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TOWARDS SYNERGY

*Research on Government and Civil Society
Collaboration in P/CVE Programs in Indonesia*



Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	v
A. Indonesia and Terrorism Issues.....	2
B. Methodology.....	6
C. Setting the Scope: Defining the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism	8
D. P/CVE: Towards Collaboration between Government and Civil Society.....	12
E. The Evolution of P/CVE Programs in Indonesia: A Shift Towards Collaboration and Community Empowerment.....	16
F. Mapping Collaborative Efforts Between Civil Society and Government.....	22
G. Enhancing Collaborative Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism	28
H. Navigating Complexities: Examining the Challenges and Opportunities of PCVE in Indonesia	36
I. Community Engagement and Empowerment in PCVE.....	50
J. Forward-Looking Strategies for Better Collaboration	56
K. Discussion	66
L. Recommendations.....	67
M. Conclusion.....	68
Appendices.....	69
Bibliography.....	70

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research examines the collaboration between government agencies and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Indonesia's effort on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), especially following the 2021 Presidential Decree on the National Action Plan for P/CVE (Rencana Aksi Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Mengarah Terorisme - RAN-PE). While these collaborations have existed for over two decades, the RAN-PE formalized the partnership, granting CSOs a legal standing in both implementation and decision-making. The study aims to identify positive experiences, remaining challenges, and best practices in light of evolving terrorism threats, such as the increased use of social media platforms for recruitment, women's increasingly active role in terrorist groups, and returning foreign terrorist fighters and their family members.

Positive experiences:

Collaboration between government agencies and CSOs has resulted in various positive outcomes, significantly enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of P/CVE efforts. However, the two parties have different perspectives on the benefits they gain from these partnerships. The research found that government agencies and CSOs highlighted different aspects as their most valuable positive experience. Government agencies placed the highest value on sharing resources, which helps mitigate budgetary and strategic constraints, followed by implementation and impact—such as drafting regional (at provincial or regency level) action plans for the prevention of violent extremism (Rencana Aksi Daerah Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Mengarah Terorisme - RAD-PE) and reaching a broader target audience. In contrast, CSOs often reported that they benefit from increased access and legitimacy, particularly in areas under government jurisdiction, such as programs in prisons and involving terrorist detainees. They also valued outreach and networking and initiation and support opportunities as a result of governmental support that CSOs receive, whether through official decrees or public affirmations during speeches and events.

Both government and CSOs mentioned a similar category as positive experience, which is sharing resources. However, the frequency with which each party highlights these experiences differs. For instance, sharing resources is the most mentioned benefit for government agencies but the least mentioned by CSOs. This divergence in frequency indicates that while the collaboration allows both sides to complement each other by addressing gaps in resources or capabilities, it also points to underlying challenges. For example, while government agencies see resource sharing as a benefit, the low frequency of mentioning it by CSOs might indicate a challenge as it may reflect disparities in access to resources.

Challenges:

The research identifies twelve distinct categories of challenges in the collaboration between CSOs and government agencies, including institutional constraints, communication and trust-building, and resource limitations. Both parties highlighted institutional constraints and resource limitations as their primary obstacles. Additionally, government respondents also pointed to issues like data transparency and programmatic overlaps, while CSOs emphasized communication and trust-building as significant barriers.

Both CSOs and government agencies share the same concern regarding institutional constraints, but their experiences differ. For CSOs, the challenge lies in the absence of a supporting system that can prioritize and sustain P/CVE programs beyond the individual officers in charge. Often, collaboration is dependent on the priorities of those in leadership positions rather than institutional structures, leading to inconsistency and a lack of continuity. In contrast, government agencies face challenges rooted in the bureaucratic nature of their operations, which includes long administrative processes and the need for specific nomenclature to implement programs. This often results in friction, as government approaches tend to be top-down, rigid, and heavily regulated, while CSOs are more flexible and driven by activism. This cultural and systemic divergence can create barriers to effective collaboration. Moreover, bureaucracy further exacerbates the challenge of resource limitations, particularly in the context of co-sharing budgets. Even though the government expresses willingness to co-finance initiatives, some CSOs reported that the stringent and bureaucratic policies governing government budgets often hinder the efficient allocation of funds, complicating resource-sharing efforts with CSOs.

Other challenges mentioned by CSOs relate to community engagement programs. While these programs play a crucial role in the success of P/CVE efforts, particularly in fostering active participation from local communities, the implementation has faced some obstacles. Certain concerns that were highlighted relate to surveillance, stigmatization, and lack of accountability, which have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of these programs. These challenges serve as important reminders that a stronger emphasis on the protection of human rights should be integrated in such programs, especially as the second phase of the RAN-PE shifts its focus towards human security.

Best practices:

Despite some of the challenges highlighted earlier, the participants in this study expressed optimism regarding the future of CSO-government collaboration in P/CVE. Key best practices that emerged include stakeholder and interagency engagement, structural support from the government, and strategic partnership planning, which were cited most frequently by CSOs. Similarly, government respondents emphasized the importance of multi-stakeholder coordination, capacity enhancement, and active participation as central to effective collaboration. While both groups identified the need for ongoing, long-term programs and

clear partnership agreements, these were less frequently cited. The alignment of these strategies points to the necessity for a structured, coordinated approach that involves all relevant actors, leverages existing institutional support, and prioritizes continuous capacity-building to ensure sustainable and impactful P/CVE efforts.

Recommendations:

The challenges highlight in this study on collaboration between government agencies and CSOs in P/CVE programs – including institutional constraints, limited funding, and difficulties in inter-agency coordination – present opportunities for the future, particularly in enhancing coordination and preventing program overlap.

Additionally, the study indicates that there is a need for increased integration of human rights and privacy norms in P/CVE programming, and a more balanced focus between perpetrators and victims to ensure victims' voices are heard. Continued and enhanced collaboration between government agencies and CSOs remains crucial for incorporating these important ethical issues within P/CVE efforts.

As the second phase of RAN-PE is taking shape, the successful government and CSO collaboration efforts and synergies should be elevated to sustainable and optimized partnerships. This can be achieved by ensuring mutual understanding of each party's working systems and committing to provide each other with structural support. To maximize effectiveness, the collaboration should include technical components such as an established evaluation model, data sharing, and knowledge transfer. At the same time, it must remain flexible and open to address emerging challenges and ethical concerns, particularly those related to human rights, human security and a victim-centred approach.



Indonesia and Terrorism Issues

A. Indonesia and Terrorism Issues

Indonesia has grappled with a succession of tragic events resulting in considerable human casualties from terrorist attacks, such as the Bali Bombings in 2002 and the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Bombings in 2009, both attributable to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). While JI distinguished itself with its history of large-scale attacks, clandestine and long-standing recruitment processes, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014 introduced different typologies, especially concerning recruitment, modus operandi, and women's involvement. Numerous reports suggest that individuals who pledged allegiance to IS were primarily recruited and radicalized online, underscoring the extensive use of online propaganda and dissemination of materials by the group.¹ This phenomenon also illuminates a complex radicalization process that is not confined to either online or offline channels but may occur in a hybrid fashion, encompassing elements of both.²

A novel phase has also been marked by the migration of women and children to Syria to join the group, a phenomenon contrasting the 1980s and early 1990s when only male Indonesian volunteers – some of whom later became (founding) members of JI – migrated to Afghanistan to receive military training and fight against the Soviet invaders and their allies.³ Beyond amassing significant online followers, IS has influenced various terrorist groups in Indonesia, leading them to pledge allegiance. These include Jemaah Anshar Daulah (JAD), Jemaah Anshar Khilafah (JAK), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), and small group like Katibah Gongong Rebus (KGR). Although terrorist incidents and plans have continued to decrease since 2020, which can be partially attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath, paired with a rise in arrests of terrorists and suspects—totaling nearly 200 or more arrests per year since 2019—it does not conclusively signify the end of terrorist threats in the nation.⁴

The frequency of terrorist attacks can provide insights into their activities and intent, but it should not serve as the only metric for measuring the threat level and the success of counter-terrorism efforts. Terrorist threats might operate beneath the surface and can manifest in

1 Nate Rosenblatt, Charlie Winter, and Rajan Basra, "Islamic State Propaganda and Attacks: How Are They Connected?," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 13, no. 5 (2019): 39–60. \\uc0\\u8221\\} \\i\\}Perspectives on Terrorism\\} 13, no. 5 (2019) Charlie Winter et al., "Online Extremism : Research Trends in Internet Activism, Radicalization, and Counter-Strategies," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 14, no. 2 (2020): 1–20. Haroro J. Ingram, "An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's Propaganda War," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 5 (May 4, 2017): 357–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212551>. Nuraniyah Nava, "The Evolution of Online Violent Extremism in Indonesia and the Philippines," September 25, 2023, <https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org>.

2 J. J. Whittaker, "Online Radicalisation: The Use of the Internet by Islamic State Terrorists in the US (2012-2018)" (Leiden University, 2022), <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3250473>. Nafees Hamid, "Offline Versus Online Radicalisation: Which Is the Bigger Threat?," GNET (blog), February 21, 2022, <https://gnet-research.org/2022/02/21/offline-versus-online-radicalisation-which-is-the-bigger-threat/>.

3 Bekal Militer di Afghanistan Berbuah Teror di Indonesia, CNN Indonesia, 31 Dec 2021, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20211216152700-20-734942/bekal-militer-di-afghanistan-berbuah-teror-di-indonesia/>

4 Unaesah Rahmah and Amresh Lavan Gunasingham, "Indonesia Annual Threat Assessment," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA)* 15, no. 1, accessed September 27, 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvttr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-15-issue-01/?doing_wp_cron=1695831153.2366011142730712890625.

subtle yet profound ways. For instance, before announcing its disbandment in June 2024, JI changed its strategy to *Tamkin Siyasi* (Political Consolidation) by diversifying their influence across economic, political, and social spheres, enhancing their capabilities in those domains, including their military skills by sending members to Syria and other conflict-prone areas.⁵ These shifts suggest that assessing the efficiency of counter-terrorism strategies based solely on attack rates and numbers of arrests could be misleading. It underscores the need for a comprehensive perspective, one that integrates the more securitized counter-terrorism (CT) strategies with ‘softer’ approaches such as preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE).

Following the adoption by Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021 of Indonesia’s National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism leading to Terrorism for 2020-2024—(abbreviated as RAN-PE in Bahasa Indonesia),⁶ work on P/CVE has intensified in Indonesia. There is a push towards a more comprehensive approach applying the concepts of whole-of-government and whole-of-society. This implies an increased expectation for collaboration between state agencies and civil society organizations (CSOs). For the purpose of this report, the following working definitions of CSOs are used, for lack of an official definition: CSOs include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), volunteer organizations, indigenous peoples’ organizations, mass-based membership organizations, as well as social movements, communities and citizens acting individually and/or collectively.⁷ CSOs can be any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or international level.⁸

While collaboration between CSOs and government is not a novel concept in both CT and P/CVE endeavors—indeed, some CSOs have collaborated with the government as early as 2008—there is a need to look more closely at CSO and collaborative efforts to identify success stories, challenges, and lessons learnt.

This report aims to examine collaborative P/CVE efforts by government and CSOs and outline both positive and negative experiences from both CSOs and the government, to be used as an evidence-base for developing best practices and recommendations to provide guidance for enhancing, streamlining and accelerating the efficacy of current and future collaborative P/CVE initiatives both in- and outside Indonesia.

5 Unaesah Rahmah, “Indonesia Annual Threat Assessment,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) 13, no. 1, accessed September 27, 2023, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-13-issue-01/>.

6 “Peraturan Presiden (PERPRES) Nomor 7 Tahun 2021 tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme Tahun 2020-2024,” <http://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/157948/perpres-no-7-tahun-2021>.

7 UNDP, “UNDP and civil society,” accessed October 31, 2023, <https://www.undp.org/partners/civil-society-organizations>.

8 UN Department of Global Communications, Civil Society Unit, “About-us,” accessed October 31, 2023, <https://www.un.org/en/civil-society/page/about-us>





Methodology



B. Methodology

This study adopted a qualitative methodology, harnessing a nuanced, multi-faceted data collection process delving deeply into the dynamics of collaboration between government institutions and CSOs on P/CVE initiatives in Indonesia. The study commenced with a desk review and library research phase, where an exhaustive analysis of documents pertaining to terrorism, P/CVE, and counterterrorism was conducted. This foundational phase integrated an extensive range of sources, including the most recent and pertinent literature, reports, and scholarly articles, synthesizing the existing body of knowledge to form a robust baseline for the study.

Following this, semi-structured interviews with primary stakeholders in the P/CVE interventions within Indonesia were conducted. This cohort comprised four representatives from governmental bodies, and one representative from an independent state institution – also categorized as ‘governmental’ for response purposes – and twelve interviewees from CSOs. The semi-structured format of these interviews, characterized by predetermined questions supplemented by additional probes based on participants’ responses, facilitated both depth and breadth in gathering nuanced insights. The interviews were conducted both online and in-person from April to June 2023.

Complementing the interview process, a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was organized serving as a platform to foster dialogue and debate between government and CSOs representatives. These discussions unearthed both challenges and best practices, thereby nurturing a collaborative understanding and giving opportunities for providing strategic recommendations to enhance the efficacy of P/CVE programs in Indonesia. The FGD convened a diverse group of 24 participants, encompassing eight representatives from the government, one delegate from an independent state institution, and ten from CSOs, and five representatives from UNODC. Prioritizing the confidentiality of participants, the report conscientiously omits any identifying details, including names and pseudonyms of the individuals involved in the interviews and FGD, unless they stated otherwise and agreed to include their names in the references. The FGD was conducted on 16 June 2023.



Setting the Scope: Defining the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism

C. Setting the Scope: Defining the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism

There is no internationally agreed definition of neither terrorism nor violent extremism. According to the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism:

"Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief. Definitions of terrorism and violent extremism are the prerogative of Member States and must be consistent with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law."⁹

The issue of terrorism, undoubtedly a global concern, calls for solutions that extend beyond the confines of military intervention or force. A military approach, while critical in certain scenarios, is not a panacea for the deep-seated complexities of terrorism.¹⁰ It is increasingly recognized among scholars and policy analysts that the genesis of terrorism cannot be solely attributed to extremist ideologies.¹¹ Instead, it is rooted in a multitude of interconnected factors that span across social, economic, political, and psychological domains.¹² A comprehensive approach that includes both preventive and interventionist measures is necessary to effectively address the multiple dimensions of violent extremism.¹³

9 UN General Assembly, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Report of the Secretary-General," UN Doc. A/70/674, December 24, 2015.

10 "A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism | International Peace Institute," accessed September 26, 2023, <https://www.ipinst.org/2010/07/a-new-approach-deradicalization-programs-and-counterterrorism>.

11 Donald Holbrook and John Horgan, "Terrorism and Ideology: Cracking the Nut," *Perspective on Terrorism* 13, no. 6 (2019).

12 Alex P. Schmid, "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review," *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague* 4, no. 2 (2013), <https://www.icct.nl/publication/radicalisation-de-radicalisation-counter-radicalisation-conceptual-discussion-and>. Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, "The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 11 (November 2, 2015): 958–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375>. Kumar Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2009). Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2011). Julie Chernov Hwang, "Pathways into Terrorism: Understanding Entry into and Support for Terrorism in Asia," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 6 (November 2, 2018): 883–89, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481186>.

