A military contribution to the Spanish Presidency of the EU

EU builds strategic autonomy through international partnership

A new security paradigm for the EU
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**EU MILITARY FORUM**

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Dear friends and colleagues,

The summer has been rather hot. Climate warming and El Nino, a cyclical climatic phenomenon that warms the Pacific Ocean, both contributed to the extreme temperatures, which led to the hottest June ever recorded in Europe. Cerberus, a high-pressure anticyclone named after the Greek mythology underworld protector, approached from the south, early July, followed by Charon, as the ferryman who transported souls from the living to the dead world. Several areas of Greece, Spain, and Italy suffered temperatures higher than 45 degrees. Phenomena that will increase in frequency and intensity, unfortunately, according to scientists.

But the summer hasn’t simply been hot because of the weather. Since the publication of the previous issue of our magazine, there have been some events related to international security at different level, which could bring consequences, in the long run, yet to be evaluated.

If I had to name just a few, I would say that the Coup d’Etat in Niger, the death of Wagner leader, the BRICS Summit, and the G20 would in chronological order be the four highlights of the last couple of months.

On July 26, Niger’s government was overthrown. Several countries and organizations have since then suspended their relations with Niger and closed their land and air borders with the country. This latest coup was a major blow to Niger, the Sahel region, and West Africa, as a whole. The world community is keenly observing the incident and attempting to assess its medium- to long-term implications for a variety of reasons: Niger’s location at the intersection of North, West, and Central Africa; its potential for renewable energies and mineral and oil resources; and the risk of increasing terrorist activities and Wagner influence. In sum, a crucial figure in African chessboard, from several strategic perspectives, whose destiny has potential repercussion on the regional security scenario, and beyond.

It is perhaps too early to predict the effects that the alleged death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the commander of the Wagner Group, would have on the broader Russian strategy and elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the accident of August 23rd took away from Putin a strong and skilled player who had shown his value by leading his forces into some of the deadliest engagements of the Ukraine War, while furthering Russian interests throughout Africa, notably in the Sahel. In the upcoming weeks or months, we will find out what the Wagner Group is still capable of.

On a different front, the BRICS Summit (South Africa, 22–24 August 23) brought up the issue of a fluid geopolitical order once again, where adaptations of international ties and balances may be read positively if they would result in more stability, but this is something that remains to be carefully monitored for potential shifts in power. One of the key outcomes, in fact, was the choice to add Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to the group. Does the
post-World War II system seem to have recognized the multipolar reality and adapt to the new circumstances? Very difficult to determine what these new relationships’ true implications will be, at the moment.

Finally, the G20 (New Delhi, 9–10 September 2023), an economic and political conference, where disagreements over how to criticize Russian aggression and the conflict in Ukraine represented a major obstacle to reaching a consensus on the final statement. The first declarations stated, referring implicitly to the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, that “Today’s era must not be of war.” The main global powers acknowledged that the ongoing war has a detrimental impact on supply chains, macrofinancial stability, inflation, and growth, according to the G20 Declaration. And therefore on international order, I would add.

Now, looking ahead, while we can’t help but enjoy the fall’s lower temperatures, we also wish for positive advancements in times of adversity. Similar to my previous attempt of looking at past events, I will now list few key, upcoming events.

First, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, September 19–26, New York City), ongoing as we prepare to publish this edition of the EU Military Forum. Given Russia’s recent presidency of the UN Security Council (UNSC), tensions were expected to remain high at this year’s session. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated debates on UN reform, even if a comprehensive UNSC reform is virtually impossible to implement since it would require support from two-thirds of member countries and all permanent UNSC members. Other significant issues at the UN might be the resumption of grain commerce in the Black Sea, recent coups in Niger and Gabon, and Ethiopia’s ongoing power struggles. The outcomes of the UNGA will definitely be relevant for all of us.

Another significant occasion will be the COP 28 (November 30 - December 12, Dubai). The UN Climate Change Conference faces this year challenges like exceptionally high temperatures, a declining Gulf Stream, and a profusion of wildfires. The recent dramatic floods in Libya are again a call to action that cannot remain unanswered. This year’s COP is crucial in demonstrating nations’ political commitment on de-carbonization and climate change mitigation measures. Yet, insufficient research and investments have been done on the relationship between security and climate change. We should all raise our voices, in this regard.

Final point, of course, the development of the war in Ukraine, which has proven to be an attrition-based conflict, and continues to hang as a dark shadow, with calls for a “just peace” coming from all directions. In this regard, it is crucial to stress that with all the resources and tools that have been approved by the Member States, the EU will continue to support Ukraine right to defend itself and its territorial integrity, as long as it takes. By no means can the idea be accepted that one country may use force to acquire a geographical advantage over another. We cannot afford to accept or carry along this terrible inheritance to history, and to future generations. Ukraine’s sovereignty under international law must not and shall not be questioned.
Of direct interest for the EU Military Committee and the whole military community, in the near future, we now anticipate the first Live Exercise by the EU in Spain as a significant turning point in our development as a reliable, widely respected security partner and supplier. This is also a crucial component of the ongoing Strategic Compass’ implementation. A lot has been achieved, and much more is within our reach, based on a convinced commitment by all Member States.

We look forward to our next EU Military Committee meeting at Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) level, in October, the very first away from Brussels. Hosted by Spain, in Seville, we will discuss several topics which are paramount in the EU security and defense domain. Inter alia, the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), the Capability Development Plan, the situation in Ukraine and in Sahel. This EUMC Meeting at CHODs level will be preceded by the EUMC Away Days in Madrid, another opportunity provided by the Spanish Presidency of the EU Council, where we will deal with Space and the EU engagement in the Sahel region.

At the time this Magazine will be in your hands, we would have already discussed with the Political Security Committee (PSC) the implementation of the RDC, and about to conduct the Post Allocation Conference on the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the Force Generation Conference and a Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on Defence.

In regard to diplomatic engagements, as you can see also from the News section, I will continue the bilateral meeting with EU and Partner Countries CHODs. I was recently in Moldova, and I am planning to pay official visit to Belgium, Romania, Greece, Estonia, and the Netherlands, before the end of the year.

In the meantime, the EU Military Committee that I have the privilege to chair, will continue its daily commitment on several urgent topics like, inter alia, how to enhance our effectiveness in the EU decision-making process, and constantly reviewing our Common Security and Defence (CSDP) military missions and operations, for improved effectiveness.

And I conclude with our sincere hope that the subjects covered in this edition of the EU Military Forum will trigger your interest, again. Our objective remains the same: continue to foster and consolidate a stronger European defence culture, by offering some thoughts for your reflection.

Enjoy the reading!

Yours, General Robert Brieger
Spain has just started the hectic period of the European Union’s Presidency, an occasion that the Spanish Armed Forces will try to use to reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). To this end, the Spanish Joint Headquarters has developed an ambitious plan in line with the priorities of the Ministry of Defence and those of the Government. 

Our main goal is to boost some lines of effort already in progress -those that we consider more relevant in view of the current strategic context- together with some other emanating from our Mediterranean and Atlantic vision of Europe. 

It is always difficult to achieve the perfect balance between assuming as many important issues as possible and putting the focus on some specific topics that require immediate action by the EU, but we are confident that we will be able to make important progress throughout.

To this effect we propose to work on the following areas:

### CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGIC COMPASS

Given the amplitude of the Strategic Compass we will put the focus on the following issues: improving EU’s Command and Control, bolstering the development of the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) and enhancing EU Military Missions Effectiveness, including our support to Ukraine.

More specifically, our goal is to facilitate that the decision to separate the EUMS and the MPCC could be made during the SP presidency of the Council, as well as encouraging the provision of the required manning, communications and infrastructure to the MPCC. Additionally, the Spanish Joint Staff is working on a proposal to increase the relevance of the European Union Military Committee.

Spanish Joint Staff

The Joint Defence Staff (EMACON) is the Spanish CHOD’s auxiliary command body in the exercise of its powers and responsibilities. It will act as the main coordinator of the Spanish Defence general activities.
(EUMC) as an entity entitled with the "military direction of all military activities within the EU framework"\(^1\).

Regarding the RDC one important step forward this year will be the execution of the exercise MILEX/LIVEX 23, which will take place in Cádiz in October, becoming the first tangible milestone in the development of the capacity.

Together with this we will also make an effort to improve the effectiveness of EU’s Military Missions and Operations, based on the recommendations included in the "Concept for enhancing EU Military Missions Effectiveness" of March 22nd, most of them conducted in complex scenarios like the Sahel, Central African Republic or the support to Ukraine in the context of the devastating Russian invasion.


**FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS**

Free access to global commons is critical for different sectors of the EU, including security and defence. To this end, important developments are taking place in the maritime and space domains and we believe that a contribution from the military side of the house would be important.

In fact, the new *EU's Maritime Security Strategy and the Space Strategy for*...
Security and Defence developed by the European External Action Service and the Commission could be complemented by a contribution from the EUMC, in order to incorporate those lessons identified during recent and current conflicts.

We would also like to mention other important maritime initiatives like the Coordinated Maritime Presences, in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Northwest Indian Ocean, where additional improvements based on the experience gained so far could be incorporated. The Spanish Joint Staff is already working on concrete ideas and proposals to stimulate the discussions on these matters.

