

Annex to the 2023 Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. COUNCIL DECISIONS	6
1.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES	6
1.1.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)	6
1.1.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1187 of 19 June 2023 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	7
1.1.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East	8
1.1.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1306 of 26 June 2023 in support of a project on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (ME WMDFZ) in an evolving regional security environment	8
1.1.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	9
1.1.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2064 of 25 September 2023 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities	9
1.1.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	10
1.2. CHEMICAL WEAPONS	11
1.2.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	11
1.2.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344 of 26 June 2023 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	11
1.2.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons	12

1.2.4.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	13
1.2.5.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery	13
1.3.	BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS	15
1.3.1.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	15
1.3.2.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 of 25 November 2021 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	16
1.3.3.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	16
1.3.4.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	17
1.4.	BALLISTIC MISSILES	18
1.4.1.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	18
1.4.2.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/124 of 17 January 2023 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	18
1.5.	UNSCR 1540	20
1.5.1.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	20
1.5.2.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/654 of 20 March 2023 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery	21
1.6.	CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS	22
1.6.1.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with the OSCE	22
1.6.2.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition	23

1.6.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace IV')	23
1.6.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/387 of 20 February 2023 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace V')	24
1.6.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	25
1.6.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 of 21 September 2021 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)	26
1.6.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1726 of 28 September 2021 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase II	27
1.6.8. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2275 of 18 November 2022 in support of the development of an internationally recognised arms and ammunition management validation system (AAMVS) to prevent illicit proliferation	27
1.6.9. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 of 2 December 2021 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South-Eastern Europe	28
1.6.10. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans	28
1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2321 of 25 November 2022 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans and in support of disarmament and arms control activities in South-East and East Europe	29
1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas	30
1.6.13. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects	31
1.7. ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS	32
1.7.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 of 12 October 2020 on the promotion of effective arms export controls (COARM V)	32
1.7.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2539 of 13 November 2023 supporting a project on the promotion of effective arms export controls	32
1.7.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 of 16 April 2021 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty	33

1.7.4.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2296 of 23 October 2023 on Union support for activities of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty	33
1.7.5.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)	34
1.8.	EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES	35
1.8.1.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security'	35
1.8.2.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2320 of 25 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security'	35
1.9.	COLLABORATIONS WITH NGOS AND THINK TANKS	36
1.9.1.	Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks	36
2.	COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS	37
2.1.	CHEMICAL WEAPONS	37
2.1.1.	Council Conclusions on chemical disarmament and non-proliferation with a view towards the Fifth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction – The Hague, 15-19 May 2023 (20/02/2023)	37
3.	STATEMENTS	49
3.1.	GENERAL STATEMENTS	49
3.1.1.	EU statement at the High Level Segment of Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 28/02/2023)	49
3.1.2.	EU general statement at the 78 th session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee (New York, 02/10/2023)	52
3.2.	NUCLEAR ISSUES	55
3.2.1.	EU statement at the General Debate of the First Preparatory Committee Session of the 11 th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: General Statement (Vienna, 31/07/2023)	55
3.2.2.	EU Statement at the General Debate of the 67 th session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna, 25/09/2023)	59
3.2.3.	EU Statement at the 67 th session of the IAEA General Conference on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine (Vienna, 28/09/2023)	61
3.2.4.	EU Statement at 61 st session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 13/11/2023)	62
3.2.6.	Press Release of the Council of the EU – Iran: Council maintains restrictive measures under the Non-Proliferation Sanctions Regime after the JCPOA Transition Day (17/10/2023)	66

3.2.7. EU Briefing on behalf of the High Representative – UN Security Council: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) (New York, 18/12/2023)	67
3.3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS	70
3.3.1. Statement by the Spokesperson of the High Representative on the Outcome of the Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference (Brussels, 21/05/2023)	70
3.3.2. US: Statement by the High Representative on the complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles Outcome of the Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference (Brussels, 08/07/2023)	70
3.3.3. EU general statement at the 28 th session of the Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention Statement of the European Union at the 27 th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 22/11/2023)	71
3.4. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS	74
3.4.1. EU Statement at the Meeting of State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 11-13 December 2023)	74
3.5. BALLISTIC MISSILES	77
3.5.1. DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the satellite launch (Brussels, 23/11/2023)	77
3.5.2. DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the launch of an inter-continental ballistic missile (Brussels, 19/12/2023)	78
3.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS	79
3.6.1. EU statements at the 9 th Conference of States Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty (Geneva, 22/08/2023)	79

1. COUNCIL DECISIONS

Overview of EU Council Decisions in the field of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, including in the framework of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, that were in force in 2023:

1.1. NUCLEAR ISSUES

1.1.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)

Objective: With this Decision, the EU is supporting one of the key elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

The objectives of the support are to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, to raise awareness among national policy- and decision-makers, as well as capacity-building to help improve national legislation and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism. The Council Decision aims to build synergies with on-going EU projects in support for relevant international legal instruments, such as the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Council Decision promotes the universalization and effective implementation of ICSANT through the development and maintenance of a password-protected website on all resources on ICSANT including examples of national legislation; the development of an e-learning module on ICSANT, to be translated into at least four UN official languages; the provision of relevant legislative assistance; capacity-building of relevant stakeholders, including criminal justice officials that could be involved in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving nuclear and other radioactive material covered by ICSANT; the holding of global and regional workshops and country visits and by the collection; and the dissemination of good practices.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

Budget: € 4,999,986

Official Journal: L 314/41 11.12.2018

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/919 of 7 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 November 2022

Official Journal: L 201/27 8.6.2021

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2185 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 until 30 June 2023

Official Journal: L 288/80 9.11.2022

1.1.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1187 of 19 June 2023 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Objective:

- a) Increase the number of States initiating processes to become party to ICSANT and heighten awareness and knowledge of ICSANT among beneficiaries, such as national policy- and decision-makers, and in international fora.
- b) Improve national legislation and the capacity of criminal justice officials and other relevant national stakeholders in beneficiary countries to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases in which ICSANT is of relevance.
- c) Enhance policies, practices and procedures to prevent, detect and respond to the threat of non-State actors, including terrorists, acquiring, possessing and/or using nuclear or other radioactive material.
- d) Improve knowledge and understanding of the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism and other criminal conduct involving such materials.
- e) Enhance national and international cooperation, including information exchange, within and among State Parties, in devising and adopting effective and practical measures to effectively implement the Convention.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)

Budget: € 4,000,000.82

Official Journal: L 157/35 20.06.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.1.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East

Objective:

- a) Produce a factual narrative of efforts to establish a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (ME WMDFZ) between 1995 and 2015 to fill an important gap in the research literature and identify lessons for future efforts.
- b) Identify key issues, opportunities, obstacles and ideas of contemporary relevance to consideration of a ME WMDFZ and efforts to enhance regional security cooperation.
- c) Engage and obtain perspectives and insights from a wide community of researchers, policymakers and academics in the region on these issues and, in so doing, expand the number and diversity of participants exploring the prospects for dialogue and progress.
- d) Facilitate dialogue among these experts with a view to fostering networks, communication and engagement that could in turn contribute to future efforts to advance regional security, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament progress in the region.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: € 2,856,278

Official Journal: L 149/63 7.6.2019

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/753 of 16 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 until 10 July 2023

Official Journal: L 138/15 17.5.2022

1.1.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1306 of 26 June 2023 in support of a project on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (ME WMDFZ) in an evolving regional security environment

Objective:

- a) Assist in mitigating regional WMD proliferation trends.
- b) Encourage regional security arrangements and arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament norms and processes.
- c) Develop a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between the ME WMDFZ and current regional international developments.
- d) Promote an effective, verifiable, inclusive, and sustainable ME WMDFZ.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: € 2,099,969

Official Journal: L 161/70 27.6.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.1.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objective: Support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and in particular strengthen: 1) the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system, including radionuclide detection, and 2) the capabilities of the States Signatories to the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT.

Implementing Agency: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

Budget: € 6,288,892

Official Journal: L 207/15 30.06.2020

Duration: 36 months

1.1.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2064 of 25 September 2023 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities

Objective:

- a) Strengthen the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system.
- b) Strengthen the capabilities of the States Signatories to the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT and to enable them to benefit fully from their participation in the CTBT regime.
- c) Raise awareness of the CTBT and promote its universalisation and entry into force.

Implementing Agency: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

Budget: € 6,285,929

Official Journal: L 238/122 27.09.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.1.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objective:

- a) Contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training.
- b) Assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance.
- c) Support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA's Policy Making Organs.

Implementing Agency: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Budget: € 11,582,300

Official Journal: LI 372/4 9.11.2020

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1852 of 4 October 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 until 31 March 2024 and include among its purposes to assist Ukraine in ensuring the maintenance of its nuclear security regime.

Official Journal: L 257/10 5.10.2022

1.2. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1.2.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objective: The Council Decision foresees a contribution to the core activities of the Organisation, notably for verification, national implementation, universalisation and the Africa programme. It also contributes substantially to the project of transforming the OPCW laboratory into a Centre of Chemistry and Technology and to the implementation of the decision by the OPCW Conference of States Parties directing the OPCW Technical Secretariat to put into place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: € 11,601,256

Official Journal: L 93/3 2.4.2019

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/573 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 in support of activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 until 30 April 2023

Official Journal: L 109/66 8.4.2022

1.2.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344 of 26 June 2023 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Objective:

- a) Verify the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production facilities subject to the verification measures provided for in the CWC.
- b) Prevent the re-emergence and reduce the threat of chemical weapons use.
- c) Respond effectively and credibly to chemical weapons use and allegations thereof.
- d) Ensure preparedness through the provision of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, their use, or threat of use in accordance with the provisions of Article X of the CWC.
- e) Promote peaceful uses of chemistry in economic and technological development through international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the CWC.

- f) Work towards universal adherence to the CWC.
- g) Ensure that the OPCW remains fit for purpose to face the challenges and opportunities generated by progress in science and technology.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: € 5,350,000

Official Journal: L 168/27 3.7.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.2.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons

Objective: Support the full operationalisation of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism (UNSGM) for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in view of growing apprehensions regarding the possibility of the use of biological weapons.

More specifically, the following activities are supported:

- a) training of experts on the roster of the UNSGM;
- b) participation of laboratories in activities to develop a network capable of supporting an UNSGM investigation into an allegation of the use of biological weapons;
- c) outreach activities to ensure nominations of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
- d) a full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);
- e) regular coordination activities/workshops with relevant organisational partners; and
- f) implementation of the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: € 1,418,042

Official Journal: LI 172/5 3.6.2020

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2787 of 8 December 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 until 14 January 2025

Official Journal: L series 11.12.2023

1.2.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objective: Upgrading ICT infrastructure in line with the OPCW's institutional business continuity framework, with a strong focus on resilience, and ensuring privileged access governance, as well as physical, logical and cryptographic information management and separation for all strategic and mission networks of the OPCW.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: € 2,151,823

Official Journal: L 224/24 24.06.2021

Duration: Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1515 of 20 July 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 until 30 August 2024

Official Journal: L 184/37 21.07.2023

1.2.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 of 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through satellite imagery

Objective: Support the project of the OPCW to enhance its operational effectiveness through satellite imagery and imagery analysis provided by SatCen, with the following objectives:

- a) expanding the OPCW's capacity to support OPCW-mandated activities (the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact Finding Mission (FFM), the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), etc.) through imagery analysis as a source of evidentiary substantiation or corroboration of findings; and
- b) utilising targeted imagery analysis for areas of interest (sites, routes, etc.) in planning for OPCW-mandated missions (incidents of alleged use (IAUs), challenge inspections (CIs), technical assistance visits (TAVs), etc.) in order to increase security and confidence in verification accuracy.

Implementing Agency: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Budget: € 1,593,353.22

Official Journal: L 421/65 26.11.2021

Duration: 48 months

1.3. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

1.3.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objective: Providing essential follow-up and momentum to activities undertaken throughout 2016-2018 in the framework of Council Decision 2016/51/CFSP in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), supporting in particular discussions in the BTWC Meetings of Experts in 2019 and 2020, as well as preparations for the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC finally held in 2022.

The Council Decision covers the following activities: (1) Universalisation; (2) Capacity development for national implementation; (3) Fostering biosecurity networks in the Global South; (4) BTWC inter-sessional programme and Ninth Review Conference; (5) Preparedness to prevent and respond to biological attacks; and, (6) Enabling tools for outreach.

Implementing Agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: € 3,029,857.79

Official Journal: L 19/11 22.1.2019

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2033 of 19 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 until 4 February 2023

Official Journal: L 415/29 22.11.2021

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/123 of 17 January 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 until 4 February 2024

Official Journal: L 16/34 18.01.2023

1.3.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 of 25 November 2021 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Objective: Support the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) by:

- a) strengthening biosafety and biosecurity capabilities in Africa through increased regional coordination;
- b) capacity building for BTWC National Contact Points;
- c) facilitating the review of developments in science and technology of relevance to the BTWC by also involving academia and industry; and
- d) broadening the support for voluntary transparency exercises.

Implementing Agency: BTWC Implementation Support Unit, via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: € 2,147,443.52

Official Journal: L 421/56 26.11.2021

Duration: Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2636 of 20 November 2023 mending Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2072 until 19 December 2024

Official Journal: L series 22.11.2023

1.3.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objective: Support three projects of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) aiming at strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The Council Decision includes the following activities:

- a) Harmonisation of existing Ukrainian regulations on biosafety and biosecurity with international standards.
- b) Establishing of the veterinary surveillance system sustainability in Ukraine.
- c) Awareness raising, education and training for life scientists on biosafety and biosecurity.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: € 1,913,900

Official Journal: L 204/29 2.8.2019

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2184 of 8 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1296 until 14 January 2024

Official Journal: L 288 / 78 9.11.2022

1.3.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objective:

- a) Improve the legislative and regulatory basis of biosafety and biosecurity in the beneficiary countries, through the adoption and enforcement of appropriate effective laws which prohibit non-State actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes.
- b) Improve biosafety and biosecurity in beneficiary countries by raising awareness among relevant sectors, including through the enforcement of effective domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: € 2,738,708.98

Official Journal: L 318/123 10.12.2019

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2270 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 until 20 February 2024.

Official Journal: L 300/21 21.11.2022

1.4. BALLISTIC MISSILES

1.4.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 of 18 December 2017 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objective:

- a) Promote the subscription to the Code by an ever-larger number of States and ultimately its universality.
- b) Support the full implementation of the Code.
- c) Promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all.
- d) Reinforce the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation.
- e) Explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.

