

# IMPETUS



MAGAZINE OF THE EU MILITARY STAFF, EEAS, BRUSSELS - SPRING/SUMMER 2017 ISSUE #23



HRVP FEDERICA MOGHERINI VISITS EU NAVFOR MED OPERATION SOPHIA FHQ

EU MILITARY STAFF CONTRIBUTING TO EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

**PROGRESS ON EU SECURITY  
AND DEFENCE  
CO-OPERATION** - P.2

**CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECT  
ON SECURITY & DEFENCE** - P.6

**EU SIGNS ACQUISITION  
AND CROSS-SERVICING  
AGREEMENT WITH USA** - P.15

## CONTENT

Overview of the Operations and Missions of the European Union - May 2017	1
Progress on EU Security & Defence Co-operation <b>By HRVP Federica Mogherini</b>	2
The Changing Security Environment <b>By Lt General Esa Pulkkinen Director General EU Military Staff</b>	4
Climate change: a growing challenge for international security with major repercussions for defence <b>By Monsieur Le Drian, French Minister of Defence</b>	6
L'action d'EUTM RCA dans la réorganisation de l'armée centrafricaine. <b>By Capitaine Sébastien ISERN, Public information Officer</b>	8
Global Memo - EU CSDP Operations and Missions	10
EUTM Mali <b>By Lt Col Marc Levenbergh, Public Information Officer</b>	14
Enhancing multinational logistic support: EU signs ACSA with USA. <b>By Deborah Lassche, EUMS Logistic Directorate</b>	15
Cyber Defence in CSDP Activities <b>By Cdr Jan-Peter Giesecke, EUMS CIS</b>	16
European Air Transport Command (EATC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) are intensifying their cooperation <b>By Major General Chris Badia, Commander EATC and Brigadier General Dionigi Loria, EUMS Director of Logistics</b>	18
Requirements Catalogue 2005 Revision – Adapting the EU Military Capability Development to evolving security threats <b>By Ltc Klaus Schadenbauer, CONCAP Directorate</b>	20
First award of CSDP Medal for Extraordinary Meritorious Service <b>By Ltc John O'Loughlen, EUMS Public Relations</b>	21
International Women's Day 2017 Seminar hosted by EUMS <b>By Ltc Angela Hume, Logistic Directorate</b>	22
The EEAS STRATCOM EAST task force: Addressing Pro-Kremlin Disinformation <b>By Giles Portman, Head task Force</b>	23
EU NAVFOR (Somalia) – The achievements of MSCHOA, WFP Protection and the Legal Finish <b>By Commander Jacqueline Sherriff MBE Royal Navy – EU NAVFOR Spokesperson</b>	24

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
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Edition/Creation  
OIB European commission  
Impetus is a Magazine published by the EU Military Staff, EEAS





# EUROPEAN UNION CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS 2017



 **Military Operations / Missions**  
 **Civilian Missions**

 **6** Military Operations / Missions

 **9** Civilian Missions

  **More than 5,000** people currently deployed

## **Objectives:**

keeping the peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention of human trafficking, piracy, UN arms embargo and training of Libyan coast guard.



# Progress on EU Security & Defence Co-operation

BY HRVP FEDERICA MOGHERINI

HRVP Federica Mogherini addresses the certificate ceremony for the Libyan coastguard.



*Our Global Strategy for foreign and security policy, which I presented in June last year, described the state of world affairs as one of “predictable unpredictability.”*

Regrettably, our forecast has been proven right on many occasions since. The Strategy was presented the day after the UK referendum, when many worried that global politics would enter a volatile and erratic phase. The radical reshaping of the US Administration has added to this sense of uncertainty.

More broadly, the global distribution of power is shifting: as the centres of gravity change and multiply, it can even be difficult to fathom where the power truly lies. Cold War times are long gone. The idea of a single global policeman is nothing but an illusion, in our complex and multipolar world.

And yet a multilateral global order has not yet emerged, and we are witnessing a strong return to power politics. Against this difficult background, the European Union still stands as a reliable, cooperative and predictable force in this troubled world. As the very foundations of a rules-based international system are being questioned, the EU will be more and more an indispensable power to preserve, strengthen and enlarge a cooperative global order.

Despite the economic crisis, we are the second global economy. We are the largest global market and the leading foreign investor in most parts of the globe. We invest more in development cooperation and humanitarian aid than the rest of the world combined. We are a force for multilateralism, for human rights and for international cooperation. And we are increasingly active as a global security provider.

The EU has always prided itself on its soft power – and rightly so, because we have a unique set of tools in this field. However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do justice to an evolving reality.

Our civilian and military missions have already become a central feature of our foreign policy. Thousands of men and women serving under the European flag are working every day for peace and security – our own security, and our partners’. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand.

Partnership and cooperation remain the bedrock of our engagement. Cooperation with NATO is and will continue to be central to our work, after the historic Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw. Europe needs a strong NATO, which remains the foundation for the collective defence for those States which are Members of it, and a stronger Europe is essential to make NATO stronger.



Nonetheless, we also need to be ready to act autonomously where and if the situation so requires. In a world where power is diffuse, we need to take full responsibility for our collective security. To do so, we must both make better use of the tools we already have, and establish new forms of cooperation where necessary.

As for other policy fields, we should only act at the European level when this provides clear added value over actions at national level. However, in contrast to many other policy areas, the added value of acting jointly on foreign and security policy is systematic and uncontested. There is no international challenge that is better dealt with at national level.

Last year, as we begun to work on implementing our Global Strategy, the 28 EU governments agreed on a new level of ambition for our security and defence policy. They recognised that the EU must be able to protect our citizens through our external action, strengthen the capabilities of our neighbours and partners to prevent new conflicts, and respond to crises when they arise.

We have now started to develop together the necessary means, instruments and structures to fulfil these tasks, for the benefit of all Member States and all European citizens.

The implementation of our Defence Package – with the Global Strategy's Implementation Plan on security and defence, the European Defence Action Plan and a set of measures to operationalise the Warsaw Declaration – represents the best opportunity since Lisbon for a quantum leap in the European project.

On 6th March, I chaired a joint session of EU Foreign and Defence Ministers, where we took our first operational decisions to put our ambitious plans for EU security and defence into action.

Ministers agreed unanimously to establish a military planning and conduct capability, which will command the EU non-executive military missions and will be established within the EU military staff. We also decided to create a civilian/military joint support coordination cell that will increase synergies between our civilian and military work in hotspots around the world.

For the moment, these will be small structures. But their creation represents a big step forward, for at least two reasons.

The first one is practical. Take the case of Sahel, a crucial area for the security of our continent. The European Union currently deploys two civilian missions and one military training mission in Mali and Niger, together with the civilian EUBAM mission to strengthen Libya's borders. In a region where threats are transnational by definition, coordination among European forces is vital – and this is precisely the aim of our new structures.

The second reason is symbolic. It is no exaggeration to say that, since I presented the Global Strategy, European defence has made more progress than in previous decades. This is the best response to those who describe Europe as too slow and bureaucratic to truly protect its citizens.

It is now essential to keep the same pace, and to strengthen even further our cooperation on security and defence. With the Foreign and Defence Ministers we agreed to move forward our work on a number of other issues. First of all, on a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defence: I believe we can now make it a reality, based on an inclusive and modular approach, and concrete projects that bring added-value to European defence.

The next steps towards an EU of security and defence should be driven by effective cooperation and solidarity, and should be as inclusive as possible. At the same time, any increase in cooperation will strengthen not only the participating Member States, but the EU as a whole.

We will also continue our work together on a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which will help Member States to work better together when it comes to defence budgets. The European Defence Action Plan, including the Defence Fund, will encourage Member States to spend together better.

In a world of continent-sized powers, and continent-sized defence budgets, we need to preserve our technological edge, while improving the competitiveness and functioning of the defence industry in the single market. We need to stimulate European defence cooperation and economies of scale through collaborative projects. This will also help transatlantic burden-sharing, and is consistent with intensifying our cooperation with NATO.

Other strands of work we are also taking forward include the use of battlegroups, how to improve information sharing and how to strengthen our civilian missions.

*I am pleased to say that all this work received the firm support of EU leaders at the March European Council. With this political backing, and against the background of an unpredictable world, I am convinced that this is just the beginning. Our progress on security and defence cooperation will continue in the coming months. ■*



DG EU Military Staff  
Lt Gen Pulkkinen,  
HRVP Mogherini  
and Chair EU  
Military Committee  
Gen Kostarakos  
begin Chief Heads  
of Defence (CHODs)  
meeting

# The **Changing** Security Environment

BY LT GENERAL ESA PULKKINEN DIRECTOR GENERAL EU MILITARY STAFF

DG EUMS Lt Gen Esa Pulkkinen meets the RCA National Army Inspector General, Major General Jean-Pierre DOLLE-WAYA



*At the end of 2016 our political leadership made some significant decisions as to how Europe will deliver security and defence in the years to come. I would like to share some of my thoughts on where we started, where we now stand and how, with your approval, we might proceed in the months to come.*

## **Role of the military in EU**

Over the last few years the role of the military, as one of several CSDP instruments, has undoubtedly increased. The reason is not difficult to understand. The changing security – political landscape has had a clear impact on our thinking on security and defence. The European Security Strategy, the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Level of Ambition developed by the former HR Mr. Solana have, until now, been the pillars of this approach and of course, the latter remain unchanged.

