



European Union
Election Observation Mission
PERU 2026

Final Report



General elections

12 April 2026

Presidential run-off

7 June 2026



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ACRONYMS

CONCORTV – The Consultative Council of Radio and Television

CRPD – Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

EEM – Election Expert Mission

EOM – Election Observation Mission

EU – European Union

EUR – Euros

IACHR - Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

JEE – *Jurado Electoral Especial*

JNE – *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*

JNJ – *Junta Nacional de Justicia*

LOE – Election Law

LOP – Law on Political Organisations

LPI – *Listas del Padrón Inicial* / Initial Voter Register Lists

MTS – Ministry of Transport and Communications

OAS – Organization of American States

ODPE – *Oficina Descentralizada de Procesos Electorales*

ONPE – *Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales*

PEN – Peruvian Soles

RENIEC – *Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil*

RSF – Reporters Without Borders

RUIPN – *Registro Único de Identificación de las Personas Naturales* / Single Register for the Identification of Natural Persons

SCE – *Sistema de Cómputo Electoral* / Electoral Computing System

STAE – *Solución Tecnológica de Apoyo al Escrutinio* / Vote Counting Support System

UNCAC – United Nations Convention against Corruption

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNIORE – Inter-American Union of Electoral Bodies

USD – United States Dollars

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the 2026 general elections, Peruvians determined who would serve as the country's president and vice-presidents, members of the Congress of the Republic, and representatives to the Andean Parliament for the next five years. In a competitive political environment, the electoral process was overall credible and transparent despite instances of election management shortfalls and persistent fraud narratives. In the end, Peruvian voters narrowly chose four-time presidential contender Keiko Fujimori as President over former Minister and serving congressman Roberto Sánchez.

The elections took place against a backdrop of prolonged political crisis, which was most visibly manifested in the fact that four Presidents held office in each of the previous five-year terms. Inter-institutional manoeuvring and Congressional approval of controversial legislative initiatives greatly diminished public trust in state institutions and the political class. There was also a deep voter apathy and citizen disconnection from the government. This context exposed the country's long-standing political divisions along multiple intersecting fault-lines, which would further come to the fore during the campaign.

In this context, the general elections were contested by 37 political organisations and 35 presidential tickets. In a presidential run-off between two seasoned politicians, voters picked the more right-wing conservative Keiko Fujimori (*Fuerza Popular*) over left-wing anti-system candidate Roberto Sánchez (*Juntos por el Perú*). With early signs of a slim margin between the two options, voters waited more than three weeks for the electoral authorities to announce that Fujimori won with 50.14 per cent of the votes. In the congressional elections, *Fuerza Popular* won a relative majority of seats in both chambers but will need to cooperate with other parties to secure the majorities needed to pass legislative initiatives.

The campaign demonstrated genuine competition among contestants, with the freedoms of expression, assembly and association being upheld. The first-round campaign was subdued and punctuated by a few incidents of violence and the use of divisive language. By contrast, the run-off was characterised by a polarised campaign discourse with instances of discrimination, hostilities, and racism, which remained unaddressed by the competent state authorities. EU observers highlighted that Fujimori's campaign was undertaken with greater resources and reliance on established party structures. She achieved a clear lead (5 per cent) in the first round. Sánchez, who was slightly disadvantaged in having to await confirmation of his participation in the run-off, based his campaign on forging political alliances. Fujimori emphasised security and stability, social programmes, and a reform of public spending, whereas Sánchez called for social development, fiscal reforms, and reduction of inequalities.

The legal framework provides sufficient guarantees for inclusive and transparent electoral processes that respect fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, its coherence has been undermined by constant partial legislative changes, which have led to inconsistencies, dispersion, and duplication. Challenges to implementation, especially regarding the new provision on recounts, forced the *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* (JNE) to adopt *ad hoc* decisions to respect electoral timeframes and constitutional deadlines. This undermined the principle of legal certainty and the stability of law.

There are no excessive or restrictive legal requirements to run for the Presidency, Congress, or Andean Parliament. Prior to candidate registration, almost all political organisations opted for delegate-based primaries, the model that most diminished intra-party democracy and favoured party control. At the same time, political organisations are not responsible for the quality and accuracy of the data in candidates CVs. In a competition with almost 7,500 candidates, more than 2,500 CV-related offences (omissions, falsifications) were registered. Of the 1,900 candidate lists filed with the 60 *Jurados Electorales Especiales* (JEEs), 1,772 were ultimately approved, representing more than 90 per cent of all applications.

Voting is compulsory in Peru. There were just over twenty-seven million registered voters for these elections, including some 1.2 million out-of-country voters. No major concerns were raised by stakeholders regarding the accuracy and inclusiveness of the voter register. In line with a previous EU EOM recommendation, the deadline for updates to the voter register, such as address changes, was brought forward by six months to 14 October 2025. After closure of the register, the *Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil* (RENIEC) sent the *Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales* (ONPE) monthly updates of the deceased, as well as of voters who changed their address or updated their photograph.

The JNE, ONPE, and RENIEC performed adequately in most respects, but the failures in delivery of election material in parts of Lima on 12 April overshadowed management achievements and deteriorated national level JNE-ONPE relations. ONPE successfully implemented several measures to address the complexity of the electoral process – in which five elections were represented on one single ballot – extending poll worker training and opening more decentralised offices. Inter-institutional commissions for conflict prevention introduced by the JNE strengthened coordination between electoral stakeholders.

Freedom of expression and of the press were broadly respected. However, there was a deteriorating media environment, where journalists faced threats that were not adequately addressed by the relevant authorities. State-owned media provided equitable and neutral campaign coverage. Privately-owned media showed more bias, which became increasingly pronounced during the run-off, presenting Roberto Sánchez in a predominantly negative light and contributing to polarisation.

Social media was a central campaign arena, with fraud narratives, primarily driven by Rafael López-Aliaga and his supporters, attacks on electoral institutions, and coordinated amplification shaping online discourse, particularly after the first-round. Official candidate communication remained largely campaign-focused, while uneven paid advertising and third-party pages' attacks contributed to a polarised and confrontational online environment.

A 2024 legal reform removed the principle of gender alternation on the presidential ticket, and the principle of parity did not apply to heads of congressional candidate lists. Women's representation in the incoming Congress (36 per cent) is slightly lower than in the outgoing Congress (38 per cent). While the law requires a part of public funding to be allocated to training activities in accordance with gender parity criteria, and ONPE regulations promote spending on women's inclusion, implementation remained limited in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. During the campaign, several cases of online harassment against female candidates were reported.

The electoral bodies undertook measures to enfranchise indigenous and Afro-Peruvian peoples, as well as persons with disabilities, to ensure they could exercise their right to vote. This included voter information materials in different languages, door-to-door voter education, and voting modalities to facilitate persons with differentiated abilities. However, the remoteness of some indigenous communities, language barriers, and mechanisms for registering those with disabilities still hamper full participation.

On the 12 April election day, election material was delivered late to 66 voting centres in Lima, which led to serious delays in the opening of the corresponding polling stations. Despite a JNE extension of the permitted deadline, 13 voting centres could not be opened, and the JNE decided that elections in these centres would take place the following day. Apart from this logistical failure, in the rest of the country, both elections days (12/13 April and 7 June) proceeded overall calmly and peacefully. Polling stations opened with slight delays due to late arrival of poll workers, but the procedures for opening and voting were mostly followed. All stages of the process could be followed without restrictions by party agents and observers. Closing and counting procedures were complex and lengthy in the first-round, but much faster for the run-off. Processing of results at ONPE computing centres was observed to be professional, transparent, and methodical. The large numbers of results

protocols with inconsistencies led to a protracted results verification process, and delayed announcements of full results.

Overall, political organisations appeared to disregard, or have limited knowledge of, the procedures on complaints and appeals. After 12 April, more than 500 petitions of annulment of polling stations or the entire election were registered. They were largely dismissed as inadmissible and without substance. Following the 7 June run-off, only 13 petitions were registered. All of them were dismissed by the JEEs at first instance and by the JNE in appeal cases; most from *Juntos por el Perú* on procedural grounds and from *Fuerza Popular* due to insufficient evidence. The untimely and inappropriate nature of petitions, in the EU EOM's view, amounted to an abuse of the electoral dispute system and its safeguards.

In both rounds, the candidates Rafael López-Aliaga and Roberto Sánchez, respectively – resorted to unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, convening public protests which they addressed with polarising narratives claiming a lack of respect for, and discrimination against, their respective electorates by state institutions. Such practices have a deleterious effect on public trust in democratic institutions and on the wider electorate's perception of the legitimacy of those elected.

The EU EOM identified shortcomings which merit attention to improve future electoral processes in Peru. The following priority recommendations are offered for consideration and action to the Congress of the Republic, Government, electoral authorities, political parties, and civil society. A detailed table of recommendations can be found in the final chapter of this report.

1. *Review the legal framework to remove inconsistencies, duplication, and unenforceable provisions, to optimise deadlines and consolidate all electoral legislation into an electoral code and an electoral procedural code.*
2. *Prevent staff shortages and resignations by increasing the ONPE's resources to recruit, train, and adequately remunerate temporary staff at national and subnational levels.*
3. *Call on the competent authorities to promptly condemn and take action to halt instances of hate speech, threats of violence, incitements to violence, and intolerant rhetoric in the electoral discourse.*
4. *Ensure the effective protection of journalists against attacks, threats, and intimidation through the prompt and effective investigation of all attacks against media professionals, including by addressing rhetoric by public figures and candidates that may incite hostility toward media professionals.*
5. *Extend digital tools to prevent minor inconsistencies in results protocols, handle the protocols more efficiently, improve traceability, and reduce delays in announcing final results.*
6. *Simplify the closing procedures and reduce the number of copies of results protocols provided for in the Election Law, to lighten the workload of poll workers and reduce the number of protocols flagged with inconsistencies.*

2. INTRODUCTION

At the invitation of the Government of Peru and the *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* (JNE), the European Union deployed an Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to monitor the 12 April general elections and the 7 June presidential run-off. The mandate of the EU EOM was to assess the conduct of the electoral process in accordance with Peru's national and international commitments for democratic elections.

The mission was led by Chief Observer Annalisa Corrado, a Member of the European Parliament, and was composed of 10 election experts, 50 Long-Term Observers, and 50 Short-Term Observers. On both election days, the mission was supported with the election-day participation of Locally-recruited Short-Term Observers from EU Member States' diplomatic missions and the Delegation of

the EU to Peru. A delegation of seven Members of the European Parliament joined the mission for the first-round and a delegation of six Members for the run-off. Altogether, the EU EOM deployed 150 accredited observers from the 27 Member States as well as Canada, Norway, and Switzerland over both rounds; half of the mission members were women.

The EU sent election observation and expert missions to Peru in 2001, 2011, 2016, 2020, and 2021, as well as Election Follow-up Missions in 2017 and 2024.

3. POLITICAL CONTEXT

The general elections were held against a backdrop of prolonged political crisis and compounding loss of public trust in state institutions.

The general elections took place amid a profound political crisis, characterised by the polarisation and fragmentation of the political system, and clientelism of the political elite. The incumbent José María Balcázar was the fourth president since Pedro Castillo's election in 2021. Castillo was arrested on rebellion charges after attempting to dissolve Congress in December 2022. His successors as President, Vice-President Dina Boluarte and President of Congress José Jerí, maintained tentative congressional support through political bargaining. Nonetheless, the Congress's prerogative to remove the president enabled deposal of Boluarte and Jerí when politically convenient, on the grounds of corruption and moral misconduct, highlighting the power imbalance between the Executive and the Congress.

The outgoing Congress adopted controversial laws that introduced additional procedural requirements, making it more difficult for police and prosecutors to investigate certain crimes and for courts to seize assets thought to be linked to criminal activity. It also introduced the amnesty law benefiting those prosecuted for human rights violations committed during the internal armed conflict (1980-2000) and enacted the return to a bicameral legislature, despite the 90.5 per cent vote against the re-introduction of the second chamber of the parliament in a 2018 referendum. Following the 2026 elections, the incoming president will face a Senate that they cannot dissolve, and which has the power to impeach. *Fuerza Popular*, *Alianza para el Progreso*, and *Perú Libre* constituted the political core that promoted these legislative changes, some of which may affect the political system of checks and balances.

The political manoeuvrings and adoption of controversial legislative initiatives greatly diminished public trust in state institutions and the political class. According to the Institute of Peruvian Studies, ahead of the 2026 polls only seven per cent of Peruvians expressed confidence in the Congress, and over 80 per cent declared little or no trust in political parties.

An unprecedented number of presidential tickets (35) and political organisations (37) competed in the elections, offering voters an ample choice, ranging from socialist and statist programmes of governance to neoliberal and ultra-conservative platforms. The fact that two-thirds of the competing political parties were created since the 2021 polls underscored the lack of consolidation and stability in the political party system.

Many EU EOM interlocutors underlined voters' apathy and their sense of disconnection from the government. For weeks ahead of the first-round, the pre-electoral opinion polls indicated that over 20 per cent of voters intended to cast a blank or invalid vote. Keiko Fujimori, the leader of *Fuerza Popular* and Rafael López-Aliaga, former mayor of Lima and leader of *Renovación Popular*, were the frontrunners in the polls, whereas the remaining presidential candidates enjoyed less than six per cent of support each, with their ratings fluctuating marginally for circumstantial reasons. Roberto Sánchez from *Juntos por el Perú*, Jorge Nieto from *Partido del Buen Gobierno*, and Ricardo Belmont from the *Partido Cívico OBRAS* gained traction only in the final stretch to the 12 April elections.

Illicit economic activities, such as illegal mining, illegal logging, and drug trafficking, represent some three per cent of the country's GDP.¹ The influence of these informal and illegal economies on politics and state institutions was raised by some EU EOM interlocutors, who claimed that persons closely related to and emanating from the illegal sector presented themselves as congressional candidates. Many of the candidates had pending legal charges or records of criminal convictions. Over 150 candidates from 35 of the 37 competing political organisations had convictions for, *inter alia*, corruption, homicide, robbery, smuggling, and falsification of documents. Out of 91 sitting members of parliament who sought re-election, 55 were facing charges of embezzlement and corruption.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF 2021 EU RECOMMENDATIONS

Many past EU recommendations were fully or partially implemented, while key recommendations including decriminalisation of libel remained unaddressed.

The 2021 EU EEM for the general elections issued 15 recommendations to improve future elections. Of these, four were fully implemented: To avoid the cancellation of a political organisation despite it having elected representatives to Congress, the Law on Political Organisations was amended to specify that a political organisation is cancelled if it is unable to take up seats in either of the chambers (recommendation No. 1). To increase the accuracy of the voter register, it now closes 180 days ahead of election day instead of the previous one year (recommendation No. 4). Candidate registration requirements were eased to prioritise the right to stand over formalities on the information required (recommendation No. 5). To reduce misleading political party advertising and disinformation in social media, the legal provisions on the content of ONPE-funded campaign spots now apply to party spots in social media (recommendation No. 9).

A further five recommendations were partially implemented. To build capacities for prospective JEE members, the JNE launched a training programme in Election Law and procedures for judges and prosecutors and is considering the use of an artificial intelligence tool for drafting JEE resolutions (recommendation No. 2). The Honour Tribunal was established, issuing press releases aimed at encouraging compliance with an Electoral Ethical Pact (recommendation No. 3). The electoral bodies were active with fact-checking initiatives and debunking disinformation, while civil society struggled to do the same due to a lack of funding (recommendation No. 10). The election law was amended to implement ballot reconciliation procedures, but stops short of requiring poll workers to undertake a count of received ballots before the commencement of voting (recommendation No. 14). To speed up the adjudication of results protocols flagged with inconsistencies (*actas observadas*) and the publication of results, two new regulations in relation to *actas observadas* and recounts were introduced (recommendation No. 15).

Action or activity is ongoing to address three recommendations, but implementation has not yet been confirmed. ONPE updated its regulation for the Law on Political Organisations, adding that part of public funding should be used to carry out activities which contribute to women's effective inclusion in political life (recommendation No. 11). One tentative measure was introduced to address the lack of inclusion of indigenous peoples in the country's political life, namely to exempt electoral charges for those coming from impoverished parts of the country (recommendation No. 12). Virtual proceedings have facilitated procedures for the automatic reversal of legal prohibitions on the right to vote for persons with disabilities (recommendation No. 13).

Some key recommendations remained unaddressed, including clearly indicating the authorship of third-party campaign messages as well as their sources of financing and links with the campaigns of political parties and candidates (recommendation No. 6). There are still prison sentences for libel offences in the media, and in fact there have been attempts to increase prison time (recommendation

¹ Escuela de Gestión Pública de la Universidad del Pacífico, [Indicadores para entender las economías ilegales en el Perú](#), November 2024.

No. 7). There are no signs of initiatives to enforce journalist ethics codes in terms of the private media's biased information coverage (recommendation No. 8).

Most of these issues are reflected in the current set of recommendations at the end of this report.

5. ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Coherence of the legal framework has been undermined by constant partial legislative changes, which have led to duplications and inconsistencies between provisions and deadlines.

5.1 Electoral system

The general elections determined the president and two vice-presidents, 130 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 60 senators, and five representatives to the Andean Parliament, all for a five-year term. For the presidential election, as no candidate obtained more than 50 per cent of the valid votes, a second round was held on 7 June between the two leading candidates. The legislative elections saw the return of a bicameral system, which was abandoned in 1993 but reinstated under a 2024 constitutional reform passed by Congress. The 130 seats of the Chamber of Deputies were allocated proportionally in 27 constituencies, while half of the senators were elected in a national constituency. The other half was distributed as follows: one for each of the departments, one for the province of Lima, one for the Constitutional Province of Callao, one for Peruvians living abroad, and four for Lima. Andean Parliament representatives were elected in a single national constituency.

To qualify for seat allocation, parties must obtain at least five per cent of the valid votes, as well as a minimum of five per cent of the seats in the relevant chamber (three seats in the Senate and seven seats in the Chamber of Deputies). Prior to the electoral reform of January 2025 (Law No. 32245), the threshold could be met by achieving either five per cent of the vote or five per cent of the seats.

5.2 Legal framework

Peru has ratified the main international and regional treaties on democratic elections, which according to the Constitution are incorporated in the national legislation. A significant 2024 constitutional reform reintroduced a bicameral system, whereby the Senate is not subject to dissolution by the President, but the President is subject to removal on the grounds of moral incapacity, if agreed by the Congress. This configuration undermines the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches. As for the judiciary, in March 2026, the [Venice Commission](#), to which Peru is a state party and full member, highlighted the urgent need for legislative reforms. Two months later, the [Supreme Court](#) appealed to State institutions to respect and protect judicial independence. In recent years, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has noted interference by the legislative branch in other branches of the State and expressed concern regarding the legislative activity of Congress and the approval of laws that restrict access to justice.² At the same time, Peruvians' perception of corruption has increased significantly, with a regression across indicators of democratic governance such as representation and Rule of Law.³

In addition to the Constitution, the electoral legal framework is governed by a wide collection of laws and regulations (*see Annex A*). Since 2021, the legislature has pursued a pendulum-like approach, repeatedly introducing and reversing recent reforms, with significant implications for the configuration of the political system and the electoral framework. Among others, recent reforms included amendments to allow Congress members to stand for immediate re-election, the introduction of a single ballot paper (*cédula*) requirement regardless of the number of elections being held concurrently, the possibility of running for both presidential and legislative elections at the same time, the repeal of the system of open, simultaneous, and compulsory primaries for all parties (which would

² The IACHR refers to, *inter alia*, the law on crimes against humanity (2024) and the reform of the law governing the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI Law, in 2025).

