



European Union
Election Observation Mission
HONDURAS 2025
Final Report



General Elections
30 November 2025



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REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS 2025

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The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily
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ACRONYMS

ACHR	American Convention on Human Rights
ASJ	Association for a Fairer Society – <i>Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa</i>
CDE	Departmental Electoral Council – <i>Consejo Departamental Electoral</i>
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CME	Municipal Electoral Council – <i>Consejo Municipal Electoral</i>
CNE	National Electoral Council – <i>Consejo Nacional Electoral</i>
COHEP	Honduran Council of Private Enterprise – <i>Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada</i>
CONADEH	Office of the Ombudsperson – <i>Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos</i>
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DC	Christian Democracy Party - Christian Democrats – <i>Democracia Cristiana</i>
DNI	National ID card – <i>Documento Nacional de Identificación</i>
EU EOM	European Union Election Observation Mission
FONAC	National Forum of Convergence – <i>Foro Nacional de Convergencia</i>
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
IPU	International Parliamentary Union
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersexual
LIBRE	Liberty and Refoundation Party – <i>Partido Libertad y Refundación</i>
OEH25	Electoral Observers for Honduras 2025
PINU-SD	Innovation and Social-Democrat Unity Party - <i>Partido Innovación y Unión Social Demócrata</i>
PLH	Honduran Liberal Party – <i>Partido Liberal de Honduras</i>
PNH	Honduran National Party - <i>Partido Nacional de Honduras</i>
PSH	Salvador de Honduras Party – <i>Partido Salvador de Honduras</i>
RDD	Network for the Defense of Democracy - <i>Red por la Defensa de la Democracia</i>
RNP	National Civil Registry – <i>Registro Nacional de las Personas</i>
TJE	Electoral Justice Tribunal – <i>Tribunal de Justicia Electoral</i>
TREP	Transmission and announcement of preliminary election results – <i>Transmisión de Resultados Electorales Preliminares</i>
UFTF	Campaign Finance Oversight Unit – <i>Unidad de Financiación, Transparencia y Fiscalización de Partidos Políticos y Candidatos</i>
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

I. Executive Summary

On 30 November 2025, Hondurans voted for the president and three vice presidents, the 128 members of the National Congress, the 298 municipal councils, and indirectly for the 20 members of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). Although 11 political parties were registered with the National Electoral Council (CNE), the EU EOM observed a reduction in political space, with only five parties permitted to participate in the elections after the CNE rejected the candidacy of other political parties that were previously represented in Congress. The three main parties, the ruling Liberty and Refoundation Party (LIBRE), the National Party of Honduras (PNH) and the Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH), dominated not only the election campaign but also the electoral institutions. The other two contesting parties were the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Innovation and Social Democratic Unity (PINU).

The general elections took place in a tense and highly polarised environment, with political disputes affecting the work of both the CNE and the Electoral Justice Tribunal (TJE). Internal disagreements among plenary members reflected the vulnerability of these institutions to paralysis and politicisation, hindering important decision making. Furthermore, the LIBRE representatives' resort to state authorities, namely the Public Prosecutor's Office, to initiate politically motivated legal actions against their CNE and TJE colleagues undermined the effective operation and autonomy of these institutions. European Union (EU) observers positively noted better cooperation among the members of the CNE decentralised structures, which was largely devoid of the conflicts prevailing at the central level.

Concerningly, the leadership of the Armed Forces, responsible for ensuring the security of the transportation of election materials, weighed in on the country's political life. This was particularly evident in their official request to obtain the presidential election results forms, as well as their repeated challenges to the CNE's authority. Following election day, however, the new leadership of the Armed Forces adopted a different attitude, respecting the constitutional limits of their mandate and facilitating the CNE's work.

Election day was conducted in a peaceful manner with a turnout of 60.19 per cent. Voting was assessed by EU observers as good or very good in 97 per cent of the polling stations observed. Polling procedures were largely adhered to, and polling staff performed well. The secrecy of the vote was generally respected. National observers were present at 38 per cent of polling stations visited by EU observers. The CNE announced the first preliminary results for the presidential elections, based on 34 per cent of the results forms received through the Election Results Transmission System (TREP), four hours after the polls closed. This was one hour later than the three-hour legal deadline for releasing preliminary presidential election results. Access to the results from individual polling stations was made available to both political parties and election observers contributing to the transparency and traceability of the election results.

In contrast, the tabulation of results took place amid narratives of fraud fuelled by shortcomings in the transmission of results, constant attempts by parties' representatives - notably the ruling party and the Liberal Party - to discredit the electoral process through protests, acts of violence, boycott and sabotage during the special recounts. This was compounded by threats about the Public Prosecutor's Office confiscating election materials and daily public comments by the President of Congress regarding the permanent commission of the Congress bypassing the CNE and announcing the results. Credible rumours about a possible detention order for the CNE's president and PNH councillor appeared on 11 December jeopardising the proceeding of the electoral process and leading both

councillors to hide and conduct their professional activities online until the end of the electoral process. The EU EOM issued two press statements in this regard on 10 and 20 December.¹

The final results of the general elections were announced through online-streamed sessions chaired by CNE President Ana Paola Hall, Councillor Cosette López-Osorio and substitute Councillor Carlos Enrique Cardona. The presidential election results announced on 24 December were based on 98.2 per cent of results protocols for the presidential election, while the election results announced on 30 December represented 86.6 per cent for the congressional election and 90.3 per cent for the municipal election. Any protocols with inconsistencies were to be processed by the TJE's jurisdictional recounts.

The National Party candidate Nasry Asfura was elected president with 40.26 per cent of the valid votes cast. The margin between the two leading presidential candidates was narrow, with Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party receiving 39.5 per cent of the vote, just 27,000 votes behind Asfura. Rixi Moncada of LIBRE came third with 19.19 per cent of the vote. In the congressional elections, the National Party secured 49 of the 128 seats, while the Liberals obtained 41, followed by LIBRE with 35. The National Party also won control of 151 municipalities, more than double the 71 won by the Liberal Party - a decrease from its previous 91. LIBRE saw a significant victory at the municipal level, increasing from 48 to 69 municipalities. While the PNH and PLH together control 90 seats in Congress, exceeding the 86-vote threshold required for a qualified majority for key institutional decisions and high-level appointments, the PLH and LIBRE together hold only 76 seats. This is insufficient for making key decisions such as the appointment of high-level positions in state institutions.

The legal framework provides an acceptable basis for democratic elections to be conducted in accordance with international commitments. However, some important shortcomings remain in several parts of the legislation, requiring urgent and inclusive debate on electoral reform. Contrary to good international practice, regulations are often approved very late in the process, creating legal uncertainty regarding relevant procedures. This was particularly evident in key regulations concerning candidate nomination, campaigning, election observation, the transmission of preliminary election results (TREP) and election dispute resolution. Of particular concern is the possibility for elected congressional candidates to transfer their seat to individuals who were not on the party list and did not participate in the elections. This undermines the integrity of party lists and the purpose of preferential voting, thereby weakening respect for voters' choices. A prominent case includes Jorge Cálix of the Liberal Party, whose congressional candidacy was rejected.

The CNE's current tripartite political configuration, reflected in its directorates, led to the diffusion of responsibility resulting in diminished accountability, poor coordination and slow decision making. Throughout the process, the CNE did not establish a coherent institutional public communication. Apart from announcing tenders and resulting contracts, key decisions were not systematically published, and joint press conferences involving all three councillors were rare. This undermined transparency. Instead, councillors chose to post information selectively on their personal social networks, sometimes presenting conflicting accounts of the preparations for the election. This affected the credibility of the CNE but also contributed to the erosion of public trust in the electoral process.

The generalised mistrust among the three main political parties led to the adoption of a complex technological architecture intended to enhance the integrity, transparency and traceability of the electoral process. However, significant weaknesses were revealed in the planning and implementation of this system, as well as in the accumulation of different safeguards and control mechanisms, which often proved ill-suited to the Honduran technological infrastructure.

¹ See Annex I: Press Statements

Fundamental freedoms were respected during the electoral campaign and, despite a state of emergency being in place in most municipalities, political parties were able to campaign freely. However, in some urban areas the presence of organised criminal groups challenged the campaign of some candidates. Campaign messaging was divisive and polarising with messages focused on accusations of electoral fraud and on the cases initiated by the Public Prosecutor against TJE and CNE opposition members. The drug trade and illicit financing emerged as issues towards the end of the campaign, particularly after United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump granted a pardon to former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was convicted by a U.S. court in 2024 of crimes relating to corruption and drug trafficking.

Social media platforms were extensively used for electoral campaigning. TikTok emerged as a key driver of online visibility, as content originating on the platform was frequently shared across other social media platforms. In addition, all parties made extensive use of paid political advertising to promote their candidates, using accounts on Facebook and YouTube. In this context, the LIBRE candidate's campaign expenditure on digital advertising was significantly higher than that of the other candidates. The absence of a legal framework governing online political advertising created an unregulated digital environment, limiting transparency and hindering effective oversight of campaign spending.

The three statements published by U.S. President Donald Trump on social media between 26 November and 1 December, during the campaign silence period, in support of Nasry Asfura generated significant political reactions and public debate. EU EOM social media analysis found that these statements sharply increased online engagement and dominated political discourse around three narratives: Trump's endorsement of Asfura, references to a pardon for former President Juan Orlando Hernández, and perceptions of foreign interference in Honduras's electoral process. These narratives were widely amplified by traditional media. The impact of US President's posts extended beyond digital spaces and had the potential to influence broader segments of the electorate.

Monitoring of social media revealed a deeply polarised information space, marked by the widespread circulation of conspiracy theories about electoral fraud, disinformation, and defamatory and gender-based attacks, frequently amplified by AI-generated content and inauthentic behaviour. The EU EOM recorded sophisticated deepfakes intended to mislead voters, which targeted candidates, institutional figures, media outlets, and prominent journalists. Insufficient safeguards against disinformation facilitated the spread of conspiratorial and polarising narratives of electoral fraud, undermining public confidence in the electoral process. The absence of a coherent and effective institutional communication strategy by the CNE, combined with the lack of systematic online voter education, further contributed to an environment conducive to the proliferation of disinformation.

The media operated in an environment of intimidation, smear campaigns and legal persecution with regular hostile rhetoric from senior government officials and key institutional and political actors towards critical media and journalists, including by the then Head of the Armed Forces, in contrast with weak protection mechanisms. The distinction between public information and campaign messaging in favour of the ruling party candidate was blurred by government communication and the selective allocation of state advertising. At the same time, public broadcasters did not provide equitable or impartial coverage of the campaign, creating a highly unbalanced environment that fell well short of the standards of independent public service journalism. Of the monitored broadcast media, Televisión (Canal 5), HCH and HRN provided a more balanced coverage.

Honduras has a diverse and vibrant civil society with a long-standing tradition of engagement in election observation. The most important organisations united in a common network *Red por la Defensa de la Democracia* (RDD), which later regrouped into *Observadores Electorales por Honduras* (OEH25). The platform developed, with the assistance of the National Democratic Institute, a sound election methodology relying on a sample-based observation, commonly referred

to as Process and Results Verification for Transparency (PRVT, in fact an evolution of the classical parallel vote tabulation, PVT). OEH25 was able to generalise its findings, indicating main trends in the presidential election just two days after elections. This helped to dispel allegations of fraud initially promoted by the ruling party and later by the PLH too.

Complementing past EU recommendations, the EU EOM offers 24 recommendations to the consideration of the Government of Honduras, the Congress, the National Electoral Council and the Electoral Justice Tribunal, political parties, civil society and the international community. The priority recommendations of the EU EOM to Honduras 2025 are:

1. Congress to undertake a process of electoral legal reform well in advance of the next elections, in consultation with the electoral institutions and civil society, to address inconsistencies and shortcomings of the current legislation as well as the timeframes for electoral authorities to publish all necessary implementing regulations.
2. Strengthen the institutional capacity, independence and public accountability of the CNE to protect it from political party interference and ensure the efficient, timely, and impartial administration of elections, including internal safeguards to prevent politically-motivated paralysis.
3. Implement an effective CNE institutional communication strategy to ensure consistent and timely external communication, thereby strengthening public confidence and improving responsiveness to disinformation. This should also include the prompt publication of all decisions and continuous public information dissemination, particularly in the pre- and post-electoral periods.
4. Create a safe and intimidation-free media environment for all actors, including adequate protection of journalists at risk.
5. Ensure effective implementation by political parties of the gender parity and alternation requirements at all levels of candidacy, supported by enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for non-compliance.
6. Both state authorities and political parties to consider adopting policies and mechanisms to effectively prevent and address gender-based political violence within the public political sphere and within political party structures.
7. Strengthen the CNE's ownership and control of the results management system, for example by developing a robust results management system in house, instead of relying on external companies. The resulting system should be developed, tested and audited sufficient time ahead of the next elections and should comply with the highest standards on transparency.

II. Introduction

The European Union deployed an Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Honduras to observe the 2025 general elections, following an invitation from the Government of Honduras and the National Electoral Council (CNE). The EU EOM was present in the country from 11 October to 22 December and was led by Chief Observer Francisco Assis, Member of the European Parliament. The Mission deployed 138 observers from 26 EU Member States, as well as Canada and Norway, across all departments of Honduras.

The mandate of the EU EOM was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the electoral process in accordance with Honduras's national legislation and its international commitments to democratic elections. The EU EOM operates independently in its findings and conclusions and adheres to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, endorsed at the United Nations in October 2005. The EU has previously observed general elections in Honduras in 2013, 2017 and 2021.

This report presents a detailed assessment of the Mission's findings across all stages of the electoral process and includes a series of recommendations aimed at contributing to improvements in future elections. The EU EOM issued three press statements after election day, on [10 December](#), [20 December](#) and [31 December](#), regarding concerns with the electoral process.

III. Political Background

On 30 November 2025, Hondurans voted for the president and three vice presidents, 128 members of the National Congress and mayors and councillors of 298 municipalities, as well as indirectly for the 20 members of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN).

Although 11 political parties were registered with the CNE, the EU EOM noted a contraction of the political space with only five political parties being approved to participate in the elections. The remaining parties were disqualified on controversial grounds regarding deadlines for presentation of candidacies, considerably reducing voters' choice. The three main parties were Liberty and Refoundation Party (LIBRE), National Party of Honduras (PNH) and the Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH). The two other parties were the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Innovation and Social Democratic Unity (PINU).

The presidential competition was dominated by the three main parties which elected charismatic figures during the primary elections held in March 2025. The ruling LIBRE elected Rixi Moncada, former Minister of Defence and Finance, the PNH elected Nasry 'Tito' Asfura, the former mayor of Distrito Central – Tegucigalpa; and the PLH elected Salvador Nasralla, a popular TV presenter and politician. The two other candidates competing were Mario Enrique Rivera of the DC and Jorge Nelson Ávila of PINU. Attempts by civil society to organise presidential debates were unsuccessful, in contrast with some mayoral candidates who participated in televised debates and other events.

The general elections took place in a tense and polarised environment, with political disputes permeating electoral institutions - the CNE and the TJE. Internal disagreements among members reflected the vulnerability of institutions to political influence leading to consecutive paralysis in their functioning and decision making. Furthermore, the use of state authorities, namely the Public Prosecutor's Office, as a political tool by the LIBRE representatives against their CNE and TJE colleagues, undermined the effective operation and autonomy of these electoral institutions. The involvement of the leadership of the Armed Forces in the country's political life, particularly their intention to obtain the presidential election results forms and their repeated challenges to the CNE's authority, was concerning, especially given that the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras

entrenches the separation of the Armed Forces from politics.

Due to the failure of the president of Congress to convene sessions, Congress was paralysed since July 2025, preventing the passing of important legislation affecting the elections such as the approval of budgets for the TJE and the Campaign Finance Oversight Unit (UFTF). On 28 October, opposition deputies held an extraordinary session outside the Congress premises after the president ordered to close the building. The session was held with the legally required quorum and aimed to extend the period for ordinary sessions in order to prevent the establishment of the Permanent Commission. However, despite the objections from the majority of the deputies, the president of Congress established the Permanent Commission on 31 October, mandated to handle parliamentary business during recess but also implying its potential role in declaring election results. Nevertheless, opposition deputies continued holding sessions until after election day not recognising the legitimacy of the Permanent Commission.

Following uncertainty surrounding the post-election period and the CNE's ability to retain the necessary quorum for announcing election results, these were declared on two separate occasions: the presidential results on 24 December and the congressional and municipal council results on 30 December. Both announcements were made during online-streamed sessions chaired by CNE President Ana Paola Hall, together with Councillor Cosette López-Osorio and substitute Councillor Carlos Enrique Cardona as the LIBRE CNE Councillor Marlon Ochoa advanced that he would not participate in the announcement of results.

The CNE declared Nasry Asfura of the National Party the winner of the presidential election, with 40.26 per cent of the vote. Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party came in second, with 39.5 per cent, with a difference of 27.000 votes. Rixi Moncada of LIBRE achieved a score of 19.19 per cent. The results for the National Congress demonstrated a similar trend. The PNH emerged as the largest bloc, securing 49 seats, followed by the PLH with 41 seats and LIBRE with 35 seats. PINU secured two seats, while the Christian Democrats won one seat. For municipal councils, the PNH secured 151 of the 298 municipalities, while the PLH won 76 and LIBRE increased its local representation from 48 in past elections to 69 municipalities. PINU and an independent candidate each won one municipality.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Universal and Regional Principles and Commitments

Honduras is a party to the principal international and regional treaties that enshrine the core principles governing democratic elections, including the right to participate in public affairs through regular elections based on universal and equal suffrage, as well as the protection of fundamental freedoms. These treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples.

Honduras is also bound by the obligations arising from regional treaties and declarations of the Organization of American States (OAS), including the American Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, and the American Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Constitution stipulates that once Honduras has ratified an international treaty, its provisions become part of and take precedence over national law.

B. National Electoral Legislation

The legal framework governing general elections is set out in the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, the 2021 Electoral Law (Decree No. 35-2021), the 2024 Electoral Procedural Law (Decree No. 85-2024), the 2017 Law on Financing, Transparency and Oversight of Political Parties and Candidates and the 2004 National Registry of Persons Law. While these legal instruments establish a foundation for democratic elections, many of their provisions remain incomplete or ambiguous. In this regard, key legislation, including the Electoral Procedural Law and the Campaign Finance Law, still lacks the necessary implementing regulations for effective application. Moreover, several legislative shortcomings persist, including vague deadlines for the submission of party candidate lists in the absence of primaries, loopholes in gender parity requirements, unclear restrictions on the use of state resources, and inconsistent enforcement of campaign finance obligations.