Implementing Agency: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Budget: € 1,878,120.05

Official Journal: L 337/28 19.12.2017

Duration: Initially 40 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2074 of 25 November 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2370 until 21 January 2023

Official Journal: L 421 / 70 26.11.2021

1.4.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/124 of 17 January 2023 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Objective:

- a) Promote universal subscription to the Hague Code of Conduct.
- b) Promote the full implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct by subscribing states.
- c) Contribute to better inserting the Hague Code of Conduct into efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Implementing Agency: Fondation pour le Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

Budget: € 1,042,614.72

Official Journal: L 16/36 18.01.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.5. UNSCR 1540

1.5.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 of 11 May 2017 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objective:

- a) Enhance the relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities, primarily through training, capacity-building and assistance facilitation in close coordination with other Union programmes and other actors involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), to ensure synergies and complementarity.
- b) Contribute to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of both the 2009 comprehensive review on the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the outcome of the comprehensive review conducted during 2016, in particular in the areas of technical assistance, international cooperation and raising public awareness.
- c) Support the development of voluntary UNSCR 1540 (2004) national implementation action plans upon States' request.
- d) Promote the engagement of relevant stakeholders from industry and civil society in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004).

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: € 2,635,170.77

Official Journal: L 121/39 12.5.2017

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1025 of 21 June 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 April 2022

Official Journal: L 224/22 24.6.2021

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/574 of 7 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809 until 25 February 2023

Official Journal: L 109/67 8.4.2022

1.5.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/654 of 20 March 2023 in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery

Objective: the following activities are supported:

- a) Thematic capacity-building workshops and trainings for up to five assistance requests from States.
- b) Regional Points of Contact Training.
- c) Support the development of National Action Plans and provide tailored support.
- d) Virtual Regional Assistance Conference on UNSCR 1540 (2004) implementation.
- e) Regional Outreach Conferences.
- f) Knowledge Generation and Dissemination.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: € 2,368,769.46

Official Journal: L 81/29 21.3.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

1.6.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 of 2 December 2019 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with the OSCE

Objective:

- a) Enhance capabilities of the State Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Fiscal Service/State Customs Service of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.
- b) Enhance supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with respect to their control of the manufacture, marking and record-keeping of weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.
- c) Enhance operational capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the National Police of Ukraine, which reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with respect to forensics, analysis, detection, tracing, and investigation of illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.
- d) Enhance capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the improvement of legislative mechanisms for regulating and controlling the circulation and use of weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as raising public awareness on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.
- e) Enhance inter-agency coordination and cooperation resulting in developing strategic approach, data-collection and analysis in preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in Ukraine corresponding to the needs identified in the needs assessment.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: € 5,151,579

Official Journal: L 312/42 3.12.2019

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2276 of 18 November 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 in support of Ukraine's efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 23 January 2024

Official Journal: L 300/42 21.11.2022

1.6.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition

Objective: Contribute to improved security in the South-East Europe region and in the Union by combatting the threat posed by illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in and from South-East Europe, Belarus and Ukraine.

Implementing Agency: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Budget: € 11,819,605.20

Official Journal: L 318/147 10.12.2019

Duration: 48 months

1.6.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace IV')

Objective:

- a) Continued maintenance of a user-friendly global information management system on diverted or trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition ('iTrace') documented in conflict-affected areas in order to provide policymakers, conventional arms control experts, and conventional arms export control officers with relevant information to develop effective, evidence-based strategies and projects against the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition.
- b) Training and mentoring of national authorities in conflict-affected states to develop sustainable national illicit conventional arms identification and tracing capacity, encourage sustained cooperation with the iTrace project, better identify physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) priorities, more effectively articulate national arms control and law enforcement assistance requirements, notably Union-funded initiatives, such as Interpol's Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS), and the activities of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and strengthen dialogue with EU missions and initiatives.
- c) Enhanced frequency and duration of in-field research into conventional arms and their ammunition, illegally circulating in conflict-affected areas to generate iTrace data, in response to clear demands made by Member States and Union Delegations.
- d) Tailored support to Member State arms export control authorities and arms control policy makers, including repeat consultative visits by iTrace project staff to capitals of the Member States, a 24-hour help desk to provide instant advice on risk assessment and counter-diversion strategies, the maintenance of secure desktop and mobile dashboard applications to provide instant notification of post-export diversion, and the provision to Member States, on request, of post-shipment verification by iTrace project staff.

- e) Increasing awareness through outreach on the findings of the project, promoting the purpose and available functions of iTrace to international and national policy makers, conventional arms control experts and arms export licensing authorities, and enhancing international capacity to monitor the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition and related materiel, as well as to assist policy makers in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation and to reduce the risk of diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition.
- f) Providing key policy issue reports, drawn from the data generated by field investigations and presented on the iTrace system, about specific areas deserving international attention, including major patterns in the trafficking of conventional arms and their ammunition, and the regional distribution of trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition, and related materiel.
- g) Continued tracing of conventional arms and their ammunition, with the cooperation of Member States and non-EU States, as the most effective means to establish and verify, to the fullest extent possible, the mechanisms behind the diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition to unauthorised users; tracing will be supplemented by follow up investigations focused on identifying the human, financial, and logistics networks behind illicit conventional arms transfers.

Implementing Actor: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)

Budget: € 5,490,981.87

Official Journal: L 330/53 20.12.2019

Duration: 36 months

1.6.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/387 of 20 February 2023 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer ('iTrace V')

Objectives:

- a) Continued maintenance of a user-friendly global information management system on diverted or trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition ('iTrace') documented in conflict-affected areas in order to provide policy-makers, conventional arms control experts, and conventional arms export control officers with relevant information to develop effective, evidence-based strategies and projects against the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition.
- b) Training and mentoring of national authorities in conflict-affected states to develop sustainable national illicit conventional arms identification and tracing capacity, encourage sustained cooperation with the iTrace project, better identify physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) priorities, more effectively articulate national arms control and law enforcement assistance requirements, notably Union-funded initiatives, such as Interpol's Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS), and the activities of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and strengthen dialogue with EU missions and initiatives.
- c) Enhanced frequency and duration of in-field research into conventional arms and their ammunition, illegally circulating in conflict-affected areas to generate iTrace

data, in response to clear demands made by Member States and Union Delegations.

- d) Tailored support to Member State arms export control authorities and arms control policy makers, including repeat consultative visits by iTrace project staff to capitals of the Member States, a 24-hour help desk to provide instant advice on risk assessment and counter-diversion strategies, the maintenance of secure desktop and mobile dashboard applications to provide instant notification of post-export diversion, and the provision to Member States, on request, of post-shipment verification by iTrace project staff.
- e) Increasing awareness through outreach on the findings of the project, promoting the purpose and available functions of iTrace to international and national policy makers, conventional arms control experts and arms export licensing authorities, and enhancing international capacity to monitor the illicit spread of conventional arms and their ammunition and related materiel, as well as to assist policy makers in identifying priority areas for international assistance and cooperation and to reduce the risk of diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition.
- f) Providing key policy issue reports, drawn from the data generated by field investigations and presented on the iTrace system, about specific areas deserving international attention, including major patterns in the trafficking of conventional arms and their ammunition, and the regional distribution of trafficked conventional arms and their ammunition, and related materiel.
- g) The continued tracing of conventional arms and their ammunition, with the cooperation of Member States and non-EU States, as the most effective means to establish and verify, to the fullest extent possible, the mechanisms behind the diversion of conventional arms and their ammunition to unauthorised users; tracing will be supplemented by follow-up investigations focused on identifying the human, financial, and logistics networks behind illicit conventional arms transfers.

Implementing Actor: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)

Budget: € 6,200,000

Official Journal: L 53/19 21.02.2023

Duration: 36 months

1.6.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 of 18 February 2021 in support of the Oslo Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Objective: Contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Oslo Action Plan 2020-2024 adopted by the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, by:

- a) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the survey and clearance and mine risk education and reduction aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;
- b) supporting the efforts of States Parties to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Oslo Action Plan;

- c) promoting the universalisation of the Convention and promote norms against any use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction;
- d) supporting the efforts of States Parties that retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes to increase reporting capabilities, ensure that the number of such mines retained does not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, and explore alternatives to live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible; and
- e) demonstrating the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States Parties that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention.

Implementing Agency: The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

Budget: € 2,658,139

Official Journal: L 58 / 41 19.2.2021

Duration: 48 months

1.6.6. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 of 21 September 2021 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Objective:

- a) Preparation for and follow-up to the Sixth CCW Review Conference.
- b) Support for the universalisation of the CCW.
- c) Facilitation of discussions on under-explored, emerging and cross-cutting issues of relevance to the CCW.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: € 1,603,517.64

Official Journal: L 334/14 22.9.2021

Duration: Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1181 of 16 June 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1694 until 8 May 2024

Official Journal: L 156/37 19.06.2023

1.6.7. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1726 of 28 September 2021 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Member States of the League of Arab States – Phase II

Objective: Supporting the Member States of the League of Arab States (LAS) with their national implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the 'UN PoA') and the International Tracing Instrument, by:

- a) sustainably building the national capacity of LAS Member States to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), combat terrorism and enhance security in post-conflict situations while fully respecting international human rights standards;
- b) sustainably building the regional capacity of the LAS to address the same challenges;
- c) strengthening LAS Member States' national control over SALW at key stages of their life cycle; and
- d) enhancing the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.

Implementing Actor: Small Arms Survey (SAS), represented by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, with the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) and in close cooperation with the LAS Secretariat.

Budget: € 5,991,726

Official Journal: L 344/7 29.9.2021

Duration: 36 months

1.6.8. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2275 of 18 November 2022 in support of the development of an internationally recognised arms and ammunition management validation system (AAMVS) to prevent illicit proliferation

Objective: The purpose is to support efforts to ensure the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition by improving the decision-making processes of stakeholders working in export control and international cooperation and assistance. The objectives are:

- a) Create an operational AAMVS.
- b) Encourage the efforts of regional organisations and their Member States to develop their own AAMVS.

Implementing Agency: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT)

Budget: € 1,792,690.84

Official Journal: L 300/31 21.11.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.6.9. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 of 2 December 2021 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South-Eastern Europe

Objective: Reduce risks of illicit trafficking in, and the uncontrolled spread of, SALW in, to or from South-Eastern Europe that undermine safety and security by impeding sustainable peacebuilding and socioeconomic development as well as by contributing to a breakdown in order, fuelling terrorism and criminal violence or leading to a resumption of conflict.

Implementing Agency: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Budget: € 4,208,827

Official Journal: L 432/36 3.12.2021

Duration: 36 months

1.6.10. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Objective: Support Western Balkans partners with the implementation of the 'Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW/firearms and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024', pursuing the support of the Western Balkans partners in reaching the goals set out in the Roadmap, namely:

- a) By 2023, ensure that arms control legislation is in place, fully harmonized with the EU regulatory framework and other related international obligations and standardized across the region.
- b) By 2024, ensure that arms control policies and practices in the Western Balkans are evidence based and intelligence led.
- c) By 2024, significantly reduce illicit flows of firearms, ammunition and explosives into, within and beyond the Western Balkans.
- d) By 2024, significantly reduce the supply, demand and misuse of firearms through increased awareness, education, outreach and advocacy.
- e) By 2024, substantially decrease the estimated number of firearms in illicit possession in the Western Balkans.

- f) Systematically decrease the surplus and destroy seized small arms and light weapons and ammunition.
- g) Significantly decrease the risk of proliferation and diversion of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Implementing Agency: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme.

Budget: € 4,002,587.52

Official Journal: L 293/11 20.11.2018

Duration: Initially 36 months. However, this Council decision has been amended twice:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2161 of 6 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 October 2022.

Official Journal: L 436/46 7.12.2021

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1654 of 27 September 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans

Object: Extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 until 17 January 2023.

Official Journal: L 249/45 27.9.2022

1.6.11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2321 of 25 November 2022 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans and in support of disarmament and arms control activities in South-East and East Europe

Objective: Support Western Balkans partners with the implementation of the 'Regional Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW/firearms and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024'. The goals set out in the Roadmap are:

- a) By 2023, ensure that arms control legislation is in place, fully harmonised with the EU regulatory framework and other related international obligations and standardised across the region.
- b) By 2024, ensure that arms control policies and practices in the Western Balkans are evidence based and intelligence led.

- c) By 2024, significantly reduce illicit flows of firearms, ammunition and explosives (FAE) into, within and beyond the Western Balkans.
- d) By 2024, significantly reduce the supply, demand and misuse of firearms through increased awareness, education, outreach and advocacy.
- e) By 2024, substantially decrease the estimated number of firearms in illicit possession in the Western Balkans.
- f) Systematically decrease the surplus, and destroy seized small arms and light weapons and ammunition.
- g) Significantly decrease the risk of proliferation and diversion of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

In addition, support will be provided for countering illicit arms trafficking in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

Implementing Agency: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), via the United Nations Development Programme.

Budget: € 4,006,955.58

Official Journal: L 307/149 28.11.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.6.12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/847 of 30 May 2022 in support of efforts to prevent and combat illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas

Objective: In order to address armed violence in the Americas:

- a) Strengthen the National Firearms Regulatory Framework, considering international normative and good practices.
- b) Improve the operational capacity of national authorities to mark, trace, store, and destroy firearms.
- c) Optimise small arms control through the use of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA).
- d) Strengthen community resilience to gun violence and reduce access to illicit/and or unwanted firearms.
- e) Develop a Central American Firearms Roadmap to equip the countries with a practical and management tool through a regional, coordinated, and evidence based approach.

Implementing Agency: Organisation of American States (OAS)

Budget: € 4,240,906

Official Journal: L 148/40 31.5.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.6.13. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965 of 17 October 2022 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

Objective: Support the full and effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, enhance international, regional and national security, contribute to the realisation of human security, and promote sustainable development through SALW control, by:

- a) supporting forward-looking global policy developments in the context of the fourth United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action in 2024;
- b) strengthening effective national and regional implementation of the Programme of Actions and the International Tracing Instrument; and
- c) supporting gender-responsive SALW control policies and programmes.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Budget: € 4,524,465.05

Official Journal: L 270/67 18.10.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.7. ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS*

1.7.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 of 12 October 2020 on the promotion of effective arms export controls (COARM V)

Objective:

- a) Promote effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seek, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods.
- b) Support third countries' efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)

Budget: € 1,377,542.73

Official Journal: L 335/3 13.10.2020

Duration: Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/848 of 30 May 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 on the promotion of effective arms export controls

Object: Among others, extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1464 until 30 November 2023.