³ [Proética](#) – Corruption Perceptions Index. The [perception of corruption in the country](#) increased from 23.8 per cent in 2010 to 52.4 per cent in 2024. The [Global State of Democracy](#) (Idea, 2025).

have had the effect of significantly reducing the number of parties and presidential tickets competing on election day), and the incorporation of vote recounts when results protocols are flagged with inconsistencies (*actas observadas*) and cannot be resolved by other means.

Uncertainties were identified regarding the interpretation of some newly introduced provisions, such as those relating to the practical application of the criteria for access to seat allocation for deputies and senators (the so-called “double threshold”). Several inconsistencies persist in the legal framework that so far, have not had a major impact, but are potentially problematic. Among others, there is a discrepancy regarding the annulment of elections on quantitative grounds, whereby the JNE declares the annulment when invalid or blank votes, taken together or separately, exceed two-thirds of the number of votes cast (Article 184 of the Constitution), whilst the Election Law refers to the same threshold but in relation to valid votes (Articles 364 and 365). There are discrepancies between the Election Law and the Criminal Code which provide different penalties for the same offences.⁴ Combined, these factors contribute to undermining legal certainty.

During this electoral process, the JNE had to take two exceptional and unprecedented decisions. On 12 April, it extended the deadline for setting up polling stations from 12:00 to 14:00 and the voting hours from 17:00 to 18:00. On the same day, it authorised for voting to take place on 13 April in 13 polling centres in Lima. These decisions were based on principles such as the right to participation and the preservation of the vote. According to the Constitution, the JNE Plenary is required to make a conscientious assessment of the facts (*criterio de conciencia*), which affords a broader margin of discretion beyond a strictly formalistic legal approach.

Furthermore, the JNE adopted other *ad hoc* decisions to ensure timely adjudication of results. These were motivated by the practical impossibility to comply simultaneously with all the established legal and regulatory procedures to resolve the high number of *actas observadas* from the 12 April elections within the prescribed electoral timeframes, and also within the constitutional deadlines for those newly-elected to take office on 28 July. One such resolution repealed the need to conduct ballot recounts to resolve inconsistencies arising from the counting of preferential votes and introduced new deadlines for *Jurados Electorales Especiales* (JEEs) to conduct recount hearings. Another resolution imposed a deadline for JEEs to announce presidential results. Most of the JEEs interviewed welcomed the decision to cancel the recounts of protocols with inconsistencies based on preferential votes, which were mostly resolved through cross-checking of the various copies of results protocols. In conclusion, the JNE assumed an *in extremis* legislative role during the electoral process, which it justified by the need to respect the constitutional deadlines. However, this may have undermined the principle of legal certainty and the provision that the electoral legal framework cannot be altered during the one-year period ahead of elections.

Finally, the fragmentation of the legal framework hinders understanding of the electoral *corpus iuris* (body of law), which contains unnecessary duplications. Both the JNE and the ONPE published an electoral compendium for the 2026 elections and established regulations on the same matters and these contained duplications, such as those relating to the primary elections of political organisations or to the recounting of votes.

Recommendation: Review the legal framework to remove inconsistencies, duplications, and unenforceable provisions, to optimise deadlines and consolidate all electoral legislation into an electoral code and an electoral procedural code.

Originally due to end on 15 June 2026, Congress extended the duration of its last ordinary Session until 24 June 2026.⁵ During the last plenary session, another so-called impunity law, promoted by

⁴ For several electoral offences, the penalty provided for in the Criminal Code is higher than that provided for in the Election Law (articles 355, 357 and 359/Criminal Code and 382, 383, 384, 386/Election Law).

⁵ The extension was based on article 49 of the Rules of Procedure of Congress (adopted in November 2025), which empowers the Presidency to extend the duration of ordinary legislatures without further control.

Fuerza Popular, was passed.⁶ The National Human Rights Coordination Body, an umbrella group for NGOs and CSOs engaged on human rights issues, emphasised that the law guarantees ‘greater scope for impunity in relation to serious offences committed by state officials.’

Setting a perilous precedent, another law approved on 15 June, reduced the mandatory participation requirement for political parties in regional elections from 50 per cent to 30 per cent, in order to prevent the cancellation of their legal registration. This amendment to the Law on Political Organisations, promoted by *Fuerza Popular*, would directly benefit this party as well as the *Partido Cívico OBRAS*, according to information on candidates’ registration for the regional and municipal elections in October 2026. The law, that came into force on the day following its publication, also exempted the Election Law principle that electoral provisions must not be amended during the one-year period prior to elections (principle of intangibility).

6. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

The 12 April logistical failure damaged the public image of the electoral bodies and overshadowed an otherwise well-run electoral process.

6.1 Structure and composition of the Electoral Administration

The general elections were administered by three permanent institutions, which together form the Peruvian electoral management system: the *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* (JNE), the *Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales* (ONPE), and the *Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil* (RENIEC). Under the Constitution, the three institutions are autonomous and coordinate among each other in accordance with their respective mandates.

The JNE is responsible for administering electoral justice, overseeing the legality of the electoral process (*fiscalización*), and registering political parties and candidates. It is headed by a plenary of five members serving a four-year mandate, elected respectively by the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Bar Association of Lima, and the deans of the Faculties of Law from the public and private universities. The member elected by the Supreme Court is automatically the JNE President. Roberto Burneo was sworn in as President in November 2024.

The ONPE is the body that organises and implements the elections. Its Chief is appointed by the *Junta Nacional de Justicia* (JNJ) for a renewable four-year mandate, following an open and public competition. Piero Corvetto was appointed ONPE Chief in 2020 and reappointed in 2024. The logistical problems of 12 April, that resulted in the late or non-opening of polling stations in parts of Lima, and the subsequent political pressure on the institution, led to his resignation. In accordance with the legal provisions, managing director Bernardo Pachas took over as acting Chief, whilst on 27 April, the JNJ launched the process to select a new ONPE Chief.

The RENIEC is in charge of the civil register and the voter register, as well as issuance of identity documents (*see Voter Registration*). The RENIEC Chief is appointed through the same procedure as the ONPE Chief; Carmen Velarde was re-appointed for a second term at the head of RENIEC in 2024.

While RENIEC has permanent offices throughout the country, both JNE and ONPE set up decentralised temporary bodies for each electoral process. Between April and November 2025, 60 *Jurados Electorales Especiales* (JEE) were set up to handle candidate registration, monitor the campaign, resolve results protocols flagged with inconsistencies, and conduct recounts. ONPE

⁶ On April 2026, the Public Prosecutor’s Office stated the law proposal as ‘unfeasible,’ as to rule solely in favour of military and police jurisdiction ‘*undermines the independence in the exercise of judicial functions*’ as guaranteed by the Constitution. Before, in July 2025, the Ministry of Justice also declared about the ambiguity surrounding the definition of ‘*offences during duty*.’

increased the number of its decentralised offices (*Oficinas Descentralizadas de Procesos Electorales* – ODPE) from 60 (2021) to 126 (2026) due to the increased complexity of these general elections.

At the lowest level of the election administration, ONPE set up 92,766 polling stations, with poll workers drawn from the voter list of the respective polling station.⁷ Citizens who performed poll worker duties on election day received a financial compensation (PEN 165, EUR 41) as well as one day of paid leave for those who underwent training; those who failed to turn up on election day were fined PEN 275 (EUR 68).

6.2 Decision-making and public communication

Following the call for elections on 26 March 2025, an inter-institutional coordination committee was set up, as required by law. At the committee's weekly meetings, technical staff from JNE, ONPE, and RENIEC exchanged information on the preparations of the elections. Coordination within this committee functioned reasonably well until election day. However, in the aftermath of the logistical failure of 12 April, the JNE sought to disassociate itself from ONPE and assume a lead role within the electoral management system, which some interlocutors saw as the JNE exceeding its constitutional mandate. The public rift between the JNE President and the ONPE Chief led to a deterioration in relations between the two institutions. Following the resignation of the ONPE Chief, and ahead of the run-off, the heads of JNE and ONPE sought to present an image of unity and once again appeared together in public. Across the rest of the country, where the elections on 12 April had proceeded normally, relations between ODPEs and JEEs were observed to be cooperative and unaffected by the tensions at the national level.

Overall, JNE, ONPE, and RENIEC operated with experienced, professional and competent staff. The EU EOM encountered a high degree of openness and transparency and was granted full access to information, even if, in the case of the JNE, information was often provided late. JNE decisions were often made public through press statements or social media posts, with the corresponding resolutions only being published several days later. As for ONPE, public communication was generally adequate, with informative sessions organised for political parties ahead of election day. However, it was poor in the context of the logistical problems in Lima on 12 April, during which ONPE barely communicated due to internal information gathering difficulties. This lack of an official and proactive communication further fuelled disinformation. Ahead of the run-off, both ONPE and the JNE stepped up their public communications through press statements, interviews, and social media activities.

Even before the 12 April logistical failure, public confidence in the election administration had been low,⁸ mainly because of unsubstantiated narratives of fraud in past elections, as well as smear campaigns and threats made by individual candidates in this electoral process. This mistrust increased strongly after 12 April, with various media and most political actors framing the logistical shortcomings as intentional manipulation by the election administration.

In the weeks following 12 April, JNE and ONPE were under increased public and political pressure. The JNE at times appeared to acquiesce to demands from *Renovación Popular*, even if they were made outside of legal channels (*see Electoral Disputes*). As for ONPE, in addition to the Public Prosecutor's investigations into the logistical failure, the institution faced numerous inquiries by other State entities (such as the JNJ, the Comptroller's Office, and the Office of the Attorney General) as well as Congressional hearings. These investigations and inquiries tied up considerable resources and placed an additional burden on ONPE staff who were working under a strict timetable to organise the

⁷ ONPE first selected 25 citizens from the 300 voters of each polling station, giving priority to those with the highest level of education, without disabilities, and who had not previously served as poll workers. Draws were then held to select three standing and six substitute poll workers for each polling station – three more substitutes than in previous processes to reduce the impact of no-shows. This strategy was successful, as only 2.5 per cent of polling stations had to resort to voters from the queue on 12 April, significantly fewer than the 18.9 per cent in the 2021 general elections.

⁸ A 2025 survey by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics found that public confidence in JNE and ONPE was low (12 and 15 per cent, respectively), while RENIEC reached 46 per cent. Similarly, according to a Datum poll from June 2025, 73 per cent of citizens did not trust the election administration.

run-off, as well as simultaneously preparing for the upcoming regional elections. Several interlocutors characterised this as interference in the election management system by other State institutions, resulting in a *de facto* expanded electoral management system.

6.3 Administration of the elections

Overall, the preparations for the general elections progressed well and in line with the electoral calendar. ONPE undertook various measures to manage the increased complexity of this electoral process, with five elections represented on one single ballot. The number of decentralised offices (ODPEs) was doubled, allowing the deployment of more staff and the set-up of additional results processing centres. The training period for temporary staff and poll workers was extended. ONPE developed high-quality training material, which was used via a virtual training platform, in-person training at district level, and two training days for poll workers. All in all, ONPE trained over half a million poll workers (over 80 per cent of them in-person), representing more trained poll workers than in any previous election. Both JNE and ONPE undertook extensive voter education and information campaigns, both online (*see Social Media Monitoring*) and on the ground. Although ONPE reached over 8.4 million voters through its in-person activities, it was sometimes challenged in reaching remote populations (*see Participation of Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian Peoples*).

ONPE recruited around 36,000 temporary staff, notably polling station and voting centre coordinators. These played a key role in ensuring election day operations and supporting poll workers. However, ONPE struggled to fill all positions, particularly in Lima, as several institutions were recruiting staff for the same period. ONPE also faced a high number of resignations and staff turnover, which particularly affected positions with short-term contracts and a heavy workload.

Recommendation: Prevent staff shortages and resignations by increasing ONPE's resources to recruit, train and adequately remunerate temporary staff at national and subnational levels.

Voting centre premises were identified by ONPE in September 2025, after which voters could select their three preferred voting centres via an app. After ONPE assigned voters to voting centres, some 200 centres (out of some 10,300) had to be reallocated because of infrastructural damage or because the owners of private schools and universities refused to make their premises available. Ahead of the run-off, ONPE again had to relocate 44 voting centres, partly on the recommendation of the security forces. The limited legal power of ONPE to designate suitable premises also impacted other activities, including training days for poll workers and mock tests for election technologies. On 15 May 2026, an amendment to the Election Law was adopted that obliges building owners to make their premises available if requested, and that gives ONPE sanctioning power in case of non-compliance.

In line with a previous EU EOM recommendation, ONPE made efforts to bring voting centres closer to voters in remote areas. The number of polling stations in villages (*centros poblados*) outside of the district capital was increased from 3,097 in 2021 to 4,703 in 2026. These so-called “mesas 900,000” (according to their serial codes) were the object of a disinformation campaign, as Rafael López-Aliaga falsely claimed that ONPE had no legal basis to set up these polling stations and that these voters had been added illegally to the voter register.

For the first time, the JNE established inter-institutional commissions for the prevention of electoral conflicts, at the national as well as regional level. These commissions brought together representatives of the three electoral bodies, the Public Prosecutor's Office, security forces, and other electoral actors, thereby strengthening coordination and the exchange of information at the local level. The effectiveness of inter-institutional cooperation was observed during the deployment of election material for the run-off when roadblocks and adverse weather conditions had to be overcome.

JNE supervisors monitored all stages of ONPE's preparations as well as election day operations, reporting their findings to the relevant department within the JNE. In the first round, their reporting system appeared to be inconsistent and did not allow for rapid actions to be taken in case of incidents, such as the delays in the distribution of election material in Lima. For the second round, the JNE improved its reporting system, and the data gathered by the supervisors was displayed on a dashboard,

although the information was published with a delay and therefore appeared to contradict the figures published by the ONPE.

7. Election technologies

Logistical failures affected the first-round rollout of insufficiently stress-tested innovations, but results integrity was not compromised. Lessons learned drove improvements in the run-off.

In a bid to accelerate the publication of results, minimise human error, and improve transparency and traceability, ONPE introduced an ambitious set of technological innovations at virtually every stage of the electoral process.

A new Electoral Computing System (SCE) was developed in-house with improved recovery mechanisms and artificial intelligence as a support tool to digitise forms in computing centres. The Vote Counting Support System (STAE), previously used on a small scale to reduce arithmetic errors during counting, was expanded to all polling stations in Lima and Callao (almost a third of the national total) with new digital signing aimed at reducing errors related to missing signatures. The results publication website (PR) was completely redesigned to display results and fully traceable protocol images in real time, with privileged access for political parties and observers to download data in exploitable form for their own analysis. Digital voting for overseas voters and members of the security forces was suspended in late December following a JNE ruling.

All three core systems, STAE, SCE, and PR, had been subject to an independent IT security audit procured through a competitive public tender, carried out by M&T Corporation del Perú S.A.C. and covering the full development cycle, source code review, vulnerability and penetration testing, and compliance with international standards. However, its conclusions were only made public on 30 April, more than two weeks after the first-round. The JNE had also fully reviewed the source code with reportedly no critical findings, but its conclusions had not been published at the time of writing, including those of an announced international expert committee assessment. The audit's tight timeline coincided with a ballot of exceptional complexity, with five concurrent contests and twice the number of candidates as in previous elections. This left no time to repeat full-scale load tests of the new systems as a whole under realistic election-day conditions.

Recommendation: Electoral authorities should ensure that technological solutions are fully audited well ahead of election day, both to identify and address risks in a timely manner and to support public confidence in the systems used.

Logistical delays in delivering the equipment meant that STAE kits, which were due to be configured at the polling stations the day before election day, could not be set up on time. This amplified printer failures, connectivity issues, and operator preparation problems. Ultimately 8.8 per cent of the planned stations (2,591 out of 29,266) reverted to the conventional system. The SCE also struggled with the volume of data transmission: publication of STAE results proceeded slower than expected, and by 14 April EU observers noted that local servers in Loreto (Maynas) and Lambayeque (Chiclayo) showed 546 and 1,428 more transmitted protocols respectively than were reflected on the national server, with the figures only converging several hours later. According to ONPE, this resulted from the simultaneous processing of results data and protocol images for both consolidation and publication on the results website, which overloaded the system.

The STAE-related delays and queues, highly visible in Lima, undermined confidence in the system as a whole and prompted calls for independent technical audits. This ultimately contributed to ONPE deciding to withdraw STAE altogether for the run-off. Yet, in those cases where it could be used, the STAE did have a clear positive effect on results quality: senatorial protocols processed through it were flagged with inconsistencies (*actas observadas*) less often than under the conventional system (12 per cent versus 23 for the National Senate, and 10 versus 17 for the Regional Senate). Despite nearly one in ten STAE stations reverting to the conventional system, its impact on the pace of publication remained significant: by the early hours of the day after the first-round election, 72.95 per

cent of presidential results protocols had been processed in Lima and 82.51 per cent in Callao, compared to just 14.7 per cent in the rest of the country. According to ONPE, the website withstood nine hours of cyberattacks (originating mainly from IP addresses located in the United States and Peru).

Ahead of the run-off, ONPE adjusted the computing system to prevent the overload seen during the simultaneous handling of results data and protocol images in April, and added system-generated digital signatures for all digitised conventional protocols. Despite a specific scanning solution having been developed and used for overseas protocols in the first round, it was not used for the run-off following a request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose officials had experienced implementation difficulties.

Nationwide simulation and full load tests were conducted simultaneously across all 126 computing centres on 31 May and 4 June, with party representatives and observers present. EU observers monitored the tests from 22 computing centres and the national headquarters, and gave a positive assessment of the results. The tests covered the full transmission workflow, including complete contingency tests at a randomly selected computing centre. A special monitoring room, the *Sala Multipropósito*, was available from one week before the election for observers and parties to review source code and monitor the systems.

For the run-off on 7 June, the system performed considerably more smoothly: 75 per cent of protocols had been processed by midnight on election day, rising to 95 per cent by mid-morning the following day, compared with markedly slower processing rates during the first-round. From that point, counting speed depended mainly on the progressive arrival of results protocols from remote regions and overseas, and on results protocols flagged with inconsistencies (*actas observadas*), which had to be physically delivered to JEEs and await corresponding physical copies of the JEE resolutions before being incorporated into the tabulation of results. This residual bottleneck illustrates the practical relevance of a longstanding EU EOM recommendation.

Recommendation: Extend digital tools to prevent minor inconsistencies in results protocols, handle the protocols more efficiently, improve traceability, and reduce delays in announcing final results.

Although its operational deployment during the first round generated significant controversy, the underlying logic of the original STAE, without the added complication of digitally signed polling station installation protocols, remains sound and could further reduce the volume of flagged results protocols in future elections. This is particularly true for contests prone to high error rates such as those for members of Congress. Implementing effective digital interoperability between the JNE and ONPE for the processing of results protocols with inconsistencies would be a further concrete step in this direction. This would improve consistency between the data published by each institution and thereby strengthen public confidence in the electoral process.

8. VOTER REGISTRATION

There was overall confidence in the accuracy of the voter register, and RENIEC took measures to counter disinformation and increase voter participation.

8.1 The right to vote

The Constitution grants the right to vote to Peruvian citizens aged 18 years or older on election day. Voting rights may be suspended by a court order, by an imprisonment sentence, or the deprivation of political rights. Voting is compulsory up to the age of 70, and not voting is subject to a fine that varies according to the economic strata of the voter's district.

Following a 2005 constitutional amendment, members of the Armed Forces and the National Police have the right to vote. For the 2026 elections, ONPE planned to introduce digital voting for security personnel on duty (and certain other categories of the electorate), but the project was suspended by

the JNE. An in-person voting alternative could not be implemented because the security forces could not provide ONPE with lists of their on-duty personnel in good time.