The CNE issues regulations on various aspects of the electoral process, responsible for establishing operational rules. However, the inconsistent adoption of these regulations, while many were approved late in the process, some even on the eve of election day, created legal uncertainty on how to proceed in key areas such as candidate nominations, campaign regulations, electoral dispute resolution, election observation, the operation of the Election Results Transmission System (TREP) and special recounts.²

Since the 2021 general elections, Honduras has made little progress in electoral reform. A positive step was, however, the approval of the Electoral Procedural Law in November 2024, which created a procedural framework for the TJE to adjudicate electoral disputes. Nevertheless, the TJE's capacity and independence was deeply affected by its financial dependence on budget approval by Congress, used as a bargaining tool among political parties, as well as by internal conflicts among TJE magistrates due to political affiliations.

(Priority) Recommendation 1: Congress to undertake a process of electoral legal reform well in advance of the next elections, in consultation with the electoral institutions and civil society, to address inconsistencies and shortcomings of the current legislation as well as the timeframes for electoral authorities to publish all necessary implementing regulations.

C. The Electoral System

The Constitution establishes a multiparty democracy based on periodic elections through universal, secret and equal suffrage. Although voting is mandatory, no sanctions are imposed for non-participation. The president and members of the National Congress are elected for a four-year term. The president and the three vice presidents (*designados a la Presidencia*) are elected using a simple majority system. The presidential term is limited to a single mandate with no possibility of re-election. The 20 seats allocated to Honduras in the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) are distributed through proportional representation based on the results of the presidential elections. One seat is guaranteed to each participating party, regardless of its presidential candidate's electoral performance.

The 128 members of the unicameral National Congress are elected through proportional representation using open lists in 16 of the country's 18 departments, each of which elects between two and 23 deputies. The remaining two departments (Gracias a Dios and Bay Islands) elect one member each through simple majority. While congressional seats are allocated to departments in

² Organisation of American States (OAS) Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes 2021, Certainty Principle: "As a democratic principle, certainty presupposes that the basic rules for competing and participating in politics are clear for all parties prior to the start of the respective political processes. (...) Certainty is a key principle for eliciting citizens' trust and assuring them that acts by the authorities abide by the regulations and are strictly in accord with the powers granted them by law, as well as for guaranteeing that the rules are accepted and cannot be altered on a whim."

proportion to their population, the manner and frequency of revisions are not specified by the law. The current distribution of seats does not reflect the current demographics, since the last review took place in 2001, negatively impacting the equality of the vote.³ Both the National Statistical Institute's (INE) population projections for 2025, and the current distribution of electorate indicate that Cortés department should have four to five additional seats (increasing from 20 to 24 or 25), mainly at the expense of Valle, and Santa Barbara that should lose two or three seats (other changes would be within the range of ± 1). Overall, two thirds of the departments deviated by more than 10 per cent from the nationwide average weight of the vote, which contradicts international best practice.⁴

Recommendation 2: *Establish clear procedures and periodicity for reviewing and revising the distribution of congressional seats among departments, in order to reflect demographic changes and ensure equality of the vote.*

In municipal elections, voters choose a single mayoral and vice-mayoral candidate ticket, and municipal council seats are distributed proportionally based on the results of the mayoral election.

In the 16 plurinominal departments, political parties must submit lists containing the same number of candidates as there are seats to be filled, ranging from two to 23. Voters may mark as many candidates as there are seats to be filled, selecting candidates from one or more parties. Seats are allocated to political parties based on the total number of votes received, and mandates are awarded to the candidates within each party's list who obtained the highest number of votes (largest remainder method with Hare quota). Candidates from the same parties are then ranked according to the number of votes they received. This allocation system could negatively impact the weight of the vote, as voters may choose to vote for fewer candidates than the maximum permitted, which would automatically diminish the overall result for a given party when seats are distributed. It can also lead to the paradoxical outcome of the candidate with the most votes not being elected if their nominating party performed poorly.

Furthermore, the possibility of replacing elected candidates with individuals who were not included on a party's electoral list and did not compete in primary or general elections is contrary to the principle of freely choosing representatives through voting processes undermining the respect for voters' choices.⁵ The most prominent case involved Jorge Cálix of the Liberal Party - formerly affiliated with LIBRE - who lost the presidential primaries and whose congressional candidacy was rejected. Under Honduran law, elected members of Congress may relinquish their seats in favour of a designated substitute, a mechanism that raises concerns regarding transparency, accountability, and the effective representation of voters' preferences.

Recommendation 3: *Strengthen respect for voters' choices in congressional elections by prohibiting arbitrary post-election replacement of elected candidates by individuals who were not included on the party's list of candidates. Any replacement should strictly follow the order of the candidate list as presented to voters.*

³ Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 21: "The principle of one person, one vote, must apply, and within the framework of each State's electoral system, the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another. The drawing of electoral boundaries and the method of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not exclude or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives freely."

⁴ The Council of Europe's Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters suggests that deviations in the distribution of seats should ideally be within ten per cent and certainly not exceed 15 per cent, except in special circumstances (e.g. for protection of national minorities).

⁵ ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 7: "(...) Participation through freely chosen representatives is exercised through voting processes which must be established by laws that are in accordance with paragraph (b)"; paragraph 18: "State reports should describe the legal provisions which establish the conditions for holding elective public office, and any limitations and qualifications which apply to particular offices."

V. Election Administration

A. Structure and Composition

Responsibility for the administration of the electoral process rests with the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Electoral Justice Tribunal (TJE). The CNE is responsible for the conduct of primary and general elections and holds broad competencies, including calling elections, registering political parties and candidates, maintaining the voter register, declaring final election results, and serving as the first instance for electoral disputes. The TJE is responsible for adjudicating electoral appeals.

The CNE is headed by a board of three councillors elected by a two-thirds majority of the National Congress for a five-year term. Although not prescribed by law, the three councillors represent, by political agreement, the three largest parties in Congress: LIBRE, the National Party, and the Liberal Party. The current board was elected in 2024, together with the three magistrates of the TJE and the three commissioners of the National Registry of Persons (RNP). In line with the annual rotation among councillors, the CNE presidency for the 30 November elections was held by Liberal Party councillor Ana Paola Hall as of September 2025, following the tenure of National Party councillor Cossette López-Osorio.

While this tripartite political arrangement was intended to maximise mutual political control and mitigate long-standing mistrust among the main political forces, in practice it weakened the CNE's institutional autonomy and contributed to serious internal conflicts, a diffusion of responsibility, poor coordination, and delayed decision-making largely due to the strategic misuse of the unanimity rule mainly by the LIBRE councillor. As a result, the CNE frequently resorted to improvised solutions to problems that were generated precisely by the conflicting interests of the three parties within the institution.⁶

This tripartite political division permeates the CNE's internal structure and is replicated across its directorates, as well as *de facto* within the temporary electoral bodies established ahead of elections at the departmental and municipal levels - namely the 18 Departmental Electoral Councils (CDEs) and the 298 Municipal Electoral Councils (CMEs) - and at the level of the 19,167 polling stations (*Juntas Receptoras de Votos* - JRVs).⁷

Although these temporary bodies are composed of five members and five substitutes, the three main positions are allocated to representatives of the tripartite political forces, while the remaining two positions are assigned, on a rotational basis, to other political parties. As only five parties were authorised to participate in the general elections, these two positions were allocated to DC and PINU. However, due to their limited organisational capacity, both parties struggled to fill their assigned quotas at the departmental and municipal levels and were unable to do so at the polling station level. Other electoral staff, including trainers and technology operators, were also appointed by the CNE from lists submitted by the three main political parties. Furthermore, the Consultative Council - mandated by law to meet monthly and intended to serve as a forum for information-sharing and cooperation between the CNE and all contesting parties - was never convened. This omission further

⁶ Article 25 of the ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 20: “An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant”; OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, paragraph 5: “It is important for electoral bodies to be independent as regards their ability to decide and act, without their performance being subject to any governmental, political, or other influence.”

⁷ The staffing of the CDEs and CMEs is based on the last presidential election, while the three main JRV positions are linked to the results of the primaries (as an incentive for parties to conduct primary elections).

limited the ability of smaller parties, including DC and PINU, to meaningfully engage in the electoral process.⁸

(Priority) Recommendation 4: *Strengthen the institutional capacity, independence and public accountability of the CNE to protect it from political party interference and ensure the efficient, timely, and impartial administration of elections, including internal safeguards to prevent politically-motivated paralysis.*

B. The Administration of Elections

Since the operational problems of the March primaries⁹, political infighting became more intense at the CNE, with councillors often defending their parties' interests rather than acting in the interests of institutional independence. Public conflicts became the norm, particularly between the LIBRE and PNH councillors. The LIBRE councillor sought an investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office into an alleged electoral fraud plan by the PNH councillor based on dubious evidence, in an attempt to discredit his colleague and destabilise the institution. The two opposition CNE councillors (PNH and PLH) repeatedly reported receiving threats, including arrest threats. All this negatively affected election preparations.

In line with the election law, reflecting the mutual distrust within the tripartite setup, most material and service supplies were outsourced through public tendering instead of increasing internal capacities and developing technological solutions in-house. Following the already late approval of the general elections budget by Congress on 4 June 2025, the CNE councillors disagreed in early July over the previously approved procedures and configuration of the preliminary results management system (TREP). In an apparent attempt to force changes to the TREP system, supporters of the ruling party impeded access of prospective technology suppliers to the CNE's premises to present their offers on 7 July. The subsequent refusal of the LIBRE councillor to join plenary sessions and the unwillingness of substitute CNE members to replace him led to a four-week paralysis of the CNE before a compromise on the TREP was found on 4 August. The EU EOM noted that the current configuration enabled any of the three parties to effectively halt the electoral process by failing to participate, or by boycotting, which was apparent within the CNE's board of councillors and among the substitute councillors, but also at lower levels, such as among special recounts personnel (see Aggregation of Results).

The CNE never fully recovered from this delay, which resulted in shorter timeframes that negatively impacted most of the operational calendar, especially the parts involving outsourced technological solutions and their integration. This was further exacerbated by frequent disagreements and mutual accusations between councillors, resulting in additional delays, missing the deadlines in the electoral calendar and dramatic twists in the tendering processes. Some important contracts were only awarded at the very last minute, after several failed attempts, jeopardising the continuation of election preparations.¹⁰ Nevertheless, despite all these adverse developments at the top of the CNE that damaged its public image during the pre-election period, the CNE managed to organise election day well and deliver credible results. This was mainly thanks to the CNE's experienced operational

⁸ Article 58 of the Electoral Law.

⁹ The CNE organised primary and internal elections for the three principal parties on 9 March 2025. Delays in the distribution of election material in the two largest cities, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula led to late opening of polling stations and long waiting times affecting, according to the estimations of national observers, over 180,000 voters. The elections were postponed by a week in two voting centres in the capital.

¹⁰ The tender for transporting election materials was repeated three times, and the tender for satellite connections was repeated twice. The contract for GPS tracking devices was awarded so late that they could not be installed in the election material kits dispatched to the first departments. Considerable delays in printing the congressional ballots for Olancho and Valle were also caused by an injunction and its inconclusive resolution by the TJE.

personnel and the CNE president's firm stance in safeguarding the process's institutional integrity at key moments.

The total budget for the primary and general elections, public pre-election funding of political parties, and military support amounted to HNL 4,153 million (approximately 137 million EUR, or around 35 EUR per vote). For the general elections only, Congress approved a budget of approximately 69 million EUR. Of this amount, 7.2 million EUR was allocated to the two principal election technologies - 3.5 million EUR for biometric identification and 3.7 million EUR for TREP.¹¹ In addition, special budgets were also allocated to the Armed Forces (2.8 million EUR) and for political parties (9.1 million EUR).

Internal disputes within the National Congress, combined with attempts by the president of Congress to condition the approval of the budgets of the Electoral Justice Tribunal (TJE) and the Financing, Transparency and Oversight Unit (UFTF) of the CNE, on the approval of unrelated legislation, led to the non-approval of electoral-related budgets for these two bodies for the 2025 general elections.¹² Together with the late approval of the CNE's own budget, this exposed the structural financial vulnerability of electoral institutions to political leverage and seriously constrained their ability to carry out their mandates in a timely and effective manner.

Recommendation 5: *Ensure the financial independence and operational autonomy of electoral institutions by guaranteeing the timely approval and disbursement of adequate funding for them to effectively operate. The total electoral budget should be approved the year prior to elections, with funds disbursed sufficiently in advance to allow for effective planning, procurement, staffing, and implementation throughout the entire electoral cycle.*

Despite the belated yet generous election budget, the CNE's temporary structures (CDEs and CMEs) often lacked office premises, equipment, transportation and basic coordination and instructions from the national CNE. Nevertheless, EU observers positively noted better cooperation among the members of the decentralised structures, which was largely devoid of the conflicts prevailing at the central level. Although their responsibilities were primarily limited to political oversight and election day logistics, in most municipalities they were also responsible for delivering election materials to voting centres, as the centrally awarded contract only covered transportation to municipal capitals. To this end, the CMEs often had to rely on assistance from the main political parties.

By law, the entire management of human resources within the CNE is delegated to political parties, including the recruitment and training of polling staff and technology operators in voting centres (*custodios informáticos electorales*), as well as members of special recount stations. EU observers reported inconsistent training methodologies and varying levels of preparedness among personnel. Although the CNE offered online classes for polling station members, these were optional, meaning the CNE had no effective means of monitoring the quality of training provided by the parties. There were also no guarantees that those accredited to work at polling stations were actually the people who had received training, since their accreditations were issued without names.

The two non-essential polling station positions (vocal 1 and vocal 2) were allocated to the DC and the PINU, who were unable to provide enough staff. A few days before the election, DC formally refused to receive the accreditation for their polling staff by the CNE, believing that their accreditations could end up being given to other parties. Also, computers containing PINU poll

¹¹ Other millions were spent on terrestrial and satellite connectivity and different hardware and related services.

¹² OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, para 5: “[Electoral bodies] should have their own budget for executing their activities.”; Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Model Code of Conduct for Elections, paragraph. 7.1: “Election administrators should be free from interference by government or parties and should be provided with sufficient funds to allow them to fulfil their responsibilities.”

worker data were stolen from the party's headquarters in San Pedro Sula. EU observers also received credible reports that teachers in Cortes (Santa Cruz) had been pressured to participate as LIBRE polling staff and noted that some PNH and PLH polling staff were considering resigning due to intimidation and a tense environment in Yoro (Olanchito). The EOM received reports from various departments that LIBRE, and to a lesser extent PNH, were attempting to purchase polling staff accreditations from PINU (and DC prior to their withdrawal).

Throughout the process, the CNE did not establish coherent institutional communication. Apart from announcing tenders and resulting contracts, key decisions were not systematically published, and joint press conferences involving all three councillors were rare, which limited transparency and forced journalists to gather information themselves and from individual commissioners at the CNE premises.¹³ Instead, the councillors chose to post information selectively on their social networks, sometimes constructing conflicting narratives about the election preparations. While this brought the councillors national and political prominence, it also affected the credibility of the CNE. Together with the frequent changes to the tendering procedures, it further eroded public trust in the electoral process.

(Priority) Recommendation 6: Implement an effective CNE institutional communication strategy to ensure consistent and timely external communication, thereby strengthening public confidence and improving responsiveness to disinformation. This should also include the prompt publication of all decisions and continuous public information dissemination, particularly in the pre- and post-electoral periods.

The politicisation of the electoral process meant that voters were relegated to a secondary role. Apart from a few simple, informative videos about certain aspects of the process, which were broadcast in the days leading up to election day, the CNE did not develop any strategy to inform voters. In this context, private media outlets stepped in to provide voter information programmes. No information campaign targeting specific groups or first-time voters was observed. At the local level, EU observers noted a few initiatives conducted by civil society organisations to promote democratic values in the electoral context.

Attempts at discrediting the electoral process and the CNE from within

Throughout the process, the work of the CNE opposition councillors (PNH and PLH) was challenged on various fronts, with the aim of discrediting the two female councillors, undermining the credibility of electoral operations, and delegitimising the electoral process. The EU EOM highlights two significant incidents among the various threats and incidents directed at the two councillors that illustrate the ease with which certain authorities exerted pressure on them without accountability.

On 22 October, the CNE LIBRE councillor submitted a USB drive containing 24 audio recordings to the Public Prosecutor, claiming that they related to conversations between the CNE PNH councillor, the PNH leader of the congressional bench and an Armed Forces official who were allegedly planning to commit election fraud. A week later, the Public Prosecutor announced at a press conference that an investigation had been initiated, broadcasting the recordings live on TV. These recordings sparked a

¹³ ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, paragraph 19: “States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information.”; UN Convention against Corruption, article 10(a): “Adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of the general public to obtain, where appropriate, information on the organization, functioning and decision-making processes of its public administration and (...) on decisions and legal acts that concern members of the public.” and OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, paragraph 4: “[Electoral bodies] should have effective mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the population as whole and all political actors involved in the election.”

public debate about their authenticity and legality, with many people claiming that they had been generated using AI and demanding access to the material's metadata. Civil society and political figures questioned how the LIBRE councillor had obtained the recordings without a court order, as well as the Public Prosecutor's decision to publicly release audio recordings disclosing evidence that had not yet been accepted by a court. Subsequently, the LIBRE councillor requested that the PNH councillor be excluded from CNE's substantive electoral decisions, including results management. Apart from continuous allegations, a proper investigation did not take place. Despite the apparent attempt to discredit the PNH councillor and delegitimise the electoral process - as well as the resulting strained relationships within the CNE - the PNH councillor managed to carry out her professional duties.

On 23 October, a meeting between the Armed Forces and the CNE to plan election-day logistics escalated into a dispute over hierarchy and mandates between the two bodies. The large-scale deployment of armed personnel around the CNE building disrupting normal movement in the area, including access to a hospital as well as the intervention of the Head of the Armed Forces, who challenged the authority of the CNE and requested copies of the presidential election results forms from the CNE as a safeguard of the electoral process, was publicly perceived as a disproportionate display of force and an assertion of military control against the electoral administration institution, particularly its president.

C. Election Technology

The 2025 general elections relied on a complex technological architecture intended to enhance the integrity, transparency, and traceability of the electoral process. However, this system revealed significant weaknesses in planning, implementation, and governance. The generalised mistrust among the main three parties led to an accumulation of different safeguards and control mechanisms, such as in the design of ballots and result sheets, and signing and stamping of ballots by polling station presidents and secretaries. More importantly, it also led to an incremental introduction of technological solutions, such as biometric voter identification, a results management relying on satellite internet connection or GPS tracking of election materials. These technological solutions often proved ill-suited for the infrastructure available at Honduran elementary schools, hosting most polling stations.

The main technological components included biometric voter identification; the Results Transmission System (TREP) based on Intelligent Character Recognition (ICR); multi-layered connectivity through mobile networks and satellite internet; and traceability tools such as GPS tracking and RFID labelling of electoral materials. Each polling station was equipped with a portable technology kit comprising a computer, printer-scanner, biometric reader, and mobile modem, with Starlink satellite connectivity and solar power deployed where required. Grupo ASD – *Asesoría en Sistematización de Datos S.A.S.* was contracted to operate the TREP across 7,669 scanning and transmission centres, supported by more than 23,000 *custodios informáticos*. In parallel, GPS tracking and RFID labelling mechanisms were introduced to safeguard the chain of custody of electoral materials. However, delays and disruptions in transport procurement processes, combined with reliance on ad hoc vehicle fleets, complicated the integration of technological and logistical components and increased operational risks.

A nationwide mock exercise conducted on 9 November 2025, using 768 technology kits across approximately 1,453 polling stations, was intended to test biometric identification, the TREP, connectivity, and logistical arrangements. However, the exercise exposed serious deficiencies. Satellite equipment did not comply with tender specifications, the central data hub failed to meet CNE requirements, and misconfigured SIM cards resulted in biometric devices connecting to one mobile network operator but not the other. Overall connectivity performance during the mock exercise was

significantly below expectations, with only 22 per cent of biometric readers successfully connecting and approximately 36 per cent of the expected result sheets transmitted.

The exercise also revealed that electoral technology staff (*custodios informáticos*) and polling station staff experienced significant difficulties in installing and operating the technology kits. They lacked clear operational instructions, encountered credential and access issues, and struggled with system usability. In addition, the ICR system frequently misread numerical values, requiring extensive manual corrections and substantially increasing the workload for verification.

These shortcomings were largely attributable to earlier internal disputes within the CNE regarding the design of the TREP. A compromise reached on 4 August resulted in a complex verification workflow requiring visual checks and re-checks of all ICR-interpreted results. This significantly increased technical and operational demands and could not be fully implemented within the available timeframe.

The biometric process was introduced as a key safeguard to verify voters' identities at polling stations through fingerprint readers connected to the CNE's central systems. Each technology kit included a biometric device developed by Smartmatic, with connectivity relying on the national mobile operators Tigo and Claro and, in remote areas, on Starlink satellite links, with the intention of ensuring functionality even where mobile coverage was limited.

However, on election day, the CNE instructed polling station boards (JRVs) to remove the SIM cards from biometric devices should the connectivity issues cause significant delays in fingerprint recognition. In addition, Starlink connectivity performed poorly, with fewer than half of the approximately 1,800 units operating effectively. These failures prevented many polling stations from transmitting results through the TREP system during election night.

VI. Voter Register

A. The Right to Vote

The Constitution provides that all citizens who are at least 18 years old on election day are entitled to vote, with the exception of adults under guardianship, persons in pre-trial detention for serious crimes, and individuals serving a final criminal conviction. Members of the Armed Forces and the police are subject to constitutional restrictions on political participation.¹⁴ Additional practical limitations affect the effective exercise of voting rights for prisoners serving short sentences and for hospitalised voters, as elections are not conducted in detention facilities or hospitals.¹⁵ Although the Electoral Law mandates the CNE to adopt regulations to facilitate the registration and voting of persons whose physical or health conditions prevent them from attending their assigned polling stations, such

¹⁴ Article 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras.

¹⁵ Article 25 ICCPR, United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 10: "The right to vote at elections and referendums must be established by law and may be subject only to reasonable restrictions (...). It is unreasonable to restrict the right to vote on the ground of physical disability or to impose literacy, educational or property requirements"; paragraph 11: "States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right."; and paragraph 14: "Persons who are deprived of liberty but who have not been convicted should not be excluded from exercising the right to vote."; UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN CRPD), Article 29: "States Parties shall guarantee (...) that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others."; ICCPR United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 21, paragraph 3: "Persons deprived of their liberty enjoy all the rights set forth in the Covenant, subject to the restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed environment."; OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section B, paragraph 6: "The laws of each country may regulate the exercise of voting or being elected solely on grounds of age, nationality, residence, language, level of education, civil capacity, or conviction by a competent judge in legal proceedings."

regulations were not adopted.¹⁶ Furthermore, only citizens in possession of a National Identification Document (DNI) are entitled to vote.

Recommendation 7: *Remove restrictions on the universal right to suffrage and adopt measures to ensure the right and opportunity to vote for homebound citizens, those in hospitals, and other persons in special circumstances that hinder their political participation.*

B. Voter Registration

The National Registry of Persons (*Registro Nacional de Personas* – RNP) supports the CNE in maintaining the permanent biometric voter register (*Censo Electoral Nacional*), which is derived from the civil registry and contains the details of eligible voters. Between 2019 and 2021, the RNP implemented the *Identificate* project, co-financed by the European Union, to update and clean its database, including the removal of deceased individuals and persons permanently residing abroad. As part of the project, citizens were required to appear in person at RNP offices, where their biometric data - ten fingerprints and facial photographs - were captured for the first time.

Since then, the voter register has been periodically updated with data on new eligible voters, but also with information from the Supreme Court on persons deprived of political rights and data on active members of the Armed Forces and the police, who are excluded from the voter register.¹⁷ The law provides reasonable timeframes for public display and challenging of the preliminary voter, followed by a 30-day period for the CNE to address the challenges and publish the decisions online. The CNE received 936 substantiated complaints.

The final voter register for the 2025 general elections was published on 30 September 2025. It included 6,026,170 voters residing in Honduras, 52.3 per cent of whom were women, as well as 496,307 citizens residing abroad, 399,537 of whom were in the United States. These figures were broadly consistent with available projections of the adult population residing in Honduras. In the election period, contending political parties received monthly updates and a copy of the final voter list, contributing to the transparency of the voter register. In general, the voter register enjoyed public trust, many EU EOM interlocutors praised its increased accuracy through the integration of biometric data.

In the period preceding the elections, the RNP increased its production capacity and distribution of new and replacement DNIs and informed citizens of their availability through SMS messages and phone calls. Nevertheless, media reported long queues at RNP offices up to the day before election day, potentially leaving thousands of citizens without their DNIs and, in practice, leading to their disenfranchisement.

The CNE maintained a dedicated website enabling voters to verify the location of their assigned polling station. During November, a total of 40 polling centres were relocated due to various logistical constraints, with the last relocation occurring just three days before election day. These changes affected tens of thousands of voters, who were proactively informed at the local level by the respective Municipal Electoral Councils (CMEs) and through targeted SMS campaigns.

The Electoral Law provides for out-of-country voting in presidential elections. Since the 2021 general elections, the number of voters registered abroad has increased sharply, from 15,331 in 2021 to nearly

¹⁶ Article 81 of the Electoral law.

¹⁷ Voters may also request a change of voting address up to 15 days before an election is called. However, in at least eight municipalities, RNP offices were blocked by protesting citizens during the period in which requests for changes of voting address could be submitted. EU observers received credible information that the RNP office in Corquín (Copán) was inaccessible throughout the entire period due to a permanent blockage by LIBRE supporters, despite affected citizens having submitted a formal complaint to the Public Prosecutor's Office.

half a million. According to interlocutors from the CNE and the RNP, this increase was not primarily driven by an intention to participate in elections, but rather by the requirement to hold a valid National Identification Document (DNI) for administrative purposes, including passport renewals. By law, all eligible adult DNI holders are automatically included in the voter register, regardless of their place of residence. Based on past experience of very low turnout abroad and taking into account the current migration context in the United States, the CNE decided to organise out-of-country voting for the presidential election only in the United States, in 12 cities where at least 10,000 Honduran voters were registered. In total, 15 polling stations were established, each supplied with 1,200 ballot papers.¹⁸

VII. Registration of Political Parties and Candidates

A. Registration of Political Parties

The requirements for the registration of political groups are inclusive and in line with international principles related to freedom of association,¹⁹ however the law is very permissive in terms of deregistration of parties. The registration of political parties is governed by the Constitution and the Electoral Law and is under the jurisdiction of the CNE. The Constitution guarantees the political rights of citizens including the right to form, join and participate in the activities of a political party. Nevertheless, requests for the registration of political parties are not accepted during the period between the calling of primary elections and general elections.²⁰ Together with the prohibition on unsuccessful primary candidates standing for election under another political platform, these provisions appear intended to deter competition from and political aspirations among unsuccessful internal candidates.

Political parties are required to adhere to specific principles, guarantee internal democracy, and demonstrate a national presence. To this end, they must submit a declaration of principles, statutes, a gender policy, evidence of party structures in more than half of the departments and municipalities, and at least 50 supporting party members. In addition, parties are required to present a list of supporting signatures equivalent to at least two per cent of the votes obtained by the winning presidential candidate in the previous elections. In cases where registration is refused, the decision may be appealed before the Electoral Justice Tribunal (TJE).

According to the Electoral Law, political parties that do not participate in an election or fail to obtain sufficient votes to elect at least one member of Congress or a mayor have their registration cancelled. This sanction appears disproportionate and raises concerns regarding its compatibility with the constitutional right to freedom of association, as it effectively restricts political pluralism and electoral competition. The suspension or involuntary dissolution of associations constitutes one of the most severe restrictions on freedom of association and should be applied only in response to clearly defined and serious violations.

Of the 11 political parties officially registered, only five had their candidate lists approved by the CNE, resulting in the automatic deregistration of all remaining parties. The Honduras Salvador Party (PSH), which held six seats in the outgoing Congress, appealed this decision to the TJE, which upheld

¹⁸ This number of ballots exceeded the capacity of polling staff to process voters, therefore, according to media reports, some voters could not exercise their right to vote despite the extension of working hours of polling stations abroad.

¹⁹ Article 22 and 25 ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 26: “The right to freedom of association, including the right to form and join organizations and associations concerned with political and public affairs, is an essential adjunct to the rights protected by article 25.”

²⁰ Article 126 of the Election Law.

the CNE's decision. The party subsequently filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.²¹ At the time of writing, the case remained pending, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the legal framework in providing timely remedies for potential violations of political rights.

Recommendation 8: *Amend the electoral law to protect freedom of association by revising the requirements for registering and deregistering parties in line with regional and international principles.*

B. Registration of Candidates

The requirements imposed on candidates standing for election seem reasonable and are generally in line with international principles for democratic elections. Presidential and vice-presidential candidates must be Honduran citizens by birth, over 30 years old, and enjoy political rights. The Constitution prohibits certain public servants and members of the Armed Forces from serving as president. Members of the National Congress must be Honduran citizens by birth, be at least 21 years old, and enjoy political rights. No person can stand as a candidate if they have a final conviction or judicial interdiction. Candidates may only submit their candidacy for one of the elections; otherwise, they are disqualified.

Eleven political parties were registered with the CNE. Only the three main parties held primary elections, as more than one internal political movement within each party wished to compete in the general elections. The remaining parties did not hold primaries. Of the seven political parties that did not conduct primary elections, five had their lists rejected by the CNE on the basis of incomplete application documentation. The EU EOM considered that these parties were not given sufficient time to submit their candidacies, especially given the deregistration sanction imposed by the Electoral Law for parties that do not participate in a given election.

In a controversial decision on 30 May, the CNE rejected the candidate lists of five political parties, including the Honduras Salvador Party (PSH) holding six seats in the outgoing Congress.²² In the absence of legal timeframes, the CNE gave political parties that did not hold primaries less time to submit their candidacies than to parties that held primaries and independent candidates. In communication 23/2025 on 10 May, the CNE requested these political parties to submit their lists by 19 May but only issued the candidate nomination regulations on 17 May. The five parties appealed their rejection to the TJE, which dismissed the appeals without providing a substantiated explanation for upholding the CNE's decisions. Also, the CNE does not publish decisions on the registration of parties and candidates which is contrary to international transparency standards.

For municipal elections, of the 30 applications submitted by independent candidates, only six were approved. Independent candidates are required to submit a number of supporters' fingerprints equivalent to at least two per cent of the votes cast in the municipality in the previous election.²³ These fingerprints are verified on a sample basis by the RNP. However, the review reports provided to candidates contained only the total number of fingerprints deemed invalid, without specifying the individual errors. This limited candidates' ability to identify and replace the problematic fingerprints within the five-day deadline prescribed by law.²⁴

Recommendation 9: *Establish clear timeframes and procedures in law for registering different types of candidacies, as well as for identifying and correcting mistakes within a reasonable timeframe.*

²¹ Exp.TJE-0801-202500076, Acción de Amparo Con Suspensión del Acto Reclamado Contra La Resolución del Tribunal De Justicia Electoral (5 September 2025). See the section Candidate Nomination for more details on the application and rejection process.

²² Other political parties rejected included *Partido Anti-Corrupción* (PAC), *Partido Alianza Patriótica* (Alianza), *Partido Todos Somos Honduras* (TSH), *Partido Organización de la Reserva Democrática de la Nación* (ORDEN).

²³ *Certificación- Acuerdo 40-2025*. The number of signatures required ranges from 17 to 9,466 depending on the size of the municipality.

²⁴ Article 155 of the Electoral Law.

VIII. Election Campaign and Campaign Finance

A. Election Campaign

The election campaign began on 1 September and ended on 24 November, after which there was a five-day silence period. Fundamental freedoms were respected during the electoral campaign and, despite a state of emergency being in place in most municipalities, political parties were able to campaign freely. However, in some urban areas where organised criminal groups were present, interlocutors informed the EU EOM that candidates had to negotiate access. The CNE only issued campaign regulations on 22 September, while regulations on the role of the Municipal Electoral Councils (CMEs) in authorising campaign events were issued after the campaign had ended, on 25 November.

The five presidential candidates campaigned actively alongside candidates for Congress or municipal councils. While large rallies were held in the final weeks of the campaign, marches and door-to-door activities were the preferred method of interaction with voters, especially outside urban centres. Campaign rules were applied unevenly throughout the municipalities due to the absence of timely instructions, but the EU EOM only documented one case of a proposed campaign event being rejected.

Campaign messaging was divisive and polarising. The presentation of parties' programmes for the next government centred on promoting specific actions rather than discussing coherent governance or reform programmes. They also focused on accusations of electoral fraud and the cases initiated by the Public Prosecutor against TJE and CNE opposition members. The drug trade and illicit financing emerged as issues towards the end of the campaign, particularly after U.S. President Donald Trump granted a pardon to former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was serving a 45-year prison sentence for drug trafficking.

The campaign was marred by violent incidents, including the shooting of two municipal candidates (one from the PNH and one from the LIBRE) in Colón, the deaths of a LIBRE congressional candidate in Yoro and of a minor leaving from a LIBRE campaign event in Santa Bárbara. EU observers reported 18 instances of intimidation, harassment or threats by political parties' militants during campaign events, particularly in Yoro, Cortés, Santa Bárbara and Francisco Morazán.

Even though inauguration of public works is prohibited during campaign period, EU observers registered 86 such events categorised as "supervision" or "follow-up" events.²⁵ The use of social programmes for campaigning, mostly the distribution of aid vouchers, was also noted in at least 49 cases by EU observers, including 31 cases by LIBRE and 10 cases by PLH. EU observers and civil society reported that subsidies and social funds, available to members of Congress at the discretion of the president of Congress or through the social and infrastructure ministries, were used for campaign purposes. The legislation contains several lacunae regarding the use of public resources for election campaigns, without an explicit blanket prohibition.

Recommendation 10: *Establish clear legal provisions that prohibit the use of state resources for campaigning, including deterrent and enforceable sanctions for candidates and parties who fail to comply.*

Social media platforms were extensively used for electoral campaigning. Most candidates adopted multi-platform digital campaign strategies, with Facebook and TikTok proving particularly influential due to their large user bases. TikTok emerged as a key driver of online visibility, as content originating on the platform was frequently shared across other social media platforms and WhatsApp, significantly extending its reach.

²⁵ These included 50 cases by LIBRE, 30 by PLH and by 6 PNH.

All presidential candidates benefited from increased visibility generated by content creators and influencers producing highly engaging political and campaign-related content. In addition, all parties made extensive use of paid political advertising to promote their candidates, using personal, party, and proxy accounts on platforms such as Facebook and YouTube. In this context, the LIBRE candidate's campaign expenditure on digital advertising was significantly higher than that of the other candidates. However, the absence of a legal framework governing online political advertising created an unregulated digital environment, limiting transparency and hindering effective oversight of campaign spending.²⁶

Recommendation 11: *Develop effective mechanisms to increase the transparency of online campaign expenditure and strengthen the UFTF's capacity to monitor digital political advertising on social media.*

During the five-day silence period, asking for votes is prohibited and public events are banned. The EU EOM observed that campaign activities continued at a local level after the deadline, while the main presidential candidates held press conferences and TV interviews. Statements published by US President Donald Trump on social media between 26 November and 1 December in support of Nasry Asfura triggered reactions from major political parties and generated momentum for public discussion on voter support, despite the fact that it was during the electoral silence period. After election day, the EU EOM conducted a social media monitoring exercise to analyse how the US President's posts on Truth Social had impacted the online conversation on X, a key platform for political debate in Honduras. This study showed that these statements led to a sharp increase in engagement and came to dominate the political debate. Analysis revealed that the ensuing discourse centred around three main narratives: Trump's endorsement of Nasry Asfura, the promise of a pardon for former President Juan Orlando Hernández sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment in the United States, and a widespread perception of foreign interference in the Honduran electoral process. There were also concerns about the potential impact of Trump's positions on the election outcome. Although X has a relatively small user base in Honduras, these narratives were widely amplified by traditional media outlets. Consequently, the reach of the posts extended well beyond digital spaces and may have influenced broader segments of the electorate. (see Annex III - Social Media Monitoring Findings).