Official Journal: L 148/50 31.5.2022

1.7.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2539 of 13 November 2023 supporting a project on the promotion of effective arms export controls

Objective:

- a) Promote effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT.
- b) Support third countries' efforts at national and regional level to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)

Budget: € 682,464.03

Official Journal: L series 14.11.2023

* Detailed information on the implementation of the three Council Decisions under this section will be made available in the *Twenty-Sixth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment* (for 2023).

Duration: 14 months.

1.7.3. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 of 16 April 2021 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Objective: Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by supporting the activities of the ATT Secretariat aimed at:

- a) supporting States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT; and
- b) strengthening the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.

Implementing Agency: ATT Secretariat

Budget: € 1,370,000

Official Journal: L 133/59 20.4.2021

Duration: Initially 24 months. However, this Council Decision has been amended:

Title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/161 of 23 January 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 on Union support for activities of the ATT Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Object: extend Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/649 until 20 October 2023.

Official Journal: L 22/28 24.1.2023

1.7.4. Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2296 of 23 October 2023 on Union support for activities of the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Objective: Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by supporting the activities of the ATT Secretariat aimed at:

- a) supporting States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT; and
- b) strengthening the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.

Implementing Agency: ATT Secretariat

Budget: € 1,298,000

Official Journal: L series 20.10.2023

Duration: 24 months.

1.7.5. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2309 of 22 December 2021 on Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-OP III)

Objective: Support the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by:

- a) reinforcing or developing arms transfer control capacities and expertise for ATT implementation in new and existing beneficiary countries, through instruments such as legal assistance and training of licensing and enforcement officials;
- b) outreach to other countries, including non-States Parties to the ATT, with a view to supporting universalisation of the ATT at national, regional and multilateral levels.

Implementing Agency: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) and Expertise France.

Budget: € 3,499,892.39

Official Journal: L 461/78 27.12.2021

Duration: 36 months

1.8. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

1.8.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2269 of 18 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Promoting Responsible Innovation in Artificial Intelligence for Peace and Security'

Objective: Support greater engagement of the civilian artificial intelligence (AI) community in mitigating the risks that the diversion and misuse of civilian AI research and innovation by irresponsible actors may pose to international peace and security, by:

- a) generating greater understanding of how decisions in the development and diffusion of AI research and innovation can impact the risks of diversion and misuse, and in turn generate risk or opportunities for peace and security;
- b) promoting responsible innovation processes, methods and tools which can help ensure the peaceful application of civilian innovations and the responsible dissemination of AI knowledge. To that end, the project will support capacity-building, research and engagement activities that enhance the capacity within the global civilian AI community to include and address the peace and security risks presented by the diversion and misuse of civilian AI by irresponsible actors through responsible innovation processes; and strengthen the connection between risk mitigation efforts in responsible AI in the civilian sphere with those already ongoing in the disarmament, arms control and non- proliferation community at an intergovernmental level.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), supported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Budget: € 1,782,285.71

Official Journal: L 300/11 21.11.2022

Duration: 36 months

1.8.2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2320 of 25 November 2022 on Union support for the implementation of a project 'Unlocking Innovation: Enabling Technologies and International Security'

Objective: Support the work that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducts within its Security and Technology Programme (SECTEC) with a view to enhancing knowledge and understanding of new and emerging technologies with relevance for international security.

Implementing Agency: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Budget: € 1,234,011

Official Journal: L 307/142 28.11.2022

Duration: 24 months

1.9. COLLABORATIONS WITH NGOS AND THINK TANKS

1.9.1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/597 of 11 April 2022 promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

Objective: Continue to promote and support the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, in order to:

- a) encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
- b) provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control, and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the meetings of the Consortium;
- c) constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;
- d) contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
- e) contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries, including by strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament education, raising awareness of those issues among the younger generations and promoting the next generation of researchers and practitioners in this field, especially women, and in the natural and technical sciences.

Implementing Agency: The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, consisting of the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies Europe (IISS-Europe), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP).

Budget: € 4,700,000

Official Journal: L 114/75 12.4.2022

Duration: 36 months

2. COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

2.1. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

2.1.1. Council Conclusions on chemical disarmament and non-proliferation with a view towards the Fifth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction – The Hague, 15-19 May 2023 (20/02/2023)

1. The European Union stands united in its support for the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons as well as for the fight against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. The Council strongly believes that the use of chemical weapons, including the use of any toxic chemicals as weapons, by anyone, be it a State or a non-State actor, anywhere, and under any circumstances is unacceptable and must be vigorously condemned. It constitutes a breach of international law and may amount to a war crime or a crime against humanity. As there can be no impunity and those responsible for such abhorrent acts must and will be held accountable, the European Union and its Member States are steadfast in their resolve to pursue their commitment to this cause, notably through the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.
2. The European Union welcomes the release of the third report of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 27 January 2023. The report concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that on 7 April 2018 in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Air Force used chlorine during a military attack, killing 43 persons and affecting dozens more.
3. The European Union strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Air Force, as concluded by the report. We fully support the reports' findings which further confirm the systematic failure of the Syrian Arab Republic to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The Investigation and Identification Team's professional reporting is an important contribution to efforts to end impunity for the use of chemical weapons.
4. The Council considers the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which entered into force on 29 April 1997, to be a key disarmament and non-proliferation instrument, the integrity and strict application of which must be fully guaranteed to safeguard international peace and security. In this regard, the Council is convinced that in its 25 years of existence, the Convention has significantly reinforced the rules-based international order by establishing a global norm against the use of chemical weapons as well as by strengthening international cooperation in eliminating and preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons worldwide.
5. The Council welcomes the significant progress achieved in the destruction of declared chemical stockpiles. As of 31 October 2022, 99,4% of the world's declared chemical

stockpile has been verifiably destroyed while the only remaining possessor State is on track to complete the destruction of its remaining stock by 30 September 2023.

6. The CWC has one of the most extensive memberships amongst the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The objective must continue to be global coverage, and therefore States not party to the CWC should continue to be urged to join the Convention. Our efforts shall remain firm until full universality of the Convention has been achieved and the world's entire population lives under the protection of the Convention.
7. The Council finds it deeply distressing that the international community is still confronted with the use of chemical weapons. The Council has strongly condemned the proven use of chemical weapons in Syria on various occasions since 2013, in the UK in 2018 and in Russia in 2020. Chemical weapons have also been used in Iraq and Malaysia. Responding to the re-emergence of chemical weapons use, the Council on 15 October 2018 adopted a Decision establishing a regime of restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The Council has also imposed sanctions in the framework of its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, which was established on 7 December 2020. The Council is ready to consider taking further measures as appropriate, and will continue to work towards ensuring full accountability for those responsible for these heinous crimes.
8. The Council underlines the strong conviction that it is the international community's responsibility to identify and hold accountable the perpetrators of any chemical weapons attack. In this respect, the Council strongly supports the continued implementation of the decision adopted by the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties on 27 June 2018 leading to the establishment of an independent mechanism for attribution, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT).
9. The Council reaffirms its support to the full implementation of the CWC and recalls the vital role the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons plays in fulfilling the goals set by the Convention. In order to continue its vital work, the OPCW requires a predictable and solid financial base. The European Union calls upon all States Parties to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. In this context, the Council recalls that the EU is the biggest contributor of voluntary funding to the OPCW through projects financed via the EU budget and via individual EU Member States' national budgets. These projects support, inter alia, capacity building, OPCW Cyber security and information protection as well as provision of satellite imagery for OPCW activities.
10. The Council reiterates its full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat, its professionalism, independence, impartiality and well-established technical expertise. The EU remains steadfast in defending the Organisation against deliberate and baseless attacks on its integrity and credibility. In this context, the Council underlines the complementarity of the work between the OPCW and the United Nations and appreciates the regular sharing of information of the OPCW activities and investigations with the United Nations Secretary-General and the UN Security Council.
11. The Syrian regime's failure to respect its international obligations under the Convention is substantiated through comprehensive and thorough work and investigations carried out by

the OPCW-UN Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM), the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and the IIT.

12. The Decision adopted at the 25th Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention suspending the voting rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic is a strong message for the integrity of the Convention, against impunity for the use of chemical weapons, and in defence of International Law, including International Humanitarian Law. It is an appropriate response by the Conference to the clear violation by the Syrian regime of the Convention and its core principles. In order for its voting rights and other privileges to be restored, the Syrian regime needs to resolve all pending issues, declare the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, and return to full compliance with the Convention.
13. The Council commends the work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat on all aspects of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and appreciates its continuous efforts to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic including at ministerial level. The Council urges the Syrian regime to act constructively as there is no alternative to full and effective cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW in accordance with the Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118. Almost ten years after the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic, it still cannot be considered accurate and complete, and many important questions about the Syrian chemical weapons programme remain unanswered.
14. The European Union has already imposed restrictive measures on 36 senior Syrian officials, scientists and businesspersons as well as three entities for their role in the development and use of chemical weapons. On 14 November 2022, the Council decided to impose additional restrictive measures against two businesspersons and their company which supplies the Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) with materials used to produce chemical weapons delivery systems. The European Union is ready to consider introducing further measures as appropriate.
15. The Council reiterates its strong concerns that the Russian Federation has not reacted to international calls for a thorough and transparent investigation into the assassination attempt on the Russian opposition figure Mr. Alexei Navalny. The poisoning of Mr. Navalny in Russia in August 2020 by a nerve agent of the “Novichok” group (a substance developed by Russia), has been confirmed, beyond doubt, by certified laboratories in Germany, France and Sweden, as well as by the OPCW.

The Council has condemned this poisoning in the strongest possible terms and sanctioned six Russian government officials and a state research institute linked to the assassination attempt. The Council once again urges the Russian Federation to provide substantial answers to the questions posed by 45 States Parties in the framework of Art. IX, paragraph 2 of the Convention on 5 October 2021, and to disclose without further delay the circumstances of the assassination attempt against Mr. Navalny.

16. The Council further resolutely condemns Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. As part of such aggression against Ukraine, Russia has engaged in a campaign of disinformation and state-controlled propaganda in spreading unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations against Ukraine and others regarding

chemical weapons while risking exposure of the Ukrainian population to toxic chemicals through deliberate attacks against civilian industrial facilities. The European Union and its Member States are committed to supporting the OPCW in case Ukraine requests assistance from the OPCW due to a chemical incident or an alleged chemical attack. In this context, the European Commission has a capacity to provide rapid assessments of chemical incidents in Ukraine and it stands ready to respond quickly to requests from Ukraine for assistance.

17. It is well established that Ukraine is a responsible member of the Chemical Weapons Convention and in full compliance with the Convention. The Council hereby recalls that Russia, the country responsible for the ongoing war and violations of international law and international humanitarian law in Ukraine, has a track record in the use of chemical weapons in assassinations and assassination attempts. Following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted a variety of unprecedented sanction packages against it. On 3 June 2022, the list of sanctions was amended to ban the export of chemicals to Russia that could be misused for the manufacturing of chemical weapons.
18. The Council looks forward to the opening of the Centre for Chemistry and Technology ("the ChemTech Centre") as the new flagship of the OPCW, combining state-of-the-art laboratory and verification activities with international cooperation and assistance.

In the Council's view, the ChemTech Centre will be instrumental in training and maintaining key expertise required for the OPCW's verification tasks, in enhancing international cooperation and assistance programmes and in addressing the emerging science and technology challenges and opportunities, and the full use of its potential should be ensured. The EU is proud to be one of the major donors to the construction of the ChemTech Centre, through important voluntary contributions made by the EU and the EU Member States.

19. In order to remain fit for purpose, the OPCW requires a fully operational Technical Secretariat, equipped with necessary knowledge and expertise. In this context, the Council underlines the need for amending the OPCW Tenure Policy, to bring the level of flexibility closer to other non-career organisations in the field of disarmament. The Council further supports a geographically diverse Secretariat and encourages the Secretariat to continue its efforts in this respect, in full respect of Art. VIII of the Convention. States Parties are also encouraged to intensify their efforts to present qualified candidates for OPCW vacancies.
20. The Council strongly believes that gender equality and gender mainstreaming are necessary to fulfilling the mandate of the OPCW, and should continue to be an integral part in all areas of the work of the OPCW and implementation of the CWC. A wide diversity of views is essential for decision-making and in helping tackle the challenges the OPCW faces with greater effectiveness. We commend the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat for the work they have carried out thus far and look forward to further progress towards gender equality and on implementing the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and its subsequent resolutions by the Organisation. The Council notes that further actions towards gender equality are needed, including through the swift implementation of the recommendations of the Gender and Diversity audit, strengthening the gender focal

point network and enhancement of gender mainstreaming in all areas of the Technical Secretariat's work.

21. The Conference of States Parties in its Twenty-Fourth session adopted Decisions (C-24/DEC.4 and C-24/DEC.5 of 27 November 2019) amending Schedule 1 to Annex on Chemicals, by adding three new families of chemicals, including the substance used in Salisbury, UK in 2018. The Council considers it essential that the CWC remains responsive to new and emerging threats, including through regular updates to the Annex on Chemicals, as appropriate.
22. The Council recalls that in its Twenty-Sixth session the Conference of States Parties adopted the Decision "Understanding regarding the aerosolised use of Central Nervous System (CNS) acting chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes" (CSP-26/Dec.10, dated 1 December 2021). The Council notes that the aerosolised use of CNS-acting chemicals is understood to be inconsistent with law enforcement purposes as "a purpose not prohibited" under the Convention and further notes that the decision does not address the use of CNS-acting chemicals for other purposes not prohibited under the Convention.
23. The Council believes that close engagement of the OPCW with other relevant International Organisations, chemical industry, academia, youth and civil society and non-governmental organisations on a regular basis is beneficial for the work of the OPCW and the implementation of the Convention. The Council is concerned that participation of civil society representatives in OPCW meetings has been continuously hampered by a small number of States Parties opposing such participation without providing any justification and calls for the creation of a clearly defined, fair and transparent procedure for the participation of civil society representatives in the future.
24. The Council welcomes the adoption on 7 December 2022 by the UN General Assembly of Resolution (A/RES/77/73) on the implementation of the CWC. The Resolution is an expression of the UN Member States' support to and appreciation of the work of the OPCW, the implementing body of the CWC.
25. The Council reaffirms its commitment to strengthening chemical safety and security globally. The EU's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative is an important enabler for many OPCW States Parties' efforts to improve their capacities against CBRN threats. The CoE Initiative works in a number of areas that are complementary to the OPCW activities, notably detection, prevention, preparedness, response, and legislative and regulatory measures. Additionally, the EU provides voluntary financial contributions in support of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons.
26. On 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 (2004), reaffirming that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as a threat to international peace and security. Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent Resolutions are mutually reinforcing. The Council warmly welcomes the outcome of the comprehensive review process in 2022 of Resolution 1540 (2004) and

whose centrality, importance and authority was affirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2663 (2022). The European Union has a long-term commitment to supporting the implementation of the UNSCR 1540(2004) since 2006. The latest EU Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809, adopted on 11 May 2017, provides for further assistance to interested States to enhance their national capabilities in implementing UNSCR 1540 (2004) and to facilitate greater cooperation among all relevant stakeholders.

