EU Statement at IAEA BoG on the verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), as delivered on 16 November 2022

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Albania*, Ukraine*, the Republic of Moldova*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Iceland+, Liechtenstein+, Norway+ and San Marino.

The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2022/62, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 11 November 2022.

The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and is determined to continue working with the international community to restore and fully implement this Plan of strategic importance for the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. The EU calls on all countries to support its implementation in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

The EU supports the unwavering diplomatic efforts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. Full and verified implementation of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments in this regard is indispensable.

We stress that the package submitted by the Coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission on 8 August in order to allow for Iran’s return to compliance with its JCPOA commitments and a US return to the deal, is the best possible way to thoroughly accommodate the concerns of all parties to the talks in a balanced way. The EU regrets that Iran has chosen not to seize the diplomatic opportunity and calls on Iran to reconsider without further delay. We wish to underscore that the JCPOA negotiation is separate from Iran’s legally binding obligations under the NPT, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime.

The EU acknowledges the issues connected to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions by it. Alongside the verified full implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions is an essential part of the Plan. The EU has fully upheld its commitments, including sanctions lifting under the JCPOA.

The EU is seriously concerned that Iran, while voicing its commitment to the JCPOA, continues to escalate its nuclear programme far beyond any plausible civilian use justification in the context of Iran’s declared nuclear programme. We deplore that Iran has turned its nuclear programme into a political tool. Iran’s actions inconsistent with the JCPOA have severe and, in the case of R&D activities in particular, irreversible proliferation implications. These actions, which raise serious concerns about Iran’s intentions, include:

- continued and accelerated accumulation of enriched uranium, far beyond JCPOA thresholds for quantity and level of enrichment, including alarming quantities of material at 20%, as well as at 60% which is of particular proliferation concern. IRN’s increased LEU production capacity has serious implications as an enabler for further HEU enrichment.

- continued expansion of uranium enrichment capacity, through the installation and testing of additional centrifuges at a worryingly rapid pace. More than half of Iran’s advanced centrifuges have been installed only since the beginning of 2022 at the underground Natanz site.

We strongly urge Iran to refrain from any further escalatory steps, to reverse all activities inconsistent with the JCPOA and return, without any further delay, to its full implementation.

We recall our grave concern with the significant work on uranium metal previously reported, including with nuclear material enriched up to 20%, and associated irreversible knowledge gains. We reiterate our call on Iran not to commence any further work related to the conversion of UF6 to UF4 for the production of uranium metal and not to resume any activity related to the production of uranium metal.

We remain deeply concerned that, from 23 February 2021 onwards, the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. For almost two years, the Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran’s activities on the entirety of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle.

Iran’s unilateral decision in June 2022 that all Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment be removed from operation has further aggravated existing concerns. As a consequence, the Agency cannot perform verification activities related to the production and inventory of centrifuges and associated infrastructure, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate. This has detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

We urge Iran to implement all transparency measures, so that the Agency is in a position to resume the necessary verification and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA. We take note with concern the significant impact of the current situation on the Agency’s ability to recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge, in the event of a full resumption of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. We also note with concern that the longer the current situation persists, the greater the uncertainty will be in establishing any future baseline.

We strongly urge Iran to resume all JCPOA-related transparency measures, including its Additional Protocol. This, together with full implementation of the CSA, including modified Code 3.1 is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU expresses its strong support to and commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective and impartial work and wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We welcome Member States’ extra budgetary support to IAEA’s mission in Iran.

Chair,

The EU takes note of the Director General's report and requests that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.

 


* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.