The Implementation Plan for Security and Defense (IPSD) derived from the new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy has now been developed, and we will support the implementation of several of the 13 actions identified by the High Representative as essential elements for the future of our Common Security and Defense Policy. For the EUMS, the main impact of the IPSD relates to those actions dealing with the review of the requirements catalogue, the establishment of a permanent planning and conduct capability, the coordination of civil and military intelligence, rapid response

- in particular a review of rules and regulations aiming to strengthen the relevance, usability and deployability of EU Battlegroups - financing of capacity building (CBSD) and finally the improvement of our relationship with partners. At this point I will highlight the anticipated political approval for the establishment of a military planning and conduct capability for non-executive training missions and my new role as director of this embedded staff element within the EUMS.

We must meet the three main priorities derived from the Global strategy; to enable the EU military to meet the military challenge of conflict prevention, capacity building and the protection of the Union and its citizens. This of course raises the question of the political – strategic objective behind these priorities, bearing in mind that we will complement, not duplicate, NATO's role in the collective defence of Europe.

## **The threats of today**

The world we thought we knew has changed. Both the EU and its citizens now feel threatened on several fronts; by widespread security issues, the uncontrolled flow of migrants into Europe and the challenge to worldwide free trade. The EU's efforts must focus on mitigating these risks and threats with all the civil and military instruments at its disposal. This ability to deliver a Comprehensive Approach in its own right is



the main difference between NATO and the EU – with the focus on societal change rather than military defeat.

The solution is not clear or straightforward. It is easy to say, for example, that the Union wants Somali fisherman currently fleeing their homes to be able to stay in Somalia. By extrapolation we therefore need to ensure that indigenous security forces are able to establish a secure and stable environment, providing the conditions for the employment of civil instruments, which will in turn create an acceptable economic, healthy, educational etc. environment where people wish to live and work. However, we all know it is not quite that easy.

We also know that the vast majority of the trade that supports all our economies still relies on the freedom and safety of navigation of the high seas. So we must in parallel also be ready to secure our Sea, and other, Lines of Communication and alongside this, face new threats against our key infrastructure in the hybrid and cyber domain, amongst others.

### Future missions and operations

Out of the brief analysis above, we may draw the shape of the most likely military operations and missions we might be challenged with in the future, without changing the Headline Goal or the political Level of Ambition.

Firstly, we should think about the protection of our Land Lines and Sea Lines of Communication worldwide in close cooperation with organisations such as e.g. UN, NATO, AU, ASEAN etc. So clearly, EUNAVFOR (ATALANTA, SOPHIA) remains crucial not only in their conduct of this protection of both Sea Lines of Communication, but also in their engagement with our partners. Their work and that of their OHQs has been first class.

Secondly, we need to consider our role in building up resilience in so-called failed states and thus the necessity to be

able to enter and stabilise with military and other security forces. This is clearly demonstrated within the framework of Operations in the Western Balkans

Thirdly it is what we are already doing with our current training and advisory missions; training, advising and where needed, mentoring the military forces of partners in our neighborhood, and the neighborhood of the neighborhood. Our work to regenerate the necessary instruments of security and defence needed by the governments in Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia, is at the heart of this approach. We should not forget that this assistance cannot always be delivered in a safe and secure environment.

### Improving the results

This brings me to the question of risk. We must be much more aware of the balance of risk and effect in the missions and operations. Member State resources are finite and we must not be afraid to prioritise where the benefits are greatest, nor to accept that the level of risk is sometimes too significant. We must also get better at assessing and measuring the effect of what we deliver.

*On this note, it is surely time we better understood the many partners contributing to the protection of our interests and values and how we can work together more effectively. We need to look hard at supporting processes such as the implementation of the NATO – EU Joint declaration and use every means at our disposal to ensure the commitment, coherence and communication necessary to make this work. The enhancement of Defence Cooperation through additional instruments such as CARD, PESCO and the Commission's European Defense Action Plan offer the opportunity to really examine our capabilities, particularly in light of BREXIT and plan effectively for the future operations and missions that will assuredly be needed. ■*



DG EUMS Lt Gen Pulkkinen visits training instruction by EUTM RCA



# CLIMATE CHANGE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY WITH MAJOR REPERCUSSIONS FOR DEFENCE

BY MONSIEUR LE DRIAN, FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Monsieur Le Drian,  
French Minister of  
Defence



*I would first of all like to look back on our efforts in 2015, which ensured the success of the Paris Conference with the adoption of the Paris climate change agreement, the first agreement that is both ambitious and legally binding. One of the achievements of COP21 was the expression of a broad international consensus on the reality of climate change and the attendant risks, setting in train a dynamic response commensurate with the issues at stake.*

**The link between defence and climate change is now incontrovertible.** This has not always been the case. Although there is nothing to suggest that climate change could be the sole direct cause of a conflict, we do know that it plays a part in worsening the economic, social and political situation in certain countries. It can, for example, provoke internal crises which may in turn unleash regional and international crises. Thus, the progressive shrinking of Lake Chad, which has lost almost 90 % of its surface area over the last 50 years, is not incidental to the tensions and violence affecting the sub-region today. Although caution is warranted when referring to

the notion of 'populations displaced by climate change', the fact remains that desertification and water shortages in many regions are putting increasing pressure on local people who have no choice but to move away, either within their own countries or beyond. These population displacements carry a dramatic human cost. They sometimes exacerbate internal and international tensions. They may be significant, and the International Organisation for Migration estimates that they could involve hundreds of millions of people by 2050.

Contrary to received wisdom, **global warming does not only affect the security of developing countries.** France is also exposed to climate change, on the mainland and in its overseas territories, to say nothing of its 11 million km<sup>2</sup> of exclusive economic zones spread throughout the world's oceans and seas. Thus, all countries are affected by extreme weather events - a situation which will only worsen with time.

**Climate change already has a direct global impact on our environment,** an environment in which human societies - some of them fragile; others more resilient - evolve: rising sea levels, the number and intensity of extreme weather events (storms, cyclones, heat waves, floods, etc.) and rising temperatures and desertification, could leave entire regions uninhabitable, submerging land and putting huge pressure on resources, particularly water. How could this not affect international security? And how can we possibly ignore the huge consequences for those in charge of defence?

**In times of peace, thanks to their rapid response capability and in accordance with their rules of engagement and resources, armies intervene** in support of other administrations or, in some instances, on the frontline to bring relief to populations hit by major natural disasters. If these interventions were to increase in number and intensity, this would of course have consequences for armed forces' operational

contracts and resources. In times of crisis or conflict, and where the armed forces are involved in external operations, the environmental and climate context is critical, as it may constitute a major constraint for the forces deployed, both in human and material terms. We are experiencing this on a daily basis, particularly in the Sahel. The armies conduct their mission taking account of local exposure to climate, food or water constraints, which may vary in severity.

Furthermore, **in the early 2000s, the French Ministry of Defence undertook to implement a sustainable development strategy** which led, in particular, to a 20 % reduction in energy consumption over the past five years (operational activities aside), the eco-design of large amounts of equipment and infrastructure, and to major efforts to make the armies' operational activities compatible with the need to preserve the environment and biodiversity. These efforts in the field of 'green defence' will be continued, with active contributions from the defence sector to the government's sustainable development policies.

However, **our efforts in the field of defence cannot be confined to mitigation measures.** They should also cover specific features of defence missions, particularly in relation to knowledge and anticipation, protection, prevention and intervention. In France, strategic research has been bolstered by a geopolitical research institute which is assessing the repercussions of climate change for security and defence. It brings together experts on climate change, regional issues and defence, with a view to progressively mapping out the new risks associated with climate change in order to better anticipate the risks of international tensions and draw the necessary conclusions for our defence policy.

Finally, **it is clear that climate change is a global challenge which requires collective responses:** international cooperation is imperative. That is why I organised a major international conference of defence ministers and senior officials in Paris on 14 October 2015 to help build momentum for COP21, and also to promote awareness within defence ministries

across the world of the scale of the challenges facing us and the implications for defence. The conference brought together 33 delegations, including 15 ministers, along with representatives of the UN, the African Union and the European Union.

The conference provided an opportunity not only for very rich exchanges between ministerial representatives from all continents, but also for fruitful discussions on best practices and on the ways and means of pulling together in order to pass from collective awareness to action and cooperation. I therefore immediately supported my Moroccan counterpart's suggestion at the conference that the climate change issue be tackled in the framework of the 5+5 Western Mediterranean Defence Initiative. Under the current French presidency of the forum in 2017, the Euro-Maghreb centre for research and strategic studies, which brings together researchers from partner countries, will conduct a study on the impact of climate change on security within the ten countries of the 5+5 and their immediate neighbours.

Morocco, which chaired COP22 in 2016, also suggested organising a second international defence and climate change conference with a view to carrying on my initiative and instigating an international cycle of meetings at political level on a multi-faceted strategic challenge. The conference took place in Skhirat on 7 September 2016 and provided an opportunity to discuss other important issues, including the impact of climate change on maritime safety and the contribution of the space sector.

