Dear Readers,

We hope that you find IMPETUS 21 useful in increasing your situational awareness of what the EU Military Staff are doing, including EU Operations and Missions. If you have any comments on any of the articles, or indeed any suggestions in how IMPETUS could be improved, we would be very happy to receive both at the below email address.

Thanks,
the Editor.

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- **Legend**
  - Ongoing
  - Completed

**6 on-going military missions**

**11 on-going civilian missions**

More than 6,000 people currently deployed.

**15 completed missions since 2003.**

80,000 people deployed since 2003: soldiers, policemen and rule of law experts.

Objectives: keeping the peace, preventing conflicts strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law and prevention of piracy.
This fifteenth anniversary of the European Union’s Military Staff comes at a moment of impressive challenges and important achievements. During the first eighteen months of my mandate I have had the opportunity to follow closely the Military Staff’s work, to appreciate their professionalism and to rely on their expertise. The preparation and launch of Operation Sophia makes for a great example.

After the tragedy on 16 April 2015 in the Strait of Sicily, when over 800 people drowned in a single shipwreck, we could wait no more. Our response to the migration crisis had already been too slow. One month later, the Foreign Affairs Council took the political decision to launch a naval operation to disrupt the human smugglers’ business model and to save lives. Try and look back at the comments appearing on the media during those days: everyone was so convinced that our response would take several more months to be agreed upon and set up. But in one month we managed not just to build political consensus on the operation: we identified capabilities and moved quickly to the force generation process. On 22 June the Council was able to formally launch Eunavfor Med – or Operation Sophia, as we now call it. Two months after the process had started, the first ships operating under the EU naval force flag were sailing the Mediterranean. It is a strikingly short time if we compare it to previous European deployments, but also in comparison with other international military missions. And this would not have been possible without our Military Staff and its planning capabilities.

Your involvement with Operation Sophia was not over with the preparations, and it is still crucial. The operation’s first phase was devoted to intelligence gathering, in which you also played an important role. It was then time for the Force Generation Conference aimed at defining the Member States’ contribution to the following phase...
of the operation. The readers of “Impetus” know how much work was necessary to make this happen, and I shall thank once again the Military Staff for their precious efforts. Operation Sophia currently relies on assets from twenty-four countries from all corners of our Union: this is our Union at its best – truly united in building peace and solidarity. So far our ships have seized over a hundred boats, have arrested tens of traffickers and saved over 13,000 human lives.

Of course, Operation Sophia is not alone in addressing the issue of migrants and refugees – and it could not suffice alone. On the contrary, it shows in very concrete terms how the European Union’s “comprehensive approach” works. Some of our civilian missions are also focusing on migration. EUCAP Sahel Niger has been strengthened, and I personally visited the mission in September last year. Should the Libyan national unity government ask for further engagement in supporting and training their security forces, we stand ready to re-inforce EUBAM Libya and to work together on a new civilian mission, to provide advice and build capacities in the fields of counter-terrorism, border management and the fight against human traffickers. Operation Sophia could also contribute to improving the broader security situation, by supporting the legitimate Libyan authorities. Stabilising Libya and its borders is crucial for the region and for Europe. The military instrument – coordinated by the Military Staff – is indispensable to our foreign policy, as part of a broader strategy based on international diplomacy and humanitarian aid, development cooperation and trade, national assets and common European responses.

Of course, the work of the Military Staff goes well beyond Sophia. For instance, focusing on our most recent decisions, the Staff’s capabilities are important in the transition from the military advisory mission to the Central African Republic (EUMAM CAR), whose mandate is about to expire, to our new military training mission (EUTM CAR). General Wolfgang Wosolobe visited Bangui last December on a fact finding mission, and recommendations from the Military Staff have helped us understand how to develop our CSDP presence in the country.

The Staff’s activities include early warning (via the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity), situation assessment, strategic planning, the work on Communications and Information Systems, concept development, training and education, and the support to joint actions with our partners. In concert with the EU Military Committee and EEAS partners, the Military Staff helps foster the conditions for the military to conduct their operations and missions, together with their civilian partners in the field. If security reasons deny others the ability to operate, the military will stand and act as necessary, accepting the related risks. This gives the Military Staff a special responsibility.

Over the past 15 years, the Military Staff has developed from a small interim Planning Cell into a more mature structure, which has gained great respect inside the institutions and outside Brussels. The EU Military Staff is now an integral part of our External Action Service, where it has become a key and valued player. Together with our other crisis management instruments, it has become crucial not only in crisis prevention, management and response, but also in our Union’s relations with our international partners.

Wherever I travel in the world, from Latin America to South-East Asia, I see a growing demand for our European Union to take up its role as a global security provider. This is what our partners ask from us, but this is also our clear interest as Europeans: we all know that instability in our region and beyond has a direct impact on the daily lives of European citizens.

As I congratulate the whole Military Staff on this anniversary – the Director General, General Wosolobe, with all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilian staff – let me also remind all of us that the road ahead is still very long. Fifteen years after its foundation, the Military Staff is coming of age. Together we can lay the path towards a stronger Union, a global force for democracy, prosperity and peace.
3 years as Director General EU Military Staff: some thoughts to share

BY LT GEN WOLFGANG WOSOLSOBE

2016 is a special year for the European Union Military Staff. 15 years ago, the interim structures of what was then called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) handed over to the definitive structures. A large part of this issue is dedicated to this 15th anniversary and I am particularly glad and grateful that all former Directors General were willing to provide contributions. As my own three years tenure as Director General will come to an end this spring I can add, with all due modesty and on a strictly personal basis, the following are a few thoughts drawn from my three years’ experience in office.

Some words about achievements

An increasingly dynamic operational and security environment: Since 2013, we have seen critical developments in Mali, in the Central African Republic, in Ukraine and in Libya, all with strong impact on the EU’s crisis management, in all its aspects. Crises in the Middle East, in Yemen, south Sudan and in the Lake Chad region (Boko Haram) less directly touched EU crisis management mechanisms but required steady and growing attention. The move of EUTM Somalia from Uganda to Mogadishu put this mission into a new, more challenging security environment. In the EU-context, developments as the rise in migration and the ever more direct threat by terrorism are not dealt with by military means. Nevertheless, the potential of the military to contribute to a broad spectrum of threats, risks and challenges needs to be regularly evaluated. Against this backdrop, within a few years, the intensity of work and the responsibility of the EUMS have increased considerably.

EEAS gathers speed: The years 2013-2016 were also particularly rewarding as the recently created EEAS had to hit the ground running in the circumstances described above. This young and very modern institution managed to do so very well and showed the necessary degree of flexibility to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. This includes an improved understanding of the opportunities offered by the military dimension and I can clearly confirm that military considerations are taken into account at ever earlier stages of planning, and more broadly across the board.

Progressive development of an EU-genuine comprehensive approach: These past years showed very well that a real comprehensive approach has to be much broader than just civ-mil cooperation. The latter remains an important building block of a much larger cooperation between EEAS and the areas of the European Commission dealing with external relations. The years since autumn 2014 have seen a reinforced and fruitful effort, on the level of the HRVP, to harmonise lines of action across institutional boundaries.

Steady high level reminders of the importance to build a strong European Defence: The European Councils on Security and Defence of 2013 and 2015 sent strong messages to Member States in order to improve their willingness to invest more in Defence, to cooperate in building new capabilities and to use the full potential of the EU to deal with the numerous security challenges we have to face. It was made clear that this potential includes the military and that only close cooperation between EU and NATO can unleash the full potential of European Defence and security capabilities. The process of strategic messaging on the highest political level will continue with the presentation of a European Global Strategy at the European Council in June of this year. This strategy is the condensation of the European Union’s experience of the past years, blended with the analysis of how this experience will translate into the future.

Some thoughts for the future

It can be expected that the European Global Strategy, hopefully accompanied by clear messages of all Heads of States and Governments will become the starting point for a powerful process aiming at a real shift in Europe-
an defence capabilities, in all respects. It will have to trigger a swift process to indicate how the EU intends to use its military instrument in the future. There are very clear indications that the EU will have to shoulder more responsibility for its own security. The Global Strategy and the documents derived from it will have to describe how the EU intends to do this. This is important for Member States’ planning and for their decision to choose the EU as a political framework for military action. For the future, it can be expected that this framework will be larger than CSDP, given the increasingly blurred separation lines between internal and external security. Our future thinking should not exclude defence aspects, in complementarity with NATO.

For these reasons, the EU has an interest in reinforced military capabilities of Member States, even if these were to decide to use non-EU political frameworks for deployment and action. What counts is the common security interest. This can also be effectively addressed in a NATO, UN or multilateral groupings.