The evolution and refocusing of Operation ATALANTA and the improvement of EU’s ciberdefence capabilities will be also among our priorities in this field for the upcoming Presidency.

TO FACILITATE THE PARTICIPATION OF IBERO-AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN CSDP MISSIONS, OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS THE COOPERATION WITH INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERS IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN

The cooperation with Ibero-American countries is part of the EU’s external action and is especially dear for Spain. Some of these countries have concluded agreements establishing a framework for their participation in CSDP missions and operations in the past and we will try to find new opportunities. Some Indo-Pacific countries have also showed interest in cooperating at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and we will also try to exploit this opportunity.

To make all this happen, the Spanish Joint Staff and the Spanish MILREP have developed an ambitious programme, including meetings, conferences, seminars, exercises and other activities. At the forefront of these activities will be the EUMC meeting at Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) level that will take place in Seville in October. The meeting will run in parallel with the LIVEX exercise so the CHODs can have the opportunity to participate in the Distinguished Visitors Day.

We are fully confident that this programme and the common effort of the Member States will allow us to give the CSDP an important push during the next six months building on the excellent work done by Sweden.

¡Bienvenidos a España!
CSDP has undergone a transformation under the leadership of High Representative Josep Borrell. Few would have predicted just four years ago how important a contribution CSDP would make to Europe’s security. The geographic focus of both civilian and military CSDP has shifted decisively to our eastern flank to meet the most significant threat to Europe’s peace and security since the Second World War. The scope and adaptability of the CSDP instrument has been thoroughly tested to meet the new level of threat. With 22 missions and operations (including 13 civilian missions) currently deployed on three continents, the EU is more active than ever as a global security provider. On the military side, we now deliver - through the EU Military Advisory Mission to Ukraine and the European Peace Facility - a train and equip package to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian aggression. On the civilian side, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) on the reform of the security sector in Ukraine is the first ever CSDP mission to operate in a country under direct attack by a Third State aggressor. In Georgia, Armenia and now Moldova, we stand by our partners, committed to their long term stability and security.

Over the last 20 years, Civilian CSDP has often lead the way in the development of CSDP practices, setting precedents for the military side to follow. The first ever CSDP mission, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia/Herzegovina, was a civilian mission. The civilian missions in Kosovo and Georgia still stand today as benchmarks for successful on-the-ground EU response to specific foreign policy and security challenges. At the organizational level, civilian CSDP has also often made first tracks. 16 years ago, it was the first to develop a dedicated headquarters capability, the Civilian Conduct and Planning Capability (CPCC), which I am proud to lead in my double-hatted capacity as
Civilian Operations Commander for all our civilian missions, and managing Director CPCC. CPCC served as an inspiration for the later establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). But in recent years the development of military CSDP has undoubtedly shifted into a higher gear. Member States have now moved to match this progress with further advances in civilian CSDP capabilities. This should unlock the full potential of CSDP as a joined up EU security instrument and flagship of the EU’s integrated approach, in line with the broader objectives of the Strategic Compass.

CIVILIAN COMPACT PROVIDES NEW IMPETUS

The May 2023 Civilian Compact adopted by the Member States tackles the need for improved civilian CSDP capability head-on.

Once fully implemented, the Compact should deliver more effective, adaptable and robust civilian missions, ready to meet the challenges of the new global security environment. As part of the Compact, the Member States and relevant EU institutional actors have signed up to 20 concrete commitments, in line with their respective prerogatives. These include: developing the capacities and capabilities that civilian missions now need to fulfil their mandates; establishing CPCC as a fully-fledged civilian headquarters; improved decision making; enhancing national systems dedicated to CSDP (spread across various ministries and agencies); and enhancing responsiveness by being able to deploy 200 civilian security experts in a crisis area within 30 days. In a nutshell, the new Civilian Compact will make Civilian CSDP a more potent instrument at the service of European security interests and better equipped to meet the security needs of our partners.

Of particular interest is what the Compact says about civ-mil cooperation. Under Commitment 6, civilian CSDP stakeholders will “foster synergies and complementarity between the civilian and military dimensions of CSDP, and between security and defence initiatives under the Strategic Compass, including in areas of policy, training and exercises and the planning and conduct of missions and operations, in accordance with the relevant legal and financial provisions.”

CIV-MIL COMBINED EFFECT

The Member States commitment to civ/mil cooperation stems from an understanding that crisis situations need to be addressed through the broad variety of instruments at the EU’s disposal, through the Integrated Approach. And this includes both the civilian and military components of CSDP. More often than not, the root of a security crisis is broad and to deal with it effectively one needs to follow a holistic approach.

So the message is clear. The Member States expect us to come forward with proposals to further develop combined civ/mil cooperation and complementarity and achieve a result-enhancing Combined Effect. How should we approach this challenge?

Civilian and military missions are already deployed in the same theatre in Somalia, the Central African Republic, Mali and Niger, and share common areas of interest in Ukraine and Libya. Our missions already exchange information on the ground and the Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) provides an important platform for civ-mil coordination in headquarters. But I believe that more can be done both on the ground and in HQ to enhance CSDP crisis management capability in the future.

The initial remit of the JSCC was to coordinate and pool resources in a limited number of logistical areas rather than act as a coordinating body for across the board civ-mil coordination. Under the impetus of EEAS Deputy Secretary General Charles Fries, a paper was presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with concrete proposals to broaden and deepen the scope of civ-mil coordination and broaden the JSCC remit. The paper included proposals for some coordination on operational activities linked to mandate delivery. Against this background, new developments are tak-
Participation in the JSCC has been expanded to ensure a more systematic approach to coordination: EUMS now participates, bringing naval operations Atlanta and Irini into the orbit of civ-mil coordination for the first time. We have increased information sharing on the ground between military and civilian missions. In Africa, EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia have drawn up a joint plan to showcase best practice in sharing of expertise and to consider joint training modules with local counterparts. This experience should provide MPCC and CPCC with further ideas on how to develop similar types of cooperation in other theatres in the future. Certainly more could be done in the Sahel should the political and security context allow. Further reflection is also ongoing on the JSCC terms of reference to explore how it can better contribute to the improved efficiency and reach of CSDP action.

For the first time, the EU is planning a joint civil/military initiative for a Security and Defence Partnership with West African Countries of the Gulf of Guinea. A groundbreaking joint civilian/military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is in the pipeline. I have no doubt that this initiative will prove a valuable testing ground for the further development of civilian military corporation, both in the planning phase and on the ground.

We need to look beyond the civilian and military silos if we want to harness the full potential of CSDP as the EU’s preeminent security instrument. Certainly, the scope and prominence of headquarter coordination is destined to increase as both MPCC and CPCC complete their transition to fully operational headquarters. I look forward to working closely with DGEUMS and Director MPCC, Lieutenant-General Michiel Van Der Laan, in the coming months to bring forward practical proposals for operational synergies to enhance the effect of deployed assets and better achieve mutually reinforcing and coherent mandates.

LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD

In certain specific scenarios, large scale combined military and civilian CSDP action (in the form of a hybrid mission) may provide a possible way forward, but for now this remains a tantalising prospect. In other more conventional scenarios, civilian and military missions or operations will work together, as opposed to individually as is currently the case, to achieve a single coherent effect. Our cultures, decision making processes and chains of command are distinct. But we should not allow these differences to separate us from our strategic goals.
EU BUILDS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

COMMISSIONER’S OP-ED FOR THE EU MILITARY FORUM

By Mrs. Jutta Urpilainen

The global security order is in flux. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a profound shift in the geopolitical and geoeconomic approach of the European Union and the EU’s partner countries. It has ushered us in a new geopolitical era. War in Europe is a global crisis that affects our partners directly. It has showcased that security is about much more than only military actions. In all our future policy considerations, we ought to factor in the concept of overall security.

Both the European Union and our partners must strengthen their strategic autonomy, reduce dependencies, and reinforce international partnerships. The comprehensive way we respond to Russia’s aggression will help to determine the future of our Union, our continent, and the entire international system.

In these perilous times, when the planet and its people are struggling to cope with cross border challenges, the European Union’s role is critical. There can be no peace without development, and no development without peace.

USING THE WHOLE TOOLBOX FOR PEACE AND STABILITY

Instability and conflict often result from chronic fragility, political crisis, the impact of climate change, and poverty. Our work on international partnerships addresses these root causes. We work on building resilience and preventing instability. We support democratic participation and human rights. We fight inequality. We empower women, young people and minorities. We create sense of belonging and try to stop vicious cycles leading to radicalisation. We boost universal access to basic services, like healthcare and education. And we support reforms in the security sector.

With the EU’s support in fragile states, we help people meet their basic needs and prevent the state from collapsing. We help build the country’s long-term resilience and strengthen its economy, paving the way for sustainable development and peace.

To implement the EU’s strategic goals of peace and security, we are using all the tools at our disposal to strengthen all dimensions of foreign policy in line with our values. With a budget of nearly €80 billion for 2021-2027, our NDICI-Global Europe financial instrument supports those countries most in need.

It includes a rapid response mechanism of more than €3 billion. This allows us to swiftly address crises and contribute to peace and stability. We have added an additional €9 billion to allow the European Union to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances and new challenges.