27. The Council stresses the imperative of ensuring the EU's continued political, diplomatic and financial support to the implementation of the CWC as well as ensuring the high level representation and visibility and effective protection of the EU's interests on chemical issues in international fora and in particular within the OPCW. The Council recalls that it is essential that all relevant EU actors, including the EEAS, continue their active engagement with and representation at the OPCW. To this end, the Council looks forward to an early establishment of the EU Delegation to the International Organisations based in The Hague.

Position of the European Union relating to the Fifth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the CWC, The Hague, 15-19 May 2023

28. The Fifth Review Conference will be an opportunity to consider how to strengthen the implementation of the Convention as a key instrument of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Achieving a common vision on countering the re-emergence of chemical weapons and safeguarding the global non-use norm is a shared responsibility of all States Parties.
29. The European Union and its Member States have been contributing actively and constructively to the work of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG). The agreed OEWG work programme allows all delegations to express their views on progress made in the implementation of the Convention and offers delegations the opportunity to set out their expectations and priorities for the future. In this context, the Council expresses its gratitude to the Chairperson, Ambassador Lauri Kuusing of Estonia, for leading the work in an open and inclusive manner, with the goal of building consensus.
30. The Council will contribute constructively to and strive for a consensus outcome of the Fifth Review Conference during 2023, while pursuing the following key objectives to be reflected in the outcome document of the Review Conference, under the broader chapeau of strongly highlighting the non-use norm, the integrity of CWC/OPCW and accountability:
 - i. To strengthen the CWC by building on the progress achieved in destroying declared stockpiles of chemical weapons and the prevention of their re-emergence, through inter alia enhancement and adaptation of the CWC's verification system, improvement of national implementation, addressing the issue of chemical security and safety as well as efforts towards achieving universality;
 - ii. To strengthen the CWC by ensuring its effective implementation in light of the global changing security environment and developments in the global chemical industry and in science and technology, and by emphasising that the Fifth Review Conference should provide political support and broad guidance for the work to be undertaken in the intersessional period on the future priorities of the OPCW;

- iii. To strengthen the CWC by enhancing the global norm against the use of chemical weapons by addressing violations of the Convention including through independent investigation and attribution activities;
- iv. To maintain the OPCW as the centre of knowledge on chemical weapons issues in the broadest sense and enhancing OPCW's robustness and up-to-date capacity of the Technical Secretariat through, inter alia, consistent recruitment and promotion policies based on merit while ensuring geographical diversity, gender-balance, and improvement of the tenure policy, as well as making best use of the opportunities offered by the ChemTech Centre;
- v. To contribute to a full review of the operation of the CWC taking into account in particular scientific and technological developments including convergence of chemistry and biology, new production technologies, as well as developments in verification instrumentation and methodologies;
- vi. To promote the above mentioned essential issues by, inter alia:
 - a) Upholding the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a key instrument of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture and the rules-based international order.
 - b) Condemning the cases of use of chemical weapons that took place over the past years in Syria, Iraq, Malaysia, UK, and in Russia.
 - c) Stressing the obligation to adopt national implementing legislation as the core of what the States Parties have taken upon themselves when joining the Convention. It is regrettable that 25 years after entry into force of the Convention, 35 States have yet to adopt initial implementing measures.
 - d) Urging all the States not party to the CWC to join the Convention with a view to achieving universality.
 - e) Commending the leadership of the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, and reiterate the Council's full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat, its professionalism, independence, impartiality and well-established technical expertise in implementing the CWC and tasks assigned by the States Parties.
 - f) Defending the OPCW Technical Secretariat against baseless accusations and attacks on its integrity and credibility through deliberate campaigns of state-sponsored disinformation.
 - g) Appreciating the ability of the OPCW to address the allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria, including through the work of the Fact-Finding Mission and the IIT.
 - h) Expressing concern at the continued gaps and discrepancies in the Syrian initial declaration and acknowledging the work of the Declaration Assessment team.
 - i) Recalling the Council's consistent and strong support to the implementation of the CWC including its extensive voluntary financial contributions in support of the OPCW activities.
 - j) Recalling that countering the re-emergence of chemical weapons and safeguarding the global non-use norm is a shared responsibility of all States Parties.

On Verification

- k) Highlighting and upholding the Convention's verification regime, as carried out by the OPCW through its verification activities, as essential to the successful implementation of the Convention and to the norm against the use of chemical weapons.

- l) Recognising that in light of changes in the chemical industry and rapid developments in science and technology the verification regime requires some adaptation in order to remain relevant.
- m) Improving the Article VI Verification Regime by rendering the inspection processes more efficient, simpler, and by adapting the selection processes for inspections to current requirements, notably the methodology for the selection of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) for inspection.
- n) Highlighting the importance of increasing chemical safety and security worldwide and stressing the need to cover all stages of a chemical life cycle – i.e. not just production but also transportation, storage and disposal.
- o) Supporting further development of capabilities, tools and methodologies of the Secretariat to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use, such as chemical forensics.

On Capacity Building and International Assistance

- p) Underlining the importance of continued support to capacity building and to promoting peaceful uses of chemistry.
- q) Recalling that combatting chemical terrorism effectively requires States Parties to strengthen legislative and regulatory frameworks, develop adequate prevention and response capacities, and improve cooperation at regional and international levels.
- r) Proposing that the Review Conference requests the Technical Secretariat to further develop support programmes related to legislation and regulatory frameworks pertaining to chemical security and countering chemical terrorism.
- s) Maintaining the ability and capacity of the Secretariat to conduct non-routine missions as they provide the States Parties with objective and reliable information regarding allegations on chemical weapons use.
- t) Emphasising the importance to continue the International Cooperation and Assistance activities as they play an essential role in contributing to the full and effective implementation of the States Parties' obligations under the Convention, as well as to ensuring the continued relevance of the Convention as a key instrument of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
- u) Recalling the EU's long-standing commitment to support State Parties capacity building efforts, including through the Africa Programme.
- v) Requesting the Technical Secretariat to further enhance an integrated approach to the assistance and cooperation programmes, overcoming the article-by-article programming whenever possible.
- w) Strengthening the OPCW capacity to respond promptly to a request for assistance under Article X.

On ChemTech Centre

- x) Welcoming the opening of the Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre) as the new flagship of the Organisation, combining state-of-the-art laboratory and verification activities with international cooperation and assistance.
- y) Recognising that the ChemTech Centre will be instrumental in addressing the emerging science and technology challenges and opportunities.
- z) Promoting and supporting the possibility to train inspectors at the ChemTech Centre of the OPCW.

- aa) Supporting further development of assistance and protection programmes, making full use of the ChemTech Centre facilities, while at the same time drawing on the top quality expertise available in State Parties.
- bb) Urging the enhancement of the system of managing voluntary contributions, including through regularly issuing a list of unfunded activities for potential donors to choose from. Such a list should notably include additional activities that could take place at the ChemTech Centre.
- cc) Emphasising that expertise and capacity to deal with chemical weapons, old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons should be retained, while expertise on sea-dumped chemical weapons is to be maintained, developed further and provided, upon request from States Parties concerned to support voluntary cooperation to deal with threats posed by chemical weapons dumped at sea, taking into account relevant regional aspects, and that the OPCW must also continue to develop expertise necessary to deal with challenges in a new security environment, making full use of the ChemTech Centre.

On Outreach, Education and Stakeholder Cooperation

- dd) Acknowledging the expertise of the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach and the key role it plays in recommending education and outreach activities with a view to strengthening the engagement with relevant stakeholders.
- ee) Maximising the impact of OPCW programmes by encouraging states to select candidates with the most potential.
- ff) Requesting the Technical Secretariat to develop further Guidelines on most relevant topics, as well as to explore other innovative tools that could be made available to State Parties online, such as e-learning courses.
- gg) Encouraging the States Parties and the Technical Secretariat to continue their outreach efforts, including through the development of additional materials on the future challenges the OPCW is facing, such as the re-emergence of the use of chemical weapons.
- hh) Underlining the importance to raise awareness of the CWC and the visibility of the OPCW through education and outreach activities.
- ii) Calling for more tailored guidelines for small and medium-sized companies to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the CWC, as discussed by National Authorities in Doha in October of 2022.
- jj) Reiterating the importance to engage all relevant external stakeholders and partners in the OPCW work, ranging from chemical industry to academia, think tanks, civil society and international organisations.
- kk) Considering as crucial to deepen cooperation with the chemical industry, relevant international and regional organisations as well as communities of experts. As for Article XI, a deeper relationship between the OPCW and corresponding industries and NGOs would be beneficial for learning from each other's experiences in practical implementations.
- ll) Thanking the Technical Secretariat for their efforts to maintain dialogue with chemical industry, in line with the mandate given by the Third Review Conference.
- mm) Noting the important contributions that civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have made to support the common objective of a world free of chemical weapons. Their participation must be inclusive and non-discriminatory.

- nn) Encouraging the organisation of side-events in the Conference of States Parties and Review Conferences with civil society, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders to make their voices heard.

On Gender

- oo) Encouraging senior management of the OPCW to continue working towards a more gender-equal, diverse and inclusive Technical Secretariat as well as applying a gender-responsive approach throughout all policy documents, decisions and programmes and field activities within the Organisation.
- pp) Underlining the importance of the swift implementation of the recommendations of the Gender and Diversity Audit, and encouraging such audits within each review cycle of the Convention. Enhancing the institutional capacities and expertise on gender equality, including through gender responsive leadership, and strengthening of the gender focal point network could support gender mainstreaming efforts.

On the Technical Secretariat

- qq) Appreciating the OPCW Technical Secretariat's effort to approach the issues of the progress and challenges of the CWC in a more integrated manner, working across relevant provisions of the Convention.
- rr) Affirming the need to recruit and retain highly qualified and competent staff to ensure that the Organisation remains fit for purpose and able to implement the Convention and the tasks assigned by the States Parties.
- ss) Proposing to amend the OPCW Tenure Policy with a view of improving the Technical Secretariat's ability to retain key expertise required by allowing former staff to be re-hired after several years of break in service for a new tenure of 7 years, and by allowing the extension of contracts by a limited number of additional years, in order to ensure successful continuation or completion of a specific task.
- tt) Calling upon the Director-General to explore the possibility for the OPCW to join the UN Pension Fund as an additional means to increase the competitiveness of the OPCW as an employer.
- uu) Calling for further efforts to strengthen the training and knowledge management of the staff to mitigate the effects of rotation.

Other Measures

- vv) Welcoming the thematic approach and substantive discussions held by the Open-Ended Working Group under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Lauri Kuusing of Estonia on the future priorities of and challenges faced by the Convention, as well as a thorough assessment of its implementation over the past five years.
- ww) Welcoming the progress achieved since the Fourth Review Conference in the implementation of Articles VII, X and XI while recognising that more efforts are required to ensure the full implementation of all provisions of the Convention.
- xx) Appreciating the role and expertise of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in advising the Director-General and States Parties on science and technology related issues, including its comprehensive input to the Fifth Review Conference.
- yy) Proposing that the Executive Council takes duly note of the SAB reports and that they are subject of an in-depth discussion in the EC.

31. The Council supports the following actions to be taken by the European Union regarding the aforementioned purposes, including, where appropriate, through outreach demarches prior and during the Fifth Review Conference:

- i. To urge State Parties to support and participate in an effective and complete review of the operation of the CWC, and in this context reiterate their commitment to the fundamental global norm against the use of chemical weapons;
- ii. To promote effective and full national implementation of the CWC by States Parties in accordance with Article VII;
- iii. To promote universal accession to the CWC;
- iv. To promote agreed EU proposals aimed at further strengthening the CWC;
- v. To promote visibility of the long-standing and substantive EU action in support of the CWC;
- vi. To issue statements and working papers, as appropriate, for consideration by States Parties;
- vii. To support the broadest possible participation in the preparatory works and attendance by representatives of International Organisations, chemical industry, academia as well as civil society and non-governmental organisations.

EU action in support of the CWC and the OPCW 2004-2023

On 22 November 2004, the Council adopted the first Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. That Joint Action was followed by Council Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP adopted on 12 December 2005; Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP adopted on 19 March 2007; Council Decision 2009/569/CFSP adopted on 27 July 2009; Council Decision 2012/166/CFSP adopted on 23 March 2012; Council Decision 2013/726/CFSP adopted on 9 December 2013; Council Decision 2014/906/CFSP on 16 December 2014 Amending Decision 2013/726/CFSP in support of the UNSCR 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council EC-M-33/Dec 1; Council Decision 2015/259/CFSP adopted on 17 February 2015; Council Decision 2015/2215/CFSP adopted on 30 November 2015 in support of UN Security Council Resolution 2235 (2015); Council Decision 2017/1252/CFSP adopted on 11 July 2017 in support of the strengthening of chemical safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; Council Decision 2017/2302/CFSP adopted on 12 December 2017 in support of the OPCW activities to assist clean-up operations at the former chemical weapons storage site in Libya; Council Decision 2017/2303/CFSP adopted on 12 December 2017 in support of the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013).