The Global Strategy, its follow-on documents and the European Defence Action Plan should provide the framework for more cooperation and cooperative action in security and defence. A sound level of cohesion and complementarity with NATO should be sought.

The conclusions to be drawn from the Strategy should not only relate to capability development in terms of armament and equipment, but also for command structures, rapid reaction and situational awareness. The higher risk and frequency of serious security incidents and hostile action require a more solid command structure. This especially applies to the non-executive military missions.

It will not be enough to prepare a better hardware, but we also have to improve our software. We can expect higher risk, higher tempo and higher complexity, as well as reduced predictability. This requires a quantum-leap in situational awareness and the EU’s ability for strategic analysis. We need more Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance(ISR) of all levels and we need to better connect these tools.

This all should lead to improved and focused rapid response. Rapid response, again, is not about hardware in the first place, but the spirit of rapid response has to be integrated in the security policy software of 28 Member States.

The comprehensive approach has progressed, but remains to be further reinforced, particularly between EEAS and the European Commission. In addition, coordination between EU operational presence with non-EU actors is key, not only in terms of operational de-confliction and mutual support, but also in defining common objectives. The link between a steady situational awareness, early warning, Security Sector Reform and crisis management has to become more systematic and has to draw in all phases on all resources of the EU.

In this complex environment, the EUMS has to remain the unique provider of coordinated and consistent military advice, drawing on all sectors and layers of military experience and knowledge. All military views expressed across EU-institutions and on behalf of EU-institutions have to be consistent. Maintaining a unique military voice will remain a strong responsibility with regard to MS providing SNE’s for the EUMS and military contributions to military operations and missions.

The ability of the EUMS, within its current structures and responsibilities, to deal with the increasing intensity of the security environment in general and with that of operations and missions in particular, requires an adaptation of structures and attribution of responsibilities and resources.

Thanks

In concluding, I would like to address my thanks to all those, whose relentless effort and loyal cooperation were essential for the success of the EUMS in these past years, and, more broadly, for the success of the military side of CSDP. First of all, my thanks go to the personnel of the EUMS, military and civilian to those currently present in the staff and also to those who have left it during the past three years. Their knowledge, experience and dedication made it possible for me and my Deputy to steadily continue providing inputs to EUMC and EEAS which, I believe, were constantly appreciated. My thanks go to all the operations and mission commanders and their personnel and all they have performed. It was extremely rewarding to cooperate with these highly qualified officers and to benefit from their wide-ranging experience.

The EUMS could not have reached its high level of achievement without the support and the permanent cooperation of all colleagues in the External Action Service, particularly those dealing more closely with security policy and crisis management. Here I would very clearly include the numerous EU Delegations we had the pleasure to work with.

I wish you all good luck for your personal lives and for the common effort to build a stronger European Union. From my side, I can promise that I will remain dedicated to this effort, whatever the future may bring.
**EUNAVFOR ATALANTA**

**Operation Atalanta** Investing in the Integrated Approach

**BY MR PAUL MITCHAM, OPERATION ATALANTA POLITICAL ADVISOR**

Following a comprehensive review of the CSDP missions and operation in the Horn of Africa last Autumn, in February 2016 the Council confirmed its intention to extend the mandates of EU NAVFOR, EUTM-S and EUCAP Nestor until December 2018, with a view to further enhancing the EU’s Comprehensive Approach, in particular the security-development nexus. Whilst Operation Atalanta’s main focus continues to be counter-piracy operations and the protection of UN World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to the Somali people, EU NAVFOR has successfully exploited the opportunity to further strengthen the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to the Horn of Africa.

The operation's current mandate enables EU NAVFOR units to support, as a secondary task, upon request and within means and capabilities, other EU missions and instruments in Somalia and other actors in order to contribute to creating the conditions for an enduring solution to the Somali piracy crisis. This particular choice of wording has been important, because it means EU personnel have been able to work directly with international organisations like the UN, which have many years of expertise in the region.

**Support to International Organisations**

In support of a UN programme to promote alternative livelihoods for the Somali coastal population, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO) requested support from EU NAVFOR for an operation at sea in November 2015, that would see the laying of 25 fish aggregation devices (FADs) along the Somali coast. In light of this request, Operation Atalanta warships ITS Carabiniere and HNLMS Groningen provided close escort protection to the vulnerable UN FAO vessel MV Comarco Kestrel, as it deposited the FADs along the Somali coast.

The FADs' unique design create artificial reefs that in turn will help to develop local fishing grounds and thus boost the littoral economy, thereby providing financially realistic alternatives to piracy for local youths. Reports from Mogadishu already indicate a five-fold increase in catches since the FADs were laid; and anecdotal evidence from Bosasso has been similar. EU funding from DG DEVCO will ensure that follow-on FAO projects sustain this initiative, through the provision of solar fridges, fish drying, fish processing training and hopefully, later on, improved infrastructure.

**Support to the EU’s Comprehensive Approach**

Sometimes the web of funding means it is difficult to separate what constitutes a peculiarly EU project, from a Member State project, from a UN project, when donors use different mechanisms to achieve similar ends. This is particularly important to remember in security terms.

Of course, EU NAVFOR already works alongside the EU Delegation to Somalia and EU Training Mission – Somalia in terms of information and intelligence-sharing. But we also maintain relationships with security partners and law enforcement agencies such as Interpol, Europol, the UN Department for Safety and Security, UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, International Maritime Organisation, and national crime and intelligence agencies, to name but a few. This co-operation has recently seen the pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan 'Afweyne' successfully prosecuted by the Belgian authorities, and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

When appropriate, information and intelligence is shared with other relevant stakeholders, such as the Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea (REFLECS3), African national bodies like the Seychellois Piracy Intelligence Cell (SEYPIC), or the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). In the wake of the Yemen crisis, EU NAVFOR has also seen increasing demands for assistance from agencies like the UN High Commission for Refugees. Whilst migration is not strictly part of EU NAVFOR’s mandate, it is clear that there is an added value to be had in having Member State warships in the vicinity, where further information can be used at no added cost. In a recent exchange of letters between the UN High Commissioner and HR/VP Mogherini, the importance of the EU NAVFOR’s Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) was upheld in this regard, in order to facilitate the exchange of more timely information.

As part of Operation Atalanta’s support to other CSDP missions in Somalia, EU NAVFOR has supported EUCAP Nestor on various occasions. In one such example, in March this year, the German warship, FGS Erfurt worked...
alongside EUCAP Nestor colleagues to provide maritime training to Somaliland Coast Guard cadets. The training, which covered maritime radio communications and navigation procedures, will be invaluable to the cadets when they join the newly opened maritime operations centre in the harbour town of Berbera. Their role will be to supervise shipping routes and pass on safety information to vessels transiting through the area.

Speaking about specialist training provided by Operation Atalanta, FGS Erfurt’s deck officer stated “It was a pleasure to work with the Somaliland cadets and to pass on my naval experience to local people as they seek to develop their own coast guard.”

EU NAVFOR vessels regularly use the opportunities provided by port visits to support the training objectives and needs of our partners in order to enhance local maritime capabilities. In recent months, units have provided local maritime capacity building training to the Royal Omani Navy, to the Seychelles Coast Guard, Air Force and Maritime Police Unit, the Djiboutian Navy and Coast Guard, the Malagasy Navy, Tanzanian Navy, Somaliland Coast Guard and the Galmudug Coast Guard. These interventions have ranged from teaching basic maritime skills such as fire-fighting and navigation, up to multi-layered search and rescue exercises, all of which, of course, are essential knowledge in operating an effective counter-piracy force at the national or local level.

Naval Diplomacy

It has always been the case historically that navies conduct a diplomatic role overseas, and in that sense, EU NAVFOR is no different. While regional defence diplomacy is conducted by means of the various conferences and fora in which we are represented, a key role for Operation Atalanta’s commanding officers at sea has been to develop a close liaison with maritime partners, such as Japan, to co-ordinate counter-piracy efforts in the region. Regular meetings and exercises at sea not only ensure that counter-piracy activities are co-ordinated effectively, they also help to develop a greater understanding between EU Member States and international partners. Repeat EU NAVFOR participation in the US AFRICOM sponsored Ex CUTLASS EXPRESS in February ensured the EU had a stake in testing improved regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness (MDA) and information-sharing practices off the African coast. This increasingly important exercise, which leverages the IMO-sponsored Djibouti Code of Conduct (to which 20 nations are signatory) as a framework for exercising information sharing practices and enforcing international law of the sea, saw more than 10 African forces participate, as they look to develop their maritime security capabilities.