Mrs. Jutta Urpilainen

Finnish politician, she was the Minister of Finance of Finland from 2011 to 2014. Since 1 December 2019, she is the European Commissioner for International Partnerships in the European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen.
We are also using our Capacity Building in support of Development for Security and Development (CBDSD) programme to create safe areas and promote economic development. CBDSD projects support armed forces as enablers for development when there is a threat to the existence of functioning state institutions or to human rights and fundamental freedoms.

For example, in Ivory Coast, we work together as Team Europe to deliver a 4-year and €10 million Peace and Stability Programme. It will strengthen the armed forces in the most dangerous and remote areas of the country, and the internal security forces in the country’s northern districts. It will also enable the local population to access basic services such as food for their families and health care more easily.

GLOBAL GATEWAY
BOOSTING STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

Our innovative EU Global Gateway strategy is connecting the world in a sustainable manner, using a €300 billion infrastructure investment model. It boosts smart, clean and secure links in strategic sectors - digitalisation, energy and transport - and strengthens health, education and research systems across the world. It is an ambitious approach to promoting sustainable economic growth and peace on the planet, creating links with partners, not dependencies.

Through Global Gateway we are enabling partner countries to become more resilient and to boost their sustainable development in strategic sectors. By doing so, these countries are better able to strengthen their economies and create much-needed jobs. With more revenues and more employment comes more stability and security.

Global Gateway takes a 360-degree approach. It is not just about building the hard infrastructure of bridges, dams and roads. To have a truly transformative impact on international growth and stability, it also focuses on building skills in education, research, and institutional capacities for partners. To put it simply, we are focusing not only on the infrastructure and value chain, but the whole ecosystem around them. By doing this, we are creating enabling environment for private investments as well.

The Russian’s invasion of Ukraine has shown how much we live in a world of interdependence, where global supply chains are often fragile. For supply chains, a secure and trustful connectivity is key. This is what Global Gateway is about.

It includes the extension to the transatlantic BELLA cable from the coast across Latin America to boost internet access and local economies, the expansion of
the Trans-European Network to improve transport links with the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkan countries; and scaled-up funding for the Erasmus+ student exchange programme worldwide.

In Africa, along with support for new strategic transport corridors, the EU will mobilise €2.4 billion in grants for Sub-Saharan Africa and over €1 billion for North Africa to support renewable energy and the production of renewable hydrogen and critical raw materials. In Namibia, we provide guarantees for private investments in green hydrogen to ensure clean energy for the country and to generate new revenues from it. These initiatives will help meet the demand for clean energy and promote the green transition both in our partner countries and in the EU.

In Rwanda, we are working with a vaccine producer to bring mRNA technology to Rwanda so that this country, with the private sector, can produce life-saving vaccines for the region. In the Philippines, we are connecting our Copernicus satellites to the first earth observation system in Southeast Asia. In July we renewed our strategic relationship with Latin America and Caribbean, including a €45 billion investment programme.

We are currently implementing 90 flagships projects in Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. More will come. Global Gateway is delivering.

A GAME CHANGER FOR A MORE CONNECTED AND PEACEFUL WORLD

To be successful and reach a new scale, we need to work differently. That is why we emphasise the Team Europe approach. This mobilises all EU institutions, EU Member States, their Development Finance Institutions, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European private sector to pool skills and resources and work together to address key strategic goals. Ultimately, Global Gateway is about increasing Europe’s geopolitical and geoeconomic influence and doing so in a European way.

Global Gateway builds on the conviction that scaling up high-quality investments will strengthen our bilateral partnerships and position the EU more prominently in a competitive world, boosting competitiveness. It seeks to position Europe as a reliable partner in an increasingly volatile and competitive international context. It helps provide a compass to direct our external investments to help address the needs of our partners but at the same time support the EU’s strategic interests.

I am convinced that Global Gateway will be a game changer for a more connected and peaceful world. Let’s uphold the principles that have guided us so far: responsibility, unity, solidarity, and determination. Let’s fight hard for the democratic values that we hold most dear and that are under sustained threat. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, “Europe has always gained its power through peace, and its peace through power.”
THE EU CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

In the last issue of this magazine, Joseph Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, set out his vision of the EU as a ‘long-term, global security provider’. This includes the Indo-Pacific, the vast geographical area between the Eastern coast of Africa and the Pacific islands. The reader needs no reminder why the Indo-Pacific is important for the EU: this region accounts for 60% of world GDP and two thirds of world economic growth. Trade with the Indo-Pacific is essential for the EU, and most of this trade is by sea. Therefore, it is of critical importance to the EU that sea lines of communication are protected from piracy and other maritime crime. In addition, the Indo-Pacific is home to some of the world’s most acute geopolitical tensions and rivalries, notably around the Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan and the South China Sea. A conflagration there would have dire consequences also for the EU.

In recognition of the growing importance of the Indo Pacific region to the EU, in 2021 the EU adopted a Strategy for Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific, which includes a chapter on security and defence. The outbreak of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 did not deflect the attention of the EU away from this region. Rather, it acted as a reminder that territorial claims can lead to armed conflict and aggression also in this part of the world and underlined the importance of working together to uphold the principles of the UN Charter globally, not only in our backyard. These key themes were reflected in the EU’s Strategic Compass of 2022, with increased prominence given to the importance of the EU’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific. This was again emphasised in this year’s Joint Communication on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy. But how can the EU help promote maritime security in the Indo-Pacific?

Mr. Giovanni Cremonini
Giovanni Cremonini is the Head of Maritime Security Sector (EEAS). EU official since 1994, from 1998 to 2003 he was posted to Russia, managing technical assistance programmes, and then to China, as Head of Political Section.
In three main ways. First, the EU can mobilise the assets of its Member States’ Navies, either through EU CSDP operations or through flexible forms of coordination, to ensure a tangible EU naval presence against threats to maritime security. Second, the EU as a regional organisation based on the rule of law is very well placed to promote regional cooperation for maritime security and international maritime law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Finally, the EU has the know-how to help Indo-Pacific partners develop their own capacity to ensure effective control of their maritime space.

**NAVIES: ENSURING THE PRESENCE OF THE EU AT SEA**

Since 2008, the EU has deployed the EU Naval Force – Operation Atalanta in the Western Indian Ocean. Originally directed against piracy, the operation has made a very substantial contribution to virtually eliminating this threat in its area of operation. Since its inception, Atalanta has escorted over two thousand World Food Programme supply ships, with a 100% success rate preventing attacks. In recent years, Atalanta’s mandate has expanded to include the fight against arms and narcotics trafficking, monitoring of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and other illicit activities at sea. Atalanta’s area of operation has also expanded to cover a large part of the Western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, a vital maritime transport corridor for world trade and for the European economy. Despite the decrease in piracy, Atalanta remains vigilant and maintains an alert centre for the shipping industry, the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) in Brest, France. Atalanta has both naval assets and reconnaissance aircraft, provided by the EU Member States.

In addition, the EU has launched a new form of naval presence in the Indian Ocean: the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP). This is a recent and innovative instrument in the EU toolbox, which enhances the coordination of the existing Member States naval, air and space assets present in specific areas. Member States communicate the presence of their assets to a Maritime Area of Interest Coordination Cell (MAICC) located within the EU Military Staff in Brussels, and exchange information with each other, but preserve their national lines of command for their assets. The first application of the CMP concept was launched in 2021 in the Gulf of Guinea; the Northwest Indian Ocean followed in 2022. The area concerned by CMP in the Northwest Indian Ocean is larger than the area of operation of Atalanta, and includes the Strait of Hormuz and the Western coast of the Indian subcontinent. CMP facilitates the regular presence of EU assets in the region, including port calls and naval diplomacy, as for instance the call of an Italian ship on Mumbai in August 2023.

The presence of EU assets in the Indian Ocean, including EUNAVFOR Atalanta, allows the EU to conduct joint naval exercises with partners in the region and with partners from further away in the Indo-Pacific. In the past few years, the EU has held joint naval exercises with Djibouti and Oman as well as with India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea and the United States. The strategic communication surrounding these exercises highlighted the commitment of the EU and of its partners to the rules-based order at sea and to freedom of navigation and overflight.

**THE EU AS A CHAMPION OF UNCLOS**

The EU regularly and consistently issues statement in support of UNCLOS as the legal framework under which all activities in the oceans and sea must be carried out. In particular, the EU supports the dispute settlement mechanisms provided under UNCLOS for the peaceful resolutions of maritime disputes. This includes the 2016 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under UNCLOS on the dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. The EU has expressed its strong opposition to any unilateral actions that endanger peace, security and stability in the region, including incidents involving Chinese vessels and vessels of other countries of
the South China Sea. In its statements, it has often stressed the importance of upholding the freedoms, rights and duties established in UNCLOS, in particular the freedoms of navigation and overflight.

In its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU sets out the goal ‘to promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture … in accordance with the legal framework established by the UNCLOS’. A regional organisation, the EU is a strong supporter of the most highly developed regional organisation in the Indo-Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The EU is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). From 2018 to 2021, it co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security. It continues to co-sponsors, together with Indo-Pacific partners, ARF workshops on maritime law enforcement and on the implementation of UNCLOS.

