HR/VP Kaja Kallas: Keynote speech at the European Defence Agency Annual Conference 2026

Dear colleagues,

Dear friends,

Dear guests,

It is a pleasure to be here today as we need to prepare ourselves for the future. Indeed, the crisis we face has deepened dramatically during the past year.

As we get close to marking four years of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine, we are fending off:

• cyber attacks;
• sabotage against critical infrastructure;
• foreign interference and information manipulation;
• military intimidation;
• territorial threats;
• and political meddling.

And it has become painfully clear that Russia will remain a major security threat for the long term.

The Middle East has lived through a year of relentless crisis, from conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Gaza to protests in Iran. The only certainty now is that that the region will remain completely unpredictable.

China, too, remains a long-term challenge: it poses a risk to our economic model, threatens countries in the East and South China seas, and supports Russia’s war against Ukraine.

In this regard, China is not the only one. As President Zelenskyy underlined in Davos last week, Russia can only continue to build weapons and pay for them thanks to imports of critical parts and continuing oil sales. If we want to stop the war, we must cut Russia off from both.

Arguably, the biggest change in the fundamental reorientation is going on across the Atlantic: a rethinking that has shaken the transatlantic relationship to its foundation.

Let me be clear: we want strong trans-Atlantic ties. The U.S. will remain Europe’s partner and ally. But Europe need to adapt to the new realities. Europe is no longer Washington’s primary centre of gravity. 

This shift has been ongoing for a while. It is structural, not temporary. It means that Europe must step up – no great power in history has ever outsourced its survival and survived.

These developments put a severe strain on the international norms, rules and institutions enforcing them that we have built over 80 years. The risk of a full-blown return to coercive power politics, spheres of influence and a world where might makes right, is very real. Since we last spoke here, the virus has started to spread. 

Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney hit the nail on its head in his own speech in Davos. It’s time also for Europe to take down its sign. To acknowledge that this tectonic shift is here to stay. And act with urgency.

When I was a schoolgirl in Estonia, before anyone had a mobile phone in their pocket, many schools used a bell system to tell you the time. The first bell was the signal to go to the class. The second bell was a warning. And the third bell meant you were late and there would be consequences. We are now dangerously close to the third bell.

Before that third bell actually rings, we need to inject a sense of urgency into our efforts in four areas.

The first and arguably most important of these is: defence. We need the capabilities to deter and defend. You all know the diagnosis:

• There is a lack of complementarity of capabilities in Europe. We are too focussed on national interests to tackle fragmentation in a serious way;
• Fragmentation makes us slow. It makes us weak. We need to change the culture away from thinking like nations, towards acting jointly, as Europeans. In areas including investment, development, procurement, maintenance, training – the full circle.
• Our defence spending is rising, which is good, but Europe lacks a number of strategic enablers, which are often too costly, or complex, for any one single Member State to develop alone. So it is not only about how much we spend, but whether we spend it wisely and to maximum effect.
• We must also strike the right balance between innovation and traditional systems. Warfare is evolving fast. Capabilities that are used today might be outdated by tomorrow.

We need to put our militaries in a position of strength. Or put simply: we must be able to win the fight tonight and be ready tomorrow.

Fortunately, there is no shortage of ideas on how to address each of these. And we have already made a lot of progress. Just think: White Paper, Defence Readiness Roadmap, 9 capability priorities led by our Member States.

But addressing the capabilities shortfalls also means posing some rather tricky questions:

• What geopolitical role do we want Europe and the EU to play?
• Can we identify a set of “European” NATO capability targets, for which the EU can then support the development?
• Could we also think of establishing EU military capabilities that would be financed and owned by the member states?

These and other sensitive subjects require political debate and action.

The second priority area for action is the defence industry.

Here quite a lot is happening. We are already setting the conditions for industry to flourish. I am sure my good colleague Commissioner Andrius Kubilius will address these in detail when he speaks in a few minutes. So here I will just flag that what I see is a slow-motion ramp-up.

There is a long list of areas where we are already acting but where there is an urgent need to do more in order to reach a turning point.

We need to fill our gaps, first and foremost. But we also stand before another huge task: to support Ukraine with 60 billion euro in military aid for 2026 and 2027. And ensure Ukraine gets the capabilities it needs – and fast!

For this, European industry must simply deliver. Why? Because otherwise, the money will go abroad, to those industries who can. This is the European moment to show what it can do: get ready to accept this challenge!

I am speaking here…:

• …of adapting our defence industrial base to better support the defence of Europe, with critical mass, economies of scale and deeper cross-border cooperation;
• …of security of supply;
• …of cross-border cooperation as well as collaboration between primes, on the one hand, and small and medium enterprises on the other;
• …of a greater sense of responsibility among industrial stakeholders for the security and defence of our continent.

There is also a need for more innovation, entrepreneurship and private financing. It is the EU’s task to prepare the ground and create the conditions. But it is industry’s task to deliver.

If we are to reach that point of no return, it is critical to have a broader sharing of risks and responsibilities among Member States—politically as well as economically. With Rearm [Europe] and SAFE, we have sent a clear signal of demand. Industry needs to take up that call.

This also requires the strong support of the European Defence Agency, the EU Military Staff as well as the European Commission. Together we must help to aggregate demand and encourage joint procurement so that industry can better predict how to make investment decisions.