*With Europe now playing a leading role in the issue of climate change at international level, it seems to me that it would also be in its interest to support this international cycle of conferences on climate change and the implications for defence. COP23, chaired by a country from the Asia-Pacific region (Fiji), is particularly aware of the security challenges of climate change. It will be held in Bonn this autumn. In 2017, I want Europeans to remain fully committed, together with their partners, to monitoring the link between defence and climate change. ■*



Climate change effect on population stability



# L'action d'**EUTM RCA** dans la réorganisation de l'armée centrafricaine.

BY CAPITAINE SÉBASTIEN ISERN, PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER

La mission de formation de l'Union européenne EUTM RCA a été lancée en juillet 2016, pour un mandat initial de deux ans. Déployée à Bangui en République centrafricaine, l'objectif militaire principal d'EUTM RCA est de participer à la réforme globale du secteur de sécurité, en se concentrant sur le volet défense et en particulier la formation des nouvelles forces armées centrafricaines. Le pays se relève doucement d'une crise politique et sécuritaire majeure qui a fortement ébranlé l'outil de défense.

La mission de l'EUTM RCA s'inscrit dans le cadre de la comprehensive approach, composante essentielle de la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune de l'Union européenne. Le Force Commander, actuellement le général de brigade Herman Ruys (belge)<sup>1</sup>, travaille avec les autorités politiques et militaires démocratiquement

élues ainsi qu'avec les partenaires de la communauté internationale investis dans la résolution de la crise centrafricaine (dont l'ONU avec sa mission multidimensionnelle : la MINUSCA et surtout la Délégation Européenne présente à Bangui avec un ambassadeur). En lien direct avec le Service Européen d'Action Extérieure – le Chairman du Military Committee aujourd'hui et demain le directeur du Military planning and conduct capability sont les chefs militaires dans l'appareil bruxellois – le général Ruys assure la cohérence des actions de l'EUTM RCA avec les acteurs locaux et internationaux à Bangui.

L'Union européenne participe depuis plusieurs années à la résolution de la crise centrafricaine. L'action d'EUTM RCA s'inscrit dans une forte continuité, succédant aux missions EUFOR et EUMAM, qui ont permis d'une part

Attestation de Participation







HQ EUTM RCA

la stabilisation de la capitale (zone d'opération exclusive des missions européennes), et d'autre part une revue pluridirectionnelle du système de défense centrafricain en vue de sa refondation.

Ainsi, fort de ses 170 hommes et femmes issus de 11 nations européennes et partenaires (le détachement de Force Protection de la mission est armé par la Géorgie, fidèle allié depuis sa participation à EUFOR et EUMAM), l'EUTM RCA s'articule principalement autour de trois axes majeurs : le Strategic advice pillar, l'Education pillar et l'Operational training pillar. L'appui de l'EUTM RCA à la renaissance de l'armée nationale couvre ainsi l'ensemble des besoins en matière de réforme, et à chaque niveau :

- L'étroite coopération au niveau du Ministre de la Défense se traduit par les travaux d'élaboration de la politique de défense nationale et de soutien à la rédaction d'un livre blanc de la défense décrivant le concept d'emploi des forces nationales,
- Basé sur le concept « train the trainers », redonner aux cadres militaires centrafricains la capacité de former en autonome sur un nouveau modèle démocratique leur propre armée,
- Enfin, la remontée en puissance opérationnelle des forces tactiques en vue de leur déploiement sur l'ensemble du territoire national, accompagnant ainsi la reconquête du pays par l'Etat.

La cohérence encore une fois est un marqueur fort de la mission. Pour l'Etat centrafricain, il était important, outre de redevenir un Etat souverain à travers un sys-

tème de défense recomposé, de redéfinir complètement ce système. Le premier bataillon d'infanterie de la nouvelle armée sera en conformité avec les aspirations nées des dernières élections démocratiques. Et l'EUTM RCA devrait pouvoir « livrer » cette unité de plus de 700 hommes et femmes rigoureusement sélectionnés<sup>2</sup> dès le printemps 2017. Son emploi devra être en conformité avec la politique de défense nationale. En parallèle, avec le soutien de partenaires comme la France, un bataillon amphibie retrouve lui aussi ses capacités opérationnelles, redonnant à l'Etat le contrôle de ses frontières fluviales.

*La problématique de l'équipement et surtout celle de l'armement des troupes reste un enjeu politique fort en République centrafricaine, où l'armée a eu un rôle ambivalent dans la succession des crises tandis que des groupes armés persistent dans certaines zones du territoire. L'apport d'EUTM RCA sur cette question est de démontrer (tant à la communauté internationale qu'au pouvoir politique centrafricain lui-même) que les soldats centrafricains qui sont passés entre les mains des instructeurs européens répondent aux nouvelles valeurs de la République et seront les garants de la sécurité de ses sujets. ■*

1. Le général Ruys est issu de l'Eurocorps, qui assure également la deuxième rotation d'EUTM RCA, en formant le key nucleus de la mission. L'état-major strasbourgeois sera à nouveau déployé sur Bangui à l'été 2017.

2. L'adoption d'un code de justice militaire par le Président de la République et fortement soutenu par l'Union Européenne, ajoute à la démocratisation des troupes centrafricaines.





Note: Missions/Operations in **bold** are ongoing. Dates refer to agreed mandates and do not mean that missions/operations will necessarily close on dates indicated. Information correct at time of print 01 May 2017.



# EU Missions and Operations

Since 2003, the EU has conducted, or is conducting, 34 missions and operations under CSDP. 12 are military operations/missions. The remainder are civilian missions. Currently, the EU is undertaking 15 missions and operations under CSDP (6 military missions and operations and 9 civilian missions).

Operations	MILITARY MISSIONS	CIVILIAN MISSIONS
MIDDLE EAST	-	EUJUST LEX-Iraq (Iraq), Mar 05 - Dec 13 <b>EUPOL - COPPS</b> (occupied Palestinian territories), Jan 06 - 30 Jun 17 <b>EUBAM Rafah</b> (occupied Palestinian territories), 25 Nov 05 - 30 Jun 17
EUROPE	CONCORDIA (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Mar - Dec 03 <b>EUFOR ALTHEA</b> (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Dec 04 - Nov 06 <b>EUNAVFOR MED – Operation SOPHIA</b> . Contribute to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. Training Libyan coastguard and prevention of arms smuggling, Jun 15 - Jul 17	EUPOL Proxima (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Dec 03 - Dec 05 EUPAT (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) followed EUPOL Proxima, Dec 05 – Jun 06 EUPM BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jan 03 - Jun 12 EUJUST Themis (Georgia), Jul 04 - Jul 05 EUPT Kosovo, Apr 06 - Feb 08 <b>EULEX Kosovo</b> , 04 Feb 08 - 14 Jun 18 <b>EUMM Georgia</b> , 15 Sep 08 - 14 Dec 18 <b>EUAM Ukraine</b> , 22 Jul 14 - 30 Nov 17
ASIA	-	AMM (Aceh Province, Indonesia), Sep 05 - Dec 06 EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (Afghanistan), 12 Jun 07 - 31 Dec 16
AFRICA	ARTEMIS (Ituri province, Congo RDC), Jun – Sep 03 EUFOR RD Congo (Congo RDC), Jun – Nov 06 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad-Central African Republic), Jan 08 – Mar 09 <b>Operation ATALANTA</b> (EUNAVFOR Somalia Operation to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia) Dec 08 – Dec 18 <b>EUTM Somalia</b> (Training Mission, Somalia), Apr 10 - Dec 18 <b>EUTM Mali</b> (Training Mission, Mali), Feb 13 - May 18 <b>EUTM RCA</b> (Central African Republic, Africa) July 16 - Sep 18	EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo RDC), Apr 05 - Jun 07 EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau), Jun 08 - Sep 10 AMIS 11 Support, Darfur Province (Sudan), Jul 05 - Dec 07 EUVASEC South Sudan, Sep 12 - Jan 14 <b>EUCAP SOMALIA</b> , Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, 01 Jul 12 – 31 Dec 18 EUPOL RD Congo (Congo RDC), 01 Jul 07 - 30 Sep 14 <b>EUCAP Sahel Niger</b> 15 Jul 12 - 15 Jul 18 <b>EUCAP Sahel Mali</b> 15 Jan 15 – 14 Jan 19 <b>EUBAM LIBYA</b> 22 May 13 – 21 August 17



 <b>OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES</b> <b>EU BAM RAFAH</b> 	
TYPE	EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point.
OBJECTIVES	To provide a “Third Party” presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) on the Gaza-Egypt border, mandated to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) border police and customs services at the RCP and to contribute to confidence building between Israel and the PA.
MANDATE	Operational phase began on 25 November 2005. However, operations at the RCP have been suspended since June 2007 due to Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip. The Mission has maintained its readiness and capacity to redeploy to the RCP once political and security conditions allow. It supports capacity building of the PA’s border agency to enhance their preparedness to return to the RCP. The Mission mandate runs until 30 June 2017.
COMMITMENT	The authorised strength of the Mission is 13, as well as 3 visiting experts. The budget for the period from July 2016 to June 2017 is € 1.5 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Natalina Cea</b> (IT).



 <b>OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES</b> <b>EUPOL COPPS</b> 	
TYPE	EU Police and Rule of Law Mission.
OBJECTIVES	To contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing and wider criminal justice arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU’s institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector and Criminal Justice Reform.
MANDATE	Launched on 1 January 2006, the current Mission mandate runs until 30 June 2017.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Ramallah, the Mission has an authorised strength of 114 staff. Mission members include police experts, judges, and prosecutors.. The budget for the period from July 2016 to June 2017 is €10.3 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Rodolphe Mauget</b> (FR).