B. Campaign Finance

Political and campaign financing is regulated by the Electoral Law and the Law on Financing, Transparency and Oversight of Political Parties and Candidates, known as the Clean Politics Act. The main oversight institution is the Finance, Transparency and Oversight Unit (UFTF) under the CNE. The UFTF is responsible for controlling and auditing the political and campaign finances of political parties and candidates by receiving and reviewing documentation on campaign income and expenditure and ensuring compliance with the legal framework.

The UFTF has an annual budget of 5 million HNL (approximately 163,000 EUR), which is subject to yearly approval by Congress. Additional funding of 90 million HNL (approximately 2.9 million EUR) is provided in election years. Apart from the annual budget reportedly being insufficient to fulfil the Unit's needs, Congress failed to approve the additional election budget. Consequently, the UFTF was limited in its ability to carry out planned oversight activities, such as deploying mobile units to gather data on campaign expenditure for field audits and verifying campaign finance reports. The UFTF also relies on international support, including from the European Union through the Euro-

²⁶ ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 19: "Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party."

Elect project. This provided the Unit with IT tools to assist candidates in submitting their campaign finance reports.

The allocation of public funds to political parties is determined by the number of valid votes they obtained in the previous presidential election. Public funds are disbursed on two occasions: 60 per cent of the total amount is disbursed within 15 days of the election announcement, with the remaining 40 per cent scheduled for disbursement in the first quarter of the year after the election. LIBRE was assigned 44,550,778 HNL (approximately 1.4 million EUR), PNH 32,713,089 HNL (approximately 1 million EUR), and PLH 23,745,496 HNL (approximately 773,624 EUR). By contrast, independent candidates are only entitled to public financing if they are elected.

The CNE set campaign spending limits at 508,588,773 HNL (approximately 16.8 million EUR) for presidential candidates, and between 2,795,918 HNL (approximately 92,000 EUR) and 4,822,101 HNL (approximately 159,000 EUR) for congressional candidates, depending on the size of the electorate in each department. In 18 municipalities, the spending limit for the municipal council contest exceeded that for congressional candidates in the same department. The spending limits were considered too high by most interlocutors, which increased the risk of illicit funding infiltrating politics.²⁷

Although the UFTF formally holds the authority to grant sanctions, it is highly politicised and lacks the tools necessary for effective enforcement. It is headed by a board of three directors, each representing one of the three main political parties. Furthermore, the legal framework contains numerous ambiguities and gaps, and an absence of deterrent effect of sanctions as fines are too low to be effective, resulting in highly unequal chances in the electoral competition not in line with international principles.²⁸

Parties and candidates are required to open dedicated bank accounts where all campaign-related income and spending is managed. Accounts for public and private campaign financing must be separate, and a financial representative is to be accredited for each candidature. However, there is no legal deadline for opening such accounts, nor were there detailed regulations governing the banking sector's handling of them. Many candidates reported using alternate bank accounts or simply not declaring donations.

Effective oversight of campaign funding and spending throughout the electoral process is lacking. Political parties and candidates are only required to submit a report to the UFTF detailing their campaign income and expenses after election day. In addition, there is an absence of the deterrent effect of sanctions, resulting in highly unequal chances in the electoral competition. To address this issue and enhance accountability, the UFTF has communicated the status of candidates' financial reports to the public, thereby increasing pressure on candidates and political organisations to adhere to the established rules.

Recommendation 12: Introduce mandatory standardised intermediate financial reports to be submitted by political parties ahead of elections, to ensure effective and regular control of campaign funding and legal compliance.

²⁷ Article 25 ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 19: “Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.”

²⁸ United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), Article 7.3: “Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures (...) to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties.”; and Inter-American Democratic Charter, Article 5: “The strengthening of political parties and other political organizations is a priority for democracy. Special attention will be paid to the problems associated with the high cost of election campaigns and the establishment of a balanced and transparent system for their financing.”

IX. National and International Election Observation

The CNE is required to adopt specific regulations on election observation for each electoral process. This approach makes the conditions for observation unpredictable for interested organisations. The regulation for the 2025 elections, applicable to both national and international observers, was adopted relatively late, on 12 September, and proved to be more restrictive than the one applied in 2021. It introduced new requirements, including the obligation to declare the sources of funding used for observation activities, a prohibition on publishing reports before their submission to the CNE, and restrictions on making public statements on controversial issues arising during the electoral process. The regulation also set a deadline of 15 February 2026 for national, and international, observers to submit their final reports. Despite its late adoption, the regulation defined election observation as an impartial assessment of the pre-election, election-day, and post-election phases. This was inconsistent with the CNE's decision to issue accreditations to observer groups that expired one day after election day. New accreditations, and in limited numbers, were to be issued for the post-election period.²⁹

Recommendation 13: *Introduce legislation on national and international election observation, either through the approval of a specific law or the inclusion of legal provisions in the electoral law, containing key principles for a meaningful inclusive election observation, including the applicable timeframes, scope, and the rights and responsibilities of observers.*

A. National Election Observers

Honduras has a diverse and vibrant civil society with a long-standing tradition of engagement in election observation. Among the most prominent organisations were the *Asociación por una Sociedad más Justa* (ASJ), with 6,969 accredited observers; the *Colegio de Abogados de Honduras* (CAH), with 1,917; the *Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada* (COHEP), with 1,622; *Cáritas*, with 855; and the *Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos* (CONADEH), with 604 observers. Several civil society organisations also published periodic analytical reports in the months preceding election day, including COHEP, the *Centro de Estudio para la Democracia* (CESPAD), and the *Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción* (CNA).

To maximise their impact and to limit potential dissonance, the most prominent organisations united themselves for election day in a common network *Red por la Defensa de la Democracia* (RDD) which later regrouped into *Observadores Electorales por Honduras* (OEH25). Over the course of several electoral processes they developed, with the assistance of the National Democratic Institute, a sound election methodology relying on a sample-based observation, commonly referred to as Process and Results Verification for Transparency (PRVT, in fact an evolution of the classical parallel vote tabulation, PVT).

With observers mainly from *Cáritas* deployed to a random sample of 1,007 polling stations, OEH25 was able to generalise its findings on voting and counting procedures, indicating main trends in the presidential election just two days after polling closed. On 10 December, once the CNE had tabulated preliminary results from 85 per cent of result protocols, OEH25 confirmed the accuracy of the officially aggregated results. This helped to dispel allegations of fraud initially promoted by the ruling party and later by the PLH too.

Similarly, the *Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción* (CNA), a semi-state entity which narrowly avoided takeover by the LIBRE government and chose not to accredit observers, concentrated its efforts on observing the public counting of votes at polling stations. The CNA later independently processed and tabulated the vast majority of result protocols, publishing them on a dedicated website. This civic

²⁹ ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 8: “Citizens also take part in the conduct of public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves. This participation is supported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association.”

initiative helped to fill the information gap created by delays in the official tabulation process, enhancing transparency and confirming the integrity of the official partial results while reducing uncertainty surrounding the publication of the final results.

The *Forum Nacional de Convergencia* (FONAC) had by far the largest number of accredited observers. However, at the end of October, a new individual with close ties to the ruling party was appointed as the executive secretary of this semi-state organisation. Almost 600 observers were removed as a result, and a total of 9,731 new individuals were controversially accredited in just two days. The accreditation process, which used a CNE online platform, was normally considered slow by EU EOM interlocutors. Another organisation that appeared to be pro-government, with over 3,000 observers, was the *Primer Colegio Profesional Hondureño de Maestros* (PRICPHMA). Despite their large numbers, EU observers only reported seeing a limited number of their observers at three per cent of the polling stations visited. The CNE authorised 45 national organisations with a total of over 32,612 accredited observers, making these the most observed elections in Honduras' history.

B. International Election Observers

Besides the EU EOM, some 800 international observers from 49 organisations and states were deployed in Honduras. These included the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Union of Electoral Bodies (UNIORE), the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL), and the American Electoral Magistrates Association - *Asociación de Magistradas Electorales de las Américas* (AMEA), Transparencia Electoral, among others.

The OAS Election Observation Mission headed by Eladio Loizaga (Paraguay) comprised 101 observers and was present in Honduras from 20 November. The OAS Election Observation Mission's preliminary report was published on 2 December. The UNIORE Election Observation Mission was composed of 16 observers led by Roman Jáquez (Dominican Republic) and issued its statement on 2 December. The COPPPAL mission was led by Milton Morrison (Dominican Republic) and had 57 observers, releasing a statement on 1 December.

X. Media and Elections

A. Media Environment

The Honduran media landscape is extensive and diverse, comprising a large number of licensed broadcasters and a wide range of local and community outlets. According to the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL), there are 351 television licences and over 1,000 radio licences, though not all licence holders currently broadcast. The vast majority of media outlets are privately owned, with ownership concentrated in the hands of a few groups. Community radio stations are present in many parts of the country and play an important role in providing local information, including in rural and indigenous areas. National television and radio remain the main sources of information. Printed newspapers have only a modest physical presence, with most audiences now accessing them online.

The media operated in an environment of intimidation, coordinated smear campaigns and legal persecution with regular hostile rhetoric from senior government officials and key institutional and political actors against journalists and media outlets on multiple social media networks, as observed by the EU EOM. Two journalists were killed in June this year³⁰ and the EU EOM received reports of

³⁰ Mission for Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom in Honduras:

harassment and death threats against media workers across the country. C-Libre, a national non-governmental organisation working on Human Rights, recorded more than 90 acts of aggression against journalists this year up to election day. Of particular concern was the Head of the Armed Forces' stance towards the media, which included verbal attacks and the filing of multiple defamation suits and requests for the disclosure of journalistic sources, in violation of several international and regional government commitments to protect source confidentiality.³¹ Violence and intimidation was not limited to critical or opposition-aligned outlets, as journalists from media perceived as aligned with the ruling party were also targeted, while confrontational conduct by senior officials and restrictions on media access to public events further contributed to a restrictive working environment for the press.

The state Mechanism for Protection of Journalists and Human Rights Defenders was widely viewed as ineffective, due to limited capacity, delayed responses, politicisation and a lack of operational independence. Journalists also noted practical difficulties in accessing and maintaining protection measures, which affected trust in the mechanism. LTOs reported that many journalists felt unsafe and expressed limited confidence in the institutional support available to them.

(Priority) Recommendation 14: *Create a safe and intimidation-free media environment for all actors, including adequate protection of journalists at risk.*

B. Media Legal Framework

Freedom of expression and the right to information are guaranteed by the 1982 Constitution and by the 1958 Law on Freedom of Expression. However, criminal defamation, including offences of slander and insult, remains regulated in the Criminal Code and carries prison sentences, which is inconsistent with international standards on freedom of expression.³²

Recommendation 15: *Decriminalise defamation in favour of civil laws, in line with international standards on freedom of expression and media, including in the electoral context.*

Access to public information is regulated by the Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information. Nevertheless, journalists and civil society organisations continued to raise concerns regarding the implementation of access to information provisions.

Broadcast media are regulated under the Framework Law on Telecommunications, which assigns responsibility for spectrum management and licensing to CONATEL, granting it broad regulatory powers. The Special Law on the Interception of Private Communications allows for the interception of communications subject to judicial authorisation. Journalists and civil society organisations have expressed concern about the potential impact of this legislation on source protection and investigative journalism.

The legal framework governing media coverage of elections is set out in the Election Law. It regulates campaign periods, political advertising, electoral silence, and restrictions on government advertising during the campaign period, and assigns supervisory responsibilities to the CNE.

<https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/medias/file/2025/10/Comunicado%20Prensa%20Mision%20Honduras%20octubre%202025%20-%20ESP.pdf> and <https://rsf.org/es/honduras-rsf-y-siete-organizaciones-asociadas-denuncian-un-clima-de-vigilancia-intimidaci%C3%B3n-y>

³¹ ICCPR, Article 19; American Convention on Human Rights, Article 13; Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Principle 8; UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Report A/HRC/44/49 (2020), para. 57-59.

³² ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, paragraph 46: “States parties should consider the decriminalisation of defamation, and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty”.

In December 2024, Congress approved the Law on the Organisation and Transmission of Presidential Debates. This law assigned responsibility for coordinating at least two official debates to be broadcast simultaneously on all radio and television networks to the CNE. At the time of writing, however, the law had not yet been published in the Government Gazette. If published, it would prohibit alternative debates and limit participation to candidates who have polled at least 15 per cent in three recognised national surveys, which would have a detrimental effect on the participation of smaller and independent contenders, effectively excluding them.

C. Monitoring of Media Coverage of Elections

The EU EOM media monitoring³³ found a highly uneven media environment, characterised by the dominance of institutional actors, pronounced imbalances in state-owned media, and clearly differentiated editorial approaches in private outlets. Across television, radio, print and digital media, coverage prioritised the CNE and the Government, alongside the main presidential candidates, while smaller parties, congress and municipal candidates received limited visibility.

In broadcast media, the CNE and the Government accumulated the highest volumes of coverage throughout the monitored period. This prominence was driven by the wide array of controversies surrounding the electoral process, which kept the CNE at the centre of the news agenda. Among presidential candidates, Rixi Moncada received the greatest overall exposure, followed by Salvador Nasralla and Nasry Asfura, while the remaining contenders appeared only sporadically. Coverage was delivered primarily through news programmes, complemented by debates and political programmes, and accompanied by a visible presence of political advertising.

State-owned broadcasters *Televisión Nacional de Honduras* and *Radio Nacional de Honduras* failed to provide equitable or impartial coverage of the electoral process. Both outlets devoted a substantial share of airtime to government advertising during the campaign, in breach of the Electoral Law's prohibition on government propaganda in broadcast media. Editorial coverage further reinforced official narratives, presenting institutional activities almost exclusively in a positive tone. While the three main presidential candidates received broadly comparable levels of editorial airtime, coverage of the ruling party candidate was overwhelmingly positive, whereas opposition candidates were portrayed predominantly negatively. The combination of extensive government advertising and biased editorial treatment resulted in a highly unbalanced media environment on both state outlets.³⁴

Recommendation 16: *Transform state media into a genuine public service broadcaster with editorial independence and financial autonomy.*

Private broadcast media displayed pronounced variation in both volume and tone of coverage. On Telecentro, airtime was distributed relatively evenly among the three leading candidates and the Government, but tonal treatment differed, with predominantly negative coverage of Moncada and the

³³ From 22 October to 29 November the EU EOM monitored TV channels: *Televisión Nacional de Honduras (Canal 8)*, *Telecentro (Canal 5)*, *HCH Televisión Digital*, and *UNE TV* – (07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00); Radio stations: *Radio Nacional de Honduras (RNH)*, *HRN (Emisoras Unidas)*, *Radio América*, and *Radio Globo* - (06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00); Print newspapers: *La Prensa*, *El Heraldo*, and *La Tribuna*; Digital news outlets: *El Libertador*, *Hondudiario*, *Proceso Digital* and *Tu Nota*. See Annex II: Media Monitoring Findings.

³⁴ ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, paragraph 16: “States parties should ensure that public broadcasting services operate in an independent manner. In this regard, States parties should guarantee their independence and editorial freedom. They should provide funding in a manner that does not undermine their independence.”; UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, 2017 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda, Article 3-c: “States should ensure presence of strong, independent and adequately resourced public service media, which operate under a clear mandate to serve the overall public interest and to set and maintain high standards of journalism”.

Government and largely positive coverage of Nasralla. On HCH, coverage concentrated on Nasralla, the Government and Moncada, with Nasralla and Asfura portrayed mainly positively and Moncada mostly negatively. Coverage on UNE TV was the most uneven, with Moncada overwhelmingly dominating airtime and receiving exclusively positive treatment, while Nasralla and Asfura were marginalised and covered negatively. Despite limited balance within individual outlets, the diversity of editorial positions across private television channels contributed to pluralism in the overall broadcast space.

Private radio stations also demonstrated distinct editorial lines. On HRN, coverage was relatively evenly distributed among the main actors, with mixed tonal treatment. Radio América devoted most attention to Moncada and the Government, with predominantly negative tone across all actors. On *Radio Globo*, Moncada and the Government received predominantly positive coverage, while Nasralla and Asfura were portrayed largely negatively. Taken together, private radio outlets offered a range of perspectives despite limited internal balance.

In print media, coverage focused strongly on electoral institutions and the three leading presidential candidates. Newspapers devoted comparable levels of space to Nasralla, Asfura and Moncada. Nasralla and Asfura were generally portrayed in favourable or neutral terms, while Moncada and the Government attracted more critical coverage overall, although both maintained sustained visibility. Paid political advertising in newspapers remained marginal.

Digital news media mirrored trends observed in traditional private outlets. The Government and Moncada received the highest visibility, often accompanied by predominantly negative reporting, while Nasralla and Asfura combined substantial exposure with more positive or mixed treatment. Individual outlets exhibited polarised editorial positions, but overall digital coverage reflected a competitive and highly critical media environment.

XI. Social Media and Elections

A. Legal framework

The legal framework governing digital rights is limited and fragmented. The Penal Code includes provisions for addressing certain cybercrimes, such as piracy and identity theft. However, a dedicated cybersecurity law has not yet progressed in Congress. Despite the provisions of the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law offering a certain degree of protection to personal data, Honduras lacks a comprehensive data protection framework, necessary to properly regulate consent and safeguard the collection and processing of personal information.

Recommendation 17: *Adopt a data protection law that establishes principles, definitions, rights, obligations of those responsible for the processing of personal data, including election stakeholders for the processing of election-related data; create a supervisory authority to ensuring its implementation with a view to robustly protect citizens' right to privacy both online and offline.*

The Information and Communication Technology Literacy Act establishes a legal framework for the promotion of digital literacy programmes, recognising the development of digital skills as a public policy priority. The Telecommunications Sector Framework Law (*Ley Marco del Sector de Telecomunicaciones*) and its General Regulation establish the competence of the State, through CONATEL, to regulate, supervise and promote the provision of telecommunications services under conditions of equity, coverage and quality throughout the national territory. Strengthening coordination between competent authorities, operators and other relevant actors would help to reduce territorial and social disparities in access to Internet services, thereby indirectly supporting the effective exercise of fundamental rights recognised in the Constitution, including access to

information, citizen participation and equal opportunities. Such efforts would also contribute to alignment with international standards that recognise access to the Internet as essential for the full enjoyment of human rights, including freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive and impart information.³⁵

B. Social Media Landscape

As of early 2025, it was estimated that 65.8 per cent of the population had access to the Internet, equivalent to some 7.2 million users.³⁶ The digital landscape is dominated by platforms such as Facebook, TikTok and YouTube, which have become primary spaces for political communication and electoral campaigning. A considerable digital divide between urban and rural areas prevents widespread access to the Internet and limits access to digital opportunities for many communities.