In March, Operation Atalanta warships, ESPS Tornado and FGS Erfurt, undertook training in the Indian Ocean with two Chinese Navy vessels, the tanker CNS Taihu and frigate CNS Daqing. This included air operations with the ships’ embarked helicopters, followed by replenishment at sea. Before the exercise commenced, EU and Chinese navy liaison officers cross-decked to each other’s vessels and this helped to ensure that the day’s events ran smoothly. The whole event was deemed to be a success and helped to further develop the cooperation and interoperability between Atalanta’s ships and other nations’ naval forces operating in the region.

EU NAVFOR also remains at the forefront of co-operating with international counter-piracy actors through strategic engagement. Combining a wish to demonstrate their credibility and interoperability with EU forces, with hundreds of years of commlany in the fight against maritime crime, partner states from across the world have demonstrated their desire to support the dedicated EU counter-piracy effort by means of working alongside EU NAVFOR. The Operational Headquarters in Northwood, UK, has welcomed delegations to discuss that matter (from Pakistan, Chile, Colombia, Republic of Korea, etc); and fruitful collaboration at sea was witnessed most recently when the Colombian ship 7 de Agosto joined the EU-NATO counter-piracy effort last August.

Looking to the Future

Although the detail of EU NAVFOR’s next 2-year mandate is being finalised, Op Atalanta will continue to liaise with regional actors and her other partners. The Operation has already transformed from a ‘supported’ to a ‘supporting’ framework. In the future, personnel will continue to work in support not only of CSDP objectives, but also, importantly, to enable longer-term development programmes led by the European Commission. This makes sense, supporting Indian Ocean rim actors to build a regional maritime security architecture of their own, for a strategically important waterway which already carries an eighth of world sea-borne trade. Imparting EU NAVFOR’s experience and expertise to regional partners will be invaluable in this sense, right across the spectrum from maritime interdiction to legal finish.

That same capacity-building in support of security and development will ultimately result in an increased regional ownership of the piracy issue, which is just one of a number of maritime security issues increasingly high up the African Union’s agenda. Indeed, it is envisaged that a unique AU maritime security charter will be signed in Togo in October to that very end. Building the capacity of regional forces as soon as possible to deal with the scourge of piracy will also enable European naval ships to be redeployed to areas of higher security priority in the future. This is why capacity-building is so important; and why EU NAVFOR is the successful embodiment of the EU’s integrated approach.
The European Union’s politico-military structure started to take on flesh in late 1999. Javier Solana arrived as the first Secretary-General/High Representative, with Pierre de Boissieu as his Deputy, and the Policy Unit (PU) started to form up. In early 2000, an interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC) and interim Military Body (iMB) held their first meetings and the author was selected, as the first serving military officer in the Council General Secretariat, to head a team to design and deliver a new military Directorate-General, the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The design was completed, ‘sold’ to all the stakeholders and approved by the end of that year.

By spring 2001, the EUMS was forming up and moving from the Justus Lipsius to the purpose-adapted Kortenberg building some 700 metres away. It did so not alone but along with all its key colleagues in the EU’s politico-military structure, such as the bulk of the Directorate-General for External Affairs, the PU and the Joint Situation Centre. By the end of 2001, the Political and Security and Military Committees (PSC and EUMC) had taken their place as official Council bodies and a 130-strong EUMS had attained ‘full staff capability’.

A few personal snapshots of the first two weeks of what was to become the interim Military Staff. After Javier Solana’s telephone call to me in England, on Thursday 8 March 2000, confirming my appointment to head the interim Military Staff (iMS) and asking me to start work as soon as possible, I quickly sorted out some temporary cover in my existing job, made the necessary family arrangements, then flew to Brussels to start things moving on Monday 13 March. I walked into the Justus Lipsius in civilian clothes on Day One, not wanting to cause too much consternation, but Solana quickly made it clear that he positively wanted ESDP’s first steps to be militarily visible. I was made most welcome, not just by Solana and his Cabinet team, but also by Pierre de Boissieu and his senior leadership team, without whom nothing touching on people, budget, office-space, equipment or communications could have been achieved.

Having settled in to my temporary office, in the Fisheries corridor, the face-to-face briefing I presented for Solana’s approval that first week was my outline work plan covering suggested main responsibilities, initial operating concept and draft timelines. The second such briefing, on Tuesday 21 March, was for the selection of the first tranche of seven candidates to be called forward soonest from the Member States to start forming up the iMS, to be followed by a second tranche of five before the summer; several of these pioneers would bring with them their invaluable WEU experience of policy, plans and operations in the European arena. The third briefing, this time to de Boissieu and his team, covered: what the iMS needed logistically and pretty much immediately to start its design work, collocated in an empty conference room with the interim Situation Centre; and also an urgent draft input to the following year’s Council Secretariat budget lines for a future EU Military Staff. On Friday 24 March, I was invited by the Presidency to brief the iMB on how I saw the development of the iMS and its evolution into the EUMS.

I welcomed the first member of my team, Jean-Luc Lagadec, on Wednesday 29 March. By the end of week two I had already given, at Solana’s suggestion and in my Fisheries office, the first power-point presentation on the iMS to a curious but not unfriendly US Assistant Secretary of Defense. And so the ball started to roll!

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1 Major General (Retd) Messervy-Whiting CBE a member of the judiciary for England and Wales and an academic at the University of Birmingham. In March 2000, he was recruited by Dr. Javier Solana to design a military staff for the EU, becoming the interim DG of the implementation team to recruit, house, equip, train and deliver a fully capable staff. He became the first Chief of Staff of the new EUMS when Lieutenant General Rainer Schuwirth was appointed as the DG.

2 A detailed description of the design work in 2000 leading to the EU’s Military Staff, capabilities catalogue, crisis-management procedures and exercise policy is in the author’s article in the December 2000 edition of the RUSI Journal (Volume 145 No 6).
It gives me great pleasure to wholeheartedly congratulate all members of the EU Military Staff on the 15th anniversary of its existence. This in itself is good news – and it has been complemented by steady and prosperous developments and transformations, by a significant and successful output and, most of all, by its professional and motivated military and civilian personnel.

Together with numerous civilian counterparts in other parts of the complex EU institutions the EUMS has proven to be a solid and constant key element in support of the European and now Common Security and Defence Policy – within the General Secretariat of the Council and now in the External Action Service. And in conjunction with the Military Committee it has permanently represented the military element of the corresponding EU’s level of ambition. During those fifteen years the achievements and contributions have added up to an impressive list of activities such as: searching for offices, desks and chairs in early 2001, defining and receiving a legal status in Belgium and appreciation inside the EU, developing working procedures and getting hands on more sophisticated equipment, producing all kinds of drafted concepts for the Military Committee and other actors, preparing, conducting and evaluating training and exercises, preparing military advice for missions and operations, contributing to command and control, cooperating with other organizations, engaging for capability improvements, identifying and performing re-organizations, and also enjoying sportive and social activities.

I think it is only normal that I look back with deep gratitude, respect and pride to the initial team. It started to assemble in an improvised environment in Justus-Lipsius, then moved into the refurbished Kortenberg Building, and developed with excellent motivation and spirit in roughly nine months from almost zero to full operational capability in line with the agreed peacetime establishment at that time. There was a significant drive to implement the political decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government of the EU in Nice, Cologne or Helsinki. This gave strong support also for our work. But some dogmas, like the fear that the autonomy of decision-making might be endangered, also created obstacles again and again. The agreement on Berlin Plus was quite a relief in that regard, although the implementation later suffered again from political influences.

There are many nice recollections – just two of them: I still remember several working lunches with my NATO counterpart in local restaurants and in civilian clothes – in order not to get accused on either side as doing something illegally. We also conducted a number of sessions for the EU establishment to inform that those strange individuals wearing military uniforms did not pose any danger to their lifestyles – however, for some it remained difficult to accept the military straightforward workstyle.

Fifteen years onward, I am still convinced that the EU project and the Common European Security and Defence Policy remain indispensable – to give Europe the capacity to act if and when required, and to improve its common capabilities, also for the benefit of contributions in other organizations.

Sadly, fifteen years of intensive work have not created the kind of improvements that one might have expected – and we all know the main reason: it is relatively easy to produce papers, communiques and declarations. But translating those intents into reality with the necessary will is a different story. So there are excellent reasons to continue the common efforts – even more when we see the two disastrous and terrorist events enveloping those fifteen years: USA 9/11 in 2001 and Belgium/Brussels 3/22 in 2016.

Again – all the best for the EUMS and CFSP/CSDP.
Late 2002, I was Deputy-COMKFOR in Pristina when the French Chief of Defense asked me whether I would be the French candidate to become DGEUMS.

That was a surprise to me, but since I had enjoyed many opportunities to work in an international framework, including in operations, I did not hesitate very long.

In addition I had welcomed the decision to make the EU a security actor through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) whose competence, organization, structures and assets were defined in the Nice Treaty (December 2000), to deal with crisis management outside the EU territory.