CAPACITY BUILDING

To ensure maritime security and to control effectively their maritime space, Indo-Pacific countries need good maritime domain awareness (MDA). The EU defines MDA as the effective understanding of activity associated with the maritime domain that could have a security, safety, economy, or environmental impact. The EU Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO) project provides an online communication platform called Indo-Pacific Regional Information System (IORIS) and an interconnection tool for partners to increase MDA between national agencies and across borders, called SHARE.IT. The EU places these tools under the full control of its partners. IORIS and SHARE.IT are compatible with other MDA applications, including the U.S. SeaVision platform. Over 50 national and regional maritime agencies across the whole Indo-Pacific already use IORIS.

The EU Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA) project provides EU know-how to Indo-Pacific partners on topics such as international maritime law, inter-agency coordination and accident management in the maritime domain. Many other EU initiatives help reinforce partners’ capacities for maritime security, including targeted cooperation projects in East Africa and the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, a civilian Common Security and Defence Policy mission. EUNAVFOR Atalanta also helps develop the capacities of partners’ Navies and Coast Guards with hands-on training activities in its area of operation. EU Member States’ assets that participate in CMP often do the same. The EU strives to develop synergies between all tools at its disposal, including both EU-managed tools and the tools of its Member States, to maximise the impact of its action for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

WAY FORWARD

The updated EU Maritime Security Strategy sets out as its first strategic objective, ‘Step up activities at sea’. In the Indo-Pacific, this means strengthening EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences. It is important for the EU to have a sufficient number of assets to ensure a tangible presence in the region. The EU will hold more naval exercises with partners, and will seek to conduct not only bilateral but also trilateral and regional exercises, notably in the Indian Ocean. Together with partners, it will seek to address the new and emerging threats, including threats to maritime cybersecurity and to the underwater domain.

In addition, the EU will continue to promote the implementation of UNCLOS through diplomatic action, public statements and specialised events such as ARF workshops. The EU ESIWA project will help share EU experience on UNCLOS implementation and on other relevant topics. To improve MDA, the EU will appoint liaison officers to maritime information fusion centres in the region. Building on the success of the EU CRIMARIO project, it will encourage partners to take increasing ownership of the governance system for the project’s IORIS maritime communication platform. IORIS is very well placed to work in synergy and complementarity with the Quad’s Indo-Pacific MDA initiative to help partners control their maritime space.
THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN DELIVERING A STRONG EUROPEAN COMMON CULTURE FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE.
THE ROLE OF THE ESDC.

By Mr. Holger Osterrieder

Education was formally recognised as an area of EU competence in 1992 in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty stated that the Community ‘shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States’. The Lisbon Treaty retained the provisions on the role of the EU in training and education, also clearly defining the general provisions of the Union’s external action as safeguarding the EU’s values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity, supporting and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law. To allow for such external action, the Lisbon Treaty defined the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thereby providing the Union with an operational capacity that could draw on civilian and military assets for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and missions that would strengthen international security. In this context, it should be acknowledged that CSDP training is an area characterised by multiple stakeholders and overlapping responsibilities.

The training of personnel for CSDP missions and operations is primarily the responsibility of the Member States, although it is of course shared with EU institutions and dedicated EU bodies. It is also important to highlight that each Member State retains full discretion with regard to the organisation of its own training system. The European External Action Service (EEAS) provides basic guidelines and procedures to support, facilitate and complement the training activities provided by the Member States and training institutions, including its ‘Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training for CSDP’. In this context, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is the main training actor providing civilian military training in the area of the CSDP, and supporting the interaction between the EU Military Training Group (EUMTG) and the EU Civilian Training Group (EUCTG).

The legal basis for the ESDC was laid down in a Council Decision of 2020 that defines the Mission of providing training and education in the area of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the wider context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at European level, in order to develop
and promote a common understanding of the CFSP and CSDP among civilian and military personnel.

Training for the CSDP should promote EU principles, pursue the objectives set out in the Treaty on European Union, reflect the developments within EU policies, and it must be adaptable to new security challenges.

Reiterating the above-mentioned ‘Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training for CSDP’, training for the CSDP should directly or indirectly promote EU values and principles, and pursue the objectives set out in the Lisbon Treaty, including contributing to peace and security and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, sustainable development and the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter.

The context in which the CSDP is carried out has dramatically changed in the past few years. We live in times of existential crises, both within and beyond the European Union. Since early 2020, the SARS COV-2 pandemic has precipitated a devastating sharp contraction of economic activity and a huge loss of jobs, and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has brought war back to our continent. While the European project has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, it must be continuously nurtured. The global shocks brought by these events are no longer theoretical distractions and, as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell has often said, Europe must have the capacity to act.

If it is true that great challenges very often require a rethinking of our methodologies and approach, the above-mentioned elements have been a serious wake-up call signalling the need to be more united. Unity ensures greater efficiency and effectiveness. There is a real need to look for innovative ways of doing business, by using all available policies and resources. To pursue this approach, the EU should continue to leverage all available tools through its Integrated Approach. Training and education is indeed a very powerful tool. In most cases it is much less expensive than other tools, while at the same time generating much greater leverage. It empowers knowledge and supports building bridges. This is very clear to all those who are employed in the field of training and education, since any education system is always in constant flux.

The capability to unlearn and re-learn is a paramount takeaway of the developments brought about by digital interconnection and globalisation. In order to break the cycle of failure in training and education, a learning, unlearning, and re-learning cycle is required in order to gain and apply knowledge, discard out-of-date information, and collect new information that builds upon and updates the previous knowledge. This methodology involves staying up-to-date and reflecting on one’s current opinions and beliefs and potentially revising them if and when necessary. This process is iterative, meaning that all
information and perspectives gained can and should be updated and adapted when our knowledge base grows. The ESDC is exactly at the nexus where knowledge is developed, verified and adapted, and where unlearning and relearning is made possible. This is also due to our network structure, which brings together more than 200 civilian and military institutes, colleges, academies, universities, institutions, centres of excellence and other actors dealing with peace, security and defence policy issues.

During the 2022-2023 academic year, the ESDC supported more than 240 activities in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy, but the ESDC does not only give courses. In 2023 alone, the ESDC organised major conferences, most importantly, as chair of the European Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, when the ESDC organised its annual event. The ESDC also contributes to strengthening the EU and its institutions by promoting and enhancing the Common European and Security culture.
In this context the ESDC is already contributing to the implementation of the strategic compass, by training civilian and military personnel for CSDP missions and operations (ACT), by contributing to increasing intelligence capacities and situational awareness (the cyber training team of the ESDC - SECURE), by focusing on strategic partnerships in training and education with NATO and existing regional and new partners (Asia-pacific seminars) and by aiming to bring real added value to EU operational readiness.

The more complex security environment we now face requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and political willingness to act, strengthen our resilience, and continue investing efficiently in our security and defence mindset, culture and education.

To conclude, the more complex security environment we face requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience, and invest more and better in our security and defence capabilities. Difficult times can be ripe with opportunity. In this moment of opportunity, the leap could be made by starting from one of the most important domains, that of knowledge, in order to continue acquiring, processing and using knowledge and empowering decision makers and action officers at all levels, both in the Member States and in EU Institutions and Agencies. To name just one example, in the current civilian Compact, the Council and the Member States committed to fostering synergies and complementarity between the civilian and military dimensions of CSDP, including capability development, operational planning and the conduct of missions deployed in the same theatre, in particular in mission support. The ESDC has a very important role to play here. The Strategic Compass (SC) also states that in order to implement the EU’s integrated approach effectively, we “make full and coherent use of all available EU policies and instruments and maximise synergies and complementarity between […] the civilian and military dimensions of our Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)”.

An ever-changing international stage, and threats such as cyber-attacks, climate change, hybrid threats, global terrorism, call for more integrated mechanisms, new ways of thinking and achieving strategic autonomy. A holistic rethink of the nature of security-related education and training is therefore essential to meeting the current challenges we face. We must find ways to work even more closely together. There are indeed many other ways to bolster our peace, security and defence capabilities, all of which require a common culture and education. As committed Europeans we should continue working to make the EU a long-term global security provider for our citizens and for our partners. It is only by being even more integrated and by finding better ways to cooperate that the EU can successfully address this and other future challenges.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has accelerated the emergence of a multi-layered threat landscape marked by instability, polarization, fragmentation and competition. Geopolitical trends towards bipolarity coupled with ‘messy multipolarity’ - to use the words of our High Representative – are already visible. The resurgence of high-intensity war on our doorstep has brutally confronted us with this new strategic environment – which bears profound implications for the EU’s security and defence policy.

We live in a world shaped by raw power politics, where all levers of power are used to gain influence. Our adversaries increasingly use hybrid threats – a mix of conventional and asymmetric means to undermine, influence and coerce our democratic and economic systems. Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and foreign information manipulation and interference, and an outright military aggression are part of a single continuum. Security at sea and in space is more contested. Energy, food supply and even migratory flows are being blatantly instrumentalised while access to raw materials, critical technologies and foreign direct investments are weaponised.

In this competitive and power-political world, we must rethink our security paradigm. If we want to address the multiple threats to our security, we need a broader prism and an even more integrated “whole of government” security approach. We need the tools to defend ourselves and protect our interests. Military means, civilian instruments, economic policies: we need to learn to use all EU policies and levers as instruments of power.