 <b>BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA</b> <b>EUROPEAN UNION</b> <b>FORCE ALTHEA</b> (EUFOR ALTHEA) 	
TYPE	Military EU-led operation.
OBJECTIVES	Under the authority of the Council and in line with the mandate, EUFOR ALTHEA supports Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) efforts to maintain a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and in parallel, conducts capacity building and training of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) in order to contribute to the stability of the state.
MANDATE	In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibility of maintaining a SASE in BiH from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The EU-led military Operation EUFOR ALTHEA is a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mission.
COMMITMENT	In October 2011 the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) decided to keep the executive role to support BiH's authorities' efforts to maintain the SASE. By September 2012, the operation had been reconfigured with forces which, in addition, will focus on capacity building and training. There are currently 565 troops from 14 EU Member States and 5 Third Contributing States ready to carry out these tasks. EUFOR is backed up by the Intermediate Reserve Forces and stands ready to respond to any security challenge.
HEAD OF MISSION	The operation is conducted under Berlin+ arrangements, where EU Staff Group in NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) acts as an EU Operational HQ. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), <b>General Sir James Rupert Everard</b> (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. <b>Major General Anton Waldner</b> (AT) is the Force Commander (COM EUFOR) of EUFOR ALTHEA.

 <b>UKRAINE</b> <b>EUAM UKRAINE</b> 	
TYPE	EU Advisory Mission for civilian security sector reform
OBJECTIVES	To assist the Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights. The goal is to achieve a civilian security sector that is efficient, accountable, and enjoys the trust of the public.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 22 July 2014 and its current mandate is until 30 November 2017.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Kyiv with regional presences in Lviv and Kharkiv as well as mobile outreach to other regions. The Mission has an authorised strength of 268 staff. A budget of €20.8 million was allocated for the period from December 2016 to November 2017.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Kestutis Lancinskas</b> (LT).

 <b>KOSOVO</b> <b>EULEX KOSOVO</b> 	
TYPE	EU Rule of Law Mission.
OBJECTIVES	As the largest civilian Mission launched under the CSDP, EULEX Kosovo's task is to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.
MANDATE	Launched on 4 February 2008, the Mission's current mandate runs until 14 June 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquartered in Pristina, the Mission has an authorised strength of 800 staff. EU Member States and five Third State contributors Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA and Canada also support the Mission. A budget of €34.5 million is allocated for the budget period from June to December 2016.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Alexandra Papadopoulou</b> (EL)



 <b>GEORGIA</b> <b>EUMM GEORGIA</b> 	
TYPE	EU Civilian Monitoring Mission
OBJECTIVES	Following the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia, EUMM provides civilian monitoring of parties' actions, including full compliance with the Six Point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures on a countrywide basis throughout Georgia, including South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, working in close coordination with partners particularly the UN/OSCE and coherent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to stabilisation, normalization and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia.
MANDATE	Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission's mandate runs to 14 December 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi. Currently 23 EU Member States are contributing to the Mission. The Mission has an authorised strength of 412. The budget for the period from December 2015 to December 2016 is € 17.6 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Kestutis Jankauskas</b> (LT).

 <b>CENTRAL SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN</b> <b>EUNAVFOR MED</b> 	
TYPE	Operation SOPHIA – EUNAVFOR MED. Operation to contribute to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean.
OBJECTIVES	The aim of this military operation is to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers. Countering the smuggling and trafficking of migrants is one dimension of ending the human tragedy that we see in the Mediterranean sea. Currently 24 Member States are participating to the operation. On June 2016, the mandate was extended until July 2017 and reinforced with two supporting tasks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy;</li> <li>• contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, following the UNSCR 2292 (2016).</li> </ul>
MANDATE	EUNAVFOR Med is operating in accordance with the political, strategic and politico-military objectives set out in order to contribute to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. Jun 2015 - Jul 2017.
COMMITMENT	The flagship is the Italian Landing Platform Dock ITS San Giusto, 5 surface units and 6 air Assets are deployed. In addition, the expected common budget from Jul 16 to Jul 17 is EURO 6.7 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Rome (Italy), Rear Admiral (UH) <b>Enrico Credendino</b> (IT Navy) is the Operation Commander and a Rear Admiral (LH) <b>Andrea Romani</b> (IT Navy) acts as Force Commander at sea.







 <div> <b>LIBYA</b>  <b>EUBAM LIBYA</b> </div> 	
TYPE	EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya
OBJECTIVES	EUBAM Libya will assist in a comprehensive civilian security sector reform planning process, with a view to preparing for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission with the task to 'inform EU planning for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission in the field of security sector reform, co-operating closely with, and contributing to, UNSMIL efforts, liaising with the legitimate Libyan authorities and other relevant security interlocutors.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 22 May 2013 and has a mandate until 21 August 2017. The Mission was temporarily relocated to Tunis on 31st July 2014. Current authorised staff is 23.
COMMITMENT	The Mission operates from its Headquarters in Tunis. The budget for the period from 22 August 2016 to 21 August 2017 is €17 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Vincenzo Tagliaferri</b> (IT-).



 <div> <b>NIGER</b>  <b>EUCAP SAHEL</b> </div> 	
TYPE	EU Capacity Building Mission.
OBJECTIVES	Through training and advising, the Mission aims to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces (Gendarmerie, National Police, National Guard) to fight terrorism and organised crime as well as better control irregular migration flows in an effective and coordinated manner, with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 15 July 2012 and the current mandate runs until 15 July 2018.
COMMITMENT	Headquarters in Niamey and Field Office in Agadez. Authorised 127 staff. An annual budget of € 26.3 million was allocated for the period from July 2016 to July 2017.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Kirsi Henriksson</b> (FI).



 <div> <b>MALI</b>  <b>EUCAP SAHEL</b> </div> 	
TYPE	EU Capacity Building Mission
OBJECTIVES	The Mission supports the restructuring of the Malian internal security forces (the Police Nationale, Gendarmerie Nationale and Garde Nationale) with a view to help Malian authorities implement their Security Sector Reform through a combination of training activities and the provision of strategic advice. In this, it complements the work of the EU Military Training Mission.
MANDATE	The Mission was launched on 15 January 2015 and its current mandate runs until 14 January 2019.
COMMITMENT	The headquarters of the Mission is in Bamako. The authorised strength is 140 staff. The annual budget for the period from January 2017 to January 2018 is €29.8 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Albrecht Conze</b> (DE).

 <div> <b>HORN OF AFRICA AND THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN</b>  <b>EUCAP SOMALIA</b> </div> 	
TYPE	Capacity Building Mission.
OBJECTIVES	The Mission aims to strengthen the maritime security capacity of host countries to effectively govern their territorial waters and to reinforce their ability to fight piracy better. The Mission's efforts in Somalia concentrate on mentoring and advising Somali partners. This strategic level advice and mentoring is supported by the coordination and facilitation of specialised training to support capacity building efforts. The Mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia.
MANDATE	Launched in July 2012, current mandate runs until 12 December 2016.
COMMITMENT	The mission has its headquarters in Mogadishu with an administrative back office in Nairobi and a field office in Somaliland (Hargeisa). Authorised strength is 176, though currently deployed 48. The budget allocated for the period from December 2015 to December 2016 is €12 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Maria-Cristina Stepanescu</b> (RO).

 <div> <b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC</b>  <b>EUTM RCA</b>  <b>(MILITARY TRAINING MISSION)</b> </div> 	
TYPE	EU CSDP Military Training Mission
OBJECTIVES	EUTM RCA is part of the EU's comprehensive approach in the Central African Republic. This approach aims to contribute to the African and wider international efforts to restore stability and support the political transition process in the country. EUTM RCA follows the EU Military Advisory Mission in CAR (EUMAM RCA).
MANDATE	Launched on 16 Jul 16, its mandate expires two years after Full Operational Capability (FOC), on 20 Sep 18
COMMITMENT	In order to contribute to the Defense Sector Reform in CAR within the Central African Security Sector Reform process coordinated by MINUSCA, and working towards the goal of modernized, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA), EUTM RCA provides strategic advice to CAR's Ministry of Defense and Military Staff, education to the FACA's commissioned and non-commissioned officers and specialists, and operational training to the FACA. It also coordinates closely with the EU Delegation in Bangui
HEAD OF MISSION	The Mission Headquarters is located in Bangui. It performs the functions of both Operational and Force Headquarters. The EU Mission Commander is <b>Brigadier General Herman Ruys</b> (BEL). He exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.

 <b>SOMALIA</b> <b>Operation ATALANTA – EUNAVFOR</b> <b>Operation to counter piracy</b> <b>off the coast of Somalia</b> 	
TYPE	Counter-piracy maritime operation. First EU maritime operation.
OBJECTIVES	In support of UN Security Council Resolutions calling for active participation in the fight against piracy. The areas of intervention are the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean off the Somali Coast. The operation includes: Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; in addition, Operation ATALANTA also supports, as a Secondary Task, upon request and within means and capabilities, other EU missions, institutions and instruments within Somalia. Of note, Operation ATALANTA is not a Fishery Protection mission; however, its role does allow it to contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and report this activity to DG MARE. Currently 735 staff members, 19 EU contributing states and 3 non-EU states.
MANDATE	Launched on 8 Dec 2008 - Dec 2018
COMMITMENT	Subject to Military Force Flow and the Force Generation process, Operation ATALANTA typically consists of between 1 to 3 surface combat vessels and up to 2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Common costs for the Operation in 2016 are € 6.3 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK). <b>Major General Rob Magowan CBE</b> (UK) is the EU Operation Commander. <b>Rear Admiral Rafael Fernández-Pintado Muñoz-Rojas</b> (ES) is the Force Commander.

