Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia^*, Montenegro*, Albania*, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Iceland⁺, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺ and San Marino.

The European Union welcomes the Director General's update on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran contained in document GOV/2023/26 and thanks Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 1 June 2023. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective, independent and impartial work in verifying Iran's safeguards obligations. The EU encourages the IAEA to continue to use all safeguards-relevant information available to it as per standard practice.

For the past years, the EU has repeatedly expressed, and again reiterates today, its serious concerns at the presence of nuclear material at undeclared locations in Iran. The EU is deeply concerned that the current location of this nuclear material and/or of equipment contaminated by nuclear material, which may still exist in Iran today, is not known to the Agency.

On many occasions, the EU has called upon Iran to urgently fulfill its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement by providing technically credible explanations and grant necessary access. The Board of Governors adopted three resolutions, in June 2020, June 2022 and November 2022, to call on Iran to clarify all outstanding safeguards issues.

In its resolution of 17 November 2022, the Board expressed its profound concern and decided on actions that Iran had to take, without any delay, with a view to clarifying all outstanding safeguards issues. The Board unequivocally decided that Iran had to: provide technically credible explanations; inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or contaminated equipment; provide all necessary information, documentation and answers; and provide the necessary access to locations and materials, including for the taking of samples. 

We note that the Agency has no additional questions at this time regarding the presence of depleted uranium particles at a location known as “Marivan” and considers that the matter is no longer outstanding at this stage. We also note that the Agency stands by its assessment of the activities that were undertaken by Iran at “Marivan”, namely that Iran conducted explosive experiments in preparation for the use of neutron detectors and nuclear material. We recall that Iran has not addressed this issue and has provided no evidence to support its responses regarding the activities at this explosive test area and the Agency assesses that the explanation given is “not technically credible”.

The EU notes with great concern that no progress has been made towards resolving the outstanding safeguards issues in relation to the two other locations, namely Turquzabad and Varamin. We urge Iran to take the expected necessary actions without any further delay. All safeguards issues will remain under our close scrutiny, until they are fully clarified.

It is extremely concerning that the Agency still cannot confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Agency is therefore not in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Substantial and swift action by Iran to deliver on its commitments and safeguards obligations, including taking the actions specified in the November 2022 resolution and implementing the set of activities in the March 2023 Joint Statement, as requested by the Agency in its report GOV/2023/26 is essential and urgent. The EU expects rapid and tangible progress to be achieved in the shortest timeframe and shall consider further action accordingly.

At the previous meeting of the Board, the EU took note of the 4 March 2023 Joint Statement by the IAEA Director General and the Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran. We expressed our expectation that Iran acts promptly to restore confidence by entering into full, substantial and constructive cooperation with the Agency. Although the Agency reports that some progress was made in implementing the activities set out in the March 2023 Joint Statement, we stress that the process needs to be sustained and uninterrupted in order that all of the commitments contained therein are fulfilled without further delay.

The EU underlines the Agency’s assessment that installation of the relevant surveillance and monitoring equipment needs to be completed. For these activities to be effective it is indispensable that the Agency and Iran agree on an approach without delay that would provide the Agency with access to all the data recorded by its cameras.

The EU recalls its serious concern at Iran’s failure to provide pre-notification to the Agency of changes in the configuration and operation of advanced centrifuges at Fordow, contrary to its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. We note that, following the detection at Fordow of HEU particles containing up to 83.7%, Iran has provided information which is assessed by the Agency as not inconsistent with Iran’s explanation for the origin of these particles, and that the Agency has no further question on this matter at this stage.  We reiterate our serious concern that such activity is gravely inconsistent with the level of enrichment declared by Iran at 60% at this facility. The EU’s concerns are exacerbated by the fact that Iran has modified the configuration of the centrifuges able to quickly produce high enriched materials at levels considerably over 60%, without any credible civilian justification. In this context, the EU notes the installation of enrichment monitoring devices at two facilities in Iran.

The EU notes with concern the absence of progress regarding the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance evaluation, specifically that the corrections made by Iran to the declared amount are, as reported by the Agency, not based on scientific grounds and therefore, not acceptable.

The EU recalls that the current global verification standard is based on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement combined with an Additional Protocol. We call on Iran to resume implementation of the Additional Protocol to enable the Agency to provide credible assurances on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. We stress that the implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under its CSA, which cannot be modified or suspended unilaterally.

In light of the Agency’s assessment in GOV/2023/26, the EU expects Iran to address without further delay:

• the outstanding safeguards issues in relation to Turquzabad and Varamin, including informing the Agency of the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment.
• the discrepancy in the amount of nuclear material verified by the Agency at UCF originating from JHL compared to the amount declared by Iran.
• the completion of the installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment, access to data recordings and the gaps in the recordings.
• Iran’s implementation of modified Code 3.1.

The EU takes note of the report, looks forward to the Director General continuing to report to the Board of Governors, as appropriate, and requests that this report be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.