Since the Fourth Review Conference in 2018, the Council has further adopted the following Decisions in support of the CWC and the OPCW. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/294 adopted on 26 February 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/259 in support of activities of the OPCW; Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1943 adopted on 10 December 2018 as no-cost extension of the CD in support of the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons; Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 adopted on 1 April 2019 in support of activities of the OPCW; Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1092 adopted

on 26 June 2019 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2302 in support of the OPCW activities to assist clean-up operations at the former chemical weapons storage site in Libya; Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2112 adopted on 9 December 2019 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 in support of the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council decision EC- M- 33/DEC.1 on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons; Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 adopted on 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the OPCW; Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 adopted on 25 November 2021 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of the OPCW through satellite imagery; and Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/573 adopted on 7 April 2022 Amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 in support of activities of the OPCW.

3. STATEMENTS[†]

3.1. GENERAL STATEMENTS

3.1.1. EU statement at the High Level Segment of Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 28/02/2023)

Mr. President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the potential candidate country Georgia and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

Let me start by congratulating you on your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and wish you every success in your endeavours. Rest assured of the EU's full support.

It is, indeed, a privilege to address this Conference. We are gathering here at a very dark moment as we mark one year of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine – one of the greatest challenges to international peace and security, which affect people in all corners of the world, with particularly dramatic effects on most vulnerable.

Today, upholding the rules-based international order is more important than ever. The EU will continue to support effective multilateralism, with the UN at its core, in order to ensure a safer, more stable and sustainable world. This is the only way to address global challenges and deliver results on issues important to our citizens.

However, we witness a worrying trend of some States moving away from multilateral measures, rules and principles when it comes to national security. The EU attaches great importance to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control instruments which contribute to peace, security and stability. The current complex security environment, which is marked by the Russian war of aggression, increased tensions and continued proliferation crises, underscores the need to preserve, implement and further strengthen these instruments. The EU will continue to robustly counter any backtracking from agreed commitments and obligations.

The reduction of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals under the New START Treaty, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism, contributes to international and European security and to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. The EU welcomed the agreement reached in 2021 between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for an additional five years. The EU is deeply concerned about the current developments, notably Russia's announcement on suspending its participation in the New START Treaty after it has failed to comply with legally-binding obligations under the Treaty. We deplore the announcement and call on Russia to immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations, including by facilitating New START

[†] All EU statements on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament-related matters are available on:

- [European External Action Service – Press materials](#)
- [Delegation of the EU to the UN and other international organisations in Geneva – Press materials](#)
- [Delegation of the EU to the UN in New York – Press materials](#)
- [Delegation of the EU to the International Organisations in Vienna – Press materials](#)

inspections on Russian territory, and by returning to participation in the Treaty's implementation body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

The maintenance and full implementation of existing arms control arrangements is of paramount importance for the entire international community and we call on Russia to re-engage in good faith in these efforts. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear weapon States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their arsenals including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons and to pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction and verification, laying the ground for even more robust and ambitious future arms control agreements and reporting. In this regard, the EU welcomes the increased transparency shown by some nuclear-weapon states on their doctrines and the nuclear weapons they possess and calls on others to do likewise.

Furthermore, we call upon Russia to urgently pursue de-escalation and we reaffirm that Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric is unacceptable. We recall the "Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Race" of January 3, 2022 and call upon Russia to respect the commitments contained therein.

The EU reiterates its support for intensified dialogue, including on strategic stability, increased transparency and confidence building measures by the nuclear weapon States to promote further progress in disarmament. Given the rapid and extensive build-up of China's nuclear arsenal, we call on China to join future arms control agreement and to respond positively to calls for an arms control dialogue as a first step. We urge China to immediately take measures to improve the transparency of its nuclear weapons, to refrain from further build-up, which is not in line with its commitments under the NPT, and pursue new risk reduction measures. Pending a future agreement on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT), the EU calls on China to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Mr. President,

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has played an important role over the years in constructing the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture in order to make the world safer. Many of successful and ambitious disarmament agreements in the past were born here. However, the CD finds itself at a crossroad on how to overcome its long standing impasse in order to regain its credibility and maintain its relevance as a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The CD, as one of the key components of the international disarmament machinery, requires reinvigoration. This endeavour needs to look at its working methods and procedures. Distorting the rule of consensus to hamper the work of the CD does not create a conducive environment and cannot increase trust among States.

While the EU and its Member States are ready to launch substantive work on all core items, our longstanding priority in the CD is to immediately commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) and we support starting such negotiations in accordance with document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. We call on all States to contribute to facilitating the long-overdue negotiations on a FMCT. In the meantime, we call on all States concerned that have

not yet done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on their production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Furthermore, promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a top priority for the EU. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay. In this vein, the EU strongly condemns Russia's reckless rhetoric and threats of resuming nuclear tests. This is irresponsible and unacceptable behaviour. We recall that Russia has ratified the CTBT and declared a moratorium on nuclear tests and we call on Russia to abide by its commitments.

Moreover, the EU supports the enlargement of the CD, which currently comprises only 65 members. We strongly oppose raising objections to requests of UN Member States to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We reject Russia's politically motivated approach to block the participation of UN Member States, international organisations and non-governmental organisations in international fora and processes.

Mr. President,

This Conference should be negotiating issues of utmost importance for the entire international community. However, Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and blackmail, its violations of its international obligations and commitments, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum have devastating consequences for international peace and security, as well as global disarmament efforts, including the CD.

The EU reiterates its resolute condemnation of Russia's illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression with Belarus' complicity against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter. Our support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian war of aggression remains unwavering. We will stand by Ukraine with steadfast support for as long as it takes.

The crimes and atrocities committed in Ukraine cannot go unpunished. The EU supports Ukrainian and international efforts to ensure accountability for the violations of international law and war crimes. Those responsible for these war crimes, including crime of aggression and their accomplices, will be held to account in accordance with international law.

We strongly urge for peace for Ukraine. International relations must not be based on the use or threat of use of force. Russia must stop this atrocious war and immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its troops and equipment from all of the territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders. This war is a threat not only to Ukraine, but to the international peace and security and to the rules-based international order.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.1.2. EU general statement at the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee (New York, 02/10/2023)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

Today the world faces a proliferation of crises: Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and its global consequences, the deteriorating situation in the Sahel and other parts of Africa, the climate emergency, rising food insecurity, erosion of democracy and human rights, terrorism and violent extremism, cyber threats, as well as backsliding on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs are intrinsically linked to peace and security and to human rights. Without peace, none of these goals will be achieved.

These challenges cannot be addressed by any one country alone; they must be resolved collectively. That is why the EU and its Member States will continue to uphold the rules-based international order founded on the UN Charter while continuing to defend, promote and further strengthen the global architecture for arms control, disarmament, multilateralism and non-proliferation as well as export control regimes.

The disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has been under considerable pressure for some time. The EU deplores the obstructive posture of some individual States, including by blocking consensus at most multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and export control fora this year, notably the NPT First Preparatory Session in Vienna. The continued non-compliance by some States with their international obligations is a matter of grave concern to the EU. The viability and effectiveness of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements require that those agreements be fully implemented, complied with and enforced. Ensuring accountability and ending impunity is crucial to preserving the integrity of the established norms. Multilateral export control regimes, too, have experienced unjustified direct or indirect pressure. This creates a risk of side-lining these crucial effective instruments of non-proliferation, which are designed to build trust among all actors of legitimate international trade.

Mr. Chair,

The EU reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia's war of aggression, with Belarus' complicity, against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of international law and the UN Charter. Russia has blatantly violated its commitments under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine. The European Union condemns the agreement by Russia and Belarus to allow the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. The EU condemns Russia's actions, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force in its illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which further demonstrate how Russia's repeated actions undermine international peace and security. Russia's violation of existing Confidence and Security Building Measures and conventional arms control commitments damaged the European security architecture. Russia must immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. We are horrified over Russia's campaign of systematic missile and drone

strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine, in systematic breach of the rules of international humanitarian law. We furthermore condemn the delivery of Iranian drones to Russia in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Mr. Chair,

Promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a key priority and we call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex 2, to sign and ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, it is of utmost importance that all States refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.

The EU remains gravely concerned by the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We are particularly concerned about the pursuit of ballistic missile programmes in violation of UN Security Council resolutions by several countries. We call for the immediate dismantlement of these programmes, which are a source of mistrust and contribute to regional instability. The EU fully supports the multilateral instruments on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and calls on all States Parties to comply fully with their obligations under the BTWC and CWC and on all Non-States Parties to sign or accede to these conventions.

The reduction of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals under the New START Treaty, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism, contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of deployed nuclear weapons. We call on Russia to immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear-weapon States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Given the rapid and extensive build-up of China's nuclear arsenal, we call on China to join future arms control agreements and to immediately take measures to improve transparency on its nuclear weapons and doctrine, to refrain from further build-up, and to pursue risk reduction measures.

Since last year, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has launched different types of ballistic and cruise missiles in unprecedented numbers, including attempted satellite launches using ballistic missile technology. The EU condemns the DPRK's continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and calls upon the DPRK to refrain from conducting another nuclear test. These actions threaten international peace and security. The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons, any other weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

As a key security priority, the European Union reiterates its clear determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon, and recalls Iran's commitments in that respect and its international obligations. The EU expresses its grave concern at Iran's continued actions in violation of the JCPOA in particular with regard to the expansion of its nuclear enrichment capacity and production of highly enriched uranium. Iran's actions, which have no credible civilian justification, carry very significant proliferation-related risks. The EU is also gravely concerned at the lack of substantive cooperation by Iran with the IAEA and urges Iran to take the necessary actions without delay to fulfil its legal safeguards obligations and its commitments towards the Agency. The EU condemns the recent de-designation of several

IAEA inspectors by Iran, which undermines the Agency's ability to carry out its safeguards mandate effectively. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Mr. Chair.

The EU is fully committed to playing a leading role with a view to achieving an ambitious and action-oriented "Pact for the Future" as outcome of the Summit of the Future in 2024, and will continue its constructive engagement on the proposed deliverables.

A 'New Agenda for Peace' must express a renewed vow of all nations to respect the principles of the UN Charter, to maintain international peace and security, and refrain from the threat or use of force. It is an opportunity to shape new responses against old and new threats, including by inter alia strengthening prevention, by ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacekeeping, peacebuilding and implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in all its dimensions as well as the Youth, Peace and Security agenda. The New Agenda for Peace should strengthen multilateral cooperation to continue advancing disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism, hybrid attacks, as well as cyber-related risks in full compliance with international law, including humanitarian and human rights law. In this regard, the EU fully supports the evolving framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. It should also reinforce global governance for the peaceful, secure and sustainable use of outer space, and aim to strengthen synergies amongst the various governance initiatives to reinforce space safety and security. In addition, the EU is convinced that an approach based on behaviours is the most immediate way forward to make progress on prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The EU will continue to support and strengthen conventional arms control instruments. We will strive to universalize the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan. We also fully support the humanitarian goal of the Cluster Munition Convention and strongly encourage the full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects. We note as an important achievement of the international community, the adoption of the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), and the opportunity to continue these efforts at the Oslo Conference next year.

The EU will vigorously promote and scale up international efforts towards gender equality, the advancement and full enjoyment of all human rights by all women and girls and their empowerment, in line with its international commitments. The EU will continue to place the prevention and elimination of all forms of sexual and gender-based violence at the centre of its efforts.

In conclusion, the EU supports disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the European network of independent think tanks, is contributing with various activities.

We will present our priorities in each of the seven cluster EU statements.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.2. NUCLEAR ISSUES

3.2.1. EU statement at the General Debate of the First Preparatory Committee Session of the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: General Statement (Vienna, 31/07/2023)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland and San Marino.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the chairmanship of the first Preparatory Committee meeting of the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and assure you of the EU's full support. We appreciate the inclusive and transparent approach you have adopted for the preparations.

The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of all tireless efforts, the Tenth NPT Review Conference was not able to adopt a final outcome document due to Russia blocking consensus. While we also regret that no outcome was achieved at last week's Working Group, we are encouraged by the highly interactive and substantive discussions, including on transparency and accountability and we aim at continuing the work on strengthening the review process. The EU and its Member States remain united in their unequivocal support to uphold and strengthen the Treaty, which remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes.

The EU recognises the NPT's historic achievements in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in significantly reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles in previous decades. The NPT's continued vitality is especially important in view of the current security environment marked by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine as well as serious proliferation crises and challenges. The NPT has an enduring value and its full implementation is needed now more than ever.

At the start of this new review cycle, our priority must be to uphold and preserve the NPT as a key multilateral instrument, promote its universalisation and strengthen its implementation. We call upon States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. We reiterate the EU's strong, resolute and continuous support for all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote a comprehensive, balanced and substantive full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, and commitments during previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are resolved to seek a safer and more secure world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security. Ensuring the implementation of the 64 actions in the 2010 Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties to the NPT without exception.

Mr. Chair,

Russia's illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine drastically changed the paradigms of both global and European peace and security. The Russian war of

aggression against Ukraine and President Putin's threats of nuclear use seriously undermine and have a significant negative impact on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The blatant violation by Russia of the Budapest Memorandum, its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, as well as other unacceptable acts against nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, in particular its ongoing illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, are detrimental to the NPT. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the attacks against Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The partial destruction of the Kakhovka dam is a particularly serious act. It once again illustrates the tragic consequences of an aggression for which

Russia bears sole responsibility. In this regard, we support the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to help strengthen nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and to implement safeguards, including its missions on the ground and the Director General's efforts to protect the ZNPP.

The EU reiterates its resolute condemnation of Russia's war of aggression, with Belarus' complicity, against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of international law and the UN Charter. We urge Russia to immediately end the preparations for deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus, which will further exacerbate already heightened tensions. The EU demands that Russia immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. The EU remains strongly committed to the fight against impunity. Our support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence remains unwavering. We will stand by Ukraine with steadfast support for as long as it takes.

EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals. In this regard, the EU is deeply concerned about Russia's purported suspension of the New START Treaty. We call on Russia to immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations. The EU strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons and to pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, verification activities, laying the ground for even more robust and ambitious future arms control agreements and reporting.

The EU is extremely concerned by the rapid and extensive build-up of China's nuclear arsenal, which runs counter to its Article VI commitments. Therefore, we urge China to refrain from further build-up, immediately take measures to improve the transparency of its nuclear weapons, and pursue risk reduction measures. In this context, we call on China to respond positively to calls for an arms control dialogue as a first step to joining future arms control agreements.