 <b>SOMALIA</b> <b>EU TRAINING Mission,</b> <b>Somalia (EUTM Somalia)</b> 	
TYPE	Military mission to contribute to the training, mentoring and advice of the Somali National Army Forces (SNAF)
OBJECTIVES	On 16 March 2015, the Council adopted the decision on a new mandate with the objective to provide political and strategic level military advice and mentoring to Somali authorities within the Defence Institutions, mainly specialized training as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain, in order to contribute to the development of Somali National Security Forces.
MANDATE	The current mandate until December 2016. On 20 September 2016, a new mandate has been presented and will launch on 01 January 2017 and initially planned for two years, until December 2018, according to Strategic Review of CSPD engagement in Somalia and HoA. EUTM-Somalia shall not be involved in combat operations.
COMMITMENT	The mission comprises currently 176 personnel from 11 Member States and 1 participating third state (Serbia) + 17 local staff. The approved budget for the 2016 is 11,1M€. Since January 2014 all EUTM-Somalia activities including advisory, mentoring and training are now carried out in Mogadishu with the support of a Liaison Office in Nairobi and a Support Cell in Brussels.
HEAD OF MISSION	The Mission Headquarters is situated in Mogadishu. <b>Brigadier General MORENA</b> (IT) is the EU Mission Commander from 21st March 2016. The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.

 <b>MALI</b> <b>EU TRAINING MISSION,</b> <b>MALI (EUTM MALI)</b> 	
TYPE	Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF).
OBJECTIVES	In line with the "EU Strategy for Development and Security in the SAHEL", EUTM aims to support the training and reorganisation of the Malian Armed Forces and to help improve its military capacity, in order to allow, under civilian authority, the restoration of the country's territorial integrity. More than 10,000 personnel have been trained by EUTM Mali. The mission also support the implementation of the structural reforms encompassed in the Defence Programming Law ("Loi de programmation militaire - LOPM).
MANDATE	Launched on 18 February 2013 and initially planned for 15 months, EUTM Mali has been extended until May 2016. On 23 March 2016, the Council of the EU decided to further extend the Mandate of EUTM for a period of two years, until May 2018. EUTM Mali is not involved in combat operations or mentoring. Its actions extend up to the river Niger Loop, including Gao and Timbuktu.
COMMITMENT	The mission comprises 541 personnel including 200 instructors, mission support staff, Force Protection and Air MEDEVAC (in total 22 EU contributing states + 4 non EU). The Mission Headquarters is located in Bamako and the main Training area is in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of the capital. Common costs for the current mandate are estimated at €33 million.
HEAD OF MISSION	<b>Brigadier General Peter DEVOGELAERE</b> (BE). The Mission Commander exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.

# EUTM Mali

BY LT COL MARC LEVENBERGH, PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER

### An EU defense and security mission

*Since February 2013, the European Union conducts a Military Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), to provide military and training advice to the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity.*

EUTM Mali can be considered as a proving ground for the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It has adopted comprehensive bottom-up and top-down approach through education, training and advice. EUTM Mali symbolises and embodies the spirit of defense and security missions conducted by the European Union to support the empowerment of the Malian Security Forces.

Providing training support for the benefit of the MaAF



### The objectives of EUTM Mali

EUTM Mali responds to the operational needs of the MaAF through the provision of:

- training support for the benefit of the MaAF,
- training and advice on command and control, logistical chain and human resources, as well as training on International Humanitarian Law, protection of civilians and human rights,
- a contribution, upon Malian request and in coordination with MINUSMA, to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process (DDR) framed by the Peace Agreement, through the provision of training sessions in order to facilitate the reconstruction of inclusive Malian Armed Forces,
- support to the G5 Sahel process by contributing to enhancing coordination and interoperability within the G5 Sahel national armed forces.

Advisory, Training and Education Concept

### Advice

EUTM Mali provides advice at both strategic and regional level, to the Ministry of Defence, Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) authorities and to military headquarters in the military regions in support to the implementation of the struc-

tural reforms encompassed in the Defence Programming Law. Additionally, the Mission assists the MaAF in assessing the implementation of their structural and organisational reform.

French-speaking, multi-disciplinary, military advisors from eight European nations share their experience and expertise with their Malian counterparts in the domains of human resources management, doctrine, training, logistics, intelligence, conduct of operations, information systems, finances and planning.

### Training

During the last 4 years, EUTM Mali has successfully trained 8 Battlegroups whereas 5 Battlegroups have been retrained. Additionally, several Leadership Courses as well as Specialised Training Courses took place. In total, about 10000 soldiers have been trained by EUTM Mali.

In order to transition to an autonomous MaAF training in the future, EUTM will concentrate on a gradual “Train the Trainer” and “Monitor the Trainer” approach focusing on MaAF leaders mainly in the military region headquarter garrisons, Malian military schools or at the EUTM Training Centre in Koulikoro.

During the 3rd mandate, EUTM has already organised 4 Combined Mobile Advisory Training Teams (CMATT): 2 in SEGOU, 1 in KATI and 1 in GAO. A CMATT is a decentralised ad hoc training unit with the aim to deliver training and advice to MaAF in the military regions.

### Education

In order to enhance leadership skills in the MaAF, leadership education and training will always be crucial. The main focus lies on leadership skills education, tactical education, training planning process, basic military principles and International Humanitarian Law based on Malian culture and history.

### International Humanitarian Law

The respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law is an essential part of EUTM training, delivered by highly-qualified staff. The training includes basic concepts such as proportionality and military necessity, the measures and procedures required in dealing with protected sites and persons, the Rules of Engagement, self-defense, the protection of women and prevention of sexual violence.

### Evolution of the mission

EUTM Mali progressively moves from initially centralised activities, towards a more decentralised approach in the regions, enabling the MaAF to increasingly take responsibility for a military owned education and training system and for taking the lead to strive toward a successful reform process. ■



# Enhancing multinational logistic support: **EU signs ACSA with USA.**

BY DEBORAH LASSCHE, EUMS LOGISTIC DIRECTORATE

EU missions and operations operate in difficult and often dangerous environments. Adequate and fast logistical support is therefore of the essence. A very useful tool for assuring this is the recently signed Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between the European Union and the United States of America. It marks a major milestone in the enhancement of EU-US military co-operation, to enable better crisis response and promote security around the world.

### What is an ACSA?

An ACSA is a logistics tool to enable operation commanders to draw on military resources that are not immediately available from military or commercial sources. The ACSA agreement between the US and the EU facilitates the exchange of logistics support, supplies and services. There is no increase in costs applied as there are no standing fees or any other costs associated with the agreement. The mechanism simply allows both participants to exchange resources or services needed in operations either for money or for other goods. The exchange of items such as weapon systems is excluded from the agreement. The ACSA can be used during a broad range of military contingencies and circumstances including crisis management operations and peace keeping operations as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. It does not, however, place any obligation on either party to provide support in a given circumstance. All transactions must be mutually agreed upon before signing and executing a specific task.

The EU-US ACSA brings with it many advantages for both parties. It provides opportunities for reduction of costs and a more efficient and faster delivery of resources. Also, it makes it easier to respond to needs that can be location or special needs dependent. It can overcome logistics shortfalls during times of emergency, reduce the logistics tail and provide flexibility to the operation or mission commander. Lastly, it can provide worldwide coverage and enhance military-to-military interoperability.

The establishment of an arrangement for the EU as a whole will enable all EU military mission or operation commanders to draw upon the logistics capacity of the US, without having to revert to bilateral agreements and thereby potentially lose tactical opportunities or imperatives during the process. This applies equally for US activities. All in all, the ACSA is a major logistics capability enhancement.



*Former US Secretary of State, John Kerry, and HRVP Federica Mogherini sign the EU-US ACSA*

### Example of an ACSA in use: UN-US cooperation with food drops in Deir Ezzor, Syria

In spring 2016, the besieged Syrian city of Deir Ezzor was in desperate need of humanitarian aid. However, it could not be reached by the UN over land surface routes since those were all blocked. The UN also lacked an airdrop resource. By using the UN-US ACSA it acquired US airdrop parachutes to provide 20 tonnes of food aid, enough to feed 2,500 people for one month.



*Example of an ACSA in use: UN-US cooperation with food drops in Deir Ezzor, Syria*

*The EU Military Staff will function as the military point of contact for the use of the new ACSA. To that end, it is currently developing a clear set of instructions for finance staff and headquarters to assist them in implementing this new and very practical logistics tool. ■*

# Ways to implement **Cyber Defence** in CSDP activities.

BY CDR JAN-PETER GIESECKE, ACTION OFFICER EUMS CIS

Overview of malicious activities in the internet - using the NORSE information website (NORSE is operating a wide sensor network in the internet for detecting attacks and anomalies).