8.2 Voter registration

A total of 27,325,432 citizens were eligible to vote, representing an eight per cent increase over the 2021 general elections, including 2,518,576 first-time and 1.2 million overseas voters.⁹

The voter register was compiled by RENIEC on the basis of the ID card register (*Registro Único de Identificación de las Personas Naturales* – RUIPN), a database containing the data of all Peruvians with a National Identity Document (DNI). RENIEC estimates that 99.2 per cent of Peruvians have a DNI. The RUIPN was continuously updated through the exchange of information with other state institutions (such as the Judiciary or the Ministry of Health) and through updates made by citizens themselves in one of the 480 permanent RENIEC offices throughout the country.

In line with a previous EU EOM recommendation, the deadline for updates to the voter register, such as address changes, was brought forward by six months to 14 October 2025. RENIEC then published the initial voter lists (*Listas del Padrón Inicial* – LPI) during a five-day verification period, both online and in paper form in 439 districts without connectivity. Only a handful of complaints were filed along with 28 requests to remove deceased persons. RENIEC handed over the preliminary voter register to the JNE on 13 November, and the JNE approved it on 11 December.¹⁰ No major concerns were raised regarding the accuracy and inclusiveness of the voter register.

Despite operating under a substantial budget deficit (almost PEN 50 million, EUR 12.5 million), RENIEC undertook increased efforts to strengthen confidence in the voter register and counter disinformation. For the first time, RENIEC sent ONPE monthly updates of the voter register even after its closure, including lists of those deceased after 14 October, as well as those who changed their address or updated their photograph. ONPE distributed consolidated updates to polling stations on election day. In addition, RENIEC published detailed voter register statistics and analysis online. RENIEC also ran voter information campaigns focussing on voter register issues that had been the subject of disinformation in previous elections, as well as raising awareness on the importance of keeping one's own register up to date. As in previous elections, RENIEC resolved to allow voter identification with an expired ID card to facilitate participation.

9. REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES

There are no excessive or restrictive legal requirements to stand for office, but challenges remain regarding internal party democracy and the screening of candidates.

There are no excessive or restrictive legal requirements to run for the Presidency, Congress, or Andean Parliament. However, the requirement for certain public officials to resign in order to stand – while incumbent members of Congress seeking re-election are exempt – may affect equality of conditions in the exercise of the right to stand for office. In line with previous EU recommendations, the grounds for excluding candidates due to omissions in their CVs have been reduced.

Prior to candidate registration, political organisations are required to hold primary elections to determine the ordering on the lists for the general elections. Independent candidacies are not permitted. Of the three types of primaries, practically all parties opted to select delegates who then decided on the list of candidates, which favoured party control.¹¹ Moreover, the provision allowing

⁹ First-round voting was held in 68 countries and run-off voting in 73 countries, including several in the Middle East where the general elections could not be organised due to the ongoing conflict in the region.

¹⁰ In the same resolution (No. 0744-2025-JNE) by which it approved the voter register, the JNE instructed RENIEC to remove from the voter register eight citizens who had been barred from holding public office by Congress pursuant to article 100 of the Constitution, even though that article limits the scope of the penalty to the exercise of public office and that the Election Law restricts the scope of disqualification to the right to stand for election and not to the right to vote.

¹¹ The election of delegates by political party members took place on 30 November. The delegates selected the candidates for the lists on 7 December.

up to 20 per cent of congressional candidates to be directly appointed by the party may adversely affect the quality of internal party democracy.

The JNE annulled the entirety of *Acción Popular*'s primary elections, ruling on complaints filed by rival factions within the party. In line with the principles of preclusion and equal treatment of all political organisations, *Acción Popular* could not repeat its primary elections. However, the decision was adopted with two dissenting opinions, which argued that the challenges should not have been adjudicated by the JNE at that stage. Instead, they maintained that in accordance with the Election Law and the Regulations governing the JNE's jurisdiction over primary elections, the matter should have been addressed by the corresponding JEE during the candidate registration process. *Acción Popular*'s consequent failure to participate in national elections constitutes grounds for dissolution of the political organisation.

The online candidate registration process was generally assessed positively by EU EOM interlocutors, with no major issues reported apart from a technical glitch shortly before the deadline, which prompted the JNE to extend the process by a few hours. Citizens were able to challenge candidates' registrations by reporting omissions or inaccuracies in the candidates' public sworn statements (*inter alia*, academic qualifications, court rulings). Following the period for appealing JEE decisions to the JNE, there was still the possibility of candidate exclusion if a prison sentence was subsequently confirmed.¹²

On 14 March, 1,772 of the 1,900 lists registered with the 60 JEEs were definitively approved, confirming 7,484 candidates. All candidate lists for the presidential tickets were registered, along with 857 lists for deputies (94 per cent of applications), 811 for multi-district senators (92 per cent), 35 lists for national district senators (92 per cent), and 33 lists for the Andean Parliament (100 per cent).

Political organisations are not responsible for the quality and accuracy of the data provided by the candidates in their CV. This weakens the accountability link between candidates and their own parties. JEEs pointed out that candidate screening was made difficult due to limited interoperability with the judiciary. A total of 119 JNE monitors (*fiscalizadores de hoja de vida*) reviewed candidates' compliance with CV requirements until end of March, following the initial verification carried out by the JEE and the three days period for lodging objections.

According to data from the JNE platform (which does not allow for a comprehensive statistical analysis in this regard), a total of 2,540 cases relating to fines for CV-related offences (omissions, falsifications) were recorded. At the closing date of this report, more than half of the cases had been resolved by the JEEs or the JNE on appeal. There also remained pending a significant number of cases involving candidates who had not even been elected.

Recommendation: Ensure that political organisations assume greater responsibility and oversight of the quality and accuracy of their candidates' profiles vis-à-vis the electorate, for example, by introducing joint liability in the event of omissions or erroneous information in the CVs of their proposed candidates.

10. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

The legal framework establishes two distinct campaign periods: the public campaign and the media campaign. The period when fundraising and spending on campaign events was allowed started with the 26 March 2025 call for elections. The publicly-funded campaign in the media, *franja electoral*, started 60 days before the first-round and only nine days before the run-off, six days later than envisioned by the regulatory framework, due to the delay in proclamation of the first-round

¹² 156 candidates had criminal records, including convictions for peculation, failure to provide family support or defamation, mostly from *Podemos Perú*, *Fuerza Popular*, *Perú Libre*, and *Alianza para el Progreso*. Source: Study carried out by the media outlet RPP using public data from the JNE.

presidential results. In both rounds, campaign events and *franja electoral* concluded with a 48-hour campaign silence period before election day.

The Law on Political Organisations provides the electoral campaign should be guided by the principles of legality, truthfulness, equality, and non-discrimination. In December 2025, under the auspices of the JNE, 29 of the 37 competing political organisations subscribed to the [Electoral Ethics Pact](#), committing themselves to observe democratic principles during the campaign, exercise their rights within the applicable legal framework, protect the integrity of the electoral process and recognise the election results. Notably, *Renovación Popular*, a parliamentary political party led by a frontrunner in these elections, Rafael López-Aliaga, was among the parties that did not subscribe to the Pact.¹³ The Honour Tribunal, embedded in the JNE, was the Pact's oversight body.

10.1 Electoral campaign – general elections, 12 April

An overall subdued campaign was punctuated by a few incidents of violence and the use of divisive language.

Most political parties launched their campaign as late as February, mainly due to political crises which occupied the political agenda, i.e. the third change of the country's president during the tenure of the outgoing Congress, when Jose Jerí was censured and replaced by José María Balcázar. The campaign was largely subdued, with interlocutors citing citizens' disillusionment and disengagement from politics, limited campaign funds, and a shift to online campaigning. Candidates reached out to voters via smaller meetings, billboards, murals, door-to-door campaigns, and caravans. Larger rallies were organised on occasions of presidential candidates' visits to the regions, with most not exceeding 300 participants. In the week ahead of the polls, the campaign gained momentum, with closing rallies of some candidates drawing over a thousand participants and in five cases over three thousand.

Campaign topics included corruption, organised crime, economy, education, healthcare, access to potable water, and issues of local importance (*see Annex B, Chart 1*). Nonetheless, it was difficult to discern clear differences between the plethora of plans of governance presented by the contestants. Given the complexity of the ballot, many political parties explained during the campaign events how to vote for them.

The overall peaceful campaign was punctuated by a few incidents of violence as well as discriminatory and divisive language. Rafael López-Aliaga's public discourse was by far the most polarising. While campaigning in Puno and Apurímac, opposition left-wing strongholds that voted heavily for Pedro Castillo in 2021, he was met with violent attacks and resorted to offensive and discriminatory speech. Moreover, López-Aliaga issued violent threats against adversaries, journalists, and the heads of JNE and ONPE. *Avanza País* used divisive and homophobic language. No state institution or civil society organisation condemned these instances of violent and discriminatory speech. The Honour Tribunal issued warnings to *Podemos Perú* candidates for their divisive, racist, and classist language, and called for a campaign environment free of violence and discrimination against women, but its pronouncements had little impact.

Community police (*rondas campesinas*) engaged in the electoral process, at times in violation of the law. In rural and mountainous provinces of Piura they banned all electoral campaigning, whereas in Puno they publicly whipped a government official for participating in a *Fuerza Popular* campaign event. In several regions, EU observers heard allegations that contestants resorted to vote-buying in the form of financial or in-kind incentives (Cajamarca, Huancavelica, Lima, Madre de Dios, Pasco, Piura, Tacna, Tumbes) and promises of scholarships (La Libertad) or election day transportation and meals (Ayacucho, Cusco).

¹³ Other political organisations that did not sign the Electoral Ethics Pact were: *Fe en el Perú*, *Frente de la Esperanza*, *Fuerza y Libertad*, *Partido Demócrata Unido Perú*, *Partido Patriótico del Perú*, *Perú Libre*, and *Un Camino Diferente*.

10.2 Electoral campaign – presidential run-off 7 June

A competitive but polarised campaign was affected by instances of discrimination and hostilities.

The run-off campaign period started a day after the first-round elections, but a technical tie between the second and third-placed candidates, Roberto Sánchez and Rafael López-Aliaga, required that candidates await the complete tabulation of results. Proclaimed only on 17 May, over a month after election day, the results confirmed a run-off between Keiko Fujimori, who obtained 17.19 per cent of valid votes, and Roberto Sánchez, who obtained 12.03 per cent. López-Aliaga placed third, only 21,209 votes behind Sánchez. The late proclamation of first-round election results necessitated shortening the publicly-funded electoral broadcast scheme (*franja electoral*) from the legally established 15 days to only 7 days.

Already starting the day of the first-round of voting and continuing throughout the five-week period up until proclamation of the presidential results, López-Aliaga pushed a narrative of electoral fraud and organised ‘Marches for Democracy’ that attracted on average some five thousand supporters. He called for supplementary elections in Lima (not foreseen under the legal framework for general elections), cancellation of votes from rural polling stations, and an international audit of the electoral process. López-Aliaga and his supporters continued using offensive and aggressive language towards the JNE and ONPE, as well as discriminatory speech towards the opposition electorate.

The run-off campaign got off to a slow start and although its intensity increased during the week preceding the election day, overall, it was more moderate than first-round campaigning. Roberto Sánchez was slightly disadvantaged in having to wait for the confirmation of his participation in the second-round, in comparison to Keiko Fujimori whose participation in the run-off was known from the outset. Fujimori ran a structured campaign, undertaken with larger resources and greater reliance on her party structure. Sánchez based his campaign on forging political alliances, and at times accepting the political support of controversial players, including Antauro Humala, the leader of an extreme nationalist movement based in the Andean south. The mostly calm campaign environment was punctuated by hostile attempts to disrupt Keiko Fujimori’s campaigning in Arequipa, Cusco, Huánuco, Junín, and Puno. Moreover, various political and civil movements organised anti-Keiko marches in the main urban centres of the country.

The presidential candidates campaigned on distinct programmes. Roberto Sánchez called for social development, fiscal reforms, incentives for small-scale informal and artisanal miners, and reduction of inequalities in access to housing, healthcare, and education. Keiko Fujimori emphasised security and stability, social programmes, a reform of public spending. Both candidates included in their campaigns the figures of former presidents; Keiko Fujimori recalled certain aspects of her father’s legacy whereas Roberto Sánchez followed in the footsteps of imprisoned former President Pedro Castillo, whom he promised to pardon if elected.

The campaign messages from both camps were often polarising, at times with the apparent aim to instil fear. Keiko Fujimori posited the vote for her opponent would favour chaos and a return to communism. Roberto Sánchez alleged that Fujimori’s victory would lead to the capture of the state by corrupt elites, perpetuation of social inequalities, and marginalisation of those in need. Both candidates ran intensive party agent recruitment efforts and framed their deployment as vote protection.

Overall, the campaign was competitive, and fundamental freedoms were respected. However, the language used in the campaign became more divisive in the run-off and instances of racism and discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and social class, were present in the narrative of both camps. Apart from the public calls of the Honor Tribunal to refrain from violence, racism, and other discriminatory postures (7 May), and calls from the Ombudsperson’s Office to respect the election institutions and democratic tolerance (15 May), the racist, discriminatory and divisive campaign

narratives remained largely unaddressed by the competent state authorities, contrary to Peru's international commitments.

Recommendation: Call on the competent authorities to promptly condemn and take action to halt instances of hate speech, threats of violence, incitements to violence, and intolerant rhetoric in the electoral discourse.

10.3 Campaign finance

The campaign finance disclosure revealed stark differences in financial capacities of political organisations. ONPE's prompt publication of interim campaign finance reports contributed to public oversight.

The Constitution provides that political parties can be financed through public and private sources. The Law on Political Organisations and ONPE regulations allow for both private and indirect public campaign funding. The latter, comprising campaign advertising in broadcast and social media (*franja electoral*), was available to all 37 political organisations participating in the general elections. The PEN 77.7 million (EUR 19.4 million) reserved for *franja electoral* was divided among political organisations partly in equal shares and partly in proportion to their representation in Congress. As such, indirect public funding ranged from PEN 7.5 million (EUR 1.95 million) to PEN 1.3 million (EUR 320,000) per political organisation. Many candidates claimed that disparities in access to public funds resulted in an unlevel playing field. For the run-off, the PEN 10.4 million (EUR 2.6 million) dedicated to *franja electoral* was divided equally between the two presidential candidates.

The Law on Political Organisations was amended in February 2025 to permit donations not only from citizens but also from private enterprises. Yet, the business sector demonstrated little interest in supporting electoral contestants. The legal limit for individual donations to political parties, and effectively to the presidential campaigns, was raised from 120 to 200 UIT (EUR 275,000).¹⁴ The individual donation ceiling for a parliamentary candidate is equivalent to EUR 69,000. Most political organisations reported incomes from donations coming primarily from their members and supporters, and from fundraising activities. Although some EU EOM interlocutors voiced concerns over alleged illicit financing in the campaign, these allegations were more frequently of a general character than concerning a particular political party or candidate.

While there is no ceiling for campaign expenditures, no direct correlation was observed between the invested resources and the obtained electoral results. The most costly campaign, run by *Alianza para el Progreso*, spent PEN 7.2 million (EUR 1.8 million) by mid-March and only brought its presidential candidate 1.15 per cent of the vote. More modest campaigns, run by newer political parties, such as *Ahora Nación* which spent PEN 191,000 (EUR 47,800) and *Partido del Buen Gobierno* which spent PEN 73,000 (EUR 18,000) by mid-March, produced much better results for their respective presidential candidates – 7.29 and 10.97 per cent respectively (see *Annex B, Chart 2*). Sixteen political organisations based their campaign almost solely on *franja electoral*, which constituted more than 80 per cent of funds committed to their respective campaigns.

Campaign expenses in the regions were covered nearly entirely by the candidates. Moreover, in almost half of the regions, EU observers were informed that the prospective candidates were required to pay the political organisation in order to be included in the candidates' lists. Such a financial burden can pose a barrier to candidacy for less affluent groups, such as women, representatives of indigenous communities, and persons with disabilities.

Political organisations and candidates must submit to ONPE, the oversight body for political party and campaign finance, interim and final campaign finance reports. Political parties and most of the candidates presented the interim reports, which covered the period from the announcement of the

¹⁴ UIT is the acronym for Basic Tax Unit. The 2026 reference value of the UIT is PEN 5,500 (approx. EUR 1,400).

elections to 13 March. ONPE was quick to publish these reports and present declared data in a user-friendly format on the dedicated online platform – [Claridad](#). Many candidates referred to ONPE's capacity building efforts and assistance in the reporting process. There is no interim reporting obligation for parties whose candidates pass to the second-round. The final campaign finance reports must be submitted by political organisations and candidates up to 15 working days after the official proclamation of results.

ONPE must determine the compliance of campaign finance reports with legal and accounting obligations and order the initiation of the administrative sanctioning procedure in case of a non-compliance within six months from the receipt of the reports. The ONPE Directorate for Supervision of Political Party Funding has 13 auditors (supported by 26 monitors) tasked with verifying the reports of political organisations. The Directorate informed EU EOM that, while its current human resources constitute the indispensable minimum required to fulfil the oversight duties, the key challenge in conducting the verification is the lack of cooperation from political organisations and candidates.¹⁵ The ONPE has a full one-year period to determine the existence of the infractions. The extended timeframes for campaign finance disclosure and audit do not contribute to a comprehensive public oversight.

Recommendation: Shorten the deadline for submission and audit of the final campaign finance reports to reinforce the public oversight of campaign finance.

The sanctions for violation of campaign finance provisions range from 5 to 100 UIT (PEN 27,500-550,000, EUR 6,875-137,500) and the loss of direct public funding in case of a failure to present reports or acceptance of donations from prohibited sources, including from persons convicted for engagement in illicit activity. Acceptance of funding from illegal sources and provision of false information on campaign incomes and expenses are criminal offences, subject to sentences of up to eight years imprisonment. On 13 May, the Public Prosecutor called for a 5-year prison sentence and a ban on holding public office for Roberto Sánchez for alleged crimes of false declaration in administrative proceedings and falsification of information on donations received by *Juntos por el Perú* during the 2020 and 2021 election campaigns. On 6 June, on the eve of the run-off, the Specialised Criminal Court of Lima formally charged Roberto Sánchez for the alleged violations of campaign finance provisions.

11. MEDIA

While state-owned media provided balanced and neutral coverage, biased coverage by most privately-owned national media outlets limited the diversity of information available to voters for making an informed choice.

11.1 Legal framework

The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, information, opinion, and the press, and prohibits censorship. However, the Penal Code provides for prison sentences of up to three years for defamation, a sanction that goes against international standards.¹⁶ While a draft law increasing this to five years has been archived, EU EOM interlocutors feared that such initiatives may be brought back on the Congressional agenda. At the same time, there were still open defamation cases against journalists, including an aggravated defamation suit filed in November 2024 by Rafael López-Aliaga against *La República* journalist Ángel Páez Salcedo.

¹⁵ The two-calendar-days deadline for candidates to provide missing documentation, as provided in the ONPE regulation on financing and supervision of party funds (N° 000030-2025-JN/ONPE, Art. 106.2), does not stem from the Law on Political Organisations and hence its non-observance is not subject to sanctions.

¹⁶ Article 132 of the Penal Code.

Recommendation: Replace prison sentence for libel offences with financial sanctions proportionate to the severity of the offence.

