammunition in conflict-affected areas, through [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/387](#). iTrace conducted field operations in conflict areas in the Middle East, West and East Africa, the Gulf, Central Asia and Ukraine, assisting efforts to disrupt illicit trade in arms and ammunition and diversion of uncontrolled and dual-use items to unauthorized military use. Operations in Ukraine comprehensively documented and traced the origin and chain of supply of components of Russian, Iranian, and North Korean advanced weapons systems.

The implementation by the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT) of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) of the project to develop an internationally recognised arms and ammunition management validation system to prevent illicit proliferation, under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2022/2275](#), was successfully concluded with the delivery of a tool for States to self-assess their national capacities to safely and securely stockpile conventional weapons and ammunition: the Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS), which will be made available for use of all interested States free of charge in 2026.

With a view to the implementation of the EU SALW Strategy, the EU engaged in the design of international implementation of the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management, and to that end participated in the Preparatory Meeting of States (23-27 June 2025), promoting the consistency of arms export control criteria from the Common Position 2008/944 with the Global Framework, the use of AAMVS, and appropriate safeguards to accompany international arms transfers.

The EU continued, through various political dialogues, to promote the ATT's universalization and effective implementation. The EU maintained its financial support for the Treaty's implementation support programme, providing countries in Africa, Latin America, and South-East and Central Asia with technical assistance in strengthening their national systems in line with the Treaty's requirements, under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2021/2309](#), implemented by Germany's Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) and France's international technical cooperation agency Expertise France, which was replaced for the period 2025-2028 by [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/442](#). Additionally, the EU extended until 2027 the support it had been providing to the ATT Secretariat through [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/2296](#), by adopting [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/2367](#). The EU also continued to promote effective arms export controls among countries in South and East Europe, Caucasus, Middle East and North Africa, as well as Central Asia, under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/2539](#), implemented by BAFA and which in 2025 was replaced by [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/208](#), securing additional funding until 2028.

Anti-personnel mines

In 2025, the EU adopted [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/781](#) of 14 April 2025 in support of the *Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*. To be implemented over the period 2025-2029, it allocates EUR 2.7 million to support the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) with a focus on mine clearance, risk reduction, victim assistance, and the strengthening of national capacities, activities to be carried out by the APMBC's Implementation Support Unit (ISU).

The EU participated in the 22nd Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBC, held in Geneva from 1 to 5 December 2025. The EU delivered statements and supported the work of the Convention's dedicated committees, as well as that of the Implementation Support Unit. The EU contributed to the development of consensus on the outcome document of the Meeting, which reaffirmed the continued relevance and importance of the Convention and of the international humanitarian law framework.

In 2025, the EU committed over EUR 200 million in funding to mine action worldwide, with part of this support delivered through multi-annual programmes. This includes over EUR 60 million to support demining in Ukraine and around EUR 60 million for other countries, including Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan and Syria, as well as EUR 100 million provided by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy to complete mine clearance in Croatia through a multi-annual programme.

Additionally, the EU has continued to engage in support of humanitarian demining in Ukraine, which has become one of the most mine-contaminated countries in the world; for the period 2022-2030, Ukraine has received EUR 500 million for mine clearance and related activities.

EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

The EU fully supports the existing multilateral export control regimes: the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Zangger Committee. The EU stresses their crucial role in preventing the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, implementing UNSC embargoes, and promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. The EU contributes to the full implementation of strong non-proliferation mechanisms under the Treaties and UNSC resolutions by promoting robust export controls and related legislations worldwide. The EU also provides widespread support to partner countries in setting up or enhancing their own export control systems to implement UNSCR 1540, through the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence and the EU P2P Programme on arms and dual-use export controls. Multilateral export control regimes foster the legitimate transfer of dual-use goods and technologies that are essential to international cooperation on peaceful uses.

The EU has formally recognized since early 2024 that geopolitical tensions affect, to varying degrees, the capacity of multilateral export control regimes to agree by consensus the introduction of new items, including emerging technologies, at a multilateral level, and has pointed to the risk that this could undermine EU export controls. In view of these obstacles, a number of EU Member States have resorted to national legislation to introduce new controls on certain emerging technologies blocked in the international regimes, but deemed highly sensitive in terms of concerns regarding WMD proliferation or excessive accumulation of conventional weapons. In June 2025, EU Member States agreed that an EU-wide uniform introduction of those controls was feasible and necessary. As a consequence, the European Commission included the respective national listings in Annex I to the EU Export Control Regulation, which was adopted on 8 September 2025. This decision reflects the strong and unwavering commitment of EU Member States to control dual-use technologies relevant to international peace and security.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports, which are implemented by each Participating Government in accordance with its national laws and practices on licensing requirements. All EU Member

States are Participating Governments to the NSG. The European Commission (EC) participates as an observer, and implements the control lists of the Guidelines in Regulation (EU) 2021/821¹² and its modifications for the EU Member States.