## The new threat landscape

All EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) activities, including military missions and operations are dependent on effective Command & Control, on assured information and functioning and uncontested communication and information systems, and therefore deeply rely on the availability of free and secure access to the internet or – using the newer and broader term – to 'Cyberspace'.

On the other hand, Cyberspace is increasingly becoming a new battlefield with cyber-attacks being a part of daily business – and of foreign affairs and CSDP operations and missions as well. Anonymously, unattributed and below the threshold of armed conflict, adversaries are using the cyber domain to accomplish their political, economic, and also military objectives in emerging 'hybrid' scenarios. This may vary from simple disinformation via social media, to influence public opinion and electoral behaviour, to more severe destabilisation operations with cyber-attacks on energy, transport or banking systems, up to direct cyber operations also on EU's CSDP networks. Although there is no evidence yet of being specifically targeted, operations and missions are facing a growing cyber threat dimension.

## Political frameworks

In 2014 – in the follow-up to the publication of the EU Cyber Security Strategy - the European External Action Service

(EEAS) developed a framework policy to improve resilience against cyber threats in CSDP activities and to develop capabilities for cyber security and defence implementation. Recently, the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy designated cyber security and defence as a priority, focusing on both resilience and protection, and addressing in particular the need to cooperate and to share information among Member States (MS) and also with military and civilian partners. These high level documents form a valuable foundation for the implementation of cyber security and defence in CSDP activities. However, in the past the topic and appropriate measures have been taken into account to a very varying degree. Reasons may be a general ignorance of this 'nerd' business, a limited perception of cyber threats and their impact, and therefore, a low priority to 'invest' in cyber security and cyber defence capabilities.

## Cyber defence in practice

For the three most recent missions (EUMAM RCA, EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA, EUTM RCA) an appropriate consideration of cyber defence aspects was achieved in planning; and hence, resilience and protection of Command & Control and Communication Information have been implemented quite successfully. But this showed also several key aspects and identified lessons for the future:

- The most important aspect of resilience is to prepare the people involved. The most common 'cyber-vulnerability' remains the human element. **Mitigating the human risks** essentially requires a change in culture and behaviour in handling and working with ICT, to be achieved through constant education and knowledge update by regular cyber awareness training.
- To ensure effective cyber security and defence during conduct it is essential to consider cyber aspects **as early as possible during planning** (ensuring that cyber threats are addressed in the Crisis Management Concept and Initiating Military Directive).
- Cyber aspects must therefore be included in and seen as part of the overall threat evaluation for the planned operation or mission. Any planning and conduct of Cyber Defence has to be supported by continuous **cyber intelligence information**, to be provided by the EU's strategic intelligence structures (INTCEN, EUMS.INT). Key for this is intensified **information sharing** with MS, and also cooperation with CERT EU, NATO elements and commercial partners.



- Importantly, Operation / Mission Commanders and their staff must be able to understand detailed cyber-related information, know about the relevance of the cyber domain in today's conflicts (to be accepted as the 5th operational domain equal to land, air, sea and space) and the impact of cyber operations. It is therefore essential to provide them with specific decision maker's training and exercises to build up a **broader operational excellence** in the cyber domain.


### The Cyber Defence Concept and the way ahead

In view of the above mentioned challenges and reflecting the lessons learnt, the EUMS Cyber Defence Team developed a new EU Concept for Cyber Defence for military operations and missions in 2016. The aim was to describe the process of an assured and effective consideration of cyber aspects in (military) planning and how to implement cyber defence measures in operations and missions, addressing cyber specific organisational and procedural aspects as well as requirements for Member State (MS) provision of cyber capabilities for CSDP activities<sup>1</sup>.

The Cyber Defence Concept also defined the way ahead for follow-on activities to implement Cyber Defence in CSDP. The high-level requirements in the concept now have to be translated into actionable work packages. Subsequently, concrete and detailed cyber capabilities have to be defined and supported by the studies carried out by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and its cyber defence project team.

For additional and detailed support of cyber aspects during conduct of CSDP operations and missions, cyber support structures (so-called Cyber Cells) should be established within (future) OHQ/FHQ, advising the Cdrs on all cyber matters and therefore bridging the typical 'mind gap' between the higher-level decision-makers and the real specialists (at Network and Security Operation Centres). To complement this, Standardised Operational Procedures (SOPs) have to be developed and tested to ensure that both the strategic and the operational level of missions and operations act and react appropriately and without delay, and to ensure that operations can continue even in a degraded and contested cyber environment.

The main work strand is of course education, training and exercises and the streamlining of the EU's cyber defence education and training landscape. Supported by the EUMS and the MS, the cyber discipline within the EU Military Training Working Group, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the EDA are working hand-in-hand on new initiatives for the design, development, conduct and evaluation of training activities and exercises, from awareness training up to courses for high-level decision-makers. A key enabler for the latter is the cooperation with civilian and military partners. While cyber expertise from industry and academia is linked into the processes mainly by the EDA and the ESDC, the EUMS interacts closely with NATO on military aspects of cyber defence. The implementation plan of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, which was adopted by Council conclusions in December 2016,



A potential organization for an effective implementation of Cyber Defence in military EU operations and missions (as described in the new Cyber Defence Concept)

gives a huge impetus also to the common use and development of training and exercises by the two organisations.

Besides this, some first steps have also been taken towards closer cooperation between cyber security and defence in CSDP and cyber security in civilian sectors, for instance in pooling and sharing training and mutual attendance of and support for exercises.

### Conclusion

The success of cyber defence in CSDP operations and missions remains dependent on a well-balanced combination of state-of-the-art technology, well-functioning structures and procedures, and educated, cyber-aware and competent staff. But more than ever this has to be enabled by cooperation and information-sharing agreements, both with external partners such as NATO and internally across MS and EU institutions, in particular to provide vital Intelligence information on Cyber threats. With the likely organisational changes and the integration of civil and military elements in crisis management and response, there is a clear need for an integrated approach to counter cyber (and hybrid) threats for a stronger posture across all military and civilian CSDP activities

*Cdr Jan-Peter GIESECKE is an Action Officer in the EUMS CIS Directorate and Head of the Cyber Defence Team. He is mainly responsible for the implementation of Cyber Defence aspects into planning and conduct of military operations and missions, and developed the new EU Cyber Defence Concept. ■*



1. Respective ideas for integrating Cyber Security into civilian missions will be described in a dedicated concept, which is written currently by CMPD, making references to and being aligned with the new military Cyber Defence Concept.

## European Air Transport Command (EATC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) are **intensifying** their **cooperation**

BY MAJOR GENERAL CHRIS BADIA, COMMANDER EATC AND BRIGADIER GENERAL DIONIGI LORIA, EUMS DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS

Lieutenant-General Wosolsobe, Director EUMS, and Major General Badia, Commander EATC, signed on 3 May 2016 a "Letter of Intent" to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation between their organisations.

The Letter of Intent (LoI) confirms the willingness of EATC and EUMS to expand the cooperative efforts by sharing expertise and, in view of future operations, to better understand EU's planning process and EATC's operational processes. The LoI is a marker of progress to intensify technical partnership in general, as advocated by both organisations.

The EATC draws on cooperation with a number of organisations such as SHAPE, JAPCC, NSPA, UN, MCCE and EAG. Through strong relationships, it develops working partnerships in the domains of air transport, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical evacuation.

The EUMS is always open to partners to work with to enhance co-operation. This is in the spirit of the EU and of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EUMS is especially invested in logistics. Air transport, air-to-air refuelling and strategic evacuations are key capabilities for EU military operations. Moreover, air movement and transport considerations are essential from the very early stages of EU's

military strategic planning process, as well as for military advice to the political strategic level and the development of concepts.

In this respect the EATC is a privileged partner to the EUMS. The seven EATC member nations are also EU member states committed in CSDP. Both organisations benefit from each other by sharing experience and expertise in the air transport domain and by coordinating in the joint strategic planning area.

Following the signature of the Letter of Intent in May 2016, EUMS and EATC have already cooperated and exchanged information in the past in the air transport domain (collaborative efforts on EU concepts, contribution to EATC Ground Handling Working Group and to EU deployability conferences, etc...). Further cooperative endeavours are under consideration.

The European Air Transport Command - a lighthouse example of pooling and sharing ...

The EATC has become the major command for air transport, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical evacuation of seven nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands and Spain operate their military air transport assets under one command with one common set of rules and regulations.

The key to EATC's success is the trust and confidence that the EATC has gained from the member nations. Only if the condition for trust and confidence is met, nations are willing to pool and share.

Maj Gen Badia and Lt Gen Wosolsobe sign 'Letter of Intent'





Member nations have access to their nationally assigned military assets and also to the complete and diverse EATC multinational fleet of about 200 aircraft. This fleet represents 60% of all military air transport assets in Europe. From the headquarters at Eindhoven Airbase (the Netherlands), the EATC today runs a daily average of 60 missions throughout the world. Thanks to an integrated staff of currently 214 persons, the EATC handles the full process from planning and tasking to controlling of the fleet both in peacetime and in times of crisis. At any moment, the EATC chooses the asset which fits best the requirements of the mission at hand. The diversity of this multinational fleet with more than 20 type of aircraft gives the EATC a unique flexibility and the opportunity to optimise missions and enhance the required efficiency and effectiveness.