The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

Mr. Chair,

The EU considers the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) universalisation and entry into force a top priority and calls on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex 2, to sign and ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay. We

also call on all States to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

The EU calls for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Pending a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in force, the EU calls on China and all States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In line with this longstanding priority, the EU has submitted a Working Paper on a set of actions advancing the objectives of an FMCT.

The EU reaffirms the value of multilateral cooperation in advancing nuclear disarmament verification, an essential component of future disarmament and arms control frameworks, which can contribute to the implementation of Article VI.

The EU recognizes that negative security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and calls on all nuclear weapon States to reaffirm existing security assurances noted by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The EU acknowledges the critical importance of existing nuclear weapons free zones for peace and security and remains committed to the implementation of the Resolution on Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

Mr. Chair,

The EU remains seriously concerned in the face of persistent proliferation crises and challenges, which represent a threat to international peace and security, and it underlines its resolve to increase non-proliferation efforts and to strengthen, universalize and render more effective the nuclear non-proliferation architecture.

As a key security priority, the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, the EU remains committed to the JCPOA. However, we are deeply concerned by the successive IAEA reports documenting the alarming acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme. The risk of a nuclear non-proliferation crisis in the region has further increased as a result of Iran's escalating nuclear trajectory. We strongly urge Iran to reverse its nuclear trajectory and to return to its political commitments, and to its legal obligations. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The EU reiterates that the DPRK must comply immediately with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities. The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT or any other special status in that regard. The EU urges the DPRK to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State and its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, bring into force the Additional Protocol and sign and ratify the CTBT. The EU urges the DPRK to resume meaningful dialogue with all the main parties. The EU is ready to work with all relevant partners and promote any meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building sustainable peace and security and take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

Mr. Chair,

The EU is resolved to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards, recognising the IAEA's important work and central role in this regard. The EU calls on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the international nuclear safety and security conventions without delay. Ahead of the 2024 International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS), we must sustain our efforts to strengthen global nuclear security and nuclear security culture. The EU stresses that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol constitute the current verification standard under the NPT and calls for their universalisation without delay.

The EU remains committed to ensuring the responsible, safe and secure development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and welcomes the IAEA's activities in supporting its Member States in their efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement commitments including in the context of COP28. The EU reaffirms its support for the inalienable right of all Parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the NPT, including in the framework of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme.

The EU recalls the importance of effective export controls, in accordance with Article III of the NPT, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887 and 2325. We reiterate that export control regimes allow States to ensure that proliferation concerns are addressed and thus facilitate the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is a top horizontal priority and believes it is important to integrate gender perspectives into discussions across the three pillars of the NPT. The EU fully supports and promotes the equal participation of women and men in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. To this end, we welcome initiatives such as the "Young Women Next Generation Initiative" established by the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. The EU is also the largest donor to the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie

Fellowship Programme.

In conclusion, we reiterate our commitment to further contribute to the work of the First Preparatory Committee, as well throughout the whole NPT review cycle, with the aim of advancing our common objective and making concrete progress towards that goal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.2.2. EU Statement at the General Debate of the 67th session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna, 25/09/2023)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and San Marino.

Let me congratulate you, Madam President, on your election and assure you of the EU's full support and cooperation in achieving a successful General Conference.

We congratulate Director General Grossi on his reappointment and look forward to working closely with him during his second term. The EU attaches great importance to the IAEA's technical, independent and impartial role in all areas of its mandate "Atoms for Peace and Development" and remains committed to strong EU-IAEA cooperation.

In these difficult times, we must protect the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its continued armed attacks on the Ukrainian territory and illegal seizure of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) are flagrant violations of international law, including the UN Charter, and violate the very principles of the IAEA Statute. They increase risks to nuclear safety, security and the continued implementation of safeguards and require an appropriate response from the General Conference.

The EU condemns Russia's war of aggression in the strongest possible terms. We strongly support Ukraine and thank the Director General and Agency staff for their active and dedicated work in difficult circumstances. The IAEA Support and Assistance Missions on the ground are crucial to help prevent a nuclear accident that could have severe consequences. We are deeply concerned that the Director General's seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict continue to be compromised as a result of Russia's war of aggression and that Russia is preventing the IAEA from comprehensively assessing the situation at the ZNPP against the five principles established by the Director General which must be respected. We urge Russia to heed the Board's resolutions, immediately and completely withdraw all its armed forces, military equipment and other personnel from Ukraine, including from the ZNPP, and fully respect Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

As a key security priority, the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, the EU remains committed to the JCPOA. We regret that Iran has not taken the necessary steps to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region has further increased as a result of Iran's escalating nuclear trajectory. Concrete and sustained moves of nuclear de-escalation are needed to help restore trust. The EU calls on all States to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The EU calls on Iran to work with the Agency in earnest and a sustained way towards the fulfilment of the commitments contained in the March 2023 Joint Statement. Iran must cooperate in full with the IAEA without further delay to resolve all pending safeguards issues, in accordance with its legally binding obligations under its NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We strongly condemn the disproportionate unilateral measure of Iran to withdraw the designation of further experienced Agency inspectors. This profoundly regrettable decision

affects in a direct and severe way the ability of the Agency to conduct effectively its verification activities in Iran. We are also concerned of the impact of this decision on the monitoring of the JCPOA. The EU urges Iran to reverse course on these inspector de-designations.

The EU remains gravely concerned about the continued development by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The EU urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security, and to take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We insist that the DPRK return to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bring into force the Additional Protocol, and urge it to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon State under the NPT or any other special status.

The EU reiterates its firm support for the full, complete, and effective implementation of the NPT and its three pillars and continues to call for its universalisation.

The EU supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and remains of the view that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with Additional Protocols, constitute the current verification standard under the NPT. We call for their universalisation without delay.

The EU also urges all States, which have not yet done so, to amend or rescind their original standard Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) and apply the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in full, especially those States that are building nuclear facilities. We note with concern the Agency's assessment that, it may no longer be able to draw safeguards conclusions for States with the original SQP due to the limitations therein.

We attach utmost importance to nuclear safety, and its continuous improvement. Over the past decades, we have established and further developed an advanced, legally-binding and enforceable nuclear safety framework applicable in all EURATOM Member States. We continue to provide financial and human resources to help improve nuclear safety worldwide, including through the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), with a budget of €300 million. We encourage all IAEA Member States to promote a strong nuclear safety culture and stress that the highest standards for nuclear safety that can be reasonably achieved should be implemented and continuously improved.

Furthermore, the EU stresses the need for sustained efforts to strengthen global nuclear security. We encourage IAEA Member States to work together for a successful international ministerial conference (ICONS) in May 2024. As one of the largest donors to the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), we recognise the IAEA's central role in facilitating international cooperation and assisting Member States to build their capacities against nuclear security threats and risks.

We strongly support the international nuclear safety and security conventions, and their implementation and universalisation. A robust international nuclear safety and security architecture is of utmost importance. We appreciate the Agency's continued commitment to maintaining fully applicable and up-to-date Safety Standards and Security Guidance and considering the nuclear safety and security implications of situations involving armed attacks.

Madam President,

The EU and its Member States reaffirm their longstanding commitment to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and support the Agency's activities in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in order to reach the Sustainable Development Goals including in the context of

the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. All countries have the sovereign right to decide whether or not to include nuclear power as part of their own energy mix to collectively achieve the 2030 climate target and the Paris Agreement commitments. The EU acknowledges the role played by nuclear technologies in relation to the global efforts to limit climate change and mitigate its negative effects. In this regard, we welcome the organisation of this year's Scientific Forum on "Nuclear Innovations for Net Zero".

The EU also welcomes important initiatives such as Rays of Hope, and NUTEC Plastics and looks forward to hearing more about the most recent initiative announced by the Director General, "Atoms4Food".

We appreciate the IAEA's strong commitment to gender equality and encourage the Secretariat to continue its efforts to achieve gender parity and mainstream gender in programmes and projects. The EU is proud to be the largest donor to the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme.

We are concerned about the serious liquidity challenge the Agency is facing due to delays in receiving assessed contributions to the Regular Budget. We encourage all Member States to do their utmost to ensure sustainable and predictable funding so that the Agency can continue its crucial work.

Thank you, Madam President.

3.2.3. EU Statement at the 67th session of the IAEA General Conference on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine (Vienna, 28/09/2023)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and San Marino.

It has been more than 18 months since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in violation of international law, including the UN Charter and the very principles of the IAEA Statute. The Russian invasion of Ukraine holds severe consequences for Ukraine's nuclear facilities including the past looting of the Chornobyl site as well as the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

The EU continues to condemn Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. We are gravely concerned about the increasing nuclear safety and security risks, with potentially severe consequences for Ukraine and its neighbouring countries, as well as wider global repercussions. None of these existed before Russia's invasion.

As a consequence of Russia's aggression, and as reported by the IAEA Director General, the ZNPP has lost its main source of cooling water following the destruction of the Kakhovka dam. Its main off-site power supply line suffers frequent disconnections. Maintenance work is being neglected in the absence of sufficient spare parts and personnel. The operating staff is conducting their duties under constant intimidation from Russian forces, increasing the risk of mistakes. The orders of the Ukrainian Regulator for all six units to be placed in cold shutdown and the recommendations of the IAEA are being ignored. Most worryingly, the IAEA has reported continued significant Russian military presence at the site, with outwards-facing

mines and military activity near the site. Moreover, the war has made the conduct of IAEA safeguards activities more challenging.

The EU is most grateful to the IAEA and its Director General who have acted with great determination and decisiveness under these unprecedented circumstances. We recall the Agency's clear stance that the attempted illegal annexation of four regions of Ukraine has no validity under international law, as set out in UN General Assembly Resolution 11/4 of 12 October 2022. We strongly support the IAEA's continued presence at Ukraine's nuclear power plants, in full respect of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We reiterate our appreciation for the IAEA Director General's Seven Indispensable Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict as well as Five Principles to avoid a nuclear accident at the ZNPP. The IAEA experts on-site must have unrestricted and timely access to all locations to monitor implementation.

Regrettably, Russia has shown no sign of respecting either the Seven Pillars or the Five Principles. Russia is not complying with the three resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2022, let alone the previous consensus resolutions of the IAEA General Conference which clearly state that "any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the UN Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency".

Madam President,

The time has come for the IAEA General Conference to address the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP as well as safeguards implementation. The IAEA needs our support for its work to help maintain nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. Russia must leave the ZNPP in order for the competent Ukrainian authorities to ensure its safe and secure operation and in order for the Agency to safely implement safeguards, in accordance with Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

We would like to thank the co-sponsors – Canada, Costa Rica, Finland and Singapore – for their tireless and transparent efforts, which have resulted in a balanced draft Resolution for consideration by the General Conference. We call upon all IAEA Member States to support it.

The EU stands with Ukraine as long as necessary. We will continue to support Ukraine and the IAEA's nuclear safety and security work.

Thank you, Madam President.

3.2.4. EU Statement at 61st session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 13/11/2023)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Andorra and San Marino.

Mr. Chairman,

We thank the Executive Secretary for his comprehensive reports, and express our support for the recommendations contained in the reports of Working Groups A and B, as well as of the Advisory Group. We also wish to express our appreciation to you Mr Chairman for your efforts

and productive work in steering the Commission and for convening informal consultations prior to this Session.

The entry into force of the CTBT remains a priority for the EU. We urge all States that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT. We also consistently call upon the remaining Annex 2 States who still need to sign and ratify the Treaty in order to bring it into force, to do so without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, it is crucial for international peace and security that all States fully observe the moratorium on nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, we call on all States to continue to honour their engagements.

The EU deeply deplores the unprecedented decision of Russia to revoke its ratification of the CTBT. This unjustifiable decision constitutes a serious setback in Russia's commitment towards the international security architecture that undermines the ongoing non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. This latest measure by Russia, a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is also a severe step back on Russia's undertaking to promote the CTBT at the highest political level and through all available bilateral and multilateral channels. This is made all the worse by Russia's status as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council. The EU calls on Russia to continue to respect the purpose and the objective of the Treaty. We also reiterate our call on Russia to maintain the integrity of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and data availability through the verification regime.

We warmly welcome the latest ratification of the CTBT by Sri Lanka and the latest signature by Somalia and fully support the Executive Secretary and his team's efforts for achieving additional ratifications of the Treaty. In this regard, we welcome the adoption of the Final Declaration during the thirteenth Article XIV Ministerial Conference that took place on 22 September, in New York, under the Co-Presidency of Norway and Panama, whom we thank for their valuable work.

The EU and its Member States also actively participated in the First NPT 11th Review Conference Preparatory Committee session, taking place in Vienna from 31st July to 11th August, which presented another occasion to reaffirm States Signatories' support to the CTBT and its entry into force.

Mr. Chairman,

The current security environment is marked by Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, increased tensions and continuing proliferation crises. Russia must immediately cease its aggression, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

The EU urges the DPRK to cease its unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security and instead engage in dialogue with relevant partners. The DPRK must comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions to refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Any nuclear test must be met with a swift, united, and robust international response.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We urge the DPRK to abandon its existing nuclear weapons programmes as well as programmes to build delivery systems and other weapons of mass destruction in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as required by UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT without any

preconditions or further delay. We also call on the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and to sign and ratify an Additional Protocol thereto. It is critical that sanctions, which target the DPRK's unlawful weapons development, remain in place while its programmes exist. The EU calls on all UN Member States to ensure the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions to prevent the DPRK from procuring materials, knowledge and finance that support its illegal weapons programmes. The EU stands ready to support any meaningful diplomatic process and is committed to working with all relevant partners to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and take steps aimed at pursuing complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Chairman,

In line with the recommendation made by WGA, we are ready to support the Final Draft of the 2024-2025 Programme and Budget Proposals. We note in that regard that the Regular Budget of the Commission should, as a rule, adequately address its programmatic needs and therefore regret that some key elements remain unfunded. We hope that some of these will receive the necessary funding, as an extraordinary measure, from the 2020-2021 cash surplus, as supported by the Advisory Group. We thank the Chairperson of WGA for his consultations on this matter and can accept the compromise solution contained in the revised Draft Decision, which presents a balanced approach. We hope that we will be able to reach consensus, which is the best way to secure the financing for all the key elements identified in the proposal.

We encourage the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to continue to ensure its mandatory functions, notably the sustainment and maintenance of the verification system, through adequate and predictable funding. We look forward to discussing this pertinent matter further, with a view of identifying a sustainable way forward, as regards re-basing of the budget from 2026 onwards.

Moreover, it is crucial for the wider Organisation's financial health, that all States demonstrate their political commitment and honour their legal obligations by paying their assessed contributions on time and in full, as well as any arrears due to the Organisation.

The Council of the EU adopted its Ninth Council Decision on 25 September, providing a further € 6.28 million in support of CTBTO monitoring and verification activities. In a period of great financial constraints, this amount was notably kept equivalent to the previous EU Council decision. The EU has so far contributed over € 29.5 million in extra-budgetary contributions to the CTBTO. This reflects the strong commitment of the EU and its Member States to the Treaty and to its implementation.

The EU welcomes the sustained efforts within the CTBTO towards gender equality and empowerment of all women and girls, including towards equal representation within its staff and towards promotion of the participation of women in capacity building programmes through dedicated financing. Present and past EU Council decisions directly support these goals.

Mr. Chairman,

Furthering On-Site Inspection (OSI) capabilities is essential for the establishment of a balanced and robust verification regime at the time of the CTBT's entry into force. In this regard, we welcome the organisation of regular OSI exercises. The EU and its Member States have been one of the largest contributors to the OSI technologies capacity building consistently providing significant financial contributions to support the OSI capabilities build-up and the CTBT's verification regime. The Integrated Field Exercise 2025, to take place in

Sri Lanka more than 10 years after the one hosted in Jordan, will be a major milestone for the activities of the OSI division and the credibility of the future verification regime.

Temporary mobile noble gas background measurements are essential to enable analyses that lead to a further understanding of the global radionuclide background, and to facilitate the correct categorization of events. This on-going activity is part of, and helps carry out the mandate of the PTS.

Mr. Chairman,

We look forward to the appointments of the new Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Commission for the next year, as well as to the appointment of the new Chair and Vice-Chairs of Working Group A, and the re-appointment of the Chair of Working Group B. We regret that, once again, no nomination has been submitted on behalf of the Middle East and South Asia Regional Group, and invite all regional groups to submit nominations.

We take note of the nominations put forward for membership of the Advisory Group, and give our support to the nominations of: Mr Rousseau by France, Mr Konrad Max Scharinger by Germany, Mr Terrill W. Ray by the United States, Ms Yuko Mizuno by Japan, Ms Rashmi Rajyaguru by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mr Yoonseok Lee by the Republic of Korea and Mr Ramon Egli by Austria. We are not yet in a position to address a nomination that was not provided within the timeframe set out in the relevant procedures. Should the Commission be unable to reach a consensus, we support the postponement of this issue to a resumed session of the PrepCom.

With regard to the Appointment of the External Auditor for the period 2024-2025, we regret the absence of further nominations, and given the absence of consensus, we support the postponement of this issue to a resumed session of the PrepCom, and call for new applications with a view to appoint the External Auditor no later than the end of March 2024.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman,

We assure you of the EU's full support and cooperation in bringing this meeting to a successful completion, and stress that the Report of this Session should be concise and factual, focusing on operative outcomes.

Thank you.

3.2.5. Russia: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the revocation of the ratification to the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Today, Russia has signed into national law the revocation of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This takes place in the context of its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and after months of irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats, some specifically pointing at a resumption of nuclear tests.

The European Union deeply deplores this decision by Russia.

All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and have been working towards its strengthening and entry into force for many years. The Treaty is an instrument of crucial importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It has established a powerful norm against nuclear testing that is respected worldwide. It is crucial for international peace and security that all States fully observe the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any

other nuclear explosion, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) operates a unique global monitoring system that can detect a nuclear test explosion anytime and anywhere, providing the international community with credible, reliable and independent means to ensure that the norm against nuclear testing is respected.

Eight new countries have ratified the CTBT since the 2021 Article XIV Conference, making significant progress towards the Treaty's universalization. Despite having been ratified by 178 States, the CTBT has not entered into force because of the absence of ratification by eight countries out of an original list of 44 in its Annex 2. As part of this list, Russia's unjustifiable intent to revoke its ratification of the Treaty constitutes a serious setback in Russia's commitment towards the international security architecture that undermines the ongoing non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

The European Union calls on Russia to continue to respect the object and purpose of the Treaty.

As a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Russia has undertaken to work towards the early entry into force of the CTBT. In the context of Article XIV Conferences, Russia committed itself to promoting the Treaty at the highest political level and through all available bilateral and multilateral channels. This latest measure is a severe step back on these undertakings, which is made all the worse by Russia's status as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council.

The European Union furthermore continues to call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex 2, to sign and ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay.

The European Union remains fully committed to promoting the entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT, and to pursuing its objectives for a world free of nuclear testing.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the potential candidate country Georgia, as well as the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

3.2.6. Press Release of the Council of the EU – Iran: Council maintains restrictive measures under the Non-Proliferation Sanctions Regime after the JCPOA Transition Day (17/10/2023)

The Council decided to take the necessary steps to maintain the restrictive measures under the EU non-proliferation regime on Iran.

The Council evaluated that there are valid reasons to refrain from lifting these restrictions on Transition Day (18 October 2023), as originally foreseen under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Council's decision is in line with the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA, in view of Iran not fulfilling its commitments under the JCPOA, as reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019.

The Council adopted legal acts to maintain the designations that had initially been imposed by the United Nations for individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missiles

activities or affiliated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Council also agreed to maintain sectoral and individual measures, existing under the EU's sanctions regime, notably those related to Iran nuclear proliferation, as well as arms and missile embargoes.

These steps do not amount to the imposition of additional EU sanctions on Iran. Moreover, all EU sanctions that had already been lifted under the JCPoA remain lifted.

This decision is in line with the EU's commitment to the full implementation of the JCPoA, as expressed in Council conclusions in December 2022. The decision follows the letter received on 14 September 2023, by the High Representative as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the JCPoA, from the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom within the setting of the JCPoA's Dispute Resolution Mechanism that they had triggered in January 2020. The ministers stated that they stand ready to reverse their decision, should Iran fully implement its JCPoA commitments.

3.2.7. EU Briefing on behalf of the High Representative – UN Security Council: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran) (New York, 18/12/2023)

Mr. President,

It is an honour to have the opportunity to address the Council on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr Josep Borrell, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the JCPOA).

I would like to thank Secretary General António Guterres and the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of Resolution 2231 as well as Malta as the Facilitator of Resolution 2231.

Let me highlight the important role of the IAEA as the sole impartial and independent international organisation mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA.

The IAEA continues to document the expansion of Iran's nuclear programme gravely departing from its JCPOA commitments, notably as regards the expansion of Iran's nuclear enrichment infrastructure and the continued rise of highly enriched uranium stockpile including at 60%, which is of particular proliferation concern. Moreover, the relationship with the IAEA has further deteriorated in recent months with a negative impact on the Agency's ability to carry out its monitoring duties.

We continue to recognise that Iran has faced and continues facing very serious negative economic consequences following the US's withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of previously lifted US unilateral sanctions. The US have also imposed additional sanctions linked to the nuclear programme. On its side, the EU has lifted all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions since the JCPOA Implementation Day and this remains the case.

On 14 September, the High Representative received a letter from the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stating that Iran has been in non-compliance with the JCPOA since 2019 and that this has not been resolved through the JCPOA's Dispute Resolution Mechanism. They expressed their intention not to take the steps regarding the lifting of further sanctions on JCPOA Transition Day on 18 October 2023.

As Coordinator, the High Representative, in line with the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism, consulted all JCPOA participants on the way ahead. Following these consultations, he noted that the issue remained unresolved given the diverging views expressed. At the same time, he noted that participants reiterated their determination to find a diplomatic solution in the framework of the JCPOA,

Subsequently, the EU Council decided to maintain the restrictive measures under the EU non-proliferation regime on Iran on Transition day. This step is reversible and does not amount to the imposition of additional EU sanctions on Iran. Moreover, all EU sanctions that had already been lifted under the JCPOA remain lifted.

The EU continues to support the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA and of Resolution 2231.

On its side, to our knowledge, Iran has not sought the ratification of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements as it was supposed to do on Transition day.

Regarding other aspects of JCPOA implementation, we note that the Procurement Channel, remains ready to receive proposals. It was designed as a transparency and confidence-building mechanism to give assurances that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA. Moreover, civil nuclear cooperation with Iran, under Annex III of the JCPOA continues.

Mr. President,

We are extremely worried about Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine including through deliveries of drones which was done in violation of the provisions of UNSCR 2231. We call on the Government of Iran to stop that military cooperation with a country that is violating every principle of the UN Charter. This cooperation has not stopped and has even increased as publicly announced. The EU will continue to respond to this, as necessary.

Mr. President,

The world is facing a range of severe crises. In this context it is important to keep in mind that the current deeply troubling situation in the Middle East makes even more urgent to find ways to stabilise the region, of which the JCPOA should be an essential part.

With this in mind, we call on all remaining parties to the JCPOA and the United States to sustain dialogue in order to address without delay the Iranian nuclear programme. Nuclear diplomacy must be restored.

We concur with the Secretary-General's assessment in his report that the JCPOA still represents the best available option for ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

We urge Iran to resume full cooperation with the IAEA, and to refrain from any more step away from its JCPOA commitments as a first and minimum measure.

De-escalation steps on the nuclear front will help restore trust. They could re-create an environment conducive to the resumption of negotiations possibly leading ultimately to a fully effective JCPOA.

In August 2022, the High Representative had been able to put forward a compromise text laying down the necessary steps for the US to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of its commitments. Regrettably, it was not possible to reach a deal at that

time and since then, the overall political context has aggravated the situation and has made a return to the negotiation table even more difficult. That compromise text is still on the table as a potential point of departure for any renewed effort to bring JCPOA back on track.

The High representative continues his efforts to facilitate the dialogue between all participants in the JCPOA and with the United States.

Thank you, Mr. President.

3.3. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

3.3.1. Statement by the Spokesperson of the High Representative on the Outcome of the Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference (Brussels, 21/05/2023)

The European Union deeply regrets that the Chemical Weapons Convention's 5th Review Conference in The Hague ended on 19 May without a substantial outcome. Chemical weapons have been used on multiple occasions in recent years, making this review conference even more important.

In the run-up to and during the Conference, the EU and its Member States, alongside many other States Parties to the Convention, have worked constructively towards building consensus. Despite these tireless efforts it was not possible to reach agreement on an outcome document that would strengthen the Convention.

It is regrettable that the Review Conference failed to condemn violations of the Convention by Syria, as confirmed by the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). While there were productive discussions on how to give guidance to the OPCW for implementing the Convention and adapting the organisation for its future work, the lack of an outcome document also constitutes a missed opportunity to agree on them.

In the current security environment it is more necessary than ever to uphold international law. The international community must continue to reinforce the global norms against the use of chemical weapons and stress the importance of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a crucial pillar of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

While it was not possible to reach an agreement, the EU remains encouraged by the fact the overwhelming majority of States Parties share the goals of full implementation of the Convention and holding accountable those who violate it and perpetrate attacks with chemical weapons. Together we will work to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention as a means to contributing to international stability, peace and security.

3.3.2. US: Statement by the High Representative on the complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles Outcome of the Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference (Brussels, 08/07/2023)

The European Union welcomes the information that the United States have achieved the complete destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stockpile on 7 July. The liquidation was completed before the scheduled timeline set for September this year in a safe and environmentally sound manner. The EU also commends the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its on-site team verifying the destruction, for their professional work in this context.

The completion of the destruction work marks an important milestone in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 25 years after its entry into force. The Convention is a key element of the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

The European Union will continue its strong political and financial support to its implementation, with focus on the prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons and the

fight against impunity for their use. At their latest meeting on 26 June, the EU Foreign Ministers approved a new voluntary financial contribution of EUR 5.3 million for the OPCW activities in 2023-26.

3.3.3. EU general statement at the 28th session of the Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention Statement of the European Union at the 27th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague, 22/11/2023)

Mr. Chairperson,

Mr. Director-General,

Distinguished delegates,

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine as well as the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the EEA (European Economic Area) align themselves with this statement. Andorra, Monaco and San Marino also associate themselves with this statement.

The European Union (EU) pays tribute to Ambassador Vusimuzi Madonsela of South Africa, Chairperson of the 27th Conference of States Parties, and Ambassador Lucian Fătu of Romania, Chairperson of the Executive Council, for their efforts and outstanding performance in fulfilling their duties. We also warmly congratulate Ambassador Suljuk Mustansar Tarar of Pakistan for his election as the Chairperson of the 28th Conference of States Parties. I would like to assure him of our full support in steering the work of the Conference.

Mr. Chairperson,

October 14th marked the tenth anniversary of Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, ten years after, we cannot but deplore the fact that the Syrian regime still has not complied with its obligations under the Convention. This prolonged non-compliance causes serious damage to the objective and purpose of the Convention and requires further collective measures by the Conference to address the situation.

The Syrian Arab Republic has repeatedly used chemical weapons over the past years, causing numerous victims, as substantiated by comprehensive and thorough investigations carried out by the UN and OPCW. Last August we commemorated the sad tenth anniversary of the Ghouta chemical attack perpetrated by the Syrian regime, killing more than 1,400 people. We again urge the Syrian regime to fully declare and destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles and programme in accordance with its obligations under UN Resolution 2118 and the CWC.

Mr. Chairperson,

The European Union reiterates its resolute condemnation of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter, and reaffirms the European Union's unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian aggression. In the face of Russia's efforts to target civilian infrastructures

and inflict immense suffering on the people of Ukraine, the European Union will continue to provide strong support to Ukraine for as long as it takes.

This illegal aggression undermines the international rules-based order and multilateralism. Furthermore, following the poisoning of the Skripals and Mr. Alexei Navalny with the nerve agent of the “Novichok” group, for which there can be no other plausible explanation than a Russian involvement and responsibility, we are strongly concerned that Russia may be using Riot Control Agents at the front in Ukraine. Russian TV reporting claims how successful such “smoking out Ukrainian fighters” is. When asked about these RCA incidents pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 2 of the Convention, Russia provided a dubious answer and tried to make us believe that, somehow, those asking were owing Russia an explanation. This callous treatment of the Convention is worrying and illustrative for why the EU Member States fully support the candidatures of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine for the Executive Council. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, no doubt, the important regional factor that the Conventions foresees for consideration in designations for Executive Council Membership, alongside with security interests and the size of chemical industry.