Deliberations within the NSG are subject to confidentiality. The EU participated in the 2025 Plenary (Cape Town, 20-25 July 2025). Two statements were delivered on behalf of the EU. Diverging views among Participating Governments prevented once again the adoption of a public statement. The Group was in a deadlock on confirming the next plenary chair for 2026. However, the Participating Governments confirmed the candidature of Argentina to fulfil the functions of the NSG Chair until the end of 2026.

The NSG Consultative Group, one of the standing bodies, meets three times a year and is tasked to hold consultations on issues associated with the Guidelines on nuclear supply and its technical annexes. In 2025, the NSG Consultative Group met in Vienna on 7-8 April, in Cape Town on 21-22 July, and in Vienna on 6-7 November, where the EU was present from behind the observer seat of the EC.

Australia Group

The Australia Group (AG) is a group of like-minded countries seeking to harmonise export controls for chemicals, biological agents and related dual-use technologies. It has 43 members, including the EU and all EU Member States.

Deliberations within the AG are subject to confidentiality. The EU participated actively at the AG Plenary in Sydney on 14-18 July, including in the discussions on the threat of use of chemical and biological weapons, shared concern over the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, exchange on enforcement cases as well as on dual use relevant scientific and technological progress.

Against the backdrop of momentous times for arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament in the areas of chemical and biological weapons, States celebrated in 2025 the 100th anniversary of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, as well as 50 years since the entry into force of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. At its plenary in Sydney, the Australia Group also celebrated 40 years of work since its creation

¹² [Regulation \(EU\) 2021/821](#) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items.

in 1985 and took stock of developments, which had seen the AG emerging as a cornerstone of States' efforts to curb the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Missile Technology Control Regime

In 2025, the EU continued to strongly support the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is an informal and voluntary association of countries sharing the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and seeking to coordinate related national export licensing efforts. It plays a key role in tackling the proliferation of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle technologies.

The single set of EU export control rules under the EU Export Control Regulation implements MTCR guidelines and control lists, and ensures that they are effectively applied in all EU Member States, including those that are not yet members of the MTCR. The latest update on the EU dual-use export control list was adopted on 8 September 2025.¹³

To date, eighteen EU Member States are members of MTCR. A further nine EU Member States are candidates to join the MTCR: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The longstanding blockage of their accession is of fundamental importance to the EU in the MTCR context.

Deliberations within the MTCR are confidential. The EU has consistently supported the adoption of strong public MTCR statements, reflecting concerns about ballistic missile launches and significant missile technology development by, notably, Iran and the DPRK.

No plenary meeting of the MTCR took place in 2025, due to the blockage over the chairmanship, and no MTCR public statements were published during the year.

Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. It comprises 42 Participating States, 26 of which are EU Member States. Participating States apply export controls to all items set forth in the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Munitions

¹³ [Regulation \(EU\) 2021/821](#) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items.

List, which they regularly review, with the objective of preventing unauthorized transfers or re-transfers of those items. Both lists form the basis of the EU Dual-Use Control List and the EU Common Military List, respectively, which are updated regularly by the Council following WA decisions. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals and are not diverted to support such capabilities nor acquired by terrorists. Participating States also regularly exchange information and are required to report their arms transfers and transfers/denials of certain dual-use goods and technologies to destinations outside the Arrangement on a regular basis.

In 2025, Participating States continued to exchange information on arms and dual-use technology transfers and assess risks related to potentially destabilizing arms flows, particularly in conflict-prone regions. Participating States reaffirmed the critical role of strong export controls and international cooperation in preventing arms diversion and restricting access to conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist actors. As part of their ongoing efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the WA, Participating States conducted a comprehensive review of the Control Lists, resulting in updates by the increase of secondary cells energy density threshold, revision of laser output power control thresholds, clarification of acoustic seabed survey equipment, and numerous editorial issues (acronyms, abbreviations, notes).

The 29th WA Plenary meeting took place in Vienna on 3 and 4 December 2025. Deliberations within the WA are subject to confidentiality.