13 Owen Frazer and Christian Nünlist, *The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism* (ETH-Zürich, 2015). Kumar Ramakrishna, Yusuf Roque Santos Morales, and Sheryl Renomeron-Morales, "Countering Violent Islamist Extremism in Muslim Mindanao the 4M Way: The Role of Alternative Narratives," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 0, no. 0 (2021): 1–26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1929066>. The 4 M Way could gradually steer vulnerable Muslims away from violent Islamist ideological rigidities toward the flexible beliefs that have long been part of the lived realities of Bangsamoro region—and essential for peace and stability in Muslim Mindanao." "container-title": "Studies in Conflict & Terrorism", "DOI": "10.1080/1057610X.2021.1929066", "ISSN": "1057-610X", "issue": "0", "note": "publisher: Routledge\n_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1929066", "page": "1-26", "source": "Taylor and Francis+NEJM", "title": "Countering Violent Islamist Extremism in Muslim Mindanao the 4M Way: The Role of Alternative Narratives", "title-short": "Countering Violent Islamist Extremism in Muslim Mindanao the 4M Way", "volume": "0", "author": [{"family": "Ramakrishna", "given": "Kumar"}, {"family": "Morales", "given": "Yusuf Roque Santos"}, {"family": "Renomeron-Morales", "given": "Sheryl"}], "issued": {"date-parts": [{"2021"}]}}, "schema": "https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}</p></div>

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Towards Synergy: Research on Government and Civil Society
Collaboration in P/CVE Programs in Indonesia

P/CVE refers to broad, non-coercive efforts by both government and non-government/civil society actors to reduce violent extremism by addressing its root causes.¹⁴ It is a multifaceted approach aiming to deter individuals from terrorist activities and reduce reoffending among those previously involved in such crimes.¹⁵ While CT efforts focus on deterring and disrupting terrorist plots and operations, P/CVE works ‘upstream’, targeting risk factors and drivers of violent extremism to prevent or reduce the appeal of violent ideologies.¹⁶ It is often viewed as the ‘soft’ side of CT, focusing on peace and development policies.¹⁷ An example are the European Union’s various STRIVE programs, which includes a multifaceted approach with elements such as education, media capacity building, women’s empowerment, and socioeconomic inclusion.¹⁸

Another perspective to comprehend the breadth of P/CVE programs is through the lens of public health policy.¹⁹ This framework categorizes interventions into three stages: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary interventions are targeted at the wider population, aiming to foster social unity and resilience to lessen the factors leading to violent extremism. Secondary interventions focus on individuals or groups perceived to be on the brink of involvement in political violence, possibly through recruitment into extremist factions. Lastly, tertiary interventions aim at rehabilitating and disengaging individuals who have already participated in violent extremism or were implicated in activities that warranted police involvement.²⁰

Despite the widespread support for the concept of P/CVE, its inherent ambiguity often results in delegitimization among community groups. This lack of clarity is not a new issue, as scholars and practitioners seldom agree on the definitions of radicalization, (violent) extremism, and terrorism. The difficulty in distinguishing between extremist or radical views and those that are moderate or legitimate gives rise to concerns about the adoption of an ‘Orwellian thought police’ approach, which could penalize non-conforming political opinions. This issue is particularly acute in states with authoritarian tendencies, underscoring the need

14 GCERF, “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Stories from the EU’s Work around the Globe,” March 18, 2021, <https://www.gcerf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/PCVE-stories-from-the-EUs-work-around-the-globe.pdf>.

15 Cameron Sumpter, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Priorities, Practice and the Role of Civil Society,” *Journal for Deradicalization*, no. 11 (June 24, 2017): 112–47. \\uc0\\u8221{} \\{\\i{}Journal for Deradicalization}, no. 11 (June 24, 2017)

16 Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, and Yenny Wahid, “Introduction” (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_1); Ruici Tio and Samantha Kruber, “Online P/CVE Social Media Efforts,” in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender and Civil Society*, ed. Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, and Yenny Wahid, New Security Challenges (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 233–54, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_11.

17 Cameron Sumpter and Yuslikha K. Wardhani, “Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia’s National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism” (RESOLVE Network, 2022), <https://resolvenet.org/research/hopes-and-hurdles-indonesias-national-action-plan-prevent-violent-extremism>.

18 GCERF, “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Stories from the EU’s Work around the Glpbe.”

19 Matteo Vergani, “Community-Centered P/CVE Research in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges,” January 12, 2021, <https://www.resolvenet.org/research/community-centered-pcve-research-southeast-asia-opportunities-and-challenges>. Barton, Vergani, and Wahid, “Introduction.”

20 Barton, Vergani, and Wahid, “Introduction.”

for careful and balanced implementation of P/CVE strategies.²¹ A fundamental challenge associated with these strategies is the categorization of individuals as terrorists, violent extremists, or intolerant,²² which are labels often marking individuals for life, even after they are released from prison or acquitted at trial, adding to the complexity of the phenomenon.

The concept of P/CVE represents a nuanced and broad approach to countering violent extremism, going beyond traditional security-centric counterterrorism strategies. While it entails a proactive focus on prevention and addresses the root causes of violent extremism, potential challenges include the risk of delegitimization due to its inherent vagueness, the difficulties and risks associated with the categorization of individuals, and the careful balance needed to avoid infringing on individual liberties. Having established this foundational understanding, the next section will delve into the specific dynamics of P/CVE within the Indonesian context, exploring the unique challenges and opportunities presented when implementing these strategies in a diverse and complex sociopolitical environment.

21 Barton, Vergani, and Wahid.

22 Tio and Kruber, "Online P/CVE Social Media Efforts."



P/CVE: Towards Collaboration between Government and Civil Society

D. P/CVE: Towards Collaboration between Government and Civil Society

While CT programs are typically spearheaded by government authorities,²³ the initiatives and programs associated with P/CVE can be initiated by both the state and/or CSOs. In fact, it can be held that substantial involvement from CSOs is often necessary for P/CVE programs to be successful.²⁴ This has been emphasized in numerous academic publications and reports CSOs.²⁵

A key argument for promoting stronger collaboration between governments and CSOs, with an emphasis on the active involvement of CSOs, is the recognition that P/CVE initiatives extend beyond traditional security-focused measures.²⁶ They integrate aspects of social, educational, and economic fields, which are typically within the purview of CSOs and other development actors.²⁷ These organizations, due to their close connections with communities and profound comprehension of local challenges, are well-positioned to devise and execute strategies that tackle the fundamental causes of extremism.²⁸ CSOs are also deemed to have higher levels of trust among the communities they engage and serve, as compared to security-centric state agencies.²⁹ These strong traits of CSOs are essential to foster community participation in a program, particularly in the context of P/CVE. Community members are more likely to engage in initiatives that are credible, trustworthy, and relevant to their needs. Thus, the active participation of CSOs is not only desirable but essential for the success of P/CVE programs, enhancing their effectiveness and sustainability.³⁰

23 Scott Nicholas Romaniuk et al., eds., *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55769-8>.

24 Anne Speckhard, "Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism" (UN Women, 2021), https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%20Office%20ECA/Attachments/Publications/2021/2/PVE_TrainingManual-min.pdf. Joseph Gyte, Sara Zeiger, and Thomson Hunter, "Blueprint of a Rehabilitation and Reintegration Center" (Hedayah, 2020).

25 Speckhard, "Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism"; Barton, Vergani, and Wahid, "Introduction"; Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia"; I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, and D. B. Subedi, "Countering Violent Extremism through State-Society Partnerships: A Case Study of de-Radicalisation Programmes in Indonesia," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 15, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 23–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2020.1722317>. a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT). Susanna Z. Papp et al., "The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Exit Work" (Radicalisation Awareness Network, May 2022), https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/role-civil-society-organisations-exit-work-may-2022_en.

26 Speckhard, "Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism." Abdul Charis and Dwi Rubiyanti Kholifah, "Usulan Masyarakat Sipil: Rancang Bangun Kelompok Kerja Tematis Pengarusutamaan Gender." (WGCW and AMAN Indonesia, 2022).

27 M. Mubarak and Siti Razali, "Preventing Violence and Extremism in Indonesian Educational Institutions: Policies and Strategies," *KnE Social Sciences*, September 28, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v7i14.11955>; OSCE, "Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism | OSCE" (Organization for Security and Co-operation, 2019), <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/107807>.

28 Vergani, "Community-Centered P/CVE Research in Southeast Asia."

29 Vergani.

30 OSCE, "Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism | OSCE."

In the context of collaboration between CSOs and government, the government can facilitate collaboration between CSOs and other stakeholders, such as the private sector, security agencies, and universities. The collaboration between government and CSOs is part of a holistic approach which involves multiple stakeholders from various disciplinary backgrounds,³¹ including government officials from various ministries and agencies, legislators, parliamentarians, and of course various CSOs and academia. When collaborating, it is important to synchronize strategies and policies related to P/CVE along with the active participation of all government stakeholders and CSOs.³² One initiative aimed at fostering a partnership between governments and CSOs is the Southeast Asian Network of Civil Society Organizations (SEAN-CSO), which is a regional P/CVE program community founded in 2016 and facilitated by Deakin University in Australia in partnership with a wide range of CSOs from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia. This community seeks to promote collaboration between governments and CSOs from the early stages of P/CVE policy development to the implementation of programs in Southeast Asia.³³



Certain social and political conditions are necessary for fruitful collaboration between CSOs and the government, enabling these organizations to contribute effectively to P/CVE programs. It underscores the importance of a democratic government that cultivates – or at least tolerates – an open civil society, allowing CSOs to participate in the development and execution of policies.³⁴ The government should also safeguard freedom of association and speech while maintaining appropriate oversight of CSOs. When the public has high trust in the government, such collaboration can be particularly rewarding, as it allows CSOs to help shape policies and secure resources without the need for constant critique and opposition.

31 Malkanthi Hettiarachchi, "Multi-Stakeholder Engagement in Rehabilitation," in *Combating Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe: From Cooperation to Collaboration*, ed. Christian Echle and Rohan Gunaratna (Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018), 141–54.

32 Mubarak and Razali, "Preventing Violence and Extremism in Indonesian Educational Institutions."

33 "About Us," SEAN-CSO, accessed October 31, 2023, <https://www.sean-cso.org/about>

34 Anna Halafoff, Kim Lam, and Gary Bouma, "Worldviews Education: Cosmopolitan Peacebuilding and Preventing Violent Extremism," *Journal of Beliefs & Values* 40 (May 24, 2019): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2019.1600113>.

Conversely, the effectiveness of such partnerships could be compromised if the government suppresses critical dialogue and public involvement. The presence of ethno-religious tensions, particularly when the government is seen to only represent the interests of the ethnic and/or religious majority, could similarly undermine collaborative efforts between CSOs and the government.³⁵

Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia stands out for the extensive participation of its CSOs in P/CVE programs. Indonesian CSOs are typically older and more established than their counterparts in the region. Indonesian CSOs often engage in formal collaboration arrangements with government agencies, frequently in the form of contractual work, such as developing and providing training programs. These organizations are also more linked up with partners and other CSOs, indicating a more conducive environment for P/CVE activities compared to other countries in Southeast Asia. This highlights a positive trend in the collaborative efforts between CSOs and the government within the context of P/CVE programs in Indonesia.³⁶

35 Halafoff, Lam, and Bouma.

36 Barton, Vergani, and Wahid, "Introduction."



The Evolution of P/CVE Programs in Indonesia: A Shift Towards Collaboration and Community Empowerment

E. The Evolution of P/CVE Programs in Indonesia: A Shift Towards Collaboration and Community Empowerment

P/CVE in Indonesia has been an ongoing process for the past two decades, significantly since the tragic Bali bombings in 2002.³⁷ This terrorist attack, which caused over 200 deaths, both local and foreign acted as a catalyst for the evolution of P/CVE programs in the country. Although the terminology has evolved over time, the essence of these initiatives remains focused on preventing and countering violent extremism.

The key state actor of P/CVE in Indonesia is the National Counter-Terrorism Agency/Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), which was founded in 2010. The BNPT consists of three primary divisions: 1) prevention, protection and de-radicalization; 2) operations and enforcement; and 3) international cooperation.³⁸ The agency plays a pivotal role in coordinating the government's response to terrorist threats and leading the execution of de-radicalization programs. To assist BNPT's program and implementation at the local level, the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum/Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme (FKPT) was created and currently operates in 32 out of the 34 provinces in the country.³⁹ FKPT's programs involve hosting discussions, inviting local government officials, academics, former police officers, and clerics from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), an autonomous and independent non-state agency.⁴⁰ However, both BNPT and FKPT have faced criticism for not sufficiently engaging with youth and women's groups in P/CVE programs.⁴¹

37 Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia"; Noorhaidi Hasan, B. Hendriks, and F. Janssen, "Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia," ed. R. Meijer, The Hague, 2012, <https://repository.wodc.nl/handle/20.500.12832/1796>.a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)

38 Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia."a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)

39 "Peraturan Kepala Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme Nomor : Per - 03/K.Bnpt/1/ 2017 Tentang Pedoman Umum Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme Di Daerah," accessed September 28, 2023, <https://ikhub.id/produk/kebijakan-nasional/peraturan-kepala-badan-nasional-penanggulangan-terorisme-nomor-per-03-k-bnpt-1-2017-tentang-pedoman-umum-forum-koordinasi-pencegahan-terorisme-di-daerah-45085594>.

40 Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia."a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)

41 Sumpter; BNPT, "Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan Dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Yang Mengarah Pada Terorisme (RAN PE) Tahun 2021" (Sekretariat Bersama Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme (RAN PE), 2022).a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)

With the implementation of the RAN-PE since 2021, a broader array of state agencies from various ministries and independent state institutions like KOMNAS Perempuan are now participating in P/CVE programs. This is in line with the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to P/CVE, as stipulated in Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on RAN-PE, which mandates the involvement of all ministries and agencies in countering violent extremism.⁴²

As mentioned earlier, CSOs have been actively involved in P/CVE programs in Indonesia as early as 2008, two years prior to the establishment of BNPT. In their work, CSOs often provided practical and social support to help reintegrate former violent extremist prisoners back into society and carry out preventive work in educational institutions.⁴³

Initially, both government and CSOs in Indonesia took on the challenge of P/CVE independently and not in unison, with their relationship largely being driven by top-down directives from the state. The Indonesian government P/CVE program primarily adopted an ideological approach focusing on deradicalization efforts that aimed to alter the ideology of imprisoned terrorists.⁴⁴ On the other hand, CSOs leaned towards a more comprehensive approach that prioritized the prevention of violence, individual growth, and the propagation of peace and tolerance. However, their initiatives often operated independently of state programs and frequently lacked the necessary governmental support or guidance.⁴⁵

This lack of collaboration was not confined to the interaction between the government and CSOs, but also permeated within governmental agencies. There was limited information exchange among these entities, leading to unclear procedures and redundancies across various departments. This confusion was particularly noticeable when it came to determining whether the BNPT or the Directorate General of Correction (DGC) was in charge of conceptualizing and executing deradicalization programs in prisons. There was also limited coordination among CSOs, leading to programmatic overlap and lost opportunities for synergistic collaboration, however, several CSOs managed to initiate effective programs.⁴⁶

42 PERPRES No. 7 Tahun 2021, 7.

43 Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia"; Barton, Vergani, and Wahid, "Introduction"; Z. Papp et al., "The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Exit Work." a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)

44 Hasan, Hendriks, and Janssen, "Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia"; Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia"; Barton, Vergani, and Wahid, "Introduction." conducted from March 2010 to March 2011, of the counter-terrorist strategies of three countries: Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. The aim of this study was to acquire insight into the counter-terrorist strategies of these countries, to analyse them, and to compare them. The main question focussed on how the combination of counter-narratives, deradicalization programmes and political changes (democratization, amnesty, etc.

45 Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia." a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT)

46 Barton, Vergani, and Wahid, "Introduction."

Some initiatives launched by CSOs include the economic empowerment program by YPP for former terrorist detainees and a peaceful campaign targeting youth by AIDA. The economic empowerment initiative by YPP encompasses entrepreneur training, which then enables the participants to either start their own small enterprises or join a business established by YPP. One of the most successful ventures emerging from the YPP initiative is Dapoer Bistik Solo. AIDA, on the other hand, engages both victims of terrorism and former terrorists in its efforts to increase awareness about the dangers of violent extremism and foster empathy towards the victims of terrorism among the youth.⁴⁷

47 Muhammad Wildan, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: The Role of Former Terrorists and Civil Society Organisations," in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender and Civil Society*, ed. Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, and Yenny Wahid (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 195–214, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_9

49 Visna Vulovik, "Peace Villages," in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender and Civil Society*, ed. Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, and Yenny Wahid, *New Security Challenges* (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 101–24, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_5.

Furthering the collaboration between state and CSOs, the launch of the RAN-PE in 2019, signaled a notable turning point.⁵⁰ This plan underscored the crucial role of CSOs not only in executing the plan but also in contributing to the decision-making processes.⁵¹ The inception of RAN-PE was largely due to the relentless efforts of local CSOs and a global trend in which governments are acknowledging the significance of community involvement in combating terrorism and addressing the social conditions that foster violent extremism.⁵²

The RAN-PE is structured to coordinate and merge P/CVE activities across various government agencies and stakeholders. Its strength lies in fostering local ownership of programs, thereby ensuring their relevance across Indonesia's diverse islands, regions, and urban centers. While the lead agencies of RAN-PE are not explicitly stated, it is suggested that BNPT, as well as the provincial governments play a pivotal role.⁵³ Measures are in place to ensure that the execution plan is gender-sensitive, with organizations such as the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) and Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN) Indonesia focused on reinforcing the women, peace, and security (WPS) perspective in conflict vulnerability assessments.⁵⁴

To further foster collaboration and exchange of best practices 'Thematic Working Groups', or 'Pokja Tematis', have been established under the RAN-PE, which offer a formal space for CSOs to collaborate with government actors.⁵⁵ This engagement is crucial for preserving democratic space in Indonesia, especially to counter-balance the dominant security approach prevalent in P/CVE work. The Thematic Working Groups, with their diverse civil society backgrounds, not only facilitate exchange among civil society entities but also enable the exchange of information, experiences, and best practices between government and non-government actors.⁵⁶

50 BNPT, "Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan Dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Yang Mengarah Pada Terorisme (RAN PE) Tahun 2021"; Sumpter and K. Wardhani, "Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia's National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism"; BNPT, "Perpres RAN PE: Apa, Mengapa, Bagaimana?" (Bogor: Deputi Bidang Kerja sama Internasional Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme Republik Indonesia, 2021).

51 Alamsyah M Dja'far, "Implementasi Kebijakan Kementerian/Lembaga Mencegah Intoleransi Dan Ekstremisme Kekerasan Di Perguruan Tinggi, Tempat Ibadah, Dan Media Sosial Di Indonesia" (Pasar Minggu: INFID, 2020).

52 Dja'far.

53 Sumpter and K. Wardhani, "Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia's National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism"; BNPT, "Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan Dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Yang Mengarah Pada Terorisme (RAN PE) Tahun 2021." "author": [{"family": "Sumpter", "given": "Cameron"}], [{"family": "K. Wardhani", "given": "Yuslikha"}], "accessed": {"date-parts": ["2023", "9", "28"]}, "issued": {"date-parts": ["2022"]}], {"id": "129", "uris": ["http://zotero.org/users/local/Is15Z34n/items/DPJSAEAN"]}, "itemData": {"id": "129", "type": "report", "publisher": "Sekretariat Bersama Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme (RAN PE)"}.

54 Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE, "Laporan Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE," February 10, 2023, <https://amanindonesia.org/publikasi/laporan-kelompok-kerja-tematis-ran-pe-tahun-2022/>.

55 Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE; Charis and Kholifah, "Usulan Masyarakat Sipil: Rancang Bangun Kelompok Kerja Tematis Pengarusutamaan Gender."

56 Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE, "Laporan Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE"; Charis and Kholifah, "Usulan Masyarakat Sipil: Rancang Bangun Kelompok Kerja Tematis Pengarusutamaan Gender."

Even though the plan offers opportunities for collaboration with CSOs and promotes community-level P/CVE activities, achieving full CSO involvement still remains a challenge, which could potentially hinder the effectiveness of RAN PE, especially at the community level.⁵⁷ Challenges and opportunities in relation to collaboration between government and CSOs will be elaborated on more in Section H below.

⁵⁷ Sumpster and K. Wardhani, "Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia's National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism"; Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE, "Laporan Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE."



Mapping Collaborative Efforts Between Civil Society and Government

F. Mapping Collaborative Efforts Between Civil Society and Government

Table 1. Collaboration between government and CSOs in PCVE Programs in Indonesia⁵⁸

No	Theme of Collaboration PCVE Program	CSOs	Government	Summary of Activities/Achievements
1	Mainstreaming Gender; Law Enforcement and Human Rights	(1) WGWC (2) Percik Institute (3) AMAN Indonesia (4) YPP (5) Institut Perempuan (6) Balai Syura Ineuong Aceh (7) Yayasan Empatiku (8) Fatayat NU Jawa Timur (9) Libu Perempuan Sulawesi Tengah	(1) BNPT (2) West Java Regional Government (3) Central Java Government (4) Aceh local government (5) East Java Regional Government (6) Banten Regional Government (7) Bogor City Government (8) Solo City Government (9) Sukoharjo District Government	The collaborative program involves issuing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to aid in the formation and implementation of the Regional Action Plan on Preventing Extremism (RAD PE). The outcomes of this program include regulatory support for the National Action Plan on Preventing Extremism (RAN PE) in the form of (1) Regional Action Plans for Central Java and West Java (RAD PE), and (2) Working Groups on the Regional Action Plan (Pokja RAD PE) for East Java, Sukoharjo District, and Central Sulawesi.
2	Mainstreaming Gender; Law Enforcement and Human Rights	(1) AMAN Indonesia	(1) Local government	The program includes strengthening the local government's perspective on women, peace, and security
3	Mainstreaming Gender; Law Enforcement and Human Rights; National Preparedness	(1) WGWC (2) AMAN Indonesia (3) INFID	(1) Kesbangpol in Provincial level	The program aims to support gender mainstreaming and sensitivity in RAD PE within local government. The output of the program is a gender-sensitive RAD PE, serving as the subsidiary regulation of RAN PE.
4	Mainstreaming Gender; National Preparedness	(1) Serve Indonesia	(1) Women's local network group in East Java such PKK (2) Women's local network group in West Java (3) West and East Java provincial government.	The program encompasses national preparedness and aims to elevate awareness for early warning, early response, and detection of extremism. As a result of this initiative, the PKK network is now actively engaged in the early warning and early response to extremism. Based on the interview, Serve further disclosed that the PKK is mapping areas particularly susceptible to extremism and radicalism in their region.
5	Strengthening government roles through the Peace Village Program	(1) Wahid Foundation	(1) Village and sub-district government	The program aims to strengthen local governments through the Desa Damai Program. Desa Damai has been highlighted by the BNPT as one of its successful initiatives.
6	Strategic Communication; Gender Mainstreaming	(1) Fatayat NU	(1) Local government and religious leaders	The program's objective is to establish an anti-radicalism preacher forum. Training sessions have been conducted for preachers to equip them with knowledge on counter-narratives against radical ideologies within religious communities. As a result, these forums have empowered the preachers, and they now possess the capacity to integrate counter-narratives into their preaching.
7	Protection of Witnesses and Fulfillment of Victims' Rights	(1) Libu Perempuan	(1) Central Sulawesi Regional Government	The program encompasses the creation of safe spaces for individuals to report incidents and offer support to terrorism victims. It also aims to bolster mechanisms of psychosocial support, especially for those affected by the incident in the Lembantonggoa case in Sigi, Central Sulawesi.

58 Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE, "Laporan Kelompok Kerja Tematis RAN PE"; BNPT, "Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan Dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Yang Mengarah Pada Terorisme (RAN PE) Tahun 2021;" Interviews with state agencies and CSOs in April, May and June 2023; Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts, June 16, 2023.

No	Theme of Collaboration PCVE Program	CSOs	Government	Summary of Activities/Achievements
8	Protection of Witnesses and Fulfillment of Victims' Rights; Law enforcement and Human Rights	(1) Institut Perempuan (2) Percik Institute	(1) West Java Regional Government (2) Central Java Regional Government	The program focuses on providing access to terrorism victims through activities such as counselling and long-term recovery. It is imperative that the program is incorporated and documented in RAD PE. Moreover, there is an emphasis on overseeing the program that offers justice access to terrorism victims, supported by gender-sensitive counselling services, and ensuring that the long-term recovery process is outlined in the West Java RAD PE.
9	Protection of Witnesses and Fulfillment of Victims' Rights	(1) YKP	(1) Indonesian Police (2) Directorate General of Corrections	The program facilitated visits and dialogues between survivors of terrorist incidents and terrorist detainees in several prisons, including Gunung Sindur, Cipinang, Salemba, Cilacap, Porong, and Malang. Additionally, they seek to establish a cooperative network (Koperasi) as a forum for survivors/victims residing in various cities such as Greater Jakarta, Cirebon, Surabaya, Bali, and Poso. The primary objective is to foster empathy and promote reconciliation between terrorist detainees and their victims. Besides the dialogue, they also provide psychosocial support services for survivors/victims.
10	Protection of Witnesses and Fulfillment of Victims' Rights	(1) FKAAl	(1) Indonesian Police (2) Directorate General of Corrections (3) BNPT	The program includes marking the anniversaries of terrorist incidents or attacks to educate society about the dangers and risks of terrorism, extremism, and radicalism, while building empathy towards the victims of such attacks. The intention is also to foster dialogues and forums where the perpetrators or members of terrorist acts can seek atonement and ask the victims for forgiveness, furthering the journey towards reconciliation.
11	Youth Involvement	(1) Peace Generation	(1) ITB (2) Ministry of Education and Culture	The program focuses on the enhancement of socio-economic skills, encompassing critical thinking, empathy, collaboration, and creative problem-solving. The primary objective of the program is to equip university-level students with refined critical thinking abilities.
12	Youth Involvement	(1) Peace Leader Indonesia	(1) Ministry of Education and Culture	The program includes enhancing the capacity of youth in managing diversity and peace education, which is seamlessly integrated with the implementation of P5 (Proyek Penguatan Profil Pelajar Pancasila/ Project to Strengthen the Profile of Pancasila Students).
13	Youth Involvement; Strategic Communication	(1) AMAN Indonesia (2) KAMI DAMAI (3) Peace Leader Indonesia (4) Girl Ambassador for Peace	(1) BNPT	The program involves crafting a map of the advocacy journey, which integrates the youth agenda, peace, and security within RAN PE. The result of this initiative is a policy brief titled, "Strengthening Meaningful Participation of Youth for Peace and Security: The Role of Youth in the Implementation of RAN PE."
14	National Preparedness	(1) Wahid Foundation	(1) Local government in West Java and East Java	The program encompasses two primary initiatives. The first focuses on bolstering the resilience of women's communities at the grassroots level. This is achieved through training sessions and the transfer of knowledge on topics such as social cohesion, resilience, equality, and diversity. The second initiative seeks to fortify the PVE elements within school curricula.

No	Theme of Collaboration PCVE Program	CSOs	Government	Summary of Activities/Achievements
15	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) Yayasan Empatiku (2) WGWC (3) YPP (4) AMAN Indonesia	(1) Local government, religious leaders, community leaders, and residents of Mekarjawa district, Depok city.	The initiative, titled “Komunitas Tangguh” (Resilient Community), is designed to be implemented in locations where former terrorists or terrorist detainees reside. The objective of this program is to encourage the identity of these ex-detainees and their families to become more transparent, positive, and cooperative, facilitating collaborative efforts in advancing the P/CVE program.
16	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) Yayasan Empatiku (2) INFID	(1) Local government (2) BNPT	The program encompasses an assessment focused on the social integration of deportees and returnees. The desired outcome is to create a space for reconciliation between society and the individuals involved, primarily through dialogic methods. Furthermore, the initiative tailors its approach to cater to the specific needs of returnees and deportees. This includes provisions such as helping them obtain identity cards (kartu kependudukan), securing access to healthcare, enhancing their economic skills, and other relevant support.
17	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) FKAAl	(1) BNPT	The program is designed to facilitate social work opportunities for former terrorist detainees. It encourages these detainees to take a proactive role in their communities by participating in programs that serve local residents, such as community service (bakti sosial) and social assistance (bantuan sosial).
18	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) DASPR	(1) Directorate General of Corrections	The initiative focuses on capacity building for prison officers, emphasizing specialized training on handling female and juvenile terrorist detainees.
19	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) YPP	(1) Directorate General of Corrections	The program entails two primary initiatives: Firstly, it is focused on developing a standardized module for handling female and juvenile terrorist detainees. Secondly, it prioritizes the creation of a training module geared towards the reintegration of returnees and deportees.
20	Law enforcement and Human Rights	(1) Wahid Foundation	(1) BNPT	The program entails the establishment of the “Forum Kemitraan” (Partnership Forum) at the national level, designed to facilitate dialogue between the government, decision-makers, and the broader public concerning RAN PE. The anticipated outcome is a well-defined regulatory model that emphasizes partnership and civil society engagement.

