Today I conclude my four day visit to Kabul, kindly hosted and accompanied by Raffaella Iodice, the EU Chief of Mission to Afghanistan, and her team. I would like to thank everybody who took the time to see me and share their experiences and perspectives on the current situation and the future, and Raffaella and colleagues for all their support before and during my mission. In the course of my visit I met, among others:

• The UNSRSG, the UN Special Coordinator, and representatives of UNAMA, UN agencies, the World Bank and the diplomatic community;
• The acting Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs, the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, the acting Minister of the Economy, the acting Minister of Repatriation and Refugees, the acting deputy Minister of Interior for Counter-narcotics, and officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
• Representatives of civil society and the business community, including Afghan women
• Former President Karzai; and
• Representatives of international non-governmental organisations working in Afghanistan and colleagues from DG ECHO and the EU Delegation to Afghanistan.

1. My visit to Kabul follows a period of extensive outreach to countries invited to attend a meeting in Doha on 18-19 February of Special Envoys for Afghanistan, convened by the UN and hosted by Qatar. I participated in a G7+ meeting in London two weeks ago, together with colleagues from Europe, including Türkiye, Japan and North America and I have held bilateral conversations with several others, including Indonesia, Pakistan and the OIC. Next week, I look forward to meeting colleagues from the five Central Asian countries at the EU-Central Asia meeting on Afghanistan hosted by Kyrgyzstan.

2. The main focus of my visit this time was to compare notes with the de facto authorities, other Afghans and representatives of the diplomatic community to help us set realistic expectations and prepare better for a constructive Doha meeting. At the first meeting of Special Envoys in Doha on 1-2 May 2023, chaired by the UN Secretary-General, no Afghans were invited. That meeting allowed for a frank conversation and with an agreement on three main points: 1) No support to be provided for armed resistance in Afghanistan, 2) The need for engagement with the Afghan de facto authorities, and 3) That the conditions were not in place for international recognition of the de facto authorities as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Since then, Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu, has finalised his independent assessment. On 29 December 2023, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2721 (2023), taking positive note of the assessment, requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, and welcoming his intention to convene a second meeting of Special Envoys. It is on this basis that the Doha meeting will take place and, unlike last year, I understand that both representatives of the de facto authorities and other Afghans have been, or will be, invited.

3. We discussed the independent assessment and its recommendations as a possible and positive way forward to protect the rights of the people of Afghanistan, the aspirations of the de facto authorities to have good relations with the international community, based on mutual respect for obligations and rights, and to protect the legitimate interest of the international community to have an Afghanistan at sustainable peace with itself, its neighbours and the wider world. I shared my assessment that the Doha meeting is a significant opportunity to meet to hold  meaningful discussions about Afghanistan, and to show, on  all sides, readiness to engage on a way forward, based on the report, in a UN-led process. I also welcomed the fact that other Afghans, women and men, would be invited to Doha to share their experiences and perspectives. I sensed among all interlocutors a positive appreciation of the main findings and recommendations of the report. The only specific question I heard referred to the need for a UN Special Envoy, as requested by the UN Security Council, which I understood as being based on negative experiences from a different historic context and a perceived lack of clarity about the precise function and mandate, also in relation to UNAMA’s future mandate. Acting ministers shared with me their positive outlook on the Doha meeting and their participation and informed me that the composition of the delegation was currently being discussed and would be decided, taking into account also some expected clarifications regarding meeting formats and proceedings in Doha.

4. I also used my visit to discuss with the acting deputy Minister of Interior for Counter-narcotics the significant achievements by the de facto authorities in terms of curbing poppy cultivation, the remaining significant challenges. I recalled the support provided by the EU, as the main international partner providing €26 million in assistance, through UNODC and WHO, for the rehabilitation of people suffering from drug addiction. Also the EU already provides over €79 million for agriculture, food security and climate resilience projects, many of which will be beneficial for poppy farmers in dire need who are looking for alternative and sustainable livelihoods. In many of my meetings, the de facto authorities expressed their appreciation for the swift humanitarian assistance provided by the EU to the victims and survivors of last year’s earthquakes in Herat, with EU providing shelter, additional funding of €4.5 million and three humanitarian air bridge flights carrying 300 tonnes of food assistance, health supplies, tents and blankets. Acting Ministers also recognised the major support of €78 million provided by the EU to assist Afghanistan, through IOM and UNHCR, to support Afghans in need among the more than 500,000 Afghans returning from Pakistan since September last year, and spoke about the visits to Herat and to the border by our Chief of Mission.

5. Other Afghans I met and listened to raised issues familiar to me from previous missions, but also as reported by our Delegation, the UN and conveyed through our regular interaction with Afghans inside the country. While everybody welcomed the fact that the war was over, many shared their concerns about the dire humanitarian situation amid shrinking funding; limited prospects for economic growth and finding a job despite the economy having stabilised at a significantly lower level; frustration about the restrictions on secondary and higher education for girls and women and the impact these are having on mental health, opportunities for future employment and hope for the future; and continued restrictions on women’s right to work and participate in various aspects of public life. Many referred to dialogues with the de facto authorities at different levels and their mixed experiences and perceptions about the results. Others also shared their negative personal experiences, in some cases including intimidation, notably, in an environment characterised by legal uncertainty and where there are very significant challenges for many Afghans, particularly women and specific ethnic and religious communities, to access justice.

6. Finally, my visit offered an opportunity to discuss with highly committed UN agencies, humanitarian partners and NGOs their experience in delivering assistance to the people of Afghanistan with – more than €600 million humanitarian assistance and more than €600 million disbursed or foreseen by the EU as basic needs and livelihood support since August 2021 until the end of 2024 – and their reflections and recommendations. All underlined that it was still possible to deliver humanitarian assistance, and basic needs and livelihood support in a principled manner, making sure that it reaches the men, women, boys and girls that need it most. This requires constant and repetitive negotiations with the de facto authorities at various levels often resulting in fragile understandings. Shrinking funding from other donors has forced some UN Agencies to reduce the number of beneficiaries, in some cases by half. The critical lack of basic services has led to an incapacity to absorb shocks (e.g. earthquakes, massive number of Afghan returnees, or climate change drive drought), and the lack of rain and snow this winter, despite Kabul being white this week, creates a risk of further drought in a country which is already one of the worst affected by climate change, and with limited capacity for water storage and management. Many referred to the well-known saying that Kabul can be without gold but not without snow. The need for sustainable assistance, gradually moving beyond humanitarian, was frequently mentioned, and the dysfunctional banking system as well as the difficulty to retain specialised staff were also referred to as key impediments. Many advocated for more focus on support to rural areas at community level, and some saw the need, in that context, for small-scale infrastructure support, notably in the agricultural sector to sustain and provide livelihoods. Among specific sectors or areas that would require more support, references were made to protection, not least in the context of large number of Afghan returnees, and mine action (another example where Afghanistan has been severely affected by four decades of war). Finally, I heard a strong plea for a more constructive dialogue between implementing partners and the de facto authorities, and with significantly more active involvement and presence by donors, to identify issues and areas of common interest and to seek ways to address them in order to build trust and for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan.