Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia^*, Montenegro^*, Albania^*, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina^*, Iceland⁺, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺ and San Marino.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2023/39, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 6 September 2023.

As a key security priority, the EU will continue to invest diplomatically and politically to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, the EU remains committed to the JCPOA. We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions and not taken the necessary steps to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region has further increased as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory. Concrete and sustained moves of nuclear de-escalation are needed to help restore trust. The EU calls on all countries to support the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The EU remains deeply concerned by the successive IAEA reports documenting the alarming acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments, including with regard to the expansion of its nuclear enrichment infrastructure. Iran’s actions, which have no credible civilian justification, carry very significant proliferation-related risks. These actions raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions. They include continued accumulation of enriched uranium, far beyond JCPOA thresholds for quantity and level of enrichment. The report documents a continued rise of material at 20% and, although at a reduced production rate, at 60%, which is of particular proliferation concern.

The EU notes with grave concern the de-designation of key experienced Agency inspectors and denials of visas for Agency officials dealing with Iran. Iran must maintain a smooth cooperation with the IAEA and ensure the appropriate treatment of inspectors.

The EU strongly recalls Iran’s obligation under its Safeguards Agreement to provide pre-notification to the Agency of changes in the configuration and operation of its nuclear facilities. We take note that the Agency accepted Iran’s explanations for the origin of the HEU particles containing up to 83.7% U-235 at the Fordow facility reported previously. Nevertheless, we remain seriously concerned by the technical capability of Iran to reach such unprecedented levels of enrichment that bear grave proliferation risks. It is indispensable that the IAEA is able to detect and report in a timely manner any move by Iran to escalate its nuclear activities.

We remain concerned about the absence of progress regarding the discrepancy between the amount of natural uranium declared by Iran from the Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) and the amount verified by the Agency. We expect Iran to clarify this matter without any further delay as requested by the Agency.

Since 23 February 2021, the Agency’s verification and monitoring in relation to the JCPOA have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of JCPOA transparency measures and the Additional Protocol. Iran’s unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further exacerbated the situation. This has detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The continuity of knowledge has been lost and in the event that Iran resumes implementing its obligations under the JCPOA, a new baseline would need to be established, that would involve major challenges. We reiterate our grave concerns in this regard.

In June, the EU took note of the 4 March 2023 Joint Statement by the IAEA Director General and the Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran. The EU regrets that no further progress has been made in implementing the activities set out in the Joint Statement, including Iran’s refusal to agree to the Agency’s request to install additional cameras at another location. The EU underlines the Agency’s assessment that installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment needs to be completed. It is also indispensable that the Agency and Iran agree on an approach without delay that would provide the Agency with access to the data recorded. The EU firmly expects Iran to engage with the Agency, in a sustained and uninterrupted manner.

We strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory, to return to its political commitments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation without further delay, including its Additional Protocol, and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1, is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

To conclude, timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU expresses its strong support to and commends the Director General, the Secretariat, and in particular the IAEA inspectors, for their professional, objective and impartial work. The EU wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We welcome Member States’ extrabudgetary support to IAEA’s mission in Iran.

Chair,

The EU takes note of the Director General's report and requests that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.