No	Theme of Collaboration PCVE Program	CSOs	Government	Summary of Activities/Achievements
21	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) CDS	(1) Directorate General of Corrections	<p>The program entails the establishment of an instrument designed for managing high-risk detainees. The scope of this tool has evolved beyond exclusively addressing terrorist detainees; it now also encompasses those incarcerated for general crimes. This instrument plays a pivotal role in the "Development Progress Report" (Laporan Perkembangan Pembinaan), a mandatory form for detainees seeking remission.</p> <p>Additionally, the program incorporates the development of a training curriculum for the aforementioned instrument. This initiative is closely aligned with the organization of training sessions for the guardians or overseers of terrorists, termed as "wali teroris." The training emphasizes counterterrorism, networking, and other vital components for the rehabilitation (pembinaan) and mentoring (pembimbingan) of terrorist detainees.</p> <p>The collaboration also offers courses for students in polytechnics with a corrections program focus. Another significant outcome of the program is raising awareness about strategic communication in the corrections domain. Termed "Corrections Public Relations" (Publik Pemasyarakatan), this initiative engages staff from the public relations department of each prison. In conjunction with the overseers of terrorists, the program produces videos highlighting best practices in rehabilitating terrorist detainees.</p>
22	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) Ruang Damai	(1) Directorate General of Corrections	The program includes giving counselling to terrorist detainees in several prisons, specifically those in the Greater Jakarta areas (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi), as well as Nusakambangan, Cilacap.
23	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) AIDA	(1) Directorate General of Corrections	The program includes facilitating dialogue between terrorist detainees and victims of terrorist incidents/attacks. Additionally, training is conducted for prison officers and overseers of terrorists. This training encompasses discussions on radicalism, terrorist networks, and other related topics.
24	Rehabilitation and Reintegration	(1) AIDA (2) YPP (3) CDS	(1) Directorate General of Corrections	The program includes conducting scoping studies and research on the management of handling terrorist detainees and terrorist clients in Indonesia. Additionally, the research products have been disseminated to government entities and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
25	Strategic Communication	(1) Ruang Obrol	(1) BNPT (2) The Attorney General's Office (3) Densus 88 (4) Ministry of Social Affairs	The program includes training for social workers affiliated with the Ministry of Social Affairs or the Social Services Department, and staff of BP2MI. The training focuses on creating positive and peaceful narratives, capacity building to prevent violent extremism, and the use of social media to counter radicalization leading to violent extremism.
26	Strategic Communication	(1) Duta Damai	(1) BNPT (2) Ministry of Communication (3) Other relevant government agencies (4) Other relevant law enforcement agencies	The program includes the creation of a cyber patrol within BNPT that focuses on identifying websites, social media, and online content indicated of leading to violent extremism. The cyber patrol is also responsible for taking down harmful online content, particularly those that promote violent extremism.

No	Theme of Collaboration PCVE Program	CSOs	Government	Summary of Activities/Achievements
27	Community Policing	(1) Ruang Obrol	(1) Local government (RT and RW level) in Semarang and Tuban (2) PKK	The program is designed to engage local governments at the RT and RW levels as a key component of the reintegration initiative. Its goal is to prepare both local officials and community members for the return of former terrorist detainees to their homes and neighborhoods. To this end, it includes training and seminars aimed at educating and increasing awareness about the critical importance of accepting these individuals back into society. This effort seeks to ensure that the community plays an active role in the reintegration process. Training sessions are held for six months prior to the return of the former detainees to their communities.

List of acronyms of government agencies:

1. BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorism/National Counter-Terrorism Agency)
2. BP2MI (Badan Perlindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia/Indonesian Migrant Worker Protection Agency)
3. Densus 88 (Detachment 88/Special Counter-Terrorism Task Force)
4. Kesbangpol (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik/ National Unity and Politics Agency)
5. PKK (Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/ Family Welfare Empowerment)
6. RT (Rukun Tetangga/Neighbourhood Association)
7. RW (Rukun Warga/Community Association)

List of acronyms of civil society organizations:

1. AIDA (Aliansi Indonesia Damai/Indonesian Peace Alliance)
2. AMAN Indonesia (The Asian Muslim Action Network Indonesia)
3. CDS (Center for Detention Studies)
4. DASPR (Division for Applied Social Psychology Research)
5. Fatayat NU (Nahdlatul Ulama Young Female Wing)
6. FKAAL (Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Akhlakul Karimah Indonesia/ Communication Forum for Akhlakul Karimah Activists in Indonesia)
7. INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development)
8. KAMI DAMAI (Koalisi Anak Muda untuk Indonesia Damai/ Youth Coalition for a Peaceful Indonesia)
9. Libu Sulawesi Tengah (Perkumpulan Lingkar Belajar untuk Perempuan Palu/Palu Women's Learning Circle Association)
10. Percik Institute (The Institute for Social Research, Democracy, and Social Justice)
11. YKP (Yayasan Keluarga Penyintas/ Survivors' Family Foundation)
12. YPP (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian/ Institute for International Peace Building)
13. WGWC (Working Group on Women and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism)




Enhancing Collaborative Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism

G. Enhancing Collaborative Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism

Positive Experience

Collaboration has been serving as a pivotal aspect in P/CVE programs. In recent years there has been a proliferation in collaborative undertakings between CSOs and state agencies on P/CVE. This section is dedicated to examining the positive outcomes of these collaborations between government and CSOs. These positive experiences serve both as useful insights and as strong reminders of the importance of sustaining such collaborative work. Moreover, the report highlights the premise that these partnerships have been crucial in improving both the effectiveness and efficiency of P/CVE programs.



Based on interviews, this report identifies various positive experiences arising from collaborations on P/CVE issues between CSOs and government agencies. These experiences are grouped into at least five categories: 'Access and Legitimacy', 'Sharing of Resources', 'Initiation and Support', 'Outreach and Networking', and 'Implementation and Impact'.

The data clearly indicate divergent benefits for each group. CSO respondents often emphasized 'Access and Legitimacy', particularly as their work frequently involves areas under governmental jurisdiction, such as prisons. For example, 30% of CSO respondents cited 'Access and Legitimacy' as positive experiences, a figure absent among government respondents, likely because they already have jurisdiction and do not feel that collaboration with CSOs gives them additional access and legitimacy. With regard to the 'Sharing of Resources', 56% of government respondents identified this as a positive aspect of the collaboration, a point cited by only 8% of CSOs. In fact, CSOs identify 'Sharing of Resources' as a challenge, as will be discussed in more depth in Section H of this report. The reason that government agencies identified 'Sharing of Resources' as a positive experience could be due to their budgetary limitations and lack of strategic planning, and hence they valued their collaborative efforts with CSOs, especially in areas where complementary support was beneficial.

'Implementation and Impact' was cited by 33% of state respondents, it garnered attention from only 15% of CSO respondents. In terms of other categories, 22% of CSO respondents mentioned 'Initiation and Support' and 'Outreach and Networking' as positive collaboration experiences. State respondents, however, cited 'Outreach and Networking' less frequently, at 12%, while not citing 'Initiation and Support' at all. This is quite a surprising outcome as one would imagine that collaborating with a CSO as a government agency would expand the outreach and networking beyond what a government agency usually would be able to achieve. Similarly, it is surprising that government agencies did not choose 'Initiation and Support' at all as positive experiences, while it seems logical that collaborating with CSOs would have positive effects on the initiation and support of new or existing P/CVE programmes and projects. Notably, the CSO respondents cited five sub-categories of positive experiences, whereas state or semi-state agencies mentioned only three. Apart from the reasons outlined above, this could also be due to a smaller number of respondents from government agencies, with 13 respondents compared to 22 respondents from CSOs for the interview and FGD.

Access and Legitimacy

As mentioned, 'Access and Legitimacy' were frequent responses among CSO respondents but absent from government respondents. As mentioned earlier, this disparity could reflect the CSOs need for access, particularly to prisons, whereas the government is the entity granting such access. 'Access', according to respondents, provides CSOs the opportunity to enter restricted areas like prisons or to engage with individuals under certain limitations such as terrorist suspects, detainees, returnees, deportees, or released terrorist convicts. Most CSOs who mentioned 'Access' as a positive experience are usually involved in prison-focused programs and projects for terrorist detainees.⁵⁹ These include training prison officers to identify radicalization and extremism, implementing risk assessments, deradicalization initiatives, and post-release monitoring and reintegration. Several CSOs expressed their appreciation for the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC), specifically citing the agency's role in facilitating their research and programs related to terrorist detainees and prisons.

While 'Legitimacy' does not always align directly with 'Access', the two concepts are interrelated. The government grants access to specific venues or individuals, and in doing so, often confers a degree of legitimacy upon the CSOs. This acquired legitimacy enables CSOs to conduct a range of activities, from training and risk assessments to deradicalization and post-prison reintegration programs. Although some argue that close ties with the government could potentially undermine the effectiveness of CSOs work, many still seek and value this form of governmental endorsement. For example, the Wahid Foundation's 'Desa Damai' project gained both social and local government legitimacy through its collaboration with various levels of administration.

59 Adhe Bhakti, Interview with the Researcher from PAKAR, June 14, 2023; Dete Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia, April 14, 2023; Noor Huda Ismail, Interview with Representative of Ruang Obrol, April 15, 2023; Taufik Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), April 16, 2023.

In a different vein, 'Access' can also refer to connections facilitated by the government between CSOs and other relevant state agencies. For instance, the CSO Yayasan Empatiku required liaisons with multiple government departments such as Dinas Sosial (Social Services), Dinas Kesehatan (Health Services), and Dinas Kependudukan dan Pencatatan Sipil (Department of Population and Civil Registration) for its programs for returnees and deportees. In these cases, 'Legitimacy' may come in the form of official government letters or calls, facilitating the CSOs' collaborations with local stakeholders at the provincial, city, or regency levels.

Sharing Resources

Resource sharing emerged as a focus point among respondents from state agencies, whereas it received less emphasis from CSOs. All respondents from these agencies confirmed that they have benefitted from sharing resources with CSOs in efforts to counter violent extremism. Such resources included funding, strategic concepts, manpower, infrastructure, knowledge transfer, and expert consultation on terrorism issues.

In the case of DGC, the resource sharing primarily involved program development for both prison and terrorist detainees. Given that terrorist detainees make up a small fraction of the overall population—around 0.36%—⁶⁰they are not the primary focus of allocated funds. Collaboration with CSOs such as the Center for Detention Studies have served to complement existing resources and led to a partnership which has lasted nearly 15 years. DGC has also engaged in collaborations that address different facets of the broad issue of terrorism, partnering with CSOs such as Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian/Institute for International Peace Building (YPP), Aliansi Indonesia Damai/Peaceful Indonesia Alliance (AIDA), Ruang Damai/Peace Space, and Rahima/Mercy. Additionally, some CSOs such as Society against Radicalism & Violent Extremism Indonesia (SeRVE) Indonesia and INFID indicated that the government has been proactive in sharing resources, including facilities, manpower, and partial funding.

Expertise sharing is another form of resource collaboration. For example, the CSO named PAKAR (translation: 'expert') collaborated with BNPT as early as 2009 to create a comprehensive database of terrorist incidents in Indonesia. Similarly, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag) improved its conflict management skills through training provided by CSOs. BNPT also acknowledged that their initiatives have been enriched by the knowledge and experience shared by CSOs, including contributions to the RAN-PE.

⁶⁰ The percentage of 0.36 percent was calculated based on the total number of terrorist detainees as of January 2022, which was 1,301 detainees, and the total number of Indonesian detainees, which was 278,849 individuals as of July 2022. See "BNPT: Total Tahanan dan Napi Terorisme Sebanyak 1.031 Orang," accessed April 9, 2024, <https://www.suarasurabaya.net/kelanakota/2022/bnpt-total-tahanan-dan-napi-terorisme-sebanyak-1-031-orang/>; "Jumlah Narapidana Indonesia Terbanyak Keempat di Asia - DataIndonesia.id," accessed April 9, 2024, <https://dataindonesia.id/gaya-hidup/detail/jumlah-narapidana-indonesia-terbanyak-keempat-di-asia>.

Lastly, these collaborations have acted as two-way channels for information and data sharing, enriching the collective knowledge-base and eliminating program overlap. This has allowed CSOs to gain valuable insights into terrorism and radicalism, thereby enhancing the overall efficacy of P/CVE efforts across sectors.⁶¹

Initiation and Support

In the collaborative landscape, the term ‘Support’ encompasses at least four distinct dimensions. First, it involves formal governmental endorsement, which can manifest in various ways—either through the issuance of official decrees supporting P/CVE programs or via formal public affirmations made during speeches or by attending CSO events.⁶² For example, the Governor of Central Java and the Mayor of Surakarta have both issued decrees endorsing P/CVE initiatives. Additionally, the Mayor of Surakarta has formally expressed support for P/CVE at public engagements.⁶³ This dimension of endorsement also extends to less formal expressions of support, such as verbal affirmations or written correspondence communicated through unofficial channels.⁶⁴

The second dimension of ‘Support’ signifies governmental acknowledgment of CSOs, illustrated by their inclusion in planning meetings.⁶⁵ This allows CSOs to propose P/CVE-related initiatives, signaling the government’s recognition of their role as co-organizers and their specialized expertise on the subject matter.

Thirdly, ‘Support’ indicates a governmental openness to collaboration with CSOs. As cited by AMAN, provincial governments in regions such as West Java, East Java, Central Java, Central Sulawesi, and Aceh have demonstrated receptiveness to such partnerships. This responsiveness underlines governmental acknowledgment of the valuable contributions that CSOs make to P/CVE efforts.⁶⁶ Notably, some CSOs have reported that governmental agencies are now taking the initiative to seek collaboration, marking a significant shift from previous practices where CSOs were primarily the initiators.⁶⁷

61 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

62 Mega Priyanti, Interview with Program Officer of Yayasan Empatiku, June 13, 2023; Dwi Rubiyanti Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia, April 17, 2023.

63 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP); Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

64 Andrie.

65 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

66 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

67 Interview with Program Officer PVE INFID, June 14, 2023. INFID’s experience collaborating with the Regional Representatives (PW) of Fatayat Nahdlatul Ulama in East Java and West Java, along with various stakeholders, in promoting RAD-PE at the regional level.

Fourthly and lastly, 'Support' encompasses direct dialogue between government and CSOs aimed at understanding challenges and proposing viable solutions.⁶⁸ These multifaceted forms of support have been instrumental in facilitating smoother program implementation, particularly for CSOs.⁶⁹

Outreach and Networking

Based on interviews, both CSOs and government representatives reported positive experiences in 'Outreach and Networking' arising from collaborative efforts in P/CVE programs. Notably, 22% of CSO respondents shared this view, as opposed to a mere 11% among government representatives.

Respondents frequently identified Pokja Tematis and Forum Kemitraan as crucial platforms for such positive experiences in 'Outreach and Networking'.⁷⁰ Pokja Tematis functions as a coordination hub for CSOs and state agencies, facilitating joint initiatives. Forum Kemitraan is designed to channel governmental funding toward P/CVE projects led by CSOs. These frameworks have expedited not only outreach and networking but also fortified inter-organizational coordination. Separately, some CSOs have also benefited by establishing connections with relevant state agencies, further aiding them in the execution of their programs.

Furthermore, both CSOs and state agencies recognized that their collective efforts have enabled them to reach broader and more diverse target audiences by capitalizing on each other's networks.⁷¹ Although challenges related to inter-agency coordination will be discussed in Section H, it bears mentioning that positive experiences in 'Outreach and Networking' have been more commonly reported among CSOs.

68 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

69 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

70 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP); Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia; Akhmad Kusairi, Interview with the Researcher of Ruang Obrol, April 16, 2023; Alamsyah M Dja'far, Interview with the Researcher of The Wahid Foundation, April 18, 2023.

71 Interview with Representative of El-Bukhari Institute, June 19, 2023; Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

Implementation and Impact

Positive experiences also manifest in the realm of ‘Implementation and Impact’, signifying that collaboration can facilitate, expedite, and enact RAN-PE or P/CVE programs more broadly. Based on interviews, state agency respondents reported a higher percentage of positive experiences in this category—33%, compared to CSO participants at 15%.