Disinformation

Due to the high levels of disinformation and harmful narratives in previous elections, members of civil society, the media, academia and the CNE, with international support, established the Coalition for Electoral Information Integrity. The adoption of a 'Commitment to Electoral Information Integrity' aimed to strengthen digital resilience and promote an online environment that enhances information integrity in the lead-up to the election. However, the initiative's effectiveness was limited as it remained largely unknown beyond its immediate participants.

In the run-up to the elections, the digital information environment was characterised by high exposure to disinformation and inflammatory narratives. The limited digital literacy of large sectors of the population and absence of public information campaigns increased the vulnerability of public debate to misleading content, curbing the citizens' ability to critically evaluate political disinformation disseminated on digital platforms.³⁷ In this context, strengthening digital literacy programmes was identified as a key measure to improve the resilience of the electorate, promote the informed exercise of freedom of expression, and contribute to the integrity of the electoral process.³⁸

Recommendation 18: *Strengthen cooperation between the media, civil society, academia and technology companies in order to develop digital literacy and awareness-raising campaigns on online election-related disinformation and reinforce existing fact-checking initiatives.*

³⁵ ICCPR, art. 19(2): “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and seek receive and impart information through any media and regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice”; ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34 and UN Human Rights Council Resolution “[The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet](#)” adopted on 13 July 2021.

³⁶ *We are Social*, Honduras, [Country Report](#).

³⁷ [Conectividad en Honduras 2024](#). Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), 2024.

³⁸ UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda, article 3(e): “States should take measures to promote media and digital literacy, including by covering these topics as part of the regular school curriculum and by engaging with civil society and other stakeholders to raise awareness about these issues.”; article 6(a): “All stakeholders – including intermediaries, media outlets, civil society and academia – should be supported in developing participatory and transparent initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of disinformation and propaganda on democracy, freedom of expression, journalism and civic space, as well as appropriate responses to these phenomena.”; and Joint declaration on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age, 2020, article 1(b.5): “States should make a concerted effort to promote digital media and information literacy, including in relation to elections.” and article 2a(iv): “Digital media and online intermediaries should make a reasonable effort to address dis-, mis- and mal-information and election related spam, including through independent factchecking and other measures, such as advertisement archives, appropriate content moderation and public alerts.”

C. Social Media Monitoring Findings

The EU EOM monitored online political discourse throughout the campaign period across Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok and YouTube. The findings of this monitoring revealed instances of inauthentic behaviour, such as networks of accounts working together strategically to amplify narratives artificially, bot-driven engagement creating misleading impressions of popularity or consensus, and the widespread use of synthetic media generated by artificial intelligence (AI) to fabricate images and videos at critical moments in the electoral process.³⁹ Sophisticated, multi-platform tactics were observed, including the dissemination of campaign-related disinformation and coordinated attacks against candidates on several platforms by recently created accounts. These accounts published clips of misleading, AI-generated political influencers on Facebook, X and TikTok. The EU EOM documented at least 11 sophisticated deepfakes designed to mislead voters by impersonating candidates, institutional figures, media outlets, and renowned journalists.

Insufficient safeguards against disinformation facilitated the spread of conspiratorial and polarising narratives of electoral fraud, undermining public confidence in the electoral process. The absence of a coherent and effective institutional communication strategy by the CNE, combined with the lack of systematic online voter education, further contributed to an environment conducive to the proliferation of disinformation.

Concerns about foreign interference in the digital campaign environment prior to the election became a central topic of political debate following U.S. President Donald Trump's 26 November endorsement of Nasry Asfura on Truth Social, followed by two additional posts in subsequent days.⁴⁰ These publications triggered a surge of political reactions on X. Despite its relatively small user base, X remains a key platform for political debate in Honduras and is widely used by national media outlets to set the news agenda. Consequently, the impact of these posts extended beyond digital spaces and had the potential to influence broader segments of the electorate.

In connection to these statements, the EU EOM identified a non-transparent, coordinated influence operation involving a paid Facebook campaign intended to counterbalance the potential impact of Trump's endorsement of presidential candidate Nasry Asfura. The campaign featured advertisements that questioned the authenticity of Truth Social posts, misrepresented the U.S. President and other national and international leaders, and impersonated trusted media outlets. The imitation of genuine media sources to disseminate disinformation is of particular concern as it can significantly increase the credibility, reach, and potential impact of misleading content.

The EU EOM observed genuine efforts by some fact-checking initiatives to counter disinformation during the electoral process. However, insufficient cooperation among these actors constrained the reach and impact of their work. Improved coordination among fact-checking organisations would strengthen their capacity to timely debunk false narratives and increase public awareness. Ensuring that voters have access to verified information remains essential to safeguarding electoral integrity.

XII. Political Participation of Women

Honduras is a party to major international gender equality instruments, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), although it has not ratified its Optional Protocol. Notwithstanding, women remain significantly underrepresented in practice, particularly in municipal leadership, due to structural barriers, weak enforcement, and persistent political violence against women. This disparity highlights a clear disconnect between formal legal equality and women's effective participation in political life.

³⁹ See Annex III - Social Media Monitoring Findings.

⁴⁰ President Donald Trump's post of [26 November](#), [28 November](#) and [2 December](#) 2025 on Truth Social.

The 2021 Electoral Law sets out candidate quotas, requiring gender parity and alternating positions between women and men on the candidate lists. Nevertheless, the 2025 electoral process demonstrates a continued divergence between these legal requirements and political realities. The number of women elected falls significantly short of 50 per cent parity because of loopholes in the law: the parity requirement does not apply to elections for mayor; the preferential vote allows voters to choose any candidate from the lists without respecting the gender parity requirement. The parity and alternating position requirements apply to the primary elections, but if a party holds primary elections, their general election lists are exempt from the requirements.

While women accounted for approximately 47 per cent of candidates in the primary elections, they represented only 10.96 per cent of mayoral candidates, where executive authority and political power are most concentrated, and approximately 43 to 47 per cent of congressional candidates. Following the 2025 general elections, women hold approximately 37 of the 128 seats in the National Congress of Honduras (around 29 per cent). This represents a marginal increase compared to previous legislative periods but remains well below parity.

(Priority) Recommendation 19: *Ensure effective implementation by political parties of the gender parity and alternation requirements at all levels of candidacy, supported by enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for non-compliance.*

This underrepresentation contrasts sharply with women’s electoral weight, as women constitute 52.3 per cent of the national voter register. Structural constraints—including unequal access to campaign financing, socioeconomic inequality, resistance within political parties, and widespread political violence against women—continue to deter women from running for office and to constrain those who do. Although national and international initiatives seek to promote women’s political leadership and strengthen protection mechanisms, implementation remains weak and cultural resistance deeply entrenched.

Women’s organisations have played a central role in advocating for legal reform and expanded political inclusion. Nevertheless, women still have limited influence within party leadership structures and are systematically subjected to harassment, threats, gender-based violence, and coordinated disinformation campaigns aimed at silencing them, undermining their legitimacy, and preventing them from participating in public life.

In this regard, the two female councillors of the CNE formally denounced the gender-based violence directed against them and lodged complaints with the Public Prosecutor’s Office. They claimed that the personal attacks were part of a strategy of gender-based political violence, which included threats of violence and death, as well as defamation campaigns and attacks on social media. They called for effective investigations and for their personal safety and the safety of women in public office to be guaranteed throughout the process. However, no action was taken by the state authorities in response to these matters.⁴¹

(Priority) Recommendation 20: *Both state authorities and political parties to consider adopting policies and mechanisms to effectively prevent and address gender-based political violence within the public political sphere and within political party structures.*

⁴¹ ICCPR, article 2(3)(a): “To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed.”; CEDAW article 2(c): “States parties to establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination.”; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, Article 5: “Every woman is entitled to the free and full exercise of her civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and may rely on the full protection of those rights as embodied in regional and international instruments on human rights. The States Parties recognize that violence against women prevents and nullifies the exercise of these rights.”

By contrast, women are comparatively well represented within electoral and judicial institutions. In the National Electoral Council (CNE), two of the three councillors are women, also including women in senior leadership positions responsible for electoral administration and oversight. The Electoral Justice Tribunal (TJE) includes one woman among its three magistrates. In the judiciary, the 2023–2030 composition of the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) comprises 15 magistrates, of whom eight are women and seven are men, resulting in a slight female majority following their election by the National Congress in February 2023.

XIII. Political Participation of LGBTI

Since 2021, Honduras’s legal and institutional framework for the protection of LGBTI rights has largely stagnated or regressed. Although Honduras is bound by the rulings of the Inter-American human rights system, particularly those requiring the establishment of gender-recognition procedures and strengthened state responses to the acute levels of violence faced by LGBTI persons, implementation has been minimal and fragmented.⁴² International organisations consistently report persistent deficiencies in criminal investigations, protection mechanisms, and administrative processes related to LGBTI rights. Violence against LGBTI individuals remains widespread, and accountability for such abuses is rare, resulting in entrenched impunity.⁴³ Institutional responses remain weak, under-resourced, and largely reactive, failing to meet regional human rights standards.

In the electoral and political sphere, LGBTI rights remain highly polarising as certain political actors promote conservative and exclusionary narratives, while others invoke constitutional and international human rights obligations. In practice, meaningful political participation for LGBTI individuals remains severely constrained. Many potential candidates and activists fear for their personal safety, while party-affiliated LGBTI members encounter discrimination, limited access to campaign financing, and resistance within party structures.

Despite a binding ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, transgender persons in Honduras remain unable to change their legal name and gender marker through accessible administrative procedures. This lack of legal recognition directly undermines their ability to exercise political rights.

The situation of LGBTI political rights in Honduras reflects a broader pattern of normative resistance and institutional inertia with international obligations. While advocacy efforts remain active, substantive legal reform and effective implementation continue to lag, leaving LGBTI persons exposed to violence, discrimination, and political exclusion.

XIV. Political Participation of Indigenous and Afro-Descendant Peoples

While the legal right to vote and to stand for office is formally guaranteed, the effective political participation of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples remains severely constrained by structural

⁴² According to the KAI+ Observatory, 565 LGBTI persons were violently killed between 2004 and 2024, including 52 homicides in 2023—the deadliest year on record—and 47 in 2024. <https://pbi-honduras.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/PBI%20-%20CDSH%20-%20Report%20prepared%20for%20the%20Universal%20Periodic%20Review%20%28UPR%29%20of%20Honduras%20in%20November%202025.pdf>

⁴³ The National Commissioner for Human Rights (CONADEH) reports an impunity rate of around 93 per cent, with the majority of cases remaining unresolved. Between 2020 and March 2025, CONADEH recorded 6,618 complaints relating to threats, assaults, discrimination and other human rights violations. The majority of these incidents occurred in Francisco Morazán and Cortés.

violence, socioeconomic exclusion, weak legal protections, and political party practices that fail to ensure meaningful inclusion, despite their full political rights as citizens.⁴⁴ National minority groups—including Garífuna, Miskitu, Lenca, Tolupán, Pech, Tawahka, Chortí, and Bay Creole—are significantly underrepresented in elected offices and within political party structures. Although these communities are frequently mobilised as electoral “vote banks,” they rarely exert meaningful influence over political agendas or decision-making processes.

In the absence of special constituencies, reserved seats, or quota systems, the political representation of indigenous and Afro-descendant populations remains largely dependent on party dynamics and priorities. Political parties generally lack internal mechanisms to ensure the inclusion of indigenous and Afro-descendant members, while candidate selection processes tend to favour individuals with financial resources, urban networks, and strong party affiliations. These practices restrict access to competitive positions and contribute to the marginalisation of community priorities—such as territorial rights, consultation mechanisms, intercultural education, differentiated health services, cultural preservation, and climate resilience—from national political agendas.

In the outgoing Congress, Garífuna representatives constituted the only minority group with a notable presence, with seven members elected across four political parties. In the 2025 general elections, 15 Garífuna candidates competed for congressional seats and six for mayoral positions, resulting in the election of four candidates and two alternates (*suplentes*). A modest increase in indigenous candidacies was also observed, primarily under the LIBRE party, including the election of three Lenca mayors. Nevertheless, representation at the national level remains limited, and public policies continue to overlook key indigenous and Afro-Honduran concerns.

Recommendation 21: *Ensure the effective participation of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples in political life by adopting internal party measures to increase their representation on candidate lists and by providing these communities with adapted electoral services, particularly for voter registration and civic education.*

XV. Political Participation of Persons with Disabilities

Honduras ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and adopted the 2021 Electoral Law, both of which impose binding obligations to guarantee non-discrimination and accessible participation in electoral processes. Despite these commitments, conditions during the 2025 general elections fell significantly short of ensuring the equal and effective political participation of persons with disabilities. While the right to vote is formally recognised, the conditions required for an equal, independent, and accessible electoral process, as mandated under the CRPD, remain largely unmet.

Estimates suggest that between 221,000 and 585,000 eligible voters with disabilities were included in the electoral register, depending on whether disability prevalence is calculated at 3.4 per cent or 9 per cent of the population. Despite the size of this electorate, the National Electoral Council (CNE)

⁴⁴ UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 2: “Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.” and ICCPR, Article 26: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

continues to lack a functional disability-disaggregated registry, limiting its ability to conduct targeted planning, allocate resources, and implement reasonable accommodations.

Physical inaccessibility constituted the most widespread barrier. Polling centres, predominantly located in schools and universities, frequently lacked ramps, accessible entrances, adequate signage, or unobstructed internal pathways. Where ramps existed, many were excessively steep or poorly constructed, preventing independent access. As a result, many voters with disabilities were forced to rely on third-party assistance to reach voting tables, undermining the secrecy, autonomy, and dignity of the vote.

Institutional preparedness was insufficient. Electoral staff received limited training on assisting voters with visual, hearing, or mobility impairments. The CNE did not provide accessible voting materials, such as Braille or large-print ballots, nor were sign language interpretation, assistive technologies, or alternative voting modalities available for voters unable to travel to polling stations. Public information campaigns addressing inclusive voting were largely absent.

Economic barriers further exacerbated exclusion. Disability organisations reported that government subsidies were insufficient to cover transportation costs, particularly for voters living in remote or elevated areas. These constraints discouraged participation and, in practice, restricted the exercise of the right to vote.

Political engagement on disability inclusion remained minimal. None of the five presidential candidates presented comprehensive proposals addressing voting accessibility or broader disability-related public policies. At the municipal level, limited exceptions were observed. Notably, Eliseo Castro, a Liberal Party candidate for mayor of the Central District, publicly presented proposals focused on employment, health services, and urban accessibility for persons with disabilities.

Human rights institutions, including CONADEH, warned that the electoral environment failed to guarantee accessible conditions. Civil society organisations—particularly the National Federation of Organisations of Persons with Disabilities of Honduras (FENOPDIH)—continued to advocate for inclusive participation; however, systemic deficiencies in infrastructure, training, and policy implementation persisted.

XVI. Electoral Justice

Internal disputes among the three magistrates of the Electoral Justice Tribunal (TJE), combined with the repeated and deliberate absence of the LIBRE-appointed magistrate from plenary sessions, prevented the quorum required to convene the tribunal as the substitute magistrates also refuse to participate. As a result, the TJE was effectively paralysed from 31 October until after election day, severely limiting its capacity to operate during a critical phase of the electoral process.

In response, the two opposition magistrates (appointed by the PNH and PLH) relied on provisions of the Public Administration Law allowing collegial bodies to meet with a majority of members present. On this basis, they approved the candidacies of Jorge Cálix (Olancho) and Cristian Adalid Villalobos (Valle), previously rejected by the CNE, and ordered their inclusion on the congressional ballot papers.

The LIBRE magistrate subsequently filed a complaint with the Public Prosecutor's Office (PPO), alleging that the decision was invalid and accusing the two magistrates of malfeasance, usurpation of functions, and abuse of authority. The PPO promptly opened an investigation, deployed agents from the Police Investigations Directorate (DPI) to the TJE, seized documents related to the appeals, confiscated officials' mobile phones, and summoned more than a dozen TJE staff members for questioning.

These actions, followed by proceedings before the Supreme Court and persistent rumours of imminent detention, led the two opposition magistrates to go into hiding for several weeks out of fear of arbitrary arrest. This further weakened the institutional capacity of the TJE and impaired its preparedness to address post-election disputes.

Beyond the TJE case, the PPO also initiated or threatened high-profile investigations against senior electoral and political figures, including CNE councillor Cossette López. These cases, based largely on allegations of corruption and a purported “electoral conspiracy,” were publicly announced at press conferences without formal charges. The broadcast of audio recordings, whose legality, authenticity, and chain of custody were widely questioned, including allegations of AI manipulation, raised serious concerns regarding due process and the right to defence.

In the post-election period, threats against the two female CNE councillors persisted, echoing the situation faced by the opposition TJE magistrates. Although no arrest warrants were issued, the sustained risk of detention or investigative actions by the PPO created a climate of intimidation and uncertainty, raising concerns about the independence of electoral authorities and the integrity of the electoral process.

A. Complaints and Appeals

The Electoral Law provides five days after election day for aggrieved parties to request to the CNE for the annulments of polling station results and 10 days for recounts. These deadlines needed to be extended by 72 hours due to delays in publishing the election results. Decisions taken by the CNE may be appealed to the TJE within three days after the decision is issued and the TJE must resolve the matter within 30 days, with the possibility to extend this deadline for another 15 days. The deadlines for election challenges must strike a balance between promptness and feasibility.⁴⁵ However, the deadlines set by the CNE and TJE are too short for complainants to prepare a case, as sufficient proof must be included with any challenge. In the case of a results challenge, this would require copies of all the challenged results forms.