The main laws regulating media are the 2002 Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information and the 2004 Radio and Television Law. The Court of Transparency and Access to Information, a body assigned to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, adjudicates complaints and appeals on access to public information. Several EU EOM interlocutors reported that journalists' access to information is generally possible. However, they emphasised that conditions have deteriorated in recent years, with varying levels of accessibility across institutions. There is no media regulatory body, and the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTS) is the authority in charge of issuing and revoking broadcasting licenses. The Consultative Council of Radio and Television (CONCORTV), an advisory body attached to MTS, promotes good practices in radio and TV channels.

The Election Law does not include specific provisions on media coverage. It prohibits publication of opinion polls during the week before elections as well as state advertising from the call for elections. The Law on Political Organisations prohibits paid political advertising on television and radio.¹⁷ It also provides for a publicly funded electoral broadcast scheme administered by ONPE (*franja electoral*). For general elections, half of the broadcast time is equally distributed among all contestants, while the other half is allocated proportionally based on each party's representation in Congress, with non-parliamentary parties receiving the amount of the smallest party represented. For the first-round of elections, the law provides for 60 days of transmission of the *franja electoral*, up until two days prior to elections. There are no detailed provisions in the law regarding the *franja electoral* for run-off elections.¹⁸

11.2 Media environment

The media landscape in Peru is diverse with 8,283 broadcast media operating in 2026. Online media consumption is gradually overtaking traditional media, prompting mainstream outlets to expand their digital platforms, while radio remains the most widely accessible medium and continues to play an essential role, particularly outside of Lima and across the regions.¹⁹ Pluralism is affected by significant concentration and editorial polarisation which contributes to a decline in overall trust in news.²⁰

The *Grupo El Comercio* dominates the market promoting a conservative-liberal perspective, while *Grupo La República* offers a centre-left alternative and *RPP* is the leading radio and online news organisation. Recently, ownership changes affected television channels *Latina* and *Panamericana*, with the latter being marked by a controversial statement by the new owner, who expressed his intention to overhaul the editorial team and remove journalists he considers biased towards the left. In May 2026, the process began for the sale of more than 60 per cent of the shares of *Grupo El Comercio*, which owns 80 per cent of the most important private centre-right-leaning channels *América TV* and *Canal N*.

State media hold a significant presence through the National Institute of Radio and Television of Peru (including *TV Perú* and *Radio Nacional*) as well as the daily *El Peruano* and *Andina* news agency. While *TV Perú* broadcasts daily newscasts in Quechua and Aymara, some EU EOM interlocutors

¹⁷ Article 35 of the Constitution only allows political electoral advertising in broadcast media through public indirect financing (*franja electoral*). Article 36 (c) 6. of the Law on Political Organisations explicitly bans paid electoral advertising in television and radio.

¹⁸ Article 53.3 of the Regulation on the Financing and Oversight of Political Party Funds of the National Office of Electoral Processes (Resolution No. 000030-2025-JN/ONPE) provides for a 15-day broadcast period ending two days before the election day.

¹⁹ Internet penetration in 2026 was 82 per cent.

²⁰ According to the Reuters Institute's Digital News Report 2026, trust in news overall in Peru fell by eight percentage points compared to the previous report.

criticised a lack of decentralisation both in structure and programming and insufficient representation of the diversity of the country in its programming.

Peru faces a serious setback in freedom of expression ranking 144/180 in the RSF's 2026 World Press Freedom Index, down 14 points from 2025. Journalists face increasing threats, including verbal, physical, and digital attacks as well as judicial persecution, with 458 incidents recorded last year, including four murders. Although journalists were generally able to cover the campaign, they were often targeted, with over 60 incidents over this electoral period, including death threats, reported by the National Association of Journalists.²¹ These threats were echoed in social media, amplifying their effect.

EU EOM interlocutors indicated that the release in March 2026 of Daniel Urresti, convicted in 2023 for the 1988 murder of journalist Hugo Bustíos, has fuelled a climate of impunity. Despite condemnation by the IACHR and media watchdog organisations, Urresti actively participated in the campaign of *Podemos Perú*. EU EOM interlocutors also indicated that investigative journalism is limited by the APCI Law amendments that control foreign funding and provide for heavy sanctions. Five media outlets have initiated constitutional protection actions in response.

Recommendation: Ensure the effective protection of journalists against attacks, threats, and intimidation through the prompt and effective investigation of all attacks against media professionals, including by addressing rhetoric by public figures and candidates that may incite hostility toward media professionals.

11.3 Media and elections

National media offered extensive election campaign coverage, with media polarisation becoming more pronounced during the run-off period. Regional coverage was constrained by precarious financial conditions, with local media frequently charging for interviews or coverage, particularly during the first-round. This often left populations in radio-dependent areas with poor access to quality information. EU EOM observers reported frequent self-censorship in regional media.

In the first-round, the JNE organised a series of presidential debates broadcast on *TVPerú* that were generally well-structured and informative despite the large number of candidates. However, they often featured mutual accusations rather than substantive policy discussion. These confrontational exchanges were widely rebroadcast by other media outlets. During the run-off campaign, traditional media coverage focused primarily on the two presidential candidates and criticism of the electoral authorities, while some media also persisted with fraud narratives. The JNE-organised debates between both campaign's technical teams and the presidential candidates contributed to voters' right to an informed choice. *TVPerú* attempted to organise interviews between members of the technical teams; however, representatives of *Fuerza Popular* did not participate. In addition, neither candidate appeared for the agreed interview with *TVPerú*.

For the first round, the *franja electoral* was broadcast from 11 February to 9 April, in 380 different media outlets. Some 57 per cent went to TV, 32 per cent to radio, and 11 per cent to digital media, with similar shares between national and regional outlets. New rules allowing political parties to select both from a wide range of media outlets and from specific broadcast slots sparked controversy and investigation, as some parties allocated their *franja electoral* to party-affiliated outlets. Some interlocutors complained that the unequal distribution of the *franja electoral* favoured incumbent parties represented in the outgoing Congress, which already benefitted from direct public financing.

²¹ On 16 January 2026, during an interview on *Panamericana TV*, Rafael López-Aliaga threatened journalist Ángel Páez, stating he would "spare the life of every journalist, except Páez." On 2 April 2026, after López-Aliaga was attacked during a rally in Andahuaylas, *Renovación Popular* issued a statement accusing journalists Paul Pilco and Willy Contreras and the outlet *NTV* of inciting violence and announced plans to file criminal complaints against them.

País para Todos was the only party not to use the *franja electoral*, deeming the mechanism untransparent.

Following delayed publication of the first-round results, ONPE adopted a resolution to shorten the broadcast period of the *franja electoral* and set the corresponding budget for the run-off. The *franja electoral* was broadcast from 29 May to 4 June across 144 media outlets. While it was evenly distributed between local and national media, 72 per cent was allocated to television, 27 per cent to radio, and 1 per cent to digital media. While *Fuerza Popular* prioritised media with national coverage, *Juntos por el Perú* placed a larger share of its *franja electoral* in local media. In its current configuration, the *franja electoral* does not serve the citizens' right to information. It also risks fostering unethical relationships between media and political organisations, and contributes to polarisation.

Recommendation: Revise the provisions on franja electoral to promote citizens' informed choice by ensuring that participating media outlets provide information on all contestants and are selected to maximise reach across the electorate.

11.4 EU EOM media monitoring – general elections, 12 April

The EU EOM media monitoring unit assessed the entire campaign period. Quantitative and qualitative monitoring included a selection of major television channels, radio stations and newspapers.²² Media coverage was concentrated on the presidential race and focussed on the candidates leading in opinion polls. State-owned television provided extensive, balanced and neutral coverage of candidates (*see Annex C, Chart 3*). The private television outlets with the largest amount of electoral coverage showed more bias. In the combined data from all monitored private television channels, Rafael López-Aliaga and Keiko Fujimori received the most extensive coverage, largely neutral in tone and with the highest level of direct access. Other candidates received significantly less coverage. Among them, Carlos Álvarez's coverage was mostly neutral with considerable direct access, while César Acuña, Wolfgang Grozo, Alfonso López-Chau and Roberto Sánchez were more often covered negatively and had limited direct access (*see Annex C, Charts 4, 5, and 6*). Women candidates received 19 per cent of total TV channel coverage, compared with 81 per cent for men candidates (*see Annex C, Chart 2*). Monitored radio offered largely neutral coverage. Newspapers monitored by the EU EOM were mostly critical in tone.

11.5 EU EOM media monitoring – presidential run-off, 7 June

The EU EOM media monitoring revealed that state-owned media maintained neutral and balanced coverage (*see Annex C, Charts 9, 15 and 18*). Most privately-owned media showed a strong bias against Sánchez and *Juntos por el Perú*. *Willax TV* showed the strongest bias, allocating 45 per cent of airtime to *Juntos por el Perú*, out of which 75 per cent was negative in tone, and 23 per cent to *Fuerza Popular*, out of which 83 per cent was neutral and 6 per cent positive in tone (*see Annex C, Chart 10*). *Panamericana TV* dedicated 40 per cent to *Juntos por el Perú* (58 per cent negative in tone) and 26 per cent to *Fuerza Popular* (82 per cent neutral and 16 per cent positive in tone) (*see Annex C, Chart 11*). *América TV* and *Latina TV* dedicated similar amount of airtime to both, however, 36 per cent of *América TV*'s coverage of *Juntos por el Perú* was negative in tone, while *Latina TV* was more neutral in tone (*see Annex C, Charts 12 and 13*). *ATV* dedicated 50 per cent to *Juntos por el Perú* (48 per cent negative in tone) and 31 per cent to *Fuerza Popular* (92 per cent neutral and 5

²² EU EOM monitored the primetime broadcast (from 18 to 24 hours) of national TV channels *TVPerú* (state-owned), *América TV* (private), *Latina TV* (private), *ATV* (private), *Panamericana TV* (private), and *Willax TV* (private); radio stations (from 6 to 11 hours) *Radio Nacional* (state-owned), *RPP* (private), and *Radio Exitosa* (private); and the daily newspapers *El Peruano* (state-owned), *El Comercio* (private), *La República* (private), *Correo* (private), *Perú21* (private), and *Trome* (private). First-round monitoring was conducted from 11 March to 12 April, and run-off monitoring from 9 May until 7 June.

per cent positive in tone) (see *Annex C, Chart 14*). Women candidates received 39 per cent of total TV channel coverage, compared with 61 per cent for men candidates (see *Annex E, Chart 8*).

Monitored radio stations maintained a largely neutral tone and provided comparable coverage of both candidates (see *Annex C, Charts 15, 16 and 17*). Among newspapers, *Perú21*, *El Comercio*, *Correo*, and *Trome* devoted more than twice the coverage to Sánchez and *Juntos por el Perú* compared to coverage given to Fujimori and *Fuerza Popular*, largely with a negative tone, with *Perú21* showing the strongest bias, with over 70 per cent of its coverage of Sánchez and *Juntos por el Perú* being negative. (see *Annex C, Charts 19, 21, 22 and 23*). In contrast, *La República* gave comparable coverage to both candidates, yet 40 per cent of it was negative to Fujimori and *Fuerza Popular*, while its coverage of Sánchez and *Juntos por el Perú* was mostly neutral (see *Annex C, Chart 20*). The coverage across monitored media of Fujimori largely focused on campaign activities, and coverage of Sánchez was linked to concerns over alleged economic impact, his relationship with Antauro Humala, and alleged ties to illegal mining, investigations into party financing, terrorism, and also the arrest of a former *Juntos por el Perú* congressional candidate who was supposedly connected with a criminal extortion group.

12. SOCIAL MEDIA

Fraud narratives, attacks on institutions, and coordinated amplification shaped the online environment, while official candidate communication remained largely campaign focused.

12.1 Legal framework

Peruvian Election Law does not establish a dedicated framework for social media campaigning. However, since 2020, legislative and regulatory changes have incorporated digital platforms into rules on electoral propaganda, campaign finance, and responsibility for prohibited campaign conduct. In 2024, social media platforms were included in the *franja electoral*, allowing political organisations to access publicly funded advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. For the general elections, ONPE allocated PEN 8.7 million (EUR 2.2 million) to social media advertising, representing 11 per cent of the total *franja electoral*, distributed equally among the 38 participating political organisations. For the run-off, the social media allocation was reduced to PEN 88,000 (EUR 22,000), equivalent to 0.8 per cent of the total allotment, divided equally between the two contenders. However, most online campaign activity remained outside the *franja* framework, as direct paid political advertising is prohibited on radio and television, but permitted on social media, where it is subject mainly to campaign finance rules.

12.2 Social media environment

Peru's online environment is extensive yet shaped by a persistent digital divide. Around 80 per cent of the population had access to the internet, with penetration considerably higher in Lima and other urban centres than in rural communities, where it remained below 60 per cent. Connectivity is predominantly mobile, with phones far more common than computers in households, favouring campaign communication designed for mobile consumption such as short-form video formats.

Social media use was widespread, with around 88 per cent of internet users accessing these platforms. Facebook had the largest reach, with around 25 million users, followed by TikTok (19 million), YouTube (17 million), Instagram (11 million), and X (4 million). Platform preferences varied by audience, with TikTok and YouTube particularly relevant among younger users, including as sources of information and political content, while Facebook remained important among older audiences. X, despite its more limited reach, remained relevant for political actors, journalists, and highly-engaged users.

12.3 Social media and elections

Social media was a central space for campaign communication, voter information, and political debate, extending beyond official party and candidate accounts to include influencers, streamers,

alternative media pages, partisan accounts, and other actors operating primarily on social media. This contributed to a fragmented information environment in which political content circulated alongside entertainment, opinion, and unverified claims, increasing the visibility of polarising narratives and targeted attacks.

Political organisations and presidential tickets maintained uneven levels of presence across platforms, with the visibility of individual political figures often exceeding that of party structures. Election management bodies used social media extensively for voter information and institutional communication, with ONPE, JNE, and RENIEC active on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, and X. ONPE and JNE were also highly active in countering false claims related to the electoral process, publishing frequent debunks through their social media accounts. These efforts were complemented by a UNDP-supported initiative with seven Peruvian universities, which monitored digital discourse throughout the campaign period, including toxic communication, hate speech, and disinformation, and by fact-checking initiatives *PerúCheck* and the *OjoPúblico*-coordinated network *Ama Llulla*. Influencers and content creators were particularly visible on videocentric platforms such as TikTok and YouTube, expanding the reach of political content beyond official accounts while blurring the distinction between political commentary, campaign promotion, and paid or coordinated communication. Varying platform transparency created uneven conditions for monitoring political advertising and online campaign activity, reinforcing the need for clearer transparency mechanisms around content promoted outside official party channels.

Recommendation: Strengthen transparency of online campaign expenditure by requiring social media platforms to maintain publicly accessible information on paid or promoted electoral content, including sponsors and amounts spent.

12.4 EU EOM social media monitoring – general elections, 12 April

Analysis of the highest-engagement posts by candidates' and political parties' official accounts during the first-round campaign (see *Annex D, EU EOM Social Media Monitoring Methodology*) showed that their online communication was driven mainly by campaign promotion, with attacks and polarising content forming a significant secondary layer (see *Annex D, Digital Campaign*). The accounts generating the highest relative engagement were not necessarily those of candidates or parties leading in the polls, suggesting that online interaction was shaped less by electoral strength than by the ability to mobilise highly engaged digital audiences. This was visible in influencer collaborations on TikTok and Facebook, and in coordinated or inauthentic-looking activity, particularly on X, which amplified both supportive campaign messaging and hostile discourse. Campaign appearances, rallies, endorsements and direct appeals to voters dominated the most successful posts, while legislative candidates, issue-based content, and voter information received limited attention.

Around the televised debates, negative mentions increasingly targeted leading candidates, particularly Keiko Fujimori after the first debate and Rafael López-Aliaga after the second, with party accounts showing a clearer shift towards criticism and direct attacks on individual candidates. Polarising discourse in candidates' and parties' content emerged as the most prominent concern across platforms, particularly in content targeting political opponents. Offensive content was present but remained relatively stable, without clear viral peaks, and relied mainly on ideological labels rather than sustained attacks on specific individuals.

The broader online discourse around the first round was more volatile than candidates' and parties' official communication, with high-interaction content shaped by political actors, media, influencers, and ordinary users (see *Annex D, Electoral Discourse*). Before election day, ONPE and RENIEC were the most active institutional communicators, publishing extensively on polling locations, identity documents and practical voter information, while JNE had a more limited presence and focused on the presidential debates.

Fraud narratives, previously contained within politically aligned echo chambers, expanded sharply after election day, as online attention shifted towards ONPE and its Chief, Piero Corvetto (*see Annex D, Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour surrounding fraud narratives*). The discussion moved from procedural information and campaign activity towards election-day irregularities and claims of fraud. Real election-day logistical failures and technical aspects of the results process were combined with unsubstantiated or false claims, framing them as evidence of deliberate manipulation. This shift was reinforced in official accounts, with López-Aliaga emerging as the main individual driver of fraud narratives, while *Renovación Popular*, *Avanza País*, and *Fuerza Popular* directed converging criticism at electoral institutions. Overall, the first-round online environment moved rapidly from electoral campaigning to contestation of the results process, creating a basis for fraud narratives that continued into the run-off.

The use of paid online campaign tools added another layer of inequality to the first-round campaign. Parties used the publicly funded digital *franja* differently, with some maximising volume through lower-cost local and regional programmes, particularly in the Amazon region, while others bought fewer spots in more expensive national or high-profile programmes. Beyond the *franja*, Meta advertising was uneven and concentrated, with spending accelerating sharply in the final week. César Acuña led candidate spending on Meta overall, while José Luna dominated during the final month and in the last week of the campaign, including through affiliated organisations and third-party profiles. Third-party advertising was also visible through pro-Fujimori pages and pages attacking her rivals, raising concerns over the attribution and oversight of online campaign spending (*see Annex D, Political Advertising in Meta*).

12.5 EU EOM social media monitoring – presidential run-off, 7 June

During the run-off campaign, fraud narratives remained central to the online environment, sustained largely by the same networks that had challenged the first-round results. They were triggered and amplified primarily by Rafael López-Aliaga, whose accusations against ONPE and JNE, mobilisation in Lima on 14 May, and use of his own and *Renovación Popular*'s official accounts generated the highest peaks of fraud-related content. The narrative combined attacks on electoral institutions and officials with calls for mobilisation, while troll-like accounts on X amplified fraud claims, anti-left messaging, and attacks on both finalists. Although coordinated inauthentic activity declined in the final week, fraud-related content remained persistent across platforms and continued to frame the run-off as taking place under contested electoral legitimacy (*see Annex D, Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour surrounding fraud narratives*).

Recommendation: Strengthen voter education initiatives to improve citizens' digital literacy and their ability to critically assess election-related information and identify disinformation disseminated on social media platforms.

By contrast, the official accounts of the two run-off candidates focused mainly on campaign events and policy messaging. Their communication reflected political and ideological rivalry, but did not reproduce the institutional delegitimisation observed in the wider fraud discourse.

The broader high-interaction electoral conversation was more adversarial, with traditional and digital media helping shape a discourse in which Keiko Fujimori and Roberto Sánchez were frequent targets (*see Annex D, Electoral Discourse*). Discussion of the electoral process continued to dominate, keeping fraud narratives and attacks on electoral institutions visible. On TikTok, anti-campaign dynamics also shifted between rounds, with the first-round “*Por Estos No*” campaign declining and anti-left hashtags becoming more prominent during the run-off, increasingly targeting Roberto Sánchez and *Juntos por el Perú*. ONPE remained the main institutional target, while JNE content often became an arena for political confrontation in comment sections. RENIEC's interaction remained largely service-oriented.