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

In 2025, retaining human control over weapons and weapons systems, no matter how technologically sophisticated they may be, remained a critical condition for the EU. This position was repeatedly presented in various international fora, notably at the UN and at the discussions in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE on LAWS), which in 2025 continued its important work on regulating the application of emerging technologies to weapons and weapons systems in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. Throughout 2025, the EU continued to work within the GGE on LAWS in order to contribute to the report with recommendations on LAWS to the 2026 Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on how to move forward on the issue of regulating LAWS.

In 2025, the EU also worked within the UN on artificial intelligence (AI) in the military domain. On 1 December, the UN General Assembly adopted [Resolution 80/58](#) on Artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications. The draft had been promoted by the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea and co-sponsored by all EU Member States.

Previously, the EU had contributed to the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/239 on Artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security¹⁴ – its first-ever resolution on this topic –, in favour of which all EU Member States had also voted the previous year. In its contribution, the EU in particular recognised that there are military advantages of applying AI in the military domain. This goes in particular for the speed, scale and precision of military operations. AI can provide a tactical advantage from the management and pre-processing of vast data sets stemming from surveillance and weapons systems, drones and satellite images, which can enable human operators to achieve speedier and better decisions. AI applications can reduce costs by improving logistics or the maintenance of equipment via predictive maintenance management. Likewise, AI can provide greater distance military operations and more precision of military operations in uncertain environments.

At the same time, the EU also underlined that the very advantages of speed and scale by AI applications in the military domain also pose challenges. AI accelerates the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act). The increase of speed and scale capabilities may give rise to misperceptions due to inconsistencies between military intentions and the analyses produced by AI-driven systems. AI could thus unintentionally contribute to escalation. Speed is also a

¹⁴ See pages 92 and 93 of the [Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/239 on Artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security](#).

challenge to the objective of retaining human judgement and control over the use of force. Against this backdrop, the EU stressed the importance of international cooperation aimed at studying the impact of AI in the military domain and possible governance frameworks.

In 2025, the international process on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) continued to be a cornerstone for international discussions on AI in the military domain. All EU Member States have aligned themselves with the Blueprint for Action agreed at the 2024 REAIM Summit in Seoul in September 2024. REAIM remained the most comprehensive and inclusive process on responsible military use of AI in 2025. The EU committed itself to attend the REAIM26 Summit in February 2026 in A Coruña (Spain), and stood ready to continue to engage in the REAIM process.

In 2025, the EU continued to implement the 2024 EU AI Act, a major step forward for the Union's human-centred approach to AI. As the AI Act also covers dual use, it is likely to have an impact on military use of AI, although AI systems developed only for military use fall outside its scope.

Throughout 2025, the EU also continued efforts to better grasp and manage the consequences of the impact of emerging technologies on arms and arms control with a view to continue its efforts to contribute to international security and disarmament. The EU continued to support two projects launched in 2022 addressing fast developments in the area of emerging technologies, and notably Artificial Intelligence (AI):

- [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2022/2269](#), of 18 November 2022, on Union support for the implementation by UNODA and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) of the joint project *"Promoting Responsible Innovation in AI for Peace and Security"*; and
- [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2022/2320](#), of 25 November 2022, on Union support for the implementation of the project *"Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security"*.

Both projects were finalised in 2025. In order to continue to support work on monitoring emerging technologies, including AI, and their impact on arms control, the EU launched yet another project on emerging technologies and arms control in March 2025:

- [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/529](#), of 17 March 2025, on Union support for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research project "Science and Technology Watchtower: *"Monitoring Innovation for Disarmament"*.

COLLABORATION WITH THINK TANKS AND NGOS

Civil society is a driving force in the field of disarmament, contributing to the development, promotion and implementation of international disarmament instruments, as well as to disarmament education. Civil society's role, especially in ensuring transparency and accountability, is vital. The EU continuously stands for the inclusion of civil society in discussions in multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament fora. The EU also provides financial support to civil society organisations for specific projects.

The most prominent area of cooperation between the EU and civil society in issues covered by this report is the **EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium**. The Consortium comprises the following six European think tanks: *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* (FRS), the International Affairs Institute in Rome (IAI), the International Institute for Strategic Studies – Europe (IISS-Europe), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). Based first on Council Decision (CFSP) 2010/430 of 26 July 2010, the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been actively supported by the Consortium, which started its activities in January 2011. Phase IV of the project, under [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2022/597](#) of 11 April 2022, was completed on 17 May 2025. The activities of the Consortium have been renewed for a fifth phase through [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2025/889](#) of 12 May 2025, which allows for the continuation of the Consortium's mandate and activities under the framework established by the European Union by 2028.