Recommendation 22: *Establish deadlines for case preparation after the publication of preliminary results, ensuring sufficient time to submit evidence and legal arguments, thereby safeguarding procedural fairness and the integrity of the adjudicative process.*

At the CNE level, a total of 297 complaints were submitted, including 261 requests for recounting, 21 for corrections, seven claims of nullity, and ten other cases. Most complaints concerned the municipal elections reaching 122, while 88 referred to the presidential elections and 78 to congressional elections. Most complaints referred to the departments of Francisco Morazán, Santa Bárbara, and Cortés. Most complaints were submitted by the Liberal Party with 117 cases, followed by the National Party with 95, LIBRE with 79, PINU with five, and three submitted by other actors. LIBRE filed two challenges to presidential elections - one seeking the annulment of the entire election and another requesting a full recount - alleging serious irregularities despite the absence of supporting evidence.

⁴⁵ ICCPR, article 2(3)(a): “To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, paragraph 9: “Elections must be conducted (...) within a framework of laws guaranteeing the effective exercise of voting rights.”; OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, Justice and The Rule of Law Principle, page 9: “(...) there should be mechanisms and structures that provide legal protection on an equal footing for all; that process claims within a reasonable period of time; and do so independently and impartially.”

Following the announcement of final election results, the TJE received 106 appeals concerning all elections. Three of these appeals were submitted by Salvador Nasralla, alleging inconsistencies between polling station results forms and the official presidential results announced by the CNE. All three were declared inadmissible on procedural grounds and late submission. At the municipal level, one of the most high-profile cases concerned the election in Distrito Central, where Jorge Aldana (LIBRE) submitted 435 results protocols alleging inconsistencies and requesting additional recounts, which were dismissed by the TJE dismissed on procedural grounds.

Despite the TJE being described in the Constitution as the final and exclusive instance of electoral justice, there is a limited possibility of bringing a further challenge alleging a breach of constitutional rights (*recurso de amparo*) to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, although very few such cases are admitted. Jorge Aldana submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court to revert the TJE decision and order the recounts, however his appeal was not accepted by the Court.

XVII. Election Day and Post-Election Period

A. Voting and Counting

EU observers visited 414 polling stations (PS) in all departments throughout the country. Opening was observed in 50 polling stations and closing and counting in 45.

Two thirds of the polling stations observed opened either on time or within 30 minutes of the official opening time. Delays were mostly caused by limited preparedness of polling staff and difficulties with starting biometric voter identification devices. In spite of the numerous setbacks and organisational shortcomings observed in the weeks preceding the elections, election material was delivered on time to all visited voting centres. Opening procedures were generally adhered to in a transparent process. EU observers assessed the opening process as good or very good at 42 of the 50 polling stations observed. All 17 polling stations in the San Antonio de Flores municipality (El Paraíso) did not open at all due an obstruction staged by PLH polling staff whose credentials had been reportedly handed over by the PLH presidential candidate to the local branch of PNH.⁴⁶ The EU EOM observed voting in 13 polling stations during the rescheduled elections on 7 December.

The EU EOM assessed the overall conduct of voting as good or very good in 97 per cent of the polling stations observed and described the process as calm and orderly. Large queues were observed in 20 per cent of polling stations, especially in the morning hours. Polling procedures were largely adhered to, and polling staff, appointed in their majority by the three main parties, performed well. Sixty-six per cent of members of the visited polling stations were women. Biometric voter identification was systematically used in nine out of 10 polling stations observed, in the others, polling staff were having difficulties operating them or the units showed technical problems.

The secrecy of the vote was generally respected, although some six per cent of voting locations were seen as overcrowded. Ballot boxes remained in clear view, but due to their design they were in most cases observed not properly sealed. The generalised distrust among the main three parties led to a multiplication of different safeguards during voting and counting, such as signing and stamping of ballots (themselves with multiple security features) by polling station presidents and secretaries; signing and stamping the voter roll with each voter and their additional registration through biometric devices; and, during counting, stamping each ballot with a dedicated seal according to their qualification. In general, these extra layers of control slowed down the process and reduced the number of voters each polling station could handle. National observers were present at 38 per cent of polling stations visited, contributing to the transparency of the process. According to the EU observation, the OEH25 deployed the largest number of observers. EU observers noted that security

⁴⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122270871626021370&set=a.122118106940021370>

forces acted in an impartial manner.

EU observers assessed the counting process positively in most cases. The majority of the visited polling stations extended voting by one hour. The public character of counting was largely respected, though, due to a narrow interpretation of the regulations by the polling staff, EU observers were not permitted to observe the process inside five polling stations and observed from the window. This was in some cases solved by a statement issued by the CNE instructing poll workers to let observers in. Ballot reconciliation and counting procedures were mostly followed in observed polling stations. The presence of polling station members from the three parties were observed to ensure correct attribution of votes. However, secretaries appeared to have difficulties filling out the results sheets in six cases, in which arithmetic inconsistencies were noted.

After the ballots for each election were counted, polling station secretaries moved to scan and transmit the results protocols. In all observed centres, technology operators (*custodios informaticos electorales*) appointed by all three parties were present, ensuring the integrity of the process. In general, the transmission of results went reasonably well in observed cases. However, the automatic recognition of results did not work properly anywhere, thus polling staff had to manually correct most of the figures under the supervision of technology operators. In two cases the transmission slips showed figures swapped among different candidates, despite being previously revised and corrected, a problem that was later encountered also during the results verification phase in the congressional election in the department of Cortés - this turned out to be a simple programming error that only affected the visual representation of the results, not the attribution of votes to individual candidates. This was swiftly rectified during the verification process. All poll workers received certified copies of the results protocol, but in most polling stations observed results were not posted outside.

B. Aggregation of Results

The results management consisted of three steps: transmission of results protocols from polling stations to a central repository; extraction of data from results protocols and their tabulation (i.e. a correct transcription of the hand-written figures into the central database); and rectification of potentially corrupted results protocols (i.e. revisions and recounts based on automatic triggers or on complaints).

C. Transmission and Integration of Results Protocols

On election night, scanned copies of results sheets, together with data files of automatically extracted figures were transmitted from voting centres to the TREP servers.⁴⁷ Contending political parties, as well as interested media and observer organisations had a real-time access to all the transmitted data. Some four hours after the close of polls, the three CNE councillors presented the initial set of preliminary results with some 34 per cent of presidential results protocols tabulated. There were no further public presentations of preliminary results by the CNE councillors. The public could follow the progress of results aggregation on the CNE's dedicated website which experienced several failures throughout the election night, reportedly due to excessive number of requests from abroad.⁴⁸ By early morning, when the transmission from the field was concluded, 57 per cent of presidential, 42 per cent

⁴⁷ Hand-written figures were interpreted by a simple ICR (Intelligent Character Recognition) software installed on the 7,669 computers deployed to all voting centres. Based on the observation of the CNE's post-election visual verification of results protocols, the EU EOM estimated its accuracy rate well below 50 per cent, therefore polling staff had to manually correct most of the figures. The results, both automatically interpreted and manually corrected, were stored in JSON files (JavaScript Object Notation).

⁴⁸ The implementing company, ASD, stated that every time the results page, located in the AWS cloud, was enabled, it immediately received around 2.7 million visits and collapsed. Subsequently, all traffic from outside Honduras was blocked.

of congressional and 41 per cent of municipal results sheets were transmitted. However, on the next day, ASD discovered that a total of 16,708 result sheets (3,880 presidential ones) had been received from voting centres on election night but not integrated into the tabulation system owing to the insufficient processing capacity of the servers. These unaccounted-for results protocols represented a missed opportunity, since had they been integrated correctly, the transmission rate would have exceeded 75 per cent, a record number in Honduran elections. Instead, their late discovery combined with the inaccessibility of the results page on election night and the following day, fostered narratives of fraud, eroding the trust in the results management.

Even though the CNE guaranteed material and technical conditions for the transmission of results from all voting centres, a quarter of results protocols could not be transmitted on election night mainly due to insufficient training of the party appointed technology operators and polling staff. There were established procedures for retrieving the results protocols from computers that did not transmit them (3 to 5 December), as well as by scanning the physical results sheets from electoral kits which were delivered with support of the armed forces to the CNE two to five days after elections (8 and 9 December).⁴⁹ After implementing these backup solutions, presidential results from 38 polling stations were still missing, as well as 100+ congressional and municipal results sheets (these could only be completed during the special recount phase). After the integration of all available results sheets on 14 December, the preliminary results for the presidential elections were still tabulated only from 85.2 per cent of all polling stations, since 2,792 protocols did not pass the automatic validations for internal arithmetic consistency and were therefore quarantined. At that stage, the preliminary congressional results were tabulated, overall, from 58 per cent of polling stations due to a considerably higher number of internal inconsistencies. Similarly, the preliminary municipal elections results were tabulated from 70 per cent of polling stations.

D. Visual Verification and Correction of the Transcribed Data from Results Protocols

In the applied configuration, the TREP was initially fed with digitalised results protocols and their automatically interpreted numeric values (that were subsequently verified and manually corrected by polling station secretaries). This process was especially prone to errors due to a very low accuracy rate of the character recognition. In order to ensure that the numeric results faithfully represent the hand-written results protocols, the compromise solution for the TREP of 4 August introduced a complicated procedure consisting of a visual verification of all forms (against the interpreted figures and recording corresponding observations in the system), a manual correction of the entries (following the approval of the CNE) and a repeated visual verification of the corrected forms. One of the best approaches to achieve this is the internationally well-proven and widely used double blind entry procedure, often applied in a decentralised manner (e.g. at a departmental level) which is fast and reliable. The visual verification of all results forms began on 1 December but was interrupted two days later due to a series of errors in the software. The necessary corrections to the software were applied following the approval by the CNE councillors on 7 December. The process resumed on 9 December and concluded on 13 December and was observed by the EU EOM.

The subsequent phase of the correction of the errors of transcription was blocked for over a week due to the formal requirement of approving all the necessary changes unanimously by all three CNE councillors (i.e. to have the figures transcribed as they are in the protocols). This was obstructed by the LIBRE councillor and was overcome by a formal removal of the unanimity requirement, after a

⁴⁹ The original results protocols from the 15 polling stations from the USA were also scanned and integrated in the TREP after they were delivered to the CNE within five days after election day.

revision of the legal provision.⁵⁰ The transcription errors in the presidential results were corrected between the 22 and 23 December and the congressional and municipal results between 26 and 30 December. The second visual verification of the corrected protocols did not take place due to a lack of time. That means, the applied approach managed to get the results transcribed as they were in the original results protocols only three to four weeks after election day. This process also substantially reduced the number of invalid and blank votes.

Throughout the whole tabulation period, the difference between the PNH and PLH presidential candidates kept around or below one percentage point. In the first days the leading candidate changed two times before it stabilised on 4 December, ultimately leaving the PLH candidate in the second place. Until the transcription errors were rectified, the candidates had at their disposal only the original data files (JSON) containing often incorrect or implausible data, as not all wrongly interpreted figures were corrected before their transmission. Misunderstandings of the provisional nature of the original JSON files led to repeated accusations of fraud committed by the CNE. Moreover, due to these delays in the correction of the errors of transcription, parties and candidates based their formal complaints against the results on wrong figures often complaining about having been awarded fewer votes than they had in the results protocols.⁵¹

Recommendation 23: *To improve the efficiency and reliability of results tabulation, apply the standard double blind entry procedure for the transcription of hand-written results protocols in the database.*

E. Special Recounts – Escrutinio Especial

Under normal circumstances, special recounts were meant to begin only after the visual verification and correction phases had been concluded, so that no recounts would be ordered based on transcription errors. Recounts were to be automatically triggered by internal inconsistencies in the original results protocols (detected by the TREP once the transcription errors were rectified), or to be granted by the CNE following a justified complaint. However, due to the enormous delays in the transcription of results, the special recounts had to be conducted in parallel. The CNE councillors approved a corresponding procedural protocol on 10 December. Logistical preparations for 150 recount stations were ready on 10 December, the party-nominated staff was trained by 12 December, and the necessary software programming was approved and concluded on 13 December. On 14 December, the CNE decided (with the LIBRE councillor voting against) to give an absolute priority to the presidential election and to begin the special recounts with 1,081 protocols that were transcribed correctly but showed internal inconsistencies and 38 polling stations whose protocols were neither transmitted, nor delivered in paper.⁵² Later the number of polling station results sent for special recounts was increased to 2,103 by adding those that presented inconsistencies even after the correction of transcription errors.⁵³

The expected launch of the operation on 14 December did not materialise due to a protest among the PLH recount staff organised by the congressional candidate and spouse of the PLH presidential candidate demanding recounts of all votes, one-by-one, which lacked any legal basis. In parallel, the LIBRE mayoral candidate (current mayor) of Tegucigalpa convened his supporters for a permanent

⁵⁰ During the CNE plenary meeting with the three councillors on 20 December, the PNH councillor requested an addition to the agenda: a vote on the revision of Article 20 of the TREP regulations, which required unanimous decisions. The two councillors (PNH and PLH) accepted this inclusion, and the revision was subsequently approved by a majority vote.

⁵¹ Even after the correction process was concluded, there still remained a few incorrectly transcribed results protocols, for example in the presidential election in the polling stations 371, 7213 or 8708 which escaped the applied verification/correction procedure.

⁵² CNE Certificación-2940-2025, 14 December 2025

⁵³ CNE Certificación-3014-2025-Declaratoria Nivel Presidencial, 24 December 2025

protest at the entrance of the special recount premises. There were rumours that LIBRE infiltrated the pool of PLH recount staff, and perhaps of the smaller parties, as well. DC formally requested the CNE not to accredit any personnel under their flag, as they could not control any attempts at impersonation. In the following days, the protests continued and a few acts of violence were reported. There was uncertainty over how the armed forces leadership would respond if protesters attempted to break in and damage electoral documents.

The special recounts finally began on 18 December, though never at full capacity of 150 workstations (usually with some 90 operating). However, the process continued to be marked by protests occasionally accompanied by violence, deliberate obstruction on the part of the recount staff appointed by LIBRE and PLH. These dilatory tactics caused recounts of ballots to last 12 hours instead of the calculated 45 minutes per PS (CNE's estimation based on the experience from the March 2025 primaries). EU observers reported on cases of recount staff from different parties acting in collusion to put all figures to zeros without recounting the ballots, causing their *de facto* invalidation without having such competences. All these unforeseen delays put at risk the processing of the other two elections. The CNE dismissed the grounds for the petitions for recounts and announced the presidential results on 24 December.⁵⁴ The special recounts of the congressional and municipal elections took place between 25 and 30 December.

During the 30-day period of tabulation, the numerous software failures, system setbacks and delays were politically instrumentalised by the ruling LIBRE and its CNE councillor, and later also by the PLH presidential candidate. They used the poor communication of the CNE about the technical difficulties and the resulting uncertainty, to attack the PLH and PNH councillors and to promote narratives of fraud in order to delegitimise the results tabulation and eventually the whole electoral process.

While the analysis of the EU EOM confirmed that the numerous problems did not affect the integrity of the tabulated results, it became evident that the CNE did not manage well the technical solutions employed (as it was operated by an external supplier), nor of the special recounts personnel (as these were appointed by political parties).⁵⁵

(Priority) Recommendation 24: *Strengthen the CNE's ownership and control of the results management system, for example by developing a robust results management system in house, instead of relying on external companies. The resulting system should be developed, tested and audited sufficient time ahead of the next elections and should comply with the highest standards on transparency.*

F. Announcement of Official Election Results

Results tabulation took place against the backdrop of narratives of fraud, constant attempts from parties' representatives to discredit the electoral process, protests and acts of violence and sabotage at the special recounts, a possibility of the Public Prosecutor's Office confiscating election materials, and public comments about the Congress' permanent commission bypassing the CNE and announcing the results. Since the credible rumours about a possible detention order for the CNE's president and PNH councillor appeared on 11 December, both councillors went into hiding and conducted their activities online. The results of the presidential election were announced with 18,820 (98.2 per cent)

⁵⁴ At the time of the announcement of the official results, due to the deliberate delays and invalidation of the results protocols, the results from 333 polling stations could not be recounted and results protocols from 14 polling stations were completely missing.

⁵⁵ ICCPR, General comment 25, para. 20 "There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes."

results protocol tabulated, leaving over 330 protocols with inconsistencies unprocessed. The announced congressional results were based on 86.6 per cent of protocols and the municipal results on 90.3 per cent of the protocols. The outstanding protocols with inconsistencies were to be processed by the TJE's jurisdictional recounts.

The CNE announced the official results of the presidential election on 24 December during an online-streamed session chaired by CNE President Ana Paola Hall, together with Councillor Cosette López-Osorio and substitute Councillor Carlos Enrique Cardona. The CNE declared Nasry Asfura of the National Party the winner, with 40.26 per cent of the votes (1,479,822 votes). He was narrowly followed by Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party, who obtained 39.5 per cent (1,452,796 votes). Rixi Moncada of LIBRE placed third with 19.19 per cent. The voter participation reached 60 per cent. These results were fully in line with those of the parallel vote tabulation exercise conducted by OE25 and the CNA's independent, near-full-scale tabulation effort.

The results for the National Congress and municipal elections were announced on 30 December, in accordance with the constitutional deadline. The announcement was likewise made during an online-streamed session, with the two councillors appearing jointly and accompanied by substitute Councillor Carlos Enrique Cardona. The National Congress results produced a fragmented legislature dominated by the three main political parties. The PNH emerged as the largest bloc with 49 deputies, followed closely by the PLH with 41 seats. LIBRE secured 35 seats, while PINU obtained two seats and the Christian Democrats won one seat. The newly elected Congress commenced its term on 21 January 2026.

Taken together, the PNH and PLH control 90 seats, exceeding the 86-vote threshold required for a qualified majority. This majority is necessary for key institutional decisions, including high-level appointments. Consequently, opposition parties (LIBRE, PINU, and Christian Democrats) are unable to block such decisions without the participation of either the PNH or the PLH. While the PLH and LIBRE together can reach 76 votes, this alliance remains insufficient to influence decisions requiring a qualified majority. As a result, cooperation between the PNH and PLH will be decisive for institutional governance, while smaller parties—PINU and Christian Democrats—will have limited influence over congressional decision-making.