Above all: if we want to address today’s threats, we need to work together both within the EU and with partners. The EU needs strong and reliable partnerships. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, our strategic partnership with NATO and with the United States has become more important than ever. At the same time, strengthening our partnerships in Africa, the Indo-Pacific and Latin America is indispensable for security and stability.
THE STRATEGIC COMPASS

That is why the Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022 – a few short weeks after Russia’s invasion - sets out an ambitious set of concrete objectives and actions enabling the EU to respond to these threats and challenges and to become a more capable security and defence actor in the next 5 to 10 years.

The EU Rapid Deployment Capacity is one of the Compass flagship initiatives. Recent crises in Afghanistan, Sudan or Niger have reminded us of the importance of such an instrument. The work of the EU Military Staff on the development of the EU RDC – from concepts, to operational scenarios, C2 implications and capability planning – is absolutely key for its success. Mid-October the first EU Live Exercise will take place in Spain – this is an important milestone for deepening cooperation and interoperability among EU armed forces. Nevertheless, a lot remains to be done before the EU RDC can be declared operational in 2025. To make it a reality, Member States need to commit forces and capabilities. We need to strengthen the MPCC and give it the infrastructure, personnel and communication systems it needs to become the ‘preferred’ command and control structure at EU level.

Russia’s war has highlighted again the importance of military mobility: we need to be able to move military forces and assets at speed. This is crucial for the EU’s most ambitious training mission (EUMAM Ukraine), for European and transatlantic military support to Ukraine, and for EU-NATO cooperation.

Our civilian and military missions and operations are a crucial instrument in our toolbox. Following the Compass, we have launched two new civilian missions in Armenia and Moldova. They are flexible and adapted to help host countries deal with new threats. At the same time, the latest developments in the Sahel are extremely worrisome. Following the coups in Niger and Gabon, after Mali and Burkina Faso, it is clear we need to rethink our approach. Beyond our immediate reaction to suspend our security and defence activities, reduce staff of our two CSDP missions and possible impose sanctions, we need to remain committed to region. We are currently stepping up our support to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea because the security situation at their northern borders will most likely deteriorate. Yet, we need to reflect more broadly on our engagement in the region. The military contribution to this discussion is crucial.

The EU continues to strengthen its resilience on all fronts and notably against hybrid threats and cyber-attacks. A newly developed hybrid toolbox, a strengthened cyber diplomacy toolbox and an EU Policy on Cyber Defence help prevent, deter and respond to hybrid and cyber-attacks against the EU, its Member States and their partners. EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams will enable us respond to any hybrid threat or campaign in support of a Member State, partner country or CSDP mission or operation.

To guarantee maritime security in many parts of the world, an updated maritime security strategy addresses new challenges in the maritime domain, including threats to critical underwater infrastructure. As part of our wider effort to increase cooperation with partners we now regularly conduct joint naval exercises, including with the United States and with partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Our Coordinated Maritime Presence, which started as a pilot project in the Gulf of Guinea, has now been enlarged to the North West Indian Ocean, again with an important role for the EUMS hosting the Coordination Cell.

Since the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the geopolitical dimension of space has significantly increased. We see an increase of threats against our critical infrastructure in orbit, including our satellite navigation, earth observation and nascent communications fleets, and instances of irresponsible behaviour in space. The first EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence adopted in March 2023, aims at developing a shared understanding of space threats, increasing our resilience and preparedness to respond to space threats. Together with partners, we continue to promote responsible behaviours in outer space, share threat assessment, and we will further deepen our engagement with the UN, NATO, the US and other likeminded partners. Without security in space, there is no security on Earth.
BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF ‘SECURITY’

Three areas already briefly mentioned in the Strategic Compass deserve more attention in the coming years if we are to pursue a ‘whole of government’ approach in security.

The first is energy security. In 12 months, we significantly reduced our dependence on Russian oil and gas. Going from 40% of gas imports to almost zero in a relatively short time has been unthinkable for a long time. Russia’s total energy revenues have been cut to half since 2022 and brought to below those of 2021. With its weaponisation of energy, Russia destroyed its most important market while we have enhanced our strategic position. It is now important that we avoid swapping one dependency for another and continue to guarantee our own energy security.

This brings me to the second area: economic security. We need to find ways to increase resilience in facing the risks stemming from certain economic linkages and the geopoliticisation of technology. The new “de-risking” strategy on Economic Security presented in June 2023, will guide us in preventing that global warming further exacerbates instability and insecurity, while supporting Member States to climate-proof their security and defence forces.

THE WAY FORWARD

In order to address such a complex picture of threats and challenges, a whole of government approach is needed. Unique to any other international player, the EU can cover a broad spectrum of threats with a large toolbox: ranging from diplomacy to civilian and military tools, and to financial instruments or regulatory power.

Over the last years, the European External Action Service has been working on an ‘integrated’ or ‘comprehensive’ approach to fully scale the power of ‘Team Europe’ - EU institutions with 27 Member States. The best example of this is our support to Ukraine. In reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, we have not only imposed 11 packages of sanctions, we also very rapidly established the largest EU Military Assistance Mission that has trained nearly 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers and will continue to do more. On top of that, we mobilised in total more than € 25 billion of donations and transfers of military equipment through and incentivised by the European Peace Facility. Unthinkable when we created the EPF only two years ago. For the first time in history, the EU closely cooperates with European defence industry to ramp up production and stimulate joint procurement to quickly provide ammunition to Ukraine.

Time has now come to further build on this good example and move to the next level where we overcome the remaining boundaries and continue breaking our own ‘political’ glass ceiling. The key added value of the EU as a security actor is how it can cleverly combine and leverage the variety of these instruments. This is why the EU is a smart enabler.

With this in mind, we recently adapted the structure within the EEAS and have created a Managing Directorate for Peace, Security and Defence (MD PSD). MD PSD is engaged in fostering and strengthening the EU’s role as a global security actor. Our thematic spectrum is as broad as our mission is simple: everything we do, all the instruments we apply and policies we formulate and implement seek to promote peace and security and to deliver on the EU’s ambition in security and defence. We engage in the entire conflict cycle, from prevention and mediation to counterterrorism, from military and civilian crisis management to defence, stabilisation and early reconstruction. Enabling common EU action through unity is at the essence of the MD PSD’s work while acting in concert with partners is in the EU’s DNA.

To conclude, a test of credibility for the EU as a peace, security and defence actor is ahead of us. A clear vision, unity and determination are key ingredients to deliver – and the military contribution to this mission is indispensable.
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF UKRAINE’S RECOVERY

By Mr. Daniel Fiott

When accepting the Charlemagne Prize of Aachen on behalf of the Ukrainian people in May 2023, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy boldly proclaimed that ‘Ukrainians will always make Europe stronger’. He also cautiously warned that while history is built on victories, it also remembers defeats. It is clear that European leaders do not want to leave Ukraine prey to any negative fate of history. The shock of a return to war in Europe has certainly galvanised leaders and forced them to act in ways unthinkable before the war. Russia’s war on Ukraine has also done more for any notion of strategic responsibility or autonomy than any single speech by European leaders. Out of the destruction in Ukraine comes a sense, however faint, of a strategic culture in Europe built on action and initiatives.

The European Union (EU) and its Member States have so far dedicated approximately €20 billion to Ukraine to help the country repel Russian forces. About €5.7 billion of this amount comes directly from the European Peace Facility (EPF) in the form of ammunition and military equipment and the provision of medical supplies, logistics facilities, cyberdefence capacities and de-mining equipment to Ukraine’s armed forces. Funds from the EPF have also helped cover some of the costs associated with the Union’s Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM). While the United States has contributed $46.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014, the EU has nevertheless moved in new and unprecedented ways to support Ukraine in its moment of need.

The idea that the EU would today be training Ukrainian soldiers on the Union’s territory or that the EU and its Member States would be producing, procuring and despatching weapon systems such as tanks to Ukraine would have seemed implausible a few years ago. What we are witnessing in the EU’s response to Russia’s aggression is the growth of a more militarily muscular Union. While the EU can always do more to assist Ukraine, its response so far has lived up to the Strategic Compass’ call for more rapid and robust action whenever a crisis erupts.

TRAINING, INVESTMENT AND AMMUNITION

Through EUMAM the Union has engaged successfully in training Ukrainian armed personnel. Keep in mind that many Ukrainian recruits are civilians and so the intensity of warfighting is something alien to them. By April 2023 more than
we should not exclude a possible enlargement of the EDF in the coming years and a follow on programme to the ASAP and EDIRPA. Such a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) could be a real sign of commitment to EU security and defence, but only if it is endowed with the right level of investment.

For the coming months and years, therefore, the EU will be expected to continue this form of military support for Ukraine. In fact, there are already signals that the Union is preparing to structure this support over the next few years. Reports have already emerged that the Union’s High Representative and European Commission Vice-President wants to see the EPF endowed with €20 billion over a four year period. This would specifically support Ukraine with weapons, ammunition and military equipment. Should such an idea come to fruition, it would be further evidence of the EU’s evolution as a military actor.

