Check against delivery!   

Thank you, and thank to all of you for waiting so long.

You can imagine that it was not easy to discuss about the situation in Ukraine, plus our relations with China. 

And I want to thank you, Tobias [Billström, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden], for your hospitality in this beautiful place and this sunny Sweden. Certainly, climate change is a reality. And it is good for you because it is such a beautiful day here in Sweden to talk about two important issues: Ukraine, Russia and China. 

First, on Ukraine.  

It is clear that Putin has no intention to abandon its objective to subjugate Ukraine, and he will continue bombing, attacking, destroying Ukraine. It is clear. 

Now more than ever, the [Foreign Affairs] Ministers have agreed on stressing the importance of continuing supporting Ukraine. 

It is – and it remains – our priority to continue supporting Ukraine and give Ukraine the means to defend itself and build [up] the necessary resilience to defeat Russia.  

Over the last 15 months, we have been providing military support to Ukraine for about €15 billion. It is significant but more will have to come. 

We have been fast in our response, but now we have to look a little bit further – in the medium term – on how to transform the instruments that we have developed to face the immediate threats and to provide ammunitions and military equipment into a long-term commitment to ensure  Ukraine [wins] and to support Ukraine [with] humanitarian [means], financially and militarily. 

We know that the accession to the European Union is our ultimate commitment to Ukraine, to the stability and prosperity of Ukraine. But in the meantime, we have to continue offering practical and concrete support. And I want to send a clear message to Putin: there is no, and [there] will not be, fatigue. We will continue supporting Ukraine as much as Ukraine needs, for as long as needed. 

I think it is important to repeat some narrative. There is an aggressor, and an aggressed. Ukraine is a victim, and Russia is the aggressor. Russia does not want to stop fighting. And Ukraine cannot stop fighting. If it [Ukraine] wants to continue just existing as a nation, it cannot stop. Russia does not want [to stop], and Ukraine cannot stop.  

Many people say they want peace. We do. And the ones who want peace more than anyone else, are the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians want peace, we want peace. But we want a capitulation. We do not want Ukraine to become the second Belarus. And that is why, President [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula, for us, today, right now, is the only comprehensive framework for a just, sustainable peace in Ukraine. 

Tomorrow, we will continue the discussion with Foreign Minister [of Ukraine, Dmytro] Kuleba.  

Then, after lunch, we had a long discussion that reflected our consensus on China.  

I am happy – I think I can announce – that colleagues [Foreign Affairs Ministers] welcomed the paper that we presented, the summary of this paper and the letter that I addressed to them.  

They agree on the basic lines of this recalibration of our strategy on China, considering the recent domestic evolution in China and the foreign policy trajectories. 

We continue with a triptych because it reflects reality. It [China] is [a] rival, partner and competitor. 

And there is a key word, which is ‘engage’. We have to engage with China in many fronts, for many different issues, and at the same time, we have to compete with China and to decrease our dependencies when these dependencies become too big and so risky. 

And in the last times [lately], the dimension of ‘rival’ [rivalry] has become more and more important, at the same time that the complexity of our relations with China has been increasing.  

I cannot explain you four hours of discussions, but I can summarise it saying that with respect to China, we have an issue about values. We have a different political system. We understand differently what [are] human rights – individual and collective human rights. We have multi-party political systems and a free market economy. It means that our values on which we base the political system are different, and we have to deal with that. 

Second, we have a problem on economic security. Our trade relations are very much unbalanced. They have to be balanced and dependencies have to be avoided. This is not a new slogan; de-risking is just a word. But behind this word, there is a lot of work that will take time to review our economic relation with China, not for decoupling, but to balance [it] in a fair way; balance and avoid excessive dependencies on some critical sectors. 

We are not drifting toward protectionism; China and the European Union, we are both economic powerhouses. We have to put our relations in a balanced approach. The world needs that, and we will work on it. 

And finally, on strategic security, there are two main issues: Taiwan and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 

On Taiwan, nothing new. Our position remains consistent with the ‘One China policy’. We want to engage with China and with the United States on maintaining the status quo and de-escalating tensions in the Strait of Taiwan, which is so important for world trade, and, in particular, for us.  

And on Ukraine, the European Union-China relations will not develop normally if China does not push Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. We call on China, as a Permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, to influence over Russia to stop this war, and to play a constructive role to achieve a just peace for Ukraine. 

The paper I presented, thanks to the work of many people of the European External Action Service (EEAS), will be reviewed, will be perfectioned, in order to be used by the European Council at the next meeting, when the leaders will discuss about China. 

Today, it has been a fruitful and positive discussion. 

Thank you. 

And last news. As a proof of unity among us, the Member States have agreed to support unanimously the candidature of António Vitorino as Director-General of the International Organisation for Migration [IOM]. 

Q&A 

Q. Regarding China, there are some different views on China among the Member States. Some are in the Belt and Road Initiative, some are not members of the Belt and Road Initiative. So, which are the main sticking points among the Member States when it comes to China? What do you actually mean with “de-risking the relation with China”? And also, could there be some kind of export restrictions towards China going forward? 