At the municipal level, the distribution of power reflects the dominance of the three main parties observed in the National Congress, with a continued territorial advantage for the PNH, consistent with previous electoral cycles. The PNH secured 151 municipalities (*alcaldías*), including the capital city, Distrito Central, although the result was contested following a very narrow margin of fewer than 1,000 votes over the LIBRE candidate, Jorge Aldana. The PLH won 76 municipalities, including San Pedro Sula, the country's largest city, representing a decline from the 91 municipalities it controlled in the last mandate. LIBRE secured 69 mayoralties, significantly expanding its local presence compared to the 48 municipalities won in 2021. PINU and independent candidate each secured one municipality.

XVIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
LEGAL FRAMEWORK						
1	11	<p>Many provisions in the legal framework remain incomplete or ambiguous while several legislative shortcomings persist. This was further aggravated by the inconsistent adoption of implementing regulations related to key legislation created legal uncertainty on how to proceed in key areas of the electoral process: candidate nominations, campaign regulations, electoral dispute resolution, election observation, the operation of TREP and special recounts.</p>	<p>Congress to undertake a process of electoral legal reform well in advance of the next elections, in consultation with the electoral institutions and civil society, to address inconsistencies and shortcomings of the current legislation as well as the timeframes for electoral authorities to publish all necessary implementing regulations.</p>	<p>Electoral law and other applicable Legislation, including CNE regulations</p>	<p>National Congress Electoral Institutions Political Parties Civil Society</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">RULE OF LAW</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 9: <i>“The rights and obligations provided for in [ICCPR article 25] paragraph (b) should be guaranteed by law.” (...)</i> <i>“Elections must be conducted (...) within a framework of laws guaranteeing the effective exercise of voting rights.”</i></p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 34, para. 25: <i>“A norm, to be characterized as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public.”</i></p> <p>UN Human Rights Council Resolution 19/36 (A/HRC/RES/19/36, 2012) p.16 [The Human Rights Council] <i>“calls upon States to make continues efforts to strengthen the rule of law and promote democracy by: ...c) Ensuring that a sufficient degree of legal certainty and predictability is provided in the application of the law”</i></p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
ELECTORAL SYSTEM						
2	11-12	While the 128 congressional seats are to be allocated to departments in proportion to their population, the manner and frequency of revisions are not specified by the law. According to the National Statistical Institute's (INE) population projections for 2025, two thirds of the departments deviated by more than 10 per cent from the nationwide average weight of the vote.	Establish clear procedures and periodicity for reviewing and revising the distribution of congressional seats among departments to reflect demographic changes and ensure equality of the vote.	Electoral law and other applicable legislation	National Congress	<p>GENUINE ELECTIONS THAT REFLECT THE FREE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF VOTERS</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 21: <i>“The principle of one person, one vote, must apply, and within the framework of each State's electoral system, the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another. The drawing of electoral boundaries and the method of allocating votes should not distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not exclude or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives freely.”</i></p>
3	12	Under Honduran law, elected members of Congress may relinquish their seats in favour of a designated substitute, an individual who was not included on a party's electoral list and did not compete in primary or general elections. This raises concerns regarding transparency, and accountability, and is contrary to the principle of freely choosing representatives through voting processes undermining the respect for voters' choices.	Strengthen respect for voters' choices in congressional elections by prohibiting arbitrary post-election replacement of elected candidates by individuals who were not included on the party's list of candidates. Any replacement should strictly follow the order of the candidate list as presented to voters.	Electoral law	National Congress	<p>GENUINE ELECTIONS THAT REFLECT THE FREE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF VOTERS</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 7: <i>“(…) Participation through freely chosen representatives is exercised through voting processes which must be established by laws that are in accordance with paragraph (b)”</i>; paragraph 18: <i>“State reports should describe the legal provisions which establish the conditions for holding elective public office, and any limitations and qualifications which apply to particular offices”</i></p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION						
4	13-14	While the CNE tripartite political arrangement was intended to mitigate mistrust among the main political forces, in practice it weakened the CNE's institutional autonomy and contributed to serious internal conflicts, a diffusion of responsibility, poor coordination, and delayed decision-making.	Strengthen the institutional capacity, independence and public accountability of the CNE to protect it from political party interference and ensure the efficient, timely, and impartial administration of elections, including internal safeguards to prevent politically-motivated paralysis.	Electoral law	National Congress Political Parties CNE	GENUINE ELECTIONS THAT REFLECT THE FREE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF VOTERS ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 20: <i>“An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.”</i> OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, para. 5: <i>“It is important for electoral bodies to be independent as regards their ability to decide and act, without their performance being subject to any governmental, political, or other influence.”</i>
5	15	Internal disputes within the National Congress led to the non-approval of election budgets for of the TJE and the UFTF prior to the general elections. Together with the late approval of the CNE's own budget, this exposed the structural financial vulnerability of electoral institutions and seriously constrained their ability to carry out their mandates in a timely and effective manner.	Ensure the financial independence and operational autonomy of electoral institutions by guaranteeing the timely approval and disbursement of adequate funding for them to effectively operate. The total electoral budget should be approved the year prior to elections, with funds disbursed sufficiently in advance to allow for effective planning, procurement, staffing, and implementation throughout the entire electoral cycle.	Electoral law and electoral institutions laws	National Congress CNE	GENUINE ELECTIONS THAT REFLECT THE FREE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF VOTERS ICCPR General Comment 25, para. 20 <i>“An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process...”</i> OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, para 5: <i>“[Electoral bodies] should have their own budget for executing their activities.”</i> IPU: Model Code of Conduct for Elections, para. 7.1: <i>“Election administrators should be free from interference by government or parties and should be provided with sufficient funds to allow them to fulfil their responsibilities.”</i>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
6	16	Throughout the process, the CNE did not establish coherent institutional communication: key decisions were not systematically published, and joint press conferences involving all three councillors were rare, which limited transparency, affected the credibility of the CNE and further eroded public trust in the electoral process.	Implement an effective CNE institutional communication strategy to ensure consistent and timely external communication, thereby strengthening public confidence and improving responsiveness to disinformation. This should also include the prompt publication of all decisions and continuous public information dissemination, particularly in the pre- and post-electoral periods.	X	National Congress Political Parties CNE	<p align="center">TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 34, para. 19: <i>“States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest.”</i></p> <p>OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, para. 4: <i>“[Electoral bodies] should have effective mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the population as whole and all political actors involved in the election.”</i></p>
VOTER REGISTRATION						
7	18-19	Practical limitations affect the effective exercise of voting rights for prisoners serving short sentences and for hospitalised voters. Although the Electoral Law mandates the CNE to adopt regulations to facilitate the registration and voting of those persons such regulations were not adopted.	Remove restrictions on the universal right to suffrage and adopt measures to ensure the right and opportunity to vote for homebound citizens, those in hospitals, and other persons in special circumstances that hinder their political participation.	Implementation of Constitutional provisions and article 81 of the Electoral law.	CNE and public institutions	<p align="center">UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE / RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE / STATE MUST TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO GIVE EFFECT TO RIGHTS</p> <p>ICCPR, article 25(b) <i>“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity (..) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections (...).”</i>;</p> <p>ICCPR General Comment 21, para. 3: <i>“Persons deprived of their liberty enjoy all the rights set forth in the Covenant, subject to the restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed environment.”</i></p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 10: <i>“It is unreasonable to restrict the right to vote on the ground of</i></p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
						<p><i>physical disability or to impose literacy, educational or property requirements” and paragraph 11: “States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right.”and para 14: “persons who are deprived of liberty but who have not been convicted should not be excluded from exercising the right to vote.”</i></p> <p>Article 29 UN CRPD: “States Parties shall guarantee (...) that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others.”</p>
REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES						
8	20-21	<p>Political parties that fail to participate in an election or obtain sufficient votes to elect at least one member of Congress or a mayor have their registration cancelled. This sanction raises concerns regarding its compatibility with the right to freedom of association. The suspension or dissolution of associations is one of the most severe restrictions on freedom of association and should be applied only in response to clearly defined and serious violations.</p>	<p>Amend the electoral law to protect freedom of association by revising the requirements for registering and deregistering parties in line with regional and international principles.</p>	Electoral Law	National Congress	<p style="text-align: center;">FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION</p> <p>Article 22 and 25 ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 26: “The right to freedom of association, including the right to form and join organizations and associations concerned with political and public affairs, is an essential adjunct to the rights protected by article 25.”</p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
9	21	The CNE rejected the candidate lists of five political parties on the basis of incomplete application documentation. The EU EOM considered that these parties were not given sufficient time to submit their candidacies, especially given the deregistration sanction imposed by the Electoral Law for parties that do not participate in a given election.	Establish clear timeframes and procedures in law for registering different types of candidacies, as well as for identifying and correcting mistakes within a reasonable timeframe.	Electoral Law	National Congress	<p>RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 26: “The right to freedom of association (...) is an essential adjunct to the rights protected by article 25.”</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 9: “ (...) “<i>Elections must be conducted (...) within a framework of laws guaranteeing the effective exercise of voting rights.</i>”</p> <p>UN Human Rights Council Resolution 19/36 (A/HRC/RES/19/36, 2012) p.16 [The Human Rights Council] “<i>calls upon States to ...c) Ensuring that a sufficient degree of legal certainty and predictability is provided in the application of the law</i>”</p>
ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE						
10	22	The legislation contains several lacunae regarding the use of state resources for election campaigns, without an explicit blanket prohibition.	Establish clear legal provisions that prohibit the use of state resources for campaigning, including deterrent and enforceable sanctions for candidates and parties who fail to comply.	Electoral Law	National Congress	<p>PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION/FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 19: “<i>Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.</i>”</p>

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11	22-23	All parties made extensive use of paid political advertising on digital media platforms. However, the absence of a legal framework governing online political advertising limited transparency and effective oversight of campaign spending.	Develop effective mechanisms to increase the transparency of online campaign expenditure and strengthen the UFTF’s capacity to monitor digital political advertising on social media.	Electoral Law	National Congress CNE UFTF	<p>PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION/FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 19: “<i>Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.</i>”</p>
12	24	Political parties and candidates are only required to submit a report of their campaign funding and spending after election day. In addition, there is an absence of the deterrent effect of sanctions, resulting in highly unequal chances in the electoral competition.	Introduce mandatory standardised intermediate financial reports to be submitted by political parties ahead of elections, to ensure effective and regular control of campaign funding and legal compliance.	Electoral Law Financing, Transparency and Oversight of Political Parties and Candidates Law	National Congress	<p>PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION/FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN</p> <p>Inter-American Democratic Charter, Article 5: “<i>The strengthening of political parties and other political organizations is a priority for democracy. Special attention will be paid to the problems associated with the high cost of election campaigns and the establishment of a balanced and transparent system for their financing.</i>”</p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
ELECTION OBSERVATION						
13	25	The CNE is required to adopt specific regulations on election observation for each electoral process. The regulation for the 2025 elections was adopted late and proved to be more restrictive than previous ones by introducing new requirements.	Introduce legislation on national and international election observation, either through the approval of a specific law or the inclusion of legal provisions in the electoral law, containing key principles for a meaningful inclusive election observation, including the applicable timeframes, scope, and the rights and responsibilities of observers.	Electoral Law	Congress	<p>RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 8: “<i>Citizens also take part in the conduct of public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves. This participation is supported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association.</i>”</p>
MEDIA						
14	27	The media operated in an environment of intimidation, coordinated smear campaigns and legal persecution with regular hostile rhetoric from senior government officials and key institutional and political actors against journalists and media outlets on multiple social media networks.	Create a safe and intimidation-free media environment for all actors, including adequate protection of journalists at risk.	Adoption of legislation and effective mechanisms for the protection of freedom of expression and the activity of journalists	Government Congress	<p>FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 34, para. 23: “<i>States parties should put in place effective measures to protect against attacks aimed at silencing those exercising their right to freedom of expression. (...) Journalists are frequently subjected to such threats, intimidation and attacks because of their activities.(...) All such attacks should be vigorously investigated in a timely fashion, and the perpetrators prosecuted....</i>”</p> <p>IACHR Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression - Principle 9: “<i>The murder, kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators (...) violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the state to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.</i>”</p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
15	27	Criminal defamation, including offences of slander and insult, remains regulated in the Criminal Code and carries prison sentences, which is inconsistent with international standards on freedom of expression.	Decriminalise defamation in favour of civil laws, in line with international standards on freedom of expression and media, including in the electoral context.	Criminal Code	Congress	<p>FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 34, para. 47: “States parties should consider the decriminalisation of defamation, and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty”.</p> <p>ICCPR General comment 34, para. 9: “The harassment, intimidation or stigmatisation of a person, including arrest, detention, trial or imprisonment for reasons of the opinions they may hold, constitutes a violation of article 19, paragraph 1”</p>
16	28	State-owned broadcasters failed to provide equitable or impartial coverage of the electoral process, devoting a substantial share of airtime to government advertising during the campaign, in breach of the Electoral Law’s prohibition on government propaganda in broadcast media.	Transform state media into a genuine public service broadcaster with editorial independence and financial autonomy.	Media related legislation	Congress	<p>FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN</p> <p>ICCPR General Comment 34, para. 16: “States parties should ensure that public broadcasting services operate in an independent manner. In this regard, States parties should guarantee their independence and editorial freedom. They should provide funding in a manner that does not undermine their independence.”</p> <p>UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR 2017 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda Art. 3-c: “States should ensure presence of strong, independent and adequately resourced public service media, which operate under a clear mandate to serve the overall public interest and to set and maintain high standards of journalism.”</p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS						
17	29	Honduras lacks a comprehensive data protection framework, necessary to properly regulate consent and safeguard the collection and processing of personal information.	Adopt a data protection law that establishes principles, definitions, rights, obligations of those responsible for the processing of personal data, including election stakeholders for the processing of election-related data; create a supervisory authority to ensuring its implementation with a view to robustly protect citizens' right to privacy both online and offline.	Introduce a data protection law	Congress	<p style="text-align: center;">RIGHT TO PRIVACY</p> <p>ICCPR, Article 17: <i>“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy [...] Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”</i></p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 16, para. 10: <i>“The gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law.”</i></p> <p>ACHR, article 11: <i>“No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence (...).”</i></p>
18	30	In the run-up to the elections, the digital information environment was characterised by high exposure to disinformation and inflammatory narratives. The limited digital skills of large sectors of the population increased the vulnerability of public debate to misleading content, curbing the citizens' ability to critically evaluate political disinformation disseminated on digital platforms.	Strengthen cooperation between the media, civil society, academia and technology companies in order to develop digital literacy and awareness-raising campaigns on online election-related disinformation and reinforce existing fact-checking initiatives.	X	<p>Media</p> <p>Civil Society</p> <p>Academia</p> <p>Tech Companies</p> <p>Political Parties</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN</p> <p>UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR 2017 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda, article 6(a): <i>“All stakeholders – including intermediaries, media outlets, civil society and academia – should be supported in developing participatory and transparent initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of disinformation and propaganda on democracy, freedom of expression, journalism and civic space, as well as appropriate responses to these phenomena.”</i></p> <p>Joint declaration on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age, 2020, article 1(b.5): <i>“States should make a concerted effort to promote digital media and information literacy, including in relation to elections.”</i></p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN						
19	32	The Electoral Law sets out gender parity and alternating positions between women and men on the candidate lists. However, the number of women elected falls significantly short of 50 per cent parity because of loopholes in the law.	Ensure effective implementation by political parties of the gender parity and alternation requirements at all levels of candidacy, supported by enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for non-compliance.	Electoral law	Congress Political parties	RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, Article 5: <i>“Every woman is entitled to the free and full exercise of her civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and may rely on the full protection of those rights as embodied in regional and international instruments on human rights. The States Parties recognize that violence against women prevents and nullifies the exercise of these rights.”</i>
20	32	Women have limited influence within party leadership structures and are systematically subjected to harassment, threats, gender-based violence, and coordinated disinformation campaigns aimed at silencing them, undermining their legitimacy, and preventing them from participating in public life.	Both state authorities and political parties to consider adopting policies and mechanisms to effectively prevent and address gender-based political violence within the public political sphere and within political party structures.	Gender-based political violence legislation	Congress Political Parties Office of Public Prosecutor Civil Society	RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ICCPR, Article 2(3)(a). <i>“To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed.”</i> CEDAW Article 2(c): <i>“States parties to establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination.”</i>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS AND AFRO-DESCENDANT PEOPLES						
21	34	In the absence of special constituencies, reserved seats, or quota systems, the political representation of indigenous and Afro-descendant populations remains largely dependent on party dynamics and priorities.	Ensure the effective participation of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples in political life by adopting internal party measures to increase their representation on candidate lists and by providing these communities with adapted electoral services, particularly for voter registration and civic education.	Electoral law	Congress Political parties CNE	<p>RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE / STATE MUST TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO GIVE EFFECT TO RIGHTS</p> <p>UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 2: <i>“Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights”</i></p> <p>ICCPR, Article 26: <i>“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination.”</i></p>
ELECTORAL JUSTICE						
22	36	The deadlines set by the CNE and TJE are too short for complainants to prepare a case, as sufficient proof must be included with any challenge.	Establish deadlines for case preparation after the publication of preliminary results, ensuring sufficient time to submit evidence and legal arguments, thereby safeguarding procedural fairness and the integrity of the adjudicative process.	Electoral Law Electoral Procedural Law	Congress CNE TJE	<p>RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY</p> <p>ICCPR, article 2(3)(a). <i>“To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”</i></p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 9: <i>“Elections must be conducted (...) within a framework of laws guaranteeing the effective exercise of voting rights.”</i></p> <p>OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, Justice and The Rule of Law Principle, page 9: <i>“there should be mechanisms and structures that provide legal protection on an equal footing for all; that process claims within a reasonable period of time; and do so independently and impartially.”</i></p>

No.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
ELECTION DAY AND TRANSMISSION OF ELECTION RESULTS						
23	39-40	The TREP was initially fed with digitalised results protocols and their automatically interpreted numeric values. This process was especially prone to errors due to a very low accuracy rate of the character recognition.	To improve the efficiency and reliability of results tabulation, apply the standard double blind entry procedure for the transcription of hand-written results protocols in the database.		CNE	<p style="text-align: center;">GENUINE ELECTIONS THAT REFLECT THE FREE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF VOTERS TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 20: <i>“An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws. (...)”</i></p> <p>OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, para 4: <i>“[Electoral bodies] should have effective mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the population as whole and all political actors involved in the election.”</i></p>
24	41	During the 30-day period of tabulation, the numerous software failures, system setbacks and delays were politically instrumentalised by some political parties to delegitimise the results tabulation and disregard the whole election process.	Strengthen the CNE’s ownership and control of the results management system, for example by developing a robust results management system in house, instead of relying on external companies. The resulting system should be developed, tested and audited sufficient time ahead of the next elections and should comply with the highest standards on transparency.		CNE	<p style="text-align: center;">GENUINE ELECTIONS THAT REFLECT THE FREE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF VOTERS TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION</p> <p>ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 20: <i>“There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.”</i></p> <p>OAS Electoral Good Practices Guide for Strengthening Electoral Processes, section C.1, para 4: <i>“[Electoral bodies] should have effective mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the population as whole and all political actors involved in the election.”</i></p>

Annexes

Annex I - Press Statements



MISION DE OBSERVACION ELECTORAL DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Elecciones generales - Honduras
30 de noviembre de 2025



PRESS RELEASE

Tegucigalpa, 10 December 2025 – The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) has been present in Honduras since 11 October, deploying 138 observers for election day.