The ‘Implementation and Impact’ category can manifest in various ways. Firstly, it includes achieving specific goals outlined in RAN-PE, such as drafting regional action plan for the prevention of violence-based extremism led to violence (RAD-PE/ rencana aksi daerah pencegahan ekstremisme berbasis kekerasan yang mengarah pada kekerasan). The creation of RAD-PE is a crucial component of RAN-PE, as it equips local governments with the necessary legal instruments to implement RAN-PE at the local level.⁷²

In West Java, for instance, a RAD-PE was issued as a collaborative effort between the government and CSOs.⁷³ Moreover, four other provincial governments—Aceh, Central Java, East Java, and Central Sulawesi—have encouraged local governments to adopt RAD-PE, contextualized to their specific locales.⁷⁴

Secondly, successful collaboration could mean the effective implementation of P/CVE programs⁷⁵ and a broader reach to diverse target audiences. For instance, law enforcement agencies, in collaboration with other stakeholders like CSOs, executed nearly 780 programs and activities, impacting approximately 27,300 individuals in 2022. These programs were conducted in cities identified as hotspots for terrorist networks in Indonesia, such as Surakarta, Sukoharjo, Bima, and Poso.⁷⁶ Additionally, the Ministry of Religious Affairs noted that collaboration with CSOs led to more targeted and effective conflict management programs in Nusa Tenggara Barat and East Java.⁷⁷ Not only does collaboration aid in the implementation of programs, but different cases also highlight that such cooperative efforts can enhance evaluative mechanisms. For example, INFID has undertaken programs specifically aimed at monitoring and evaluating the implementation of RAN-PE.⁷⁸

72 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

73 Tulus Tahi Hapistaran Sibuea, Interview Head of Regional Vigilance Division of Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Kesbangpol) Jawa Barat, April 27, 2023.

74 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

75 Andhika Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT), n.d.

76 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

77 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

78 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

Lastly, 'Implementation and Impact' also signifies that the products of collaboration are utilized and implemented by stakeholders. While the 'Challenges' section will discuss instances where collaborative outputs went unused, some state agency respondents have indicated that they successfully implemented the products of collaboration. For example, DGC adopted risk assessments for terrorist detainees, extending this practice to other categories of convicts.⁷⁹ Moreover, modules for the reintegration and rehabilitation of former and current terrorist convicts were adopted. Similarly, the Ministry of Education and Culture revealed that they had integrated certain modules across all levels within the ministry, a result of their collaboration with CSOs.⁸⁰

79 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections, June 20, 2023.



80 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.



Navigating Complexities: Examining the Challenges and Opportunities of PCVE in Indonesia

H. Navigating Complexities: Examining the Challenges and Opportunities of PCVE in Indonesia

While the previous chapter elucidated the positive experiences emanating from collaborations, there are also some challenges when it comes to joint efforts between CSOs and state agencies. Interviews revealed a spectrum of twelve categories of challenges, including 'Institutional Constraints and Variance,' 'Communication and Trust Building,' 'Program Sustainability,' 'Output Shortcomings,' 'Resource Limitations,' 'Data Transparency and Programmatic Overlaps,' 'Inter-agency Coordination,' 'Knowledge and Technical Issues,' 'Evaluation and Needs Assessment,' 'P/CVE Plan Implementation,' 'Imbalanced Participation,' and 'Competition and Work Systems.'



CSOs identified 'Institutional Constraints and Variance' and 'Resource Limitations' as their primary challenges, each comprising 13% of reported obstacles in collaborative endeavors with governmental entities. This figure is closely mirrored by government stakeholder respondents, albeit higher by a marginal 1%. These primary challenges are followed by 'Communication and Trust Building' at 12%, and 'Inter-agency Coordination' and 'P/CVE Plan Implementation,' each at 10%. The least cited challenges were 'Evaluation and Needs Assessment' and 'Competition and Work Systems,' each accounting for 4%, with the remaining categories falling between 4% and 10%.

Conversely, government stakeholder interviews revealed five main challenges, each reported at a rate of 14%. These categories are 'Institutional Constraints and Variance,' 'Resource Limitations,' 'Data Transparency and Programmatic Overlaps,' 'Inter-agency Coordination,' and 'Knowledge and Technical Issues.' The remaining categories were cited less frequently under 10%, namely 'Program Sustainability,' 'Evaluation and Needs Assessment,' 'Output Shortcomings,' 'Communication and Trust Building,' with one category not being reported at all, the 'P/CVE Plan Implementation.'

Institutional Constraints and Variance

Challenges in the category of 'Institutional Constraints and Variance' manifest in diverse ways. First, the success of collaborative programs largely depends on key governmental figures who have established relationships with CSOs and prioritize the relevant issues.⁸¹ When these leaders are transferred to different positions, their successors may not have the same focus, either due to limited awareness of the issue or a lack of existing relationships with CSOs. As a result, initiatives that were started under the previous leaders may be at risk. This compels CSOs to spend additional time, sometimes extending over months or even years, in briefing and convincing new leaders of the significance of P/CVE programs.⁸² Sometimes, CSOs find themselves being "passed around" within or between governmental departments when they have not identified the key person with whom to discuss P/CVE programs.⁸³

This dynamic is also pertinent to the creation of RAD-PE as part of the implementation of RAN PE at the regional level. While some provinces like West Java, Aceh, and Banten have created RAD-PE through regional regulations such as gubernatorial decrees (*perturan gubernur*), many others have yet to formalize RAD-PE. The challenge in establishing RAD-PE lies in multi-stakeholder involvement, which is not limited to local government but also

81 Ismail, Interview with Representative of Ruang Obrol; Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia; Linda Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation, April 15, 2023; Priyanti, Interview with Program Officer of Yayasan Empatiku, June 13, 2023; Mega Priyanti, Interview with Program Officer of Yayasan Empatiku, August 29, 2023; Interview with Representative of El-Bukhari Institute; Interview with Program Officer PVE INFID; Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

82 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation; Interview with Program Officer PVE INFID; Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

83 Priyanti, Interview with Program Officer of Yayasan Empatiku, August 29, 2023; Interview with Program Officer PVE INFID.

includes Kesbangpol and CSOs.⁸⁴ Moreover, there is a need for RAD-PE to be extended beyond the provincial level to reach municipal and district levels. Additionally, changes in leadership in local government mean that CSOs need to brief the new incumbents about RAD-PE specifically and RAN-PE in general.⁸⁵ Despite these challenges, stakeholders argue that rotation within government departments can serve as a mechanism for finding suitable personnel for programs, even if it sometimes occurs due to staffing limitations and places individuals in roles beyond their areas of expertise.⁸⁶

Second, governmental agencies and CSOs operate under differing working styles and mechanisms. The governmental approach tends to be bureaucratic, administrative, and top-down, whereas CSOs are often more flexible and driven by activism.⁸⁷ These differences lead to divergent strategies in program execution and may cause friction over administrative processes. For instance, CSOs find extended administrative processes of the government challenging, but the government remains bound by rules and regulations to operate within their mandates.⁸⁸ The frustration arises when the government cannot effect significant changes to the system, leading to the perception of prolonged administrative process. However, the reality is that the government is obligated to adhere to the established rules and regulations.

These disparities are not confined to relationships between the government and CSOs; they also exist among government agencies themselves. For example, CSOs working with both the East Java and West Java provincial governments found the former to be more bureaucratic and procedure-oriented, while the latter was more flexible and open.⁸⁹ The different working systems pose challenges not only for CSOs but also for government agencies. For example, government agencies may require specific programs that CSOs cannot accommodate due to restrictions in their budgets and programming imposed by donors, thereby limiting the flexibility of CSOs.⁹⁰

Third, institutional constraints have also appeared through resistance from various government agencies in accommodating joint programs that address issues of radicalism, extremism, and peace. This resistance requires CSOs to employ alternative methods in framing and presenting P/CVE programs in a manner that is more acceptable by the government.⁹¹

84 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

85 Sumpena.

86 Dedi Slamet Riyadi, Interview with Head of Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance, Ministry of Religious Affairs, April 2023.

87 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

88 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

89 Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia.

90 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections.

91 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

Communication and Trust Building

Challenges related to communication and trust-building often intersect, as deficiencies in one realm can substantially impede progress in the other. For instance, unclear communication from government agencies can hinder the development of trust with CSOs. Some CSOs have questioned whether certain governmental efforts on issues of P/CVE are genuine due to a lack of transparency. For instance, the introduction of sudden and unplanned programs – without consulting or involving CSOs has negatively affected communication and trust-building.⁹²

The issue of insufficient communication between government and CSOs has also impacted government agencies. For example, the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) has pointed out inefficiencies and unmet objectives CSOs when CSOs disseminated counter-narrative books to prison officers, without prior communication to the DGC, leading to reservations on the part of the DGC and thereby hampering trust-building efforts.⁹³ In the broader context, government agencies have established procedures that must be adhered to before integrating collaborative products into their policies and operations. Miscommunication around these procedures can result in misunderstandings CSOs and delays, which could be wrongly interpreted on both sides as unwillingness to jointly implement collaborative outcomes.⁹⁴

Although strides have been made since the launch of the RAN-PE, establishing trust remains a complex endeavor. As a BNPT officer stated, “Overcoming barriers to trust is essential for successful collaboration, both within governmental departments and with CSOs.”⁹⁵ After the launch of the RAN-PE, things gradually improved as contributions from CSOs gained more credit and recognition, although some concerns remained. An example of a remaining concern is that of inclusivity—or the lack thereof—which also has implications for trust. Some CSOs devoted to establishing RAD-PE as part of the RAN-PE implementation found themselves excluded from government-led initiatives, a situation that generated some friction and disappointment.⁹⁶ The exclusion of CSOs from certain initiatives is challenging because of the multi-dimensional and complex nature of P/CVE, which can really benefit from collaborative solutions.

92 Kusairi, Interview with the Researcher of Ruang Obrol.

93 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections,.

94 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections,, Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

95 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT).

96 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

Lastly, the protracted time and effort needed to build trust and facilitate effective communication present an additional challenge, particularly for programs with stringent timelines. As CSOs are often the initiators of such programs, face particular pressure to expedite the process. This urgency adds a layer of complexity to the already challenging tasks of building trust and improving communication.⁹⁷

Program Sustainability

Sustainability remains a significant and ongoing challenge for both CSOs and government agencies in their collaborative P/CVE.⁹⁸ Several factors contribute to this issue. First, programs often face discontinuation or operate through intermittent, unstructured partnerships that lack a well-defined framework for longer term collaboration.⁹⁹

Second, timeline misalignment and competing priorities introduce challenges to program sustainability from both CSO and governmental viewpoints. From the government's perspective, the inability to continue certain important programs has often resulted from misaligned timelines with CSOs, who may shift their program focus to meet donor priorities. These inconsistencies require adjustments in both program timelines and focus areas, further complicating sustainability efforts.¹⁰⁰

Third, funding constraints pose an additional hurdle to program sustainability. Some CSOs are hesitant to enter into Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) because of the substantial financial commitments required to maintain long-term program activities. This hesitation is often due to the instability of their – usually project-based – funding sources.¹⁰¹

Output Shortcomings

While several collaborations have taken place, often yielding programs that benefit thousands, challenges related to the quality of outputs have been raised. The BNPT shared that they still find it challenging to qualify, rather than simply quantify, the effectiveness of existing programs. The goal of any program, be it joint or standalone, is to be impactful and bring about meaningful change in society.¹⁰² CSOs also echoed the same concern noting that evaluations

97 Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia; Bhakti, Interview with the Researcher from PAKAR; Dja'far, Interview with the Researcher of The Wahid Foundation.

98 Kusairi, Interview with the Researcher of Ruang Obrol; Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP); Bhakti, Interview with the Researcher from PAKAR; Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan, June 1, 2023; Interview with Representative of El-Bukhari Institute; Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia; Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia; Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections; Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation; Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

99 Bhakti, Interview with the Researcher from PAKAR; Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.

100 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections.

101 Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia.

102 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism

of collaborative efforts often rely on output-based checklists, rather than assessing the societal impact of the work. This focus undermines the ultimate goal of P/CVE efforts, which should be transformative societal change.¹⁰³

Another dimension to the output challenge – and also closely related to program sustainability is the extent to which collaborative products are adopted and institutionalized by government and public entities. Several respondents indicated that the outcomes of these collaborations, such as policy instruments or modules, are not adequately institutionalized or implemented.¹⁰⁴ For instance, collaborations may yield policies like the RAD-PE, but these often lack follow-up. In practice, the implementation of RAD-PE is predominantly undertaken by Kesbangpol and CSOs, rather than at the municipal or regency level. One contributing factor to this discrepancy is the insufficient literature or understanding regarding P/CVE, which has not prioritized its implementation at those levels.¹⁰⁵

Resource Limitations

Resource limitations is a cross-cutting issue which has come forward in most of the previous subsections as well. The challenges arising from this primarily stem from funding constraints,¹⁰⁶ although some organizations also report a shortage of manpower.¹⁰⁷ BNPT, the leading sector and coordinator for counter-terrorism initiatives in Indonesia, echoes this sentiment.¹⁰⁸

Multiple factors cause funding constraints. Firstly, CSOs encounter unstable funding sources, largely because they rely on donor contributions,¹⁰⁹ which are often temporary.¹¹⁰ This instability is further compounded by competition among CSOs for access to the same financial resources, thereby limiting their funding options.¹¹¹ As a result, CSOs commonly find themselves without consistent financial support,¹¹² even though they are often expected to be the primary financiers of programs in collaboration with government agencies.¹¹³ Given this situation, many CSOs have expressed concerns or reservations about funding arrangements, expressing a desire for shared financial responsibilities with government agencies for future collaboration.¹¹⁴

Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT).

103 Dja'far, Interview with the Researcher of The Wahid Foundation.

104 Bhakti, Interview with the Researcher from PAKAR; Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

105 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

106 Interview with Program Officer PVE INFID.

107 Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.

108 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

109 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

110 Ismail, Interview with Representative of Ruang Obrol.

111 Ismail.

112 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

113 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

114 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

It is noteworthy that while cost-sharing of programmes between CSOs and government agencies is generally still a challenge, it is not entirely non-existent. Some CSOs have shared experiences of successful co-budgeting endeavors with state institutions. For instance, AMAN and the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak, KPPA) have previously executed such a co-budgeting scheme in a project spanning 11 provinces, with AMAN responsible for administering the budget in five provinces and KPPA taking charge of the remaining six. Each entity was solely responsible for managing the financial resources of the project within the provinces they were assigned.¹¹⁵

Secondly, the rigid bureaucratic system renders government budgets inflexible,¹¹⁶ impeding the potential for resource sharing, mainly on funding, with CSOs. Although the government expresses a willingness to co-finance initiatives, stringent policies often hamper the efficient allocation of funds. As a result, CSOs perceive the government's commitment to financial support as less than optimal, and they often resort to using their own budgets to fund programs. For instance, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has stated that while they can involve CSOs as instructors, they do not have the budget for collaborative programs.¹¹⁷

Lastly, the limited budget allocation extends to local governments at both the city and regency levels, particularly concerning P/CVE programs.¹¹⁸ This situation poses a challenge, as the RAN-PE's "whole society and whole government" approach calls for local government involvement in P/CVE initiatives. In situations where dedicated budgets for these programs are lacking, local governments are mostly dependent on CSOs for support.¹¹⁹ However, there are notable exceptions. West Java Province, for example, has outlined in its Regional Action Plan for Countering Extremism (RAD-PE) that funding for P/CVE initiatives can be sourced from various governmental financial pools. These include the National Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara), with contributions from the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri), the Regional Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah), and budgets allocated by city or regency governments.¹²⁰

115 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

116 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

117 Riyadi, Interview with Head of Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance, Ministry of Religious Affairs.