The third priority area I see is partnerships.

First of all NATO.

Twenty plus years ago, back when my country joined the EU and NATO for that matter, all we had was what you will remember as “Berlin Plus.”

This was the framework from 2003 that allowed the EU to use NATO military assets for EU-led crisis management operations, in cases when NATO chose not to act.

We have come a long way in the ten years since that first EU-NATO Joint Declaration in Warsaw. There is constructive leadership and close staff-to-staff cooperation. Moreover, Russia’s full-scale invasion led to unprecedented, previously unthinkable changes within the EU.

For the first time, we are using our instruments—intentionally, explicitly, aimed on achieving results—to support the capability targets set by NATO allies. And with that, NATO’s territorial defence and deterrence. Because the point is to make the 23 members we have in common stronger.

We are all well aware of the political issues that have limited cooperation. But especially now, as the US is setting its sights abroad and beyond Europe, NATO needs to become more European to maintain its strength. And for this, Europe must act.

For example, we need to ensure that our security and defence initiatives remain complimentary to NATO. For this, the ball is also in NATO’s court: if we want to use EU instruments – such as our budgetary and regulatory power – to support and enable NATO, we have to know what the needs and targets are. The more information NATO provides, the better we can align. Here, those 23 countries that are members of both organisations bear a special responsibility and have a vested interest in ensuring coherence.

In short, we need to sync our efforts, together with NATO, so as to complement each other. And to demonstrate how a distinct European pillar adds value through more burden sharing and military strength on our continent.

That is on the NATO side. But more and more, our bilateral partnerships are also becoming a valuable tool. Not only in security and defence but also in the sense of broader foreign policy issues.

Countries around the globe are looking to diversify their partnerships to manage the heightened risk. I hear this every single time I travel and meet those countries in other regions. And when they search for a strong partner, more and more they also come to the European Union.

We now have 9 specific Security and Defence Partnerships. I just signed the ninth yesterday with India. For me it is important that these are tailor-made arrangements that are operational, with a focus on tangible take-ways that serve both sides:

• Such as contributions to missions and operations or joint training, exercises and initiatives.
• The partnerships should also be used to leverage key Common Security and Defence Policy goals, like support for Ukraine.
• We could turbo-charge our collaboration with selected like-minded partners.
• But we could also prioritise partners that are leaders in their regions in order to bolster the EU’s position and narrative on the global stage.

The fourth priority for action is how to make our political and military decision-making more fit for purpose, more responsive to the urgent situation we find ourselves in.

Let’s face it, Europe can be slow. Unanimity means we cannot always act at the speed of relevance. Of course there are policy differences among Member States, this is all natural. But unanimity is also used by some as a bargaining tool. And it cannot be that the one country’s veto defines the policy for others.

So we need to think about how to make our procedures more effective:

• We can take inspiration from the decades-long process when Justice and Home Affairs moved from being a strictly Member State competence to a communitarian one;
• We can explore the clauses within the Treaties on topics like constructive abstention in the context of military and defence decisions.
• We should dare to also consider the Q-word. Meaning a gradual extension of qualified majority in Common Foreign and Security Policy.
• We should operationalise our own article 42.7 of the Treaty on the European Union.
• And when it comes to our Defence Ministers’ Meetings (Defence Councils), they need to happen more frequently. They need to address all the issues, including the questions related to industry. We need more strategic-political discussions. And for sure we need more thinking in European and not only in national terms.

Dear friends,

Capabilities, industry, partnerships, decision-making: these are the four areas where we need urgent action. And the institutions that you in this room represent are the ones to make it happen.

For Member States:

• Speed up and modernise your procurement procedures and your work with others. The role of defence ministers is key: you provide the resources and the mandate to empower the EDA. It is in your interest to do so.

For industry:

• Show us your lean and mean side! Let’s see more of your entrepreneurial spirit as you innovate and ramp up. It is also in your interest to do so.

And since this is the annual EDA conference, a few special messages for the Agency.

The organisation is well respected among the Member States. This came out clearly during discussions on defence at last year’s European Council, where the EDA got a strong push. Thank you for your efforts so far.

As we move forward:

• You must be fit for purpose, with the right internal organisation and financial and human resources tailored to our priorities. This is also a message for Member States: if you want a strong EDA, provide the necessary means.
• If we want to translate our political ambition into operational capability, the EDA needs to lead, not just facilitate; you need to act, not just advise.

So today I am calling on the EDA to:

• Keep the focus on supporting Member States.
• Make the EDA a true EU hub for defence innovation, including by supporting next-generation and disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum. The current war has showcased drones; the next one will be about technologies we can only envision today.
• Collaborate closely with Ukraine. We have a lot to learn from them, their battlefield experience and innovative defence solutions.
• Leverage cooperation with partners, be it NATO or bilaterally.
• And engage with broader EU defence policies. You can help bring coherence and alignment across all EU initiatives.

We all know what to do. And we know that our aim is a strong and independent Europe – also in defence. If what we create now will one day be called a European Defence Union, then so be it.

We must strengthen our instruments, end fragmentation, close our gaps and join forces with our partners.

We are facing today a crisis that is an opportunity in disguise. So let’s use it!

Thank you.