Offensive and discriminatory discourse was comparatively limited in volume and concentrated mainly on X, with Roberto Sánchez receiving most attacks, primarily ideological, Keiko Fujimori facing more varied personal and racialised abuse, and Brígida Curo receiving fewer but more clearly racist and classist attacks (see *Annex D, Offensive content during the second round*). After election day, the conversation remained focused on alleged irregularities, while López-Aliaga and *Renovación Popular* continued to question the result and electoral bodies.

The use of paid online campaign tools remained uneven in the run-off. In the social media component of the *franja*, *Juntos por el Perú* bought significantly more spots, concentrated mainly in local digital programmes in the Amazon region, while *Fuerza Popular* used fewer but more diversified placements. On Meta platforms the balance shifted the other way, with official spending by Keiko Fujimori and *Fuerza Popular* concentrated in the final week and far exceeding that of Roberto Sánchez and *Juntos por el Perú*. The pro-Fujimori third-party advertising visible in the first-round became more pronounced during the run-off, with anti-campaign pages promoting Fujimori or attacking Sánchez, including some recently created pages that presented themselves as news outlets, and were administered in part from outside Peru, or repeatedly circulated similar content (*Annex D, Paid advertising in Meta*).

13. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

Setbacks in the parity law and the absence of measures for effective inclusion continue to limit women's participation in political life.

Peru accepted several recommendations on women's rights during the 2023 Universal Periodic Review, which advocated the adoption of regulatory frameworks guaranteeing gender equality and combating structural discrimination in all spheres of society. However, no significant progress has been introduced; rather, there were setbacks regarding the 2020 Law on Parity and Alternation, including removal of the gender alternation rule for presidential tickets and elimination of the requirement of horizontal gender parity in regional elections.

The prevailing view among EU EOM interlocutors was that women's political participation continues to be hindered by structural barriers, such as economic dependence, discrimination, sexism and gender inequalities, as well as the limited political priority given to women's inclusion. In addition, it was reported that political parties often complied with gender requirements only formally rather than in practice.

Only 4 of 35 tickets featured a woman as presidential candidate (*Fuerza Popular*, *Un Camino Diferente*, *Fuerza y Libertad*, and *Primero La Gente*), though all included at least one woman. Gender parity in top positions was not observed, as reflected by the fact that only 20 per cent of congressional lists were headed by women. The new Congress will have 16 women senators out of a total of 60 (27 per cent) and 54 women deputies out of a total of 130 (41 per cent). Women's representation in the outgoing Congress (38 per cent), was slightly higher than the incoming Congress (36 per cent). *Fuerza Popular*, *Juntos por el Perú*, and *Partido del Buen Gobierno* account for the vast majority of the 69 women who will sit in Congress.

Women candidates reported that, while the law requires that half of the public funding to political parties must be allocated to training activities under gender parity criteria, and ONPE regulations promote spending on women's inclusion, implementation of these provisions remained limited in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms.

Recommendation: Introduce effective and efficient mechanisms, to ensure that public funding for political parties is engaged in education, training and research activities that contribute to the effective inclusion of women in party politics.

The 2021 Law to prevent and sanction harassment of women in political life contains gaps in its scope of application and in its penalty framework, rendering it unenforceable and ineffective. While the

JNE issued new guidelines to coordinate the handling of complaints, most EU EOM interlocutors were unaware of these. Women candidates also reported a recent uptick of violence in digital and media environments. The Honour Tribunal issued a statement condemning harassment against women candidates, referencing a specific case involving a congressional candidate.

A sustained harassment campaign against Brígida Curo, candidate for second vice-president for *Juntos por el Perú*, intensified during the run-off campaign. Curo was the target of racist, classist and sexist attacks due to her status as an Andean indigenous woman who wore traditional dress. These attacks circulated mainly on social media, in posts on X and Facebook linked to the strongly conservative *Fundación Fuego Libre*, where she was branded a ‘useful idiot’ of Roberto Sánchez. EU observers reported on other cases of political harassment, involving attacks and defamation on social media, smear campaigns, and social or family harassment.²³

Recommendation: Strengthen the scope of application and the penalty regime of the 2021 Act to prevent and punish harassment of women in political life, with a view to making it enforceable and effective.

The JNE promotes an [Observatory on Equality](#) that raises awareness of and promotes the political and electoral participation of women, among other groups. Regarding political harassment, there was a virtual space on the platform to report cases, but little analysis and dissemination of information was provided during the electoral process.

14. PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS AND AFRO-PERUVIAN PEOPLES

ONPE continued to eliminate barriers to indigenous communities’ right to an informed choice and election participation; a lack of affirmative measures led to underrepresentation in elected bodies.

Peru ratified the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169, and endorsed the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Constitution recognises the rural and native communities as legal persons and grants their authorities as well as *rondas campesinas* the right to exercise jurisdictional functions at the territorial level. Of the total population aged 12 and above, 26 per cent identify as indigenous and 4 per cent refer to themselves as Afro-Peruvian. Quechua, Aymara and other native languages are recognised as official state languages in the areas where they are predominantly spoken.

The election administration undertook measures to ensure the right of indigenous communities to an informed choice. The Ministry of Culture trained 200 ONPE officials who delivered training and voter education in indigenous languages. JNE developed voter education materials in Aymara, Ashaninka, Awajún, and Quechua. Nonetheless, some representatives of Awajún, Chopcca, Cacataibo, Machiguenga, Shawi, and Shipibo communities informed EU observers that they received information solely in Spanish, and that this posed a linguistic barrier. Indigenous activists advocated for more oral communication and increased use of local radios in future voter education campaigns.

Indigenous peoples and Afro-Peruvians are underrepresented in political life, contrary to Peru’s international commitments. The 15 per cent electoral quota for indigenous communities applicable in regional and municipal councils, has been unanimously criticised as ineffective and instrumentalised by political parties. EU EOM interlocutors underlined that affirmative measures required prior consultation on the specificities of indigenous political life. For instance, representatives of indigenous villages (*centros poblados*) in Apurímac, Cusco, Huancavelica, Junín, Loreto, Madre de Dios, Piura, and Ucayali informed EU observers that their members choose their preferred candidates collectively, prior to voting.

²³ For example, candidate Ericka Sandy in San Martín; candidate Ersy Gomez and Lucy Canales Trillo in Ica. No formal complaints were lodged.

Recommendation: Undertake affirmative measures, defined in consultation with indigenous communities and their regional organisations, that ensure proportional political participation and representation of indigenous communities and Afro-Peruvians in elected bodies.

Interlocutors in Loreto, Madre de Dios, and Ucayali raised concerns over the remoteness of polling stations from some communities, for whom voting would entail travel expenses that frequently exceeded the fine for failing to vote. Consequently, the Amazonian regions had the lowest turnout in both rounds.²⁴ In order to address the issue, ONPE opened polling stations in distant *centros poblados* to facilitate the vote. Following the first-round, the allegations of fraud in *centros poblados* raised by López-Aliaga and his supporters, were tainted with discriminatory remarks toward indigenous voters, claiming that this population did not have the capacity to make an informed vote.²⁵

Political platforms of the 35 presidential candidates paid little attention to issues specifically affecting indigenous communities. However, many political organisations included indigenous candidates on their lists. Indigenous leaders ran for the vice-presidency on the *Ahora Nación* and *Juntos por el Perú* tickets, and an Afro-Peruvian activist ran for the vice-presidency with *Partido del Buen Gobierno*. In the run-off, both presidential candidates intensified their outreach to indigenous voters. Sánchez targeted Andean communities, Fujimori canvassed Amazonian communities. EU observers reported the use of indigenous languages in almost 15 per cent of observed campaign events.

15. PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

Voters with disabilities were offered different measures facilitating their inclusion but the lack of a unified mechanism of the voters' registration affects enfranchisement.

Peru ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (IACEDP). The Constitution enshrines the rights of persons with disabilities (PwD) and respect for their dignity and to a legal system of protection. The 2018 Legislative Decree 1348 recognises and guarantees equality without discrimination to all persons with disabilities in all aspects of their life, including the right to political participation, regardless of their use or necessity of reasonable adjustments or support to make a choice. There are still over 500 persons with intellectual disabilities not included in the voter register due to legal interdictions adjudicated before 2018. While RENIEC follows up on the updates of their legal status, the *Consejo Nacional para la Integración de la Persona con Discapacidad* (CONADIS) informed the EU EOM of plans to offer direct assistance to those persons to ensure their incorporation in the voter register.

There is a notable difference between the number of adult population with disabilities and the number of voters whose disability has been registered. According to the 2017 census, PwD constitute 14.7 per cent of the Peruvian adult population, amounting to over 2.7 million persons. For these general elections the voter register included only 205,979 PwD, which constituted 7.5 per cent of adults with disabilities as per census data. RENIEC informed the EU EOM that the majority of persons are reluctant to voluntarily register their disability to avoid having it reflected in their identification document, while in fact one can have the information pertaining to disability included in the state register without having it reflected in the identification document.

ONPE complements the voter register data with information gathered through its own online register of persons with disabilities (*Sistema para el Registro de Personas con Discapacidad*, [REDIS](#)) as well as that of CONADIS. The three systems of registration – RENIEC, REDIS, and CONADIS – are not

²⁴ Loreto had the lowest turnout at 58.52 per cent in the first-round and 55.91 per cent in the run-off, compared to the overall turnout of 73.81 per cent and 72.03 per cent.

²⁵ On 9 May, a legal representative of *Renovación Popular* alleged that the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest ([AIDESEP](#)) signed the voter lists on behalf of the indigenous voters and filled in the result protocols in these polling stations. On 15 June, AIDESEP sued the lawyer for defamation.

interconnected and none of them is exhaustive nor offers information about the grade of a voter's disability, which would allow applying adequate inclusion mechanisms.²⁶

Recommendation: Revise the mechanism used to form the list of voters with disabilities to ensure their widest possible enfranchisement and application of adequate mechanisms for inclusion.

ONPE used a number of mechanisms to enfranchise voters with disabilities, such as special polling stations, temporary voting units allowing for mobile voting on the ground floor of voting centres, preferential voting, Braille ballot sleeves, and assistance of sign language interpreters. On the election days, most voting centres visited by EU observers had measures in place for voters with disabilities, such as temporary voting units (in 83.1 per cent of centres), infrastructure that allowed people with reduced mobility to access the polling station without assistance (73.3 per cent), or Braille ballot sleeves (71.5 per cent). The layout of the observed polling stations was suitable for voters with reduced mobility in 82.2 per cent of cases (*see Annex B, Chart 3*). Mechanisms applied for inclusion of persons with visual and hearing impairments merit revision, as only six percent of persons with visual disabilities are Braille-literate, and according to CONADIS, only 26 per cent of the visited polling stations had sign language interpreter services offered via video calls.²⁷

16. PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS OF DIVERSE SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND GENDER IDENTITIES

Persistent barriers limit political participation of persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities.

The lack of a specific regulatory framework to reinforce rights of people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities (henceforth LGBTIQ+) results in an infringement of fundamental rights, including the right to political participation. This situation of vulnerability has been recognised by, *inter alia*, the Ombudsperson for Human Rights and was highlighted during the latest Universal Periodic Review. There has been no progress on a draft bill on gender identity that was introduced in 2022.

The presence of openly LGBTIQ+ members of Congress has been historically very low, with some 20 candidatures, mainly in Lima, during the 2026 polls. A transgender woman candidate for the Chamber of Deputies and well-known LGBTIQ+ rights activist, Gahela Cari (*Venceremos*), informed the mission that she had been subjected to a violent and arbitrary arrest in February 2026 and detained for two days. She was accused, among other things, of disturbing public order. On appeal, the Constitutional Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima partially upheld a *habeas corpus* petition filed on her behalf, ordering the police to refrain from the arbitrary use of force and from interfering with the right to peaceful protest.

Some competing political parties included LGBTIQ+ issues in their plans for government. *Alianza Venceremos*, *Juntos por el Perú*, *Integridad Democrática*, and *Partido Morado* put forth positive policies, and *Partido Democrático Federal*, *Partido Sí Creo*, *Renovación Popular*, and *Fuerza Popular* either lacked or put forth negative policies.²⁸ A 2025 [Ipsos](#) survey found that 43 per cent of Peruvians had a positive LGBTIQ+ attitude compared with 17 per cent who were openly hostile.

²⁶ The questionnaire of the 2025 census applied the [Washington Group's methodology](#), which defines disability as an interaction between a person's capabilities (limitation in functioning) and environmental barriers (physical, social, cultural or legislative) that may limit their participation in society. Hence, it is expected the results of the latest census will capture a larger number of PwD, while the information about the types of disabilities and the level of required assistance will be more comprehensive.

²⁷ UNESCO, [Día Mundial del Braille: una oportunidad para la inclusión](#), 3 January 2020 and CONADIS, Informe de resultados finales de la campaña *Tu voto cuenta: Elecciones accesibles para todos*, 20 April 2026.

²⁸ Research and assessment prepared by [Crónica de la diversidad](#), an online communications platform created in April 2014 to help promote Peruvian art and culture and to combat discrimination against LGBTIQ+ in the media.

RENIEC referred to a working group led by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights that has prepared a draft amendment to the Civil Code to establish an administrative procedure for the recognition of the name and gender of transgender persons based on self-identified gender. Currently, these changes require judicial proceedings. In addition, the State inhouse prosecutor from RENIEC routinely appeals judicial decisions granting such requests, further delaying a process that is already lengthy, burdensome and costly. In June, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights condemned the Peruvian State for violating the right to gender identity (case Karen Mañuca).²⁹

Insufficient institutional efforts have been made toward LGTBIQ+ political participation. The JNE's Equality Observatory on the political participation of LGTBIQ+ has not been updated since the 2022 local elections. The ONPE protocol for transgender voters, which set out guidelines to ensure non-discriminatory treatment by poll workers, was not sufficiently promoted. [Rosa Rabiosa](#), under the umbrella of *Transparencia*, observed the application of the protocol in 18 regions over both elections days and claimed, *inter alia*, little effective implementation, insufficient visibility of information materials, lack of information received by poll workers, and limited institutional response to incidents.

17. CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

Inclusive legal provisions and an active participation of observers and party agents contributed to the transparency of the process.

The legal framework provides for national and international election observation at all stages of the electoral process. Accreditation requests could be submitted to the JNE up to 10 days before election day. Party agents could also be accredited for all levels of the election administration, either with the respective *Jurado Electoral Especial* (JEE) no later than seven days before election day, or directly in the voting centres on election day, an option preferred by most political parties. Shortly before the run-off, the JNE created some confusion by announcing an app to facilitate the registration of party agents, something that is no longer within its remit at that stage of the process.

In the pre-election period, the national observer group, *Transparencia*, launched a platform to provide more information about the candidates, as well as a voting simulator. They also deployed long-term observers throughout the process and, through a broad coalition of civil society organisations, fielded some 5,000 observers on the election days. *Transparencia* carried out quick count exercises in collaboration with Ipsos. For the first time, the Ombudsperson's Office undertook a comprehensive election day supervision, deploying some 12,000 personnel for the first-round and over 14,000 for the run-off, and publishing detailed reports including recommendations.

With a total of 563 observers for the first round and 587 for the second round, the JNE accredited more international observers than in any previous electoral process. Apart from the EU EOM, international observers were deployed by, *inter alia*, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter Center, the Inter-American Union of Electoral Bodies, and the Association of World Electoral Bodies. In their reports, the OAS noted that the delays in Lima fuelled allegations of fraud and disinformation campaigns, while the Carter Center noted that other State entities appeared to infringe on the autonomy of the election management bodies after 12 April. *Transparencia*, for its part, stated that the elections had been credible despite the delays in Lima, and warned of the risk of political interference in the election administration.

²⁹ The case has lasted for 20 years. [Karen Mañuca Quiroz Cabanillas](#) was denied a comprehensive registration consistent with her identity by RENIEC and the Constitutional Court, which annulled her documents and maintained a gender marker that did not correspond to her. The IACHR concluded that Peru had violated her rights to legal personality, private life, equality, and judicial protection.

18. POLLING, COUNTING AND TABULATION OF RESULTS

18.1 General elections, 12 April

A logistical failure in Lima led to serious delays in the opening of polling stations and overshadowed an otherwise calm and orderly election day.

Election day was calm and orderly in most parts of the country but characterised by significant delays in the opening of polling stations in Lima. Election materials were delivered late to 66 voting centres in South Lima, 13 of which could not open despite a two-hour extension by the JNE of the permitted opening deadline (from 12:00 to 14:00). After the closing of polls (extended from 17:00 to 18:00), the JNE declared that elections in the 13 affected voting centres would take place the following day, prioritising the right to vote for the 55,261 affected voters.³⁰

Throughout the day, the EU EOM visited 617 polling stations, including 28 (4.54 per cent of observed polling stations) in remote areas (*centros poblados*). The EU observed the opening of polls at 60 polling stations across the country. Out of these, all but two opened late, 36 with a delay of up to 60 minutes and the rest with a delay of more than one hour. In most cases, this was due to the late arrival (27 cases) or unpreparedness (26 cases) of poll workers, and in six cases, due to a lack of material. The opening of polls was overall slow and delayed, but transparent. Opening procedures were mostly followed, and EU observers and party agents were able to follow the process without restrictions.

The procedures provided for in the Election Law stipulate that poll workers must arrive at 06:00. If the three standing poll workers are not all present, they must wait until 07:00 to fill the vacant positions with substitute poll workers. Only then will they receive the box with election materials from ONPE coordinators and begin preparations to open the polling station. These procedures make it effectively impossible to start voting at 7:00.

Recommendation: Revise the procedures provided for in the Election Law, in order to guarantee a timely opening of polling stations and start of voting.

The EU EOM observed voting at 577 polling stations and described the process as calm, orderly and smooth. Most polling stations visited throughout the day were staffed by the pre-designated poll workers, and in only 3.3 per cent of polling stations was it necessary to draft a replacement member from among queuing voters. At 34 per cent of observed polling stations, there were no party agents, at 60 per cent there were up to three agents, and at 6 per cent there were more than four. The parties with the most agents were *Renovación Popular* (26 per cent), *Alianza para el Progreso* (22 per cent), *Fuerza Popular* (16 per cent), and *Ahora Nación* (11 per cent). Despite the complex ballot paper, EU observers assessed voters' understanding of how to mark the ballot as good or very good in 94 per cent of the observed polling stations.

The EU EOM observed closing and counting at 59 polling stations. The presence of party agents increased as compared to during the day, with their presence observed in 53 out of 59 polling stations. Counting procedures were mostly followed, but EU observers noted that poll workers had difficulty to complete the results protocols at more than half of the polling stations. While the handling of the counting and closing process was overall transparent and well-intentioned, it was affected by the complex and lengthy procedures as well as insufficiently prepared and exhausted poll workers.

³⁰ In addition to the late opening of polling stations, the logistical problems led to a string of other issues during the redeployment of election material from polling centres to ODPEs in Lima. Due to the extended voting hours and the long counting process, in some cases, the pre-contracted transport was no longer available, so that ONPE staff had to arrange alternative transport at short notice in the early morning of 13 April. This was the case in Surco, where an ONPE coordinator took boxes with ballot papers from the polling centre to the ODPE in a taxi without police escort, leaving four of the 24 boxes behind in the vehicle; the materials were later found discarded on a public thoroughfare. In other cases, poll workers and ONPE coordinators made mistakes when re-packaging the materials, mixing sensitive and non-sensitive materials, which ultimately led to delays in the processing of results and the annulment of 18 polling stations in Lima.

Recommendation: Simplify the closing procedures and reduce the number of copies of results protocols provided for in the Election Law, to lighten the workload of poll workers and reduce the number of protocols flagged with inconsistencies.