118 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

119 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

120 Sibuea, Interview Head of Regional Vigilance Division of Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Kesbangpol) Jawa Barat.

Data Transparency and Programmatic Overlaps

Data sharing and transparency between agencies,¹²¹ particularly from the government to CSOs, are critical for effective program coordination in P/CVE. This lack of open communication often culminates in the duplication of efforts and overlapping of programs among CSOs, governmental bodies, and other involved entities.¹²² Furthermore, there is a notable lack of categorized data concerning victims of terrorism or female terrorist perpetrators and detainees.¹²³ Yayasan Penyintas points out that this data deficit is not only an administrative concern but also has implications for victim identification and compensation. Records are frequently erased a decade after terrorist incidents, complicating efforts to track victims of terrorism in Indonesia who are entitled to compensation. This lack of focus on victim data, results in the issue of terrorism victims becoming secondary to that of the violent extremist offenders, leading Yayasan Penyintas to argue that more attention – in the form of deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes – is given to perpetrators than victims.¹²⁴

Inter-agency Coordination

Interviews and focus group discussions reveal a significant shortfall in effective, integrated coordination, specifically concerning collaboration on P/CVE.¹²⁵ Several challenges stemming from this lack of coordination have been identified. First, despite policy frameworks that endorse a whole-society and whole-government approach, CSOs and government agencies frequently find themselves working in isolation, tackling identical issues without mutual engagement.¹²⁶ This is particularly concerning as CSOs often assume the responsibility for initiating collaborative efforts, including fundraising for P/CVE programs, while formal partnerships with state agencies remain noticeably absent.¹²⁷

Second, the absence of integrated planning and coordinated execution results in frequent overlaps in work. Such overlaps occur when both government agencies and CSOs work independently on identical issues, leading to inefficient use of resources and leaving other areas unaddressed.¹²⁸

121 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

122 Riyadi, Interview with Head of Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance, Ministry of Religious Affairs; Kusairi, Interview with the Researcher of Ruang Obrol.

123 Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.

124 Vivi Normasari, Interview with Representative of Yayasan Keluarga Penyintas, May 7, 2023.

125 Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.

126 Kusairi, Interview with the Researcher of Ruang Obrol; Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia.

127 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

128 Kusairi, Interview with the Researcher of Ruang Obrol; Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia; Bhakti, Interview with the Researcher from PAKAR; Dja'far, Interview with the Researcher of The Wahid Foundation; Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

Third, the limited presence of specific P/CVE programs in various ministries and agencies underscores an overarching lack of coordination. While BNPT has made commendable achievements in areas ranging from prevention to deradicalization, it is evident that broader engagement from certain other government entities needs further improvement.¹²⁹ Interviews and focus group discussions indicate that many ministries and agencies have neither integrated the RAN-PE framework nor initiated P/CVE-specific programs. In this context, BNPT is perceived as not having fully realized its potential as the coordinator and central hub for counter-terrorism initiatives.

This issue also manifests when BNPT engages ministerial departments to work on P/CVE programs. In the experience of the Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution (BPKI-PK) under the Directorate General of Islamic Community Guidance (Bimas Islam), Ministry of Religious Affairs, they argue that while BNPT has initiated coordination and evaluation meetings, their aspirations to extend involvement to additional departments within the ministry have yet to be realized. Until now, only the sub-division BPKI-PK of Bimas Islam has been actively engaged, rather than the Ministry of Religious Affairs more broadly. There is a pressing need to extend authority, supervision, and development to Islamic educational institutions, which is an important area for potential collaboration that remains largely untapped.¹³⁰

Fourth, coordination also involves informing and training local governments to prepare for P/CVE programs. A salient example of this coordination deficit pertains to the handling of returnees and deportees. When these individuals are returned to their local governments by the BNPT, the local government often lacks the requisite knowledge and resources to manage them appropriately. Consequently, some deportees continue to express extremist inclinations, as has been observed by Yayasan Empatiku.¹³¹

Finally, the lack of a comprehensive database documenting CSO involvement in the RAN-PE initiatives exacerbates coordination challenges. Local governments often opt for collaboration with familiar CSOs, overlooking the potential for more fruitful partnerships with other organizations.¹³²

129 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

130 Riyadi, Interview with Head of Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance, Ministry of Religious Affairs.

131 Priyanti, Interview with Program Officer of Yayasan Empatiku, August 29, 2023.

132 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

Knowledge and Technical Issues

Differences in knowledge and technical capabilities often become points of contention between governments and CSOs. These disparities can lead to the deprioritization of P/CVE initiatives in government action plans. Furthermore, gaps in knowledge often compel CSOs to provide ongoing training and briefings to government officials. In addition to knowledge gaps, technical issues also pose a challenge to the coordination between the government and CSOs, such as the lack of supportive legislation required for the implementation of RAN PE.

Regarding knowledge-based challenges, some CSOs report difficulties when collaborating with local governments, which often respond slowly. One reason for this sluggishness is the perception among local governments that issues related to radicalism and terrorism fall under the purview of the central government.¹³³ Furthermore, local governments often lack pre-existing expertise in P/CVE, particularly before the 2019 enactment of the RAN-PE. This absence of knowledge necessitates CSOs to assist these local government bodies in program planning, design, evaluation, and monitoring.¹³⁴ There remains an urgent need to harmonize perspectives between CSOs and (local) government entities, both in terms of P/CVE knowledge and expertise and the recognition of the issue's importance.¹³⁵

Another challenge lies in the sensitivities surrounding discussions of terrorism and radicalism, which can be particularly contentious in regions where these topics are linked to the criminalization of religious scholars (ulama).¹³⁶ Community resistance is also a concern. These challenges are not restricted to government entities; educational institutions also show hesitancy in addressing P/CVE due to political nuance of extremism and radicalism which has been perceived as a means to label those who oppose the government.¹³⁷

On the technical front, implementing the RAD-PE at local and provincial levels is a prolonged process, often taking between one and three years. For instance, local regulations in Solo and Central Sulawesi are still under development and have been so since before the COVID-19 pandemic. The slow pace is often attributed to bureaucratic procedures requiring extensive discussions and formalities.¹³⁸ In addition, local governments often lack capacity-building opportunities and sufficient information on RAN-PE, leading to uncertainties. They also commonly struggle with program evaluation and monitoring due to inadequate knowledge on P/CVE.¹³⁹ This shortfall is not limited to governmental bodies; society at large also often lacks awareness about issues related to radicalism.¹⁴⁰

133 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

134 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

135 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

136 Dja'far, Interview with the Researcher of The Wahid Foundation.

137 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

138 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

139 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia; Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

140 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

Other technical issues include 'language barriers' between government and CSOs, as well as with educational institutions, as they have their own way in communicating issues related to P/CVE.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the socialization of the RAN-PE has been incomplete; several CSOs have not been involved in RAN-PE initiatives¹⁴² and are unaware of mechanisms like the Thematic Working Groups (Pokja Tematis) discussed earlier.¹⁴³ In the field of P/CVE, many CSOs require further skill-building.¹⁴⁴

The government's understanding of victims' needs is often inadequate. Current compensation measures are generalized and insufficient.¹⁴⁵ For instance, some victims require ongoing medical care, which the existing compensation schemes do not adequately cover. Additionally, the definition of "victim" should be expanded to include family members of victims who were the primary breadwinners. Currently, these issues are not adequately addressed in existing policies.¹⁴⁶

Lastly, there is a need for strategic policies to facilitate cooperation between CSOs and state agencies. These may include fiscal policies and local regulations supportive of RAN-PE or RAD-PE.¹⁴⁷ The current state of affairs reveals sporadic and unplanned collaborations, highlighting the need for a more structured and long-term approach.¹⁴⁸

Evaluation and Needs Assessment

Several agencies have reported a lack of established evaluation models or mechanisms.¹⁴⁹ This is also true for CSOs, many of which are unfamiliar with the intricacies of such mechanisms. Consequently, training on this has become a prerequisite for agencies.¹⁵⁰ This absence of evaluation frameworks is consistent with prior research, which has suggested a lack of well-conceived mechanisms among Indonesian agencies working on P/CVE programs.¹⁵¹ This represents a significant challenge because effective monitoring and evaluation is essential for assessing a program's success and impact. While some agencies rely on feedback from target audiences to gauge effectiveness, having a formalized evaluation and assessment framework remains a challenging endeavor.¹⁵²

141 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

142 Bhakti, Interview with the Researcher from PAKAR.

143 Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia.

144 Aliyah.

145 Normasari, Interview with Representative of Yayasan Keluarga Penyintas.

146 Normasari.

147 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

148 Riyadi, Interview with Head of Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance, Ministry of Religious Affairs.

149 Kusairi, Interview with the Researcher of Ruang Obrol; Interview with Representative of El-Bukhari Institute; Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

150 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

151 Vergani, "Community-Centered P/CVE Research in Southeast Asia."

152 Ismail, Interview with Representative of Ruang Obrol.

For BNPT, the reporting mechanism for other ministries or agencies involved in P/CVE initiatives has been described as overly administrative and formalistic. For example, BNPT circulates a link directing to an evaluation form that must be filled out quarterly. According to the ministries that report to BNPT, this method is ineffective.¹⁵³ Challenges for the evaluation process also arise from the fact that not all of the 48 participating ministries and state agencies have reported to the BNPT; only 70 to 80 percent have done so.¹⁵⁴

Beyond evaluation mechanisms, there is also a lack of needs assessments designed to identify an agency's needs before initiating training programs. Agencies that offer training to the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) sometimes proceed without conducting such assessments. Also, many training programs are organized without adherence to standardized competencies. According to DGC, standard competencies are crucial as they guide the direction in which prison officers should be trained. The redundancy of content across different training programs leads to inefficient allocation of resources such as funding, time, and human resources.¹⁵⁵

A needs assessment is indispensable for tailoring programs aimed at returnees and deportees. In the field, certain initiatives crafted by BNPT are considered to be misaligned with the unique requirements of these groups. Notably, while numerous BNPT programs concentrate on economic factors, they frequently miss the mark with the intended beneficiaries. This shortfall can primarily be attributed to the absence of financial management training to supplement the entrepreneurial lessons. Furthermore, the spectrum of needs among returnees and deportees encompasses not only economic dimensions but also psychological, social, and other dimensions.¹⁵⁶

Another obstacle in the evaluation process is the need for legal provisions. For instance, to effectively evaluate the implementation of the RAN-PE in regional areas, specific clauses addressing evaluation must be included in the RAD-PE. Without such provisions, monitoring and evaluation will not be required by regulation and hence become problematic.¹⁵⁷

Lack of evaluation also occurred with P/CVE strategic communication initiatives that resulted from government-CSO collaboration. As a result, it was not clear to what extent the strategic communication initiatives contributed to a reduction in extremist propaganda. The lack of such evaluation will make it difficult to determine which strategic communication instrument, tool, or strategy actually works to counter extremist narratives.¹⁵⁸

153 Riyadi, Interview with Head of Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance, Ministry of Religious Affairs.

154 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT).

155 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections.

156 Priyanti, Interview with Program Officer of Yayasan Empatiku, August 29, 2023.

157 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

158 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

Imbalanced Participation

The imbalanced participation is often manifested in the roles assumed by CSOs in collaborative projects, highlighting disparities in workload and resource allocation.¹⁵⁹ Some stakeholders contend that CSOs frequently shoulder a disproportionate burden, ranging from initiating and designing the program to securing funding and executing the monitoring and evaluation procedures.¹⁶⁰

This imbalance is also evident in the partnership formation process. Numerous CSOs claim that they are typically the ones to proactively seek opportunities for collaboration with governmental bodies.¹⁶¹ Moreover, they argue that their negotiating power is often diminished in discussions with government representatives, who may at times forget to acknowledge the rights and responsibilities of CSOs. Consequently, the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) has emerged as a mediator between government bodies and CSOs.¹⁶²

159 Ismail, Interview with Representative of Ruang Obrol.

160 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

161 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

162 Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.



Community Engagement and Empowerment in PCVE

I. Community Engagement and Empowerment in PCVE

In addition to investigating the dynamics and challenges inherent in collaborations between government agencies and CSOs in broader P/CVE programs, this report also examined partnerships with a specific focus on community-oriented policing and Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) initiatives in P/CVE. Within the Indonesian context, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)¹⁶³ has endorsed these programs as integral to broader P/CVE efforts in both the nation and the Southeast Asia region. For example, in 2022, the UNODC collaborated with the Police Community Policing Education and Training Center (Pusdik Binmas) and the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang to launch a community-oriented policing “train-the-trainers” program as part of the European Union (EU)-funded STRIVE Asia project.

Both community-oriented policing and EWER can be understood as forms of community engagement, an aspect scholars argue is crucial in counter-terrorism efforts. This engagement offers an alternative to the predominantly militaristic strategies characterizing early post-9/11 counter-terrorism initiatives. Furthermore, community-oriented policing and EWER enables proactive participation by community members in providing information critical to identifying violent extremism.¹⁶⁴

While the two programs share some similarities, they differ slightly in approach and objectives. Community-oriented policing focuses on collective problem-solving, facilitated by sustained interactions and enduring relationships between local law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.¹⁶⁵ EWER centers on the systematic collection and analysis of open-source information related to violent conflicts, channeled into formal and institutional response mechanisms with the aim of preempting violence.¹⁶⁶ However, both initiatives underscore the critical role of community involvement, empowering local populations to address directly impacting social issues.

Based on interviews and the focus group discussion conducted, various CSOs and government entities such as Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, Wahid Foundation, Ruang Obrol, the BNPT, Special Counter-Terrorism Task Force Detachment (Densus) 88, and Maarif

163 “2022_UNODC Supports South-East Asian Practitioners to Develop Effective Communication Campaigns to Prevent Violent Extremism,” United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed September 9, 2023, [//www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2022_unodc-supports-south-east-asian-practitioners-to-develop-effective-communication-campaigns-to-prevent-violent-extremism.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2022_unodc-supports-south-east-asian-practitioners-to-develop-effective-communication-campaigns-to-prevent-violent-extremism.html).

164 Adrian Cherney and Jason Hartley, “Community Engagement to Tackle Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Challenges, Tensions and Pitfalls,” *Policing and Society* 27, no. 7 (October 3, 2017): 750–63, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2015.1089871>. Tensions and Pitfalls, \\uc0\\u8221{ } \\i{Policing and Society} 27, no. 7 (October 3, 2017

165 Cameron Sumpter, “Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: Evident Potential and Challenging Realities,” Policy Report (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, September 22, 2016), <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/community-policing-to-counter-violent-extremism-evident-potential-and-challenging-realities/>.

166 Db Subedi, “Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” *Peace Review* 29, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 135–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1308185>.