EUMAM will also continue to be a vital part of the Union’s military support for Ukraine, especially as, while the months go by, armed personnel in the EU will collect invaluable information from Ukrainian fighters. Following the years of engagement in crisis management operations in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of Africa, militaries from EU and NATO states have an opportunity to retrieve and share valuable operational information that is emanating from a conventional war. Such operational intelligence will be invaluable as the war evolves and it will help the Union with its own operational planning.

A ROAD TO RECOVERY?

The EU’s military strategy after any post-war settlement will be crucial too, not least because questions about Ukraine’s EU and NATO accession will influence policy. First, the need to train Ukraine’s armed forces will not end after any potential armistice with Russia. What is likely to happen is a change in the way military training is designed, with more of a focus on issues such as de-mining and personnel integration. This last point, integration, will be vital when one considers that the Ukrainian armed forces have swelled with civilian volunteers and conscripts. Any settlement with Russia is likely to raise the question of how far these relatively new recruits will want to return to civilian forms of employment or how they can be integrated into a modernised Ukrainian military.

Over the next few years, the EU will see a ramping up of its investments into ammunition production and capabilities through the new Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), as well as military capability development through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). While these tools collectively represent a meagre €9 billion until 2027, 16,000 Ukrainian personnel had been trained by the EU. According to military trainers, the training under EUMAM has not only taught Ukrainian fighters basic warfighting techniques (e.g. weapons training) but it has led to greater morale in Ukraine’s rank and file. Trainers in Spain, for example, have stated that certain recruits turned up to the training facility in Toledo without ever having fired a weapon.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has also given greater energy to invest in the EU’s own military capacities. Although the Trump Presidency and Brexit gave way to closer EU defence cooperation, the war in Ukraine has unlocked new sources of financial support (e.g. the EPF) and forced EU Member States to tend to the health of their defence industrial bases. Indeed, the capability and manufacturing deficiencies that military personnel and academic experts have long documented and called attention to in the EU have suddenly become issues of great urgency for politicians.

Here, it is worth acknowledging that the EU has gained experience in security sector reform, especially when it comes to the reform and modernisation of armed forces after violent conflict has ended. Seemingly mundane issues such as pension payments, access to medical and mental health care and wages have all featured in past EU missions in post-violent conflict zones. Another feature of the EU’s past engagement...
in such cases has been the provision of training on international law and human rights, and in the case of Ukraine any future EU accession process will provide an opportunity to standardise Ukraine’s armed forces in line with established EU and NATO norms.

One area, however, that is perhaps more sensitive and deviates from past EU experiences is de-mobilisation and proliferation. For the EU, the logic thus far through its security and defence missions and operations has been to stem the proliferation of arms and munitions in post-war situations, and to actively work to demobilise forces that have been at war with each other. This may not be so simple or even desirable in the context of the war on Ukraine, not least because Ukraine would have to remain prepared and vigilant for any future Russian (re) invasion. In fact, quite the opposite of what the Union is used to is likely to occur: to continuously deploy weapons systems to maintain a favourable military advantage for Ukraine.

**A EUROPEAN DESTINY?**

Regardless of how the war is eventually prosecuted and resolved, there will be questions about how to sustain Ukraine’s military over the longer-term. Today there are already discussions about how and when to provide Ukraine with fighter aircraft. Additionally, Russia’s continued ability to menace security and food supplies in the Black Sea underlines the need to help build up Ukraine’s navy. Ukrainian officials have also called for enhanced air and missile defence capabilities, especially given Russia’s continued ability to fire cruise missiles and to use its fighter aircraft over civilian areas in Ukraine.

Ukraine cannot be compared to other wars, however, not least because Euro-

pean leaders have held out the prospect of EU and NATO membership. While no specific timetable or process has been agreed for Ukraine’s accession into the Union, it is increasingly likely that the EU’s military support over time will have to respond to any potential accession process. For example, should a roadmap for Ukraine’s EU accession be agreed after the war there will be a need to see how Ukraine can be gradually integrated into EU security and defence policy initiatives such as the EDF, EPF or even Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

If we accept the fact that any post-war settlement will be fragile, as well as taking European leaders’ word for it that Ukraine has a future in the Euro-Atlantic group of nations, time will be of the essence to integrate Ukraine swiftly into the EU and NATO architectures. Ukrainian membership of NATO will raise questions about nuclear deterrence and conventional defence, but for the EU we are talking about full economic and political integration. As part of the acquis, Ukraine will need to be integrated into the Union’s security and defence structures. For example, pressing issues will include how quickly Ukraine can be integrated into the military mobility initiative or to what extent Kyiv will want to engage in air and missile defence projects supported by the EU.

There may be many obstacles to Ukraine’s path to EU accession, but what is clear already is that the Union and Ukraine have embarked on an unprecedented military partnership. When President Zelensky stood at the lectern in Aachen in May 2023, he proclaimed that a Ukrainian victory over Russia would ‘save’ Europe. He probably and rightly had in mind notions of peace and freedom when making this statement, but he may have also implied that the war in Ukraine has saved the EU from military naivety and obsolesce in a more general sense. In this regard, the Union owes Ukraine more than it probably realises.
While not a global military superpower, Brazil’s actions and policies have far-reaching implications for global security and stability.

Brazil is one of the EU’s nine strategic partners and it is an active player in the international arena, pro-actively taking positions on global security issues. Brazil has a history of contributing to international peacekeeping efforts; its military has contributed to maintain peace and stability through UN missions, in Haiti and Lebanon.

Brazil holds until end 2023 a non-permanent UNSC seat and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is re-positioning the country as a leader of the Global South and strong advocate of global governance, including the UNSC reform. Brazil’s upcoming G20 Presidency (starting 1 December 2023) will evidence these ambitions.

Brazil’s continental size (the territories of the EU’s 27 EU Member States fit twice on Brazil’s landmass) and wealth in natural resources – it holds 60% of the Amazon rainforest, minerals, rare earths, abundant water resources and oil – make it a global player with regards to climate change and the preservation of biodiversity.

Brazil borders 9 different countries (including France, in the form of French Guiana), and plays a significant role in the fight against transnational and international organised crime, including illegal trade of drugs and arms, gold and human trafficking, as well as the
smuggling of timber. Brazilian criminal organisations have connections to international criminal networks, including those in Europe, Africa, and North America. Collaboration with Brazil is vital to disrupt these networks. Brazil’s extensive coastline and proximity to major international shipping routes make it vulnerable to maritime crime, such as piracy and illegal fishing.

Brazil unequivocally pursues an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, including nuclear power generation and medical research. The country is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and currently chairs two out of the four nuclear export regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), both for the 2023-2024 period.

Brazil actively participates in international efforts to combat cybercrime and enhance cybersecurity, and decision makers are interested in the EU’s toolbox on cybersecurity.

As stated by HRVP Borrell in the context of the adoption of the Strategic Compass, “... [Partnerships] can help us uphold the rules-based international order and effective multilateralism, with the UN at its core, set international norms and standards and contribute to peace and security around the world. We will bolster tailored partnerships where they are mutually beneficial, serve EU interests and support our values, particularly when there is a shared commitment to an integrated approach to conflict and crises, capacity building and resilience.”

**EU-BRAZIL COOPERATION ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY RELATED ISSUES**

The EU and Brazil already have a good degree of cooperation on security related issues:

- Cyber security dialogues took place in 2017 and 2020; the next one is foreseen for early 2024. Through the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) programme, the EU is financing cyber security capacity for Brazilian authorities and relevant state agencies.
- The EU- Brazil expert meeting on drugs takes place on an annual basis in the margins of the UN’s Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna. Co-chaired on the EU side by the member state holding the Council Presidency and on the Brazilian side by the MFA, it provides the opportunity to update each other on the latest drug related developments, policies and good practices, as well as opportunities for further engagement.
- Efforts are ongoing to conclude agreements between the EU and Brazil to enhance the fight against international organised crime via EUROPOL and EUROJUST. In an online exchange between Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and Brazilian Minister for Justice and Public Security Flavio Dino in May 2023, the Commissioner underlined the potential that both agreements had to significantly enhance both partners’ capacity and cooperation in the fight against international organised crime through the exchange of personal data.
- The fight against international organised crime and related human rights violations is equally being driven forward through a number of assistance programmes, such as the Global Illicit Flows Programme, the Assistance Programme against organised crime (el PACTO), the cooperation programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU on drug policies (COPOLAD), and Criminal Network Disruption Global Programme (CRIMJUST). The institutionalisation of AMERIPOL (the regional Latin American counterpart to EUROPOL) under Brazil’s leadership during the second semester of 2023, would constitute a further step
forward towards police cooperation reinforcing the fight against organised crime.

In parallel to strengthening cooperation and political dialogue, the EU has been co-sponsoring with local partners a series of conferences, the most emblematic of which is the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, which celebrated its 20th edition in 2023, assembling senior decision-makers and high-ranking civil society actors in order to provide different visions from responsible stakeholders and create a better environment for a broad discussion of key defence and security issues.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION AHEAD

At the EU-Brazil High Level Political Dialogue (HLPD) of 30 May 2023, the two partners explored areas for enhanced cooperation in the defence and security related fields.