The following day, the EU observed the opening of the 13 voting centres in Lima that were not operational the previous day. By 09:00, 12 of these centres had opened for voting, mostly with the pre-designated poll workers. One centre in Pachacamac opened only shortly before 12:00 due to a shortage of poll workers. Outside some centres, there was a strong media presence and initial tensions, but the situation calmed once the voting centres opened their doors. JNE supervisors as well as representatives from the Public Prosecutor and the Ombudsperson's Office were present at all voting centres, and party agents (mainly from *Renovación Popular* and *Fuerza Popular*) in 10 out of 13 centres.

Tabulation and publication of results

From election night until Friday 17 April, the EU EOM observed the processing of results at 63 computing centres in all regions of the country. The reception of electoral material and processing of results were largely described as professional, transparent, methodical and orderly. In some ODPEs, bottlenecks were observed in the reception of electoral material, but overall, the processing of protocols was carried out in accordance with the planned procedures, and the technical aspects of the process worked well. ODPE staff were observed to be carrying out their work efficiently. There were few party agents present and no interference from external actors in the process.

ONPE began publishing results at around 18:30 on election day, via a new website, where users could access the results by polling station. For each results protocol, a full timeline of the digitisation, data entry and tabulation stages was displayed. The publication process was slow at first, with only 18 per cent of presidential results processed by 22:00. In Lima and Callao, however, the processing of STAE protocols was faster: by the early hours of 13 April, 72.9 and 82.5 per cent respectively had been processed, compared with 14.7 per cent in the rest of the country. Processing continued at a slow pace during the first few days until adjustments were made to improve the simultaneous handling of result data and protocol images, and to prioritise presidential results.

ONPE's results processing software detected large numbers of results protocols with inconsistencies (*actas observadas*), especially for congressional elections.³¹ There were significantly fewer *actas observadas* in Lima and Callao where the STAE was implemented. On the other hand, there were high percentages of *actas observadas* in the out-of-country voting, where in-person training of poll workers did not take place and there were no ONPE coordinators to support them.

Actas observadas were forwarded from ODPEs to JEEs for adjudication. Due to the high numbers, deadlines were missed both by ODPEs (for handover to the JEEs) and by JEEs (for initial treatment and resolution). From Thursday 16 April, JEE staff started to process *actas observadas*, comparing their copies of results protocols to the ODPE copies to resolve errors and missing signatures (*cotejo*). Overall, 96 per cent of *actas observadas* were resolved through this administrative mechanism, which was not open to public scrutiny, thereby limiting the oversight and transparency of this part of the process. All other *actas observadas* were resolved through ballot recounts.³² The first recounts took place on 20 April, and two days later the JNE amended procedures to speed up the process, deciding there would be no recounts in cases of inconsistencies related to preferential votes.³³ The JNE also set 7 May as the final date for recounts and deployed additional staff to JEEs to assist with the process. Not all JEEs abided by the 7 May deadline. The last JEE to complete recounts on 29 May was the

³¹ For the presidential election, 5,867 results protocols (6.32 per cent) were flagged with inconsistencies, and for the national senate 17,943 (19 per cent), the regional senate 13,665 (15 per cent), the chamber of deputies 15,666 (17 per cent), and the Andean Parliament 14,620 (16 per cent).

³² There were 891 recounts for the presidential elections, 476 for the national senate election, 450 for the regional senate election, 495 for the deputies election, and 555 for the Andean Parliament election.

³³ In the corresponding Plenary Agreement, the JNE estimated that about 40 per cent of *actas observadas* were due to inconsistencies related to preferential votes.

one in charge of out-of-country voting, where over 600 recounts had to be conducted due to poll workers abandoning their duties before finalising counting. The JNE announced the results of the first Presidential Election on 17 May, and the results for the Congress and Andean Parliament Elections on 19 June, more than two months after the general elections.

18.2 Presidential run-off, 7 June

An orderly election day with isolated incidents concluded with a quick and transparent counting process.

The run-off election day was overall calm and orderly. The JNE and ONPE reported isolated cases of ballot papers with markings found in polling stations; ONPE clarified that the affected ballot papers were replaced and the incidents reported to the Public Prosecutor.³⁴

Throughout the day, EU observers visited 576 polling stations across all regions of the country, including 26 polling stations (4.51 per cent of all observed) in remote areas (*centros poblados*). The opening of the process was observed in 56 polling stations, the majority of which opened with delays of up to one hour, mostly due to insufficient poll workers. Electoral materials were observed to be on hand, and EU observers qualified the opening as calm, orderly, and without complications.

During voting, EU observers visited 504 polling stations, most of which were staffed with the pre-designated poll workers; in only 2.8 per cent of stations, there were poll workers drawn from the queue of voters. Voting procedures were largely followed and poll workers performed well. The EU observed a strong presence of party agents (in 68 per cent of polling stations), contributing to the transparency of the process. JNE supervisors were present in 94 per cent of visited voting centres and the Ombudsperson's Office in 71 per cent. Overall, EU observers described the voting as calm, orderly, and smooth.

The EU observed closing and counting in 57 polling stations. As had been the case throughout the day, party agents and observers could follow the process without restrictions. During counting, the established procedures were not always strictly followed. In nine observed polling stations, poll workers did not always check whether the ballot papers had the required signatures, and in eight polling stations they had difficulties filling out the results protocols. However, these procedural shortcomings did not impact the integrity of the results in the observed polling stations. As a consequence, EU observers classified the counting positively in 53 out of 57 polling stations.

ONPE started to publish the first results protocols shortly after 18h00 on election day, reaching 50 per cent of protocols by 22h00, and 92 per cent by early next morning. From the election night until two days after election day, the EU EOM observed the reception and processing of results protocols at 47 computing centres across the country. As during the first-round, this part of the process was observed to be professionally conducted, orderly and methodical, with the technical aspects working smoothly. The resolution of *actas observadas*, the numbers of which were significantly lower in the run-off election (1,662), still took about three weeks. Final results of the presidential run-off were announced on 3 July 2026.

19. ELECTORAL DISPUTES

The volume of untimely and inadmissible petitions for annulment of results revealed limited knowledge of procedures if not abuse of electoral dispute mechanisms.

The Constitution, the Law on Elections (LOE), and the JNE resolution on the procedure for applications for annulment clearly set out the established grounds for declaring elections invalid. A polling station may be annulled where it was unlawfully constituted or installed; bribery, intimidation or violence affected the vote; poll workers exerted undue pressure on voters; or where the irregular admission or rejection of voters was sufficient to alter the election result. An entire district or province

³⁴ According to the Public Prosecutor, some 4,000 ballot papers with markings had been found, corresponding to more than 100 polling stations across several regions.

results may be annulled when invalid or blank votes, taken together or separately, exceed two-thirds of the number of valid votes.³⁵ Procedural and evidence requirements are also established.³⁶ JEE decisions may be appealed to the JNE, whose rulings are final under the Constitution.

In practice, the annulment of a polling station is highly exceptional. The principle of conservation of the vote cast and the preclusion of electoral stages underpins the entire electoral justice system, which, in order to guarantee the integrity of the vote, includes significant concurrent safeguards, *inter alia*, the presence of party agents at polling stations, oversight by the JNE, supervision by the Ombudsperson's Office, and the timely publication of results protocols.

Overall, political organisations appeared to disregard or have limited knowledge of the procedures on complaints and appeals. The untimely and inappropriate nature of petitions was observed to amount to an abuse of the electoral dispute system and its safeguards.

The post-12 April period saw the highest number of annulment petitions. The JEEs recorded a total of 202 requests for the annulment of polling stations, of which 63 were submitted within the legally established period of up to three days after election day. There were a further 25 requests for annulment of district results and 325 requests to annul the entire election results. Private citizens, without legitimate standing, lodged a considerable number of applications for annulment.

The overwhelming majority of the cases were dismissed as inadmissible (due to non-payment of fees, the petitioner lacking standing, outside the statutory deadline), and without substance (deficiency of precision in the requests, lack of proof). Of the decisions analysed, the JEEs have ruled in accordance with the law.³⁷

Some JEE decisions were appealed to the JNE. In one, López-Aliaga himself requested the annulment of all polling stations with the serial number 900,000, corresponding to rural areas (*centros poblados*). He based the complaint on ONPE's alleged lack of authority to establish these polling stations and the possibility of unregistered voters casting ballots there. He did not provide any evidence. The competent JEE (Pacasmayo) rejected the complaint in accordance with the law (complaint submitted out of the statutory deadline, and the candidate's lack of standing as only the party's legal representative has the capacity to lodge such a complaint). Later, the JNE unanimously rejected an appeal, with a reasoned vote exposing arguments on the substance, clarifying the ONPE's legal authority to establish polling stations in *centros poblados*. The reasoned vote highlights the element of discrimination in López-Aliaga's arguments, which repeatedly equated the electorate in these centres – where he failed to secure results – with ignorance and susceptibility to manipulation.

In addition, *Renovación Popular* pushed its narrative of electoral fraud by using *ad hoc* litigation procedures. At the end of April, the JNE confirmed the unfeasibility of supplementary elections for the city of Lima. This followed a request from López-Aliaga under the argument that the delayed opening of polling stations resulted in a drop in votes for him. The JNE's legal reasoning was in accordance with the law, as supplementary elections are only provided for in the case of municipal elections. The JNE had no legal obligation to rule publicly on López-Aliaga's request, which lacked an objective legal basis. Soon afterwards, the *Renovación Popular* Mayor of Lima filed a writ of constitutional protection (*amparo*) against the JNE resolution. Given that the presidential results have

³⁵ The Constitution establishes the general rule by reference to votes cast (Article 184). By contrast, the Election Law relies on valid votes for the application of its provisions.

³⁶ 1) Recording the complaint on the results protocol on election day; 2) complaint must be substantiated in writing before the JEE during the following three days; 3) payment of a mandatory non-refundable petition fee of 1,350 PEN (343 EUR) for each case lodged, which aims to reduce the filing of irrelevant petitions; 4) proof that the claimed ground for annulment aimed to benefit one of the contestants.

³⁷ A comprehensive revision of JEE decisions was not possible as the JNE's platform does not allow for a consolidated analysis of case files, requiring individual file queries. Furthermore, there were errors in the classification of cases and their status.

been definitively declared and are not subject to appeal, according to the principle of *res judicata*, it would be unheard of for such a claim to succeed.

For the run-off, only 13 petitions were registered. All of them were dismissed by the JEEs. *Juntos por el Perú* requested the annulment of 1,751 polling stations in Lima and several abroad. All were dismissed on procedural grounds, for the failure to pay electoral fees and being presented outside the statutory deadline.³⁸ *Fuerza Popular* requested the annulment of five polling stations and two voting centres in Puno, on the grounds that their party agents were denied entry to polling stations. These requests were dismissed as unfounded by insufficient evidence. *Juntos por el Perú* appealed against the first-instance rulings by the JEEs, and the JNE upheld all the arguments from the rulings of the JEEs.

Alleging electoral fraud in out-of-country voting, *Juntos por el Perú* filed a series of complaints (outside of the prescribed time period) challenging the regulations and conditions governing overseas voting. *Juntos por el Perú* also appealed the announcements of the second-round results issued by the JEEs as well as the final results proclaimed by the JNE, despite the fact that this last decision is not subject to appeal. In accordance with the legal framework, all appeals were dismissed.

Other election-related petitions

Many other complaints related to the electoral process, as well as judicial and administrative actions, were recorded after 12 April. The *Junta Nacional de Justicia* (JNJ) initiated disciplinary proceedings against the ONPE Chief. Also, the Public Prosecutor's Office initiated confidential investigations after several complaints against the ONPE Chief, including those filed by the JNE internal prosecutor, by López-Aliaga, and later by the Comptroller's Office.

Data from the Public Prosecutor's Office indicated that between 12 and 13 April, there were 57 incidents of an electoral criminal nature. Recorded offences included, inter alia, identity fraud and propaganda outside the permitted period. Data from the Public Prosecutor's Office in relation to the run-off indicated a total of 156 incidents of a criminal nature. Most offences related the alteration of ballot papers (*cédulas rayadas*) and identity fraud.

20. RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

Questioning of results by losing presidential candidates, who resorted to unsubstantiated and polarising narratives of fraud, undermined public trust in the electoral process.

According to the official first-round results Keiko Fujimori (*Fuerza Popular*) and Roberto Sánchez (*Juntos por el Perú*) passed to the run-off with 17.19 and 12.03 per cent of valid votes respectively (see Annex E). Their collective support represented less than one third of valid votes. The highly contested run-off was won by Fujimori, who obtained 50.13 per cent of valid votes.

Both rounds of the presidential election resulted in extremely narrow victory margins. In the first-round, the difference between the second most-voted candidate, Roberto Sánchez, and third most-voted candidate, Rafael López-Aliaga, amounted to 21,209 votes. In the run-off, Keiko Fujimori secured victory with 49,641 votes more than Roberto Sánchez. In both rounds, the losing candidate resorted to unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, questioning the integrity of the electoral process. López-Aliaga and Sánchez convened public protests and reinforced their claims with polarising narratives alleging a lack of respect for and discrimination of their respective electorates by state institutions. Such practices have a deleterious effect on public trust in democratic institutions and on the legitimacy of the elected. They also run counter to the commitments that political organisations subscribed to in the [Electoral Ethics Pact](#), where they pledged to respect the electoral process and the official election results as an expression of the voters' will and to contest results using established mechanisms.

³⁸ In addition to the polling stations in Lima, petitions referred to specific polling stations in North Carolina (USA), Chicago, Houston, New Jersey, and Argentina.

The high number of blank ballots in the first-round reflected voter disengagement and disenchantment with politics. In the first-round of the presidential race, after the candidature of Keiko Fujimori (2.87 million votes), the second most frequently chosen option countrywide was to cast a blank vote (2.37 million votes), which constituted 11.77 per cent of votes cast. The highest number of blank votes was in San Martín (19.62 per cent), where blank ballots exceeded the number of votes cast for any of the 35 presidential candidates.

Pursuant to results proclaimed on 19 June, the new Congress will be composed of six parties, four less than elected in 2021 (*see Annex E*). The decrease in the number of parliamentary parties is owed to political fragmentation combined with the application of a double threshold for accessing seat allocation. Three of the six congressional parties, *Fuerza Popular*, *Juntos por el Perú*, and *Renovación Popular*, held seats in the previous parliament. There will also be three new parties: the centre-left *Ahora Nación* of Alfonso López-Chau, the centrist *Partido del Buen Gobierno* led by Jorge Nieto, as well as the populist *Partido Cívico OBRAS* of Ricardo Belmont.

21. RECOMMENDATIONS (priority recommendations in bold)

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
LEGAL FRAMEWORK						
1	10	“Uncertainties were identified regarding the interpretation of some newly introduced provisions (...). Several inconsistencies persist in the legal framework (...). There are discrepancies between the Election Law and the Criminal Code which provide different penalties for the same offences. Combined, these factors contribute to undermining legal certainty.” “Furthermore, the JNE adopted other ad hoc decisions to ensure timely adjudication of results (...).” “Finally, the fragmentation of the legal framework hinders understanding of the electoral corpus iuris, which contains unnecessary duplications.”	Review the legal framework to remove inconsistencies, duplication, and unenforceable provisions, to optimise deadlines and consolidate all electoral legislation into an electoral code and an electoral procedural code.	Among others: Organic Law on Elections No. 26859 Law on Political Organisations Law No. 28094, Law on the Election of Representatives to the Andean Parliament Law No. 28360, Law regulating state advertising Law No. 28874 Organic Law JNE No. 26486, ONPE No. 26487, RENIEC No. 26497 Regulations and resolutions by JNE and ONPE	JNE Congress of the Republic	Rule of Law Transparency and access to information ICCPR GC 34, para. 25: “A norm to be characterised as a law, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly, and it must be made accessible to the Public.” ICCPR, Article 2.2: “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes the necessary steps... to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the preset Covenant”. UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 19/36 of 2012 (A/HRC/RES/19/36) [Human rights, democracy and the rule of law], para. 16(c): “States to make continuous efforts to strengthen the rule of law and promote democracy by: ensuring that a sufficient degree of legal certainty and predictability is provided in the application of the law, in order to avoid arbitrariness.” Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001), art. 3: “Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, (...) access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law (...)”.

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION						
2	13	“ONPE recruited around 36,000 temporary staff (...). These played a key role in ensuring election day operations and supporting poll workers. However, ONPE struggled to fill all positions (...). ONPE also faced a high number of resignations and staff turnover, which particularly affected positions with short-term contracts and a heavy workload.”	Prevent staff shortages and resignations by increasing the ONPE’s resources to recruit, train, and adequately remunerate temporary staff at national and subnational levels.	No legislative change required	Government (Ministry of Economy and Finance) Congress of the Republic	Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of voters ICCPR GC 25, para 20: “An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.”
CANDIDATE AND POLITICAL PARTY REGISTRATION						
3	17	“Political organisations are not responsible for the quality and accuracy of the data provided by the candidates in their CV. This weakens the accountability link between candidates and their own parties.”	Ensure that political organisations assume greater responsibility and oversight of the quality and accuracy of their candidates’ profiles vis-à-vis the electorate, for example, by introducing joint liability in the event of omissions or erroneous information in the CVs of their proposed candidates.	Law on Political Organisations Electoral Law Regulations Statutes of political parties	JNE Congress of the Republic	Prevention of corruption Fairness in the election campaign UNCAC Art.5(2): “Each State Party shall endeavour to establish and promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption.” ICCPR GC 25, para.19: “Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind.” Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001), art. 4: “(...) probity, responsible public administration on the part of governments, (...) are essential components of the exercise of democracy.”

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
CAMPAIGN						
4	18-20	“The (...) campaign was punctuated by a few incidents of violence as well as discriminatory and divisive language. (...) No state institution or civil society organisation condemned these instances of violent and discriminatory speech.” “(…) instances of racism and discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and social class, were present (...) the racist, discriminatory and divisive campaign narratives remained largely unaddressed by the competent state authorities (...)”.	Call on the competent authorities to promptly condemn and take action to halt instances of hate speech, threats of violence, incitements to violence, and intolerant rhetoric in the electoral discourse.	No legislative change required	Ombudsperson's Office Public Prosecutor's Office Honour Tribunal JNE	Fairness in the election campaign State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights ICCPR, art. 26: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Peru, 5 April 2023, para. 17: “The State party should continue to increase its efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate all forms of discrimination, particularly racial discrimination and xenophobia, including by: (...) (b) Taking measures to prevent all hate speech, discrimination, violence or other alleged offences motivated by prejudice and stereotyping, including when such offences occur in the media or on the Internet, and responding to them promptly and effectively.” CCPR/C/PER/CO/6: https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/PER/CO/6

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
CAMPAIGN FINANCE						
5	21	“The final campaign finance reports must be submitted by political organisations and candidates up to 15 working days after the official proclamation of results. (...) The ONPE has a full one-year period to determine the existence of the infractions. The extended timeframes for campaign finance disclosure and audit do not contribute to a comprehensive public oversight.”	Shorten the deadlines for submission and audit of the final campaign finance reports to reinforce the public oversight of campaign finance.	Amendments to the Law on Political Organisations	Congress of the Republic ONPE	Prevention of corruption Transparency and access to information UNCAC, Art. 7.3.: “Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures, (...) to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties.” Inter-American Democratic Charter, Art. 5: “Special attention will be paid to the problems associated with the high cost of election campaigns and the establishment of a balanced and transparent system for their financing. VC, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Explanatory Report Paragraph II.3.5: “(...) funding [of political parties and electoral campaigns] must be transparent; such transparency is essential whatever the level of political and economic development of the country concerned.”
MEDIA						
6	21	“However, the Penal Code provides for prison sentences of up to three years for defamation, a sanction that goes against international standards. While a draft law increasing this to five years has been archived, EU EOM interlocutors feared that such initiatives may be brought back on the Congressional agenda.”	Replace prison sentence for libel offences with financial sanctions proportionate to the severity of the offence.	Amendment of the Penal Code	Congress of the Republic	Transparency and access to information Freedom of opinion and expression ICCPR GC 34, para 47: “Defamation laws must be crafted with care to ensure that they comply with paragraph 3, and that they do not serve, in practice, to stifle freedom of expression ... State parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty. It is impermissible for a State party to indict a person for criminal defamation but then not to proceed to trial expeditiously – such a practice has a chilling effect that may unduly restrict the exercise of freedom of expression of the person concerned and others.”