Institute, indicated their engagement in collaborations for community-engagement for P/CVE programs. Participants in the FGD argued that such collaborative endeavors serve as conduits for building trust among government entities and CSOs. For example, the Maarif Institute successfully implemented a community policing initiative in Bima in 2018, fostering trust with local government agencies and law enforcement.¹⁶⁷

Similar to other initiatives, the cornerstone of effective collaboration in community-oriented policing also lies in a mutual understanding of each organization's operational systems and institutional constraints. Capitalizing on existing programs and actors who work in analogous initiatives, especially those led by the government, emerged as a strategy recommended during the FGD. In Indonesia, subsequent to the issuance of Ministry Regulation No. 2 of 2018 concerning Early Warning at the Local Level, early warning community forums have been established at multiple administrative levels. These forums typically collaborate with law enforcement agencies and also engage religious and community leaders. Therefore, rather than launching new community programs, it is more prudent for CSOs to work in tandem with existing structures such as the Early Warning Community Forum (FKDM) to optimize resource utilization and avoid program duplication.

Challenges in forging collaborations for community-based programs are multifaceted and span three primary dimensions: conceptual definition, implementation, and accountability. During the FGD, participants voiced a range of public concerns related to community-oriented policing. Among these were perceptions that community policing bears an unsettling resemblance to intelligence operations and data collection.¹⁶⁸ Such concerns are exacerbated by fears that these programs might facilitate unjust stereotyping of specific social groups or communities.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, questions have been raised regarding the extent to which public interests are effectively incorporated within the community policing framework.¹⁷⁰ These concerns echo findings from other studies, which have similarly reported apprehensions.¹⁷¹

167 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

168 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

169 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

170 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

171 Issues and problems related to community policing in counter-terrorism projects, including its potential for intelligence gathering, as well as issues like distrust and community involvement, have been investigated by other researchers. Partnerships with communities can be challenging to sustain and often involve tension. In the context of Western countries, a significant concern arises regarding trust, especially since community-policing programs may inadvertently cast Muslims as security objects, thereby stigmatizing their community and implying inherent risks. This can lead to suspicion among Muslim community members towards community-based policing programs. See Sharon Pickering, Jude McCulloch, and David Wright-Neville, "Counter-Terrorism Policing: Towards Social Cohesion Community Policing and Terrorism," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 50, no. 1–2 (2008): 91–110. Cherney and Hartley, "Community Engagement to Tackle Terrorism and Violent Extremism."plainCitation:"Cherney and Hartley, "Community Engagement to Tackle Terrorism and Violent Extremism.""noteIndex":172,"citationItems":[{"id":32,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/Is15Z34n/items/KM WMBER3"],"itemData":{"id":32,"type":"article-journal","abstract":"It is recognised that community cooperation is central to mitigating the risks of terrorism. This has seen police and security agencies in western jurisdictions

These issues inevitably cascade into broader matters of accountability, particularly concerning the availability of mechanisms for individuals to lodge complaints in cases of disagreement, discrimination, or stigmatization that occur within the community-policing program.¹⁷² The reporting mechanism for the aforementioned incidents differs from EWER, as the purpose of this complaint mechanism is to afford individuals the opportunity to defend themselves or appeal if they are adversely affected by the community-policing program.

The example of a complaint mechanism within a community policing program is illustrated by the 'Desa Damai' project initiated by the Wahid Foundation. This project offers a complaint mechanism whereby individuals adversely affected by the program can lodge complaints with village heads, staff, involved CSOs, or religious leaders. Upon receipt of a complaint, the designated individuals or organizations undertake to track and investigate it to ascertain whether discrimination or stigmatization has indeed occurred, and subsequently work towards finding a resolution. The ultimate objective is to uphold human rights and pivot the focus of community policing programs towards prevention rather than punitive measures.¹⁷³

On EWER programming, Indonesia's Ministry of Education and Culture (Kemendikbud) has established a reporting system to report suspicious activities or individuals. They operate an online portal specifically for recording incidents such as intolerance and bullying.¹⁷⁴ While similar online platforms exist within other ministries, consolidated under the umbrella initiative 'lapor.go.id,' a primary challenge often manifests in sluggish responses to these reports, predominantly due to administrative obstacles. Contrasting this, the Maarif Institute revealed a more efficient experience in its collaboration with BNPT and Kemendikbud. Within this cooperative framework, data concerning suspected intolerance at tertiary educational institutions is categorized by urgency. Incidents or individuals suspected of involvement in tolerance and deemed as high priority are promptly reported to the BNPT, which typically leads to immediate action and investigation.¹⁷⁵

In the case of FKDM Surakarta, they employ a different reporting mechanism for EWER compared to Kemendikbud, Maarif Institute and BNPT. Here, individuals report concerns to community or religious leaders, who then relay these to the Agency for National Unity and Politics ('Kesbangpol'). Subsequently, an internal review is undertaken to evaluate any disturbances to communal harmony before forwarding the case to the Forum for Religious

engage Muslim communities in an effort to improve intelligence gathering and threats arising from violent extremism. However, community engagement in the context of counter-terrorism is fraught with tension, which makes it a challenging and at times conflict-laden process. This paper explores these tensions highlighting the challenges police and Muslims face when working in partnership. We focus on four key issues: (1

172 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

173 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

174 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

175 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

Harmony (FKUB). The transparency of this process, however, remains a matter of uncertainty, as does the availability of a system for lodging complaints against such reports. Nonetheless, FKDM appears to be a more promising model due to its grassroots involvement of community and religious leaders.¹⁷⁶

Beyond the exploration of community-oriented policing for P/CVE and EWER within that context, it is essential to examine collaborative efforts in the domain of EWER programs more broadly as well. Interviews and the FGD indicate diverse stakeholder involvement in such broader EWER initiatives. Noteworthy among these are governmental bodies like BNPT, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Culture, Komnas Perempuan as State Independent body, alongside CSOs such as SERVE, Empatiku, AMAN, and PPIM. Each entity manifests distinct focal areas within their EWER frameworks; for instance, AMAN targets capacity building among women for the identification of radicalization markers, while the Ministry of Education and Culture employs educational modules that subtly address EWER through the lens of diversity. PPIM, on the other hand, aims to combat disinformation through school-based training and has devised modules that enable community leaders to recognize and report dubious activities. These initiatives frequently involve collaborative efforts with other governmental agencies, CSOs, and even international organizations; for example, BNPT has joined forces with UNDP to bolster pre-existing early warning mechanisms aimed at conflict prevention and violent extremism through the PROTECT project.¹⁷⁷

Although the scope of these collaborations is indeed expansive, their ultimate impact in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency remains indeterminate. Given that comprehensive evaluations are currently underway, formulating definitive assessments presents a considerable challenge. However, it is worth noting that specific programs, such as the collaboration between SERVE and Kesbangpol Jabar, have demonstrated measurable enhancements in operational efficiency—advancements that can be attributed to their wide-reaching audience and the pooling of resources. Consequently, the primary challenge extends beyond merely establishing inter-agency collaborations to optimizing the tangible outcomes that these synergies could potentially yield. The preliminary qualitative data underscore the imperative for meticulous evaluation criteria to rigorously measure the true impact of these EWER collaborations.

176 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

177 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT).




Forward-Looking Strategies for Better Collaboration

J. Forward-Looking Strategies for Better Collaboration


Notwithstanding the obstacles outlined in the preceding section, the interview participants remain optimistic about the future of collaboration between CSOs with government entities in the realm of P/CVE. The interviewees have identified a range of best practices that warrant further examination and implementation when feasible. Further clarification for each point or category has been informed by the FGD outcomes.

Best Practice Sub-Category Responses by CSO Participants



Based on interviews with participants from CSOs, a variety of best practices have been identified that facilitate collaboration with government agencies on P/CVE initiatives. The most frequently cited best practices, mentioned by 13% of participants, were 'Stakeholder/Interagency Engagement' and 'Structural Support from the Government.' These were followed by 'Strategic Partnership Planning,' 'Multi-Stakeholder Coordination,' and 'Capacity Enhancement' and 'Active Participation,' each mentioned by 11% of participants. The least cited practices, garnering only 4% of mentions, were 'Partnership Agreements' and 'Long-Term, Continued Programs.'

Best Practice Sub-Category Responses by State Agencies/Bodies



As for government agencies, the most commonly identified best practice was multi-stakeholder coordination, cited by 16% of respondents. This was followed by stakeholder/interagency engagement, monitoring and evaluation, capacity enhancement and active participation, and structural support from the government, each mentioned by 12%. Notably, the least mentioned best practice, with a citation rate of 0%, was collaboration with CSOs that have existing government ties.

Strategic Partnership Planning

Strategic partnership planning encompasses consultation, needs assessment, and the collaborative efforts between CSOs and government agencies to align programs with existing tasks and functions. The aim is to streamline operations without necessitating the creation of new initiatives. This often involves including CSOs in governmental meetings focused on annual programming and budget allocation.

A crucial element of strategic partnership planning is the compilation of robust data to substantiate the significance of a program, coupled with efforts to find common ground based on the government's existing agenda or annual plan. One interviewee from the Wahid Institute representative noted:

*"Having compelling data to persuade the government that there is a pressing issue is crucial. From there, aligning with a relevant government program becomes essential. Governments often seek collaboration to gain societal legitimation and opportunities for public outreach."*¹⁷⁸

Hence, program design should be rooted in mutual benefit and robust evidence to ensure longevity and impact.¹⁷⁹

In instances where a proposal has been rejected, CSOs may opt to align their initiatives with pre-existing governmental projects. For example, Peace Generation successfully integrated their focus into the Ministry of Education and Culture's "Tiga Dosa Besar Pendidikan - Three Major Sins of Education" initiative when their original educational program was declined. Creativity and adaptability are essential attributes for successful collaboration.¹⁸⁰

Subsequent steps typically involve bilateral meetings between CSOs and governmental representatives to negotiate program terms and offerings. For instance, the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) conducts regular meetings with CSOs to coordinate programs and potentially reallocate resources to avoid redundancies. During such collaborations, DGC remains proactive in articulating its needs, scrutinizing program offerings, and coordinating training content and facilitators.¹⁸¹

178 Dja'far, Interview with the Researcher of The Wahid Foundation.

179 Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia.

180 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

181 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections,.

Early planning and resource sharing are pivotal to fostering a sustainable collaboration; these considerations should be discussed in the initial planning stages. CSOs can propose their programs through the Strategic Plan (Renstra) of the government, an annual or multi-year planning document that outlines objectives and performance indicators. The Renstra also provides a forum for dialogue between the government and CSOs, allowing for discussions around societal needs and community engagement.¹⁸² Understanding the Renstra is a strategic method for CSOs to persuade the government of the importance of P/CVE initiatives.

Lastly, it is essential for CSOs to understand both the operational dynamics and bureaucratic culture of government agencies to navigate challenges and sustain impactful collaborations.¹⁸³ These understandings enable the design of mutually beneficial programs and help overcome bureaucratic limitations, such as misaligned scopes of work (main tasks and functions).¹⁸⁴

Stakeholder/Interagency Engagement

Both CSOs and governmental agencies emphasize the critical importance of establishing and maintaining close, trusting relationships for effective collaboration.¹⁸⁵ For instance, DGC has maintained long-standing partnerships with multiple CSOs, such as a 14-year engagement with the Center for Detention Studies and relationships with YPP dating back to 2008 and AIDA since 2015. Open communication is a fundamental component of these successful relationships.¹⁸⁶

A crucial factor for the success of programs, especially for CSOs, is identifying focal points and key individuals within governmental structures who share similar visions and have the authority to plan and execute programs.¹⁸⁷ These focal points are valuable at both the national and local levels of government.¹⁸⁸ Such involvement could range from extending invitations for events¹⁸⁹ to deferring to government leadership in specific initiatives. When government officials assume these leadership positions, CSOs should be prepared to offer comprehensive planning and evaluative support.¹⁹⁰

182 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

183 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

184 Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.

185 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT); Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections,.

186 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections,.

187 Dja'far, Interview with the Researcher of The Wahid Foundation; Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia; Interview with Program Officer PVE INFID.

188 Interview with Representative of INFID.

189 Interview with the Representative of The Wahid Foundation

190 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

Consistent meeting forums can further solidify these partnerships. For example, the joint secretariat of RAN-PE coordinates quarterly meetings between CSOs and government agencies. Special thematic working groups, known as *Kelompok Pokja Tematis*, also hold meetings where representatives from coordinating bodies like joint secretariat are present. Although not every working group may consistently participate, the regularity of these meetings is a meaningful improvement. Certain local governments who have issued RAD-PE regulations also have been facilitated by the Governor's Regulation to have meeting every four months.¹⁹¹

Partnership Arrangements

Partnership agreements typically take the form of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) or Collaboration Agreements (*Perjanjian Kerjasama/PKS*) to delineate the rights and obligations of both parties, thereby ensuring long-term cooperation. For instance, DGC has established a structured collaboration mechanism whereby they utilize such a PKS when collaborating with CSOs and MoUs when engaging with other ministries and state agencies.¹⁹² CSOs also emphasize the importance of such formal agreements as they contribute to sustaining collaborations and facilitating impact assessment. Without these formal agreements, the scope of the work might remain limited, and it would be difficult to evaluate the program's impact. By establishing collaboration agreement, the partnership may last for a duration of two to three years.¹⁹³

Moreover, these agreements do not solely secure the project's timeline; they also establish Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the collaboration. This includes openness between CSOs and government agencies to accommodate the views and arguments of both sides.¹⁹⁴ It is crucial to clarify the responsibilities of each party and to negotiate compromises regarding differing styles, strategies, and programs.¹⁹⁵ Regular meetings, whether formal or informal, are essential to ensure that the agreement is being adhered to and effectively implemented.¹⁹⁶

191 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

192 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections;; Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia.

193 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

194 Aliyah, Interview with Executive Director of SeRVE Indonesia.

195 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

196 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

Resource Management

Resource management generally pertains to the sharing of assets between two or more collaborative entities.¹⁹⁷ Interviewees expressed positive views regarding such sharing between CSOs and governmental bodies, citing advantages such as cost reduction and increased efficiency. As a result, the financial and logistical burdens are not solely shouldered by one party. In the experience of CSOs, collaboration with government has led to increased participation from local government officials, community leaders, and other CSOs, thereby aiding in the program's execution.¹⁹⁸ Effective resource management serves as a mechanism to address deficiencies in funding, manpower, expertise, and networking.¹⁹⁹

Acknowledgement and Openness

Acknowledgment and openness are crucial factors for CSOs, facilitating a smoother process when seeking governmental collaboration. This is especially significant since the launch of the RAN-PE, where CSOs are now integral to the decision-making process alongside governmental bodies. Both in interviews and the FGD, numerous government agencies have recognized the vital role of CSOs and expressed a willingness to collaborate. BNPT also emphasized the necessity of an inclusive approach in P/CVE programs. This approach should not only encompass various ministries and agencies but should also actively involve CSOs. BNPT articulated the value of CSO involvement, stating:

*"If you're operating as part of a government initiative, partnership with civil society organizations, particularly those with grassroots reach, is essential for effective policy implementation. I believe this is the future of the national action plan for P/CVE."*²⁰⁰

Monitoring and Evaluation

In light of the limited standardization in monitoring and evaluation frameworks across Indonesia, some CSOs have independently developed their own assessment methods. This is a positive development, signaling growing awareness and implementation of program monitoring and evaluation. For instance, YPP has instituted evaluation assessments for their initiatives, with a focus on behavioral change among targeted audiences.²⁰¹ In a similar vein, DGC also employs assessments to gauge behavioral changes in terrorist detainees, a methodology developed in collaboration with the Center for Detention Studies (CDS).²⁰²

197 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

198 Interview with Representative of INFID. INFID's experience collaborating with the Regional Representatives (PW) of Fatayat Nahdlatul Ulama in East Java and West Java, along with various stakeholders, in promoting RAD-PE at the regional level.

199 Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.

200 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT).

201 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

202 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections.

On the governmental front, Kesbangpol Jabar revealed that they too utilize evaluation assessments to gauge the efficacy and impact of their RAD-PE program. These assessments are derived from digital reporting as well as national index metrics.²⁰³ Furthermore, BNPT has implemented an evaluation system for the RAN-PE, managed by a joint secretariat. This body comprises multiple ministries, including the Coordinating Minister for Political Security and Legal Affairs, the Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), in addition to BNPT itself.²⁰⁴

The Ministry of Education and Culture also have an Indeks Kebinekaan (Diversity Index)²⁰⁵ that was conducted between 2021 and 2022. They shared that through this monitoring and evaluation index they could see that there is an increase in the Indeks Kebinekaan rating and have stated it as one of the results of working together with CSOs. The assessment is conducted through surveys. From 2021 to 2022 there was a significant increase of the Indeks Kebinekaan rating reaching almost 89%.²⁰⁶

Capacity Enhancement and Active Participation

Enhancing capacity is essential for bridging disparities between collaborating entities and for equipping staff with the skills necessary to expedite or effectively manage partnerships. For instance, some CSOs provide training or briefings to government officers on P/CVE issues. The National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) also calls for increased active participation from CSOs in P/CVE, as another way to strengthen civil society consolidation.²⁰⁷ The Unity of Nation and Politics of West Java (Kesbangpol Jabar) further contributes by offering technology and digital skills training to its officers.²⁰⁸

Action Plan Implementation

Another best practice involves the adoption of collaborative products and outputs by stakeholders or policymakers, as this can amplify the impact of the program to a wider audience. For example, Noor Huda Ismail mentioned that his deradicalization model has been adopted by the government, signifying that his work can influence intervention strategies

203 Sibuea, Interview Head of Regional Vigilance Division of Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Kesbangpol) Jawa Barat.

204 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT).

205 The diversity index is an index that indicates the level or measure of diversity of educational units related to national knowledge (wawasan kebangsaan), religious tolerance, and accommodative attitudes through religious and cultural equality. Based on Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

206 Focus Group Discussion on Collaborative Government and Civil Society Organization/Non-Government Organizations Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Efforts.

207 Interview with Representative of KOMNAS Perempuan.

208 Sibuea, Interview Head of Regional Vigilance Division of Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Kesbangpol) Jawa Barat.

toward terrorist perpetrators in government programs.²⁰⁹ Similarly, Taufik Andrie shared that 3H theory pioneered by YPP (Heart, Head, and Hand) has been integrated into state-led reintegration and deradicalization programs.²¹⁰ These examples underscore that the adoption of concepts may not always be formalized but can still influence the state's perspectives and intervention models.

The Directorate General of Corrections serves as another example of a state agency that has adopted and implemented products and outputs resulting from collaborative initiatives with CSOs. They stated that their 'instrument for terrorist detainees' ('instrument penanganan dan pembinaan napiter') has been distributed to prisons across Indonesia and has been included in evaluations for granting remission to terrorist detainees since 2022. Moreover, this instrument has also been utilized for general detainees. In addition, DGC has actively disseminated these instruments to regional offices ('regional offices in the areas' or 'kanwil di daerah'). Beyond instruments, DGC has also shared research findings from collaborations with the Center for Detention Studies (CDS) and YPP, with the aim of influencing policy recommendations.²¹¹

Multi-stakeholder coordination

Coordination plays a pivotal role in collaborative efforts, a point underscored by multiple interviewees and discussed above in the "Challenges" section, where it was noted that current collaborations often lack sufficient coordination. Effective coordination prevents overlap in tasks, ensures equitable distribution of responsibilities, and most importantly, facilitates integration with local governments and communities—entities that have become key players in P/CVE programs and initiatives.²¹² According to some interviewees, the best approach to multi-stakeholder coordination is through platforms such as the Partnership Forum (Forum Kemitraan) and the Thematic Working Group (Forum Pokja Tematis). The Partnership Forum serves as a gathering space not just for CSOs, but also for ministries, private sector entities, donors, and charitable organizations. From these two forums, it appears that an increasing number of collaborations are emerging.²¹³ These platforms also empower CSOs by providing them greater access to decision-making processes, particularly in relation to P/CVE programs.²¹⁴ Kesbangpol Jabar has also adopted the pentahelix model to incorporate diverse sectors—including government entities, CSOs, the private sector, and educational institutions—into their P/CVE initiatives.²¹⁵

209 Ismail, Interview with Representative of Ruang Obrol.

210 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

211 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections.

212 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

213 Andrie.

214 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

215 Sibuea, Interview Head of Regional Vigilance Division of Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Kesbangpol) Jawa Barat.

Structural Support from the government

Structural support is an instrumental best practice in fostering synergy between CSOs and the government. This support becomes a valuable asset in addressing governmental constraints, such as sharing resources like funding or manpower. Such measures are crucial, given that governmental functions often operate within strict nomenclatures.²¹⁶ The RAN-PE, introduced in 2019, underscores this, advocating for a holistic approach involving both government and society to address P/CVE issues. More pertinently, RAN-PE grants CSOs a formalized and official status when working alongside the government,²¹⁷ positioning them not merely as executors but also as vital participants in the decision-making process.²¹⁸

Moreover, structural support facilitates smoother cooperation with local governments. For instance, in 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) dispatched an official directive encouraging local governments to establish P/CVE programs, with semi-annual reporting stipulated to the Ministry. While not binding, this directive raises awareness among local governments about their roles in P/CVE endeavors.²¹⁹ In West Java, the Governor's Regulation, in conjunction with the directive from Kemendagri, mandates city and regency governments to implement RAD-PE action plans. This has resulted in several cities and regencies issuing such plans. Additionally, West Java's regulatory framework identifies potential financial sources, allowing local governments to source budgets from the state budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/APBN), regional budget (p/APBD, and other funds compliant with current regulations. Given the substantial number of cities and regencies in West Java (with 22 yet to finalize their RAD-PE as of May 2023), the regulation provides flexibility in RAD-PE's implementation, refraining from setting a rigid deadline and allowing extensions beyond 2024.²²⁰

Understanding the pivotal role of structural support, representatives from CSOs emphasized during FGD the importance of incorporating collaborative programs into official laws or regulations. Notably, AMAN's contributions to gender mainstreaming have found recognition in the Provincial Regulation (Peraturan Gubernur).²²¹ However, the mere existence of a regulation is insufficient for effective implementation. To operationalize the rules, it is imperative to have specific implementation tools in place, namely Implementation Guidelines (Petunjuk Pelaksanaan / Juklak) and Technical Guidelines (Petunjuk Teknis/ Juknis).²²²

216 Interview with the Representative of The Wahid Foundation

217 Chrisnayudhanto, Interview with Deputy for International Cooperation of the National. Counter Terrorism Agency of National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT).

218 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

219 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

220 Sibuea, Interview Head of Regional Vigilance Division of Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Kesbangpol) Jawa Barat.

221 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

222 Interview with the Representative of The Wahid Foundation

Long-term and continued program

Maintaining a long-term and continuous program is a best practice that CSOs strive to implement, despite challenges related to finances, manpower, and regulations. Numerous CSOs, including individuals like Noor Huda Ismail, Taufik Andrie, and Dete Aliyah, have devoted more than a decade to addressing this issue. Consistency²²³ and sustained intervention are both crucial.²²⁴ Entities such as DGC, CDS, and YPP have demonstrated that enduring collaboration is achievable, even if the specifics of the program evolve over time.²²⁵

Collaborating with CSOs with existing government ties

Collaborating with CSOs that have existing ties to the government can expedite the process for other CSOs to identify key personnel within governmental structures, making it easier to advance their programs. For instance, AMAN partnered with INFID, a CSO that had previously forged connections and collaborations with both the West Java provincial and local governments in the development of the RAD-PE plans.²²⁶ Teaming up with such CSOs with existing government ties can assist other CSOs in expanding their networks within the government. In a similar vein, Peace Gen benefitted from working with Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ2) with existing government ties on the 'knowledge hub' project. Given AIPJ2's extensive history of collaboration with the government, it could effectively link Peace Gen with the appropriate government officers.²²⁷

223 Andrie, Interview with Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).

224 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.

225 Interview with Officer of Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development, Directorate General of Corrections.

226 Kholifah, Interview with Country Representative of AMAN Indonesia.

227 Sumpena, Interview with Learning and Community Manager of Peace Generation.



Discussion

K. Discussion

The findings from desk reviews and field research, including interviews and the FGD, affirm several enduring challenges in establishing effective collaboration between government entities and CSOs. These challenges include institutional constraints, limited funding, sustainability issues, as well as obstacles in inter-agency coordination and governmental support. The primary research reveals that governmental support can manifest in various forms, some of which continue to pose challenges. From structural aspects such as regulations to more positive experiences like governmental acknowledgment and openness, collaboration exhibits multiple facets. For some agencies, these represent opportunities, whereas for others, they present challenges. This underscores the necessity to understand the nature of these challenges and to find ways to convert them into beneficial collaborative experiences.

Similarly, some elements often viewed as challenges can simultaneously serve as enablers for better collaboration. Specifically, inter-agency coordination has been a challenging endeavour, but when successful it also turned out to be a best practice. While there is still a lack of smooth coordination among and within CSOs and government agencies in relation to P/CVE, effective inter-agency coordination has resulted in the prevention of program overlap and the promotion of inclusive participation across national, provincial, and local levels. This suggests that challenges often contain the seeds of their own solutions.

Additional insights from interviews and the FGD highlight an often-overlooked aspect: the disproportionate focus on perpetrators – the violent extremist offenders – in most P/CVE programs at the expense of the victims of terrorism. Beyond the mechanics of collaboration, this study identifies other critical considerations for the successful implementation of P/CVE programs. These include ethical issues related to human rights, the potential for stigmatization, and privacy concerns. As future efforts aim to optimize collaborative frameworks, they must also focus on generating meaningful impacts. Any successful collaboration should respect human rights and privacy, particularly within community engagement programs, which should not be utilized as tools for gathering intelligence and data.

L. Recommendations

While numerous recommendations for enhancing collaboration have been posited in existing reports and scholarly publications, this report aims to underscore select best practices that could ameliorate the challenges confronted by both CSOs and government bodies in collaborative efforts on P/CVE. Acknowledging that institutional barriers remain a primary obstacle for both entities, it becomes crucial for these organizations to acquire an intimate understanding of each other's operational modalities. Although this recommendation may not serve as a panacea for the existing challenges, it could broaden the perspectives of both parties, illuminating the disparate working systems and constraints inherent to each. Armed with this nuanced understanding, stakeholders can then employ strategic approaches to collaboration, such as crafting strategic plans, aligning with pre-existing governmental agendas, or identifying key personnel within governmental structures, as elaborated in the Best Practice section. While comprehending each other's working styles may appear straightforward, it often emerges as a significant barrier to successful collaboration.

In addition, the necessity for structural support cannot be overstated. Given the bureaucratic nature of governmental operations, CSOs often face hurdles in procuring financial and human resources from state agencies, particularly in the absence of a designated nomenclature for such collaborations. As the RAN PE initiative nears its conclusion, questions loom regarding the continuity of collaborative frameworks post-implementation. It should be noted that advocating for structural support is a complex and time-intensive endeavor.

Lastly, Indonesia has been cited as a paradigmatic case for effective collaboration between CSOs and government agencies. The next evolutionary step entails transitioning from mere partnership formation to optimizing the impact of these collaborative initiatives. This could be achieved through the institution of rigorous and systematic evaluation protocols, data sharing mechanisms, and knowledge transfer between the involved organizations.

M. Conclusion

P/CVE initiatives are essential given the complex and multi-faceted nature of violent extremism pathways. However, these programs are not without challenges, ranging from conceptual ambiguities to potential delegitimization. A robust collaboration between government agencies and CSOs is imperative for effective outcomes. CSOs offer invaluable grassroots knowledge, thereby complementing the facilitating role of the government in resource allocation and legitimacy. Indonesia stands as a testament to the potential effectiveness of such collaborations in Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, collaboration is not without its hurdles, such as institutional constraints, which are difficult but not impossible to navigate. Effective collaboration requires strategic planning, resource sharing, and perhaps most critically, the willingness to adapt and innovate. This is especially vital in ensuring the sustainability and impact of P/CVE initiatives. As the RAN-PE phase two is currently in progress and awaiting approval for the Presidential Regulation for the period 2025-2029, best practices for sustaining collaboration are expected to continue. Additionally, as the RAN-PE phase two focuses on human security, it highlights that collaboration addresses not only institutional and mechanism constraints but also ethics, including human rights, as briefly discussed previously.

In summary, both government agencies and CSOs hold unique advantages that, when synergistically combined, can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of P/CVE programs. As we ponder the future, particularly in the context of RAN-PE phase two, the focus should not only be on sustaining collaborations but also on fine-tuning them to better address emerging challenges and ethical considerations, including human security.

Appendices

List of Participants (anonymized)

1. Interviews

- a. Government Representatives
 1. National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT)
 2. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance
 3. Directorate General of Corrections, Sub-Directorate for Detainees Personality Development
 4. Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Kesbangpol) Jawa Barat
 5. National Commission on Violence Against Women (KOMNAS Perempuan)²²⁸
- b. CSO Representatives
 1. AMAN Indonesia
 2. Peace Generation
 3. SeRVE Indonesia
 4. Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian
 5. Ruang Obrol
 6. PAKAR
 7. Yayasan Empatiku
 8. Yayasan Keluarga Penyintas
 9. The Wahid Foundation
 10. El-Bukhari Institute
 11. INFID

2. Focus Group Discussion

- a. Government Representatives
 1. National Counter-Terrorism Agencies (BNPT)
 2. Directorate General of Corrections
 3. Detachment 88, Prevention Directorate
 4. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Resolution in Islamic Community Guidance
 5. Center for Character Strengthening, Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology
 6. KOMNAS Perempuan, Working Group on Women and Diversity
- b. CSO Representatives
 1. AMAN Indonesia
 2. The Wahid Foundation
 3. Yayasan Keluarga Penyintas
 4. El-Bukhari Institute
 5. MAARIF Institute
 6. INFID
 7. PPIM UIN Jakarta
 8. SeRVE Indonesia
 9. Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian

²²⁸ This research recognizes that KOMNAS Perempuan is a not state agency but rather an independent state institution. However, for the purposes of data categorization in this study, responses from Komnas Perempuan have been included under the 'state category,' owing to the limited options available—namely, 'state' and 'CSOs/NGOs.'

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