At the end of 2002 I learned that my nomination was agreed by the EU Military Committee and endorsed by the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana.

In fact I was the second appointed DGEUMS due to take over from my predecessor on the 26th of February 2004.

This event celebrated during the very first military parade organised inside the entrance Hall of the “Justus Lipsius” building stays in my mind as a unique and unforgettable moment. The picture of 200 European military greeting the EU flag while a Belgian military band was playing the European Anthem was for me the clear indication of the new EU challenge: making the European more responsible, more capable and more effective in the field of Defense and security.

While my predecessor had to build everything of the EUMS: working procedures, cohesion, doctrines, concepts etc…, I could rely on a well trained team ready to prove its capacity in operations. This was fortunate because the year 2004 was a very busy time for the EUMS.

The first EU autonomous military operation in DR Congo “Artemis” was hardly ending when I was tasked by Javier Solana to plan the Take over of NATO in Bosnia (Operation ALTHEA). Although the situation in this country had calmed down since the IFOR deployment, peace was still fragile and the country reconstruction was at its very outset. This operation launched in cooperation with NATO with reference to the so called “Berlin+” agreement was an interesting experience which gave us the opportunity not only to test the crisis management procedure of the EU but also to experiment the cooperation between the EU and NATO. Finally the take over happened successfully in Sarajevo early December 2004 after …. 8 months of planning.

In parallel the EUMS was involved in:

- the setting of the Requirement Catalogue aiming to express the need of military capabilities of the EU to cover the whole spectrum of its potential missions (Petersberg tasks),
- the writing of the new “Battle group” concept, proposed by a UK/DE/FR initiative of march 2004,
- the welcome and integration of new people coming from the 10 new EU Member-States (1st May 2004),
- and the creation of a new planning civ-mil cell within the EUMS to improve the global approach of the EU in crisis management.

The following years were not much quieter: setting of the Force catalogue, planning of the ACEH civil operation, assistance mission to the African Union in Darfur in 2005, planning and running of the EUFOR DRC operation, opening of liaison teams with the UN and NATO in 2006, implementation of the (non permanent)Operation Center within the EUMS inaugurated in 2007.

This was indeed a very busy but also very exciting and blossoming period of time for the EU military. When I handed over to my successor on 1st of March 2007.

I was proud of the job accomplished and convinced that the European Military are able to deliver very seriously and efficiently together as soon as their political masters request them to do it and give them the necessary capabilities.
My tour as DG EUMS was one of the most interesting of my military career.

BY LT GEN (Ret) D LEAKEY, DG EUMS 2007 - 2010

The British have a long and strong attachment to NATO and a tendency to Euroscepticism. It was, therefore, a surprise and even a moment of anxiety for some people that a British general should become DG EUMS in 2007. However, having previously been the first ComEUFOR in Bosnia, my EU credentials were well known in Brussels.

It was probably NATO who took more ‘interest’ in the new British DG EUMS. At the time there was tension between NATO and the EU. Some characterised this as rivalry between the two organisations. Many could not see the point of two Brussels based military organisations which shared many of the same member States.

However, in Bosnia the EU was able to show the added value of having a military force alongside the other ‘instruments’, all working together within the same international organisation on stability, recovery and the rebuilding of the Bosnian state. This provided a strong political coherence between the various EU missions under the EU High Representative. And there was excellent practical collaboration between EUFOR, the EU Police Mission, other EU actors and the many strands of the Commission’s work. This ‘comprehensive approach’ using all the EU instruments, civilian and military, was something which NATO as a uniquely political and military alliance could not deliver as effectively or in the same way.

The EU’s military capability has also usable purpose in regions where operations led by NATO would not be acceptable to the regional states. This was one reason why the EU deployed a force of some 4,000 to Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 to deter and prevent the Darfur rebellion spreading westwards from Sudan. Neither the UN nor NATO, as a provider of an international military force, were acceptable to some key players in the region at that time.

Similarly, it was the EU who responded when an international force was needed at very short notice in Georgia in 2008 to monitor the ceasefire between the Russians and Georgia. A monitoring mission provided by NATO would have been perceived by the Russians as provocative. Although the EU mission in Georgia was primarily a civilian mission, it was the EUMS who provided much of the emergency planning and force generation capability in Brussels. And many of the monitors were military personnel.

Another example of the utility of the EU’s military capability was when the international community sought to establish a naval operation in the Indian Ocean in 2008 to counter the piracy operating off the coast of Somalia. The piracy was proving costly and disruptive to international shipping. There was already a US-led naval coalition operation in the region to which NATO contributed force elements. However, the EU set up and maintained a dedicated Operational HQ and a Command and Control structure dedicated to running the maritime counter-piracy operation. One of the principal benefits of this EU-led operation was the willingness of other non-EU members to participate or at least cooperate, China, Russia and India to name but three who would not have been willing to operate under a NATO banner.

My tour as DG EUMS was one of the most interesting of my military career. It was highly rewarding to lead a truly multinational team of military and civilian staff in helping to establish and orchestrate operations in Sudan, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, the Central African Republic, Georgia, Kosovo, and the Indian Ocean.

Amidst these and many other rewarding missions and EUMS work, I experienced three particular disappointments during my three and half years. The first was the conservativism, reluctance, and even unwillingness of so many military and civilian officials, MilReps and diplomats to genuinely embrace the modern requirement to develop a truly ‘comprehensive approach’ to operations. Second, I regretted the frequent lack of harmony between NATO and the EU. And third, I was sad to leave; I enjoyed such professionalism, humour, spirit and camaraderie amongst the EUMS. I miss the many friendships, but raise a glass to the EUMS on its 15th Birthday.
Wonder why the EU is so much in the media? I assume because of its promising potential to protect our European interests and a widespread impression that it does not fulfill that promise. Is that a reason for turning our back on it? No. The EU did not cause the crises at our borders, but it can be an essential part of the solution. If we would not have the EU in this period of common threats, our heads of state and governments would most likely come together and start developing it. The only way to solve the many crises is to do so commonly, using all means of power, including the military. The EU has the potential to do so, but not in isolation.

Even without a detailed analysis of the crises around Europe, it is valid to assume that none of these crises can be solved by just one Member State and also that all our Member States directly or indirectly feel the negative consequences. So, we have to counter the related threats together. It is also valid to assume that none of these crises can be solved by only one instrument in isolation. So, we need a comprehensive approach to crisis management using all instruments of power, including the military. This is not a brilliant new idea but one of the basic thoughts behind the EU Treaty of Lisbon. It is the reason why we have a HRVP with the mandate to coordinate external actions including crisis management, with the EEAS supporting her and the EU Military Staff being part of it.

So if the idea is good, why then is it so difficult to make the EU work? Why is there a growing number of politicians who promote a national way forward, who make voters believe that threats will go away if we close the national borders, which of course they will not. My experience is that most Member States, if not all, tend to mainly look from a national perspective. Threats which are closest to the national borders should have the highest priority, with divided opinions in the EU as a result. Many national politicians tend to gladly take the honor if something goes well, but blame the EU if it goes wrong, even if they were part of decision making and did not take a fair share of the common burden. Their attitude is understandable, because their position is determined by national elections. The effect is that their voters think that they could do better without the EU. It is of course also true that effective decision making in the EU is hampered by internal bureaucratic tensions. But these tensions are often the same as we see within national governments, in which all ministers agree that the minister for Foreign Affairs should coordinate external action, but continue to have their separate opinion on what should be their own individual role. If we understand the logic of these mechanisms, it is easier to accept. It also underlines that if we want the EU to be successful, we all have a responsibility to bridge the differences.

As the military, we always have understood that we cannot solve a crisis by ourselves. We can only be successful if our operations are synchronised with all civilian actions towards the same political goals. Until now, our EU operations have been relatively modest, but we can give many examples in which the military had a very positive contribution. It is also true that there is still much to be improved. I find it very motivating to feel the eagerness in the EU Military Staff to do so. I hear excellent ideas on how to clarify comprehensive decision making procedures, improve cooperation with strategic partners like NATO and improve operational planning capacities, all essential for future success. As the EU Military Staff becomes 15 years old and already had quite some success which deserves congratulations. Being 15 years in existence, it is not strange that there is also still room for improvement. May all good ideas come to effect and thus improve the EU’s capacity to safeguard our future, in concert with the other EU services, the EU Member States and partners. The future is yours.
While around me, every 3 years, there is change of the Director General and his team, I am one of the permanent civilians in the EUMS Structure. I have learned tremendously from the EUMS over these past 15 years, and I have very fond memories of all the people I have had the privilege to work with. It must have been fun; otherwise I would not be here today!