A full answer to these three questions would be to repeat the four hours of discussion, and I am sure you will not resist it. I am sure that you [would] prefer a short answer. 

First, a complex relationship like the one that we have with China unavoidably has different approaches because there are different interests. It is not the same thing for a big exporter to China, like it is the case of Germany, or countries that have almost no economic relationship. It is clear that we are in a different situation. But one thing is clear - and believe me - the 27 [Members States] are united behind the music of this text. Then, there will be some words that someone will be happy if it is changed for another one - nuance.

Second, third rank considerations. The paper has been considered a complete and solid approach to our relation with China. I have not seen any concrete disagreement. I am happy because I think it is a very solid basis for China [to] understand that the 27 [Member States] are united. Finished [is] the fourteen [state] group that was in a specific relationship with China – now there are 27 [Member States], only 27. The 27 together, behind this approach. Then, there are tonalities, certainly. A little bit more of that, a little bit less from that, maybe not so much – but [these are] second or third rank considerations. 

[On] ‘de-risking’: when a dependency is too big, it is a risk. And a typical example is the dependency on the Russian gas. It was a risky dependency, and we made a strategic mistake on letting this dependency grow so big. Today, we have dependencies on China, with respect to the digital transformation, that are bigger than the ones we had with Russia on the hydrocarbons field. I am thinking of solar panels, critical [raw] materials, specific technologies. It is not a matter of considering a danger, but certainly, there is a risk when you depend too much on someone. Even if your market depends on a single client – imagine a firm that has only one client, it is a risky situation [and] you would prefer to have several. This is the case. If the word ‘de-risking’ has a negative feeling, use another one. Reducing excessive dependencies, that [is what it is] about. Can we think of restrictions? We want to avoid the circumvention of sanctions, and we want to avoid that Russia gets dual-use materials that could feed their war machine, and this is something valuable for everybody. 

Q. What is the next step in putting together a new China policy? Do you want to have something in place, for example in time for the EU-China Summit later in the year? What form will that take? Will it be an update on the 2019 Strategy? High Representative, you keep saying that if the Chinese do not act positively on Russia, then the relationship cannot stay the same. What is going to happen if you do not have something productive from China on that front? Will we see an end to some of the engagements that are promoted in the paper, for example? Or what form does that change the relationship?  

You know, life is complicated. If I do not like your behaviour, you cannot expect [us] to be good friends. It is as simple as that. I cannot go to concrete things because there is a matter of international relations, [which] will depend on many things that I cannot foresee today. But for us, it is so important that China understands that what is happening in Ukraine is an existential threat for us, and we expect that China will use its role and its responsibilities. If this is not the case, our relationship will not be so good.  

And what are the next steps? To improve this paper, to incorporate what Member States have been considering, to produce a new paper and to present that to the leaders in order for the leaders at the European Council to take a clear stance on our relations with China.

Additionally, we continue working on the economic security proposal that is being worked together [between] the [European] Commission and the High Representative, and it should also be approved as a joint proposal before the next European Council – I hope. And then, we will continue working on the issues related to dual use of exports and with the critical raw materials act and the other things that have already been approved by the [European] Commission. I want to recall that I am also Vice-President of the [European] Commission so I take my part in it. And [we will] present it to the [European] Parliament and to the Council for its approval. But to finish this paper and to approve a joint proposal on economic security – these are the two immediate steps. 

Q. I have a question on your discussion tomorrow with Minister [for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro] Kuleba. In your recent conversations, Kuleba has often expressed his dissatisfaction with the European Union. He said [that] the European Union acts too slow, be it on ammunition or on sanctions. What can you offer him concretely tomorrow? Are there any concrete commitments you can make, be it on sanctions, be it on more ammunition? What will you tell him, besides your strong words, that you just made again? 

I understand, if we were in the situation of Minister Kuleba, if we were in the shoes of any Ukrainian soldier fighting in the front, I would be very demanding. I understand [him] perfectly. If I were in their critical situation, I would be very demanding, asking for more and asking for quicker answers. It is human. 

But the concern that Minister Kuleba expressed about the agreement between Member States on ‘Track 2’ for [the] joint procurement of ammunition - this has been solved. We already have an agreement, and the work continues in order to implement it. And he knows that.  

Minister Kuleba knows that we are doing everything we can according [in accordance] with our rules of procedure in order to support Ukraine. He knows that, and I thank his stimulus and I understand him.  

Q. The Hungarian Foreign Minister [Péter Szijjártó] said, after the discussion this afternoon that the Hungarian government can hardly negotiate sanctions as long as Hungary’s largest bank is on the Ukrainian list of international war sponsors. What is your comment on this? Do you see this as a problem?  

We have not heard of these comments from the Hungarian Minister.  

Q. He also criticised a “war atmosphere” in the room. 

A war atmosphere? To tell the truth, I have not perceived a war atmosphere at all. I can understand that Hungary has concerns and it is not a secret that Hungary does not believe in the effectiveness of the sanctions, they say that every day. But there has been nothing new about that. But we are peaceful people. 

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-240702