EATC's well-thought-out concept assures the transfer of authority of the member nations' air transport assets. The fact that the transfer of assets can be revoked at any given time safeguards possible national caveats. From the beginning, this built-in provision resulted in a stable number of aircraft transferred to the EATC. Over time, as trust and confidence in the EATC grew, so did the number of transferred aircraft.

The EATC is not an independent body governing the assigned assets, but is part of the seven national command structures. Consequently the people working at EATC oper-

ate in fact for the nations. Through the Operational Division, they plan, task, control and report on missions on behalf of the nations. They have at their disposal a unique dedicated IT tool, MEAT<sup>1</sup> that was developed by the EATC. Through the Functional Division, they enhance harmonisation and standardisation of doctrines or procedures, as well as work on a smart solution to share and pool. They run, in coordination with the EDA, multinational training for national air transport crews and assets, such as EATT<sup>2</sup>, EAATTC<sup>3</sup> and EATIC<sup>4</sup>. In future, the EATC will work hand in hand with the European Tactical Airlift Centre (ETAC) that will be set up in Spain.

While the EATC has built a large and recognised experience in the domains of military air transport, air-to-air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation, it is now striving towards a threefold centre of expertise for the member nations. To do so it is continuously optimising its processes in close relation with the national actors and according to their needs.

Through training, standardisation and harmonisation of procedures and regulations, EATC increases the performance level of the nations' air transport capabilities. Moreover it provides the member nations concepts and ideas as to how to proceed in the future. A recent example of EATC's work is the key role it plays with the employment of new aircraft types, such as the Airbus A400M. The EATC has written a variety of concepts for the A400M for the benefit of and in close coordination with our A400M-user nations. Another example to shape the future is the planning and testing of a standard route for military air transport.

*EATC will continue to prove its success by enabling the member nations to fully rely on the multinational command, relinquishing costly air transport solutions and sharing common ideas. Through the increased trust and confidence by the member nations, future challenges can be dealt with more effectively and more efficiently. ■*



1. Management of European Air Transport
2. European Air Transport Training
3. European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course
4. European Advanced Tactical Instructor Course

# Adapting the EU Military **Capability** Development to evolving security threats

BY LTC KLAUS SCHADENBAUER, CONCAP DIRECTORATE

Military Planners  
Workshop



*Deployment of Aircraft Carriers, projection of amphibious forces and large scale military manoeuvre in hostile environment - that's not what comes to one's mind first when thinking about EU CSDP military operations. Nevertheless, such capabilities were virtually deployed from 03 to 07 April 2017 by a group of Military Planners from EU Member States during an EUMS led workshop in Brussels.*

### The Tasks

The workshop was the fourth in a series of eight necessary for the revision of the Requirements Catalogue 2005. In November 2016, the Council tasked a review of the military requirements stemming from the EU Global Strategy and the level of ambition. Subsequently the EUMC Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force was tasked by EU Military Committee to revise the Requirements Catalogue. Concepts and Capabilities (CONCAP) Directorate is the main working body of the EUMS in this regard and supports the EUMC Headline Goal Task Force by providing capability expertise in drafting documents, organising and conducting workshops and processing the significant amount of data generated during the Requirements Catalogue 2005 revision process.

### The Aim

The aim of the revision is to derive the total list of EU Military Capability Requirements by the end of 2017. The new tasks, threats and challenges stemming from last year's EU Global Strategy and Council Conclusions should be properly reflected in the result. Hybrid Threats and Maritime Security Challenges are just two of several new aspects that were incorporated into the revision of the illustrative scenarios. In addition, the EU Capability Codes and Statements were introduced as the new EU Capability Planning taxonomy, which will enable results that are 100% compatible with the ones of NATO's Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and avoid duplication. In the spirit of last year's EU-NATO Joint Declaration, this serves the purpose of enhancing the comparability and transparency of both organ-

isations military capability planning processes.

### The Content

The EU Scenario based approach uses five illustrative scenarios for deriving a comprehensive

Capability Package that is in line with the EU Level of Ambition. Every scenario revision consists of several steps that are undertaken to establish a clear traceability of every capability derived. During the workshop from 03 to 07 April the Peace Enforcement scenario was revised comprehensively. It simulates a robust major joint EU CSDP operation in a non/semi-permissive environment. Thus, the required capabilities derived by EU Member states experts will represent the quantitative and qualitative core of the upcoming EU Military Requirement Catalogue.

The NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) supports the revision process since March 2017 by applying Computer Assisted Operational Analysis that will finally complement the results developed by the Military Planners in order to increase the audibility and credibility of the results.

The main challenges of the Requirements Catalogue revision are the given limited amount of time and the high spectrum of required expertise, which can only be covered by maintaining the MS contributions to the workshops that will be held in Brussels until autumn 2017.

### The Way Ahead

The two scenarios still expecting their revision are the scenarios "Conflict Prevention" and "Stabilisation and Support to Capacity Building". The latter is planned to be tackled not only by military planners, but also by involving civilian planners and experts. This will lead to a more comprehensive planning perspective and will foster the EU civilian-military capability development.

*Later this year, based on the revised Military Capability Requirements and the Member States Contributions to the Force Catalogue 2017, a new list of Military capability shortfalls will be generated, that will be the foundation for the European Military Capability Development of the future. ■*



# First award of CSDP Medal for **Extraordinary Meritorious** Service

BY LTC JOHN O'LOGHLEN, PUBLIC RELATIONS & INFORMATION

*The CSDP Medal for Extraordinary Meritorious Service was presented to Soldier H. who prevented an attack, where his reaction was deemed courageous and exemplary in preventing attackers successfully striking the Mission HQ and causing casualties among the civilians and the personnel of EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali in Bamako. A special parade was held with the attendance of Chairman EU Military Committee (EUMC) General Kostarakos and EUMC MILREPs of the 28 member states. The medal was presented by the Director General EU Military Staff Lt General Esa Pulkkinen on behalf of the High Representative / Vice President (HRVP) Federica Mogherini.*


The HRVP Federica Mogherini is the sole authority for the award of this decoration. It is the highest level of recognition for distinguished achievement and service, or for deeds of outstanding gallantry. It can be awarded to either military or civilian personnel for their service to an Operation / Mission conducted under the CSDP, who have demonstrated outstanding valour or have provided extraordinary meritorious service with significant positive impact in the interest of the Operation / Mission.

## Description of Action

On the evening of 21 March 2016 the Mission HQ of the EUTM in Mali (Bamako) came under a sustained terrorist attack with AK 47 and hand grenades by more than one attacker.

On guard at the hotel where the EUTM Mali HQ is located, Soldier H. reacted promptly to the assault and with his brave and audacious behaviour; he terminated the terrorist attack that potentially could have caused several casualties.

In particular, when the attackers opened fire in the direction of the Mission HQ where Force Protection elements were stationed and on personnel of the EUTM Mali that were present in front of the Hotel, Soldier H. responded instantly and effectively with his weapon, returning fire, and was able to neutralise one of the terrorists before the attacker could injure or kill the civilian staff of the hotel or the military personnel of the Mission present in the area.



DG EUMS Lt Gen Pulkkinen presents CSDP Medal for Extraordinary Meritorious Service



DG EUMS Lt Gen Pulkkinen addresses the Award Ceremony

Lt General Esa Pulkkinen stated that 'his actions demonstrate that our soldiers who are deployed to operations and missions are well trained and capable to take the necessary action to protect their fellow members.'

*This is the first occasion for the award of the CSDP Medal for Extraordinary Meritorious Service. ■*



CSDP Medal for Extraordinary Meritorious Service

# International **Women's Day** 2017 Seminar hosted by EUMS

BY LTC ANGELA HUME, LOGISTIC DIRECTORATE

Presentation by  
DG EUMS Lt Gen  
Pulkinnen to  
NATO Speakers  
Ltc Dvorakova  
and Ambassador  
Schurman



*The EU has been increasingly active in promoting gender equality in its external action, including in its development cooperation and humanitarian aid. In order to achieve a comprehensive approach towards gender mainstreaming, there is a real need for cooperation with the domestic institutions and organisations as well as among the different actors that operate in the area of operations.*

On 8th March 2017 during the event of International Women's Day, the EUMS organised their first International Women's Day High Level Seminar on Gender in Operations. This supports the EUMS staff in their work on a strategic level and also to enhance cooperation with the CSDP partnerships with International organisations on the work of Gender in Operations. This is in line with the June 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) as part of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy.

Making international support in areas of crises and conflict more effective and contributing to long-term stability and peace requires that all of the different groups, people from different ages, sexes, social status and ethnicities, in the affected area are heard and respected. This applies to all stages of the operation: pre-deployment, deployment and transition.

Beside a male and female focus, a gender perspective in operations should include an internal as well as an external focus. Externally, having a gender perspective improves the way we look at a society and therefore it enlarges our 'situational awareness'. This creates a better understanding of culture, local customs and values. It can improve access to and communication with the local population, local government and the International Community. A proper gender analysis can be a force-multiplier and improve mission effectiveness. If conducted in the right way it should also include an internal focus, looking at our own internal procedures, policies, training means and assets.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) specifically addressed this problem in 2000 by adopting Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. It calls on Member States and all actors in a conflict to involve women in the entire process of re-establishing peace and stability, to protect women's rights and to take account of their specific needs in conflict and post-conflict situations.