What a coincidence, I worked for all EUMS Directors General (5 in total), and according to their military rank that makes a total of 15 “military” stars. Funny, as this year we are celebrating 15 years of EUMS. It matches!

During these 15 years, of course, there have been times of frustration, but it has been mostly good and challenging particularly at the beginning when setting up the Military Staff back in 2001.

On 1st March 2001, I was appointed Personal Assistant to the first DG EUMS. At that time, LtGeneral Rainer Schuwirth (DE) was leading the EUMS and we were part of the General Secretariat of the Council. From then we started the build-up of the EU Military Staff. It has been quite a challenging period as everything had to be done from scratch (even search for desks, chairs, offices and more…..).

During these 3 years, the EUMS undertook 2 operations: CONCORDIA: FYROM and ARTEMIS: Democratic Republic of the Congo. By end of 2004, EUMS was composed of about 80 staff including officers, NCOs and Civilians, but needless to say that we were still in a growing-phase!

LtGeneral Jean-Paul Perruche (FR) took over the post of DG EUMS in March 2004. We faced restructuring in the EUMS. Then EUMS was assisted by a Civilian/Military Cell and reached 120 staffs. Again, EUMS run operations (i.e.: EUFOR ALTHEA: Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUFOR RD Congo: Democratic Republic of the Congo).

In February 2007, LtGeneral David Leakey (UK) had the lead for 3 years. We reached 180 staff. These 3 years, having British colleagues brought me back to a more “comprehensive” standard of English speaking which sometimes lacks in the Institutions! We all understand each other in institutional English language! Operations were run in Tchad: EUFOR Tchad-RCA: Chad and Central African Republic and EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA: off the Somali coast.

While being the PA of LtGeneral Ton van Osch (NL) in May 2010, we faced a new challenge with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

To create this new Institution, we merged officials from the Commission, from the Council, from Delegations and external staff. We encountered quite a few organisational and bureaucratic difficulties.

I am currently the PA of LtGeneneral Wolfgang Wosolsobe (AT), the speed of work has not decreased. Our overview of the Operations and Missions of the EU shows that in 2016: 15 missions were completed; 6 on-going military missions; 11 on-going civilian missions; 6000 people currently deployed.

I have been approached several times by officials of the EU asking me if it was not too rigid working with military staff and if uniforms didn’t bother me. My answers have been always consistent….. It’s painless to work for a clear hierarchy and rank structure. Though I see daily all these men in uniform, I must say that I still don’t recognise grades and ranks from their shoulders! But I’m sure they forgive me for this. Even though I’m civilian I often say that I should sometimes be granted a uniform!

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all my past and current colleagues (military and civilian) who make my daily professional life enjoyable! I would like to add that EUMS has a great spirit of multinational friendship and I enjoy the professionalism, the motivation, comradeship and loyalty of all my colleagues.
EU Missions and Operations

Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 30 missions and operations under CSDP. 9 are military operations/missions. The remainder are civilian missions. Currently, the EU is undertaking 17 missions and operations under CSDP (6 military missions and operations and 11 civilian missions).

### Military Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE EAST</td>
<td>EUJUST LEX-Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq, Mar 05 - Dec 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian territories, Jan 06 - 30 Jun 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian territories, 25 Nov 05 - 30 Jun 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUJUST Themis</td>
<td>Georgia, Jul 04 - Jul 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUPT Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo, Apr 06 - Feb 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUEX Kosovo</td>
<td>04 Feb 08 - 14 Jun 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>22 Jul 14 - 30 Nov 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA</td>
<td>AMM (Aceh Province, Indonesia)</td>
<td>Sep 05 - Dec 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>EUPOL AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>Afghanistan, 12 Jun 07 - 31 Dec 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Civilian Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES</td>
<td>EU BAM RAFAH</td>
<td>EU Police and rule of law mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing and wider criminal justice arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU’s institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector and Criminal Justice Reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operational phase began on 25 November 2005. However, operations at the RCP have been suspended since June 2007 due to Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. The Mission has maintained its readiness and capacity to redeploy to the RCP once political and security conditions allow. It supports capacity building of the PA’s border agency to enhance their preparedness to return to the RCP. The Mission was extended until 30 June 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The authorised strength of the Mission is 4 international Mission members and 7 local staff, as well as 4 visiting experts. The budget for the period of July 2015 to June 2016 is € 9.17 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Head of Mission: Rodolphe MAUGET (FR).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Note:** Missions/Operations in bold are ongoing. Dates refer to agreed mandates and do not mean that missions/operations will necessarily close on dates indicated. Information correct at time of printing in April 2016.
Military EU-led operation.

**Gabriele Meucci**

The flagship is the Italian Aircraft carrier CAVOUR, 3 surface EUPOL Afghanistan's support is delivered by its police EU Advisory Mission for civilian security sector reform. Headquartered in Pristina, the Mission has an authorised

In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibility of following the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia, EU civilian monitoring mission under the CSDP framework. The mission's current mandate runs until 14 June 2016.

**Kosovo**

**EULEX**

EU civilian mission launched under the CSDP. EULEX Kosovo's task is to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.

**Head of Mission**

**Kestutis Jankauskas** (LT)

**Mandate**

Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's mandate has been extended to 14 December 2016.

**Commitment**

Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Msikhetra, Gori and Zugdidi. Currently 23 EU Member States are contributing to the mission.

**Type**

EU Rule of law mission.

**Objectives**

As the largest civilian mission launched under the CSDP, EULEX Kosovo's task is to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.

**Head of Mission**

**Gabriele Meucci** (IT)

**Mandate**

Launched on 16 February 2008, the Mission's current mandate runs until 14 June 2016.

**Commitment**

Headquartered in Pristina, the Mission has an authorised strength of 173 staff, plus 35 members of the KEK.

**Objectives**

Engages in two main areas focusing in particular on strategic level: 1) Institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), 2) Professionalisation of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

**Type**

EU Police mission with linkages into wider rule of law.

**Objectives**

EUPOL Afghanistan supports the building of a civilian police force operating under an improved rule of law framework and in respect of human rights. The Mission engages in two main areas focusing in particular on strategic level: 1) Institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), 2) Professionalisation of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

**Mandate**

Launched on 12 June 2007, the mandate expires on 31 December 2016.

**Commitment**

EUPOL Afghanistan's support is delivered by its police and rule of law experts from EU Member States in Kabul. Sustainable transition to Afghan ownership underpins the Mission's activities together with an emphasis on mainstreaming anti-corruption, human rights and gender equity. The Mission has an authorised strength of 316 staff, deployed 124 international and 143 local staff. The budget for the period of 1 January to 31 December 2016 is €4.36 million.

**Head of Mission**

**Pia Stjernvall** (FI)

**Type**

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**Head of Mission**

Pia Stjernvall (FI)

**Head of Mission**

**Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin** (DK)

**Mandate**

Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's mandate has been extended to 14 December 2016.

**Commitment**

Headquarters in Pristina with 3 Regional Field Offices in Msikhetra, Gori and Zugdidi. Currently 23 EU Member States are contributing to the mission.

**Type**

EU civilian mission under the CSDP framework.

**Objectives**

Following the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia, EUMM provides civilian monitoring of parties' actions, including full compliance with the Six Point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures on a countrywide basis throughout Georgia, including South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, working in close coordination with partners particularly the OSCE and other EU actors.

**Mandate**

Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's mandate has been extended to 14 December 2016.

**Commitment**

Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Msikhetra, Gori and Zugdidi. Currently 23 EU Member States are contributing to the mission.

**Head of Mission**

**Kestutis Jankauskas** (LT)

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EU civilian monitoring mission under the CSDP framework.

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Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Msikhetra, Gori and Zugdidi. Currently 23 EU Member States are contributing to the mission.

**Head of Mission**

**Kestutis Jankauskas** (LT)
Support mission in the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The Mission operates from its Headquarters in Tripoli (national Headquarters in Niamey and field office in Agadez in Niger). It provides advice and assistance on defence reform (as part of SSR in the DRC with the aim of assisting the Congolese authorities in establishing a defence apparatus capable of guaranteeing the security of the Congolese people).

The mission was launched on the 08 June 2005. As from 1 July 2013 has started its closing mandate (mandate 9), which will expire on 30 June 2016.

During this period EUSec should strive for a finalization or effective handover of its tasks to the Congolese authorities, other EU instruments or bilateral or international actors with a view to sustainability of the result. Tasks related with the management of the Congolese Armed forces (FARDC) are being handed over to EU’s PROGRESS program, within the 11th EDF.

The mission consists of 10 military and civilian personnel from 4 EU Member States + 17 local staff. The mission is located in Kinshasa. The mission budget for this final mandate is €2.9 million.

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The overall objective of EUBAM Libya is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity to enhance the security of their land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management strategy in the long term.

The mission was launched on 22 May 2013 and has an extended mandate until 21 August 2016. (The mission has been temporary relocated out of Libya on 31st July 2014 and since April 2015 downsized. Initial authorised 111 International staff. Currently deployed 2 international and 2 national staff.)

The headquarters of the Mission is in Bamako. Deployed on a semi-permanent basis to Somalia. Currently deployed 79 international and 29 national staff. The annual budget allocated for the period from January 2016 to January 2017 is € 15.1 million.

The mission aims to strengthen the maritime security capacity of host countries to effectively govern their territorial waters and to reinforce their ability to fight piracy better. Mission’s efforts in Somalia will concentrate on mentoring and advising Somali partners. This strategic level advice and mentoring is supported by the coordination and facilitation of specialised training to support capacity building efforts. The Mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia.


The mission has its headquarters in Mogadishu with a back office in Nairobi and field offices in Somaliland and Puntland (not yet deployed). The mission staff from Nairobi deploy on a semi-permanent basis to Somalia. Currently deployed 47 international and 29 national staff. The annual budget allocated for the period from December 2015 to December 2016 is € 12 million.

The headquarters of the Mission is in Bamako. Deployed 73 international and 29 national staff. The annual budget for the period from January 2016 to January 2017 is € 15.1 million.

The overall objective of EUCAP SAHEL is to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region.

The missions was launched in April 2014 and current mandate is till 14 January 2017.

The mission aims to improve the capacities of Nigerian Security Forces (Gendarmerie, National Police, National Guard) to fight terrorism and organised crime as well as better control irregular migration flows in an effective and coordinated manner, with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region.

The initial two-year mandate starting on 16 July 2012 was extended by a further two years until 15 July 2016.

The headquarters in Niamey and field office in Agadez in Niger. Deployed 79 international and 48 national staff. An annual budget of € 18.4 million was allocated for the period of July 2015 to July 2016.

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### CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**EUMAM RCA (MILITARY ADVISORY MISSION)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the CAR Armed Forces (FACA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>RCA is part of the EU's comprehensive approach in the Central Africa Republic. This approach aims to contribute to the African and international efforts to restore stability and support the political transition in the country. The mission is a follow-up to the CSDP military bridging operation in CAR (EUFOR RCA), to contribute to security in the capital Bangui. EUMAM will assure smooth transition to EUTM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANDATE</td>
<td>Current mandate from March 15 - July 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITMENT</td>
<td>EUMAM RCA will advise the CAR military authorities on the management of their current resources, on the preparation of the future systemic reform of the CAR armed forces and on the set up of conditions for a proper training programme for their forces. It will provide the EU Delegation in Bangui with military and security expertise and support MINUSCA in the SSR process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD OF MISSION</td>
<td>Mission Commander – Brigadier General LAUGEL (Fr)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SOMALIA

**Operation ATALANTA – EUNAVFOR Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>Counter-piracy maritime operation. First EU maritime operation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>In support of UN Security Council Resolutions calling for active participation in the fight against piracy. The areas of intervention are the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean off the Somali Coast. The operation includes: Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; in addition, Operation ATALANTA also supports, as a Secondary Task, upon request and within means and capabilities, other EU missions, institutions and instruments within Somalia. Of note, Operation ATALANTA is not a Fishery Protection mission; however, its role does allow it to contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and report this activity to DG MARE. Currently 1013 staff members, 20 EU contributing states and 2 non-EU states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANDATE</td>
<td>Launched on 8 December 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITMENT</td>
<td>Subject to Military Force Flow and the Force Generation process, Operation ATALANTA typically consists of between 4 to 8 surface combat vessels and up to 2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Common costs for the Operation in 2016 are € 6.3 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD OF MISSION</td>
<td>The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK). Major General Martin Smith (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. Rear Admiral Jan KAACK (DE) is the Force Commander.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MALI

**EU TRAINING MISSION, MALI (EUTM MALI)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>In line with the &quot;EU Strategy for Development and Security in the SAHEL&quot; EUTM’s aims to support the training and reorganisation of the Malian Armed Forces and to help improve its military capacity, in order to allow, under civilian authority, the restoration of the country's territorial integrity. Until now, eight BattleGroups, each consisting of 650 to 700 personnel, have been trained by EUTM Mali. The mission also supported the preparation of the Malian Defence Programming Law (&quot;Loi de programmation militaire - LOPM&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANDATE</td>
<td>Launched on 18 February 2013 and initially planned for 15 months; EUTM Mali has been extended until May 2016. On 23 March 2016, the Council of the EU decided to further extend the Mandate of EUTM for a period of two years, until May 2018. EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations and mentoring. It’s actions shall extend up to the river Niger Loop, including Gao and Timbuktu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITMENT</td>
<td>The mission comprises 550 personnel including 200 instructors, mission support staff, Force Protection and Air MEDEVAC (in total 23 EU contributing states + 4 non EU). The Mission Headquarters is located in Bamako and the Training area is in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of the capital. Common costs for the current mandate are estimated at €27.7 million. For the third Mandate the common costs are estimated at €33.4 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD OF MISSION</td>
<td>Brigadier General Werner ALBL (DE). The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SOMALIA

**EU TRAINING Mission, Somalia (EUTM Somalia)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>Training, Advising, Mentoring, Somalia National Forces (SNF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>On 22 January 2013 the Council adopted the decision on a new mandate with the objective to contribute to building up the Somali National Security Forces accountable to the Somali National Government. In line with Somali needs and priorities EUTM Somalia will provide political and strategic level advice to Somali authorities within the security institutions (Ministry of Defence and General Staff), support and advise on Sector Security Development as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANDATE</td>
<td>The current mandate until December 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITMENT</td>
<td>The mission comprises currently 130 personnel from 11 Member States and 1 participating third state (Serbia) + 9 local staff. Estimated common costs for the extended mandate (Jan 2013 - March 2015) are €11.6 million. Since January 2014 all EUTM Somalia activities including advisory, mentoring and training are now carried out in Mogadishu with the support of a Liaison Office in Nairobi and a Support Cell in Brussels. 5000 SNF trained so far.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAD OF MISSION</td>
<td>The Mission Headquarters is situated in Mogadishu. Brigadier General MORENA (IT) is the EU Mission Commander. The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Congratulations to the EU Military Staff on your 15 year anniversary.

2005 saw the establishment of a new institution which would soon become the number one training provider in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy. That institution was the European Security and Defence College, also known by the abbreviation ESDC.

ESDC = facilitator of a European Security Culture
Before the foundation of the ESDC, there was no single entity in the EU devoted to European training and the development of a common European Security Culture. It was only in 2002 that the Greek Presidency introduced what it called “Common training” as one of the Presidency priorities. The task of common training involved developing a European security culture by providing knowledgeable personnel both in the EU Member States and within the EU institutions.

ESDC = 28 EU Member States
The EU Member States are the political masters of the college. They convene in a steering committee, which is chaired by a representative of the High Representative and which gives political guidance and strategic direction on issues relating to the academic training programme. The programme encompasses all the training activities offered in the course of the academic year, which runs from September to July. A small but efficient international secretariat located in Brussels facilitates the conduct of training activities and the organisation of meetings in various formats.

ESDC = 120 training providers
The ESDC was created as a network college and therefore relies on certified national training institutes, which provide training on a “costs lie where they fall” basis. In general, the courses can be attended cost-free, insofar as the ESDC does not charge tuition fees. The sending authority covers participants’ travel and accommodation costs.

ESDC = embedded in the EEAS
The structure of the college is as unique as its setting within the EU structures. The ESDC is embedded in the crisis management structures of the European External Action Service. It is therefore not a CSDP agency, unlike the European Defence Agency or the Institute for Security Studies in Paris. It has limited legal capacity and is able to provide first-hand training to meet real-time training needs and requirements.

ESDC = 40 different training courses
Over the years, the ESDC has developed around 40 different training activities, most of them with a regional or horizontal focus. Two of the more general courses are on the Common Foreign and Security Policy itself, at newcomer level in the case of the CSDP Orientation Course and at strategic leadership level in the case of the CSDP High Level Course. The other courses/seminars/conferences focus on horizontal (e.g. peacebuilding) and regional (e.g. Western Balkan) issues. Specific training programmes for partners (e.g. Eastern Partners) complement the academic programme of the college.

ESDC = relying on the expertise of civilians and military
The ESDC relies on the expertise of subject matter experts from the EU member states, both in the administration and the academia, as well as within the EU structures. The EU Military Staff plays a crucial role with its subject matter experts in particular for the areas of ‘capability development’, ‘strategic planning’, ‘cyber defence’ and ‘strategic communication’. These experts are also welcome with their valuable contributions in the various working groups of the ESDC.