This could take the form of a High-Level Defence and Security Dialogue, as well as through the participation in respective military trainings in EU Member States, as well as in Brazil (e.g. reputed for its excellent military jungle trainings). Enhanced cooperation could also be envisaged on Coordinated Maritime Presence; in August 2022, the Brazilian Navy spearheaded Operation Guinex-II in the Gulf of Guinea, with exercises at sea and ports, to increase maritime security and interoperability with the navies and coast guards of the region.

The EU could further invite Brazil to participate in EU Military Training Missions, as has already been the case in the Central African Republic.

Last but not least, both partners agreed to re-launch the dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation at the level of Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation on the EU side and the Secretary for Multilateral Political Affairs of the Brazilian MFA.

In conclusion, there are numerous reasons why the EU should value its Strategic Partner Brazil as an important player and ally on security and defence related subjects. As the EU forge ahead, we need to keep in mind that cooperation between the EU and Brazil needs to take place on an equal footing and be based on mutual interests. The renewed focus on Brazil will provide us with opportunities to drive our valuable cooperation as equal partners forward, including on defence and security.
During his first official visit in Zagreb, General Brieger discussed with local authorities the most pressing issues in the EU Defence and Security agenda: the implementation of the Strategic Compass, including the ongoing war in Ukraine and its consequences, the need for the UE to invest in partnerships, but also to continue work towards a necessary strategic autonomy. Meeting with the President of the Republic of Croatia Mr. Zoran Milanović, with the Prime Minister, Mr. Andrej Plenković and with the Minister of Defense Mr. Mario Banožić, as well as in bilateral talks at military level, CEUMC stressed: "We shall be proactive and pragmatic. We cannot keep on relying completely on others to deal with security stances affecting our citizens and interests. Disposing of capacities and capabilities that will allow us to act even alone, should partners not be available, will make us stronger. And even a more reliable partner for those who look at us in confidence, starting with NATO. A stronger EU will make NATO stronger". Brieger delivered a lecture at the Croatian Defense Academy, where he was presented with the Golden Army Plaque. During the visit, the President of Croatia awarded MGen Frank, Director of EUMC Cabinet, with the Order of the Croatian Interlace, in recognition of the support he provided, while working in the Austrian Ministry of Defence, in enhancing relationships between Vienna and Zagreb.

CEUMC OFFICIAL VISIT TO CROATIA, 28/4/2023

CEUMC delivered a keynote speech at this year edition of the 8th 'EU in International Affairs’ (EUIA) conference, organised by five European Universities (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Université Libre de Bruxelles, the United Nations University, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, and Warwick University). CEUMC delivered an intervention on the theme of the conference: “Europe’s pathways to (dis-)engagement with the world”. His main message was that “disengagement is almost impossible, nor advisable, nowadays, or in the near future. For the EU, reverting to inwardly focused strategies would be myopic. Greater EU autonomy is required - because the alternative is dependence - but our strategies go through more strengthened partnerships.” The EUIA Conference represents the biennial get-together of academics and policy-makers interested in the global role of the EU. The participation of around 350 academics and practitioners, and the presentation of more than 200 scientific papers selected through an anonymous peer review process underlined the relevance of the event.

EUIA23 CONFERENCE, 3/5/23
TRIO CHODS MEETING, 9/5/23

The Swedish Chief of Defence, Gen Michael Bydén, hosted this now traditional meeting, inviting the CHODs from both the “outgoing trio” of EU Presidencies (FR, CZ and SE) as well as the “incoming one” (ES, BE, HU), in the presence of the CEUMC. Gen Brieger welcomed the timely and now well-established opportunity to exchange freely at the highest level provided by this format, ensuring a smooth transition and continuity of efforts. Inter alia, the CEUMC recalled the priority of the implementation of the Strategic Compass, highlighting some of results already achieved and the projects on track: the Military Rapid Response concept finalization, the Military Input on C2 evolution, and the Military Contribution to Capability Development Plan (CDP). Overall, CEUMC stressed that there are very high expectations for EU’s ability to act in a degraded context, with war back on European soil, with the utmost commitment by all stakeholders that remains key. “As chair, I intend to ensure continuity and momentum, especially through key leader engagement to constantly explain military requirements and needs.”

EU MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETS AT CHODS LEVEL, 10-11/5/23

The 27 Chiefs of Defence met, under the chairmanship of Gen Robert Brieger (CEUMC), to discuss main priorities for the EU security and defence agenda. The event was selectively attended also by representatives from EU institutions and partner organizations and countries: the EEAS, the EU Commission, EDA, the EUMS, NATO and Norway, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Serbia, and Vietnam. Following the opening remarks of the HR/VP; Mr. Josep Borrell, the EUMC emphasized the urgency of achieving the ambitious goals of the Strategic Compass, without delay, particularly to enhance EU military capabilities, in light of all current and potential threats and challenges to European security. The EUMC discussed the status of major military work strands (the Rapid Deployment Capability, the Military Planning Capability, and the EU Command and Control structure), key to the EU’s capacity to manage crises and promote security in situations where its citizens and interests are at risk. In this regard, they expressed their contentment with the EU live exercise scheduled for Spain next October, a crucial milestone towards EU’s preparedness for specific crisis scenarios. In a session dedicated to Ukraine, CHODs welcomed the participation via videoconference of Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodskyi, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and concurred on the need to keep on supporting Kyiv, including in the longer term. CHODs emphasized the critical role played by the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) in providing support to Ukraine. The EUMC also analysed the first lessons observed on Joint Procurement, particularly in light of the depleted stocks of specific military equipment in EU Member States’ arsenals, as a result to the support provided to Ukraine. In this regard, they emphasized the need to increase coherence between national defense planning, aided by extant EU initiatives and support, and a joint examination of future operational requirements. CHODs subsequently discussed the future of EU CSDP Military Missions and the role of Strategic Communications in their support. They acknowledged that one of the most significant challenges for EU CSDP military missions is Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, which may impede efforts to establish trust and confidence with the Host Nations. They emphasized the importance of synchronizing information and communication activities, at all levels and with all likeminded stakeholders, in order to counter interferences with our missions, maintain the credibility of CSDP, and preserve the interest and support of target audiences. The EUMC will meet again, in this format, on 16-19 Oct, in Seville (Spain).
PHILIPPINES DEFENCE COLLEGE, 12/5/23

The think-tank Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the government of Philippines jointly invited Gen Brieger to brief a defense delegation from Manila, as part of a complete European tour program, to include German, EU and NATO relevant Institutions and authorities. The requested topic was: “Shaping European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)”. Interaction with the audience was very fruitful especially when discussing the shift of geopolitical gravity from the enlarged Mediterranean towards the Indo-Pacific. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany, with a rich tradition in social democracy, dating back its foundation to 1925. Their work focuses on the core ideas and values of social democracy, freedom, justice and solidarity.

BALKANS CHODS CONFERENCE, 17/5/23

Gen Brieger attended the 2023 edition of Balkan CHODs Conference. The aim of this annual Conference is to discuss and reinforce ways of military-to-military cooperation of the Balkan states, as well as common approaches in countering security challenges in the region. The topic of this year conference was: “Regional military connectivity and military mobility as a highlight of the partnership in the Balkans - exploring innovative ways for integration and cooperation”. Gen Brieger had the opportunity to restate the relevance of a joint support by all stakeholders for an effective Military Mobility, for the benefit of a solid EU security architecture. The Balkan CHODs Conference was established in 2006, at the initiative of Greece and Turkey. Most of the activities of the forum consist of training and education.
FAC MEETING, 23/5/23

Gen Brieger participated in a Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, in Defence session, dedicated to the EU integrated response to crisis in Ukraine. “On military support to Kyiv – said Gen Brieger - we confirmed that our Military Assistance Mission EUMAM roadmap is fully on track. This is part of a real and pragmatic EU support to Ukraine’s fight for freedom: 30,000 Ukraine soldiers will be trained by 16 EU member States before the end of 2023. We will stands on Ukraine’s side, as long as it takes.”

HUNGARIAN DEFENCE COLLEGE, 25/5/23

The former HU MilRep to EU and NATO, LtGen Borondi, invited the CE-UMC to address the General Staff Course of the Hungarian National University of Public Service, in Brussels. Students were high-ranking officers in line to become generals or head of departments. In his intervention, Gen Brieger updated the audience on the latest development of the EU Security and defence architecture, focussing on the implementation of the Strategic Compass. Founded in 1920, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem (NKE, National University of Public Service) is a non-profit public higher-education institution located in Budapest, recognised as a coeducational, higher education institution, offering courses and programs leading to officially recognized higher education degrees in several areas of study.

SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE, 4/6/23

General Robert Brieger attended the 20th edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD23), early June, one of Asia’s most relevant defence Summits, attended by several Defense ministers, permanent heads of ministries, and military chiefs, mostly from Asia-Pacific nations. In the margin of a very rich agenda of plenary sessions, covering all aspects of current affairs in the defence and security domain, the Chairman engaged in several bilateral meetings, many as part of the official EU HR/VP delegation led by Mr. Borrell. The program included meetings with Lloyd Austin, US SecDef, Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore PM, Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore MoD, Yasukazu Hamada, Japanese MoD, Gen (Ret) Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian MoD, and Jong-Sup Lee, Republic of Korea MoD. Gen Brieger was glad to meet with Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza, Chairman, Joint Chief.
of Staff Committee, Pakistan Armed Forces, LtGen Muhammad Saeed, Chief of General Staff, Pakistan Army, and the hosting Singapore Chief of Armed Forces, RADM Aaron Beng, after a multilateral meeting involving all CHODs attending SLD23. With RADM Beng, Gen Brieger recalled how, “as EU, we stress the need to engage more at mil-to-mil level & boost cooperation, taking stock of existing or new framework opportunities, following bi- or multilateral political decision.” In the same vein, with the Pakistani military authorities, the Chairman concurred that “old & new challenges produce worrying global instability & must be tackled with enhanced cooperation. And the war in Ukraine remains a matter for all.” The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), an independent think tank, promoting a sense of camaraderie among the most significant decision-makers in the region’s defense and security community. The summit is primarily an intergovernmental gathering, but it also attracts lawmakers, academic specialists, renowned journalists, and corporate representatives. The Shangri-La Dialogue has developed through time into one of the most significant independent venues for the discussion of ideas among those in charge of determining international security policy.

EUROMIL EVENT, 8/6/23

On an invitation by Mr Jacobs, the President of EUROMIL, Gen Brieger delivered a briefing at the European parliament on “European Armed Forces: State of Play 2023”. In his intervention, the CEUMC analysed three interconnected topics: where do we stand 1 year after launch of Strategic Compass; what is and how will the RDC work; and the value of common exercises for EU military personnel. Gen Brieger concluded reassuring the real added value that the RDC will bring to the EU: “The implementation of such a force will bring true credibility to the role of the EU as a security provider, and contribute to a common defense culture.”

CEUMC OFFICIAL VISIT TO EGYPT, 20/6/23

As one of the most significant partners in a region of strategic relevance for the EU, Egypt was the destination of a two-day working visit by the CEUMC, to deepen military-to-military discussions on several EU Security and Defense agenda priorities. Gen Brieger met with the Minister of Defense, Gen Zaki, debating security from a national perspective, and then on all the challenges and opportunities bringing Egypt and the EU closer. CEUMC was especially pleased to receive confirmation of Egypt’s intentions to further investigate military cooperation opportunities with the EU, such as with OP ATALANTA, for maritime awareness, and the possibility of joint EU-EGY naval exercises. Other relevant topics included Cairo’s desire to benefit from the prospects allowed by the European Peace Facility (EPF), particularly for demining activities. “EU and Egypt can effectively collaborate on a number of dossiers – said Gen Brieger - including in the North Western Indian Ocean, Area of Operations for Atalanta, to give one example. We are both committed and eager to move our partnership forward.”

Before leaving Cairo, General Brieger had the opportunity to address students at the NASSER Military Academy for Post Graduate Students, a group of high-ranking officers from nearly 20 countries (mostly Middle Eastern, African, and Asian) on where the EU stands in terms of consolidating its position as a credible global security provider.
GEN JOHANN FRANK, EU MC CABINET DIRECTOR, ATTENDS PANEL ON CLIMATE AND DEFENCE, 19/6/23

Speaking on behalf of Gen Brieger during an event organised by the Austrian Parliament, MGen Frank confirmed how everyone is aware of climate change and its implications, especially as a threat multiplier, but much more needs to be done to mitigate its effects. Including in the military domain, being a relevant subject of reciprocal EU-NATO briefings and joint initiatives. “I believe the problem must be seen from 3 different security-related perspectives – said MGen Frank – the first being the impact on areas of existing or potentially new crisis. Then, we need to look at the impact on military activities / infrastructures / capabilities. Finally, we must discuss what we can do, as military, to mitigate existing impacts and prevent further ones.” According to MGen Frank, there are currently three challenges to be tackled: the fact that modernization / replacement of capabilities / strategies must take place progressively, preserving current capacities to act and carry on all the missions and tasks assigned; the need to dispose of measurable benchmarks; and, finally, the compelling requirement to educate our personnel on the specific subject.

SWEDISH SEMESTER CLOSING CEREMONY, 26/6/23

General Brieger accepted the invitation by the Supreme Commander of the SWE Armed Forces, General Micael Bydén, to the Closing Reception of the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “When we met six months ago for the opening ceremony – said the CEUMC - I recalled the challenging circumstances in which Sweden would assume this preeminent role, with all the unpredictability surrounding the security of our borders, and the heavy program accompanying the implementation of the Strategic Compass. Now, I can only acknowledge the commitment that all your staff, Micael, has put in this mission, well accomplished. On behalf of the whole Committee, we are extremely grateful to what Sweden has managed to accomplish in the last six months, for the benefit of EU security and defence.”

EUISS 2023 ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 27/6/23

CEUMC attended the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Annual Conference 2023 on the subject “European Security and Defence – The next Steps”. In his intervention, CEUMC looked at the evolution of CSDP activities, including the implementation progress of the RDC. CEUMC’s Panel was moderated by Dr Jan Joel Andersson, EUISS Senior Analyst. The 2023 EUISS annual conference aimed to examine the future of European security and defence. Key topics were the state of implementation of the Strategic Compass, the need for a third transition within the EU, and the future partnerships enhancing security and defence.
DG EUMS / DIR MPCC HANDOVER CEREMONY, 28/6/23

VAdm Herve Bléjean handed the post of DG EUMS / Dir MPCC to LtGen Michiel van der Laan, in a ceremony attended by Mr Borrell, several EU authorities, PSC Ambassadors, EU MS MilReps, EUMS Staff, and distinguished guests. “In the military world - stated Gen Brieger in his intervention – when careers take us apart from bright colleagues, we should not be sad, but glad, because we had the opportunity to share our experience with great trip mates. During probably the most challenging time for EU security and Defence (with COVID and Russia being just two examples of what we had to go through), Herve’s commitment has been key to success. As Director General of the EUMS, Director of the MPCC, and Operational Commander at the strategic level of an ever-growing number of EU Training Missions, his leadership, professionalism and superior performance contributed strongly to enhance the EU’s credibility as a security partner.” Turning to Lieutenant General Van der Laan, CEUMC gave his warmest “welcome back” in Brussels. He also confirmed how Gen van der Laan was bringing to EUMS an extraordinary load of experience, which the EU institution will benefit of.

SPANISH SEMESTER OPENING CEREMONY, 5/7/23

Gen Brieger attended the Opening ceremony of the Spanish Presidency of the EU Council, the fifth presidency since joining the EU in 1986. “A rather intense one - dare to predict Gen Brieger - as Spain planned to host 21 informal gatherings, each in a different Spanish city. The political highlight will be in October, of course, when EU Heads of State and Government are scheduled to meet in Granada. For us, military, we will have a first taste of Spain with our AWAY DAYS in Madrid, end of September. But the very first CHODs meeting happening away from Brussels, in October, will be historical! This meeting will be immediately followed by the Distinguished Visitors Day of the Live Exercise 23, another first, for the European Union!” Main declared military objectives of the Spanish Presidency are the development of the C2 structure and the Rapid Deployment Capacity, but also maintaining and expanding the CSDP missions and operations, as well as military support for Ukraine by strengthening the financial sustainability of the European Peace Facility and continuing “train and equip” activities. “Beyond this – added the CEUMC - I especially welcome the new emphasis on a better definition of the future role of the military in ensuring the free access to the so-called global commons, which includes the maritime, space and cyber domain.”
Representing the 27 EU Chiefs of Defense, Gen Brieger attended the Informal Defence Ministers meeting in Toledo (Spain). During the extensive bilateral meetings, the CEUMC recalled the ongoing efforts that the EU is making to consolidate its position and role as a credible security provider and partner, with a 360-degree approach, the very last example being the unprecedented response to Moscow’s aggression to Ukraine. Acknowledging the attention that Moldova is paying at the outcomes of this war, as one of the countries most affected by the fallout of Russian aggression to Ukraine, Gen Brieger confirmed EU support to Ukraine: “Only few days after the invasion, and in very few hours, the EU approved the use of a new tool, the European Peace Facility (EPF), to provide military tools, including lethal weapons, in support of Kyiv’s right to defend itself”. During the talks, the pillars of the EU – Moldova partnership in the security realm were recalled, starting with the recent Council’s adoption of a third substantial assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to further strengthen Moldova’s resilience in the defence sector. The new measure fully responds to Moldovan requests to contribute to the important first step of upgrading the country’s air surveillance capacities. With an accumulated value of 87 million euros, Moldova has become one of the main beneficiaries of the EPF. “We are committed to continue supporting Moldova in this regard – said the Chairman - In this regard, we also praise the value of the new EU partnership mission in Moldova, one of EU’s efforts to enhance the resilience of the security sector of the country in areas like crisis management, hybrid threats, and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. The overall objective of our military cooperation is to bring Moldova as a new EU candidate country closer to towards EUs Common Security and Defence Policy, to its defence culture, its military structures and activities. Furthermore, we look forward to more possible future contribution by Moldova to our military CSDP Missions and Operations. And all this in full coherence with Moldova’s EU candidacy roadmap. From my point of view today’s meetings are just one element in the process of step by step further intensifying our cooperation based on the needs and lessons learned.” Concluding the visit, Gen Brieger took the opportunity to invite Gen Ohladciuc to visit Brussels soon, to deepen discussion on topics of common interest.
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