On 2 December, the Mission issued a preliminary statement on the pre-election period and election day, noting that, the electoral process was marked by severe institutional crises which contrasted with a well-organised and peaceful election day. Since then, EU observers have been present during the tabulation of election results being carried out by the National Electoral Council (CNE).

The EU EOM calls on all political actors to respect the Honduran people’s vote in the 30 November elections, and to uphold the legality of the ongoing process. The EU Mission urges political actors to raise any concerns they have about the election results using the traceability mechanisms made available to them by the CNE, as well as the established legal mechanisms.

The EU EOM exhorts members of the National Electoral Council and the Electoral Justice Tribunal — the two electoral authorities — to carry out their duties impartially and in an exemplary manner, complying with their institutions’ mandate and avoiding politically motivated obstructions or delays to the process.

Hondurans are waiting patiently for the election results, and the EU EOM encourages all actors to follow their example and avoid any disruptions to the process.



MISION DE OBSERVACION ELECTORAL
DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Elecciones generales - Honduras
30 de noviembre de 2025



PRESS RELEASE

Tegucigalpa, 20 December 2025 – The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) reiterates its call for all actors to respect the Honduran people's vote on 30 November and stresses the importance of completing the ongoing electoral process.

Throughout the electoral period, the work of the electoral administration has been undermined by consecutive and intentional paralysis, which caused serious delays to electoral preparations.

Nevertheless, the EU EOM believes that the tabulation process has so far been conducted transparently, with all political parties having had access to all election result forms from the start.

As the special scrutiny is ongoing, it is crucial that it can proceed without interruptions and without intentional invalidation of election results to alter the outcome of the presidential elections. The EU EOM urges political actors to cooperate in the swift completion of the tabulation process and use the legal mechanisms and conditions set in the law to address their concerns.

The EU EOM calls the attention of state authorities that it is their responsibility to ensure that the National Electoral Council (CNE) councillors and electoral officials can carry out their duties in an environment free from intimidation.

The EU EOM urges all parties to refrain from obstructing the official declaration of election results by the CNE.



MISIÓN DE OBSERVACIÓN ELECTORAL
DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Elecciones generales - Honduras
30 de noviembre de 2025



PRESS RELEASE

Tegucigalpa, 31 December 2025 – The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) takes note of the declaration of election results by the National Electoral Council (CNE) within the 30 December constitutional deadline for the presidential, National Congress and municipal council elections.

The EU EOM reiterates its call for all actors to respect the Honduran people's vote on 30 November and urges all political actors to address any disputes relating to the election results through the Electoral Justice Tribunal (TJE). The EU EOM supports the Tribunal's work and the suggested involvement of civil society to ensure timely recounts and resolution of appeals.

The EU EOM reminds state authorities of their responsibility to ensure that members of the CNE and the TJE are able to carry out their duties in an environment free from intimidation.

The EU EOM will publish a final report with recommendations for future electoral processes. In early March 2026, the EU EOM will convene a high-level seminar to discuss electoral reforms.

Annex II - MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS

METHODOLOGICAL PARAMETERS

EU EOM Honduras 2025 monitored a selected sample of traditional and digital media outlets from 22 October to 7 December, covering the electoral period and extending into the immediate post electoral phase.


The monitored media sample comprised four television channels, Canal 8 (Televisión Nacional de Honduras, TNH), Telecentro (Canal 5), HCH Televisión Digital, and UNE TV, and four radio stations, Radio Nacional de Honduras (RNH), HRN (Emisoras Unidas), Radio América, and Radio Globo. The print media sample included La Prensa, El Heraldo, and La Tribuna. Digital news monitoring covered El Libertador, Hondudiaro, Proceso Digital, and Tu Nota, and was conducted using the social listening tool SentiOne. Television news programmes were monitored daily during three time slots, 07:00 to 09:00, 11:00 to 13:00, and 19:00 to 21:00, and radio content was monitored from 06:00 to 09:00 and from 16:00 to 19:00.

The monitoring encompassed a broad range of election related content, including references to political parties and candidates, campaign activities, election administration, legal and institutional developments, security related issues, and post electoral developments. Media content was analysed by a team of communication experts using both quantitative and qualitative indicators. Quantitative analysis measured airtime in seconds for broadcast media, print space in square centimetres for newspapers, and word count for digital media. Qualitative analysis assessed the tone of coverage and the prominence of key electoral issues and actors.

OVERVIEW OF COVERAGE


Political and electoral coverage on TV

Legend: Debate, Voter Education, News, Other, Political programme, Government advertising, Free advertising, Paid advertising




Political and electoral coverage on radio

Legend: Debate, News, Other, Political programme, Government advertising, Paid advertising




Political and electoral coverage in digital news media

Legend: Editorial, News, Feature report



Political and electoral coverage in print newspapers

Legend: Comic, Editorial, Voter education, Interview, Paid advertising, Photo, News, Feature report




22 Oct - 29 Nov: Coverage measured in word count: El Libertador – 29,863; Hondudiaro – 71,738; Proceso Digital – 408,490; Tu Nota – 53,448
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

22 Oct - 29 Nov: El Heraldo – 258,862 cm²; La Prensa – 218,256 cm²; La Tribuna – 270,158 cm²
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

STATE OWNED MEDIA

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on Televisión Nacional de Honduras - Canal 8

measured in hours of broadcast



1 Nelson Avila

22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on Televisión Nacional de Honduras - Canal 8


■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive



22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on Radio Nacional de Honduras (RNH)

measured in hours of broadcast



22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00

Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on Radio Nacional de Honduras (RNH)

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00

Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

PRIVATE TELEVISION

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on Telecentro - Canal 5


measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising



22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on HCH


measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising



1 Mario Rivera


22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on UNE TV
measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising



1 Nelson Avila
22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on Telecentro - Canal 5




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on HCH



22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00


Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on UNE TV



22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper


PRIVATE RADIOS

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on Radio HRN - Emisoras Unidas
measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on Radio HRN - Emisoras Unidas




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on Radio América
measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising



22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00


Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on Radio América




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government on Radio Globo

measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising



Tone towards presidential candidates and the government on Radio Globo




22 Oct - 29 Nov; monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00
Source: EU EDM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

22 Oct - 29 Nov; monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00
Source: EU EDM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

PRIVATE NEWSPAPERS


Coverage of presidential candidates and the government in El Heraldo

measured in cm², excludes paid advertising



Coverage of presidential candidates and the government in La Prensa


measured in cm², excludes paid advertising



22 Oct - 29 Nov
Fuente: EU EDM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Creado con Datawrapper


22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EDM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government in El Heraldo



22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EDM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper


Tone towards presidential candidates and the government in La Prensa




22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EDM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government in La Tribuna

measured in cm², excludes paid advertising



Tone towards presidential candidates and the government in La Tribuna



22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper


1 Nelson Avila

22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

PRIVATE DIGITAL NEWS MEDIA


Coverage of presidential candidates and the government in El Libertador

measured in word count



22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper


Tone towards presidential candidates and the government in El Libertador




22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government in Proceso Digital

measured in word count




Tone towards presidential candidates and the government in Proceso Digital



22 Oct - 29 Nov
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government in Hondudiario

measured in word count



22 Oct - 29 Nov

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government in Hondudiario

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




22 Oct - 29 Nov

Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Coverage of presidential candidates and the government in Tu Nota

measured in word count



22 Oct - 29 Nov

Tone towards presidential candidates and the government in Tu Nota

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive



22 Oct - 29 Nov

Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper


POLITICAL ADVERTISING ON BROADCAST MEDIA

Paid political advertising on broadcast media was uneven and strongly concentrated on Partido Libre. UNE TV aired advertising exclusively from Libre candidates and the government, while HCH Televisión Digital and Televisión Nacional (Canal 5) offered broader access but still favoured Libre contenders. On private radio, advertising was led by Partido Libre, followed by the Partido Liberal and the Partido Nacional. By contrast, state-owned TNH and RNH broadcast almost exclusively government propaganda free of charge.

Paid advertising on private television and free ads on TNH

measured in hours of broadcast

■ Rixi Moncada ■ Current Government ■ Mayoral Candidates - Partido Libre ■ Civil Society ■ Nasry Asfura ■ CNE
■ Congress Candidates - Partido Libre ■ Salvador Nasralla ■ Congress Candidates - Partido Liberal ■ Armed Forces of Honduras
■ Mayoral Candidates - Partido Nacional ■ Congress Candidates - Partido Demócrata Cristiano ■ Other




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Paid advertising on private television and free ads on RNH

measured in hours of broadcast

■ Congress Candidates - Partido Libre ■ Rixi Moncada ■ Current Government ■ Mayoral Candidates - Partido Liberal
■ Mayoral Candidates - Partido Libre ■ Nasry Asfura ■ Congress Candidates - Partido Liberal ■ Civil Society ■ CNE
■ Armed Forces of Honduras ■ TJE ■ Mayoral Candidates - Partido Demócrata Cristiano ■ Other




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 06:00-09:00 and 16:00-19:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

COVERAGE OF THE CNE, TJE AND THE ARMED FORCES ON TV

Tone towards the CNE on television

measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Television coverage of the CNE and the TJE was substantial and predominantly negative across broadcasters, driven by criticism of institutional paralysis, internal divisions and delays affecting the electoral process. Coverage of the Armed Forces was also significant but highly polarised, reflecting their positioning and action towards the electoral process, and resulting in mainly positive portrayal on state-owned and pro-government channels and predominantly negative coverage on private broadcasters.

Tone towards the Armed Forces of Honduras on television

measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Tone towards the TJE on television

measured in hours of broadcast, excludes paid advertising

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive



22 Oct - 29 Nov, monitored times: 07:00-09:00, 11:00-13:00, and 19:00-21:00
Source: EU EOM Honduras 2025 - Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Annex III - SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS

1. EU EOM METHODOLOGY

The EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) employed a range of complementary quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse online election-related content. These included legal analysis, social media monitoring, open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques, and consultations with key stakeholders, conducted in coordination with Core Team members and long-term observers. The Mission combined social listening, data scraping, content analysis and data visualisation to obtain an overview of digital campaigning.

A representative sample of accounts, pages and topics of national relevance was analysed to identify key trends across monitored platforms. Data collection and analysis were supported by specialised tools, including Fanpage Karma, Python-based processing, a bespoke narrative-tracking platform, Facebook Ad Library, Who Targets Me, and visualisation software.

2. SCOPE OF THE EU EOM SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING

The EU EOM began by mapping the digital landscape to assess the online presence of political actors and the relevance of platforms during the electoral process. Monitoring focused on key campaign themes, political advertising, disinformation and manipulation, violent speech, and the tone of online discourse. Observation covered the campaign period, electoral silence, election day and post-election developments.

Social Media Monitoring Sample

Actor	Facebook	Instagram	X	TikTok	YouTube
Presidential Candidates	7	7	7	6	6
Political Parties	5	5	6	5	5
Influencers	46	60	17	71	26
Ministers	0	0	10	0	0
Other Political Actors	0	0	80	0	0
Total	58	72	120	82	37

Figure 1. Total accounts and profiles analysed by digital platform. Source: own elaboration.

Topic	Analytical approach	Monitoring period	Platforms	Tools
Actor mapping / multiple analysis	Qualitative	From 11 October to 11 December 2025		Fanpage Karma
Campaign narratives Analysis (multiple)	Qualitative Quantitative	From 11 October to 11 December 2025		Python
Manipulation techniques (bot-driven amplification, trolls, deepfakes)	Case-study Qualitative	From 11 October to 30 November 2025		Python
AI Generated content	Quantitative	From 1 September to 30 November 2025		Manual
Gender-based violent Speech	Quantitative	From 11 October to 30 November 2025		Manual
Paid Political Advertisement	Qualitative Quantitative	From 1 September to 30 November 2025		Facebook Ad Library Who Targets Me
Political Campaign by candidates	Qualitative Quantitative	From 1 September to 30 November 2025		Fanpage Karma
Influencers Analysis	Qualitative	From 1 September to 30 November 2025		Manual
Election Day Developments	Qualitative	30 November 2025		Manual

Figure 2. EU EOM’s social media monitoring, methodological approach. Source: own elaboration.

3. INFORMATION MANIPULATION

Coordinated amplification

The mission conducted a monitoring exercise of a potential covert influence operation on TikTok, focusing on the activity of 23 politically oriented accounts between 1 September and 22 November 2025. During this period, these accounts published a total of 5,154 videos.




Figure 3. Sample of accounts analysed and total number of videos published. Source: own elaboration.

Due to technical limitations in data collection tools, the analysis was based on a sample of 1,563 videos that generated at least ten comments each, allowing for the examination of 112,059 comments from 50,772 unique accounts. The analysis identified 341 accounts (0.6 percent of the total) that displayed behavioural patterns consistent with coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). These accounts generated 7,580 comments, equivalent to 6.7 percent of the total volume analysed, indicating disproportionate participation in digital discourse through practices that included message repetition, high posting frequency, and temporal synchronisation.




Figure 4. Sample of videos analysed, total comments examined, and unique accounts. Source: own elaboration.

The analysis identified three types of accounts that acted in a coordinated manner, each with a distinct role in the observed dynamics. Together, these groups represented a small proportion of the total accounts analysed but demonstrated a disproportionate capacity to influence digital debate.




Figure 5. Total number of accounts showing behaviour patterns consistent with CIB. Source: own elaboration.

A first group of a central nature consisted of 46 accounts that generated a high volume of repetitive and synchronised comments. These accounts acted as the core of the activity, driving the main messages and setting the tone of the conversation (“core accounts”).

A second group functioned as an amplification layer. Composed of 260 accounts, it was characterised by the rapid posting of brief and generic messages, such as emojis or short phrases, with the aim of reinforcing content promoted by the core group and artificially increasing the perception of support (“amplifying accounts”).

A third group of 35 “starter” accounts showed significant qualitative impact. Their interventions were concentrated on specific videos and within very short time windows, allowing them to rapidly saturate comment sections and kickstart the algorithm to increase visibility of the content. This behavior, carried out without evident signs of

automation and with varied messages, is consistent with the tactic known as "raids," aimed at dominating the initial conversation before the arrival of organic audience ("raids accounts").




Figure 6. Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour on TikTok. Source: own elaboration.

AI-generated content

The EU EOM identified 318 instances of AI-generated content disseminated across Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok and YouTube. Two hundred and seventy-nine of these items were shared by anonymous accounts or accounts suspected to be trolls or bots, 26 by ordinary users and 13 by political actors. TikTok was, by far, the platform where most of the content generated by artificial intelligence was detected.




Figure 7. AI-generated items analysed. Source: own elaboration.

The analysis revealed that AI was used to alter video in 187 cases, to spread deepfakes in 122 cases, images in 8 and alter audio in one case.




Figure 8. Format of the AI-generated items analysed. Source: own elaboration.

While some AI-generated content was employed for voters’ mobilisation and genuine campaign promotion, the majority aimed to spread disinformation (110) and delegitimise political opponents (128 cases).




Figure 9. Objective of the AI-generated items analysed. Source: own elaboration.

Overall, the EU EOM observed widespread use of AI-generated content throughout the campaign across all platforms. TikTok proved particularly conducive to organic dissemination, while high reach on Facebook and Instagram was largely driven by political paid advertising. In total, 58 AI-generated paid political ads were observed.




Figure 10. Views of the AI-generated items analysed. Source: own elaboration.

Many local interlocutors reported that this election marked the first time in Honduras in which AI-generated materials featured prominently, and they expressed concern about the growing sophistication of such content, which can be difficult to distinguish from authentic information. This development poses significant challenges for voters, many of whom remain unfamiliar with the use and implications of AI-generated content. Of the 318 items analysed, only 20 included a watermark indicating that they were AI-generated.




Figure 11. AI-generated content bearing a watermark.
Source: own elaboration.

4. ELECTION-RELATED INFORMATION SHARED BY NON-CONTESTANTS

Following posts on Truth Social by U.S. President Donald Trump in the week preceding the elections and the day after, the EU EOM conducted a tailored social media monitoring exercise to assess their impact on online conversation generated on X. This exercise was based on the scraping of content using a corpus of pre-identified keywords. The analysis of the three posts published between 26 November and 1 December showed that political discourse converged around three main narratives: “Juan Orlando Hernández pardon promise”, “Asfura’s endorsement”, and “foreign intervention”. The first narrative drew the greatest attention, generating approximately 80,000 reactions across a total of 660 posts published globally on the day of publication.




Figure 12. Impact of President Trump’s publications on Truth Social on Honduran election discourse - narrative evolution.
Source: own elaboration.

When narrowing the analysis to the corpus of 1,158 tweets published by accounts registered in Honduras, 74 per cent of reactions stemmed from organic activity, primarily linked to comment threads and content sharing by national media-related accounts, while the remaining 26 per cent originated from national political actors.




Figure 13. Types of accounts amplifying the main narratives following President Trump’s publications.
 Source: own elaboration.

The chart below illustrates the distribution of tweets published by national sources across the different narratives, showing that online discussion predominantly focused on President Trump’s promise of a pardon for Juan Orlando Hernández (687 tweets), followed by debate surrounding his endorsement of presidential candidate Tito Asfura (204 tweets) and allegations of U.S. foreign interference in national affairs (56 tweets).




Figure 14. Distribution of tweets generated by President Trump’s publications across the three main narratives.
 Source: own elaboration.