ESDC = support to EU missions and operations
The latest discussions on CSDP in various Council bodies (inter alia CIVCOM) has put pre-deployment training, in-mission-training and preparatory training on the ESDC agenda. More and more CSDP missions and operations involve a role for the college in providing training for staff. The first such training course was an eLearning course for newcomers in EUNAVFOR Somalia and more recent courses have included an in-mission-training course on Security Sector Reform.
ESDC = three handbooks and several other publications
Since 2010, the ESDC has published three handbooks on the Common Security and Defence Policy. A total of about 15000 copies of these publications have been distributed to date, primarily to facilitate the college’s various training activities. The handbooks were as follows:

1. Handbook on CSDP: This handbook, published in 2010, was the first in the series of CSDP related handbooks. It gives an overview of procedures, structures and policies. The third edition of the handbook was published in 2015.
2. Handbook for Decision Makers: The second handbook was developed for decision makers. It provides comments and analysis on current CFSP/CSDP issues such as sanctions, cyber security and non-proliferation. The first edition was published in 2014.
3. Handbook on CSDP missions and operations: This latest handbook was published in 2015 and focuses on operational aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The three handbooks were published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports. Other publications, including an electronic newsletter, were issued in the margins of the military Erasmus programme, either by the Polish and Cypriot Presidencies or by the ESDC itself. The handbooks and other publications have contributed greatly to both expertise development and brand visibility.

ESDC = recognised high quality training
As a network college, the ESDC has a presence in Brussels and across all 28 EU Member States. Besides the classical national training institutes, ministries and national permanent representations also provide training at EU level. In order to guarantee a minimum level of quality, all training delivered under the aegis of the ESDC must follow a standardised curriculum, which is developed by the host country or institute and agreed by the Member States. These curricula are revised annually by the relevant bodies of the European External Action Service and by the national institutes and other external experts active in the field, amongst others.

ESDC = using synergies for mutual benefit
After the summer break, the EUMS hosts one CSDP orientation course in Brussels for the newcomers. This training course is dedicated for military personnel, but also open for participation of civilian participants. Within one week, the participants learn about the basics of CSDP, such as structures, procedures, strategies, horizontal issues and regional aspects.

Other initiatives aim at identifying and using synergies between various actors in the field of CFSP and CSDP to support the regional priorities of the EU Member States and the European External Action Service. Building on these efforts, strong ties have been established between the ESDC and the newly created Directorate General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement negotiations (DG NEAR). TAIEX, a European Commission Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument managed by DG NEAR, finances ESDC training activities directed at the implementation and facilitation of accession efforts. The Eastern Partnership platform, also within DG NEAR, provides similar support to ESDC activities for the Eastern Partnership countries. Other Commission directorates also provide support to meet specific training needs. They include DG HOME (counter-terrorism), DG MOVE (maritime security) and DG DEVCO (fragility, security, development).

ESDC = number one CFSP/CSDP training provider
The college has several advantages over other training providers:

1. The ESDC is embedded in the EU structures, and hence is able to quickly identify new training needs and include them in its programming cycle and curricula.
2. The ESDC provides first-class training, thanks to its network structure, its broad variety of lecturers including practitioners, academics and officials, its use of participants with a wealth of expertise and professional experience as resource persons, its eLearning Management tool and its standardised, annually updated curricula.
3. The ESDC awards its students a certificate, which is signed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and legally recognised by all EU member states and EU institutions.
4. The ESDC follows an inclusive approach, inviting civilian, police, military and diplomatic staff to its courses, and ensuring that training groups are balanced. This approach allows for exchange of views on CFSP and CSDP from a variety of vantage points.
5. The ESDC supports the regional policies of the EU by providing tailor-made training for partners such as the Asia Regional Forum and the Arab League.
6. The ESDC evaluates all training events and includes its findings in the annual revision process. This ensures that shortfalls can be limited, good practices can be shared and a high quality of training can be guaranteed for future training activities.

ESDC = 10000 alumni
In 2015, the ESDC can look back on a 10 year success story. More than 10000 students have been trained in more than 350 training sessions, seminars and conferences. All EU Member States, institutions and agencies have sent staff to ESDC events. ESDC training is also recognised as an important part of pre-deployment and in-mission training. Thanks to its success, the ESDC is well known by EU partners within and beyond Europe.

Within its current mandate, which is framed by the 2013 Council Decision, and with the unanimous support of all the actors involved, the ESDC is well equipped to provide high-quality training to tackle the challenges of tomorrow’s missions and operations. The ESDC facilitated the development of a European Security Culture over the past 10 years and will build on its efforts in the future.
The European Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and its implications on defence

BY MICHEL BARNIER, SECURITY AND DEFENCE ADVISOR, EUROPEAN COMMISSION

We should need no further convincing that the world around us is changing for the worse. And that we need to react to it. The spread of radical Islamist threat and terrorist attacks into the heart of our societies; a Middle-East in flames; Syria, Yemen, Libya, Russia’s blatant disregard for international law, the still unfolding crisis in Ukraine; the end of the US ‘unipolar moment’, the rise of China.

The EU operates in an increasingly volatile, fragile and unpredictable security environment. The security of the European continent is not a given anymore. Either we rise up to the task, or I fear the worse. What is needed is a profound update of our European strategic software. We need to think anew what collective security in Europe means on the basis of the threats we are facing and then draw the lessons of that in terms of our crisis management and security and defence instruments, as well as capabilities and technologies. The security of Europe and the protection of our values are at stake. Bringing Member States and EU institutions closer together is a necessity to meet the expectations of our citizens.

2016 is a pivotal year in defining what we mean by this. Under the authority of the High Representative Mogherini, the new Global Foreign Policy and Security Strategy is due in June. It is the perfect occasion for the Union to define its interests and collective priorities. In parallel to similar efforts in NATO, the Global Strategy must initiate the EU’s long-term adaptation by defining anew our overall military and civilian objectives. This means assessing Europe’s shared vital interests in the new security environment, the fusion of internal and external security, possible threat scenarios and the effectiveness of past and current European missions and operations.

1. Thinking anew about European collective security

The invocation of article 42(7) - for the first time in the history of the Union is to me a watershed moment for European solidarity. Long deemed irrelevant, the EU’s very own collective defence clause, has come to life. The activation of the clause should add a new political dimension to security and defence in Europe, from the Baltics to Cyprus. This must be seized upon.

The question of the EU’s future role in mutual assistance and collective security, not as an alternative but as a complement to NATO, must now be put firmly on the political agenda. Because Article 5 of NATO is not a one size fits all solution to the threats we are facing. But even more importantly, since collective security concerns us all. The Treaty’s solidarity commitments are strong, and they apply to us all. They also have particular significance for non-NATO countries. European solidarity and collective security should therefore become a critical cornerstone of CSDP, beyond crisis management operations. The EU must be able to defend its interest and values.

Beyond the immediate and bilateral responses to France’s request, the EU’s mutual assistance clause must consequently now be operationalised as a European collective security clause involving also the EU institutions. Article 42(7) cannot be understood simply as a bilateral instrument. EU institutions can add value in joint contingency planning, coordination of intelligence and mobilisation of the full range of instruments. That will require much more, both in terms of military planning and capability development.
2. Making the CSDP the pivotal instrument and enhancing our military capabilities

The CSDP should be the pivotal instrument for the new Global strategy. Sanctions, diplomacy, overseas development aid... all are good, all are needed in a comprehensive approach.

But the CSDP is the key: because it is in itself a comprehensive tool, because it is both civilian and military, because it is our presence and intelligence on the ground, and simply because, the EU now needs to move beyond the sterile opposition between soft and hard power. We need smart power.

Once the strategic ambition is set in the Global strategy, there therefore is an urgent need to revise and determine our ambition and means of action in common defence through a European Strategic Defence Review or Defence ‘White Book’.

The CSDP is today primarily a peace-keeping and crisis management instrument, but what about the EU’s pledge to collective security in the context of increasing hybrid threats ignoring these borders? We should look again at the Petersberg tasks in the light of new demands on our security and territorial integrity.

If the EU is taking collective defence and security seriously, new scenarios must be given operational significance through contingency planning for different threats. The EU’s standard military response capability was last defined at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, in other words, in the last century!

The needs of - and contributions to - a capable EU military instrument that can face today’s crises, including through rapid response capabilities, must be defined anew. This will in turn require new efforts on capabilities. The recent UK defence review presages a European capability upgrade across Europe. Renewed investment in defence must build on synergies and avoid costly inefficiencies and duplication.

As far as possible, needs should therefore be identified in common by Member States, together with the EU and the European Defence Agency (EDA) not least. More is to be achieved together for example in the development of capabilities relevant to external and internal security, such as cyber capabilities, surveillance drones and space based assets.