Mr. Chairperson,

The European Union is ready to build on the positive progress achieved in the Fifth Review Conference, and continue work on all actionable items to keep the Technical Secretariat fit for purpose. The high turnover rate underlines the need for amending the OPCW Tenure Policy by bringing it in line with those of other comparable international organisations. It is of key importance to find practical solutions to help maintain key expertise required to ensure the continued implementation of the Convention. Equally important is to continue work with a view to improving the geographical diversity in full respect of the Convention, and without micromanaging the Technical Secretariat. We commend the efforts and leadership by New Zealand and Panama as well as Chile in taking work forward in these parallel work strands.

The EU strongly believes that, whilst respecting the paramount consideration of competence, efficiency and integrity as enshrined in the Convention, gender equality and mainstreaming of a gender perspective are and should continue to be an integral part of the work of the OPCW and implementation of the CWC. A wide diversity of views is essential for decision-making and in helping us tackle the challenges we face with greater effectiveness. We commend the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat for the work they have carried out thus far and look forward to further progress towards gender equality in the Organisation, including through the enhancement of gender mainstreaming in all areas of the Technical Secretariat’s work.

I would like to reiterate the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, ranging from chemical industry to think tanks, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations, in the OPCW work, and their meaningful and broadest possible participation in the Conference of States Parties. The European Union welcomes the ongoing work steered by Ecuador and Germany and invites States Parties to contribute to these reflections with a view to enhanced interaction with Civil Society.

Mr. Chairperson,

The European Union supports the Director-General’s proposed revision of the Programme and Budget for 2024-25 that enables the OPCW to continue its vital work including cooperation and assistance projects. We call upon all States Parties to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

The EU will spare no effort to continue to promote the full and effective implementation of the Convention, as well as its universalisation. As a concrete sign of our commitment, I am

pleased to confirm a new voluntary contribution of EUR 5.3 million in support of the OPCW activities until 2026. This contribution helps to finance key activities such as capacity building and laboratory twinning as well as the organisation of the first Table-Top Exercise (TTX) on chemical terrorism.

Finally, we seize this opportunity to commend the leadership of OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, and reiterate our full confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS), its professionalism, impartiality and well-established technical expertise in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and tasks assigned by the States Parties.

In October 2023, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee reaffirmed its strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW in the resolution on the implementation of the Convention prepared annually by Poland. This is an unequivocal expression of support to and importance of the work the OPCW is performing across the regions to the benefit of all States Parties.

I would kindly ask you to consider this statement as an official document of the Twenty-Eight Session of the Conference of the States Parties and post it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Thank you.

3.4. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

3.4.1. EU Statement at the Meeting of State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Geneva, 11-13 December 2023)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate country Georgia as well as the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

Let me congratulate you, Ambassador Cristian Espinosa Cañizares, on assuming the role of Chair of the 2023 Meeting of States Parties (MSP). We are looking forward to your stewardship and assure you of our full support and cooperation in achieving the objectives of this Convention.

At the outset, we would like to extend our warm welcome to South Sudan as a new State Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It is encouraging to see that the Convention is nearing universality. We encourage the remaining twelve States to follow suit and join the Convention without any further delay.

Mr. Chair,

We reaffirm our unequivocal support for the BTWC as the legally-binding norm against biological weapons and cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological agents or toxins from ever being developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired and used as weapons. The EU appreciates the successful outcome of the Ninth Review Conference held last year. The establishment of the Working Group, tasked with discussing crucial topics to strengthen the Convention, constitute a significant achievement and provides a unique opportunity to ensure that the Convention becomes fit for the 21st century.

The EU's primary focus is ensuring effective compliance with the provisions of this convention. We aspire to establish a robust mechanism to review scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention and to provide States Parties with sound and timely scientific advice. In addition, we emphasize the importance of addressing verification and compliance, transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs), as well as national implementation and international cooperation. We anticipate that these initiatives will contribute significantly to the strengthening of the BTWC.

Mr. Chair,

We fully support the establishment of a Science and Technology Review mechanism, which has garnered widespread support from States Parties in recent years. Such a mechanism must be equipped to identify both existing and emerging risks associated with dual-use research and biotechnology and their potential implications for the implementation of the BTWC, along with its overarching goals and objectives.

It is our conviction that such a mechanism would benefit individual States Parties, especially those with limited resources for scientific and technological research.

In this regard, the EU supports a model with two bodies: a) an open-ended Scientific Advisory Group, open to all States Parties, and b) a limited-size Scientific Reporting Committee (up to 30 experts) whose members are nominated from the open-ended Scientific Advisory Group.

Mr. Chair,

We believe that transparency and confidence-building play a pivotal role in effective implementation of the BTWC in all its aspects. By sharing information on biological research, facilities, and activities relevant to the BTWC, States Parties can build mutual confidence and contribute to an enhanced cooperation and responsibility within the Convention. Submitting annual CBM reports is an important part of the exchange of information among States Parties and constitutes a political obligation for States Parties. We encourage States Parties to use the EU-funded assistance tools such as the CBM guide and the electronic CBM facility to submit their reports to the ISU.

The EU stresses that additional measures such as voluntary visits, management systems for biosafety and biosecurity, peer reviews, and other initiatives, can assist in further strengthening of confidence between States Parties.

Mr. Chair

The EU strongly advocates for a BTWC verification regime that would ensure transparency, compliance, and robust enforcement. A well-developed verification regime, coupled with transparent practices and robust national implementation, will strengthen the BTWC, reaffirm its normative enforcement, and contribute to a more secure and cooperative international environment.

A verification system should facilitate information sharing and build trust through the submission of national declarations harmonized with Confidence-Building Measures. Moreover, an effective inspection mechanism, with clear processes and criteria, should be put into place to respond to indications of non-compliance with Article I of the Convention.

The EU continues its unwavering support for the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, underscoring its commitment to an independent international instrument. Establishing a direct link to the UNSGM would enhance the credibility of the BTWC verification system, fostering effective responses to alleged violations and facilitating the identification of the origin of a biological event.

Mr. Chair,

The EU also supports the development of a mechanism open to all States Parties to facilitate and support the full implementation of international cooperation and assistance under Article X.

For many years, the EU and its Member States have been providing assistance to and participating in cooperation projects with many BTWC States Parties. Through its Council Decisions, the EU currently provides nearly 10 million EUR in assistance to BTWC States Parties. In addition, the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative provides significant assistance to minimize risks emanating from the deliberate or accidental release of highly dangerous pathogens or toxins. This demand-driven initiative with a budget of over 140 million EUR for 2021–27 supports capacity building for CBRN risk mitigation in 64 partner countries around the world. In addition, the EU also provides support through the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

We are pleased to announce that shortly we will adopt a new EU Council Decision in support of this Convention with the estimated budget of EUR 2.8 million. Furthermore, the EU has another project in the pipeline, building upon the previous initiative that supported the enhancement of biosafety and biosecurity in Latin America, implemented by the Organisation of American States (OAS). The project will support strengthening the legislative and regulatory frameworks for biosafety and biosecurity and raising awareness in beneficiary countries in Latin America.

Nevertheless, the EU will not support the establishment of a body under the Convention that would have a mandate to exercise oversight of either cooperation projects provided by States Parties or groups of States Parties, on national export control regimes by States Parties or on sanctions.

At the same time, the EU noted the decision of Russia to withdraw from the Eastern European Group and to establish a new regional group under the Convention, consisting of Russia only. The EU does not recognize a Group of One by Russia at the BTWC owing to the implications of any new group for geographical rotation of office holders and allocation of the various positions at the BTWC meetings. We reiterate our position that any departure from current arrangements based on the existing three-group system at the BTWC requires a consensus decision by all States Parties, which does not exist at the moment.

Furthermore, the EU also supports the operationalisation of Article VII, regarding assistance to States Parties that have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention. Building on agreements reached at the Eighth Review Conference, which supported “the establishment of a database open to all States Parties to facilitate assistance under the framework of Article VII” as well as the establishment of guidelines for seeking assistance under Article VII, we particularly support the proposal by France and India to establish such a database. In addition, the EU supports the proposal by South Africa to have guidelines for States Parties for seeking assistance under Article VII and the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct for scientists, developed in cooperation with this community, as an element of an S&T review mechanism. The EU regrets that the Review Conference was unable to approve these proposals.

Mr. Chair

The EU recognizes the indispensable contribution of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to the BTWC effective implementation and in facilitating States Parties' compliance with their BTWC obligations. Its role is fundamental in enhancing the Convention's operational capacity. We encourage further strengthening of the ISU's role to ensure proper coordination and support for the decisions taken at the Review Conferences.

The EU is also fully committed to mainstreaming a gender perspective into all non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control work in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, including through promoting the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and men, and providing integrated support where appropriate.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

3.5. BALLISTIC MISSILES

3.5.1. DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the satellite launch (Brussels, 23/11/2023)

The European Union strongly condemns the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) launch of a military satellite using ballistic missile technology on 21 November.

This represents a clear threat to international peace and security and constitutes a flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit such launches. The DPRK must cease all illegal and dangerous actions that escalate military tensions in the region.

It is critical that all UN Member States, especially Members of the UN Security Council, urge the DPRK to resume meaningful dialogue with all parties, and ensure the full implementation of UN sanctions with a view to the DPRK abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities. In this context, the EU urges the DPRK and Russia to refrain from any exchanges of military equipment, missile technology or ammunition and abide by the successive UN Security Council resolutions which clearly prohibit any arms exports or imports involving the DPRK. The EU reiterates its deep concern about deepening military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, potentially in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, as well as reports of arms transfers for the use in Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and strongly condemns any such transfers.

Immediate DPRK compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions is the only viable route to sustainable peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK can never have the status of a nuclear weapon state in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The EU urges the DPRK to refrain from testing nuclear weapons, reaffirm the moratorium in that regard and to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bring into force the Additional Protocol and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The DPRK's use of resources to support its unlawful weapons programmes exacerbates the difficult living conditions and human rights situation endured by much of its population.

The EU also expresses its deep concerns about any behaviour in outer space which could be threatening or perceived as threatening and could lead to uncontrolled escalation. In line with the recently adopted EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, the EU will use all available tools, to prevent, discourage and, when necessary, appropriately respond to space threats.

The EU expresses its full solidarity with the Republic of Korea and Japan. The EU is ready to work with all relevant partners in promoting a meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building sustainable peace and security through the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

3.5.2. DPRK: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the launch of an inter-continental ballistic missile (Brussels, 19/12/2023)

The EU strongly condemns the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) launch of another intercontinental ballistic missile on 18 December, for the fifth time this year, following the launch of a short-range ballistic missile the day before. The DPRK must cease these illegal and dangerous launches, which blatantly violate UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and undermine international peace and security as well as the global non-proliferation regime.

The DPRK must comply immediately with its obligations under UNSCRs by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities. This is the only viable route to sustainable peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon state in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The EU urges the DPRK to return immediately to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bring into force the Additional Protocol and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The DPRK's use of resources to support its unlawful weapons programmes exacerbates the difficult living conditions and human rights situation endured by much of its population.

It is critical that all UN Member States, especially Members of the UN Security Council, urge the DPRK to resume meaningful dialogue, and ensure the full implementation of UN sanctions. The EU urges the DPRK and Russia to refrain from any exchanges of military equipment, missile technology or ammunition and abide by the successive UNSCRs that clearly prohibit any arms exports or imports involving the DPRK. The EU condemns any military support for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine provided by the DPRK, and reiterates its deep concern about reports of DPRK arms transfers to Russia.

The EU expresses its full solidarity with the Republic of Korea and Japan. The EU is ready to work with all partners in promoting a meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building sustainable peace and security through the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

3.6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

3.6.1. EU statements at the 9th Conference of States Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty (Geneva, 22/08/2023)

Madam President,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Republic of Moldova, the potential candidate country Georgia, as well as the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

The EU and its Member States reaffirm their strong support for the Arms Trade Treaty, as a key international instrument that aims to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade and prevent diversion. In doing so, the ATT contributes to international and regional peace, security, and stability and reduces human suffering. It complements other international instruments, such as the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the International Tracing Instrument, and contributes broadly to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Target 16.4 on reducing illicit arms flows and Target 5.2 on eliminating gender based violence. The EU also appreciates the role of the ATT in implementing the UN Secretary General's New Agenda for Peace as it pertains to addressing diversion, proliferation and misuse of SALW.

The EU welcomes the Republic of Korea's CSP9 thematic focus and President's working paper on The Role of Industry in Responsible International Transfers of Conventional Arms.

With over 31.800 licenses issued in 2021 for a license value of almost €179 billion, the EU remains an important exporter of military equipment and technology. Decisions on issuing export licenses for military equipment are a national competence, and compliance with the ATT remains one of eight criteria of EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. EU Member States, following case-by-case risk assessments including a thorough examination into respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the country of final destination, denied over 200 licenses in 2021. Military equipment must be used in accordance with International Law, including International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, and traded in a responsible manner.

Madam President,

In this context, we cannot stay silent about tragic developments in Eastern Europe. Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, in blatant violation of UN Charter, continues to cause immense destruction, and casualties, and the suffering of great number of people, including conflict-related sexual violence, and the forced transfer of population, including children, to areas under Russian control and deportations to the Russian Federation. The EU takes this opportunity to draw attention of States Parties to Article 6 para 3 of the Arms Trade Treaty, prohibiting transfer of conventional arms if such arms would be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes. In this light, the EU condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's use of various types of conventional weapons against civilians in its war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as numerous war crimes and human rights violations and notes that, given

the many breaches by Russia of the Geneva Conventions, arms transfers to Russia would not be permitted under the ATT. The EU has an arms embargo in place against Russia, following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. We call on all States Parties to refrain from any transfers to Russia, including of parts and components, in line with Article 6 para 3 of the ATT.

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine also constitutes a case where legitimate arms transfers significantly contribute to the protection of values enshrined in the UN Charter. Ukraine, in execution of its inherent right to self-defence, is supported by military assistance from a number of ATT States Parties, including conventional arms transfers from some EU Member States under European Peace Facility. EU Member States have assessed that such transfers remain fully in line with their obligations under the ATT, implemented through the EU Common Position 2008/944, as well as with the Wassenaar Arrangement Initial Elements. The EU reiterates its support for a just peace in Ukraine in line with the UN Charter and for President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula. The European Union will continue to work with Ukraine on the 10-point peace plan.

Let me conclude by underlining the EU's full support for the Korean Presidency of this Conference, and our commitment to working together towards its successful outcome. The EU's position on specific issues within the CSP programme of work will be presented in thematic statements.

Thank you, Madam President.