Foreign Affairs Council (Defence): Press conference by High Representative Kaja Kallas
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Good afternoon,
We just concluded a good meeting of European Defence Ministers.
This morning we started with the European Defence Agency steering board and approved also the next phase for strengthening the European Defence Agency.
It allows EDA to increase joint procurement and focus more on defence innovation, as well as helping EU countries develop capabilities together. This is what we are pushing for. We also discussed the first ever annual defence readiness report that provides a comprehensive picture of Europe's defence readiness. Without pre-empting its content, let me just say that Europe needs to rearm more quickly and more effectively to meet our target of 2030. Europe needs a decisive change in the scale and pace of defence investment, capability development, innovation, and industrial capacity.
On Ukraine, Member States agreed on the distribution of the €6.6 billion European Peace Facility funds. The EPF has been one of the EU’s central lines of assistance. As next step, I am discussing with Member States how to top up the EPF with new money, including after the end of the current EPF cycle.
Air defence remains the key priority for Ukraine. We see the attacks every day. Ukraine's Defence Minister Khmara made this very clear again.
We have already approved procurement plans worth of €28.3 billion under the Ukraine Support Loan, and these include purchases of Patriot missiles from future U.S. production. However, missile production takes time, and Kyiv needs Patriots now.
One option is for Member States and partners to supply missiles from their own stocks to Ukraine in exchange for later replacements financed by Ukraine Support Loan.
Member States also addressed Ukraine's financing needs. Many today called for front-loading parts of the €90 billion loan allocated for 2027. Ukraine could also benefit from up to €20 billion of remaining funds under the SAFE defence initiative.
On training, Member States agreed on the first step of strategic review of EUMAM, extending our mission for Ukraine for another two years. We will also move ahead with establishing a coordination cell in Kyiv, focusing on the battlefield lessons and strengthening also military education.
Earlier this year, I proposed financing the modernisation of two training centres in Ukraine, and I also want to thank the Netherlands for its contribution that was announced today that actually closes the gap that we had in financing. With this support and the support of Germany, Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg, we can now move on with both sides of these training centres.
To stop Russia's war, we must further reduce Moscow's capacity to fund it, including through its shadow fleets. EU naval operation IRINI has now conducted six boardings of suspected vessels in recent months, making it the lead actor in boarding operations. National boarding operations should continue in parallel, and we must coordinate closely. We use the existing legal framework under UNCLOS to inspect and seize vessels.
Russia's sustained act of sabotage, arson, and airspace violations persist. On the EU side, sanctions against perpetrators and the expulsion of Russian diplomats spiked. But we need to look into what more can we do. Ministers had a first chance to exchange views on the idea of a new emergency security protocol. Such a mechanism would provide a coordination mechanism to respond [to] grey zone attacks and complement Article 42.7 of today. And, of course, to reiterate, this is complementing NATO and providing EU with firmer response to Russia's hybrid attacks.
Freedom of navigation was also again on the agenda. The Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, but also the Black Sea are critical maritime choke points whose disruption spreads far beyond these regions. In the Red Sea, Houthi advances have put shipping routes at greater risk, and Operation ASPIDES helps to keep its vital waterway open. But we need to boost its numbers to make it more effective. If we give a mission a task, we must give it the means.
Finally, Ministers formally extended the mandates of EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS.
We will continue supporting border management, Palestinian policing and justice, because effective institutions are essential for the two-state solution, and these missions help to build them. Thank you.
Watch the video of the press conference
Q&A
Q. First question is on the discussion about Patriot interceptors. You mentioned the possibility to supply from stocks. Did any countries make some pledges? Maybe you may say how many countries of the EU may have some interceptors to give to Ukraine. Any results? The second question is on the European Peace Facility. You said that it is already agreed how to distribute 6.6 billion. We know that 1 billion goes directly to Ukraine needs, but 4.7 will be distributed between countries. How much from this will go to Ukraine? Because not all countries agree to give it back to Ukraine immediately as we need.
On the interceptors, unfortunately, there were no new pledges made today. So, many were pleading for this swap. Let us see what comes out of it. On the EPF, as you know, we now agreed to reimburse the Member States that were waiting already, and then €1 billion goes to joint procurement, and then also some funding goes for the training of Ukrainian soldiers. Now, as for the reimbursements, many countries were already making announcements that everything that they get back, they will contribute to Ukraine. And my call was also to others who have not made this pledge to actually also contribute it back and help Ukraine. But in the end, they can do it on their side because it is a bilateral support in addition to the support that we are giving on the European level.
Q. You just said if we give a mission a task, we need to give it the means. So, from the discussion today on ASPIDES, do you have any indications that Member States are willing to give more means to this mission, and what could we realistically expect? That is question number one. Question number two on the emergency protocol: did you hear sufficient support or enough support today to move forward in that direction or Member States rather hesitant to create something which might be seen as well in some kind of competition or overlap with NATO?
On ASPIDES, two countries were hinting today that they might provide additional vessels. Like I was saying as well, it is not only the number of vessels that is needed, but actually also the quality of vessels. For example, ASPIDES does not have a mine hunting mandate, which means that you need frigates, you need air defence support, you need vessels that can do the escorting of the ships. But yes, two countries were hinting today that they are actually discussing and will come maybe with the decision.
On the emergency protocol discussion. So, one could say that it was the first discussion of it, very initial. So, the conclusion was that we will continue the discussion with the Member States on different levels, ambassadors - the formats that we have here. Clearly, there were some who were saying that we need some kind of mechanism for anything that is under the armed aggression threshold, which is Article 42.7, also for Article 5. But many stress that it has to be absolutely in complementarity with NATO. We do not create anything additional, but this has to work hand in hand.