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7	23	“Journalists face increasing threats, including verbal, physical, and digital attacks as well as judicial persecution, with 458 incidents recorded last year, including four murders. Although journalists were generally able to cover the campaign, they were often targeted, with over 60 incidents over this electoral period, including death threats (...). These threats were echoed in social media, amplifying their effect.”	Ensure the effective protection of journalists against attacks, threats, and intimidation through the prompt and effective investigation of all attacks against media professionals, including by addressing rhetoric by public figures and candidates that may incite hostility toward media professionals.	No legislative change required	Government	Freedom of opinion and expression ICCPR GC 34, part 23: “States parties should put in place effective measures to protect against attacks aimed at silencing those exercising their right to freedom of expression... Nor, under any circumstance, can an attack on a person, because of the exercise of his or her freedom of opinion or expression, including such forms of attack as arbitrary arrest, torture, threats to life and killing, be compatible with article 19...All such attacks should be vigorously investigated in a timely fashion, and the perpetrators prosecuted, and the victims, or, in the case of killings, their representatives, be in receipt of appropriate forms of redress.”
8	23-24	“New rules allowing political parties to select both from a wide range of media outlets and from specific broadcast slots sparked controversy and investigation (...). Some interlocutors complained that the unequal distribution of the <i>franja electoral</i> favoured incumbent parties represented in the outgoing Congress, which already benefitted from direct public financing.” “In its current configuration, the <i>franja</i>	Revise the provisions on <i>franja electoral</i> to promote citizens’ informed choice by ensuring that participating media outlets provide information on all contestants and are selected to maximise reach across the electorate.	Law on Political Organisations Regulations	Congress of the Republic	Transparency and access to information ICCPR, article 19.2: “Everyone shall have the right to (...) seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Explanatory Report. Art 3.1.a b: “Public authorities must also give the electorate access to lists and candidates standing for election.” UNHRC Res 2000/47, art. 1.d(iv): “Ensuring, through legislation, institutions and mechanisms, the freedom to form democratic political parties as well as transparency and fairness of the electoral process, including through appropriate access to funds and free, independent and pluralistic media”.

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		<i>electoral</i> does not serve the citizens’ right to information, it also risks fostering unethical relationships between media and political organisations, and contributes to polarisation.”				
ONLINE CAMPAIGN						
9	27	“During the run-off campaign, fraud narratives remained central to the online environment, sustained largely by the same networks that had challenged the first-round results.” “The narrative combined attacks on electoral institutions and officials with calls for mobilisation, while troll-like accounts on X amplified fraud claims, anti-left messaging, and attacks on both finalists.”	Strengthen voter education initiatives to improve citizens’ digital literacy and their ability to critically assess election-related information and identify disinformation disseminated on social media platforms.	No legislative change required	JNE ONPE RENIEC Ministry of Education	Freedom of opinion and expression UN, OSCE, OAS, ACHPR Joint declaration on freedom of expression and “fake news”, disinformation and propaganda, 2017, 6(a): “All stakeholders ... should be supported in developing participatory and transparent initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of disinformation and propaganda...” ICCPR Art. 19(2): “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”.

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10	26	“Influencers and content creators were particularly visible on videocentric platforms such as TikTok and YouTube, expanding the reach of political content beyond official accounts while blurring the distinction between political commentary, campaign promotion, and paid or coordinated communication. Varying platform transparency created uneven conditions for monitoring political advertising and online campaign activity, reinforcing the need for clearer transparency mechanisms around content promoted outside official party channels.”	Strengthen transparency of online campaign expenditure by requiring social media platforms to maintain publicly accessible information on paid or promoted electoral content, including sponsors and amounts spent.	Law on Political Organisations (art. 34 & 36-D) ONPE Regulation on the Financing and Supervision of Party Funds (Arts. 90 & 105)	Congress of the Republic ONPE	Prevention of corruption Fairness in the election campaign UNCAC, art. 7(3): States should consider measures “to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties.” ICCPR, General Comment 25, para. 19: “Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.” Inter-American Democratic Charter, art. 5: “Special attention will be paid to the problems associated with the high cost of election campaigns and the establishment of a balanced and transparent system for their financing.”

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN						
11	28	“Women candidates reported that, while the law requires that half of the public funding to political parties must be allocated to training activities under gender parity criteria, and ONPE regulations promote spending on women’s inclusion, implementation of these provisions remained limited in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms.”	Introduce effective and efficient mechanisms, to ensure that public funding for political parties is engaged in education, training and research activities that contribute to the effective inclusion of women in party politics.	Law on Political Organisations (Art. 29.3.b) Regulations on the financing and supervision of party funds (Resolution No. 30-2025 Art. 8.1 and 8.2.)	Congress of the Republic JNE Ombudsperson’s Office ONPE Political parties	State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs and hold office Women’s participation in public affairs ICCPR, art. 2(1): “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant (..)”. ICCPR, art. 3 (1): “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.” CEDAW, art. 4 (1): “Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination.” CEDAW, art. 7: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country.”

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12	28-29	“The 2021 Law to prevent and sanction harassment of women in political life contains gaps in its scope of application and in its penalty framework, rendering it unenforceable and ineffective. While the JNE issued new guidelines to coordinate the handling of complaints, most EU EOM interlocutors were unaware of these. Women candidates also reported a recent uptick of violence in digital and media environments.”	Strengthen the scope of application and the penalty regime of the 2021 Act to prevent and punish harassment of women in political life, with a view to making it enforceable and effective.	2021 Law to prevent and punish harassment of women in political life	JNE Congress of the Republic Ombudsperson's Office Civil society	State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights Right to effective remedy ICCPR, art. 3 (1): “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.” ICCPR, Art. 2(3): “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy.” CEDAW, art. 7: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country.”

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS AND AFRO-PERUVIAN PEOPLES						
13	29	“Indigenous peoples and Afro-Peruvians are underrepresented in political life, contrary to Peru’s international commitments. (...) EU EOM interlocutors underlined that affirmative measures required prior consultation on the specificities of indigenous political life.”	Undertake affirmative measures, defined in consultation with indigenous communities and their regional organisations, that ensure proportional political participation and representation of indigenous communities and Afro-Peruvians in elected bodies.	Amendment of the Election Law	Congress of the Republic AIDESEP Other regional indigenous organisations	Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs and hold office ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), art. 2: “Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity. Art. 6.1.b. (...) Governments shall (...) Establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them.” Inter-American Democratic Charter, Art. 6: “Promoting and fostering diverse forms of participation strengthens democracy.” VC Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Explanatory Report, I.2.4: “Certain measures taken to ensure minimum representation for minorities either by reserving seats for them or by providing for exceptions to the normal rules on seat distribution, e.g. by waiving the quorum for the national minorities’ parties do not infringe the principle of equality.”

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PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES						
14	30-31	“There is a notable difference between the number of adult population with disabilities and the number of voters whose disability has been registered. (...) The three systems of registration – RENIEC, REDIS, and CONADIS – are not interconnected and none of them is exhaustive nor offers information about the grade of a voter’s disability, which would allow applying adequate inclusion mechanisms.”	Revise the mechanism used to form the list of voters with disabilities to ensure the widest possible enfranchisement and application of adequate mechanisms for inclusion.	Revision of legal and regulatory framework and applied mechanisms	Congress of the Republic RENIEC CONADIS ONPE	Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs and hold office CRPD, Art. 12.3: “States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.” Art. 29.a.i.i: “States Parties shall guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with others, and shall undertake: (...) To ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others (...) by ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use.” Inter-American Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against persons with disabilities (1999) Art. ii: “(...) to prevent and eliminate all forms of discrimination against persons with disabilities and to promote their full integration into society. Art. iii, to adopt the legislative, social, educational, labor-related, or any other measures needed to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities and to promote their full integration into society”.

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
POLLING, COUNTING AND TABULATION						
15	33	“The procedures provided for in the Election Law stipulate that poll workers must arrive at 06:00. If the three standing poll workers are not all present, they must wait until 07:00 to fill the vacant positions with substitute poll workers. Only then will they receive the box with election materials from ONPE coordinators and begin preparations to open the polling station. These procedures make it effectively impossible to start voting at 7:00.”	Revise the procedures provided for in the Election Law, in order to guarantee a timely opening of polling stations and start of voting.	Election Law (art. 249 & 250)	Congress of the Republic	Right and opportunity to vote Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of voters ICCPR, article 25(b): “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity (..) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections (...).” ICCPR GC 21, para. 3: “States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right.”

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
16	33-34	“While the handling of the counting and closing process was overall transparent and well-intentioned, it was affected by the complex and lengthy procedures as well as insufficiently prepared and exhausted poll workers.”	Simplify the closing procedures and reduce the number of copies of results protocols provided for in the Election Law, to lighten the workload of poll workers and reduce the number of protocols flagged with inconsistencies.	Election Law (art. 291-298)	Congress of the Republic	Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of voters State must take the necessary steps to give effect to rights ICCPR GC 25, para 20: “An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant. (...) There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.” ICCPR, article 2.2: “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT (including reference to the relevant page of the FR)	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
ELECTION TECHNOLOGIES						
17	15	“(…) the underlying logic of the original STAE, without the added complication of digitally signed installation, remains sound and could further reduce the volume of flagged results protocols in future elections. This is particularly true for contests prone to high error rates such as those for senators and members of Congress. Implementing effective digital interoperability between the JNE and ONPE for the processing of results protocols with inconsistencies would be a further concrete step in this direction.”	Extend digital tools to prevent minor inconsistencies in results protocols, handle the protocols more efficiently, improve traceability, and reduce delays in announcing final results.	No legislative change required	JNE ONPE	Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of voters ICCPR, article 25(b): “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity (..) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections (..).” ICCPR GC 25, para 20: “There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.” VC, Code on Good Practice in Electoral Matters. II.3.b: “The procedure must be simple and devoid of formalism, in particular concerning the admissibility of appeals”

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18	14	“All three core systems, STAE, SCE, and PR, had been subject to an independent IT security audit (...). However, its conclusions were only made public on 30 April, more than two weeks after the first-round. The JNE had also fully reviewed the source code with reportedly no critical findings, but its conclusions had not been published at the time of writing (...).”	Ensure that technological solutions are fully audited well ahead of election day, both to identify and address risks in a timely manner and to support public confidence in the systems used.	No legislative change required	JNE ONPE	Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of voters ICCPR GC 25, para 20: “There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.”

American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)

22. ANNEX A – LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Amendments to the Constitution: [Law No. 31988](#) (20/03/2024)

Constitutional Reform Act: Amends Articles 2, 39, 56, 57, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 117, 118, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 142, 150, 157, 161, 162, 182, 183, 191, 194, 201, 203 and 206; incorporates Articles 102-A and 102-B; repeals Article 90-A. Content: Changes in the structure of Congress with the reintroduction of a bicameral system and the rules governing parliamentary elections.

Amendments to the Law on Political Organisations (LOP) No. 28094 and Organic Law on Elections (LOE) No. 26859

- [Law No. 31981](#) (18/01/2024). Art. 21, 22, 23, 24, 24-A y 36-C of the LOP, on the primary elections and how to determine the candidates and their order on the relevant list.
- [Law No. 32058](#) (14/06/2024). Art. 47, 58, 104 y 116 of the LOE, on the primary elections and how to determine the candidates and their order on the relevant list.
- [Law No. 32245](#) (15/06/2024). Art. 20, 21, 30, 31, 84, 108, 112, 116, 118, 121, 123-A, 320, 323 y 325 of the LOE. Art. 13 and 23 of the LOP. Articles 4, 6 y 7 of the Law on Elections of Representatives to the Andean Parliament (Law No 28360).
- [Law No. 32264](#) (20/03/2025). Art. 166, 197, 201, 202, 203 y 226 de la Ley 26859, LOE. New article 59 to the Law No. 26497 (RENIEC Organic Law). Registration of deaths. Adjusts electoral register procedures and coordination between electoral bodies.
- [Law No 32270](#) (24/03/2025). New art. 223-A LOE: Introduction of digital voting.
- [Ley No. 32254](#) (31/01/2025). Art. 29, 30 and 31 of the LOP, on direct public funding and private funding, as well as illegal sources of funding.

Amendments on Regulations and Resolutions by JNE

- [Decision No.0107-2025-JNE](#) on electoral surveys during electoral processes.
- [Decision No. 0109-2025-JNE](#) on national and international election observation.
- [Decision No.0049-2024-JNE](#) on regulations for the 2026 primary elections.
- [Decision No. 0108-2025-JNE](#) on Register of Political Organisations.
- [Decision No.01026-2025-JNE](#) on timetable for the 2026 general elections.
- [Decision No. 0164-2025-JNE](#) on registration of candidates and lists for the 2026 general elections.
- [Decision No. 0182-2025-JNE](#) on the regulations for vote recounts (*recuentos*).
- [Decision No. 0167-2025-JNE](#) on candidate's curriculum vitae.
- [Decision No. 0844-2025-JNE](#) on election campaigning, state advertising and neutrality during the election period.

Amendments on Regulations by ONPE

- [Regulation 000030-2025-JN/ONPE](#) on financing and supervision of party funds by ONPE.
- [Regulation 000022-2025-ONPE](#) on the organisation of party primaries.
- [Regulation 000063-2025-ONPE](#) on technical implementation of the primary election process.
- [Regulation 000075-2025-JN/ONPE](#) on vote recounts, storage and destruction of ballot papers.
- [Regulation 000011-2026-JN/ONPE](#) on the media for the 2026 general elections campaign period.

23. ANNEX B – POLITICAL AND CAMPAIGN

Chart 1

Topics mentioned in campaign events

Peru General Elections 2026

■ First round ■ Presidential Run-off





Chart: Source: EU EOM Peru 2026: Campaign reports • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 2

Votes and campaign expenditures

Peru — General Elections 2026




Source: Based on ONPE / JNE data

Chart 3

Measures in place for voters with disabilities

General Elections and Presidential Run-Off. Perú 2026.



Source: EU EOM Peru 2026: E-day forms

Created with Datawrapper

24. ANNEX C – EU EOM MEDIA MONITORING

The EU EOM monitored a sample of national broadcast and print media using standard quantitative and qualitative analysis of their election coverage. The media monitoring team was composed of one media analyst, one media assistant, and six media monitors. The media monitoring included quantitative and qualitative monitoring of six national coverage television channels, three radio stations, and six daily newspapers. Media monitoring aimed to provide reliable data on the distribution of time/space, and tone allocated to candidates/political organisations, public officials, government ministers and other politically relevant subjects, thus assessing whether the media provided information on the contestants in a balanced and fair manner.

The monitoring sample included:

- Television channels: *TVPerú* (state-owned), *América TV* (private), *Latina TV* (private), *ATV* (private), *Panamericana TV* (private), and *Willax TV* (private);
- Radio stations: *Radio Nacional* (state-owned), *RPP* (private), and *Radio Exitosa* (private);
- Daily newspapers: *El Peruano* (state-owned), *El Comercio* (private), *La República* (private), *Correo* (private), *Perú21* (private), and *Trome* (private).

Quantitative and qualitative monitoring was conducted between 11 March and 12 April for the first round, and 9 May and 7 June for the run-off. TV channels were monitored between 18:00 and 24:00 hours, while radio was monitored between 06:00 and 11:00 hours. This report presents media monitoring results related to the coverage of candidates/political organisations and other relevant political actors during the election campaign.

The EU election media monitoring methodology is a mix of quantitative and qualitative assessments (see [Handbook for EU election observation](#), 2025 edition, p. 90).

HOW TO READ THE CHARTS


- The donut/pie charts show the distribution of airtime or space (in percentage) allotted to candidates/political organisations.
- The bar/column charts show the tone of the coverage (negative, neutral, positive) in total and per category, or time of coverage in percentages.
- The time is monitored in seconds for the electronic media and space is measured in cm² for print media.

FIRST-ROUND – MAIN RESULTS

Chart 1

The charts represent proportion of different formats of coverage by kind of programme, on the basis of total coverage per each channel.

Political and electoral coverage by format - TV




11 March - 10 April

Chart: Total airtime: TVPerú 33h 10m 52s; Willax TV 32h 27m 34s; Panamericana TV 20h 26m 33s; ATV 13h 46m 21s; América TV 10h 10m 45s; Latina TV 10h 53m 43s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00-24:00). • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 2

Candidates' coverage by gender - All TV channels



11 March - 10 April

Chart: Total airtime: 95h 46m 52s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00-24:00). • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 3

TVPerú (state-owned) – Coverage of presidential candidates





Chart 4

Private television channels (combined data): Ten most-covered presidential candidates. Note: “Other” represents the combined percentage of media coverage attributed to all presidential candidates outside the top ten.

Combined data private televisions

News and editorial programmes - time of coverage of presidential candidates

■ Rafael Bernardo López Aliaga Cazorla ■ Keiko Sofia Fujimori Higuchi ■ César Acuña Peralta ■ Carlos Gonsalo Álvarez Loayza ■ Jorge Nieto Montesinos ■ Ricardo Pablo Belmont Cassinelli ■ Wolfgang Mario Grozo Costa ■ Pablo Alfonso López Chau Nava ■ Roberto Helbert Sánchez Palomino ■ María Soledad Pérez Tello de Rodríguez ■ Other



11 March - 10 April

Chart: Total airtime: 55h 23m 24s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 24:00) - Source: EU EOM
 Perú 2026 Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper


Chart 5

Private television channels (combined data) – Direct access: Ten most-covered presidential candidates. Note: “Other” represents the combined percentage of media coverage attributed to all presidential candidates outside the top ten.

Combined data private televisions - Direct access

News and editorial programmes - direct speech coverage of presidential candidates

■ Rafael Bernardo López Aliaga Cazorla ■ Keiko Sofia Fujimori Higuchi ■ Carlos Gonsalo Álvarez Loayza ■ Jorge Nieto Montesinos ■ María Soledad Pérez Tello de Rodríguez ■ Luis Fernando Olivera Vega ■ Pitter Enrique Valderrama Peña ■ Mesías Antonio Guevara Amasifuen ■ Ricardo Pablo Belmont Cassinelli ■ Yonhy Lescano Ancieta ■ Other




11 March - 10 April

Chart: Total airtime: 25h 31m 33s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00 - 24:00) - Source: EU EOM
 Perú 2026 Media Monitoring - Created with Datawrapper

Chart 6

Combined data private televisions

News and editorial programmes - tone of coverage of presidential candidates. Ten most covered presidential candidates.



11 March - 10 April


Chart: Total airtime: 55h 23m 24s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00-24:00) • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

RUN-OFF – MAIN RESULTS

Chart 7

The charts represent proportion of different formats of coverage by kind of programme, on the basis of total coverage per each channel.