3. Working together in partnership

The Commission stands ready to contribute to this common effort and can help enhance the EU’s ability to be both an external and internal security provider.

Under the impetus of Commissioner Bienkowska, we are developing a Defence Action plan on capabilities and technology together with the External Action Service and the European Defence Agency.

In support of Member States, we can combine our efforts to:
- identify, on the basis of the Global Strategy and the EU level of ambition, critical European needs;
- design the right set of instruments to incentivise cooperation, combining policies, funding, fiscal incentives and regulatory measures;
- catalyse greater investment in Key Strategic Activities, including in critical technologies;
- propose a long term roadmap towards more integration in key enablers such as certification, standardisation, training and simulation centres;
- define a process for strengthening the European capability development and pooling and sharing, on the basis of the Capability Development Plan;
- adjust existing instruments including EDA and OC-CAR, to best manage future European programmes;
- support solutions for more defence integration among willing Member States, following recent examples such as between Germany and the Netherlands or the well-established Nordic defence cooperation (NOR-DEFCO).

As EU’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy is being finalised, we must remember that this common effort in defence is also the vehicle for Europe’s long term strategic autonomy. Europe is called upon to assume greater responsibility for its own security and in the context of the transatlantic partnership. As Joe Biden insisted at the Munich Security Conference a couple of years ago, “Europeans, take your responsibilities!” It is our responsibility to secure our capability and freedom of action to remain a trustworthy partner. My conviction is clear: there can be no prosperity without security; there can be no strategic security without defence; no strategic defence without capabilities; no strategic capabilities without a competitive European defence industry.

Considering the tragedies across Europe over the past months, security and defence should now be our collective top priority: under the authority of President Juncker, the Commission will play its role to the fullest.
The world is getting smaller. Trans-oceanic journeys that once were measured in seasons are now accomplished in a single day. Yet, to logistics specialists, the world is expanding in size as we seek to meet modern expectations of travel to remote areas of Africa, Asia and South America, where countries that are four or five times the size of France may have less than three thousand kilometres of high-quality paved road, limited or no rail infrastructure and a reliance on air terminals and ports that lack modern cargo handling capabilities. Against this background, all EU countries have an increasing demand on logistics enablers and arguably, a reducing pool of assets to call upon to deliver logistics effect. So, expectation is high with a desire to move cargo and equipment within Africa as efficiently as one can in Europe but, the infrastructure requires significant investment and nations do not have all of the resources to accomplish this. So, how do we deliver a logistics solution that is sustainable, mobile and cost-efficient?

The answer to this conundrum may be multinational logistics and that is the co-ordination of a full range of logistical skills that include areas such as, procurement, transportation, engineering and sustainability between contributing nations. Against this background, all EU countries have an increasing demand on logistics enablers and arguably, a reducing pool of assets to call upon to deliver logistics effect. So, expectation is high with a desire to move cargo and equipment within Africa as efficiently as one can in Europe but, the infrastructure requires significant investment and nations do not have all of the resources to accomplish this. So, how do we deliver a logistics solution that is sustainable, mobile and cost-efficient?

The challenges, in a military context, range from grand-strategic differences surrounding how we structure, command and operate, down to sub-tactical issues surrounding commonality of equipment and communication. Even within a common language this can be a challenge with a single word meaning very different things depending upon the context. The greatest challenge therefore has got to be finding a common understanding, interoperability and coherence among nations.

With this in mind, much of the work within EU Logistics Directorate on Concepts is focussed on develop a set of documents which serve as reference elements linking the EU political ambitious to the military logistics reality. They are also focused on providing logistic guidelines for the OpCdr/OHQ, FCdr/OHQ and MS Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) and allow Logistic support to civilian missions and cooperation with other EU instruments and services and with Strategic partners, relevant International Organisations as well as non-EU TCNs.

The Logistic Support Concept for EU-led Military Operations is the overarching document for logistics. It details EU logistic principles and guidelines, primarily at the Political and Strategic level but also at the Military Strategic and Operational levels. It takes into account challenges deriving from the Headline Goal 2010, the specific challenges related to a Rapid Response Capability (RRC), the EU Battlegroups (EU BGs) and the logistic lessons learned during EU-led military operations. Logistic functions and logistics-related activities have been developed further in separated supporting Concepts. Added to this the EU comprehensive approach to Civilian and Military interaction and support seeks methods of sharing support and drawing logistics efficiencies were appropriate. It means that today, more so than in the past perhaps, concepts and support doctrine for civilian and military missions is demonstrating greater commonality.

Improving understanding will also help to foster better teamwork within multinational scenarios. Communication is the necessary first step in relationship building. This is all essential to the conduct of a mission and by improving dialogue through embedding staff, providing liaison officers and participating in planning and operational level discussions benefits multiply exponentially and risks are reduced. This can also lead to innovative solutions to seemingly intractable problems. For those involved in multinational logistics this sharing of infor-
Information is essential and it can often be the bridge between providing sustainable support and logistics failure with the associated issues. To materialize this effort, EUMS Log Staff maintain a broad and efficient network of cooperation covering from NATO, United Nations, Africa Union and US Commands to organizations such as Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre (AMSCC), European Air Transport Command (EATC), NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine (MILMED COE) and Eurocorps. Furthermore, the Letters of Intent signed between EUMS and Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) on 17 December 2015 highlights, once again, the way to co-operate and co-ordinate activities in delivering operational success and contributing to crisis response mechanisms by providing military expertise on the use of the military assets for crisis response and Humanitarian assistance, maintaining close working relations by regular liaison to optimize the exchange of information and to enhance mutual support for Transport Tasks.

This of course brings us on to the nub of the issue and that is having agreed a common “language”, built trust and established good lines of communication top-down, bottom-up and horizontally across force elements and headquarters, how do we then deliver multinational logistics effects. Longer term procurement issues whereby specialist equipment may be supported by national autonomic support solutions will invariably continue to require dedicated support from the owning nation however for areas with greater natural commonality in terms of medical provision, real life support and consumable equipment there may be more ability to share and pool resources. Perhaps one of the areas that best lend itself to this type of support is strategic and tactical lift and we have seen many examples of where this has been utilised effectively to support a range of mission and operations via Movement Coordination Centres.

While history does not repeat itself or offer precise comparisons, it can provide examples of how good strategy can help mitigate a decline in resources in the face of growing security challenges. Multinational cooperation has been one of the best options to bridge the gap between ambitions and the resources available to meet them.

Logistics is a cross-cutting and multi-dimensional domain which poses enormous challenges to Member States (MS) in their efforts to deploy and provide sustainability to their troops. The economic downturn experienced in the last years has provided a renewed impetus in the search for more effective and efficient methods of delivering logistics capabilities.

While MS understand the benefits of shared logistics support, its application remain relatively limited. The reluctance of MS to provide logistics enablers to EUFOR RCA, the enduring failure to provide a military air medical evacuation capability for EUTM Mali (currently provided by a contractor), makes all the more urgent to identify how to best pool and share logistics resources.

To conclude, today and in the future we will be most likely be engaged in multinational military operations. The mutual support agreements in EU Operations and the successes in sharing strategic lift capabilities have revealed and proved that that multinational logistic support is efficient and effective. However, a paradigm shift will be required both in EU and individual nations in order to respond to the MS strategic needs, interoperate with allied forces and partners. The foremost question that needs to be addressed is how to overcome national reluctances and operationalize the opportunities for deployable multinational support cooperation. In a context of austerity, defence budget cuts and combined operations by nature, isolation is not the solution anymore.
MG MESSERVY-WHITING welcomes Prince FELIPE - now King of SPAIN - 18/09/2002

General PERRUCHE welcomes Lt Gen Jerry Mateparae Chief of New Zealand Defence Force - 16/06/2006

Gen. HORST PLEINER and Gen. JOHAN HEDERSTEDT Austrian and Swedish CHODs, with Gen Rainer Schuwirth DG EUMS 20 November 2001

THE PIONEERS MG Messervy Whiting in center and Lt Col ESA Pulkinen extreme right (next DG EUMS) - 2000

An early Chods meeting 2000 / 2001 Help to identify attendees at the above. Send answers to eums.info@eeas.europa.eu

Gen Rainer Schuwirth DG EUMS, Dr BJÖRN VON SYDOW Swedish Minister of Defence and Gen Hägglund Chairman EUMC 27 June 2001
EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF - EUMS STRUCTURE

EU Military Operations and Missions

- EU NAVFOR Somalia
- EUNAVFOR Med
- EUFOR
- European Union Training Mission Mali
- Union European EUMAM RCA
- EUBAM Bosnia

All information correct at time of print – APRIL 2016