The Consortium's activities continued to increase EU visibility vis-à-vis third countries and civil society and contributed substantially to shaping EU policy in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament. The Consortium provides a platform for informal contacts among practitioners and stimulates dialogue between different stakeholders. Its activities have helped raise awareness of the challenges posed by WMD and conventional arms and explored solutions to address these challenges. It draws on an extensive Network of think tanks and research centres across Europe, including members from all EU Member States, as well as from partner countries such as Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. During 2025, three entities from Georgia, North Macedonia and Spain joined the Network, bringing the total number of members to 120 at the end of the year. The Network includes university research centres from a range of social and natural science disciplines.

During 2025, the Consortium organised the following activities to implement different aspects of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/889 and 2022/597:

- A webinar on export controls application to cloud labs (19 March);
- An intensive WMD proliferation awareness training course for graduate and post-graduate students of natural science and technical disciplines, held online (8-11 April);
- The 6th UN Disarmament Fellows visit, held in Vienna (10 April);
- A side event at the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York (29 April);
- An online seminar on good practices in export control outreach to new actors in the biotechnology ecosystem, presenting the corresponding EUNPDC brief on 'Good practices in export control outreach' (6 May);
- A briefing to the plenary meeting of the Australia Group multilateral export control regime taking place in Sydney on occasion of its 40th anniversary, based on the corresponding EU Policy Paper (17 July);
- The 14th EU Consultative Meeting, a gathering of EU officials and European experts (16 and 19 September);
- A Next Generation Workshop (10 November); and
- The 14th EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference (10-11 November).

In its work towards the achievement of the objectives of the Council Decision, the Consortium mainstreams gender issues and promotes the next generation of researchers and practitioners in non-proliferation and disarmament fields, as well as on connecting the gaps between the natural sciences and social sciences, between policymakers and academia, and between academia and policy research institutes. As part of this, the Consortium organizes non-proliferation awareness training courses for graduate and post-graduate students of natural and engineering sciences and implements the Young Women and Next Generation Initiative. All events convened by the Consortium ensured diversity of participants and speakers in terms of gender, age, expertise, and geographical representation.

Other activities related to the promotion and strengthening of non-proliferation and disarmament education in 2025 included hosting and updating e-Learning courses on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and EU policies, developing and maintaining an online

repository of non-proliferation and disarmament university courses ('Teaching clinic')¹⁵ and supporting 3 non-proliferation and disarmament internships with members of the Network.

The Consortium published a monthly newsletter, as well as eight EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament papers during 2025.¹⁶ The Consortium also released 16 episodes of the EUNPDC podcast on NPD issues.¹⁷

¹⁵ Available at <https://www.nonproliferation.eu/education-resources/teaching-resources/>

¹⁶ Available at <https://www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/online-publishing/non-proliferation-papers/>

¹⁷ Available at <https://www.nonproliferation.eu/category/podcast/>

DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

Building on the established practice since 2003, the EU continued to systematically include clauses on WMD non-proliferation commitments and cooperation on SALW in the negotiations with partner countries for association agreements and partnership and cooperation agreements. In 2025, such agreements were negotiated inter-alia with Bangladesh and the United Arab Emirates.

The EEAS continued to conduct dialogues or consultations on non-proliferation and disarmament issues with a range of third countries and international organisations. Throughout the year, dedicated non-proliferation and disarmament dialogues were held with Brazil, Canada, Japan, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine and the United States. Regular consultations on non-proliferation and disarmament were held with the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, High Level Consultations with the OPCW did not take place in 2025 due to conflicting schedules. Non-proliferation and disarmament issues furthermore continued to be integrated in the EU's various political and security dialogues with partners, including Albania, Iceland, North Macedonia, Norway and Switzerland.

Within the G7, several statements relating to non-proliferation and disarmament were issued during 2025 under the Canadian G7 Presidency, including by the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group on 20 August,¹⁸ and by the G7 Foreign Ministers on 15 February¹⁹ and on 14 March.²⁰

Coordination efforts continued also under the G7 led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,²¹ a global effort including 30 member countries and the European Union. In 2025, Global Partnership meetings took place in Ottawa and Vancouver under Canada's G7 Presidency, providing a global platform of coordination for global projects and programs on non-proliferation.

¹⁸ <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/08/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group.html>

¹⁹ <https://g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250215-statement.html>

²⁰ <https://g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

²¹ <https://www.gpwmd.com/>