Political and electoral coverage by format - TV



9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total airtime: TVPerú 19h 59m 49s; Willax TV 24h 13m 42s; Panamericana TV 18h 12m 59s; Latina TV 10h 47m 38s; America TV 10h 09m 11s; ATV 9h 22m 41s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00-24:00). • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 8





Chart 9
TVPerú (state-owned)

TVPerú - news and editorial coverage



TVPerú - tone of coverage

News and editorial programmes

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive





Chart 10
Willax TV (private)

Willax TV - news and editorial coverage



Willax TV - tone of coverage

News and editorial programmes

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive






Chart 11
Panamericana TV (private)

Panamericana TV - news and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 18h 12m 59s. Based on size in number of seconds • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Panamericana TV - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 18h 12m 59s. Based on size in number of seconds • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Chart 12
Latina TV (private)

Latina TV - news and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 10h 47m 38s. Based on size in number of seconds • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Latina TV - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 10h 47m 38s. Based on size in number of seconds • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Chart 13
América TV (private)

América TV - news and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 10h 09m 11s. Based on size in number of seconds • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


América TV - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 10h 09m 11s. Based on size in number of seconds. Monitoring slot (18:00-24:00) • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 14
ATV (private)

ATV TV - news and editorial coverage




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total airtime: 9h 22m 41s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

ATV TV - tone of coverage

News and editorial programmes

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total airtime: 9h 22m 41s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 15
Radio Nacional (state-owned)

Radio Nacional - news and editorial coverage




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total airtime: 12h 06m 58s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Radio Nacional - tone of coverage

News and editorial programmes

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total airtime: 12h 06m 58s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 16
Radio RPP (private)

Radio RPP - news and editorial coverage




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total airtime: 17h 49m 20s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Radio RPP - tone of coverage

News and editorial programmes

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total airtime: 17h 49m 20s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Perú 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Chart 17
Radio Exitosa (private)

Radio Exitosa - news and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 23h 24m 01s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Radio Exitosa - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total airtime: 23h 24m 01s. Based on size in number of seconds. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Chart 18
El Peruano (state-owned)

Newspaper El Peruano - News and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 35,008 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Newspaper El Peruano - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 35,008 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Chart 19
El Comercio (private)

Newspaper El Comercio - News and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 69,532 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Newspaper El Comercio - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 69,532 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 20
La República (private)

Newspaper La República - News and editorial coverage




9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 65,083 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Newspaper La República - tone of coverage

News and editorial coverage

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total space: 65,083 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Chart 21
Perú21 (private)

Newspaper Perú21 - News and editorial coverage




9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 49,622 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Newspaper Perú21 - tone of coverage

News and editorial coverage

■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive




9 May - 5 June

Chart: Total space: 49,622 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Chart 22
Correo (private)

Newspaper Correo - News and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 45,234 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Newspaper Correo - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 45,234 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper


Chart 23
Trome (private)

Newspaper Trome - News and editorial coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 16,816 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

Newspaper Trome - tone of coverage



9 May - 5 June
Chart: Total space: 16,816 cm2. Based on size in number of cm2. • Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Media Monitoring • Created with Datawrapper

25. ANNEX D – EU EOM SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING

1. EU EOM Social Media Monitoring Methodology

The EU EOM Social Media Monitoring Unit (SMMU) analysed the digital information environment during the general elections and presidential run-off, in line with the EU EOM Digital Observation Guidelines. Monitoring covered public content on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and X.

The monitoring period covered the first-round campaign and immediate post-electoral period from 10 March to 19 April, and the presidential run-off campaign and immediate post-electoral period from 7 May to 14 June. Monitoring included official accounts of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, political parties and electoral bodies, as well as broader election-related discourse identified through selected keywords and hashtags. In total, the SMMU qualitatively analysed 4,725 posts and conducted quantitative analysis of 737,253 posts and comments.

Core accounts tracked on monitored platforms

Official accounts monitored systematically and selected political commentators analysed qualitatively

Actor	Facebook	Instagram	X	TikTok
Presidential candidates	34	34	32	34
Political parties	36	32	33	34
Electoral bodies	3	3	3	3
Influencers/Political commentators	5		7	4

Source: EU EOM Peru 2026 Social Media Monitoring Unit • Created with Datawrapper

Most datasets were collected through the social listening tool SentiOne and manually coded by the SMMU. For official accounts of candidates and political parties, the team generally analysed the five daily posts with the highest engagement rate per platform, based on SentiOne engagement rankings. For broader online discourse, the team analysed the three daily posts with the highest number of interactions according to SentiOne metrics by platform, selected through manually defined keywords and hashtags linked to relevant electoral developments. For the official accounts of the two run-off finalists, all posts published during the monitored campaign period were analysed.

Posts were coded by platform, actor, topic, type of publication, source, tone, target of mention and risk indicators. Risk indicators included fraud narratives, disinformation, attacks on electoral institutions or officials, offensive or discriminatory discourse and manipulation of information. Some variables allowed more than one value per post, meaning that counts refer to mentions or coded observations rather than necessarily to unique publications.

Additional thematic monitoring was conducted for specific areas of concern. Offensive and discriminatory discourse was assessed through advanced SentiOne queries and a context-specific lexicon of pejorative terms. Broader narrative and network analysis used recoded actor and target variables to identify patterns of amplification, mentions and attacks across platforms.

Paid political advertising and third-party attack activity were monitored separately, using Who Targets Me, the Meta Ad Library, Apify and Exolyt. Advertisers were classified manually as candidates, political parties, supporters or detractors. Data analysis and visualisation were conducted using Python, RStudio, 4CAT, Gephi and Datawrapper.

The monitoring prioritised high-engagement and high-visibility content and should not be read as a complete census of all election-related social media activity. Platform limitations, deleted posts and differences in data availability mean that findings reflect the most visible and relevant online dynamics identified through the SMMU methodology.

2. Digital campaign

The two reference networks show the highest-engagement posts by candidates and running mates about competitors, allies, institutions, political groups and campaign themes. During the first round, references were spread across a wider field of candidates and political actors, reflecting the fragmented and saturated nature of the race. Rafael López-Aliaga and Keiko Fujimori stood out as frequent reference points, often attracting negative mentions from rivals, both as political competitors and as points of comparison in campaign debates. Several candidates with lower overall visibility generated high engagement through more direct or confrontational messaging, particularly when posting about opponents, corruption, insecurity or broader anti-establishment themes.

Reference network of presidential candidates during the first round

Top 5 daily publications with the highest engagement rate on TikTok, Facebook, Instagram and X (10/03 – 19/04)




Chart: MOEUE Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit

The second-round network was much more concentrated, reflecting the head-to-head contest between the two remaining candidates. Sánchez was the most active source of references and directed many negative mentions towards Fujimori, Miguel Torres, *Fuerza Popular*, media actors and broader political narratives. At the same time, his posts also included positive references to left-leaning allies and members of his technical team. Fujimori's references were fewer and generally more focused on campaign mobilisation, social groups, supporters and political allies. Taken together, the charts indicate that candidate activity in the run-off was more polarised and ideologically sharper than in the first round, but still largely framed as campaign competition. References to electoral authorities and allegations of electoral fraud appeared only marginally in the run-off candidates' most engaging posts, confirming that the more explicit attempts to question the legitimacy of the electoral process, identified elsewhere in the online information environment, were not primarily driven through the official accounts of the presidential finalists.

Reference network of presidential candidates during the second round

On Facebook, Instagram, X and TikTok (07/05 – 14/06)




Chart: MOEUE Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit

3. Electoral discourse

The two networks show the broader electoral discourse captured through keyword-based monitoring of the highest-interaction posts. In the first round, the conversation was more dispersed, but Rafael López-Aliaga, Keiko Fujimori, César Acuña, *La Republica*, ONPE, and several political commentators and influencer accounts generated substantial interaction across the network. Media outlets and

Electoral discourse on social media during the first round

Top 3 daily publications with the most interactions on TikTok, Facebook, Instagram and X (10/03 – 19/04)




Chart: MOEUE Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit

Electoral discourse on social media during the second round

Top 3 daily publications with the most interactions on TikTok, Facebook, Instagram and X (07/05 – 14/06)




Chart: MOEUE Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit

journalists played a particularly important role in shaping visibility and engagement, attracting large volumes of attention and interaction across different parts of the network. Much of the activity was negative or neutral, reflecting a campaign environment where electoral competition, media attitudes, criticism of candidates and early questioning of the process were closely intertwined. The first-round network also highlighted the prominence of anti-establishment narratives and criticism directed at both political elites and institutions, contributing to a fragmented and highly contested online debate.

In the second round, the network became more concentrated around Keiko Fujimori and Roberto Sánchez, but the wider discourse did not simply mirror the candidates' own communication. Media outlets and influencer accounts remained highly visible, while Rafael López-Aliaga continued to appear as an important actor despite not being in the run-off. The large quantity of red arrows around the main nodes shows the strongly adversarial tone of the conversation, with both finalists attracting negative references. At the same time, the second-round network shows the ONPE and JNE becoming more visible in the discussion, reflecting the growing prominence of fraud narratives immediately after the first round. The general online discourse was broader, more negative and more institution-focused than the candidates' own posts. While the finalists mainly used their accounts for campaign messages and mobilisation, the wider information environment gave greater prominence to fraud narratives, criticism of electoral bodies, media commentary and polarising political debate.

4. Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour surrounding fraud narratives

Mentions of “fraud” were marginal during most of the first-round campaign, but increased sharply after election day. During the second round, the narrative remained at higher and more sustained levels from the start of the monitoring period, confirming its continuity as one of the main axes of online electoral debate.

Frequency of mentions of 'fraud' during the first round

in Facebook, Instagram, X and TikTok from 10/03 to 19/04/2026.




Chart: EUEOM Peru 2026 Social Media Monitoring Unit • Created with Datawrapper

Frequency of mentions of 'fraud' during the second round

in Facebook, Instagram, X and TikTok from 07/05 to 06/06/2026.





Chart: EUEOM Peru 2026 Social Media Monitoring Unit • Created with Datawrapper

Network analysis of X posts mentioning “*fraude*” during the first round showed that fraud-related discourse was largely concentrated in the immediate post-electoral period, when allegations about irregularities gained visibility online. Using SentiOne data and Gephi network analysis, the Mission examined accounts that posted more than five times on the topic between 10 March and 19 April. The resulting mention network showed the JNE and ONPE as the most frequently targeted institutional

Network of mentions by actors with more than 5 publications about 'Fraud' during the first round

10/03/2026 —19/04/2026



accounts, alongside other public institutions, political actors, media figures and international references.

The network suggested two related but distinct clusters of conversation. One centred on Peruvian electoral and state institutions, including the JNE and ONPE. A second cluster connected the fraud narrative to broader international political references and ideological actors. This structure indicated that fraud allegations were not only directed at the administration of the Peruvian electoral process, but were also embedded in a wider political discourse questioning institutional legitimacy.

The analysis also identified repeated posting patterns consistent with coordinated or inauthentic amplification. One account, for example, published the same allegation around 60 times, often within seconds and tagging different institutional, media and political accounts. Further review found at least 35 accounts displaying similar behaviour, characterised by frequent, repetitive posts directed at electoral bodies, media outlets and politically aligned influencers. These patterns suggested an attempt to artificially increase the visibility of fraud narratives and shape public perception of the electoral process.

Example of publications from a user exhibiting inorganic behavior

10/03/2026 —19/04/2026

william 759 (@william759)	@ugluis @caro60 la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean minimosy la izqu...	2026-04-12 22:44:11
william 759 (@william759)	@willaxtv @lillianromerof la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean minim...	2026-04-12 22:43:52
william 759 (@william759)	@eduardomenoni @nova_1530 la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean minim...	2026-04-12 22:43:12
william 759 (@william759)	@riopezaliaga1 la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean minimosy la izqu...	2026-04-12 22:42:56
william 759 (@william759)	@marthachavezc @pochasesarego @onpe_oficial la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de ...	2026-04-12 22:42:44
william 759 (@william759)	@riopezaliaga1 la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean minimosy la izqu...	2026-04-12 22:37:55
william 759 (@william759)	@pcmperu @jne_pe la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean minimosy la iz...	2026-04-12 22:37:23
william 759 (@william759)	@marita_molina4 @onpe_oficial @renovacion_peru @fuerzapopular_ la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el ...	2026-04-12 22:37:02
william 759 (@william759)	@ugluis la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean minimosy la izquierda s...	2026-04-12 22:36:43
william 759 (@william759)	@juanitareategui @giova_18 @keikofujimori @marthachavezc @mikitorresfp la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para ...	2026-04-12 22:36:16
william 759 (@william759)	@altuvepe la orden para el fraude en lima no repartan materiales de votacion lleven tarde el material de votacion para asi el bolson electoral de rla y k sean	2026-04-12 22:35:58

5. Offensive content during the second round

During the first round, offensive discourse remained relatively stable and was directed mainly at ideological labels, rather than at individual candidates. In the second round, the volume of offensive content remained comparatively limited, but became more clearly concentrated on the two presidential tickets and increased towards the end of the campaign.

Roberto Sánchez was by far the main target, receiving more than 70 per cent of the identified offensive posts. Most attacks against him were framed around political ideology, using anti-left labels and associations rather than personal characteristics. Keiko Fujimori was the second most targeted candidate, while Brígida Curo received a smaller but significant share of attacks, many of which had racist, classist or ethnic-national undertones. X was the main platform for this type of discourse, accounting for the overwhelming majority of identified offensive posts.

Posts with offensive content towards candidates during the second round

430 posts identified in Facebook, Instagram, X and TikTok from 07/05 to 07/06/2026.




Chart: EUEOM Peru 2026 Social Media Monitoring Unit • Created with Datawrapper

Most prevalent types of offensive content in publications during second round

430 posts in Facebook, Instagram, X and TikTok from 07/05 to 07/06/2026.





Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 Social Media Monitoring Unit • Created with Datawrapper

6. Political advertising in Meta

Meta advertising was used in both rounds, but the pattern of spending changed significantly. In the first round, most recorded spending came from parties and candidates, with parties accounting for the largest share. Spending was concentrated among a small number of well-funded actors, with most official advertising focused on campaign visibility, mobilisation and policy messages, although some cases raised concerns, including third-party or institutional spending in support of candidates, as well as misleading paid content.


Sources of political advertising in Meta

11/03/2026-11/04/2026



First Round

06/05/2026-06/06/2026



Second Round

Parties Candidates Third-party

Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit • Source: WhoTargetsMe • Created with Datawrapper

Third-party advertising, particularly attack ads, was a defining feature of the campaign. In the first round, third-party pages represented a limited share of total spending, but were already active in negative campaigning. In the second round, despite a lower overall volume of Meta spending, third-party actors became the largest source of political advertising, accounting for almost two thirds of recorded expenditure. Most of this spending was directed towards attack ads targeting Roberto

Sánchez, *Juntos por el Perú* and the left more broadly, often through anti-communist or anti-socialist narratives.

Several third-party pages presented themselves as media or information pages rather than campaign actors, some were recently created, and some were administered partly from outside Peru. Their paid content amplified polarising messages, especially against the left, and often used emotional or alarmist framing underscoring the growing role of third-party attack pages in shaping the online campaign environment.

Distribution of advertising in Meta by political parties during the first round (in PEN)

11/03/2026 - 11/04/2026




Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit - Source: WhoTargetsMe - Created with Datawrapper

Distribution of advertising in Meta by political parties during the second round (in PEN)

06/05/2026 - 06/06/2026



Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit - Source: WhoTargetsMe - Created with Datawrapper

Distribution of political advertising in Meta by candidates during the first round (in PEN)

11/03/2026 - 11/04/2026




Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit - Source: WhoTargetsMe - Created with Datawrapper

Distribution of political advertising in Meta by candidates during the second round (in PEN)

06/05/2026 - 06/06/2026




Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit - Source: WhoTargetsMe - Created with Datawrapper

Distribution of political advertising in Meta by third-party actors during the first round (in PEN)

11/03/2026 - 11/04/2026



Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit - Source: WhoTargetsMe - Created with Datawrapper

Distribution of political advertising in Meta by third-party actors during the second round (in PEN)

06/05/2026 - 06/06/2026



Chart: EU EOM Peru 2026 - Social Media Monitoring Unit - Source: WhoTargetsMe - Created with Datawrapper

26. ANNEX E – FINAL ELECTION RESULTS

Congressional elections – 12 April 2026

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES	
Political organisation	Number of seats
Fuerza Popular	41
Juntos por el Perú	32
Partido del Buen Gobierno	18
Renovación Popular	15
Partido Cívico OBRAS	14
Ahora Nación	10
Total	130

SENATE			
Political organisation	Number of seats won in the national constituency	Number of seats won in regional constituencies	Total
Fuerza Popular	7	15	21
Juntos por el Perú	5	9	14
Renovación Popular	5	3	8
Partido del Buen Gobierno	5	2	7
Partido Cívico OBRAS	4	1	5
Ahora Nación	4	0	4
Total	30	30	60

Elections to Andean Parliament – 12 April 2026

ANDEAN PARLIAMENT	
Political organisation	Number of seats
Fuerza Popular	1
Juntos por el Perú	1
Partido del Buen Gobierno	1
Renovación Popular	1
Partido Cívico OBRAS	1
Total	5

Presidential elections, first round – 12 April 2026

	Percentage of valid votes	Percentage of cast votes
Keiko Fujimori Higuchi	17.19	14.27
Roberto Sánchez Palomino	12.04	9.99
Rafael López-Aliaga Cazorla	11.91	9.89
Jorge Nieto Montesinos	10.98	9.11
Ricardo Belmont Cassinelli	10.15	8.42
Carlos Álvarez Loayza	7.93	6.58
Alfonso López-Chau Nava	7.30	6.06
Marisol Pérez Tello	3.41	2.83
Carlos Espá y Garcés-Alvear	3.35	2.78
Fernando Olivera Vega	1.84	1.53
José Luna Gálvez	1.59	1.32
Yonhy Lescano Ancieta	1.28	1.07
César Acuña Peralta	1.15	0.96
Enrique Valderrama Peña	0.96	0.80
George Forsyth Sommer	0.92	0.76
Herbert Caller Gutiérrez	0.86	0.72
Mario Vizcarra Cornejo	0.86	0.71
Ronald Atencio Sotomayor	0.84	0.70
Rosario Fernández Bazán	0.77	0.64
Charlie Carrasco Salazar	0.71	0.59
Vladimir Cerrón Rojas	0.60	0.50
Mesías Guevara Amasifuén	0.49	0.41
Roberto Chiabra León	0.41	0.34
Paul Jaimes Blanco	0.40	0.33
Alex Gonzales Castillo	0.38	0.32
Wolfgang Grozo Costa	0.38	0.32
Rafael Belaunde Llosa	0.24	0.20
José Williams Zapata	0.20	0.16
Francisco Diez Canseco Távara	0.19	0.16
Fiorella Molinelli Aristondo	0.16	0.14
Álvaro Paz de la Barra Frigerio	0.14	0.12
Armando Massé Fernández	0.13	0.11
Antonio Ortiz Villano	0.11	0.09
Walter Chirinos Purisaca	0.09	0.07
Carlos Jaico Carranza	0.06	0.05
Napoleón Becerra García	0.00	0.00
Blank votes		11.77
Spoiled ballots		5.24

Presidential elections, second round – 7 June 2026

	Number of received votes	Percentage of valid votes	Percentage of cast votes
Keiko Fujimori Higuchi	9,223,396	50.13	46.86
Roberto Helbert Sánchez Palomino	9,173,755	49.86	46.61
Blank votes	118,396		0.60
Spoiled ballots	1,167,836		5.93