The Seminar was jointly opened by Director General EUMS Lt. Gen. Esa Pulkkinen and the European External Action Service (EEAS) Secretary General representative Ambassador Mara Marinaki, as the EEAS Principal Adviser on Gender and on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Ambassador Marinaki pointed out that human rights and gender equality are fundamental principles of the European Union and of its foreign and defence policies. The EU is one of the leading pioneers in promoting the role of women in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women Ambassador Mariëtte Schuurman presented the agenda for change. Gender equality and balance is the new norm. The UNSCR 1325 is the framework and the National Action Plans have been signed by 55 States so far.

The NATO International Military Staff Gender Advisor Lt. Col Magdalena Dvorakova gave a presentation of her office that serves as the Secretariat for the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP). The office provides information and advice on gender issues, including the effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions for missions, operations and training.

The Director of UN Women in Brussels Office Ms. Dagmar Schumacher provided a presentation on gender integrated teams in peacekeeping missions, followed by a presentation of the Head of Office UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security Mr. Rory Keane. Gender training is mandatory for all UN missions and partnerships. The EU has proven for the UN to be a good example for implementing UNSCR 1325 in their missions and operations.

Head of European Security and Defence College (ESDC) Mr Dirk Dubois provided a presentation of the gender training on CSDP. The ESDC has specialised gender training: A Comprehensive Approach to Gender in Operations, and the Integration of a Gender Perspective in CSDP. These are run several times a year and at different locations.

*After the end of the forum discussion with Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) Director's Representative Ms. Clara Ganslandt and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) Director's Representative Mr Bert Versmessen, EUMS Rear Admiral Waldemar Glusko presented the conclusions. The seminar had a positive response from the EUMS high level officers and special guest, Chairman of the EU Military Committee General Michail Kostarakos. The focus is to maintain the impetus in implementing gender in operations and missions and working together with the other organisations to enhance the effects of the UNSCR 1325. ■*



# The **EEAS STRATCOM EAST** task force: Addressing Pro-Kremlin Disinformation

BY GILES PORTMAN, HEAD TASK FORCE

*The Kremlin has a disinformation strategy. And it's targeting Europe and the EU more and more. It is an orchestrated strategy, to deliver the same disinformation stories in as many languages as possible, through as many channels as possible, and as often as possible.*

This is the conclusion, based on 18 months' research, of the EEAS's East Stratcom Task Force, set up by the European Council to address this threat. The Task Force has collected 3,000 examples of such stories in 18 languages – stories which contradict publicly available facts, and which multiply and repeat disinformation on a daily basis.

This disinformation campaign is a non-military measure for achieving political goals. Russian authorities are explicit about this, through their publically available military doctrine and the statements of top generals that the use of “false data” and “destabilising propaganda” are legitimate tools in the tool kit. The Russian Minister of Defence describes information as “another type of armed forces”. Russian journalists were awarded presidential medals for misrepresenting events in Crimea.

The aim of the campaign is to weaken and destabilise the West, by exploiting existing divisions or creating artificial new ones. Those divisions can be on the strategic level: for example the EU versus NATO/US (where NATO/US is frequently described as an occupying power), or differences among EU Member States (typically on the issue of Russian sanctions). They can also be on a local level, exploiting minority issues or the fear of refugees (take for example the infamous “Lisa case”, the false story of a German girl of Russian origin supposedly abducted and raped by migrants – promoted by Kremlin media, it brought 12,000 people onto the streets of Germany to protest against a crime that was never committed). Among further artificial divisions, a conflict between basic human rights and traditional values is often used.

Often, outright lies are deployed, aimed at denigrating a particular person, political group, government or intergovernmental organisation, as well as NGOs, mainstream media, elites, experts, the “establishment”, and those taking initiatives to counter disinformation.


Another strategy is to spread as many conflicting messages as possible, in order to persuade the audience that there are so many versions of events that it is impossible to find the truth. Particularly obvious examples include the clear obfuscation over the downing of flight MH17, Boris Nemtsov's assassination and the bombing of a humanitarian convoy in Syria.



What are the tools of disinformation? We still need much more systematic research. But it's clear that it is not only big media outlets like RT or Sputnik that are deployed, but also seemingly marginal sources, like fringe websites, blog sites and Facebook pages. Trolls are deployed not only to amplify disinformation messages but to bully those brave enough to oppose them. And the network goes wider: NGOs and “GONGOs” (government organised NGOs); Russian government representatives; and other pro-Kremlin mouthpieces in Europe, often on the far-right and far-left. All in all, literally thousands of channels to spread pro-Kremlin disinformation, all create an impression of seemingly independent sources confirming each other's message.

East Stratcom's work shows an increasing focus on Europe, its people, values and policies. This is confirmed by the recent statements from many security services around Europe, including Germany, France, or the Baltic states. That's why the Task Force is responding with simple myth-busting information campaigns, which are gaining ever greater audiences and endorsements.

*It's incumbent on us all to know what we consume. Sign up for East Stratcom's weekly disinformation review by contacting them on [stratcom-east@eeas.europa.eu](mailto:stratcom-east@eeas.europa.eu). Follow them on Twitter “@EUvsDisinfo” and Facebook “EU vs Disinformation”, and find out more on their website, [www.euvsdisinfo.eu](http://www.euvsdisinfo.eu). ■*



## OPERATIONS

# EU NAVFOR (Somalia) – The achievements of MSCHOA, WFP Protection and the Legal Finish

BY COMMANDER JACQUELINE SHERRIFF MBE ROYAL NAVY – EU NAVFOR SPOKESPERSON

EU NAVFOR  
Somalia  
protecting World  
Food Programme  
ship



*The European Union launched its first Naval Force off the coast of Somalia in December 2008. The acquis developed by Operation ATALANTA since that time is generally understood to comprise six core elements: the protection of World Food Programme vessels; the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA); legal finish; cooperation with the merchant shipping community (engendered by Best Management Practices including armed security); continued functionality of the SHared Awareness and DE-confliction (SHADE) process; and the coordination of data networks (both criminal and diplomatic).*

Relampago's  
helicopter doing  
a Fast Roping  
exercise with PNS  
Tariq



### CSDP Cooperative Frameworks

Looking at three of these elements: MSCHOA, the protection of WFP vessels and legal finish, it is probably fair to say that few people could have foreseen how fundamental these elements would become to the European Union's efforts to deter, disrupt and repress acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

### MSCHOA

Following the launch of EU NAVFOR, MSCHOA was set up in the OHQ's Joint Operations Centre in Northwood. Manned 24/7, 365 days a year by maritime industry and military personnel, it has become the internationally recognised operational shipping coordination centre for the Horn of Africa region. MSCHOA staff operate a password-protected, unclassified communications network, known as Mercury. The Mercury network enables naval forces to communicate in real time with each other to exchange information on the latest counter-piracy guidance, piracy incidents and other suspicious activity at sea. MSCHOA

is unique in that it handles commercially-in-confidence, sensitive data, such as ship movements, cargo information and self-protection capabilities that the staff can then use to assess the vulnerability of a given vessel. If a vessel is attacked, MSCHOA staff will liaise directly with naval forces in the Area of Operations, using the Mercury network to help coordinate the most appropriate response. MSCHOA is unique in this regard, working as the tasking authority to guarantee a military response. That guarantee is of the upmost importance to the commercial shipping industry and this, together with the provision of military-grade intelligence analysis, has led to a level of mutual trust, respect and understanding being developed between MSCHOA, EU NAVFOR and the shipping industry unseen since the Second World War. MSCHOA also plays an important strategic role in supporting and coordinating the naval convoys in the Gulf of Aden undertaken by nations such as China, India, Korea, Russia and Japan.

### World Food Programme (WFP) Protection

It is important to note that none of the WFP vessels afforded close protection by an EU NAVFOR warship or Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment (AVPD) as they transit the Somali coastline have been attacked by pirates. Since December 2008, over 1.3 million tonnes of much-needed humanitarian aid has arrived safely into Somali ports. Given the worsening drought in East Africa, together with the recent piracy-related incidents, it is now likely that the requirement to protect WFP vessels will increase in the months ahead.

### Legal Finish

EU NAVFOR is the only military operation in the region that can effect an end-to-end legal approach ('legal finish'). Based on a framework of legal agreements with states such as Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius, EU NAVFOR can transfer suspected pirates to them, together with all the collated evidence, for trial. That ability to detain, transfer and successfully prosecute suspected pirates quickly within the region has had a considerable deterrent effect – far more so than the original 'catch and release' policy in place prior to the legal framework being devised.

*In total, 130 pirates have been convicted by regional courts as a result of EU NAVFOR's legal finish process. Once convicted, UN Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC) works with the relevant authorities to repatriate the pirates to Somali prisons. EU NAVFOR is also working closely with UNODC in the Seychelles to deliver a 'Justice Pathway' series of exercises in order to ensure a sustainable legal legacy remains in the region. ■*



# Picture Parade



Kings New Years Reception 2017



Visit by President Niinistö of Finland to EUMS



First MPCC/CPCC management meeting at EUMS



Visiting EUCAP Somalia HQ




Visiting EUTM Somalia HQ



Visiting OPCEN with Deputy Secretary General (DSG) EEAS Serrano

## EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF - EUMS STRUCTURE



\* AS OF 01 MAY 2017

## EU Military Operations and Missions