Q. German Foreign Minister Wadephul has met with Sergei Lavrov at the United Nations, and there are differing assessments of how that meeting went. But certainly, Mr Lavrov came out ridiculing the German side, and Wadephul sort of explained that he had consulted his colleagues on this and evidently concluded that this was the right time to have this kind of conversation. Do you see any value coming out of this meeting, and do you think it was the right time to launch more diplomatic initiatives to Russia?
First, it is clear for everybody that Germany is the biggest supporter from the EU to Ukraine. I also spoke to Minister Wadephul on what he spoke to Minister Lavrov about to really raise the issue of the hybrid attacks and also press Russia to end its war against Ukraine. I think what it shows is that, as you said, Russia making these comments ridiculing, what is interesting or what is important is that there are many countries outside Europe who say that talk to the Russians and then there will be a result. But, these talks show that Russia really is not interested in peace at all. Otherwise, you do not treat your negotiation partner or the partner of meetings this way. So, this is also very clear for everybody. First and foremost, Russia needs to show by stopping the attacks on civilians that they are interested in peace, which they are not, and then they need to talk to Ukraine because it is between Ukraine and Russia. Everybody else can facilitate this process, but in the end, they need to agree.
Q. One more question on ASPIDES. Do you believe that if ASPIDES managed to reach the size you envisage it will need to adapt its current structure and mandate and chain of command? Or is just a question of simply adding more vessels?
No, the mandate and the command structure actually is exactly for this, what is needed, which is escorting the ships out of Bab el-Mandeb. We are also working in close coordination with the Saudi-led coalition, as observant in this coalition, so that there is no overlapping. The current structure allows it. We need more vessels because literally there are commercial ships that are waiting in the queue to receive the escort that we do not have enough frigates that can do that.
Q. I want to go back on the emergency protocol. I am a bit confused because you say it has to work with Article 42.7, and Member States seems to agree on that. But if I remember correctly, in May the EEAS carried out a tabletop exercise on the operationalisation of Article 42.7, and since then nothing. So, before we advance on the protocol, don't Member States first need to agree on what Article 42.7 applies to, and what scenarios it applies to? Can you give us an update on the operationalisation of 42.7 and how that would work with the emergency protocol?
You are very harsh - ‘then nothing’. That is not true. There was the tabletop exercise, but we also did the different scenarios. We mapped all the different tools that are in the toolbox of the External Action Service and the Commission's toolbox that can be used for this case. So, again, we need to keep in mind that the majority of EU Member States that are also member states of NATO, where you have Article 5 and clear protocols how that works. Now, that is why in the scenarios we also had this idea of what is it, if it is under the threshold of armed aggression? What if it is against the country that is not party to NATO? And that is why the President of the Commission came up with the emergency protocol in the State of the Union speech, and now we need to work with that. So, today was a very initial discussion, which means that we take this forward. How these tools that we have in our toolbox would all work together when it is clearly under the threshold of armed aggression.
Q. Just at 10 o'clock, there was a demonstration of Ukrainians with a demand, and they were trying to bring attention to the town of Oleshky, which was blocked for quite a long time. And people over there are under the danger of dying from hunger. There was some humanitarian help dropped by drones just yesterday, but still the city is blocked, and people cannot get out from there. Are there any means on your side to improve the situation? Maybe some sanctions are prepared. Are you aware of it?
Yes, of course, we are preparing the largest listing of sanctions, but it also clearly shows what happens to the people in the occupied territories. When somebody says, "Why don't they just give up the territories?". It sounds so easy, right? But it is actually about the people that will suffer in these territories. Of course, we are trying to get the humanitarian aid in, and we are trying to help Ukraine to defend itself and its people, so that these kind of things will not happen. But I think this is also a reminder to all of us that it is not about land - it is about people.
Q. I am a little bit confused on this emergency protocol. Would you say that there is a majority of Member States that want to go ahead with this or a majority of Member States that are part of NATO and are just saying NATO is the right place to deal with even if it is under the threshold of Article 5?
We had the first discussion on this today. Not everybody spoke on this topic, so I do not have an answer to whether it is majority or not majority. Many were saying that they need to know what is there, so to understand whether they support this or not. So, basically, we need to provide concrete answers to Member States and work closely with the Member States on this. Not come up with something that they do not possibly agree, but it is too early to tell right now.
Q. On the emergency security protocol, you talk about some Member States stressing that they do not want to see duplication with NATO, but have you had a conversation with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte about how this won't occur? Because from the outset, it looks like this is Article 4, and this is what the Commission President has stated in her speech as well. So, if you can give us the inside track on the conversations with Mark Rutte, that would be great, if possible.
Yes, I have been having the discussion with [the] Secretary General regarding the 42.7 when we were preparing the exercises as well as when we were preparing the papers of the different scenarios. Then we were very much in contact so that there is no duplication, and it is also very clear. We need to work also regarding the emergency protocol because there should not be any duplication. That is what everybody is saying, and what we do not want to create as well. When you talk about Article 4 in NATO, then Article 4 in NATO is just consultations. It is not any kind of action plan. Article 5 is very clear, but Article 4 is discussions that take place. So, the emergency protocol is rather which tools can be used at the moment of aggression that is not armed aggression that is under the threshold of Article 5 and what Member States could do.